The nature of recent challenges and the types of missions the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has undertaken highlight the need for DoD to consider ways to help the military prepare to work with other government agencies, international organizations, private and nongovernmental organizations, and foreign militaries. These challenges require DoD to combine military and nonmilitary means, such as intelligence, diplomacy, and developmental assistance, to advance U.S. national-security interests. Moreover, exhibiting cultural awareness and sensitivity vis-à-vis non-DoD partners is paramount to successful operational planning and execution. To build or bolster local governance, to foster economic growth, and to respond to natural disasters, the United States must also use different types of tools, military and otherwise, simultaneously. It is no small task to synchronize these different tools so that they work in tandem, or at least minimize conflict between them. This report provides suggestions for how the U.S. military can help prepare its personnel to work successfully with interagency, multinational, and coalition partners. The authors found that almost all of the requirements for integrated-operations training can be found in existing joint and service task lists. Current training programs aimed at headquarters staffs need to be revamped to focus on high-priority tasks that are amenable to training.

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The defense acquisition workforce includes more than 130,000 military and civilian personnel responsible for providing a wide range of acquisition, technology, and logistics support to the nation's warfighters. This report summarizes workforce analyses that RAND has undertaken in support of the Defense Acquisition University, which is responsible for strategic human capital management of that workforce. It covers the civilian acquisition workforce, the careers of acquisition workforce senior executive service members, and the military acquisition workforce and its implications for the larger workforce. It also describes an inventory projection model that uses data on the civilian acquisition workforce as a key input. The authors conclude that better definition and tracking of the acquisition workforce would improve workforce planning and that workforce analysis is only one step in an overall strategic human capital planning effort.

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Why have the costs of acquiring space systems been so high? What are the sources of the problems? To answer these questions, RAND researchers examined the sources of cost growth of Air Force space systems and undertook an extensive study of two space systems — the Space Based Infrared System–High (SBIRS) and the Global Positioning System (GPS) — including an evaluation of their sources of cost growth, an assessment of their approaches to technical risk assessment, and an examination of their acquisition policy adaptations and industrial base environments. The researchers recommend independent program assessment for space systems that emphasizes technical and program factors, and a modified organizational structure that maintains cost analyst independence. They also summarize the cost estimating best practices of several other government organizations.

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Escalation is a natural tendency in any form of human competition. When such competition entails military confrontation or war, the pressure to escalate can become intense due to the potential cost of losing conflicts of deadly force. Cold War–era thinking about escalation focused on the dynamics of bipolar, superpower confrontation and strategies to control it. Today's security environment, however, demands that the United States be prepared for a host of escalatory threats involving not only long-standing nuclear powers, but also new, lesser nuclear powers and irregular adversaries, such as insurgent groups and terrorists. This examination of escalation dynamics and approaches to escalation management draws on historical examples from World War I through Somalia in the early 1990s. It reveals that, to manage the risks of escalatory chain reactions in future conflicts, military and political leaders will need to understand and dampen the mechanisms of deliberate, accidental, and inadvertent escalation. Informing the analysis are the results of two modified Delphi exercises, which focused on a potential conflict between China and the United States over Taiwan and a potential conflict between states and nonstate actors in the event of a collapse of Pakistan's government.

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This technical report describes the F-15 programmed depot maintenance (PDM) process as performed at the Warner Robins Air Logistics Center (WR-ALC) in FYs 2004-2006. WR-ALC has a sequential process that F-15s follow when undergoing PDM. The average WR-ALC F-15 PDM visit runs behind schedule. This problem was reduced in recent years, largely because planned durations became more realistic. Durations also seem longer because customers do not pick aircraft up as soon as they finish PDM. Pickup lags for F-15s based overseas are expected, because they are typically flown overseas in pairs to make more efficient use of aerial tanker refueling. However, even for continental United States-based aircraft, it was not uncommon for operators to wait a week or more to retrieve their completed F-15s. Finally, the number of days spent at specific steps in the PDM process varies considerably, and, because PDM does not have a particularly high priority, it can wait a long time for parts. This leads to aircraft moving through PDM steps out of sequence, with missing parts catching up with the aircraft when they become available, or to cannibalization, in which aircraft that recently entered PDM provide cannibalized parts for aircraft that are scheduled to leave sooner.

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Because test scores that are part of its enlisted promotion system are not standardized, the U.S. Air Force effectively emphasizes longevity and test-taking ability differently across and within specialties, and this emphasis varies randomly over time. The random aspects of the promotion reward system mean that the Air Force cannot be sure that it is selecting individuals with the highest potential to fill positions of increased grade and responsibility. Furthermore, not standardizing scores means that some specialties randomly produce higher percentages of senior non-commissioned officers. The authors discuss a range of outcomes that the Air Force could achieve by adopting various standardization strategies. They propose a modification that would not change the policy of equal selection opportunity but would affect selection outcomes within specialties. They recommend that the Air Force implement a standardization strategy that will produce predictable outcomes that are consistent with its personnel priorities and policies.

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This report explores why, in recent decades, military fixed-wing aircraft costs have escalated beyond the rates of commonly used inflation indices, examining both economy-driven factors that the Services cannot control and customer-driven ones that they can. The authors found that this trend of cost increases is true for all types of aircraft — patrol, cargo, trainer, bomber, attack, fighter, and electronic warfare. Economy-driven variables examined include costs for labor, equipment, and material. Customer-driven ones include the costs of providing the performance characteristics that the Services want in their aircraft. The study found several reasons for cost escalation: the increased demand for greater aircraft stealth, the requirement for reduced aircraft weight, and government regulations designed to protect American industry and technology, the environment, and occupational health. Several options to reduce cost escalation are examined, including encouraging international competition for aircraft manufacture, stabilizing procurement rates, and incorporating “lessons learned” from prior development programs. Until this cost trend is curbed, the government will be able to afford fewer, increasingly expensive aircraft, especially if long-term defense investment spending remains relatively constant.

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The United States is heavily invested — diplomatically, economically, and militarily — in Iraq and Afghanistan, and developments in these two nations will affect not only their own interests but those of their neighbors and the United States as well. The authors emphasize that the United States must clarify its long-term intentions to the governments and peoples in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the surrounding regions. They describe possible regional security structures and bilateral U.S. relationships with both countries. The authors recommend that the United States offer a wide range of security cooperation activities to future governments in Kabul and Baghdad that are willing to work with the United States but should also develop plans that hedge against less-favorable contingencies. Finally, arguing that the U.S. Air Force could remain heavily tasked in Iraq and Afghanistan even after major U.S. troop withdrawals, they recommend that the United States provide increased, sustained resources for development of the Iraqi and Afghan airpower, because the greater the emphasis on building these capabilities now, the faster indigenous air forces will be able to operate independently and the operational demands on the U.S. Air Force will diminish.

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COMMENTARY

The following is a list of national security related commentary pieces that RAND researchers have contributed to newspapers in the past month. To retrieve past commentary pieces, please visit RAND's commentary page.

KOSOVO AND SOUTH OSSETIA MORE DIFFERENT THAN SIMILAR
Author: Olga Oliker (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty)

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TURKEY'S SECOND CHANCE
Author: F. Stephen Larrabee (Washington Times)

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STOP THE 'WAR' ON TERROR: CALLING IT A 'WAR' IS A BOON TO TERRORIST RECRUITERS
Authors: Seth Jones, Martin Libicki (Christian Science Monitor)

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