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As the U.S. military transforms to an information-based force, it will need to collect, combine, and utilize intelligence. The process known as fusion will help determine whether this intelligence is used in the most beneficial manner. Fusion is the process of combining pieces of information to produce higher-quality information. This report describes one approach to capturing the fusion process in a constructive simulation.
As the U.S. Army becomes increasingly interested in “commonality” — the sharing of common parts across different entities — there is a need for a clearer definition of the concept. Motivated by the reported costs arising from a lack of clear definitions during recent Army acquisition processes and by cases in which unclear definitions have led to significant problems, this report offers a new, more rigorous lexicon and illustrative examples.
This research brief highlights the efforts undertaken by civilian and military organizations in response to Hurricane Katrina and discusses a number of steps can be taken to enhance future Army and National Guard disaster-response efforts.
Rather than choose between distribution-based and supply-based logistics system designs, the Army, in conjunction with its joint supply-chain partners, should seek optimal, balanced systems that it can adapt quickly to changing conditions.
This article explains how the Army has been able to achieve historically high levels of performance in its tactical inventories of repair parts by applying a series of RAND-developed process and algorithm improvements.
The problem of multinational force compatibility requires a planning framework to guide the U.S. Army’s investments with partner armies. This report defines the Niche Capability Planning Framework, which provides a conceptual template for integrating the various considerations implicit in a strategy for cultivating compatible niche capabilities in armies that lack a stable, long-term, collaborative program of assistance with the U.S. Army.
What is the potential for a divergence in views among civilian and military elites (sometimes referred to as the civil-military gap) to undermine military effectiveness? Although a variety of differences were found among the views of military and civilian survey respondents, these differences mostly disappeared when the authors focused on the attitudes that are pertinent to civilian control of the military and military effectiveness.
This study looked at how funding instability affects Army acquisition programs. Most funding instability was found to stem from events external to the Army or ambitious Army-set technical goals. Funding instability’s effects took the form of schedule slips, cost increases, and to a lesser degree, technical compromises. No significant association was found between funding instability and the adverse effects of program cost growth and schedule slippage.
The efforts undertaken by civilian and military organizations in response to Hurricane Katrina were historically unprecedented, but a number of changes would enhance future Army and National Guard disaster-response efforts, including preparing governors to call up Guard units for out-of-state emergencies and the creation of regional standing homeland security task forces.
This monograph proposes adaptation of a RAND tool called Assumption-Based Planning to help Army personnel maintain proper alignment between strategic guidance and the Army acquisition program and budget. It uses this tool to create a model that recommends acquisition investments across a broad range of capabilities. The model works toward the goal of satisfying the complex and evolving requirements specified in the national security guidance.
Much activity is being aimed at revising the approach to planning and implementing Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations. The changes are meant to ensure a common U.S. strategy rather than a collection of individual departmental and agency efforts and on involving all available government assets in the effort. The authors find that some elements essential to the success of the process are not yet in place.
The Army wishes to improve its training strategy for Brigade Combat Teams equipped with Future Combat Systems (FCS) technologies. Key findings are that live training events will remain a cornerstone of FCS unit training, and that adaptation to changing operational requirements will be a challenge. Planned enhancements will provide important improvements for the system, but the overall training capability achieved will fall short of requirements.
The Army must transform its institutional activities to align them with operating forces to improve support and release resources from institutional activities. This document provides a model for evaluating value chains to promote the alignment of needs and resources according to three representational institutional Army activities: medical services, enlisted accessioning, and short-term acquisition.
The Army must transform its institutional activities to align them with operating forces to improve support and release resources from institutional activities. This document is the executive summary for MG-530-A, What the Army Needs to Know to Align Its Operational and Institutional Activities, which provides a model for evaluating value chains to promote the alignment of needs and resources.
The Army wishes to develop a standard methodology for updating its Annual Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) Availability Factors (AMAFs). An AMAF specifies the amount of direct and indirect productive time that a soldier has available yearly to perform MOS duties. The researchers generate a new methodology that may allow more regular AMAF updates — and ultimately yield more accurate calculations of manpower requirements.
DoD uses five different distribution channels to sustain U.S. military forces overseas. Three are by air delivery and two are by sea. How should the channels be used — which transportation modes should be chosen and where should materiel be stocked — to provide effective support as efficiently as possible? The authors discuss distribution choices for some illustrative units in Iraq and compare them with the ideal model resulting from the analysis.
Summarizes some of the work that RAND Arroyo Center's analysts have done in fiscal year 2006 to help the Army meet today's demands while making tomorrow's choices.
