Michael Johnson

After Russia's Ukraine Invasion, Seven Assumptions the U.S. and NATO Allies Should Drop

Given the realizations wrought by the recent invasion of Ukraine, the United States and its NATO allies might reconsider several assumptions and arguments that have limited conventional military deterrence in Europe. Making sure we are ready to defend and thus deter a larger war that must never be fought is critically important.

Deterring Putin in Eastern Europe

After having gone years without a significant threat from Russia, NATO leaders and legislatures now may be recognizing that the security environment has changed and that the more comfortable political status quo is gone. But if NATO were to decide to stand firmly together, conflict in Europe may be deterred and strategic stability restored.

Contain, Deter, Transform: A Winning Strategy on North Korea

North Korea's missile tests and reported progress in nuclear warhead design have produced a volatile new urgency in U.S. policy. Contain, deter, and transform isn't a radical solution, but it's one that has worked before. This approach could preserve U.S. interests while avoiding war.

In Defense of a Wargame: Bolstering Deterrence on NATO's Eastern Flank

A series of wargames examined the potential results of a Russian invasion of the Baltic states. While such an invasion appears unlikely, its consequences would be so dangerous that not taking steps to deter it more robustly would be imprudent.

Outnumbered, Outranged, and Outgunned: How Russia Defeats NATO

Today NATO is outnumbered, outranged, and outgunned by Russia in Europe and beset by a number of compounding factors that make the situation worse. But it is possible to begin restoring a more robust deterrent posture and to do so at a price tag that appears affordable.

U.S. Needs Larger Army, Not a Smaller One

To meet potential challenges in the Baltics and Korea while at the same time countering the existing terror threat posed by the Islamic State group and dealing with other problems that will doubtless emerge, the United States would need more troops, not less.

Report

Assessing Force Sufficiency and Risk Using RAND's Multi-Period Assessment of Force Flow (MPAFF) Tool

This report describes RAND's Multi-Purpose Assessment of Force Flow tool for conducting time-phased analysis of Army force sufficiency under a variety of assumptions on force generation policies, readiness policies, and force employment policies.

Report

America's Strategy-Resource Mismatch: Addressing the Gaps Between U.S. National Strategy and Military Capacity

This report describes the specific technological, doctrinal, and budgetary gaps between the stated strategic and defense policies of the United States and the resources and capabilities that would be required to implement those policies successfully.

Report

At the Dawn of Belt and Road: China in the Developing World

China has always felt vulnerable, and, in the 1990s, it began forming agreements with other nations, eventually culminating in the Belt and Road Initiative. The authors analyze China's engagement with the Developing World.

Report

Assessing the Conventional Force Imbalance in Europe: Implications for Countering Russian Local Superiority

This report outlines how NATO and Russian force levels and capabilities have evolved in the post--Cold War era and what recent trends imply for the balance of capabilities in the NATO member states that border Russia in the Baltic Sea region.

Report

What Role Can Land-Based, Multi-Domain Anti-Access/Area Denial Forces Play in Deterring or Defeating Aggression?

This report examines the role that land-based, multi-domain anti-access/area denial forces can play in helping the U.S. and its allies and partners deter or defeat aggression in the western Pacific, European littoral areas, and the Persian Gulf.

Report

Toward Operational Art in Special Warfare

Hybrid irregular and conventional military operations are playing an increasingly prominent role in international conflict. To counter this trend, the United States should adopt a new form of operational art for special warfare.

Report

Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO's Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics

This report describes the implications of a series of war games that examined the threat Russia may present to NATO's three Baltic members: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

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Limiting Regret: Building the Army We Will Need

This report addresses the size of the U.S. Army necessary to ensure the nation satisfies its national security commitments and mitigates the most important risks.

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Special Warfare: The Missing Middle in U.S. Coercive Options

RAND authors analyze the options for using special warfare to fill the gap in coercive strategies between the costly commitment of conventional forces and the limits of precision-strike campaigns, including its characteristics, advantages, and risks.

Journal Article

Special Warfare: The Missing Middle in U.S. Coercive Options

In the face of adversaries exploiting regional social divisions by using special operations forces and intelligence services, and dwindling American appetite for intervention, the United States needs to employ a more sophisticated form of special warfare to secure its interests.

Journal Article

Tailored Deterrence: Strategic Context to Guide Joint Force 2020

To prioritize limited resources in accordance with actual defense policies and threats, DOD should develop tailored approaches to deter specific threats to U.S. national security interests.

Report

Network-Centric Operations Case Study: The Stryker Brigade Combat Team

How will the network-centric operational concepts, organizational structure, and systems of this new Army unit make it a more effective combat force?