How Does and Should Tort Liability Affect High-Consequence Life Sciences Research?
In this report, the authors explain the effect of tort liability on safety incentives for life sciences researchers and research institutions.
Lloyd Dixon is director of the Feinberg Center for Catastrophic Risk Management and Compensation, a senior economist at RAND, and a professor of policy analysis at the RAND School of Public Policy. He has expertise on insurance, compensation, and liability issues. For California's Fourth Climate Change Assessment, he investigated the impact of changing wildfire risk on California's residential insurance market. He has examined the prevalence of flood insurance across the country and, following Hurricane Sandy, assessed the costs and benefits of a flood insurance affordability program for New York City. He more recently analyzed the promise and pitfalls of a public disaster risk reinsurance program for residential properties and issues in the cyber insurance market. Dixon has served as the California State Senate's designee to the governing board of the California Earthquake Authority since 2020.
Dixon has examined compensation and liability policies in a number of different settings. Following the September 11th terrorist attacks, he described and evaluated the complex web of insurance, charity, government, and tort payments that provided assistance to individuals and businesses harmed in the attacks. He has investigated the impact of compensation funds on post-disaster litigation and whether trends in jury verdicts and insurance claims provide evidence for social inflation. He holds a Ph.D. in economics from the University of California, Berkeley, and a B.S. in general engineering and B.A. in political science from Stanford University.
Ph.D. in economics, University of California, Berkeley; B.S. in general engineering, Stanford University; B.A. in political science, Stanford University
California Earthquake Authority Governing Board, Designee