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     <title>RAND Research Topic: Wages and Compensation</title>
     <link rel="self" href="http://www.rand.org/topics/wages-and-compensation.xml"/>
     <updated>2012-05-24T14:58:04Z</updated>
     <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" hreflang="en" href="http://www.rand.org/topics/wages-and-compensation.html" />
     <rights>Copyright (c) 2012, The RAND Corporation</rights>
     <author>
       <name>RAND Corporation</name>
     </author>
     <id>http://www.rand.org/topics/wages-and-compensation.html</id>
	 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">What Are Achievement Gains Worth -- to Teachers?</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP201100247.html</id>
   <published>Nov 30, 2011</published>
   <updated>Nov 30, 2011</updated>
   <summary type="html"></summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP201100247.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">The Debate over Teacher Merit Pay: A Freakonomics Quorum</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/commentary/2011/09/20/FRK.html</id>
   <published>Sep 20, 2011</published>
   <updated>Sep 20, 2011</updated>
   <summary type="html">Motivation alone does not improve schools. Even if incentives inspire staff to improve practices or work together, educators may not have the capacity or resources to bring about improvement, writes Julie Marsh.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/commentary/2011/09/20/FRK.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">New York City School-Based Financial Incentives Program Did Not Improve Student Achievement or Affect Reported Teaching Practices</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/news/press/2011/07/18.html</id>
   <published>Jul 17, 2011</published>
   <updated>Jul 17, 2011</updated>
   <summary type="html">A New York City program designed to improve student performance through school-based financial incentives for teachers did not improve student achievement, most likely because it did not change teacher behavior and the conditions needed to motivate staff were not achieved.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/news/press/2011/07/18.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">NYC School-Based Financial Incentives Program Did Not Improve Student Achievement or Affect Reported Teaching Practices</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1114.html</id>
   <published>Jul 17, 2011</published>
   <updated>Jul 17, 2011</updated>
   <summary type="html">A New York City program designed to improve student performance through school-based financial incentives for teachers did not improve student achievement, most likely because it did not change teacher behavior and the conditions needed to motivate staff were not achieved.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1114.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">What New York City&apos;s Experiment with Schoolwide Performance Bonuses Tells Us About Pay for Performance</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9596.html</id>
   <published>Jul 17, 2011</published>
   <updated>Jul 17, 2011</updated>
   <summary type="html">New York City&apos;s Schoolwide Performance Bonus Program did not improve student achievement at any grade level, perhaps in part because it provided no significant additional motivation beyond other accountability incentives.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9596.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Positive Income Shocks and Accidental Deaths Among Cherokee Indians: A Natural Experiment</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP201100120.html</id>
   <published>Dec 31, 2010</published>
   <updated>Dec 31, 2010</updated>
   <summary type="html">This study of a Cherokee Indian population in North Carolina found that sudden increases in income were associated with short-term increases in risk-taking behavior and higher rates of accidental death.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP201100120.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Do Financial Incentives Help Low-Performing Schools Attract and Keep Academically Talented Teachers? Evidence from California</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP201000154.html</id>
   <published>Jun 30, 2010</published>
   <updated>Jun 30, 2010</updated>
   <summary type="html">This study capitalizes on a natural experiment that occurred in California between 2000 and 2002.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP201000154.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Labor-force Dynamics at Older Ages: Movements Into Self-Employment for Workers and Nonworkers</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP20090020.html</id>
   <published>Dec 31, 2008</published>
   <updated>Dec 31, 2008</updated>
   <summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Labor-market transitions toward the latter parts of workers&apos; careers can be complex, with movement between jobs and classes of work and in and out of retirement.&lt;/p&gt;</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP20090020.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Modernizing the Federal Government through Pay-for-Performance</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP213.html</id>
   <published>Dec 31, 2008</published>
   <updated>Dec 31, 2008</updated>
   <summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;In 2003, the Volcker Commission recommended that explicit pay-for-performance (PFP) systems be adopted more broadly throughout the federal government. What are the pros and cons of PFP schemes compared with seniority-based salary systems?&lt;/p&gt;</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP213.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Why Wait? The Effect of Marriage and Childbearing on the Wages of Men and Women</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP20070037.html</id>
   <published>Dec 31, 2006</published>
   <updated>Dec 31, 2006</updated>
   <summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;The authors use data from the earlier and later cohorts of the NLSY to estimate the effect of marriage and childbearing on wages. Estimates imply that marriage lowers female wages 2-4 percent in the year of marriage. Marriage also lowers the wage growth of men and women by about two and four percentage points, respectively. A first birth lowers female wages 2-3 percent, but has no effect on wage growth. Male wages are unaffected by childbearing. Findings suggest that early marriage and childbearing can lead to substantial decreases in lifetime earnings.&lt;/p&gt;</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP20070037.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">The Economics of Teacher Quality</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP20060032.html</id>
   <published>Dec 31, 2005</published>
   <updated>Dec 31, 2005</updated>
   <summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;This paper suggests that, while the relative quality of teachers is declining, this decline may be the result of technological changes that have raised the price of skilled workers outside teaching without affecting the productivity of skilled teachers.&lt;/p&gt;</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP20060032.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">The Effect of Male Wage Inequality on Female Age at First Marriage</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP20020507.html</id>
   <published>Dec 31, 2001</published>
   <updated>Dec 31, 2001</updated>
   <summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Growing wage inequality appears to have had little effect on the marriage behavior of less-educated black women.&lt;/p&gt;</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP20020507.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">The Value of Remaining Lifetime Is Close to Estimated Values of Life</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP20010101.html</id>
   <published>Dec 31, 2000</published>
   <updated>Dec 31, 2000</updated>
   <summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Workers under 50 on average will spend 10-20% of their future hours working.&lt;/p&gt;</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP20010101.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Earnings Instability and Earnings Inequality of Males in the United States: 1967-1991</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP20010060.html</id>
   <published>Dec 31, 2000</published>
   <updated>Dec 31, 2000</updated>
   <summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;The author examines how these trends are related to changes in the distribution of wages and hours and the returns to education.&lt;/p&gt;</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP20010060.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Military Compensation in the Age of Two-Income Households: Adding Spouses&apos; Earnings to the Compensation Policy Mix</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD154.html</id>
   <published>Dec 31, 1999</published>
   <updated>Dec 31, 1999</updated>
   <summary type="html">Analysis of Current Population Survey data and the 1992 DoD Survey of Officers, Enlisted Personnel, and their Spouses demonstrate that the spouses of soldiers and airmen incur the heaviest burden of earnings penalty due to service specific factors.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD154.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Peter B. Brownell</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/about/people/b/brownell_peter_b.html</id>
   <published></published>
   <updated></updated>
   <summary type="html">&lt;em&gt;Associate Social Scientist&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br&gt;Ph.D. in sociology, University of California, Berkeley</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/about/people/b/brownell_peter_b.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
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