Ingo Vogelsang

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Off Site Office


Ph.D. in economics, University of Heidelberg


Ingo Vogelsang has been a RAND consultant since 1987 and a consultant to the RAND Institute for Civil Justice since 2003. He has been a professor of economics at Boston University since 1981. His academic research has focused on regulation and competition in network industries with special emphasis on telecommunications and electricity. His theoretical work on incentive pricing has led to the price cap mechanisms that have been applied widely in network industries around the world and in telecommunications regulation in the United States by the FCC and most state public utility commissions. Vogelsang has published 16 books and many articles on network industries, and has advised regulators in many countries on these issues. His current work in the area focuses on the conditions under which networks interconnect with each other and on incentives under regulation for innovations and infrastructure investments. Vogelsang has been co-editor of the Handbook of Telecommunications Economics. He is an associate editor of Information Economics and Policy, and on the editorial board of The Journal of Regulatory Economics, The Review of Network Economics, Internmational Economics and Economic Policy, and Netzwirtschaften & Recht. He earned his doctorate in economics from the University of Heidelberg.

Concurrent Non-RAND Positions

Professor of Economics, Boston University

Selected Publications

William Hogan, Juan Rosellón and Ingo Vogelsang, "Toward a Combined Merchant-Regulatory Mechanism for Electricity Transmission Expansion," Journal of Regulatory Economics, 38(2), 2010

Ingo Vogelsang, "Price Regulation of Access to Telecommunications Networks," Journal of Economic Literature, 41, 2003

Ingo Vogelsang, "Incentive Regulation and Competition in Public Utility Markets: A 20-Year Perspective," Journal of Regulatory Economics, 22, 2002

Ingo Vogelsang, Jörg Finsinger, "A Regulatory Adjustment Process for Optimal Pricing by Multiproduct Monopoly Firms," Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 1979

Ingo Vogelsang, Bridger M. Mitchell, Telecommunications Competition: The Last 10 Miles, MIT Press and AEI Press, 1997

A. Galal, L.P. Jones, P. Tandon, I. Vogelsang, Welfare Consequences of Selling Public Enterprises - An Empirical Analysis, Oxford University Press, 1994

Bridger M. Mitchell, Ingo Vogelsang, Telecommunications Pricing: Theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press, 1991

M. Cave, S. Majumdar and I. Vogelsang (eds.), Handbook of Telecommunications Economics, North-Holland/Elsevier


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    Responding to Convergence: Different approaches for Telecommunication regulators

    This report describes the phenomenon of convergence in communications and audiovisual content markets and determines its impact on regulations and market governance. It draws useful lessons from approaches applied in the U.S., U.K., and South Korea.

    May 23, 2011

  • Report

    Insurance Class Actions in the United States

    Class action lawsuits make headlines and arouse policy debates, but little is known about most of them. This book presents the results of surveys of insurers and state regulators to learn more about class litigation against insurance companies.

    May 12, 2007

  • Research Brief

    Anatomy of an Insurance Class Action

    This research brief describes characteristics of more than 700 class action cases against large U.S. insurers -- trends in claims, their allegations, and their outcomes -- including the vast majority of cases that never become certified as a class.

    Mar 13, 2007

  • Draft

    Survey Instruments: Insurance Class Actions in the United States

    This working paper provides the survey instruments that were used in the report, Insurance Class Actions in the United States (RAND, MG-587-ICJ), by Nicholas M. Pace, Stephen Carroll, Ingo Vogelsang, and Laura Zakaras (2007).

    Jan 14, 2007

  • Report

    Telephone Demand Over the Atlantic: Evidence from Country-Pair Data

    This report examines the determinants of international calling, both theoretically and empirically. It centers particularly on the role of prices to and from the United States and explains the volume of calling across the North Atlantic market.


  • Report

    Price Cap Regulation of Telecommunications Services: A Long-Run Approach

    The U.S. Federal Communications Commission has initiated a discussion about the possible use of price caps to replace rate-of-return regulation for telecommunications services.