Cooperation and Conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Implications for Migration

Edited by Jeremy R. Azrael and Emil A. Payin

with an Introduction and Overview by Kevin F. McCarthy and Georges Vernez
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Preface

This volume is an outgrowth of an April 1996 conference at which policymakers and policy analysts from Soviet successor states, the United States, and a number of international organizations discussed specially prepared reports on migratory processes and policies in the former USSR in the context of current and emergent political, social, and economic changes in the region. The conference, held in Minsk, Belarus, was hosted by the Executive Secretariat of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and was jointly sponsored by RAND’s Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies (CRES), the Center for Ethnopolitical and Regional Research (CEPRR) in Moscow, and the Forced Migration Projects of the Open Society Institute. For CRES and CEPRR, the conference was an important milestone in a multiyear program of collaborative research, training, and institution-building that began in October 1994 and is still underway.

This program is being conducted under a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, which we sincerely thank for its support in the name of both our centers. We would also like to thank Gwendolyn Farnsworth, Jane Siegel, and Adam Stulberg for their invaluable editorial and technical assistance in preparing this volume for publication.

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1. Introduction and Overview

Kevin F. McCarthy and Georges Vernez *

In the five years since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the transition from a single monolithic state to multiple independent states, and from a single centrally planned economy to separate mixed economies, has taken different paths in the Soviet successor states. At the same time, these states have had to address and surmount similar problems in their journey to state institution-building. Over time, the initial focus on asserting state sovereignty and a desire to go it alone has been increasingly replaced by a recognition of geopolitical and economic interdependence.

Independent statehood, the expansion of individual freedoms, and the push toward market economies have brought new hopes and benefits to many, but not without major costs. Declines of as much as 50 percent in gross domestic product (GDP) have brought lower economic standards of living to a majority of the people of the newly independent states. Several major armed ethnic conflicts and hundreds of lesser ones were unleashed. A strong revival of nationalistic assertiveness within the new states has led to serious ethnopolitical clashes and conflicts, both between and within several of these states. And the task of doing away with the old institutions and rebuilding new ones has been accompanied by a great deal of administrative chaos.

These hardships, combined with new found individual freedoms to move in and out and within the newly independent states, were widely expected to generate massive migration flows. The Soviet era had left a legacy of some 50 million people of many nationalities, including some 25 million Russians, living outside their titular republics in the former Soviet Union (FSU). During the Soviet period, many of these people had been forcibly relocated or encouraged to relocate to develop the vast virgin areas of the north and east and to work in gigantic economic complexes established throughout the territory of the former Soviet Union. Independence left these people without clear "nationality" status and rights as minorities. And, as the subsidies that had sustained many of the development projects and defense industries dried up, many of these people were left without work.

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The past five years have seen a flow of forced migration both within and across CIS states. They have also seen an accelerated repatriation of nationals living outside their titular republics, most especially of Russians—a process that had already begun in the 1970s. Nevertheless, by 1994, it was already clear that the fears of mass migration of tens of millions of migrants moving west and across the borders of the CIS states were without basis. Instead, after the first shock of independence, migrations flows began to take an increasingly unforced economic character.

Although smaller in volume than some had expected, forced migration and the process of repatriation has placed a new burden on some of the independent states’ already depleted economic and institutional resources, most particularly in Russia and the Trans-Caucasian states of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Because of the de facto openness of current borders, many of the Soviet successor states have also had to deal with illegal immigration from third world countries. Not surprisingly, they are still struggling with the enormous task of developing policies to manage the various types of migration flows and establishing the institutions to implement and enforce them. They are also still struggling to coordinate policies and procedures among themselves, both bilaterally and multilaterally, including through the agency of the still embryonic Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) that most of them have joined as a vehicle of, at least, partial reintegration.

In this rapidly changing political, economic, and migratory context, it seemed particularly appropriate to review what has been taking place across the territory of the former Soviet Union since independence, why it has taken place, what new issues it has raised, and what can be expected in the future. To discuss these issues, scholars and politicians from all parts of the former Soviet Union and from the West gathered in Minsk, on April 23-24, 1996.

**The 1996 Minsk Conference**

The conference had three main objectives:

- To take stock of the changes that have taken place since 1991 in the CIS states and assess how these changes have affected migration flows.
- To discuss the prospects for cooperation between CIS states and their implications for future migrations and policies.
- To bring together scholars and politicians from both the CIS and the West to rekindle a dialogue in light of the experience and lessons learned to date.
The conference brought together CIS and Western demographers, economists, sociologists, and other analysts of migratory movements, economic development, and ethnic relations. It also included government officials from all of the independent states except Azerbaijan, and representatives of various international organizations and non-governmental agencies concerned with issues of forced migration.

The Papers

All but one of the chapters included in this volume were prepared by scholars from the CIS states. As a whole they provide unique insights into the political and economic changes that have affected all the independent states: how different states have fared over the past five years; how relations among ethnic groups have evolved; how the legal framework affecting these relationships is developing; and how these changes have generated new as well as reinforced past migration flows.

The chapters project an extremely dynamic process of change and learning that had its genesis in the decades preceding independence and is still continuing. However uneven, progress has been made toward restructuring the independent states’ economies, and there are signs that many, though by no means all, ethnic conflicts have been contained. As a result, a major common theme across the chapters is that economic factors have increasingly become the dominant cause of migratory flows—of both Russians and non-Russians—from nearly all peripheral independent states to Russia. Another common theme concerns the breakdown in the old institutions—from border controls to residential registration requirements—and the lag in creating new institutions adapted to the new conditions. Finally, the chapters clearly project a sense of the magnitude and complexity of the tasks confronting the independent states and of their struggle to reconcile conflicting feelings about current and emergent migratory processes.

The thirteen chapters in this volume have been divided into four groups. Each group addresses a different dimension of the relationship between migration and the other changes occurring on the territory of the former Soviet Union. The first group of chapters provides an overview of trends in the former Soviet Union as a whole. The second group examines trends in specific states, group of states, or regions within a state. The third group focuses on issues of cooperation among CIS states and in the international arena. The fourth group considers the possibility of a different, and more closely knit, form of economic and political union among former republics.
Change and Migration: Overall Trends

The first chapter, by Zhanna Zaionchkovskaya, provides a context for all the other chapters. She begins by reminding the reader that migratory movements within the territory of the former Soviet Union are not new. In the early years of the Soviet period, the often forced and massive relocation of population went from the center to the undeveloped periphery regions within Russia and to the non-Russian republics. This pattern began to be reversed in the 1970s, and, by the 1980s, repatriation of Russians and Ukrainians from the peripheral republics and the Far East were at full swing. Non-Russian people began to migrate to Russia in increasing numbers as well. The breakup of the Soviet Union did not fundamentally modify these trends.

Independence, accompanied as it was by the eruption of ethnic conflicts, ferment of nationalistic feelings, uneven economic decline across the former territory of the former Soviet Union, and the opening of borders generated several complementary interstate migratory flows. It generated (1) a large number of displaced persons and refugees primarily in the Trans-Caucasus and Russia; (2) an accelerated repatriation of Russians from all previous republics to Russia, with the largest of these flows originating from the states of Central Asia, and especially Kazakhstan; (3) an increased interstate migration of non-Russians; and (4) an increasingly large flow of temporary migration of workers and businessmen. Interstate migration flows have increased steadily since 1991, and have become increasingly uni-directional, initially from the non-Slavic states to Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia, and, by 1994, from all other states to Russia. Annual net flows to Russia increased fourfold from 164,000 in 1990, to 810,000 in 1994. Kazakhstan alone contributed half of these flows.

While these increasing flows of migrants, most particularly "economic" migrants may have been expected, there have been at least two largely unanticipated "surprises." The first is the relatively low level of emigration to countries outside of the former Soviet Union. Post-1991 flows have been in the 300,000 range, below the peak of 440,000 reached in 1990. The main destination of these flows continues to be primarily Germany, Israel, and the United States. Another unexpected outcome was a considerable slowdown in rural to urban migration in most of the newly independent states—a slowdown that Zaionchkovskaya attributes to families postponing moves during a period of economic and political uncertainty. Rural to urban migration seemingly returned to pre-independence levels by 1995.

In their chapter, Emil Payin and Andrei Susarov examine the ethnopoltical factors behind post-Soviet migration patterns. They remind us that forced
migration occurred throughout the Soviet era, which saw coerced relocation of rural populations and mass deportations of entire nations from the North Caucasus and the Volga. They also remind us that many of the inter-ethnic conflicts that have broken out since the breakup of the Soviet Union had deep historic roots.

Payin and Susarov attribute the recent patterns of “forced migration” to differences between CIS states in four overlapping factors: political instability, “ethnic distance,” national self-assertiveness, and economic duress. They show that the largest number of refugees (700,000) have come from three states whose political systems were formed under conditions of civil war and interstate conflict, and whose regimes came to power as a result of coup d’états: Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Tadjikistan. The other three factors have combined to cause the disproportionate flows of emigrants, primarily Russians, from the republics of Central Asia. They argue that “ethnic distance” (i.e., differences in language and culture) between the Russian minority and the titular populations, is greatest in these countries and smallest in Belarus and Ukraine, with Georgia, Armenia, and the Baltic States in the middle. A resurgence of nationalism, the institution of official state languages other than Russian, lack of access for Russian-speaking people to higher education, and removal of Russian professionals from key administrative and managerial positions have contributed to making life more difficult for Russian ethnics in these areas. These developments, however, have only accelerated a trend that began in the 1970s, with implementation of the so-called “nativization” policy, which gave preferential access to higher education to natives and led to the progressive replacement of Russian professionals—some of whom had been forcibly assigned to these positions in the first place—by natives in key positions.

Vyacheslav Vashanov, in turn, examines in greater detail the differentials among countries in economic performance and the progress they have made toward developing a market economy. Although he finds that these economic differentials have helped shape migration flows since independence, the relationship appears to be a weak one at best. Economic conditions in all CIS states have deteriorated significantly. Nearly all saw their gross domestic products plummet in excess of 50 percent between 1991 and 1995. Exceptions include Russia and Belarus (which experienced 40 percent declines), and Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Estonia (which experienced a 20 percent or lesser drop in their GDP).

The CIS countries also vary in the progress they have made toward developing the service institutions (banking, insurance, and stock market), and legal infrastructure (including the legalization of property ownership, and the
privatization of state enterprises) needed to support a market economy. According to the Vashanov, the greatest progress towards privatization has been made in Russia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova, where less than 40 percent of those employed are now working in state enterprises. The least progress has been made in Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Belarus.

Relative to overall rates of economic reform, the author classifies the CIS countries into four groups:

1) States with the highest rates of economic reform include Georgia, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova. These states had attained some measure of economic stability by the end of 1995 having significantly reduced their rates of inflation and rate of decline in Gross National Product. Net out-migration from all these states has been relatively small, and has declined somewhat over time.

2) Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan constitute the group with “average rates of economic reform.” In these countries, overt and covert state regulations continue to cover the most important spheres of the economy. The budget deficit remains high, as does inflation. Out-migration from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan has increased significantly over the 1991-1994 period, while that from Azerbaijan has remained relatively constant. In this group, Russia is an exception having become, by 1994, the main destination of emigrants from all other CIS countries.

3) Countries with the lowest rates of economic reform reportedly include Belarus, Ukraine, Turkmenistan, and Tadjikistan. Their state sectors continue to dominate the economy, and inflation remains high. From immigration countries in the early 1990s, Belarus and Ukraine have begun to experience net out-migration to Russia.

4) Finally, the Baltic countries have made the most progress toward implementing radical market reforms. The result has been real economic growth and a marked decline in out-migration beginning in 1993.

State and Regional Trends

The second group of chapters in this volume turns away from a FSU-wide view of migration patterns to focus on the trends in individual states or regions. The first three chapters in this group examine migration patterns from the perspective of the three Slavic states of the Ukraine, Belarus, and the Russian Federation. The last three chapters focus on the Central Asian republics. Since Russia, the Ukraine, and Belarus have been net importers of migrants since the
collapse of the Soviet Union, while the Central Asian republics have been net exporters, these six chapters provide a nice complement of perspectives. The first three seek to explain the reasons for the current influx of migrants, while the final three seek to explain the reasons for the out-flow of migrants.

The first chapter in this group, by Sergei Pirozhkov, looks at the migration situation in the Ukraine. His chapter begins by briefly recapping migratory patterns in the Ukraine from the early Soviet to the post-Soviet period. The early Soviet period was marked by the movement of large numbers of Ukrainians from their homeland. Most of this emigration was politically driven, either in the form of forced relocation by Soviet authorities, or in the form of voluntary emigrations to the West. By the late 1980s, however, political liberalization resulted in a fundamental reversal of this pattern as many former Ukrainian émigrés began to return first to the republic and then to the newly independent state of Ukraine. By underscoring the parallels between earlier out-flows of emigrants and the more recent return of former émigrés—a process that started prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union—the chapter underscores the continuity between Soviet and post-Soviet migration patterns.

The most interesting feature of this chapter, however, is the results it presents from a survey of Ukrainians making trips outside Ukraine—an increasingly common occurrence in recent years. The survey was conducted in three areas of Ukraine among a sample of households in which at least one member had made a recent non-touristic trip abroad. Although this survey focuses on international trips of short duration (and thus excludes emigrants who are permanently leaving the country), it provides considerable insight into what appears to be an increasingly common strategy among Ukrainians: to maintain or improve their living standards in the face of the currently adverse economic conditions in the Ukraine by making short-term trips abroad for economic purposes. The chapter notes that the overwhelming majority of these trips take on of three forms: moves to take a temporary job abroad; organized shop-tours; and “shuttle” border crossing to purchase goods for resale in Ukraine.

The second chapter, by Lyubov’ Tikhonova, surveys the change in migration patterns in Belarus in different periods. In the first period, prior to 1970, the predominant movement was an exodus of rural Belarusians to other republics of the Soviet Union. The principal motivations for this movement were economic, as individuals sought relief from overpopulation and underemployment in rural areas. In the second period, lasting from 1970 to 1985, migration was driven by the intensive development of large industrial centers in Belarus and principally entailed movement within the republic—from rural areas to the large urban areas—where industrial development was taking place. Much of this movement
was a direct result of Soviet industrial policies that were targeted at the youthful, economically active population in rural areas. Since 1985, the pattern of movement to the republic has become much more complex, driven both by the ecological disaster at Chernobyl, which intensified a pre-existent trend of rural depopulation, and, more recently, by a substantial movement of migrants from other CIS states to Belarus. Included in this latest movement are Belarusians returning to the republic, and refugees fleeing ethnic conflicts. The chapter outlines the problems this dramatic reversal has created in a state that lacks both the experience of resettling large numbers of immigrants and the capacity to do so. These problems are exacerbated by the fact that a significant portion of Belarus is still contaminated by the disaster at Chernobyl.

The final chapter of this group, Pavel Minakir’s study of Chinese immigration to Russia’s Far East, discusses one of the most politically contentious migration flows in Russia today. As Minakir points out, the history of Chinese migration into this region is one of alternating periods of high in-flows and substantial out-flows. These alternating cycles have been, and still are, driven by a shifting focus of official concern between economic and political considerations. Given its remoteness from the rest of Russia and the inability of the central government to provide the economic resources needed for the area’s development, Russia’s Far East region shares a common economic affinity with China. On the other hand, the region’s distance from Moscow and the often stormy relations between Russia and China raise concerns among central and local authorities about the region’s security and its political integration into Russia. Minakir focuses in detail on the latest cycle in this process which began in the late 1980s, when increasing economic trade with China rescued the region from economic collapse after the failures of Moscow’s regional development efforts during perestroika. Political considerations, however, soon led regional political leaders to raise the “Chinese threat” and tighten the border. The result was an out-flow of Chinese immigrants, but also a decline in the local economy. Minakir concludes by suggesting that the political threat has been exaggerated and the economic necessities of the region support closer ties with China.

The second group of chapters in this volume begins with an examination by Sergei Panarin of current and future migration from the five central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan, and Turkmenistan. Believing that most of the current out-flow is involuntary and is driven by political developments in these states, Panarin identifies perceived threats to personal security as the central reason for forced migrations. Panarin conceives of individual security in a very broad sense to include: physical security, economic security, and social security (the protection...
of the individual by the group) and personal identity (the individual's sense of identity as a member of an ethnic, status, or cultural group). He then considers how and why individual states, and, in particular, the newly independent states of Central Asia, all of which are involved in the task of nation building, pose a threat to individual security, especially of those outside the titular group.

To distinguish the source and nature of the threat they pose to the personal security of different groups of individuals, Panarin sorts these five countries into three categories based on resources, social structures, and ethnosocial factors: authoritarian states with elements of real democracy (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan); authoritarian states with decorative elements of democracy (Uzbekistan and Tadjikistan); and authoritarian states with elements of a monarchy (Turkmenistan). Based on his analysis of current and likely future developments in each of these categories, he concludes that continued ou-migration of both European heritage and other minority groups is inevitable not just currently, but also for the foreseeable future.

Galina Vitskovskaya's chapter presents an interesting complement to the Panarin chapter because it examines the same topic—the repatriation of Russians from Central Asia—on the basis of data from a 1994–1995 sample of potential non-native emigrants from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. These survey results underscore the uncertain status of these non-titular residents. Between two-thirds and three-quarters of those surveyed desired to leave the republic in which they were now living, and about 70 percent of them had already taken some steps toward leaving. The urgency of the departure decision varied markedly, however, among the three countries. Over half of the current residents of Uzbekistan who desired to leave expected to do so within the next year, versus less than 20 percent of those wanting to leave the other two countries. By and large, ethnic factors and isolation from Russia were the principal reasons potential migrants cited for their desire to leave. However, the vast majority (even of those who planned to leave) were prepared to reconsider if their current concerns were effectively addressed. By and large, the majority of these potential migrants preferred to settle in Russia. Like Panarin, Vitskovskaya concludes that there will be continued migration from Central Asia to Russia, at least for the near-term.

The final chapter of this group, by Larisa Khoperskaya, deals with contemporary ethno-political conflicts and migration problems in the North Caucasus. Echoing a theme that appears repeatedly throughout this volume, Khoperskaya stresses the historic roots of current migration patterns. In the case of the North Caucasus, the deportation of several of the region's native ethnic groups has had a particularly lasting impact. The steady return of these deportees in the
aftermath of de-Stalinization gave rise to growing ethnic tensions, which exploded into violence after the collapse of the USSR led each of the North Caucasian nations to seek exclusive control over what was almost everywhere disputed territory. The result has been a flood of refugees that has placed a particularly large burden on Stavropol territory (kray) in southern Russia but has had burdensome and potentially destabilizing effects throughout the region.

Prospects for Cooperation

The two chapters in this group examine the policy challenges posed by forced migration within the former Soviet Union and the need for coordinated responses to those challenges. Vladimir Mukomel’s chapter concentrates on the dimensions and characteristics of the problem within the context of the former Soviet Union; Arthur Helton looks at these issues from a broader international perspective. Both chapters note that current institutions are not capable of providing comprehensive solutions to these problems, and that broader, more coordinated strategies and institutional arrangements are required.

Mukomel focuses on the problems caused by refugees and displaced persons and on what might be done to address them. There are currently about 1.2 million displaced persons, 900,000 refugees, and 600,000 forced migrants actually registered throughout the CIS states. The first group is concentrated in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, while the other two groups are concentrated in Russia. These migrants are a serious economic burden on the host states and aggravate already difficult problems of unemployment, overcrowded housing, and lack of social support. Tensions between migrants and native population are mounting.

Currently each CIS state is on its own to deal with these migrants with some assistance from the UNHCR and other international voluntary organizations. Mukomel argues that only a cooperative approach involving all CIS states as well as international organizations can alleviate the problems posed by displaced persons and refugees. There are many obstacles to surmount before such cooperation can take place, however. For one thing, CIS states view the problem differently, with the receiving states arguing that migration is forced and the sending states arguing it is “voluntary.” There are also significant differences among CIS states in the development of appropriate legislation regarding the definition and treatment of refugees and forced migrants and of the institutions for implementing laws and regulations. For instance, several CIS states have yet to sign the U.N. convention regarding refugees. Concerted actions by CIS states to prevent and alleviate the effects of “mass migration,” Mukomel argues, should be based on (1) widespread public distribution of information about state
policies; (2) coordination of human rights actions and establishment of basic freedoms and rights of minorities; (3) ratification and implementation of the Interstate Fund of Aid to Refugees and Compelled Resettlers; and (4) standardization of legal norms and registration requirements.

The Helton chapter also focuses on the problems of forced migrants but in a broad, international context. He begins by detailing the particular causes that produce forced migration and the international legal structures that have been developed to protect migrants. By cataloging the variety of international and regional institutions and provisions that exist to protect the rights of refugees, in general, and migrants from particular causes, e.g., armed conflicts, abuses of human rights, environmental degradation, in particular, he points out where gaps exist in international law and suggests strategies for filling these gaps. He notes, for example, in his discussion of international migration that while international law guarantees individuals the right to leave any particular country, there is no corresponding right of admission into another country. He argues that, in fact, the current international legal regime approaches these issues piecemeal with separate institutions and provisions for different situations. What is needed, Helton believes, is a new, more comprehensive approach that provides a comprehensive framework for dealing with these issues, allows for regional variation in the solution to specific problems, and offers a mechanism for settling disputes between parties. Helton concludes by suggesting that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) may just provide such a model.

**Prospects for Integration**

This final group of chapters centers on the ways in which future migration patterns within and among the Soviet successor states are likely to be shaped by organizational arrangements such as the CIS, of which all successor states, except Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have now become members. Will the CIS remain a loose confederation, as it is at present, or will it be replaced by some other more closely linked political or economic association? If so, what countries will be part of this association, and which will remain outside? How will members and non-members interrelate? The answers to these questions will have an enormous impact on the scale, character, and direction of post-Soviet population movements throughout the remainder of this century and beyond.

In his chapter, Dmitrii Furman, looks at the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union as the premature culmination of a much longer process of imperial disintegration that had its roots in the old Russian empire. Defining an empire as the unification by force of many different peoples, Furman sees such organizations
as inevitably doomed by the irreversible democratization of public life and the rise of national self-consciousness and self-assertiveness among the constituent groups that make up the empire. Thus, all empires contain the seeds of their own destruction. But the pace at which this collapse occurs depends upon the level of political consciousness and development of the individual incipient states. This, in turn, depends at least in part upon the actions of the empire itself. In Furman's view, the collapse of the Soviet empire was premature because the constituent parts were not yet ready for independence. Indeed, he cites the tensions among ethnic groups and sometimes strident assertions of independence as evidence to this effect and "proof" that a looser confederation of the sort envisioned by Gorbachev was what was actually called for. Furman believes the complex organizational and psychological dependencies that developed among the constituent republics in the past were not suddenly broken with the collapse of the Soviet empire but linger in various forms. How Russia responds to the other newly independent states will, in his opinion, determine future relations among them, with at least partial "reintegration" being the most likely outcome.

Vladimir Malinkovich's chapter looks at prospects for reintegration primarily from the vantage point of Ukraine. Malinkovich contends that the legacy of the Soviet era has left a vacuum that the CIS does not fill. What is needed are closer economic and political ties within cooperative structures that allow each state its own independence. He proposes a "Union of Four Plus," in which the largest and richest former republics—Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan—form the core of this new organization. He acknowledges, citing Ukraine as an example, that the realization of this goal will not be easy. He cites in particular the strident nationalism and its accompanying resentment of Russia as major obstacles to the process. On the basis of Ukrainian public opinion data, however, he argues that a new union is at least possible and even probable, if not inevitable.

Conclusion

Although the chapters in this volume are more analytical than predictive, they nonetheless leave the clear impression that the volume of migration within the former Soviet Union will remain substantial, if not actually increase, for the foreseeable future.

Collectively, these chapters identify three major dynamics behind the current migratory movements in the former Soviet Union. The first is ethnic conflict and the fear that it has generated among minorities in the newly emergent states. The
second is "repatriation" by non-titular peoples, especially Russians, from newly independent states in which they no longer feel at home. The third is the pursuit of economic opportunity and the diverse forms of economic migration that it has spawned.

In each case, the roots of the current movements were planted in the Soviet period, although all have been intensified by the breakup of the Soviet state. Although most of the ethnic conflicts that broke out in the aftermath of the breakup appear to have abated (Chechnya being the most obvious exception), the underlying tensions that gave rise to these conflicts typically remain unresolved. Furthermore, the nationalistic policies of many of the newly independent states could easily exacerbate the underlying tensions and generate new flare-ups and explosions.

Similarly, the repatriation of non-titular peoples from the non-Slavic states to Russia, the Ukraine, and Belarus was initially triggered by the nativization policies of the 1970s, but reached new levels in the early post-Soviet period. A combination of economic, political, and cultural anxiety, prompted many Russians and others to return to their "home" countries. Although the actual out-flows have been smaller than some had predicted, many of those who remain are actively considering repatriating. Even if official non-discrimination policies are adopted in those countries, the combination of unofficial practice and economic transition seems certain to prompt additional repatriations.

Finally, while economically motivated migration has its roots in Soviet development policies, it has taken on a variety of new forms in the post-Soviet period, ranging from temporary labor migration and shuttle border crossing to permanent relocation in pursuit of economic opportunity. Given the very different economic prospects of the newly independent states, it seems certain that economic migration will remain a feature of these countries for the foreseeable future.

If the chapters in this volume enable one to conclude that the volume of migration within the former Soviet Union is likely to continue on a large scale, they also point out the degree to which the Soviet successor states are ill-prepared to deal with this movement. The large numbers of displaced persons, refugees, and forced migrants pose enormous economic problems not only in providing for the immediate needs of the migrants, but, also, for the current and longer-term needs for employment, housing, etc., of the base population.

Similarly, these countries are generally ill-prepared to promote the kind of economic migration that could benefit both the economy and the individual migrants. Traditionally, labor mobility is viewed as an effective mechanism for
promoting a more efficient utilization of labor by encouraging workers to move to areas where they can be more productively employed. However, the absence of financial and legal institutions that are prerequisites for a truly open labor market, e.g., legalization of private property, privatization of state enterprises, elimination of the propiska system inter alia, make the prospects of free labor mobility uncertain.

Finally, as several of the chapters suggest, many of these problems are best addressed in some kind of cooperative framework among the Soviet successor states. The range of issues that might be addressed is substantial including: qualifications for refugee status, the rights of non-titular residents, treatment of temporary workers, etc. However, there are substantial obstacles to cooperation among the successor states on these issues, and it remains unclear when and in what form a cooperative framework might be developed.

The design of effective legal and institutional arrangements is something with which the West has had considerable experience and might be able to provide useful assistance. Moreover, Western organizations (governmental and nongovernmental) could help in providing some of the immediate humanitarian aid that is currently required. To the extent that such assistance helps promote a more regular, predictable, and efficient pattern of movement within the former Soviet Union, and thus a more stable political climate, it would also be in the international community's best interests.
2. Migration Patterns in the Former Soviet Union

Zhanna A. Zaionchkovskaya*

Migration patterns are useful indicators of social change. Migratory trends provide a timely insight into the quickly changing eddies and currents of development which are so important in a transitional society such as the former Soviet Union (FSU).

The collapse of the Soviet system caused critical changes in migratory processes. The five chaotic years that have passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union have witnessed the emergence of a new economic system and the creation of new, sovereign political entities from fragments of the FSU. In this chapter, migratory trends in the former Soviet Union from 1990 through 1994 are analyzed in light of these changes. It is necessary to begin with a brief overview of the past.

Historical Background

The conquest of neighboring lands and expansion of the Russian Empire was accompanied by migration from the center to outlying regions. This trend dominated for several centuries, beginning in the sixteenth century, when Russia completely freed itself from Tatar-Mongolian domination. Russians, and later Ukrainians, gradually spread across the territory of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). During the Soviet period, migration toward the outlying areas continued, supported by Stalin’s forced, mass relocations.

Preceding and during the breakup of the USSR, it became fashionable to attribute the migratory expansion of Russians and other Slavic peoples (Ukrainians and Belarusians) to Moscow’s imperial ambitions. Undoubtedly, imperial and militarist interests were key stimuli of the Russian expansion, and it would be absurd to deny their importance during the Soviet era. However, economic factors were very important. The local populations of the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Moldova did not possess the necessary skills to satisfy the demands of

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economic development. In some regions (Latvia and Estonia), the natural growth rate of the population was so low it could not provide the necessary labor force for fast growing cities.

One can argue whether economic growth was too rapid and whether local interests were sufficiently considered. However, it may be argued that sooner or later a strong demand for a skilled labor force would have emerged and become critical in any case, since modern civilization has not yet found any other means of development besides urbanization and industrialization. Development may have been unbalanced in the USSR, where the role of the military complex in industry was certainly exaggerated, but development did occur, complemented and spurred on by Russian and other Slavic migration. Even if the new states into which the USSR divided had developed as independent entities, there very likely would have been a significant flow of immigrants from Russia. This chapter is not aimed at resolving these issues, but it is very important to stress these points in order to better understand the processes now taking place.

Over time, the relationships between the center (Russia) and the periphery (the republics) changed. The demographic resources of the previously developed regions were exhausted, and, by the 1960s, the Central and Northwest regions of Russia themselves experienced labor deficits and became the most attractive areas for relocation. By the late 1970s, migration within the USSR was clearly centripetal. Regions that had previously attracted Russian immigration began to lose Russians: the Trans-Caucasus (from the 1960s), Kazakhstan (from the early 1970s), and Central Asia (from the mid-1970s). Rural to urban migration within these areas, and the increasing emergence of competitive labor markets fueled by a fast-growing contingent of native professionals, promoted a Russian and Slavic exodus from the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Kazakhstan. Beginning in the 1980s, the labor market in Russia became relatively more favorable and promoted migration to Russia and Ukraine not only by Slavs, but also by the titular populations of the non-Slavic republics. For example, during the period of 1979–1988 (the period of the last general census of the USSR) the number of Moldovans in Russia increased by 69 percent, compared to a 10.5 percent increase in their native republic. Similar patterns are observable for Georgians and Armenians (46 percent compared to 10.3 percent and 13.2 percent, respectively); Azerbaijanians (2.2 times compared to 24 percent); Uzbeks and Turkmen (1.8 times compared to 34 percent); Kyrgyz (2.9 times compared to 33 percent); Tadjiks (2.1 times compared to 46 percent) and Kazakhs (69 percent compared to 23.5 percent). These types of patterns can be observed for Ukraine, as well. Moldovans, Azerbaijanians and Armenians, whose republics had been intensively urbanized, were more active migrants to Russia and Ukraine because
local cities could not absorb all those wanting to come. Ukrainians and Belarusians migrated to the Baltic area more intensively than to Russia. Until the end of the 1980s, Moldovans relocated even to the Trans-Caucasus and Central Asia, replacing the Russians who had moved out of these areas. In the 1980s their number in Uzbekistan increased by 3.6 times, in Tadjikistan by 2.8 times, and in Armenia by 1.6 times.

The same trend applies to many non-Russian nationalities in Russia itself in the 1960s. Tatars, Bashkirs, Moldovans, Mari, Chuvash, and the ethnic groups of the North Caucasus migrated northward and eastward within Russia and to Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

Thus, in the period preceding the collapse of the Soviet Union, the primary migratory trends in the region were as follows:

- The prevailing trend was migration to Russia (in the 1980s, this comprised nearly three-quarters of the positive net volume of migration$^1$), and to a lesser extent, to Ukraine (15 percent), and the Baltic states (about 10 percent). These flows came primarily from Central Asia (40 percent of the negative net volume of migration), Kazakhstan (about 30 percent), and the Trans-Caucasus (also about 30 percent).

- Migrants were most drawn to the western and southwestern areas of the FSU, including the Baltic states, Belarus, Ukraine and some Russian oblasts (districts) located to the west and southwest of Moscow, as well as the capital itself. The Moscow and St. Petersburg areas were the strongest magnets: in the 1980s only 7 percent of the population of the USSR resided in these areas, but they “absorbed” 45 percent of the migrants. Other areas that migrants found attractive were the northern regions of the North Caucasus, the Asiatic North, the Far East, and, in particular, the northern area of West Siberia, with its strong oil and gas industry. In contrast, a long, steady flow of migrants moved westward from southern Siberia. The areas of the Urals, Volga-Vyatka and Chernozem in Russia lost population to the central and northwestern regions of Russia, the Baltic republics, Ukraine, and Belarus.

- A major trend in all areas was migration from villages to cities. The urbanization of the former USSR is far from complete, although it is nearly over in Estonia, Latvia, and some regions of Russia. The combination of growing urban labor markets and villages able to satisfy them defined

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$^1$ Net migration is the difference between the number of migrants leaving and entering the region. It can be positive, negative, or zero, if the relocation is balanced. Synonymous with this definition are the concepts of net inflow, and net outflow.
migratory directions and trends. The cities with the highest living standards were the most powerful magnets.

- Both Slavic and native peoples emigrated from the non-Slavic republics, except in the Baltic region, where, even in the 1980s, Russian immigration continued and titular nationalities stayed within their borders. The non-Russian population of the Soviet Union began to participate more actively than Russians in the development of the north and northeast. Active territorial expansion occurred among the peoples of the Caucasus, Moldova, and the Volga region, while expansion practically stopped among Slavs.

- After a long moratorium on travel outside the Soviet Union, the Iron Curtain was lifted under Gorbachev. At first, only selective ethnic emigration was permitted—that of Jews, Germans, and Greeks. From 1988 on, however, emigration rapidly expanded, doubling every year and reaching 452,000 in 1990 (compared to 39,000 in 1987).

**Changing Determinants of Migration**

The breakup of the Soviet socio-economic system caused sharp changes in the determinants of migration. New factors emerged, and existing ones shifted their influence. We can identify four groups of factors influencing contemporary migration within the former USSR.

The first group of factors results directly from the collapse of the USSR. The break-up of the country occurred unexpectedly and was a serious shock to the population. Citizens of a once indivisible country were suddenly divided into “those of our kind” and “outsiders”—natives and immigrants. The latter were not guaranteed citizenship, inheritance, pensions, seniority, or other basic rights, and were subjected to laws requiring use of the native language. This set the stage for mass repatriation, which was accompanied by flows of refugees and forced migrants from areas of armed conflict and bloody nationalist clashes.

The second group of factors is related to the initial stage of the creation of the new economic system. At this time, market levers were not yet in force and the introduction of market reforms brought a deep economic crisis. A significant drop in production was typical for all of Eastern Europe, but in the FSU this was exacerbated by the dissolution of internal administrative relationships (due to the breakup of the Soviet Union) and the separatist bent of the new states during their first years of independence. High inflation, a rapid increase in the cost of living accompanied by a sudden drop in living standards, and growing
unemployment were all results of economic restructuring. These factors also contributed to stress-induced migration.\textsuperscript{2}

The third group of factors results from the development of genuine market relations: privatization, private entrepreneurship and land ownership, the development of commerce, private financing, and a capital market. A new economic landscape is developing within the territory of the FSU, and the people are learning how to benefit from it. The new economic reality has generated some kinds of migration which were unfamiliar in the FSU, such as short-term labor migration, shuttle trade, and other kinds of commercial migration. This third group of factors includes traditional, or “classic,” determinants of migration which have only recently emerged for the people of the FSU with their new freedoms of choice. These factors have a stabilizing impact on peoples’ lives; they ameliorate stress and gradually normalize migration patterns.

The fourth group of factors are those resulting from the liberalization of life in the former Soviet Union and the transition to an “open door” policy. All of the new countries founded on the ruins of the FSU gave people the freedom to enter and exit the country and established systems to allow international migration. Emigration and immigration, educational travel, vacations, work trips, and temporary residence abroad were permitted almost immediately upon the collapse of the Union and quickly became the norm. Under the conditions of a worsening economic crisis, freedom of travel has proved to be an important ameliorating factor.

It is paradoxical that crossing the external border of the FSU is significantly easier than relocating within the CIS, which is still to some extent limited. Nevertheless, the member states of the CIS are now exhibiting a strong desire to function as a united migratory entity with free internal borders. We can assume, then, that free labor markets and free travel will gradually overcome any remaining holdovers from the collapsed system.

Naturally, no group of factors influencing migration can be isolated or assumed to be in force at only one particular point in time. From 1990 through 1992, however, stress factors were by far the most powerful determinants of migration in the former USSR. From 1993 on, the impact of economic factors prevailed. The shock and confusion which the population experienced due to the collapse of

\textsuperscript{2} Here we distinguish between stress-induced and forced migrations. By stress-induced, we mean migration caused by panic behavior, confusion, fear, threats, social discomfort, etc. Forced migration is also of a stressful nature, but the main cause of forced migration is objective, observable coercion. Stress-induced migration can be caused by an inadequate assessment of the actual situation.
the USSR is gradually waning. The majority of the population has accepted the idea that the Union is long past and has to some degree adapted to the new economic realities. Feelings of hopelessness and fear are being replaced with sensible attitudes toward the events taking place now. Migratory trends reflected this singularly important shift well before any other indicators of mass behavior. We will try to illustrate this below.

**Quality of Data**

In the USSR, assignment to (*propiska*) or release from (*vyppiska*) a place of residence was registered by passport and recorded as statistical data on migration. In the cities, there was virtually complete compliance with registration regulations due to strict requirements that applicants present valid residence permits when applying for a job, social services or medical services. In rural areas, however, the level of registration was significantly lower.

Liberalization of the rules and increased freedom of travel relaxed the rigid residence permit regime. More precisely, the formal requirements did not change much, but enforcement of the rules has weakened. Now many business people, representatives of private companies, young people seeking to avoid compulsory military duty in regions of armed conflict, and forced migrants who do not intend to change their citizenship but wish to stay in their places of asylum, are living in new places without registration. Foreign citizens who are in the CIS without official registration should be added to that list. This explains why the registration statistics show fewer migrants than the actual numbers.

In countries where armed conflicts have taken place (Tadzikistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, and Moldova), registration is simply impossible as a practical matter, while in many other regions (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan) the accuracy of data has rapidly deteriorated due to lack of funds and specialists. Therefore, data compiled by different countries very often vary. The increasing inaccuracy in immigration statistics should always be kept in mind while analyzing recent migratory trends in the CIS. Contemporary statistics may reflect general trends, but a healthy dose of skepticism is advisable.

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3. In Russia, the permit requirement is now formally deferred, and is substituted by registration of place of residence. However, due to the fact the registration limitations are still preserved almost everywhere, this has not eased the restrictions very much.

4. For example, in 1994, net migration from Ukraine to Russia, by the estimates of Goskomstat (State Committee of Statistics) of Russia, amounted to 139,000 people, while the Ukrainian Statistics Authorities estimated the total to be 124,000 people. Estimates of the numbers of refugees compiled by different countries also do not match.
As statistics from Russia are much more extensive than those of other countries of the CIS, we will primarily use Russian data in what follows.

Migration Between the Countries of the CIS and the Baltics

The population of the former Soviet Union responded to the deteriorating socio-economic situation and the breakup of the Union by reducing migration. The volume of migration decreased rapidly after 1989, in response to the first ethnic conflicts, the Turk-Meskhetian pogrom in Fergana and the Armenian pogrom in Baku (1990). This tendency can be easily seen in Figure 2.1, showing data for cities where this trend is most visible.

Between 1988 and 1990, the total migratory flow decreased by nearly 20 percent. Internal migration in Russia showed a twofold reduction, while in other countries of NIS the reduction was even higher. In Armenia alone, for example, from 1990–1993, the number of those relocating to cities fell by four times and in Azerbaijan, by three. Emigration from these countries declined: the number of total departures fell by 60 percent over three years. Thus, reality contradicts the widespread opinion that migration in the former USSR and Russia has increased sharply in recent years. People tend to prefer to wait out times of trouble in familiar places. A sharp reduction in migratory activity is evidence of shock. With that in mind, it appears that those who were in their own ethnic republics stayed home, while the mobility of non-natives increased, with most returning to their homelands either voluntarily or as “forced migrants.”

The former republics of the USSR were clearly divided into two categories, those gaining and those losing people, with the division along ethnic lines. The Slavic republics took in people and the non-Slavic republics lost people. Such a division was observed previously in connection with the outflow of Russians, but with some differences: the Baltic republics and Russia were previously countries of in-migration, while Belarus was among those losing people. Beginning in 1991, a population outflow from the Baltic republics also began (Table 2.1).

As before perestroika, relocation to Russia is a major migratory trend in the post-Soviet world. But in 1991–1992, Ukraine showed itself to be as strong a magnet as Russia, while Russia itself provided about 40 percent of the net migratory flow to Ukraine. The flow into Russia from non-Slavic countries was 4.1 times higher than into Ukraine (compared to an almost threelfold difference in population).

Net migration into Russia and Ukraine from the non-Slavic states was fairly equal in 1992, when the flow to Ukraine was at its peak (see Table 2.2). A
significant difference can be noted only in the percentages from Kazakhstan and Moldova. The countries of Central Asia provided an overwhelming share of the flow. It is interesting that the coefficient of migration fluctuated very little by group of countries (for Russia, in the range of 5.8-6.8 per thousand; for Moldova, 2.3-3.9; for Ukraine, from 1.3 to 1.7). This indicates that the relocation of populations from non-Slavic republics is evenly distributed.

Table 2.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>-143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>-32</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>-30</td>
<td>-34</td>
<td>-37</td>
<td>-15</td>
<td>-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans-Caucasus:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Azerbaijan</td>
<td>-86</td>
<td>-40</td>
<td>-61</td>
<td>-58</td>
<td>-49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Armenia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>-12</td>
<td>-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Georgia</td>
<td>-39</td>
<td>-44</td>
<td>-45</td>
<td>-30</td>
<td>-32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>-41</td>
<td>-37</td>
<td>-77</td>
<td>-120</td>
<td>-51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Tajikistan</td>
<td>-60</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>-142</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Turkmenistan</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Uzbekistan</td>
<td>-180</td>
<td>-96</td>
<td>-75</td>
<td>-54</td>
<td>-139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Kazakhstan</td>
<td>-131</td>
<td>-49</td>
<td>-179</td>
<td>-203</td>
<td>-409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltics:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Latvia</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-11</td>
<td>-47</td>
<td>-28</td>
<td>-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Lithuania</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-22</td>
<td>-13</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Estonia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-34</td>
<td>-14</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total former USSR</td>
<td>-348</td>
<td>-79</td>
<td>-187</td>
<td>-30</td>
<td>-117*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: *Excluding Estonia

SOURCES: Statistics Committee of the CIS, Demographic Yearbook, 1995, and national statistics for each Baltic country.

After 1993, the situation began to change, with only Russia continuing to receive people. National differences in economic growth and reforms are reflected in these trends. Variations in economic conditions and living standards between these CIS countries began to increasingly impact migration patterns.
Table 2.2
Net Migration From Non-Slavic Countries To Russia and Ukraine, 1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries or Region</th>
<th>Thousands of people</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans-Caucasus</td>
<td>108.9</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>214.9</td>
<td>44.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>96.9</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltics</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>487.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>117.5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Net immigration into Russia has rapidly increased. Russia has progressed farther on the road to a market economy than the other countries of the CIS. Russia’s currency is strongest and is the standard to which other CIS currencies are linked. Russia also has noticeable advantages in standards of living and business conditions. The populations of the other former Soviet republics hope to take advantage of the new possibilities for employment and growth which are so visible in Russia.

A different situation is evident in Ukraine, where the economic crisis deepened just as new evidence of stabilization appeared in Russia. Migrants immediately reacted to the new conditions. After the breakup of the Union, many Ukrainians hurried home, and Russia showed a negative migratory balance with Ukraine. For the period of 1991–1992, the balance was 176,000 people in favor of Ukraine. In 1993, the exchange evened out, and by 1994 it shifted in favor of Russia, which received a net flow of 139,000 persons from Ukraine.

Non-Slavic migratory flows were also reoriented, and net migration out of those countries to Russia also increased (Table 2.1).

Table 2.3
Net Migration From Non-Slavic Countries, 1992–1994 (in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>To Russia</th>
<th>To Ukraine</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>487.3</td>
<td>117.5</td>
<td>604.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>556.7</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>633.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>760.0</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>795.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The breakup of the USSR promoted the relocation of peoples from former Soviet republics, but not as much as is generally thought. During 1990-1993, the
number of migrants coming to Russia remained virtually constant (except in 1991, when it was lower). Contrary to conventional opinion, net migration to Russia increased more due to the reduction in numbers leaving Russia than to an increase in immigration. Emigration from Russia decreased, with a sharp fall from 1993. In 1994 and 1995, emigration from Russia was nearly three times lower than in 1990 (Figure 2.2). In 1990, the flow out of Russia into the former republics was 69 percent of the total migratory flow, but in 1994, it was only 20 percent. As we can see, migration within the post-Soviet territory flowed in one direction—into Russia. As a result, from 1991-1995, Russia received a significantly higher influx of people than ever before at the expense of the other former Soviet republics (Figure 2.3).

In 1995, the flow of immigrants coming into Russia noticeably decreased. There is no doubt that the civil war in Chechnya strongly influenced this trend, as young men at or near the draft age (and their families) gave up any plans to relocate to Russia.

Figure 2.3 shows how deeply the migratory trends of Russia are rooted in the past. The disintegration of the USSR did not reverse former tendencies but, instead, very much strengthened them. Migration to Russia, in fact, is greater than the statistics show. Due to difficulties with registration and high taxes on temporary residents in Russia, there are many non-registered immigrants. These non-registered immigrants are not only forced migrants with no status (or wish to be there), but are also immigrants from other CIS countries who are engaged in business and commerce without residence permits.

The fast growth of migration for temporary employment and the continuing improvement of related regulatory measures by state institutions testifies to the pace of stabilization in Russia. In 1995, 141,217 immigrants from CIS countries worked with licenses from Russia, with two-thirds of that number from Ukraine. The number of unregistered migrant workers was several times higher.

Thanks to better economic conditions, Russia can attract trained, qualified labor from other CIS countries, thereby compensating for its own “brain drain.” In 1993, for example, 5,492 employees from nuclear power stations moved to Russia from Ukraine. Among the Russians who applied to the Russian embassy in Uzbekistan for relocation in the first quarter of 1994, 38 percent were engineers, technicians, technologists, and software programmers; 17 percent were highly trained industrial and construction workers; and another 28 percent were teachers, doctors, nurses, lawyers, scientific researchers, artists, architects, etc. Of

5 Izvestia, 11/30/94.
all those who applied to emigrate to Russia, 40 percent had higher education, and 36 percent had special vocational training. At the same time, opportunities to attract a cheap labor force decreased, slowing growth in economic sectors such as coal and construction, where many temporary workers are employed.

We will now review how the overall picture of migration changed for each country of the former Soviet Union (Table 2.4). The direction of migration changed only for the Baltic countries, while the strengthening of previous trends is observable for the other countries of the region.\(^6\) Data for the urban population shows that all three Slavic countries have a positive migration balance with all the other countries.\(^7\) The country-level data in Table 2.4 do not balance out due to the differences in emigration beyond the borders of the former USSR. Unfortunately, complete data on migration within the boundaries of the former USSR for CIS countries does not exist.

| Table 2.4 |

<p>| Net Migration For the CIS and Baltic Countries Before and During Reforms |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(in thousands)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Russia</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ukraine</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Belarus</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Moldova</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Trans-Caucasus:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- <strong>Azerbaijan</strong></td>
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<td>- <strong>Armenia</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- <strong>Georgia</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Central Asia:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- <strong>Kyrgyzstan</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- <strong>Tadjikistan</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- <strong>Turkmenistan</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- <strong>Uzbekistan</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- <strong>Kazakhstan</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Baltics:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- <strong>Latvia</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- <strong>Lithuania</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- <strong>Estonia</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total former USSR</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** *1990-1993; **1994 without Estonia.*


---

\(^6\) An exception is Armenia, where a great number of refugees from Azerbaijan in 1991-1994 influenced the overall picture.

\(^7\) There is no data available for Georgia.
Together with the general trend of movement to Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, an intensive population exchange is occurring in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Thus, Armenia receives population from Georgia and Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijan from Georgia. Kazakhstan receives immigrants from all Central Asian countries. This influx amounts to 5,700 net immigrants (1993 urban migration into Kazakhstan from Central Asia), in comparison to, for example, 7,400 net migrants lost in the exchange between Kazakh cities and Ukraine. The most intense flows into Uzbekistan are from Kyrgyzstan and Tadjikistan, but people also emigrate from Uzbekistan and Tadjikistan into Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan.

Total net migratory losses (the difference between those leaving and entering) of the non-Slavic republics of the former USSR (including the Baltic countries) for the 5 years from 1990–1994 can be estimated at approximately 4 million people. Out of this number, 1 million crossed the borders of the former USSR, and more than 3 million went to Slavic republics within the former Soviet region, including 2.2 million to Russia.

**Repatriation**

Though the disintegration of the USSR did not cause major changes in the direction of migration flows, the nature of these flows has changed radically. The seriousness of contemporary migratory problems stems not from the growth of migration as from the fact that a significant percentage of migrants are now forced migrants and refugees leaving neighboring states under threat of violence or because of discrimination.

The collapse of the USSR provoked large-scale repatriation, affecting all Soviet successor states. Repatriation was spurred by fears of losing the ability to return to one’s motherland, of being left stranded without citizenship, and of being trapped across a border from one’s family members and friends.

Families divided by new state borders faced serious difficulties. Increased transportation costs and the enforcement of new visa regulations in some states (particularly the Baltics), and dangerous situations in others (the countries of the Trans-Caucasus, Tadjikistan, and Moldova) limited their ability to communicate. The breakup of the formerly unified currency system limited peoples’ ability to provide financial support to family members living in other states.

The most massive repatriation has been that of Russians who were forced to relocate due to war, threats, social stress, and restrictions on rights. The Russian issue is analyzed in detail in other chapters of this book. Here we will only
discuss the overall scope of the phenomenon. Repatriation of Russians varies based on the relative social and political situation. Rapidly, and literally in droves, Russians relocated from regions of armed conflict. During 1990–1994, 1.7 million Russians from non-Slavic republics, or 14 percent of Russians residing in those countries moved to Russia. The numbers from areas of armed conflicts are significantly higher: 42 percent of Russian residents left Tadjikistan (the total loss from Central Asia was 21 percent), and 37 percent left the Trans-Caucasian countries. Against such a backdrop, other losses look quite moderate: the Baltic countries and Kazakhstan each lost 5 percent of their Russians, and Moldova lost 4 percent.

The better economic situation in Russia in comparison with most of the CIS countries has undoubtedly encouraged the repatriation of Russians (Table 2.5). In 1994, repatriation decreased somewhat from the countries with military conflicts (possibly due to the fact that most Russians had already left) but sharply increased from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The rate of increase in people relocating from Kazakhstan in comparison to other republics remains, as usual, the most gradual (4 percent in 1994). However, even a relatively small increase caused a significant growth in absolute numbers of emigrants from Kazakhstan: from 82,000 in 1992 to 234,000 in 1994 (net migration). Thus, even a minor deterioration of the situation in Kazakhstan is liable to turn into an enormous problem due to a huge potential increase in numbers of forced migrants.

The flow of Russians from Lithuania and Estonia has stopped, and it has not increased from Latvia, either, reflecting a shift toward normalization in those countries. More than three-quarters of the Russians who left those republics have relocated to Russia, and one-fifth to Ukraine.
Table 2.5
Ethnic Composition Of Migratory Flows From the CIS Countries and the Baltics to Russia (net migration)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>199.9</td>
<td>117.7</td>
<td>300.1</td>
<td>419.4</td>
<td>612.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>-25.9</td>
<td>-64.3</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>79.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarusians</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>-10.6</td>
<td>-5.9</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldovans</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanians</td>
<td>-0.75</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvians</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonians</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgians</td>
<td>-2.75</td>
<td>-3.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaianians</td>
<td>-3.9</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenians</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>60.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekns</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
<td>-4.5</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyz</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadjiks</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenis</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhs</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>-6.6</td>
<td>-10.8</td>
<td>-6.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>113.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>288.3</td>
<td>104.9</td>
<td>355.7</td>
<td>533.8</td>
<td>914.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The overwhelming majority of Russians resided in capitals and large cities, where they occupied a professional niche which the untrained local population could not fill. In time, however, improved education for the native population began to shrink this niche and the Russians were squeezed out. In Central Asia, for example, from the mid-1960s onward, practically all labor market demands in education, culture, and health were met by the native populations. Kyrgyzstan is a vivid example of this; in 1989, of every 10,000 new hires, the shares of Russians and Kyrgyz in the following categories were: scientific researchers and college professors—197 Kyrgyz versus 105 Russians; literature and the arts—129 versus 67; physicians—205 versus 98; lawyers—38 versus 16.8 Gradually, employment opportunities for Russians were increasingly limited to industry and construction. Russians continued to maintain leading positions in engineering and in high-level professional fields, so that 60 percent of engineers, and 57 percent of machine tool operators in Kyrgyzstan in 1989 were Russians. Even in these fields, however, the proportions of natives, for example, steadily increased.

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8 Russians in the New Abroad, 1993, p. 35.
Thus, the exodus of Russians, as well as other “foreigners,” from overpopulated regions was, to a large extent, caused by objective forces, and should be recognized as a rational response to economic demands. This is why a significant percentage of Russians from Central Asia and the Caucasus have relocated and will relocate, even if there is no ongoing war in the region. The question is not whether, but when?

Under normal circumstances, the replacement of “aliens” in the workforce by natives would have taken place through layoffs, resignations, promotions, and death. The repatriation of Russians was encouraged by favorable employment conditions and low competition in colleges and universities in Russia. Precisely because these were “natural” mechanisms, however, the emigration of Russians took place without much fanfare, although it was rapid. The outflow of Russians would have been even higher, if residence permits (propiska) were easily obtained in Russian cities and if real estate could have been bought and sold.

The breakup of the USSR and the upsurge of nationalism among the local elite created a situation in which the native population saw still more opportunities to push foreigners out of prestigious positions and in which Russians did not want to stay, even when livelihoods were not threatened.

In 1990–1992, an abrupt change in ethnic migrations took place; all titular nationalities began to leave Russia for their respective homelands, while in the 1980s, it had been the other way around. In the early 1990s, repatriation became the norm in the territory of the former USSR and was not limited to Russians. This is clearly apparent from the data in Table 2.5. In 1993, however, the pattern shifted again in response to new circumstances. Non-Russian populations again migrated toward Russia, so that by 1994 Russia had already attained a positive migratory exchange with every other former Soviet nation. While virtually the entire net migratory increase in Russia in 1992 was provided by Russians, by 1993 Russians accounted for only 70 percent of the increase, and by 1994, 47 percent of the increase was provided by other nationalities. Russians comprised 77 percent of the net migratory influx in 1992, and only 63 percent in 1993 and 1994. Besides Russians and the titular peoples of the newly independent states, many other nationalities relocated to Russia. For example, due to migration, in 1994, Russia’s population increased by 44,400 Tatars, along with 19,000 people from the Volga region, 11,000 from the North Caucasus, and 15,200 Germans (virtually all from Kazakhstan and Central Asia).

These trends may be viewed as evidence of normalization as ethnic motivations for migration become less prominent. Despite the apparent trend toward
normalization of the situation, however, forced migration remains a very acute problem for the CIS.

Rural-Urban Migration

The most striking reaction of the population in response to the collapse of the USSR was the reversal of prevailing patterns of rural-urban migration. This was demonstrated in Russia, where, in 1989, the established migration trajectory turned in the opposite direction and, by 1992, rural areas showed positive net migration from cities (Figure 2.4). But this crisis quickly passed and, by 1994-1995, urban areas increased their population through migration even more than before. The rural areas had mostly gained their increases through forced migrations. This is the primary difference between the situation in the early 1990s and that of the 1980s. Although forced migration is particularly complicated and expensive, from 1990-1994, underpopulated rural regions in Russia gained about 1.2 million additional people in the labor force thanks to migration, which could be a positive factor in rural development.

During 1990-1992, the most vivid symptom of the stressful times after the collapse of the USSR and the price shock was urban stagnation. In 1993-1994, however, an urban revival and an increase in population migration to urban areas demonstrated that, against the backdrop of unemployment in the state sector of the economy, alternative employment opportunities had successfully developed in Russia’s labor market.

The stagnation of urbanization and the reversal of urban-rural migratory patterns were common phenomena in the other CIS countries. This is indirectly evidenced by the data showing decreases in urban populations in many CIS countries.

A Migratory Map of Russia

Since the majority of migratory exchanges in the CIS are with the Russian Federation, an understanding of changes in Russia’s internal and external (in relation to the republics of the former Soviet Union) migratory patterns is essential.

Migratory changes touched all regions of Russia (Table 2.6). The Volga-Vyatskiy, Central-Chemozem (both beginning in the last century), and Urals (since the 1950s) regions were traditional areas of emigration. In the early 1990s, however, these regions began to receive migratory influxes, mainly to rural regions. This
trend can be observed in all Russian regions except the north and Far East. The magnetic pull of the North Caucasus increased, especially from Krasnodar and Stavropol kray (territories), where flows of forced migrants from the Trans-Caucasus and the unstable autonomous republics of Russia converged. As in the 1960s, eastern Siberia again lost population. West Siberia, after a three-year interval, received an influx of migrants. In contrast, both the northern and southern areas of the Far East appeared to be very stable zones of migration outflow. In 1993–1994, as in the 1980s, the Central region ranked first in the number of immigrants.

Table 2.6

Net Migration In Russia By Economic Regions (in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>176.7</td>
<td>164.0</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>176.1</td>
<td>430.1</td>
<td>810.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>-13.2</td>
<td>-39.2</td>
<td>-45.6</td>
<td>-37.5</td>
<td>-40.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>-6.6</td>
<td>-3.9</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>98.5</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>113.2</td>
<td>216.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volga-Vyatkiy</td>
<td>-22.5</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>50.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Black Earth</td>
<td>-14.2</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>91.8</td>
<td>102.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volga</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>104.4</td>
<td>131.2</td>
<td>167.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Caucasus</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>149.5</td>
<td>103.1</td>
<td>143.0</td>
<td>167.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urals</td>
<td>-55.8</td>
<td>-23.1</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>123.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Siberia</td>
<td>81.2</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
<td>-32.0</td>
<td>-8.2</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>112.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Siberia</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>-24.5</td>
<td>-28.6</td>
<td>-36.2</td>
<td>-22.6</td>
<td>-7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far East</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>-9.6</td>
<td>-66.1</td>
<td>-150.4</td>
<td>-101.1</td>
<td>-147.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In short, Russia was divided into two zones—those receiving and those losing population (Figure 2.5). The areas experiencing the heaviest migratory pressure are the southern border zone of European Russia and the Urals, the Central region, and West Siberia. The northern and eastern regions are losing population. One of the most visible changes in the migratory patterns of the Russian population has been the exodus of people from the north. This pattern was observable at the very beginning of perestroika, but it gradually increased, with a sharp upturn in 1991.
The northern population had grown quite rapidly and reached 10 million people, distributed more or less evenly between European and Asian areas. There were many inducements attracting migrants to the region, primarily high salaries paid from the state budget. In the new market economy, the highly subsidized enterprises in the north were no longer viable. It was inevitable that such enterprises would have to shed excess workers. In fact, the north lost population very quickly. During 1993-1994, Chukotka lost 22 percent of its population; Magadan, 15 percent; the Koryak, Evensk, and Nenet autonomous areas, about 10 percent; the Kamchatka and Timyr regions, 7 percent each; the Sakhalin region, 5 percent; and Murmansk and the Komi republic, about 4 percent. All in all, in 1990–1994, the Russian Far North and neighboring areas lost 770,000 people (about 8 percent of the population). Significant population growth was maintained only in the northern region of West Siberia.

The attraction of former places of residence for internal migrants in Russia was apparent during the crisis period. Furthermore, a preference for the southern region of the country, where the living conditions are the most comfortable in European Russia, is illustrated in Figure 2.6.

It is interesting to note the differences between the autonomous republics of the Russian Federation. The republics of Tataria and Bashkiriya are the most attractive areas for migrants. Considering the complexity of the nationality issue in Russia, one may conclude that these republics attract Tatars and Bashkirs not only from the other CIS countries but from other regions of Russia. Similarly, the North Caucasus has been losing population due to a Russian exodus, but has been attracting inflows of titular peoples. However, these ethnic-based processes did not affect the republics of the Volga, where the titular populations do not have such a strong preference for their "own" republics.

Russia’s pattern of net migration exchange with the republics of the CIS is fundamentally different from the map of internal migration in the Russian Federation (Figure 2.7). All the regions of Russia, with the exception of the Far Northeast and Sakhalin, increased their populations at the expense of other newly independent states. Nevertheless, preferences for the western and southern, central, and west Siberian regions are clear. By way of contrast, the Moscow and Leningrad (St. Petersburg) regions show an insignificant increase in population. The most important factors in migration flows to Moscow and St. Petersburg, however, are not issues of preference; instead, difficulties in finding employment and obtaining residence permits prevail. As a result, there is a huge number of unregistered immigrants in these cities.
On the whole, Figure 2.7 demonstrates the difficulties which migrants from the CIS face in finding a new place of residence in Russia. They are ready to move anywhere, to any region, even to the north. A possible factor here is lack of information regarding the economic situations in major crisis areas. In any case, the migratory exchange with the other newly independent states partially compensates for the population losses in the east and north of Russia from internal migration. Additionally, it is only at the expense of these migrants from the near abroad that rural regions of Russia receive an increase of professional and highly educated people.

Attempts to explain migratory trends in Russia by the varying geography of declines in production and rises in unemployment yield no visible connection. Thus, the correlation coefficient between positive net migration and unemployment is only 0.22 percent. Moreover, in many cases there is a reverse link. At the same time, a connection between migration and the level of development of the private sector of the economy is obvious. The southwestern part of Russia, particularly along the border, differs sharply from the rest of the country in that it has a more developed private sector (Figure 2.8). It is obvious that there are better opportunities there for making a profit and developing entrepreneurship. It is also clear that migrants moving to the North and East are more likely to become dependent upon the state, and on average, have fewer options for making a living.

**Migration From the CIS**

The transition to an “open door” policy quickly stimulated migration between the CIS and the rest of the world. But there was no huge increase of emigration from the CIS, as many experts had feared. Over the last five years, officially recorded emigration from Russia has remained constant at a fairly low level, and for many other CIS countries it has noticeably decreased (Table 2.7). Since many CIS migrants obtain education and live abroad for extended periods without registering their formal departure from Russia, official data understate the true picture. But it is clear, nevertheless, that there has been no emigration explosion from the CIS.
Table 2.7
Emigration From the CIS Countries Outside the Borders Of the Former USSR
(in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>103.6</td>
<td>88.3</td>
<td>102.9</td>
<td>113.7</td>
<td>105.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>95.4</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>58.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans-Caucasus:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Azerbaijan</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Armenia</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Georgia</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Tadjikistan</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Turkmenistan</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Uzbekistan</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Kazakhstan</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>110.1</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>113.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Emigrants who formally declare their intent to emigrate tend to go to either Germany or Israel, and to a lesser extent, to Greece and the United States. In other words, ethnic emigration from the CIS is still strong. The trends in emigration are illustrated in Table 2.8. The table shows that Germans move to Germany from Kazakhstan and Central Asia; people from Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Belarus are oriented to Israel; those from Russia and Tadjikistan move to Israel and Germany; and those from Armenia move to the United States and Germany.
Table 2.8
Migration Flows From NIS Countries, 1990–1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>USA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans-Caucasus:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Azerbaijan</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Armenia</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>76.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Georgia</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central Asia:</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Tadjikistan</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>40.3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>34.5</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Uzbekistan**</td>
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<td>16.9</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Kazakhstan</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>91.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: * 1990; ** 1990-1992
SOURCE: Statistics Committee of the CIS.

The populations of the CIS countries may in time get used to the idea of emigration, but free emigration outside the borders of the former USSR is still a new phenomenon for them. However, since the rejection of totalitarianism and the collapse of the USSR, the geopolitical situation for Russia has radically changed, and this has greatly affected immigration.

Immigrants are coming to the CIS from countries of Asia and Africa. Three major influxes of immigrants can be noted, differentiated by their goals in coming to the CIS.

- Economic immigrants, looking for income opportunities and employment. These are mainly Chinese and Vietnamese, who stayed after their contracts, signed during the Soviet era, had expired.
- Refugees and individuals seeking asylum from war and other stressful situations, mainly Afghans and residents of countries in Africa, such as Somalia, Ethiopia, Angola, etc. (including university and graduate students who came from these countries to study and are unwilling to return home).
- Transit migrants who are trying to use Russia as a conduit to western countries. Most immigrants to CIS countries do not have residence permits.

These new flows of immigration have raised cautious concern in the CIS countries. Registration of immigrants has not yet been systematized. According
to estimates for the CIS countries, immigration is higher than emigration, but not
by enough to cause worry or alarm, despite popular fears of economic
competition, increased crime, new, unknown infectious diseases, etc.

Given that the increase in external immigration is taking place concurrently with
an unchecked flood of forced migrants from other former Soviet republics into
Russia, Russia faces a real problem. Countries which cannot take care of their
“own” cannot possibly create normal conditions for immigrants from the rest of
the world. But this should not overshadow the positive effects of immigration—
the stimulation of communications and business, the enrichment of cultural
exchanges, the increase in the market of affordable, mass-produced consumer
goods, etc.

Conclusion

Significant changes have occurred in migratory processes during the period of
transition to a new social and political system in the former USSR. Migration
trends have been subjected to contradictory influences and reflect the complexity
of the times. Here we will attempt to summarize these conflicting impacts.

Reactions to the collapse of the Soviet Union are revealed in sharp distortions of
migratory processes, disruptions, and even reversals of evolutionary trends,
evidencing the enormity of the social shock to which the population of the
former USSR was subjected. Indications of these distortions include:

- a sharp decrease in the geographical mobility of the population and in the
  numbers of migrants;
- stagnation of urbanization and resulting reversal of rural-urban migration;
- accelerated repatriation, reversing many earlier ethno-migratory trends and
  creating a priority concern for the countries of the CIS;
- expansion of forced migration; and
- asymmetric migratory flows, and prevalent one-directional flows.

The crisis was most vividly revealed in migratory processes in 1990-1992 (with all
of the features mentioned above). On the whole, for that three-year period,
migration flows became intensively oriented towards returning to one’s native
region or titular republic. Opposing migratory flows were asymmetrical,
primarily due to this nationalistic orientation. Thus, migration during this
period spurred and intensified the disintegration of a previously indivisible labor
market of the former USSR.
In contrast, *reassuring trends* illustrating the beginning of normalization of the situation include:

- increasing population mobility;
- re-establishment of previous rural-urban migratory trends;
- a renewed influx of titular populations of other CIS countries to Russia, and a decrease of repatriation from Russia;
- more freedom of movement among the CIS countries and their external neighbors;
- the emergence of temporary employment migration; and
- the strengthening of economic factors as determinants of migration.

The stabilization indicated by the above trends is still quite vulnerable, however. First, these “reassuring trends,” as we call them, can be identified only in Russia at this time, and not in the other CIS countries. Asymmetrical flows still exist and have even increased between Russia and the countries of the Trans-Caucasus and Central Asia. Sharp asymmetry is unusual in normal migratory exchanges between neighboring countries and, as such, speaks to the extraordinary nature of the situation in the CIS. As before, forced migration remains an important problem. All of these issues are evidence of the difficult situation in the CIS, and indicate that the deteriorating conditions in the region may yet worsen.

The CIS countries vary widely in their levels of natural population increase and in labor resources. In Russia and Ukraine, both the overall (natural) and working-age populations are in decline, while the population in the countries of Central Asia is increasing very rapidly. Considering these differences, the resulting migration trends correspond to objective demographic conditions in that people are leaving countries with high population growth to go to Russia, where the potential for natural population growth is very low. Thanks to migration, the rate of population growth in the countries of Central Asia and the Trans-Caucasus has slowed. In a number of countries migratory losses have even exceeded natural increases, causing an overall population decrease. Between 1990 and 1996, the population of Georgia decreased by 7 percent, of whom 11 percent were of working age; in Kazakhstan, the figures were 2.7 percent and 2.9 percent, respectively. A slight increase of 2.1 percent is seen in Kyrgyzstan, of whom only 1 percent were workforce entrants. In Russia, migration compensated for 70 percent of the natural decrease in the population and even provided an increase in the potential labor force of 0.3 percent. Thus, migratory trends in recent years have offset some potential demographic imbalances in the countries of the CIS. However, the effect of these processes
cannot be considered from only one perspective. Other potential, far-reaching consequences should also be considered.

Over the long-term, Russia will show a rapid decrease of labor resources, which forecasts indicate will probably begin after the year 2005. Before that, natural increases in the population will be limited to the North Caucasus, the Volga regions and North Tyumen. As Russia experiences a steady growth in production and investment, it will feel the pinch of insufficient labor resources. It should be noted that all the West European countries face labor shortages, and none of their economies can grow based only on their own populations. All of these countries have, therefore, implemented active immigration policies. Russia will not escape this either. Therefore, the inflow of people to Russia is undoubtedly a blessing and will help to maintain the labor pool. From the long-term perspective, the outflow of people from the countries of the CIS into Russia should be considered a positive phenomenon. The only exception is Ukraine, where the natural decline of labor resources is expected to be more severe than in Russia and where there is no compensatory inflow of migrants. Thus, from the point of view of demographic conditions, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus on the one hand, and countries of the Trans-Caucasus, Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and Moldova on the other, complement each other perfectly. This is a fundamental fact which points to the formation of a united labor market in the territory of the CIS. Russia needs partners in the CIS as sources of labor no less than the CIS needs Russia as a market for its labor.

In forming migration policy, its link to the creation of a labor market within the CIS should be take into account, even though during the present crisis period the relationship is not immediately obvious. This means that it is important even now to support free movement of labor within the boundaries of the CIS. Institutions regulating population movement should be considering not only customs controls and limits on immigration, but also reworking the regulations that affect the movement of labor. To this end, it is very important to implement a system-wide network of residency permits for different time periods and purposes.

From the point of view of the immediate future, the situation appears somewhat different. Increases in immigration to Russia are taking place against the background of a prolonged and deep economic crisis and a high level of unemployment. Although some highly educated professionals and qualified, hard-working immigrants are coming to Russia, most immigrants are forced migrants suffering from horrible financial and emotional traumas and needing state assistance. Additionally, migrants from the CIS are concentrating in the European, Ural, and West Siberian regions of Russia. Hordes of internal
migrants from the north are headed there, as well. The resulting heavy migratory pressure in those areas increases competition in the labor and housing markets.

With respect to the transitional period, labor and migration legislation should be flexible, and the right to work should not be strictly tied to requirements of citizenship or licenses. Limitations on hiring, just like limitations on residence permits (propiska) have turned out to be an obstacle to developing an efficient labor market and have slowed the development of the real estate market, forcing many migrants to live and work illegally.

The countries of the CIS with high emigration are losing the most qualified members of their labor forces: scientific and technical professionals, and highly skilled workers. These losses cannot be quickly compensated by the native populations. These countries will need to lure professionals into their labor forces, including those from Russia, on a contractual basis. Furthermore, easing titular language requirements and liberalizing provisions for obtaining education in one’s native language would probably stop or significantly slow the exodus of the Russian-speaking population. The policy of restricting the use of the Russian language contradicts the goal of attracting a skilled and professional labor force. For some professions the only way to get an education is through the Russian system, and without knowledge of the language this is virtually impossible.

Poor knowledge of the Russian language will limit options for the local youth to find jobs in Russia in the future and effectively reduce the mobility of the native labor force. This could cause an increase in social tensions, intertribal conflicts, and a deepening of the economic crises in those countries. Clearly, migratory policies in the CIS can and must be developed as a very important component of the overall integration and economic transformation process.
Figure 2.1—Migration To the Cities Of the USSR and Russia (millions of people)
Figure 2.2—Migration Between Russia and the Former USSR Republics (in thousands)
Figure 2.3—Net Migration Into Russia From the Former USSR Republics (in thousands)
Figure 2.4—Russia: Net Migration To Cities and Villages (in thousands)
Figure 2.5—Regional Net Migration, 1994, Including Internal Net Migration
Figure 2.6—Internal Regional Net Migration in Russia, 1994 (Excluding Intra-Regional Migration)

SOURCE: Goskomstat RF, 1995
Figure 2.8—The Private Sector as a Share of the Economy, 1994, Percents by Region
3. The Political Context of Migration in the Former Soviet Union

Emil A. Payin and Andrei I. Susarov

By 1987, following the outbreak of the first major ethno-political conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, there were several variants of regional/ethnic conflicts brewing within the Soviet Union. First, there were regional conflicts of significant duration (lasting no less than several months) that involved the deployment of regular military units. Such cases included the crises in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, Tadjikistan, South-Ossetia, Trans-Dniester, and Chechnya. Second, there were approximately 20 short-term (lasting only a few days) armed conflicts which claimed mostly civilian casualties. The most notable conflicts of this type erupted in Fergana, Osh, Ingushetia, Baku, and Sumgait. Finally, there were more than 100 non-military conflicts that transcended territorial, ethnic, and clan boundaries. Most of these conflicts were concentrated in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the North Caucasus region of Russia.

All three types of conflict directly affected the course of migration in the post-Soviet space. Given that ten million people currently reside in zones of potential conflict, there is a compelling reason to pay close attention to socio-political circumstances in the countries of the FSU and the implications that each holds for the patterns of migration and future political conflict in the region. Are the states that now provide shelter for refugees more stable than those from which the migrants originated? Is it possible to distinguish these intense waves of migration from those generated by economic and other factors? What are the consequences of these intense waves of migration for those countries that offer asylum, and for those countries that are being abandoned? Such issues form the basis of this chapter.

While all of the newly independent states face the dilemmas of transition, it is possible to sub-divide them into specific groups. Typically, analysts separate them into two groups—those states that provide asylum to refugees and forced resettlers, and those states that produce refugees and coerce resettlement. This categorization is extremely crude and imprecise, as often the very same states (or

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administrative districts) that provide asylum to some national groups simultaneously pursue discriminatory policy toward others. With this caveat in mind, it is possible to sub-divide the states of the FSU into three groups according to the extent to which national policies either “push” or “pull” migrants, and the degree to which governing structures retain the capacity to resist the temptation to play the “nationality card” for political legitimacy purposes.

The first category consists of states that are politically immature, combining precarious democratic structures with authoritarian tendencies. Members of this group include Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, Moldova, and Armenia. In each case, the institutions of civil society are extremely weak, and parliaments have become closed political corporations pitted directly against executive branches governed by presidential authority. Because of the instability inherent in nascent political institutions, governance is marred by authoritarian tendencies, characterized by a strengthening of state control over the transmission of societal interests (including control over the mass media, the legislative branch, and private entrepreneurship), and the suppression the autonomous and federalist proclivities of regional and ethnic minorities. This tendency has led to the escalation of a series of violent ethno-political conflicts, such as those in Trans-Dniester, Crimea, Ossetia-Ingushetia, and Chechnya. The political instability resulting from inchoate democratic mechanisms also gives rise to ethnophobia that fuels political and ethnic conflicts. Nevertheless, each of theses states provide political havens for refugees. Thus, the absence of refugees and emigrants from each of these states suggest the existence of an inverse relationship between the levels of political stability and migration in the FSU.¹

Russia provides a vivid example of the link between political stability and migration in this first group of states of the FSU. Although there has been a significant influx of refugees and forced re-settlers to its territory from other countries of the FSU, there are virtually no comparable flows of emigration. The only exceptions have been the several thousand Chechens that have sought shelter with relatives in Ukraine and Kazakhstan following the escalation of the war in and around Grozny.

A similar correlation between political stability and migration can be discerned for the other states included in this first group. Belarus, for example, accepted

¹ After the Chechen crisis, which caused huge migratory flows in the North Caucasus (about 320,000 people) this thesis looks extremely doubtful at first glance. However, it should be noted that the majority of migrants have already returned to their places of residence in the territory of the Chechen Republic. According to the data of the Federal Migratory Service, about 5,000 people are arriving daily.
more than 30,000 residents that were in search of political asylum from Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia and Tajikistan. Moreover, it should be noted that there have been no observable patterns of large-scale emigration of non-titular minorities from Belarus. Similarly, Ukraine has tended to provide shelter for refugees from the trans-Dniester conflict, accepting more than 50,000 people in 1992. As of 1996, practically all of those refugees left Ukraine and returned to their former places of residence. The most significant migration problem for Ukraine, however, remains the repatriation of Crimean Tatars and representatives of other repressed nations of the Soviet period that previously resided within Ukraine’s present borders (such as Greeks and Germans).

A similar situation transpired in Moldova. Following the escalation of the trans-Dniester conflict in the summer of 1992 (prompting the exodus of about 100,000 people), the socio-political situation in Moldova began to stabilize, allowing for the majority of refugees and migrants to return to their places of residence. Presently, Moldova serves as a political haven for displaced Moldovan communities spread across the FSU.

Armenia, which today enjoys a relatively stable political environment for its multi-ethnic communities, also serves as a lure for emigration. Despite the prolonged conflict with Azerbaijan, the domestic situation has stabilized largely as a result of the role played by the Armenian diaspora. The indigenous financial and cultural centers, developed by the traditional socialist (“Dashmaksutyun”) and liberal-democratic parties in Armenia during the previous century and preserved by the Armenia diaspora throughout the Soviet period, were re-established and institutionalized in the 1980s. Although Armenia experienced an outflow of forced re-settlers (more than 200,000 Azerbaijanis left the republic in 1988-1989), the nation-state was able to absorb more than 300,000 Armenian refugees, mainly from Azerbaijan. Recently, under conditions of economic austerity (precipitated by the economic blockade imposed by Azerbaijan and Turkey), Armenia has “produced” a net outflow of non-titular minorities (undoubtedly this outflow may be assumed to consist of economic migrants) to Russia and countries outside of the post-Soviet space. Given the stabilization of the national economy and the dissipation of the crisis in the Nagorno- Karabakh region, the migration situation has begun to improve.

The second category of states of the FSU consists of “quasi-stable regimes” that are governed by “educated autocrats.” Members of this group include the states of Central Asia (excluding Tajikistan). The absolute power of the leaders of these

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2 Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Kassymzhymart Tokaev, adheres to this opinion with regard to the state system of his country, *Interfax*, May 13, 1995.
states (especially in Turkmenistan), transforms nominally democratic institutions (parliament, parties, local management authorities, courts) into mere cosmetic appendages of authoritarian rule. These regimes lack popular legitimacy and ruthlessly suppress the remaining vestiges of political dissent (such as in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan). For each regime, the facade of stability masks the fact that internal conflicts continue to fester along ethnic and clan lines. Lacking popular appeal, each regime derives its legitimacy via control mechanisms and appeals to pan-Islamism that, in turn, alienate non-titular nationality groups. Thus, all of the states in this second category are “producers” of migration.\footnote{Lack of records and registration data regarding refugees and forced migrants in the abovementioned states does not allow us to evaluate the number of forced migrants arriving from the conflict areas of that region, primarily from Tajikistan, and also as the result of bloody events in Osh and Fergana (evidently, the number of forced migrants in these states amounts to tens of thousands of people). The only exception is the registration in Kirgyzstan of about 13,000 refugees from Tadikistan.} In Russia alone, the Federal Migration Service registered approximately 380,000 refugees and forced migrants from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. Roughly 70 percent of these were ethnic Russians who were forced to vacate in search of political asylum.

The third category of states includes Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Tadikistan. These states are governed by similar political systems that were formed under conditions of duress and civil war. In each case, existing regimes came to power via a coup d’etat that concentrated power to various degrees in the hands of authoritarian leaders and governing coalitions. In Tajikistan, for example, all forms of opposition have been subjected to ruthless persecution, while basic elements of democratic governance (such as opposition parties and an independent press) have been preserved in Georgia and Azerbaijan, despite the domestic political chaos and authoritarian tendencies generated by multiple ethnic conflicts.

The states that comprise this third category are the primary “producers” of forced migration in the FSU. As of 1996, these states “produced” over 700,000 refugees throughout the FSU.

The Ethno-Political Factor in Russian Migration in the FSU

Political and socio-economic factors are not the only motivations for increased migratory activity in the FSU. These factors alone cannot fully explain the character, structure and intensity of existing migration patterns in the post-Soviet space. For example, if viewed solely from the perspectives of the level of socio-
political tension and governmental capacities, Kyrgyzstan would be expected to be more stable and democratic than Belarus under President Alexander Lukashenko. Nevertheless, more Russian citizens have left Kyrgyzstan than Belarus. A much more intensive exodus of Russians is observed from relatively well-off Uzbekistan than from Ukraine which is in the throes of the most severe economic crisis in the region.

An understanding of the relationship between political stability and migration requires analysis of "ethnic distance," i.e., the cultural differences between the representatives of different ethnic groups that limit capacities for mutual adaptation. Using statistical information from 1959-1989, a scale was developed to determine the sensitivity of regional conditions for adaptation of Russian minorities.\(^4\) Research revealed that the smaller the ethnic distance between Russians and titular majority populations, the lower the incidence of Russian emigration from the "near abroad."\(^5\)

In practice, Russians are assimilating in Ukraine and Belarus more easily than ever before. In those states, the incidence of inter-marriages between Russian minorities and the titular majority roughly equals the intra-national rate of marriage for each group. Moreover, Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians easily understand each other’s language, and the exodus of Russians from these republics is lower than the influx of people from Russia (but it is too early to generalize and say that Russians "run away" from the eastern Slavonian republics). The fact that Russians adapt better under culturally similar circumstances, however, is not surprising. As a caveat, however, it should be noted that evidence of hostility between Serbs and Croatians in Yugoslavia illustrates that historical/cultural assimilation does not necessarily breed mutual tolerance. Often, contempt among culturally related peoples persists in the face of political disputes and conflicting territorial claims. Neither of these circumstances, however, undermine the ethno-cultural propinquity of Russians and Belarusians. Similarly, Russian-Ukrainian relations, although complicated by tensions over the Crimea and the Black Sea fleet, remain overwhelmingly harmonious.

Evidence from the Baltic states, Georgia, Armenia, and Moldova point to a slightly different correlation between ethnic migration and cultural assimilation of Russian minority groups. Despite the rhetoric of discrimination espoused by


extremists among titular majorities and the xenophobic propaganda
disseminated by their Russian counterparts, there has been an overwhelming
display of cultural tolerance between Russians residing in the near abroad and
the respective titular leaderships. Research by the All-Union Central Institute of
Research of Public Opinion and Relations reveals, for example, that only a small
stratum of the Russian minority community in the Baltic states has been
subjected to intense psychological pressure.6 These Russians are distinguished
by their relatively short length of residence in the region, their inability to speak
the national language, and their segregation from the local population. Included
in this group are those former employees of federal police agencies,
representatives of former Soviet administrative and communist party structures,
and Russian military servicemen. At the same time, however, it should be noted
that formal discrimination, reinforced by language and citizenship laws in Latvia
and Estonia, noticeably reduced the prospects for Russian assimilation in these
states.

In Georgia and Armenia, the Russian minority communities have always been
smaller in size compared to the other former Soviet republics. Almost half of the
Russians residing in each of these states were born in the republic, and roughly
one-quarter have some native blood. Until recently, Russian-Armenian and
Russian-Georgian relations were never a source of tension, with the percentages
of Russian-Armenian inter-marriages second only to the rate of intra-Slav
marriages. This process of assimilation, however, has been stunted by the recent
outbreak of ethnic conflicts in these states.

The territories of the Caspian-Aral region—including Azerbaijan, Chechnya,
Dagestan and the republics of Central Asia—have exhibited a peculiar set of
conditions that have provided exceptions to this general trend of Russian
assimilation in this second category of states. In fact, 80 percent of all Russians
returning to the Russian Federation come from these regions. This sharp increase
has been directly associated with the explosion of inter-national and civil
conflicts in the North Caucasus region. Yet these trends have been in place since
the end of the 1970s, suggesting that current migration patterns are more deeply
rooted than is typically recognized.7

Major obstacles to the acculturation of Russians in the newly independent states
include not only the perception of “ethnic distance,” but also the radical

6 Lev Gudkov, “The Structure and Character of the Migration of Russians from The Former
7 “Russians in the New Foreign Lands: Central Asia, Ethno-social Essay,” Institute of Ethnology
nationalistic platforms endorsed by prominent local officials. In general, many titular majorities in the newly independent states continue to see themselves as second-class citizens in their native lands, as was the case throughout the Soviet era. As a result, there has been a strong tendency exhibited by newly empowered local elites to enact reactionary laws designed to thwart a perceived Russian crusade to restore political control via national “fifth columns” in the region.

It would be wrong to attribute the mass exodus of Russians from the newly independent states solely to discrimination. The fact that a massive departure of European populations from Central Asia began at the end of the 1970s suggests a correlation between the processes of migration and changes in the ethno-social structure of the new states in the region. At that time, the percentages of titular peoples with higher education equaled those of the Russian minorities, enabling them to compete favorably against Russians for prestigious management positions within the local industries. An additional push was provided by a special ethnic policy of Soviet leaders regarding state management—the policy of “titularization” that conferred preferential treatment to representatives of native populations.

This factor became even more important following the dissolution of the USSR, when indigenous political elites were no longer restricted from occupying senior posts within national governing structures. Vested with new sovereignty, officials became free to nationalize senior positions and oust non-titular state administrators in the name of equality and national unity.

This issue has been closely connected to the promulgation of new language laws throughout the FSU. The inability to speak the local language has now become justification for the replacement of Russian professionals from power structures and administrative posts in emerging state economic sectors. Deadlines were introduced in almost every country for the transition to national vernacular in the conduct of all official business. All state officials were supposed to have mastered the national language by these deadlines. Pressure in this area has recently relaxed, however, with the Russian language receiving official status in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.

The problem of official state languages is very closely related to the lack of access for Russian-speaking peoples to higher education, and, as a result, to more prestigious occupations. This process did not begin in 1991. In fact, for the past several decades there has been distinct favoritism regarding primary school and university admissions extended towards the titular majorities in Central Asia and the Trans-Caucasus. Since independence, however, education in the Russian
language has become a critical issue at the secondary level. There has been a proclivity to reduce the number of hours for Russian language instruction. Moreover, the quality of teaching within Russian communities has precipitously declined, owing to the lack of funding for Russian schools (though national schools also need more financing), shortage of Russian textbooks, and declining pool of qualified Russian teachers.\textsuperscript{8}

These conditions have been complicated by the breakdown of the communications network throughout the FSU. Russian-speaking mass media are virtually inaccessible to citizens residing in the southern regions of the FSU. Russian publications have declined dramatically, and it is now very difficult to subscribe to most of the central Russian newspapers. Moreover, the time allocated for Russian programming on television and radio stations has been radically reduced. It is extremely difficult to maintain contacts with relatives in Russia, as rising transportation fares have made local visits prohibitively expensive.

The collapse of economic ties between the republics of the former USSR has also devastated national production and employment rates throughout the FSU. With the collapse of local industries (especially national military industrial complexes) there is no longer a demand for industrial workers. This has hit hardest the standard of living of the local Russian minorities that at one time provided the backbone for republican industries. Ironically, this disproportionate burden borne by the Russian minorities has tempered anti-Russian sentiments in the near abroad, as Russians are no longer seen as monopolizing privileged positions at the expense of the titular majority.

**The Political Consequences of Migration**

It is extremely difficult to reach decisive conclusions regarding a causal relationship between political instability and migration trends in the FSU. Professional analysts confront grave difficulties in distinguishing cases of forced migrations from those prompted by socio-economic conditions. This is especially true regarding analysis that applies rigid formal criteria. The potential for the spontaneous explosion of ethnic conflict, as evidenced in Tadjikistan, Azerbaijan, and Abkhazia, has placed Russian minorities residing in the near abroad in a constant state of anxiety. This state of perpetual insecurity explains the lasting

\textsuperscript{8} There are virtually no schools for training Russian teachers in the near abroad, and the former Soviet distribution system is no longer operational.
flow of Russian emigration in several regions, such as in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, even in the absence of overt hostilities.

The poor economic conditions in the non-Russian former Soviet republics have only exacerbated the rate of Russian emigration from the near abroad. It should be noted that the volume of migration has been higher from those countries where Russian (or European) populations have lived for a relatively short period of time. A certain percentage of the Russian population of the countries of Central Asia and the Trans-Caucasus consist of officials and managers, military servicemen, scientists and intellectuals, and workers who were immediately assigned to positions in the region upon graduation from high school. The majority of those were workers from industrial enterprises that were created after the war as the result of the communist doctrine of leveling the economic factors in different areas of the Soviet Union. The prevailing preference for autarkic economic development predisposed Soviet leaders to divert significant funds to create regional industrial bases (especially in Central Asia) that artificially privileged the rural economy in certain republics (such as in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), and doomed resource-rich republics to lower standards of living than those dominated by heavy industry. Soviet central planners failed to take into account that local populations might not be willing to fill industrial vacancies, and that they might not possess the requisite technical skills or work ethic to develop infant industries. In consequence, professionals trained in the European regions of the USSR were invited to work in these giant industrial complexes, further increasing the tendency of natives to remain in rural communities.

Today the most qualified professionals in industry, science, medicine, education, and other spheres of the economy have relocated from those unstable countries. As a rule, the first wave of emigrants were the most qualified, wealthy (relocation requires significant funds) and active members of the population. Preparation for their replacement requires time and comes at great expense.

For the countries of Central Asia and the Trans-Caucasus, the primary objective is to stem the degradation afflicting all sectors of indigenous industry. National industrial decline has tended to isolate some eastern countries of the former USSR from the rest of the world, turning the countries into remote rural provincial areas (economic and political), and forcing them to become inward-oriented. This, in turn, has encouraged local elites to resort to traditionalism, political extremism, and jingoism in order to shore up domestic political support. These diversionary tactics, however, have not only fanned the flames of
nationalism and undermined domestic political stability, but accelerated the pace of Russian migration throughout the FSU.9

In Russia, forced migrants have been relocated primarily in the North Caucasus and the Volga regions (the most conflicted regions), as well as in the Urals and the Central and Central-Chernozem regions. Last year these regions absorbed approximately 80 percent of all the Russian refugees and forced migrants. All of these territories, however, are also highly coveted by internal migrants from the northern and eastern regions of Russia. Thus, there has been competition among forced migrants from the near abroad and those internal migrants in pursuit of greater economic and social welfare. In this regard, a complex and explosive socio-psychological situation is developing around the mass influx of internal and external Russian refugees. This has been exacerbated by the political manipulation of the refugee issue by ambitious political parties that have been vying for greater representation of the Russian electorate. In fact, the political sympathies of those who have relocated to Russia lie with those politicians that promise to redress their political and economic status, even at the expense of reinstating the pre-perestroika status quo. Such rhetoric, for example, resonated in the Communist and nationalist political platforms that attracted the highest percentages of votes among forced Russian migrants.10 This was underscored most vividly by the overwhelming pro-communist vote registered by Russian minorities residing in Estonia during the 1996 presidential elections.11

Conclusion

In conclusion, under certain circumstances, refugees play an especially destabilizing role in the socio-political life of those states that provide them with shelter. In Baku, for example, refugees incited riots in 1990, and in Dushanbe, during the same year, they became victims of rumors suggesting that they provided sanctuaries to Armenian refugees.12 Unfortunately, the major problems caused by mass forced migrations will persist in the newly independent states throughout the end of the century. Most migrations will occur in areas of either continuing or potential armed conflict. This will form a southern “arc of tension” that will encompass Tadjikistan, Azerbajian, Georgia,

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9 See also, A.A. Ignatenko, “Whether There is a Threat of Islamic Fundamentalism to Post-Soviet Central Asia, in International Relations in Russia and the NIS,” Moscow: Carnegie Center, 1995.
the North Caucasus and Crimea, and the trans-Dniester region. The ongoing
danger of new conflicts in the “arch of instability” will provoke emigration of not
only Russians, but also of titular populations from the regions actually embroiled
in armed conflict (Tadjikistan, Georgia, and Azerbaijan), and from the
neighboring regions that remain on the verge of war.

Intensive migration patterns will persist in Central Asia. The exodus of Russian
(or Russian-speaking) populations will continue unabated in this region, due to
the worsening economic conditions and increasing ethnic distance between
titular majority and Russian minority groups. These patterns will be marginally
controlled by the stabilization of local economies and reversal of discriminatory
nationalities policies.

A special situation will probably develop in the Russian region of North
Kazakhstan (and in some autonomous republics within the Russian Federation).
In these regions, migratory patterns will be directly determined by economic
factors. In sum, the ebb and flow of populations from other regions will be
defined by the progress of local industrial sectors, regardless of the ethnic origin
of the migrant populations.
4. Economic Changes in the Post-USSR: Reasons for Mass Migrations

Vyacheslav Vashanov*

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the newly independent states (NIS) confronted the momentous tasks of structuring independent economies. Initial steps were devoted to decapitating the once-unified bureaucratic edifice of the USSR, liberalizing prices, and imposing stringent monetary policies. Despite initial deference to Russian interests, by mid-1992 the governments of Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan had begun to devise separate reform agendas. By the end of the same year, basic goals for developing independent socio-political policies were in place throughout post-Soviet space.

In the wake of the Soviet collapse, all of the countries of the region faced economic depression. The economies of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Tadzhikistan and Moldova, in particular, incurred negative rates of economic growth. In 1995, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for each state was roughly equivalent to only 20 percent, 38 percent, 39 percent, and 40 percent, respectively, of the 1990 levels. The situation was more acute in Armenia, where GDP fell to 41 percent; in Ukraine, where it dropped to 45 percent; in Kazakhstan, where it constituted only 45 percent; and in Kyrgyzstan, where GDP equaled only 50 percent of the 1990 level. In contrast, economic conditions improved slightly in Belarus and Russia, where GDP recovered to over 60 percent, and in Uzbekistan, where growth rates hovered around 82 percent of the 1990 levels.

In addition, the standard of living plummeted across the region. The liberalization of wholesale prices for factor inputs radically drove up retail prices for consumer goods. During the first five years following the Soviet collapse (1991-1995), inflation rose roughly 500,000 percent in Armenia, as compared to 1800 times in Kyrgyzstan; and 4.7 times in Russia. In general, NIS prices for industrial products increased 4.7 times (in 1994 it increased 9.2 times). There was also a further decline in real incomes, with dramatic variation in the incomes and prices of consumer goods throughout the region. Moreover, the share of gross

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product accumulation dropped precipitously, thus depleting much needed reserves for capital investment.

Despite these economic difficulties, there were signs of "creative destruction" throughout the 1990–1995 period. While industrial production steadily declined, the service sector showed steady signs of revival. Accompanying the disruption to transportation, social, and utility services was the formation and development of market-oriented services (such as finance and insurance). Banking, insurance, and stock markets have gradually matured in each newly independent state. For instance, there were 40, 160, 18, 27, 14, and 2,511 commercial banks established in Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, and Russia, respectively, by the beginning of 1995. According to some estimates, the gross output of production was distributed almost evenly between the different categories of goods and services by the end of 1995.

Structural changes in the economies of the newly independent states betrayed the peculiarities of modern economic development in the region. Some industries, such as the power/energy, metallurgy, and oil/chemical sectors, have been able to adapt to the general background of decline better than other sectors, such as those devoted to food processing, agriculture, and machine-building.

There have also been fundamental institutional changes in property ownership throughout the region. Countries such as Russia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova accelerated the process of privatization, drastically slashing the percentages of those employed in the state sector by 38.8 percent, 35.8 percent, 34.8 percent, and 38.9 percent, respectively. In Russia, for instance, over 70 percent of all major enterprises were subjected to ownership changes, leaving 90 percent of small firms in private hands by the end of 1995.

In contrast, a number of the newly independent states have not jumped on the destatization bandwagon and deliberately slowed the pace of spontaneous privatization. The governments of Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Belarus have been particularly loath to relinquish state ownership shares in the industrial sector. This ambivalence has been driven by fears that the already high levels of unemployment—74 percent in Kazakhstan, 70.2 percent in Ukraine, 65.4 percent in Azerbaijan, and 64.1 percent in Belarus—will spiral out of control with the transfer from public to private ownership.

Private consumer markets have also developed differently among the newly independent states. In Azerbaijan and Armenia, for example, roughly 70 percent of consumer goods are sold at market prices. Alternatively, in Kazakhstan, Russia, and Uzbekistan, roughly 24–29 percent of such products are exchanged in
private markets. Kyrgyzstan, lies somewhere in the middle, with 40 percent of consumer transactions taking place outside of the state sector of the economy.

In general, foreign investment has been actively pursued by enterprises throughout the region. By the end of 1995, there were approximately 30,000 contracts signed with foreign partners by firms in the region. Only one-half of those contracts, however, involved foreign direct investment in local production facilities.

In addition, all of the newly independent states have embraced revised monetary policies as the basis for economic restructuring. Given the economic interdependence imposed by the Soviet administered system, the liberalization of prices by the Russian Federation provided incentives for monetary reform throughout the region. Despite this domino effect, the rates at which prices have increased have varied among the newly independent states. Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Moldova, in particular, were compelled to intervene forcefully to control inflation, with strict regulations for specific strategic products. The methods for intervening have ranged from the provision of state subsidies for agriculture and food processing by the governments of Central Asia and Moldova, to the imposition of restrictions on profit accumulation, as practiced by the governments of the Baltic states and Ukraine.

Since 1994, economic conditions in the region have radically changed in comparison to the initial post-Soviet period. According to data provided by the Committee of Statistics of the CIS, the aggregate gross domestic product among the newly independent states decreased in the first quarter of 1996 by 3.7 percent, as compared to the analogous period in 1995. During this period, the most significant annual decline in economic growth was logged by Ukraine at 10.7 percent and Azerbaijan at 8.5 percent. In contrast, during the same period, the GDP of Georgia and Kyrgyzstan increased by 14 percent and 2 percent, respectively.

**Differences in the Scope of Economic Reform Among Newly Independent States in the FSU**

The newly independent states can be subdivided on the basis of the scope and depth of efficiency of the respective economic transformation. The first group consists of states that have experienced low rates of economic reform, such as Ukraine, Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Tadjikistan. According to data from the Institute of Economic Analysis, the liberalization process in each of these cases has been incomplete. In Turkmenistan, for instance, bureaucratic regulations
have completely stymied the reform process. Among these states, the total percentage of employees working in the private sector has ranged from 30 percent to 40 percent, with average inflation rates in 1995 ranging from 9 percent in Ukraine to 31 percent in Turkmenistan. The national currencies among this group of countries have been continuously devalued, and the rates of decline in real wages and incomes have exceeded the fall in GDP for each state. This, in turn, has precipitated large-scale migration to Russia from Ukraine, Turkmenistan, and Tadjikistan. In Ukraine, for example, roughly 60,000 more people in 1994 relocated to Russia than in 1993. Similarly, over 7,000 people from Turkmenistan migrated to Russia, thus significantly lowering the size of the Russian minority residing in the former Soviet republic.

Despite this general propensity to obstruct the reform process, the states within this first group have made some progress toward infusing market mechanisms into the local economy. The pace of privatization in Ukraine, for instance, was recently accelerated. The original reform program called for the privatization of 33,000 small enterprises before July 1996. The fits and stops of this program notwithstanding, mass certification of privatization in Ukraine is expected to be completed by the end of 1996. At that time, stocks for approximately 400 major and average size companies are expected to be sold every month, with shares of 200 companies to be offered for compensation certificates. Integral to the realization of this process has been the development of a functioning stock market in Ukraine, and the creation of a securities exchange commission to regulate transactions and constrain speculation. According to data provided by this commission, the total market value of all securities issued and in circulation in Ukraine equaled 100 trillion karbovanetz by June 1, 1995.

The second category of newly independent states of the FSU is comprised of Kazakhstan, Russia, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan. This group consists of states that have sustained nominal rates of growth while continuing to experiment with radical economic reform. Although significant successes have been registered in some areas (such as with Russian and Uzbek privatization, and foreign investment in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan), the requisite macroeconomic reforms have been inconsistently implemented. Formal and informal state regulations protect the strategic spheres of the economy. As a result, national budget deficits remain precariously inflated in each case. In 1995, none of the members of this group achieved financial stability, as each incurred rising annual inflation rates. In Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, for example, inflation rose by 60 percent and 85 percent, respectively; while in Uzbekistan and Russia, inflation ballooned by 120 percent and 131 percent, respectively. In addition, growth rates in GDP continue to decline among members of this group, as evidenced by Uzbekistan (0.5
percent) and Azerbaijan (17.2 percent). Moreover, Russian emigration among this group increased from 91,100 to 146,700 during 1993-1994; while the numbers leaving Kazakhstan increased from 195,600 to 346,300 people. In Azerbaijan, the trend peaked in 1992-1993, with 69,900 people annually departing for Russia.

The third group of states consists of Georgia, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova. These states have enjoyed rapid rates of growth while undertaking structural reforms. After experiencing two to three years of half-hearted and inconsistent reforms, these states renewed commitments to structural economic reform in 1994-1995. As a consequence, each one of these states achieved financial stability by the end of 1995, marked by average inflation rates that did not exceed 2-2.5 percent, annual inflation rates capped at 30-33 percent, and gross domestic product growth rates that decreased by no more than 3-6 percent. Moreover, these economic improvements have tempered migration to Russia from these states. Thus, the influx of immigrants from Georgia decreased from 69,000 to 40,000 in 1993; from 96,800 in 1993 to 50,000 in 1995; from Moldova, from 32,300 people in 1992 to 17,000 in 1995; and from Armenia, from 46,500 people in 1994 to 10,000 people in 1995.

In general, the introduction of market reforms among newly independent states of the FSU increased the aggregate unemployment level in the region by 46 percent. In 1996, this left 3.2 million people unemployed. The highest rates of unemployment in the region have been registered by Kyrgyzstan, at 284.7 percent, and Kazakhstan, at 109.2 percent. This, not surprisingly, has precipitated relatively high levels of emigration from those countries.

The fourth category is comprised of the Baltic states—Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. In contrast to members of the other groups, these states have fully embraced radical market reforms. In these countries, the reform program has been aimed expressly at reducing state intervention into the economy, creating open markets, and establishing long-term economic growth. Monetary stability and the free exchange of capital have been the linchpins of this reform agenda. In addition, the Baltic states began the process of full-scale economic liberalization in 1992, well before initiatives were undertaken by other post-Soviet states. As a result of these early efforts, full financial stability was achieved in each state by the end of 1993. State budget deficits were either completely liquidated (Estonia) or marginalized to 1-1.6 percent as in the cases of Latvia and Lithuania. In 1995, inflation dropped to 23 percent per year in Latvia; 29 percent in Estonia, and 36 percent in Lithuania. Moreover, the non-state sector contributed to more than 60 percent of GDP for each state, and 63 percent of domestic manufacturing. In general, economic growth began to materialize by
1994, as GDP began to increase annually at rates of 102-104 percent in 1994 and 1995.

In order to create and operate an efficient monetary system, Estonia and Latvia took initiatives to codify principles for currency reform. Such measures included the stabilization of the national currency, imposition of fixed exchange rates and complete currency convertibility, and development of financial and capital markets open to foreign competition. Latvia, in particular, issued official decrees that bound national monetary exchanges to these principles of currency management. These measures expedited the extension of loans in Latvia, allowing commercial bank assets to increase three-fold, deposits to rise by 150 percent, and loan allocations to treble during 1992-1995.

This hyperactivity in the banking sector, however, was not without its costs. In Latvia, it undermined the quality of loan portfolios and “overheated” the banking system, thus precipitating a banking crisis in 1995 that forced 10 major financial institutions into bankruptcy. As a result, the acquisition of financial resources for restructuring the economy, and for covering internal and external debts remains a problem for Latvia. The ability to provide capital also remains quite limited. The privatization process has proceeded more slowly in Latvia than in Lithuania and Estonia, and land “giveaways” are non-existent. As with other newly independent states, industrial and agricultural sectors remain in the throes of profound crisis, though revival can be detected in individual sectors of industry. Under these circumstances, private foreign investments have been restricted to the service sector where there is a significant capital turnover.

Within the Baltic states, the quest for independence and autonomy has been accompanied by a rise in national separatism, and discrimination against residents of non-titular nationalities, including Russian-speaking minority groups. Jingoism has been especially acute in Estonia and Latvia, as the reactionary policies of decolonization have been very pronounced. Laws promulgated by the Latvian and Estonian governments have codified biased procedures for allocating land, job opportunities, and access to education. The attachment of the language law to citizenship requirements in Estonia, in particular, have segregated the population and significantly curbed the political and civil rights of non-titular minorities.

In this context, migration has become a prominent issue in the Baltic states. During the initial years of political development, there was a net outflow of people from the Baltic states. From 1990-1995, for example, 50,000 people left Lithuania, 95,000 exited Latvia, and 60,000 departed from Estonia.
Economic Reforms and Migration

Research conducted during 1990-1995 points to a positive correlation between the processes of economic change and migration from the newly independent states into Russia. In particular, there appears to be a strong correlation between the rates of decline in GDP growth and national production levels, and the rising aggregate percentages of migration in the region. According to the data summarized in Table 4.1, Georgia, which suffered the most precipitous drops in GDP and industrial production, sustained the heaviest emigration to Russia. Azerbaijan, Tadjikistan, and Kazakhstan demonstrated similar tendencies, as they ranked close to Georgia in all categories (see Table 4.1).

Table 4.1
Correlation Between the Process of Economic Change and Migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>58.9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadjikistan</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>+0.8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>+1.7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In general, economic reform in the newly independent states of the FSU prompted variation in the rates and character of regional migration trends. For example, the highest number of immigrants to Russia arrived in 1994, when 1,146,300 people relocated from the Baltic states to Russia, while 231,700 thousand people left Russia, yielding a net positive migration balance of 914,600
people for Moscow. In 1995, partial economic stability was directly manifest in the 150 percent drop in immigration in Russia

Conclusion

In conclusion, this analysis suggests that the rates of economic stability among newly independent states of the FSU vary inversely with the level of migration in the region. First, the more radical, consistent and complex are economic reforms, the less the scope of the monetary emission. Second, the higher the percentages of employment and production in the private sector, the lower the inflation rate, and the more stable the national currency. Third, the higher the rate of economic growth, the more noticeable the increase of real income in the population acts to temper emigration from the newly independent states. These issues, in turn, directly influence the migratory processes from the countries of the NIS and the Baltic states to Russia, as slowdowns in the rate of growth of market reforms in the countries of the NIS increase pressure for migration. Thus, increasing economic growth throughout the region has been integral to the downward trend of large-scale migration in the post-Soviet space.
5. Trends in Ukrainian Migration and Short-term Work Trips

*Sergei I. Pirozhkov*

Introduction

This report presents the results of a first-ever research project on migration from Ukraine for the purpose of earning income. Relying on a survey, expert interviews, and extensive study of the regional social and economic context, the project analyzed the migratory behavior of respondents in-depth, covering the types of trips taken, the role of migration for households, and its potential regional and national impacts.

The information gathered in the course of our research allowed us to identify the most popular type of migratory trip for Ukrainian citizens, namely, short term mobility for the purposes of trade. Other types of migration, such as longer-term labor migration and migration of specialists, were on the periphery of the research, but are also important for the social and economic development of Ukraine. Some background on the history of Ukrainian permanent and long-term migration is provided below before presentation of the research results.

History of Ukrainian Migration

A significant number of ethnic Ukrainians live outside Ukraine’s legal borders. This can be attributed in part to the forced migrations of the 1920s–1950s, which cost Ukraine the best of its intelligentsia and also many workers and farmers.\(^1\) Organized recruitment of laborers to work in the North and the Far East of the former USSR and military conscription resulted in the creation of a so-called “eastern” diaspora of ethnic Ukrainians (within the territory of the former USSR), which now comprises 6 million people.

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\(^{1}\)Entire ethnic groups were deported on the basis of their nationality, including Crimean Tatars, Germans, Greeks, Armenians and others.
A “western” Ukrainian diaspora arose as the result of labor emigration from western Ukraine at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, as well as the result of three waves of political emigration (1920s, 1940s, 1970s–1980s). Emigration to the West also reduced the population of certain minority ethnic groups in Ukraine—mostly Jews, but also Germans, Greeks, etc.

At the same time, favorable climatic conditions and a rather high level of economic development of Ukraine attracted immigrants from within the former USSR. Influenced by migration, the share of ethnic Ukrainians declined from 76.8 percent in 1959 to 72.7 percent in 1989, while the populations of other ethnic groups increased. The outflow of younger, more educated workers negatively affected the republic’s human resource structure.

Since the end of the 1980s, the character, scale, and direction of migration traffic to and from Ukraine have undergone fundamental changes. The disintegration of the USSR changed the character of migration into and out of Ukraine. Ethnic and military conflicts, as well as economic and political crises across the area of the former USSR have brought massive flows of refugees and forced migrants into the newly independent Ukrainian state.

Former emigrants, who had left the country for different reasons are now returning. Recent increases in immigration have been mostly comprised of native Ukrainians. Those now leaving Ukraine are generally representatives of other ethnic groups who are migrating to other newly independent states, typically where their ethnic group is the titular nationality.

In recent years, the volume of immigration into Ukraine has been noticeably decreasing while emigration has risen. This is attributable to the worsening economic conditions in Ukraine, which have led to a reduction of traditional migration based upon economic factors, family ties, education and army discharge. Positive net migration into Ukraine decreased in 1993 by almost four times in comparison to the previous year, to 77,000 people. In 1994, for the first time in the postwar period, Ukraine experienced a negative migration balance. Most of the loss was due to the emigration of Russians to Russia, with 124,400 more departing for Russia than coming from Russia, and an overall net loss of 143,200. Economic conditions have deteriorated in Russia, but the standard of living there has remained higher than in Ukraine.

At the same time, the disappearance of the “iron curtain,” which had separated the republics of the former USSR from the West, opened the way for Ukraine to participate in global migration flows. Emigration from Ukraine to the “far” abroad intensified and has taken the form of both permanent and temporary (for employment, education, etc.) emigration. In recent years, Ukraine has also faced
a new phenomenon: illegal immigration from other newly independent states, South-East Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

Between 1987 and 1992, of the 284,000 people emigrating from Ukraine, 75 percent went to Israel. Emigration to Israel from Ukraine has been declining, however, with 29 percent (of 48,000 emigres) departing for Israel in 1993. In 1994, only 6.2 percent of emigrants from Ukraine were headed for Israel. Emigration from Ukraine has been losing its ethnic character and is becoming primarily economic emigration.

Temporary emigration abroad, reaching 2 million trips a year (not including tourism), has also been tied to economic reasons. Two-thirds of these trips are to neighboring Poland. For many Ukrainian citizens, trips abroad have become an important source of supplementary income. In addition to the so-called “trade tourists,” who transport small shipments of goods across the border, other working migrants also have begun to comprise a noticeable share of those leaving temporarily.

A large number of migrant workers travel to Russia, in addition to the far abroad. Due to the fact that customs controls are tightening and neighboring countries tend to limit immigration from the former USSR, the number of trips to the West is decreasing. At the same time, the flow of temporary migrants eastward (to Russia, primarily) is growing. Friendship and family ties are still strong there, there is no language barrier, no need to obtain any special travel documents, and there are also opportunities to earn money. This migration outflow increased especially in 1993 to 1995, when the economic situation in Ukraine was worse than in Russia. However, it is difficult to estimate the volume of temporary labor migration from Ukraine as there are no official statistics. Sociological surveys, then, are required to study such migration trends for Ukraine. Results of our own surveys are reported and analyzed below.

Analysis of Recent Trends in External Migration: An Ethno-Sociological Approach

In the late 1980s to early 1990s, temporary trips abroad for the purpose of migrant work or trade became a noticeable social phenomenon in Ukraine. According to a survey by the Center for Democratic Prospects (1994), 5 percent of those surveyed worked abroad full-time, and 21 percent did so from time to time. Since the total labor force in the republic numbers 29 million, one can assume that no less than 7 million people used trips abroad to survive under the difficult conditions of this transitional period.
The mass scale of these trips and their effect on income levels and consumer spending demonstrate the necessity of taking this phenomenon into account in developing social and economic policies. However, there is a lack of scientifically sound information on this phenomenon and there are no official records documenting temporary migration of Ukrainian citizens.

A survey aimed at filling this gap was conducted at the end of 1994 and beginning of 1995 by the National Institute for Strategic Research together with the Center for Social Monitoring (Kiev). We used an ethno-sociological research approach, developed and first used in the 1980’s to study Mexican migration to the United States. In addition to a survey, this method makes full use of geographic, demographic, social, economic and other data about the migrants’ environment, acquired from ethnographic observations, detailed interviews with the migrants and their families, experts’ opinions, etc.

The focus of the research was foreign trips by Ukrainian citizens. All trips, with the exception of tourist trips and vacations, were analyzed regardless of their length, purpose and destination. The survey was conducted in families in which at least one member traveled abroad at least once for the purpose of earning income. A short preliminary questionnaire was used for advance screening, and the sample selection was random, although some respondents were selected according to the “snowball principle.”

As the actual migration behavior of people in Ukraine was being studied for the first time, the term “migration” was interpreted rather freely. Thus, we studied, among others, short-term business trips, which are not, in the strictest sense of the word, usually considered migration, but which significantly affect the financial and social aspects of the travelers’ families and market trends in Ukraine.

We selected three places to conduct the ethno-sociological survey: Kiev, the capital, from which people actively travel abroad and from which many highly skilled people are leaving, presenting the risk of “brain drain”; the city of Chernovtsy, a regional center on the border with a multiethnic population and which is a large source of Jewish emigration and of “near the border migration”; and, lastly, the rural Yavorovsky district of the Lviv region, with a monoethnic population, whose people have a long tradition of migration and foreign trips.

In Kiev, the main questionnaire was completed by 200 families, with information received on 663 people. In Chernovtsy, 120 families were polled, with information collected on 395 people total. In Prilbychi village, Yavorovsky district of the Lviv region, 120 families participated, with a total of 578 people polled.
The research instruments included the preliminary questionnaire, used for identifying migrant households, the main questionnaire, consisting of 23 tables with 10 to 12 questions each, and instructions for researchers. The main questionnaire asked about gender/age composition of the households, their occupations, education, income level and sources of income, property, etc. The tables covered the first and the last foreign trips, excluding vacationing or tourism. As more and more people travel to Russia and other countries of the newly independent states (NIS) for seasonal work, the questions accounted for migration in both directions.

Research Results

The results were analyzed in the context of other data concerning historic, social, economic, and demographic trends for selected regions, as well as in-depth interviews of experts. The survey showed that 30 to 40 percent of the households sampled contain someone who has made at least one trip abroad. Migrants were mainly men, highly educated, and traveling for business purposes.

Since 1987, international travel has become more frequent for Ukrainians. The majority of respondents undertook their first trip abroad in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Significant societal and political changes brought by perestroika and, later, the formation of independent Ukraine, not only increased foreign travel, but changed its character. The military no longer served as a migration channel. At the same time, people received the opportunity to travel abroad with tour groups and on personal business. Expansion of business, scientific and cultural cooperation with foreign countries brought an increase in the volume of foreign business travel. Long-term business trips were replaced by multiple, short-term visits. The demographics of migrants became more varied, including more women and young people.

Another decisive factor affecting the current state of migration has been the unfavorable trend in the Ukrainian economy and the decrease in the standard of living. Under conditions of a deep economic crisis, foreign trips are an important, and sometimes the primary, source of income and become the main survival strategy for many families.

The most prevalent form of implementing this strategy is short-term international trips (for up to seven days) for the purpose of trade. Such trips constitute one-third of all trips from Pribychi, and 70 percent of all trips from Chernovtsy. Chernovtsy, thanks to its border location and a developed transportation system, as well as its tradition as a trade city, became an important
source for "shuttle trade" during recent years. From there, imported goods are transported all over Ukraine, as well as to Russia and Belarus. The median number of short-term (up to one week) foreign trips among respondents there was eight trips, compared to six trips in Kiev, and three trips in Prilbychi.

**Purpose and Direction of Migration**

The level and nature of migration in many respects depend upon the specifics of each region. According to our research results, a region's location, employment rate, other economic circumstances, and historic traditions can all be considered regional determinants of migration. For example, the relatively active migrating population in Chernovtsy may be traced to a trade route through Chernovtsy which was established in the early 1980s by Polish traders. As a large scientific and cultural center, migration from Kiev in search of employment is mostly by scientists and highly skilled labor.

The majority of commercial trips conducted by Ukrainian citizens are in tourist groups, the so-called "shopping tours." Specialized firms sell packaged tours for this purpose. Also, some of these travelers make use of personal invitations from abroad, which are easily obtained in the border regions.

The survey showed an increase in seasonal work-related trips, popular mostly among rural populations. In the western region of Ukraine, with its abundance of labor resources, peasants have a long tradition of seasonal labor, originating in the 19th century. In the Soviet period only eastward seasonal migrations were permitted due to restrictions on foreign travel. More recently, farmers from the Lviv region continue to migrate in search of seasonal work to Central and South Ukraine, Russia, and other countries, mostly to Poland. A group of seasonal laborers exists also in Chernovtsy.

Migrant workers from Ukraine perform temporary, seasonal work abroad in construction, agriculture, and the service sector, as a rule without work authorization, i.e., illegally. They travel with tourist vouchers or by private invitations. The nature of such trips determines their duration, which usually does not exceed several weeks or several months. Trips of educated professionals are somewhat more lengthy, but in general, are also relatively short-term. Generally, they are less than six months. These are mostly business trips, internships, and short-term contracts.

Overall, the survey results suggest that long-term trips abroad are not very popular. About one fourth of all trips lasted more than a month and these were
mostly limited to two to three months. Just a handful of trips exceeded three months duration.

The range of Ukrainian migrants' destinations is wide and constantly expanding. In recent years, more distant countries emerged as a destination, including the USA, China and United Arab Emirates. At the same time, the primary flow of emigrants continues to be in the direction of Poland and Russia. This is true for both trade trips and seasonal workers. Migrants who leave home to work in their area of specialization are mostly headed for developed Western countries, such as the USA and Germany. Migration also increased and has spread further eastward in the "near abroad," within the area of the former USSR. This can be explained by relatively low transportation prices within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the absence of visa requirements and language barriers, and the existence of chances to improve one's financial situation through trade or work.

Socio-economic Characteristics of Migrants

The main reason for all kinds of trips taken by Ukrainians is their desire to maintain or improve income. Over the course of time, this reason is becoming more and more widespread. Growing unemployment rate, or, rather, inability to find work providing adequate earnings, has had a strong effect on migration trends. This can be seen most clearly in those regions where the problem of employment is relatively acute, namely, in Chernovtsy and Prilbychi. In Kiev, in addition to economic motives common for all regions, professional considerations are also present.

The survey revealed a distinction between migrants for whom unemployment is a cause of their migration, and those who are not employed by choice and instead look for more profitable opportunities abroad. The highest number of unemployed persons among the migrant population is found in rural areas; however, in Chernovtsy the group of non-working migrants is also large.

Research has shown that people of a certain age and social background are most inclined to use external migration as a means of improving poor living conditions. The socio-economic and demographic characteristics of migrants from Ukraine were similar in all survey sites. Any differences between the urban and rural migrants correspond to the general differences among urban and rural residents.

Households of migrants surveyed were mostly comprised of young and middle-aged people, and did not have a large number of small children, elderly or
disabled. The majority of migrants in all regions are between the ages of 20 and 34. Men prevail, but women also actively participate in migration, primarily in short-term trade missions.

Migrants are generally characterized by a high level of education. In Chernovtsy and Kiev 51 percent and 41 percent of active migrants respectively have higher education. We have identified people with doctoral degrees, and authors of scientific papers and inventions. In the rural areas, people with higher education also take an active part in migration.

The age, education and professional composition of migrants imply that foreign trips are undertaken by people at the peak of their abilities. Those who travel abroad are generally more active people, who are strong both physically and psychologically. These are the people who can withstand the pressures of a trip abroad, while at the same time these are the people whose loss the country will feel the most if they emigrated permanently.

**Results of Migration and Short Trips Abroad**

Our research has established that families with migrants enjoy sufficiently high levels of income, as well as good housing conditions and ownership of property, mostly brought from abroad or purchased with the money earned during trips. In all surveyed regions, respondents considered the results of their migration abroad very positive. On a 3-point scale, they valued them at an average of 2.9.

The positive effects of migration were mostly based on the material results. This was mentioned by 97 percent of respondents in Prilbychi, 85 percent in Chernovtsy, and 80 percent in Kiev. Urban residents also mentioned that the trips enhanced their professional experience.

The survey showed that the average profit made from the respondents' latest trip abroad was $206 in Kiev, $322 in Chernovtsy, and $181 in Prilbychi. At the same time, the average per capita income in the same families, earned by working locally or from pensions, etc., did not exceed $15 in cities and was barely equal to $5 in villages. Achieving some level of financial independence and avoiding poverty, and, consequently, lowering social tension, are the main outcomes of international migration.

The role of migration, especially “shuttle trade” migration, in saturating the consumer market in Ukraine is very important. Its importance grows with the decline of domestic production of consumer goods. If we look at the number of border crossings in 1994 in the western region alone (along the border with
Poland, Slovakian Hungary, Romania), and count only those who travel for the purpose of trade (approximately 40 percent of all crossings, according to various sources), and multiply this number by the amount of hard currency individuals are allowed to transport, assuming the traders are using this money to purchase consumer goods abroad and to import them into Ukraine, the resulting sum represents about one-tenth of all Ukrainian imports. Comparing that figure with the volume of revenues from retail sales, we estimate that the “shuttle” traders provide for at least one-sixth of those revenues, which is actually a conservative estimate.

To a certain extent, foreign trips promote the development of new economic relations and the diffusion of new management principles. Furthermore, some successful migrants could accumulate savings sufficient to start entrepreneurial activities. According to the results of the survey, 15 percent of the migrants in Kiev and 20 percent in Chernovtsy are in business for themselves (both registered and non-registered). However, due to current economic conditions in Ukraine, revenues from migration are used mostly for personal consumption, and not for opening private businesses or production. The investment and tax environment in Ukraine is unfavorable for development of small businesses and hinders full entrepreneurial use of migrants’ savings.

It should be noted that the growing rate of trips abroad has its costs. “Shuttle” trade is a breeding ground for the “shadow economy,” and frequently involves crime. Although the majority of migrants are highly educated, many lose their qualifications and skills when they travel abroad. Especially damaging in this sense are the consequences of frequent migration for the younger generation. Physical and psychological stress, unavoidable in frequent and extended trips can have a serious negative effect on the migrants’ health.

The survey revealed that people are not well informed of the living conditions abroad and do not have sufficient command of foreign languages. The support networks for migrants, such as intermediaries, consultants, and public services barely exist. For this reason, and also due to the nature of the trips (short-term trade missions or semi-legal seasonal work), Ukrainian migrants abroad live outside of the realm of the social and public institutions of the receiving countries and are deprived of any social guarantees. Over 85 percent of migrants surveyed did not have any medical insurance, and many did not know that it was necessary or possible to obtain such insurance. Migrants’ workdays usually last 9-10 hours and housing conditions were very modest, with 7 percent of migrants sleeping at railway stations during their latest trip.
Conclusion/Directions for Future Research

Important results were obtained from the survey, but we cannot consider the results to be representative for the whole territory of Ukraine. It would be dangerous to make generalizing conclusions based only on data obtained from the capital and two territories because of the clear regional economic, cultural and psychological differences across Ukraine's territory. It is quite possible that similar research conducted in southeast Ukraine can produce different or, possibly, opposite results.

We obtained only scant information on long-term migration, which is insufficient for serious analysis. Due to the fact that fewer people take long-term trips (for at least 3 months) such cases were essentially not captured by the survey, as the sample was selected at random. Permanent emigration abroad was not considered in this research. Even though it has become more widespread in Ukraine recently, there still has not been any serious attempt at conducting research on permanent emigration.

Insufficient information on migration for long-term employment prevented us from studying a number of important issues in this regard. In particular, these include the formation of a migration network, contact between migrants and their family members remaining in Ukraine, as well as adaptation problems in receiving countries. On the other hand, some of the important questions pertaining to short-term commercial trips were also not answered. Many economic questions remain to be explored, including the volume and commodity structure of imported goods, transportation routes, sales infrastructure, pricing policies, etc. Trade migration as a widespread form of migration for Ukrainians carries various important implications for the nation and deserves a separate study. This migration greatly affects the consumer market and has a potentially powerful income effect.
6. Contemporary Migration Trends in Belarus

Lyubov’ E. Tikhonova*

A comprehensive assessment of contemporary migration trends in Belarus requires an historical perspective. Full appreciation necessitates comparison with previous patterns, as well as with trends in the republic's socio-economic development. Thus, this essay provides a preliminary review of the basic correlation between shifting migration patterns and demographic, ecological, and political changes in Belarus.

Throughout the post-war period, there have been three distinct stages of migration to and from Belarus. The period of agrarian “over-population” corresponds to the first stage (up to the 1970s). During this phase, two-thirds of the Belarusian population resided in rural areas. The republic’s urban areas were unable to absorb the surplus rural population due to the gradual pace of industrial development. Consequently, over 100,000 people emigrated from Belarus during peak years. Emigration outside of the Soviet bloc was rare and was generally politically motivated. Most migration during this first period was to other Soviet republics and was economically driven.

The second stage (1970–1985) occurred during the period of intense industrial development of the republic. During this phase, large urban industrial centers emerged to lure migrants from the rural areas. Emigration flows decreased and leveled off by the end of the period. Moreover, the migration pattern assumed a stable centripetal structure that protected Belarusian infant industries. According to various studies, a highly mobile and educated labor force immigrated to Belarus. However, the urban areas could not completely absorb the droves of younger Belarusians that flocked to the cities from the farms. As a result, the urban social infrastructure was saturated, thus precipitating a social crisis that squelched the economic incentive for migration.

During the third stage (from 1985), the contradictions of economic development were magnified. A “depopulation” phenomenon, originally observed in the villages at the end of the 1980s, became the norm across Belarus. The situation worsened in the wake of the Chernobyl disaster and further deteriorated with the

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socio-economic displacement precipitated by the breakup of the Soviet Union. As a result, throughout this period there was a tremendous exodus of people from the republic. Belarus, for example, lost over 30,000 people in population exchanges with other former republics of the Soviet Union. On average, 1.5 million people moved during the two years following the Chernobyl disaster. Only recently has this trend begun to subside.

The Chernobyl disaster dramatically disrupted previous migration trends, as people sought to minimize exposure to radioactive fallout. Because of the disaster, over 23 percent of the republic's territory was contaminated with Cesium 137 kBq/square meters. Over 18,000 square kilometers of farm land was contaminated, 22 percent of which became completely non-arable. Of the 1.8 million people that lived in the contaminated area prior to the accident (18 percent of the total population), roughly 25,000 people were evacuated immediately, largely on their own accord. Roughly 130,000 people have since relocated, although, due to the severe economic crisis accompanying the Soviet collapse, a large number have recently begun to return. This large-scale exodus from the contaminated zone altered the pattern of settlement throughout the republic. In particular, it gave rise to a bifurcated regional pattern of migration—some regions emerged with highly concentrated urban and rural populations, while others became scarcely populated zones which were poorly endowed with land and labor. In the Gomel oblast alone, for example, 100,000 people either left voluntarily or were forced out of the region.

The ecological disaster only exacerbated the existing rural to urban migration pattern in the republic. The largest exodus from the rural contaminated areas took place during the first few years after the disaster (134,700 in 1986; 115,800 in 1987; and 108,600 in 1988). This exodus not only reduced the size and altered the gender-age mix of the agricultural sector of the republic, but precipitated a nationwide de-population process.

In addition, the Chernobyl disaster indirectly led to a reduction in the labor force in cities near the contaminated zone. Large urban centers such as Gomel, Mogilev, Mozyr, Zhlobin, Pinsk, and Lida suffered dramatic population losses. The situation was even worse in many small towns located in the immediate vicinity of the accident. The void left by this mass exodus did not lure outsiders to the region due to concerns of lingering radioactivity, undeveloped local housing markets, shortages of medical provisions, a stagnating business community, and perverse taxation policies. Those who voluntarily left “clean” areas to return to the disaster zone remain there under one condition: that they never become “hostage to the zone.”
The Soviet collapse, however, also generated pressures that directly contradicted previous migration patterns. On the one hand, the process of democratization has allowed for tremendous labor mobility among the former Soviet republics. On the other hand, the ecological consequences of the disaster and the deepening economic crisis make the exchanges one-sided, as the number of emigrants from Belarus exceeds the number of immigrants. In 1985, emigration was extremely selective, resulting in a 2,200 net inflow of people into the republic. From the moment restrictions were lifted and emigration procedures were simplified, the balance turned negative—12,900 people in 1990; and 5,600 people in 1994. This volume was highest in 1990, as more than 34,000 people emigrated (over 97 percent went to Israel), with the number reaching 22,000 in 1991. During the last few years the emigration pattern in Belarus changed considerably, with the greatest numbers of emigrants opting for the United States (1.5 percent in 1990; and 41 percent in 1994) as the final destination point. The number of people emigrating to Germany has also increased, from 95 to 400 people, respectively.

In general, Jews have traditionally represented the largest share of emigrants from Belarus. This trend has changed over the past few years, as the number of ethnic Belarusian and Russian emigrants increased. In 1990, for instance, Jews represented 74 percent of all emigrants, with ethnic Belarusians and Russians constituting over 17 per cent. In comparison, the Jewish contingent in 1994 represented only 62 percent of the total number of emigrants, with the others together constituting approximately 26 percent.

According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the demographic trends of Belarusian emigration are especially ominous. Most of those that are exiting are young, working-age (20-24 years old) people, as well as those that are the most professionally active and productive (30-49 years old). Over 90 percent of those seeking permanent residence abroad are either college educated or have attended professional trade schools.

Major changes are also taking place in Belarus’ net population flows with the former republics of the Soviet Union. The number of ethnic Belarusians leaving the republic for the near-abroad is decreasing at a rate that corresponds with the emigration of the Russian-speaking population. Moreover, those forced to leave their homes in various regions of ethnic strife throughout the former Soviet Union now seek refuge in Belarus. As a result, the aggregate population is increasing rather than decreasing, despite the emigration of Russian nationals. From 1991 to 1993, for example, the republic absorbed approximately 90,000 people. This migration trend not only has compensated for the natural loss in population, but has also contributed to the overall growth of the population. Fear and confusion, experienced by the Russian-speaking population as a result
of the collapse of the Soviet Union, sparked the increase in the number of people who came to Belarus despite the ecological and health risks. Over the past several years (1994-1995), however, stress has become secondary to economic and ecological concerns in the migration calculus, resulting in a slight decline in the aggregate population.

In 1994, certain critical changes took place in the population flows between Belarus and Russia. In the past, the number of people coming into the republic from Russia was greater than the number leaving. Beginning in 1994, however, there was a negative balance due to a decline in the Belarusian standard of living.

Among the peoples of the former Soviet Union, the Belarusians have demonstrated the greatest propensity to migrate. In fact, they constitute over 47 percent of the total number of people in transition in the region. In general, these trends have occurred while intra-state population mobility has declined. The number of people coming to and leaving Belarus have been decreasing at approximately the same rate. A reduction in the total volume of refugees has been observed across the board. During 1991-1994, Belarus’ population exchanges with Russia decreased by 53 percent, with the former Central Asian republics by 48.5 percent, and with the Trans-Caucasian region by 61.5 percent.

Although some of the most socially active residents of Belarus have emigrated, migration flows have been largely contained within the republic, reaching 71 percent of the total in the last few years. The population has reacted to the breakup of the Soviet Union by curtailting economic, educational, and marriage-oriented migrations. Localization of the migration processes within the republic and the lowering of the population’s mobility are the main characteristics of the contemporary period. People prefer to wait out this “difficult” time, staying put in traditional areas of residence.

Over the past several years, a new trend has emerged, characterized by a decline in the rate of growth of the urban population in Belarus. This is attributable mainly to a decline in the flow of people moving from rural areas. By 1992, Belarus’ rural areas, which previously used to lose up to 60,000–70,000 people annually, had a net population inflow of 14,200; in 1993, the trend only slightly readjusted, with a paltry 4,500 people leaving the rural zones; and by 1994–1995 this outflow reached levels of 10,900 and 7,900, respectively. Inter-city relocation plays an increasingly important role in the regional structure of migration relative to the village-to-city transition. In 1990, for example, 82,800 people migrated between cities, with village-to-city transition totaling 109,300 people. By 1994, despite an overall decrease in the volume of migration, these flows were
64,400 and 56,600 people, respectively. Subsequently, inter-city migration has exceeded the volumes of people moving from rural to urban areas.

The influx of people into areas previously contaminated by Soviet ecological disasters is the new trend. In the Gomel oblast, for example, the population increased in 1993 by 2,400 people, as compared to the decline of 50,700 inhabitants in 1990. Similarly, in the Mogilev oblast there was a net gain of 2,300 people in 1993, as compared to the net loss of 6,400 people in 1990.

These basic trends in Belarusian migration correspond with general demographic patterns associated with modernization. However, in the absence of industrial development or urban growth, the pattern of migration has become more volatile and has shifted as a result of ecological and local socio-economic conditions. Socio-economic stabilization and renewed development, while affected by population transition, cannot be realized solely via the process of migration.

This limitation notwithstanding, migration patterns have affected the trajectory of Belarusian development by determining the size of the labor force available for employment. Labor emigration is still at an embryonic level, as only 2,000 Belarusian citizens have work contracts abroad, of which over 90 percent are employed at construction sites in Russia. Those leaving for employment in the far abroad are either highly qualified specialists, or unskilled laborers that occupy poorly paid and less prestigious jobs. Legal rights and protection for such labor, however, is non-existent and shows no signs of becoming institutionalized in the near future.

In general, there is an increasing demand for the Belarusian government to regulate the influx of refugees. Despite the legacy of the Chernobyl disaster, Belarus’ relative political stability has made it an attractive place for groups seeking to escape discrimination and flee zones of ethnic conflict throughout the near abroad. Moreover, Belarus provides a convenient stopover for those groups migrating to and from Eastern and Western Europe. Throughout 1989–1995, the State Migration Service registered nearly 31,000 refugees from the near and far abroad. In the absence of effective government mechanisms for regulating migration, Belarus has, for all practical purposes, adopted an “open door” policy that, in turn, has aggravated demographic and socio-economic problems in certain regions.

The majority of refugees come from Russia and the Baltic states. Over 76 percent of these immigrants speak Russian, of which more than one-half are Belarusian. The remaining 24 percent are evenly divided between the Tadjiks, Ukrainians, Poles, Armenians, and Georgians. The majority of these immigrants consist of single women with children (roughly 60 percent are of working age), with 46
percent consisting of children under 16 years and the elderly. The largest burden of refugees (approximately 52 percent) falls on the Vitebsk oblast, the only area not contaminated by radioactivity. The next largest is Gomel oblast with 16 percent, followed by Mogilev oblast with 8.6 percent. Although the latter two are the most contaminated zones, both regions offer abundant housing that attracts desperate people.

Adding to this influx of immigrants are refugees from outside the former Soviet Union. These immigrants consist primarily of peoples from Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Sri-Lanka, and Somalia. These people originally were sent to Belarus as part of educational and training programs administered by the Soviet state, and have since refused to return home for political reasons. According to the U.N. representative in Belarus, there are approximately 2,000 such refugees presently in Belarus. In addition, there are about 1,000 Vietnamese citizens living in the republic who had stopped working when their contracts expired. Some of them do not want to leave Belarus and continued to reside in the republic as illegal aliens. Others have been victimized by their own national government’s economic austerity and remain in Belarus because Vietnam does not have the financial resources to bring them home.

Belarus has neither the resources nor experience to legally monitor or enforce migration legislation. Nor do the other former republics of the Soviet Union have effective immigration controls. According to experts, the vast majority of illegal immigrants, roughly 200,000, enter from the CIS, Baltic states, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, originally as tourists, with or without transit visas for work-related and personal reasons. As a result, the migration situation adversely affects the socio-economic situation in the country, contributing to the spread of serious illnesses, rising crime rates, drug smuggling, expansion of the underground labor market, and real threats to national security of the republic.

Often, illegal immigrants arrive in the republic as refugees. As such they are not eligible to receive government assistance because there are no legislative acts concerning the status of refugees. Deportation of foreign nationals who do not have the right to stay in Belarus poses another serious problem, as the republic does not have the requisite resources to undertake such measures without adversely affecting social stability.

In order to solve problems of migration, the government created the State Migration Service under the State Labor Committee in June 1992. At present, laws concerning reform of the migration services, such as the development of a central apparatus with territorial subdivisions and the establishment of an independent management entity are still pending. Instead, foreign residents are
governed by the June 3, 1993, "Law on the Legal Status of Foreigners and Stateless Persons in the Republic of Belarus." According to this law, refugees are entitled to reside permanently or temporarily on the territory of the republic, to engage in a specific labor and economic activity, and to enjoy all socio-economic rights, including the right to social security (for permanent residents), and education. Other laws have also been passed, including "On Citizenship in the Republic of Belarus" (September 18, 1991); "On the Ethnic Minorities in the Republic of Belarus" (October 11, 1992); and "On Refugees" (February 22, 1995). The law "On Immigration," which is currently under review by the Supreme Council of the Republic, should complete the formation of an effective legal framework.

The law "On Refugees," adopted in February 1995, created the legal foundation for admitting refugees into Belarus. The law conferred upon refugees an appropriate legal status and specified the terms of government assistance. While it was expected that this law would be enacted starting July 1, 1995, it has been postponed due to the complex economic situation in the republic, the sharp drop in the standard of living, and the downturn in the labor market.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, migration trends in Belarus are forcing the government to improve rapidly the normative and legal infrastructure for regulating large population flows. Laws alone, however, will be insufficient for restoring balance to the process. Therefore, the state should craft regional programs aimed at controlling the uneven growth of urban areas and attracting people to depressed rural areas. State regulation is especially needed in those zones that are developing nascent economic markets. Farmers, for instance, require state subsidies to begin cultivating land on the outskirts of urban areas. Similarly, entrepreneurs that are seeking new business opportunities in small urban centers need federal support, via tax incentives and direct transfers, for the renewal and modernization of the local social infrastructure. Thus, because migration and modernization go hand in hand, it is critical for the Belarusian government to pursue highly coordinated strategies in both realms.
7. Chinese Immigration in the Russian Far East: Regional, National, and International Dimensions

Pavel A. Minakir*

In 1993, the issue of Chinese migration in the Russian Far East exploded onto the Russian political agenda. Hyped by local political elites and the media in Primorsky and Khabarovsk provinces, this issue led to the escalation of tensions between Russia and China during 1994. This burgeoning conflict, in addition to its immediate dampening effects on economic performance in the Russian Far East, complicated Moscow’s effort to reestablish central political control of the region. As a result, the issue of Chinese migration has had a significant effect on Moscow’s regional, national, and international policies.

From the outset, the anti-Chinese campaign waged in the Russian Far East media forced the Russian leadership to confront a series of issues. First, it raised questions about the magnitude of illegal Chinese immigration and its impact on the escalation of criminal activity in the region. Second, it stimulated discussion of the roles played by Chinese entrepreneurs in the current process of socio-economic development in the Russian Far East. Third, the widespread “China bashing” prompted analysts to investigate the sources of anti-Chinese hysteria prevalent in Russia. Finally, the issue prodded scholars to reflect upon Russia’s real interests in Northeast Asia, and the role that relations with China could play in realizing those interests. Together these issues have defined the importance of Chinese migration in the Far East for the course of Russia’s political development in general.

There are several aspects to the problems posed by Chinese immigration in the Russian Far East. Not only does the process affect the situation in the specific region, but it carries broader implications for center-periphery relations in Russia. Similarly, Chinese immigration is one of the most complex global issues, and a potential source of Russian-Chinese conflict.

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Russia’s expansion into the Far East precipitated Chinese immigration by default. By the end of the 19th century, roughly 500,000 Chinese lived in the Russian Far East, representing an important component of the regional labor force, especially in the agriculture, trade, and service sectors. The total population of the Russian Far East for that period did not exceed 1.5-2 million. Although the Russian scariest government closely monitored the situation and regulated migration processes, it did not impose unusually severe restrictions.

It was not until the construction of the East-China railroad that the co-habitation of Russian and Chinese populations in the Far East became a politically charged issue. At this time, a Russian colony was established in China’s Northeast region that, for practical purposes, legitimized the Chinese presence in the Russian Far East. The formation of a similar Russian colony in Manchuria also became an important impetus for Chinese immigration into Russia, as this colony served as a cultural and economic lure for Chinese entrepreneurs.

Despite this brief interlude, the Chinese colony in the Far East was neither oppressed nor supported by the Russian government prior to the 1917 revolution. (The Governor of Amur and the officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs repeatedly addressed this topic from 1908 to 1916, pointing to a number of serious problems associated with the Chinese presence in Russia’s sparsely populated Far East.) Following the revolution, the colony was ceded practical autonomy as a Soviet administrative district. At the same time, the influx of Chinese immigrants was effectively contained by tight border controls.

At the end of World War II, Chinese migration increased again due to the active formation of a satellite regime in China. This highly active migration was associated with intense training of Chinese experts and students on the territory of the Russian Far East. This migration was completely controlled by the Russian “center,” as part of Moscow’s political and economic offensive in East Asia. In fact, because Moscow’s ideological manipulation of the Soviet and Chinese populations was so effective, there was tremendous local tolerance for Chinese immigration in the Far East.

During this period, a Chinese market for Far Eastern industry was beginning to take root. Efforts to build a market and industry in China diverted valuable resources and manpower from rebuilding the Russian economy and resolving internal problems of the Far East. Simultaneously, there was a growing technological and economic dependency of China on Soviet enterprises, especially in the machine-building sector of industry. By the end of the 1980s and during the 1990s, this dependency had almost completely dissipated.
The increasing acrimony in Sino-Soviet relations after 1956 generated hostility towards Chinese immigrants in the USSR, especially in the Far East. In particular, there was a sharp decline in the number of Chinese students and interns that immigrated to the region. The tension in the relationship in the 1960s—caused by the events at Damansky and the placement of China on the list of strategic military-political enemies of the USSR—effectively put a brake on Chinese immigration altogether. The Chinese minorities in Khabarovsk, Blagoveshchensk, and Vladivostok, which by then had already been reduced to negligible levels, were simply evicted. Some were deported directly to China, while others were sent to unknown (at least to the locals) destinations, via the coercive methods perfected over many years by the totalitarian regime. It was no longer commonplace to see Chinese minorities conspicuously roaming the streets in these areas. Moreover, anti-Chinese propaganda was so intense that a definite “Chinese syndrome” materialized in a very short period that characterized the Chinese immigrants as aggressive and staunchly anti-Soviet.

In addition, Chinese minorities in the border regions of the Russian Far East were cut off from the Amur and the Ussuri rivers by barbed wire and fabricated barriers. The rivers were practically ceded to the Chinese, which angered the local Russian population in the Far East. As a result, an uncompromising regime was created along the Chinese border that generated virulent anti-Chinese propaganda. Such propaganda trumpeted the horrors of potential Chinese aggression—conjuring up threats of advancing Mongol hordes and the inevitable genocide of the Russian male population—and threw the local Russian population into a state of constant anxiety regarding the influx of Chinese into the region. For a long time thereafter, China became for the Russian Far Easterners a source of constant fear and the object of instinctive hatred, predicated on the firm belief that China was determined to annex the Primorsky Territory and the Trans-Amur region.

It was against this socio-psychological backdrop that the dramatic events in the economic sphere began to unfold, precipitating the resurgence of Chinese immigration and its attendant political problems.

The Economic Dimension of Immigration

The political and military rapprochement between the USSR and the Peoples Republic of China and the deepening commitment to economic reform in Russia reinvigorated Chinese immigration to the Far East. With economic ties becoming the linchpin in Sino-Soviet relations, previous Chinese migration patterns were quickly restored. This trend was cemented in 1991, as China’s economic reform
efforts began to outpace the Soviet transition, thus turning the Russian Far East into an increasingly attractive market for China's Northeastern provinces.

By 1991, the paths of Russian and Chinese economic development began to radically diverge. In Russia, the economic reform program had yielded rapidly declining demands for domestic industrial production and consumer goods. The Russian Far East, in particular, began to slide rapidly into a protracted socioeconomic crisis. By 1985, for example, specialized sectors of the area’s economy that previously produced more than 30 percent of the industrial production in the region were already on the decline. Traditionally abundant natural resource reserves were depleted. Investment levels in the early 1970s were too low to generate the material resources needed to sustain industrial production levels in the 1980s. The result was a decline in production levels within specialized industries that immediately affected the Far East’s fiscal status.

### Table 7.1

Production Dynamics By Industry Sector

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Timber (mill.m3)</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood Processing (mill.m3)</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish Creel (million tons)</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food production in the fish industry</td>
<td>1,504.1</td>
<td>1,655.9</td>
<td>1562.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


At the same time, China achieved significant success with economic reform, having experienced substantial growth rates in the emergence of private enterprises, manufacturing output, and production of consumer goods and foodstuffs. This strengthened Chinese export potential, as well as the demands for importing raw materials and machinery. As a result, the two economies began to complement each other in a fashion similar to the earlier stage of development in the 1950s and 1960s. This, in turn, created the basis for political accommodation between the two states that came to fruition during Gorbachev’s visit to Beijing in 1989.

The advent of *perestroika* in 1985 brought new hopes for the Far East. In 1986, in a speech in Vladivostok, Gorbachev announced a change in Soviet security and foreign economic policies towards the Asian-Pacific region. In particular, he declared that the region had become a high priority for the Soviet Union, promising rapid and constructive development of political and economic ties with countries throughout the region, regardless of regime type. As a result, in
September 1987, the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted the “Long-Term State Program of Economic and Social Development for the Far Eastern Economic Region and the Region East of Baikal to the Year 2000.”

This program, in addition to its implications for Soviet policy throughout the Asia-Pacific region, inaugurated a new phase in the development of the Russian Far East. It proposed that by the year 2000, the region would evolve into a self-sufficient economic hub, serving as the gateway for the region’s integration into the global economy. To realize this objective, the state planned to double the volume of capital investments in the region over the ensuing 15 years to an estimated 200 billion rubles, in 1987 prices. Moreover, the Far East development program was slated to be administered via Soviet central planning mechanisms. This included supervision by branch ministries that traditionally employed an extensive growth approach to the development of the local economy. Given the endemic deficiencies of this type of system, however, the program was doomed by resource constraints. There were already no possibilities for increasing the volume of investment. The last reserves were depleted by investments in the machine-building complex during the first years of perestroika in a failed attempt to bolster efficiency.

By 1988–1989, the constraints on the availability of resources and investments prevented the Soviet government from realizing the proposed targets for development in the Russian Far East. In 1986–1987, the region experienced a relatively high 4.4 percent rate of annual growth. In 1987, production efficiency declined precipitously from 2.9 percent in 1986 to 1.8 percent, with a continuous drop in annual capital investment. At the same time, the Far Eastern economy suffered from acute inflation, as labor productivity rates declined while rates of profit rose (by 7.0 percent in 1986, and by 5.6 percent in 1987) and wages increased (by 2.7 percent in 1986 and by 7.0 percent in 1987). Moreover, by 1988, the growth of industrial production declined, casting the Far Eastern economy into a prolonged crisis that affected practically every industrial sector and commercial sphere.

By 1990, the central government to all intents and purposes admitted its inability to fulfill its Far Eastern development obligations. Moscow defaulted on promised deliveries of foodstuffs, material resources, and consumer goods. In the retail trade sector, such shortages forced the depletion of local inventories.

At the precipice of economic crisis, regional authorities in the Far East undertook initiatives for accelerating economic reform throughout the territories. In May 1991, the Russian government held a joint session in Khabarovsk with the
Association of Councils of the People’s Deputies of the Far Eastern Economic Region and the Region East of Baikal. The purpose of this conference was to discuss proposals submitted by the Far Eastern authorities for redressing the socio-economic crisis in the region. The fundamental concept was to implement economic reforms oriented towards creating an open, mixed economy in the territory of the Far East. An orientation toward international economic cooperation laid at the crux of this regional proposal.

While the concept of creating a regional free trade zone was approved by the Soviet government, implementation stalled and was overtaken by the embrace of radical reform throughout Russia in the wake of the failed August 1991 coup attempt. That the national reform agenda involved the decentralization of foreign trade was fortuitous for the Far East, creating new opportunities for reorienting the regional economy towards Asian Pacific markets. Throughout the Soviet period, the Russian Far East developed lucrative export markets, especially in the timber and fishing industries. When radical economic reform precipitated a decline in internal demand due to the financial crisis and industrial stagnation, foreign trade became an attractive stabilizer for the regional economy. Regional export industries, traditionally isolated from internal markets in Russia and the CIS, exploited established ties in the Pacific Rim to offset partial losses from the collapse in the domestic demand. Thus, despite the Far East’s rather minor share in Russia’s foreign trade balance, which varied from 2.7 percent to 3.4 percent during 1992–1994, the region assumed an increasingly important role in trade and economic relations with Asian-Pacific states, especially Japan, China, and the Republic of Korea.

### Table 7.2

<table>
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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Export</td>
<td>Import</td>
<td>Turn-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Calculation based upon data provided by the Far East Regional Statistical Department and by the Government of the Russian Federation’s Center for Economic Research.

As is clearly seen from Table 7.2, South Korea and Japan constitute the most significant export markets for the Far East region. China, while traditionally the
principal exporter to the region, since 1991, has also become a significant market for Far Eastern products. The Far East’s share of exports to China increased from 27.3 percent in 1992 to 33.6 percent in 1993. As a result, China had become the second largest importer for the Far East at the end of 1993, with every indication of providing the most attractive and extensive long-term opportunities for Russian exporters.

By 1994, however, the period of extensive growth in Russian-Chinese trade had dramatically ground to a halt. The share of Far Eastern exports to China dropped to 9.7 percent in 1994. This decline in exports to China—the main importer of the region’s automobiles, fertilizers, and ferrous metals—was directly related to the shifts in the profile of Far Eastern exports that declined from 48.4 percent in 1993 to 14.6 percent in 1994. This was partially because Chinese goods had become less competitive compared to imports from other countries, and that the market was relatively saturated with Chinese goods. At the same time, however, the decline in Far Eastern imports from China was attributed to the disproportionately high import duties on certain goods, as well as to serious defects in infrastructure and organization of the bilateral trade in the Far East.

This trade shock occurred at a time when the Russian Far East economy had become increasingly dependent on trade with China to compensate for cumulative shortfalls in federal subsidies to the region. The border with China’s Northeast provinces was practically open, facilitating a massive flow of foodstuffs and industrial goods into the region. The southern regions of Russia’s Far East—the Primorsky and Khabarovsk territories, and especially the Amur Oblast—were in the throes of feverishly replacing centrally administered deliveries to China with local trade initiatives.

Two basic methods were adopted for satisfying Far Eastern consumer demands for Chinese imports. The first approach consisted of greater reliance on barter arrangements conducted by state enterprises and new trading companies. Barter deals were structured to trade natural resources (such as wood, fish, ferrous metals, coals, petroleum, cement) that were abundant in the Russian Far East for products from other Russian regions and the CIS (such as trucks, automobiles, non-organic fertilizers, ferrous metals, coal, petroleum, cotton, and fibers), which were then re-sold to China for consumer goods. The second approach involved promoting “shuttle trade” performed by individual Russian and Chinese citizens.

In 1992, cheap goods from China, even though they were of inferior quality, practically saved the Russian Far East’s consumer market from collapsing. Chinese goods completely dominated the region’s consumer market except in the
electronics and automobile sectors. At the time, quality was not yet a decisive factor in the consumption equation of the Russian consumer, who typically discriminated on the basis of price and was satisfied by the mere availability of traditionally scarce goods.

Accompanying the flow of Chinese goods to the Far Eastern market was a rush of Chinese investors. During 1992–1993, the Chinese were ahead of the Japanese and Koreans in the number of joint ventures formed with Russian firms. By the end of 1993, 42 percent of all joint ventures registered in the Far East involved Chinese capital investment, with the largest amounts flowing into the Amur oblast and the Primorsky territory. These investments, however, were primarily on “paper.” The majority of new enterprises registered with the expressed intention of liquidating their assets in the short-term. The cycle was simple and effective—a joint venture was registered in which the Chinese share of capital was paid in the form of commercial goods delivered from China. These goods crossed the border free from all customs duties, since they represented the Chinese’s portion of the authorized capital contribution. Upon selling the imported goods, the joint venture was liquidated with the proceeds transferred back to China. Bogus enterprises were also set up that permitted Chinese businessmen to circumvent Russian labor and residency restrictions on aliens.

By and large, the activation of foreign trade and the investment shelter it provided for the foreign entrepreneurs revitalized Chinese immigration into the Russian Far East, especially in the Primorsky and Khabarovsk territories and the Amur oblast. Immigration decisions were based on economic interests that tied the Chinese to the economic development of the Russian regions from which they had previously been expelled. In the process, China did not renounce territorial claims to the Far East region. As a result, the old political dispute resurfaced, but this time in the guise of creeping Chinese economic expansion in the Russian Far East.

**Various Faces of Chinese Immigration**

Since 1991, the Chinese have flocked to the Russian Far East under the guise of cultivating business ties. The first stage of such migration, 1991–1992, was marked by lax Russian immigration regulations and encouragement by the Chinese government. Some Chinese petitioned for residency permits and Russian citizenship on the basis of family ties. Moreover, a large flow of Chinese rushed into Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, and Blagoveschensk to study Russian in the specialized programs offered by colleges and universities in the Russian Far East.
By 1992, there was an active Chinese labor force in the Russian Far East. Chinese labor occupied a prominent position in Russian agriculture, which was no longer able to draft free labor from local urban centers to assist in the harvesting and processing of farm crops. The employment of Chinese workers began in 1990, but by 1992, the number almost trebled. Construction (especially interior finishing) remained the second most attractive sector for Chinese laborers, as economic reform had also deprived this industrial sector of a free indigenous labor force.

In addition, a significant number of Chinese immigrants used illegal channels to settle in the Russian Far East in order to conduct basic commercial activity. Coming to the Far East to sell small shipments of goods, they stayed on illegally, taking advantage of comparatively inexpensive housing accommodations and the prospects for high incomes. There were numerous cases of Chinese immigrants purchasing apartments, summer residences, and/or private homes on the black market as bases for conducting illegal commercial activity.

From the outset, this new wave of Chinese immigration became a controversial issue in popular and official circles in the Russian Far East. On the one hand, Chinese businessmen and their Russian counterparts were able to deliver food, consumer, and industrial goods that domestic markets could not provide. Chinese workers revived regional agricultural production and construction, which, by 1991, were already at an impasse because of the loss of “volunteer” labor from Russian cities. On the other hand, the influx of Chinese, which had a profound effect on large cities such as Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Blagoveschensk, and even Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, aroused nationalist anxieties. To many Russian Far Easterners, the “Chinese threat” was anything but abstract. Chinese immigrants and their obvious comparative economic advantages sowed fears of eventual Chinese political occupation of the region.

Adding to the tension, criminal activity in the region peaked in 1992, and was popularly attributed to the growing influx of Chinese. In fact, however, the Chinese turned out to be the victims of criminal racketeering, and not the source. Few Russians in the region were willing to appreciate this “nuance,” and public opinion overwhelmingly linked the rise in Chinese immigration to an increase in the crime rate. The festering anti-Chinese sentiments generated by these misperceptions were compounded by the obvious helplessness of Russian authorities to solve the problem of registering Chinese immigrants.

By the end of 1992, social and business circles in the Far East actively united in preparation for a new anti-Chinese campaign. Underlying this enthusiasm was a determination to remove troublesome competitors from the market. Russian
businessmen by that time, after gleaning insights from Chinese practices, felt able to fill any niche in the local market. As it turned out, however, the profit rates from selling Chinese consumer goods in the Far Eastern markets had been seriously exaggerated, and the probable losses from curbing trade operations with China were underestimated or simply ignored. Nevertheless, since 1993, a very militant anti-Chinese campaign has been underway to stop Chinese immigration and remove Chinese products from the Far Eastern markets.

The scale of Chinese immigration in the Russian Far East has been a contested issue. By different estimates, the number of Chinese immigrants in the Russian Far East in 1993 ranged from 200,000 to 2 million people. By 1993, however, the entire population of the three continental southern territories of the Far East, which were the focus of immigration, was only 4.8 million people. Furthermore, the entire population of the four major host regions—Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Blagoveschensk and Nakhodka—consisted of approximately 1.8 million people. This alone suggests that the higher estimates are tremendously exaggerated.

The number of legally sanctioned long-term Chinese residents in the Russian Far East is quite small. The estimated number of legal contract workers is approximately 10,000–15,000 people. An additional 10,000–12,000 people have received permission to study in the region for up to one year. It is hard to believe that the number of illegal aliens far exceeded these numbers. At any rate, during the operations carried out by the militia and border patrol in the Primorsky and Khabarovsk territories and Amur oblast, no more than 5,000–6,000 illegal immigrants were deported from each of these territories. Thus, it is unlikely that in 1992–1993, the real number of immigrants exceeded 50,000–80,000 people.

The skillfully organized anti-Chinese campaign led to the tightening of border controls in January 1994, and sanctioned the creeping tide of Chinese discrimination in the Far East. These sentiments were subsequently fueled by increasingly difficult economic conditions in China, including the tightening of investment regulations, virtual prohibition of barter operations with China, and the imposition of strict requirements for transactions involving convertible currencies. In 1994, these factors combined to precipitate a radical reduction of foreign trade and investment opportunities with China (especially in case of the Amur oblast). As a result, the volume of foreign trade turnover fell by more than 30 percent as compared to 1993.

The results of this trade war were disastrous, especially for those Russian companies that hoped to squeeze Chinese competition out of the Far East market. Such efforts boomeranged, resulting in the loss of valuable export markets in China. The Far East consumer market very quickly felt the reduction of trading
activity with China, registering a decline in inventories for inexpensive mass-produced goods. Consumer market prices accordingly increased, as rather inexpensive Chinese goods were quickly replaced in the market with more expensive (although better quality) South Korean and American goods.

In addition, the Russian Far East began to lose important prospects for foreign investment in major infrastructure renewal projects. For example, the project aimed at creating a Russian-Chinese special economic zone in the Blagoveschensk-Haihe region was put on indefinite hold. China also realigned itself with North Korea to stymie the development of the Tumangan transit project in the Primorsky territory. While this was welcomed by South Korea, it threatened to isolate the Russian Far East from the international cargo transit network developing between Europe and the Asian-Pacific region.

For many of the key manufacturing sectors in the Russian Far East (machine-building, building materials, metallurgy) this trade shock raised the gloomy prospects for losing potential markets in China. At risk was the opportunity to participate directly in the reconstruction program for Chinese heavy industry which had been built in the 1950s and 1960s with the assistance of the Soviet Union, including many Far Eastern enterprises.

As a result, Russia's heavy-handed policy towards China in the Far East region produced enormous costs. Not only were these acts counterproductive, they were completely unnecessary. The Chinese government, for the most part, was not opposed to the tightening of Russian immigration controls for the sake of establishing order in the border territories. In 1992–1993, Beijing offered to take joint action in this regard. The problem, however, was Russian regional political leaders who preferred to bolster their legitimacy by resorting to force for “the protection of national interests in the region.”

By the end of 1994, it had become obvious that the Far East had paid too stiff a price for severely regulating immigration. Already by the end of 1994, regional leaders in the Far East started to take steps to stabilize the situation with China. At the beginning of 1995, the administration of the Primorsky Territory signed an economic agreement with the Tsilin province, concerning joint participation in the Tumangan project. Authorities in Khabarovsk and the Amur oblast restored and deepened contacts with the Heilunzyan and Shenjan provinces.

In 1995, foreign trade between the territories of the Russian Far East and China was partially restored, as general foreign trade turnover increased by more than by 30 percent. The previous year of destructive activity, however, had taken its toll, and led to important structural changes in Far Eastern markets. In particular, American and South Korean businesses exploited the vacancy left by
Chinese businesses to carve out strong niches in local consumer markets. Moreover, the regional power structures became increasingly oriented toward these countries, despite official rhetoric directed at promoting contacts along the Pacific Rim. These changes in the geographic composition of foreign trade increased the prices of imported consumer products and decreased the Russian Far East’s competitiveness in regional trading markets, since China remained the only real alternative regional market for Russian goods.

Despite these problems, some argue that there were lasting benefits of reorienting trade away from China and toward America and South Korea. It is argued that these latter countries were in a better position to provide real capital investment in Russian regional projects. In reality, however, the inflow of foreign investment is not contingent upon any particular level of mutual trade. Much more important is the general investment climate throughout Russia. Given this caveat, because of the uncertainty in the investment climate throughout Russia, the Far East was doomed from the start in its attempts to solicit large-scale American and Korean investment. While the Russian Far East tried to pave the way for Japan, the United States, and South Korea to invest in regional markets by actively buying their goods, these countries invested their resources in China where the investment climate has been more favorable and a legitimate system of guarantees for foreign capital was in place.

The problem of attracting Chinese investment in the Russian Far East, both now and in the future, is more closely tied to Russian immigration policies than is understood by officials at the regional level. Since China’s foreign investment resources are limited, it is possible to expect only investments in small businesses. But, due to the prevailing laws that govern small business activity, the effective utilization of the invested capital can be provided only by the personal control of its use. Hence, if the region wants to receive real capital investments from the Chinese, it must inevitably accept Chinese immigration.

The continuous and escalating hostility that the Russian Far Easterners harbored toward Chinese immigrants proved to be a serious test for Russian-Chinese relations in general. The agreement that Gorbachev signed providing for the demarcation of the Russian-Chinese border in the Far East (considered as one of the crowning achievements of normalized relations) was significantly jeopardized. Regional leaders, spurred on by popular anxiety that they themselves provoked and manipulated, adopted a hard-line stance regarding a number of protocols concerning the demarcation of the border, especially in the Primorsky and Khabarovsk territories and the Jewish autonomous oblast. Local authorities, with the support of their constituencies, began to assert autonomy vis-à-vis a center that was widely perceived to be overly concessionary in
relations with the Chinese. This regional assertiveness significantly complicated the inter-state dialogue, and the negative strategic fallout was contained only after persistent actions by Russian federal authorities to reassure the Chinese that authority still rested with Moscow.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this analysis reveals a number of important findings that bear directly on the link between Chinese immigration and Russian regional assertiveness. First, it suggests that assertions about the dangerous scope of Chinese immigration and real threats to the national sovereignty of the Russian Far East are not empirically grounded. Second, the report reveals that the anxiety surrounding the issue of Chinese immigration was created by Russia’s loss of control over the immigration process that occurred in 1992. Third, there is strong evidence to support the contention that Russian discrimination against Chinese immigrants in the Far East complicated overall socio-economic conditions in and prospects for the region, and that unilateral protectionist attempts at revitalizing Far Eastern industrial competitiveness threatened the loss of the vital Chinese market. Fourth, the “Chinese card” that was played by the regional leaders to consolidate their authority severely complicated Russia’s capacity to advance its geopolitical interests in relations with China. Fifth, artificial restrictions on the Chinese presence in the Russian Far East market resulted in a shift in the structure of foreign trade flows, thus narrowing opportunities for the region to enter the global economy and realize the developmental benefits of free trade.

Finally, this analysis suggests that Russia consciously withdrew from any constructive dialogue with China at a regional level due to distorted perspectives on Chinese immigration and its implications for China’s expansion in the Far East. China’s role in the Russian Far East’s international economic and diplomatic relations in the Asian-Pacific region, especially Northeast Asia, has, ironically, expanded as a result of these misguided policies. As a consequence, Russia, in general, and the Russian Far East, in particular, have become further isolated from the most important geopolitical and economic region of the world.
No state's political development is predetermined. This is especially true with respect to the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) which have acquired national sovereignty and independent governing structures for the first time. In theory, there are multiple explanations for the political trajectory assumed by each of these states. Upon closer examination, however, it becomes clear that one factor—migration—has had a decisive impact on political development.

Migration has shaped the course of political development among states of the FSU along a number of different dimensions. In particular, the issue has directly affected: 1) ethno-cultural beliefs regarding security and national rivalries; 2) the processes of state- and nation-building; 3) the manner by which nationalities policies are expressed in language laws, educational structures, and employment opportunities; 4) the prospects for inter-state integration; and 5) the prospects for the disintegration of existing state boundaries, and the creation of new geographic borders.

Among the new states of the FSU, the most salient divisions cut across national, rather than territorial, boundaries. Examples include the Baltics, the republics of the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The challenge is to identify the lines of cleavage and devise a model for understanding the interplay between the constituent parts of the broader region.

The first section of this chapter presents the evidence and a brief description of the basic pattern of political development for the five states of Central Asia. The essay focuses on these particular states because they have experienced more than two-thirds (67.6 percent) of the cumulative net decline in population of the FSU, with population exchanges with Russia accounting for 1.5 million out of the total 2.2 million people that migrated throughout the region in 1990-1994.1

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* Sergei A. Panarin is head of department for the Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences.
1 Information taken from Russia in Numbers, Moscow: 1995, pp. 33–34.
The second section of the chapter reviews possible scenarios of political development within Central Asia. These scenarios are explicated with respect to the specific causal factors of migration in each state. For each scenario there is consideration of both general and specific sources of migration, as well as analysis of the implications that migration holds for political development in the respective states.

Central Asia: The Primary Political Model and its Modification

In general, domestic factors are more critical to the process of political development in Central Asia than external variables. In particular, resource, societal, and ethno-social factors play the most decisive role in the region. The relative importance of these factors, however, varies across the region. At one extreme is the zone comprised of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan which is dominated by the presence of nomadic tribes; at the other extreme are Tadjikistan and Uzbekistan, which are predominantly agrarian societies. In between these zones is Turkmenistan which is dominated by a unique combination of these factors. Over time, the economic differences between these zones have faded, but the attendant cultural differences persist.

External Factors. Central Asia occupies a remote corner of the world, and, besides relations with a select group of nations (Russia, China, Iran, and Afghanistan), remains isolated from mainstream geopolitics, as well as from pressures generated by the global political economy. This isolation has, in turn, fostered a peculiar sense of “inwardness” as each state within the region exerts influence on the other. As a consequence of this synergy, external influences do not provide stable models of political development for the region.

Intra-regional relations have assumed a specific character. The region is dominated by two poles–Kazakhstan to the north and Uzbekistan to the southwest. The other states face hard choices between influences emanating from these two regional powers. In particular, Kyrgyzstan is directly under Kazakhstan’s influence, while Tadjikistan is more open to influence from Uzbekistan. In contrast, Turkmenistan has sought to fend off external pressures altogether, as part of a broader isolationist strategy. As for the regional giants themselves, Kazakhstan, which is located on the very edge of Central Asia, shares a long border with Russia and cannot implement any measures aimed at development that disregard Moscow’s preferences. Uzbekistan, which is “hidden” in the center of region, remains relatively autonomous of extra-regional forces.
Resource Factors. A common feature among all Central Asian states is the structural imbalance of resource endowments. There is typically a deficit of both capital and water resources, and a surplus of unskilled labor. In many respects, this combination of factors determines the development of institutions for social security and social control, as well as norms of behavior, civic accord, intra-ethnic relations, and public attitudes toward authority. Any governing authority in Central Asia can remain strong as long as it manages to provide direct access to these life-supporting resources, even if at ever-diminishing levels.

Despite the critical importance of resource endowments, authorities throughout the region must also devote priority attention to controlling crime and corruption. Authorities need to react quickly to spontaneous flares-ups of social unrest by containing the political fallout of public disorder and the mobilization of domestic opposition. Regimes need to convey a spirit of popular consent and to unify diverse political factions. In this regard, each regime must concentrate on bolstering its strength vis-à-vis society, creating effective mechanisms for internal repression and attenuating political pluralism. Thus, there are strong objective factors that restrict the course of democratic political development and predispose the states of Central Asia toward authoritarianism.

Societal Factors. In addition, different aspects of the urban-rural division within each society affect the course of political development in Central Asia. The region as a whole is characterized by population concentrations in the capitals, industrial areas, and zones of agro-industrial production. These areas are bastions for liberal values, individualism, secularism, and cosmopolitanism. The remaining agrarian territories in each state are dominated by “traditional” relations such as inherited social ties, patriarchal values, collectivism, and religious, ethnic, or clan loyalties. The different combinations of this societal dualism has affected the trajectory of political development for each Central Asian state, thus confounding the application of regionally generic models.

Since the pre-industrial period, Central Asia has sustained an Islamic-based civilization. Confessional unity has been a powerful factor of intra-regional integration. Local Islam has strengthened the values of collectivism and respect for political authority. This has mitigated against the development of individualism and freedom of political choice, and fostered group solidarity and political conformity that, in turn, has stabilized development. At the same time, the Hanifin sect of Islam, which has dominated Central Asia, has been more

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amenable to secularism and modernization than other mazhabs.\textsuperscript{3} In general, Islam in Central Asia incorporates various political strains. Often, it serves as a symbol of national-cultural and ethnic identity; at the same time, it also weakens national unity. This type of Islam also possesses a rather strong tradition that calls upon believers to challenge secular authorities. Thus, escalating tensions between ethnic groups are more likely the result of conflicting secular demands than of cultural or theological differences.\textsuperscript{4}

**Ethno-social factors.** All societies in Central Asia are multi-ethnic. Despite the presence of titular majorities, each state is inhabited by diverse ethnic groups. As borders “solidify,” this ethnic diversity could become a critical source of intra-regional tension.

European ethnic groups occupy different positions within each state of the region. While the percentage of “Europeans” in Central Asia remains significant, it is greatest among those states in the first zone. In this zone, “Europeans” are dispersed throughout urban and rural areas. In the second and third zones, this diffusion is less pronounced, with Europeans residing mostly in cities. As a result, only in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan can European groups make claims for both cultural and territorial autonomy; while in Kazakhstan, they can also make claims for reunification with Russia. In contrast, it is unlikely that in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan they will be able to establish even cultural autonomy.\textsuperscript{5} Accordingly, “Europeans” could prove decisive in shaping the path to political development in the first zone where their presence already has had a visible effect on the local political culture.

All titular populations in Central Asia are divided into clans that impede the progress of political development in each state.\textsuperscript{6} Clan loyalties interfere with the formation of unified national constituencies and fuel corruption and nepotism within governing structures. Ethnic minorities excluded from these social structures face informal discrimination by default. The ruling elite is torn apart by both latent and overt factional struggles that stifle the process of nation-building.\textsuperscript{7}

Emigration from the region by Europeans has exacerbated ethnic rivalries. As suggested by the course of events in Tadjikistan, their departure actually threatens the disintegration of state structures. The danger has been compounded by the tendency of titular majorities to resort to national symbols as a rallying point for the consolidation of control over the state. This instrumental use of ethnicity has fostered discriminatory internal policies, excessive concentration on political traditions, formation of personality cults, and systematic neglect of individual and minority rights.

A Paradigm for Regional Political Development

On the basis of the above discussion, it is evident that internal factors have led to the prominence of authoritarianism in Central Asia. External pressures have not been able to alter dramatically this course of political development. There are, however, certain distinctions between the three zones that have lead to variations in the basic paradigm of regional political development.8

The first variant applies to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In these cases, the basic model of authoritarianism is supplemented by democratic traits, including elements of a presidential republic with significant and ever-expanding authority vested in the head of state. These regime-types are characterized by soft or “enlightened” bonapartism, with governance conducted by plebiscites and decrees. For each state, there is a constitutionally mandated separation of authority among the different branches of government. In practice, however, this has translated into the creation of strong vertical executive power, with weak legislative and judicial oversight. These states have the most developed and influential political parties in Central Asia. Moreover, they permit opposition and human rights organizations, as well as a relatively free press (especially in the capitals). Criticism of the current regime is tolerated but remains politically irrelevant, as it is either ignored or censored. The countries are relatively open to the world, with activist foreign policies oriented towards Russia, the United States, Western Europe, and the Pacific Rim.

The second variant of the basic political paradigm covers Uzbekistan and Tadjikistan, where authoritarianism is combined with cosmetic elements of democracy. The regimes are extremely bonapartist, marked by direct presidential rule. The division of authority between the branches of government

8This information was compiled from Russian, Kazakh, Kirgiz, and Tadjik periodicals. Some other works include Kazakhstani Realities and Perspectives of Independent Development, Moscow, 1995; Uzbekistan: Ethnopolitical Panorama: Essays, Documents, Materials, Volumes 1–2, Moscow, 1994, 1995); Smith, Graham, eds., The Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet States, London: 1996, pp. 315–410.
is merely a formality, as legislative and judicial powers are completely dependent upon the executive branch. The political pluralism that emerged in the late 1980s has been replaced by official political parties and state structures. The press is completely controlled, and opposition and human rights movements are not tolerated. Moreover, these regimes maintain a semi-closed posture toward the rest of the world.

The third variation to the generic authoritarian model applies to Turkmenistan, where one finds both overt and "patriarchal" forms of bonapartism, consisting of direct presidential rule (formally legitimated via referendums and "elections"), total police control, and the promotion of a "cult of personality" around the national leader. The separation of powers is incomplete even at the constitutional level. Partisan politics are woefully underdeveloped, the press is strictly controlled and obsequious, and the opposition has been either destroyed or expelled. The few human rights advocates that remain are at the mercy of hostile governing authorities. Moreover, the country is half-closed to the world, with diplomacy directed specifically at distancing the country from all major powers.

Migration-Related Dimensions of Political Development: The Implications for Change

Ethno-Cultural Concepts of Security and Conflict in Central Asia

The nationalities of Central Asia aspire to equal security. In this regard, there are no meaningful differences between Kazakhs and Germans, Uzbeks and Tadjiks, or Russians and Kyrgyz. The primary ethno-cultural differences within the region concern the specific requirements for security stipulated by each national group. In general, there are two types of groups that demand specific security requirements. The first group is categorized along ethnic lines, distinguishing between titular majority and minority groups. The main difference is taxonomic, based on disparities in size and position of the two ethnic groups. The second division cuts along urban-rural lines. In these cases, the main difference is sociological, reflecting different levels of modernization. The boundaries become blurred, however, in those cases where minority groups are part of both industrialized and non-industrialized societies, and where

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"Europeans" not only differ from "Asians" in terms of level of modernization, but simultaneously constitute a minority group.

The security concerns of different groups correspond to these cleavages. Within the region, ethnic minorities (individuals and groups) are most threatened by acts of political and social violence by a titular majority that jeopardize their economic status or national identity. In contrast, a titular majority’s primary "national security" concern rests with preserving the territorial integrity of the state and the group's ascendant political position. At the same time, "European" and "Asian" security concerns vary along individual, group, economic, social, and ethno-cultural lines. The specific combinations are depicted in the Table 8.1, below.10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Preferred Security Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europeans</td>
<td>Asians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>personal</td>
<td>individual actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>group</td>
<td>establishment of equal rights for groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economical</td>
<td>free access to rewarding employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social</td>
<td>state institutions in all spheres for providing social guarantees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ethno-cultural</td>
<td>preservation of the status of the Russian language</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.1
European and Asian Security Concerns

From Table 8.1, we see that the European population is more individualized than are the indigenous populations. It also relies upon social support from the state. As a result, the achievement of personal, economic, and social security is viewed

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differently by the two groups, with the “Asian” groups being better positioned to prevail in an open conflict.11

Ethno-cultural distinctions within the native population are not as vividly expressed. The Muslim background of all titular peoples—common Turkish background (except for the Tadjiks), and long historic traditions of cooperation and bilingualism—have prevented national groups throughout the region from forming distinct conceptions of security. This, however, is where a serious threat to the region’s security lies in the first place. Both the titular majorities and native minorities equally appreciate the importance of markets and obtaining guaranteed access to vital resources as requisites for security. When perspectives of security are “zero-sum”—tied to the same types of activity, the same positions, and the same resources—then the conflicts become most acute. Fortunately, both sides can rely on traditional institutions to foster national unity. The majority group, of course, has an undisputed advantage in consolidating power in its “own” state. The only solace a minority group can find in this scenario is support from sympathetic majority groups in neighboring states.

Competing interests and notions of security have already set the stage in Central Asia for a series of ethnic conflicts.12 This stems largely from the fact that resource imbalances in the region cannot be redressed in the near-term. As a consequence, societal rivalries will persist even after the majority of “Europeans” re-settle, as long as the urban bastions of modernization remain intact. Nations cannot be formed overnight; ethno-cultural ideas of security are too deeply entrenched to change dramatically within the next five or ten years.

Conflicts between titular majority and minority groups within one state will be fueled by competition for scarce resources. Initial conflicts will take place in local markets and in the “halls of power.” In the second zone, conflicts will likely emerge along the perimeter of the Fergana valley, in the areas where minorities reside among the largely Uzbek population; near the Aral Sea (between Uzbek and Turkmen, and Uzbek and Karakalpak groups); and in Tadjikistan (between intra-Tajik local groups and between Tadjik majority and local minorities, such as Lokai and Tadjik Arabs). In addition, occasional pogroms and deportations of the “peoples of the Caucasus” are possible throughout the region. Overall, however, contradictions between “newcomers” and “locals” will become more commonplace in the first zone. Problems of access to resources and jobs will

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exist there as well. But the primary role will be played by ethno-political conflicts, as legislative acts and local governance will become the focal point of struggle. Here, the "battleground" will be the mass media; the "players" will consist of the power structures, political parties, and popular movements; and the "weapon" will be political struggle.

Several potential ethno-political conflicts will remain localized in the southern states of Central Asia. It is possible, for example, that Karakalpak will start demonstrating separatist tendencies. Moreover, one cannot rule out the possibility of irredentism among Tadjik minorities in Uzbekistan, Uzbek minorities in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, as well as further attempts of the peoples of Pamir to wrestle autonomy from Dushanbe.

Currently, the only festering conflict in the region is the civil war in Tadjikistan. Although quasi-ethnic and social in character, the conflict has assumed a definite political coloration that is bound to persist. Moreover, since the prospects for resolving it in the near future are murky, it will undoubtedly shape the parameters of political development in Central Asia.

There are three possible scenarios for the remaining conflicts in the region. In the first scenario, ethno-social tensions will lead to moderate conflicts that local authorities will be able to control. In Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, ethno-political tensions between the titular majority and minorities will be squelched via the arrest of minority group leaders, launching of anti-corruption campaigns, and personnel turnover in the government. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, tensions will be released through parliamentary debates, nationalistic campaigns in the press, and public demonstrations.

The second scenario consists of intensified ethno-social conflicts among native populations. This will occur especially between "Europeans" and "Asians" in the first zone. In these settings, ethno-social violence can be instigated and manipulated by local politicians, and the normal political struggle might degenerate into street skirmishes and pogroms.

The third scenario involves the transformation of intra-state ethnic conflict into intra-regional conflict. In these cases, local ethnic tensions will evolve into regional wars.

The first scenario seems most probable. This is largely due to the fact that stability is highly coveted by all of the national groups in Central Asia. Furthermore, it is clear that "European" groups appreciate their relative weakness in the region and strive to avoid acute, open conflicts with "Asian" groups. Regional political leaders are also cognizant that their states are weak,
and that their own power bases lack sufficient popular legitimacy to mobilize their peoples for war.

With the likely unfolding of the first scenario, current levels of coerced migration from Central Asia will persist, as shaped by the other aspects of political development. In the other scenarios, migration flows can be expected to increase. Some nationalities will rush to exit Central Asia and enter one of the Slavic countries, as was the case during the civil war in Tadjikistan. There are also numerous intra-regional cases of forced migrations. Violence will also repel those groups that are not directly affected by it and that had not previously decided to move. This will result in the migration of a large number of Russians and “Russified” minorities. At the same time, a chain reaction will occur, beginning with the flow of “titular” refugees\textsuperscript{13} into the cities vacated by the Europeans. This will give an additional “push” to the local “Europeans” that remain.\textsuperscript{14}

**Concepts of Nation-Building: The Consolidation of State Structures**

Irrespective of formal constitutional stipulations and official statements, all states in the region practice the same form of governance. In essence, each constitutes a secular, multi-national state. The focus of each is on establishing loyalties to the state that take precedent over nationalist bonds. The states differ only with respect to the manner by which this goal is pursued.

This conceptual underpinning has directly affected the migration process in the region. The idea of a nation “by the people and for the people,” that already requires significant sacrifices by minority groups, is subordinate to the idea of a “nation from our own for ourselves” that is completely unacceptable to most minority groups. As a result, many national minorities have sought to emigrate from Central Asia.

A complete reversal of this trend will require a revolution. However, even the armed Tadjik opposition was not capable of overthrowing the regime on its own. If a popular movement of Russians and Russian-speaking peoples becomes

\textsuperscript{13} In internationally recognized terminology, this constitutes internally relocated individuals and refugees from neighboring countries. Russian definitions are not accepted by the countries of the region.

organized in Northern and Eastern Kazakhstan, then we might expect certain concessions from the central government. But even these concessions would only lead to the reversal of extreme centralism. While providing oblasts more autonomy might stem the drive toward independence, it would only retard emigration from Kazakhstan.

The key to stemming this trend resides in the consolidation of governance among Central Asian states. The weakness of a government creates uncertainty for minority groups regarding state protection, thus encouraging emigration. As a result, it is critically important that the regimes in the region develop robust governmental, administrative, and social security infrastructures as part of the broader process of political consolidation.

Within the region there are great discrepancies with respect to the scope of political consolidation. While all of the states have developed robust control procedures, there are wide disparities in terms of administrative capacity. The administrative structures of Uzbekistan, for example, are the most developed and attuned to prevailing political and economic conditions. In contrast, the capacity of the governments of Turkmenistan and Tadjikistan remain weak. In between lie the gradual processes of political consolidation underway in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

The social security sectors remain the most weakly developed dimensions of state capacity throughout the region. This is especially problematic since the principle of social equality is highly valued across the territory of the FSU. It is revered as the critical link between the common citizen and the state, and is essential for establishing political legitimacy for any regime, regardless of its capacity along the other dimensions. The absence of social guarantees not only hinders the development of each state in the region but increases the attractiveness of reintegration with Russia, which is seen by many as a panacea for social insecurity.

15 According to the previously classified files of the MVD and prosecutor’s office. This information reveals that in Kazakhstan, for example, 53 percent of the minorities (which constituted over 40 percent of the local population, and even a higher percentage of the workforce) appeared before the state prosecutor. The percentage was even higher (60 percent) for senior minority group members.

16 This impression was conveyed openly by the listeners of the Radio Station Totem, Almati, Kazakhstan, Mar. 18, 1994.
Nationalities Policy\textsuperscript{17}

Unlike the Baltic states and Ukraine, the states of Central Asia have not devoted special attention to the development of formal nationalities policies. Respective constitutions include only clauses banning discrimination based on national origin. These, in fact, have been countermanded by subsequent statements and legal imprecision.\textsuperscript{18} This fact alone has not provoked concern among minority groups because they, like all other citizens of the former USSR, are accustomed to treating constitutional law as irrelevant and devoid of practical implications.

The same holds for contradictions in the laws governing citizenship and official state languages. The laws on citizenship, for example, are aimed at ensuring the civil incorporation of minorities into Central Asian societies—all states of the region have chosen the zero variant of citizenship; at the same time, all states, except for Turkmenistan and Tadjikistan, have rejected the notion of dual citizenship and advocated national assimilation. The laws on state language also encompass the goal of assimilating local minorities. As there are no special laws that realistically defend rights to cultural autonomy, minority groups face the stark reality of having to choose between assimilation and emigration. Policies in the fields of education and employment have had the same effect.\textsuperscript{19}

In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, recent decisions have better protected the status of the Russian language\textsuperscript{20} This immediately affected the rate of emigration among European groups: in Kyrgyzstan, it dropped by 1994; in Kazakhstan, emigration began to slow during the first nine months of 1995.\textsuperscript{21} This, however, might prove to be only a short-term phenomenon, as presidential decrees become codified into constitutional amendments. The fact is that the mass exodus in previous years has had a cumulative effect, as Russian schools and classes must

\textsuperscript{17} The section is informed by data and evaluations presented in Kolsto, Paul, Russians in the Former Soviet Republics, London: 1995. Unfortunately, the valuable summary of the laws prepared by the International Organization for Migration’s Chronicle of Legislation in the CIS and Baltic on Issues of Migration and Citizenship was not available for the drafting of this chapter.

\textsuperscript{18} In Turkmenistan, any form of national discrimination is forbidden; on the other hand, only Turkmen nationals are eligible to become president of the country.

\textsuperscript{19} In 1994, for example, in the five northern regions of Kazakhstan-Akmolinsk, Karaganda, Kokshetau, Kustanai, and Pavlodar regions—where Russian and Russian speaking individuals comprise the majority of the population (from 66 percent to 75 percent in 1989), the percentage of Russian students attending local colleges fluctuated from 24 percent to 25 percent.

\textsuperscript{20} See the decree by the President of Kyrgyzstan “About the Measures for Regulating Migratory Processes in the Kyrgyz Republic” dated June 14, 1994. Also, it is important to note the increase in status of the Russian language in the new Constitution of Kazakhstan (as compared to the previous constitution).

\textsuperscript{21} This is according to the data provided by the authorities of migration services of these countries at the scientific work study seminar “Regulating Migration and Human Rights in Central Asia,” held February 22-23, 1996 in Almati. The most noticeable drop in the migration balance was in Kyrgyzstan, which declined from 121,000 in 1993, to 57,500 in 1994.
now close due to the lack of students and shortage of teachers. In order to remedy the situation, the majority of teachers promptly need to be retrained. Thus, states in Central Asia are faced with the task of creating a favorable climate for the ethno-cultural revival of Russian and Russian-speaking people. This must be accompanied simultaneously by the rehabilitation of titular languages. It is unlikely, however, that the governments of the region will be able to give preference to “Europeans” over “Asians” on this issue. Thus, while we can easily predict further liberalization of nationalities policies in the first zone, we should not expect significant shifts in the region-wide trends of migration.

Prospects of Interstate Integration

Given the prevalence of authoritarism, the processes of integration throughout the region cannot flourish and should not be expected to bear stable political results.22 Because the zones of Central Asia will experience different rates of political development—in terms of the distribution of local resources (especially arable land and water) and nationalities policy—there will be additional obstacles to preserving ethnic harmony throughout the region.

Two possible mid-term scenarios seem plausible. In the first scenario, the present situation will persist. Integration will be expressed in terms of moderate regional economic cooperation, preservation of clear borders, and nominal political cooperation. The second scenario entails disrupting the close contacts established by Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan with the Russian-Belarus core of the CIS, undermining the quest of these states for full political independence, retarding the emergence of Turkmenistan from self-isolation and re-orientation towards Moscow and Almati, fostering Tadjikistan’s strong economic dependency upon Uzbekistan, and prompting Uzbekistan to distance itself from Russia by pursuing an independent agenda in the Middle East. In essence, the second scenario would not just strengthen integration within the region, but would reorient the region along a north-south divide. Accordingly, in the first scenario, the volume and directions of the coerced inter-state migration will not noticeably change. In the second scenario, we should expect some decline in the flow of emigration from the first and third zones, with an increase in the rate from the second zone.

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22 This is reflected by the record of political development throughout the Arab world.
Prospects for Disintegration of the Existing States

In the near-term, it is highly unlikely that the existing Central Asian states will disintegrate. Tadzikistan has retained its integrity after experiencing dramatic domestic turmoil. This is not to suggest, however, that Dushanbe has set the precedent for the region or that there will not be variation among the capacities of state to cope with such problems. Uzbekistan, for example, enjoys the highest level of nation-state integration in Central Asia, marked by penetrating state control and a strong but pragmatic leadership that far exceeds what was in place in Dushanbe in 1990–1992. In contrast, there might be an attempt to challenge the seniority of the Tekins in Turkmenistan. This, however, would be doomed to failure, as the conditions for settlement among Turkmen tribes differ from that of Tadzik groups. Kyrgyzstan, due to its terrain, territorial structure and particular ethnic cleavages will follow a course similar to Tadzikistan. Kyrgyz national consciousness, however, is somewhat stronger than that of the Tadjiks, and Akayev’s national standing is higher than that enjoyed by Rakhmonov and his two unsuccessful predecessors. In Kazakhstan, Nazarbaev serves as a similar unifying force. Moreover, the “Russian threat” (real or perceived) to Kazakhstan’s integrity facilitates Kazakh national unification. Thus, it appears that neither separatist nor tribal trends of political development are sufficient in Central Asia to stem the processes of national integration.

If the industries that employ the majority of “Europeans” in Kazakhstan do not start to improve performance in the near future, and if the decrease in opportunities for “Europeans” to preserve their ethno-cultural identity is not balanced by special political measures, then local Russians will likely undertake spontaneous action without any prodding from Moscow or support from abroad. In this case, a situation similar to the one that transpired in the trans-Dniester region might arise that will spiral out of control, regardless of the level of mutual understandings between Moscow and Almati. The migration repercussions of such circumstances will be grave, as the majority of Europeans will flee from areas throughout the first zone of Central Asia (including Kyrgyzstan). Also, there will be a noticeable drop in migration from the “rebel” regions included in the settlement; and if the force used to restore Kazakhstan’s control over the breakaway regions is not blunted by Russia, there will be a renewed wave of Russian emigration from Kazakhstan.

Conclusion

The political relevance of migration trends in Central Asia can be summed up as follows. In the mid-term, one should not expect a significant drop in emigration from the region due to political changes. Rather, there will be a gradual decline in European emigration from the region. Even those political changes that hypothetically could compel emigration of the Russian and Russian-speaking population, will materialize too late to have a dramatic effect. At the same time, political factors prompting intra-regional migration flows (both titular and non-titular) will persist.
9. Relocation to Russia From the States of Central Asia: Understanding the Decision to Migrate

Galina S. Vitkovskaya*

Introduction

Researching the migratory intentions of the non-titular, usually Russian-speaking, population of the countries of the Central Asian Region (CAR)¹ is timely from several perspectives. For the last three years the largest migration flow into Russia has originated in the countries of the CAR. It may be assumed that the greatest future migration potential from the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union into Russia is concentrated in the countries of Central Asia. The basis for this assumption is the presence of a huge Russian diaspora in those countries—more than eight million people as of the beginning of 1995.²

Other Slavic ethnic groups residing in those states, which also opposed the dissolution of the Soviet Union and have resisted assimilation under the new political conditions in Central Asia, increase the number of potential migrants into Russia.

During 1994-1995, the author surveyed 1,080 non-titular families (including more than 5,200 individuals), and 28 experts in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.³ The survey did not cover members of Central Asian ethnic groups residing outside their own titular republics, such as Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan, Tadzhiks in Uzbekistan, etc. The objectives of the research were to estimate the number of potential migrants from the CAR, to understand the reasons for

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¹ The term Central Asian Region as used in this paper includes the countries of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan.

² According to official estimates.

³ Including 528 families from Uzbekistan (Tashkent, Chirchik, Samarkand, Fergana), 316 families from Kazakhstan (Karaganda Ust-J-Kamenogorsk, and Pavlodar) and 236 families from Kyrgyzstan (Bishkek, Tokmak, Belovodsk) and also 31 experts from Kazakhstan, 9 from Uzbekistan and 8 from Kyrgyzstan. Due to the absence of data necessary for constructing a representative sample, the survey was conducted using the principle of random selection of residences. Entire families were questioned in the survey. Questionnaire forms were distributed, to be completed independently, with subsequent review and clarification of inaccuracies.
migration, and to characterize the individuals most likely to migrate. This research was made possible by the financial support of the MacArthur Fund and the Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation.

The Decision To Migrate: Certainty, Confirmation, and Stability of the Decision to Migrate

The primary objective of the research was to understand the motivating factors behind the decision to migrate from Central Asia to Russia. In analyzing the data collected in the survey, the first step was to identify groups of non-titular populations with different migratory intentions. The frequency of responses indicating a desire to emigrate appeared to be high enough to validate proceeding with the analysis. Of those surveyed, 75 percent in Uzbekistan, 66 percent in Kazakhstan, and 62 percent in Kyrgyzstan responded they would like to emigrate. Correspondingly, 14 percent, 24 percent, and 28 percent of the respondents expressed their desire to stay. However, we cannot evaluate the actual migratory potential based on these answers alone. It is important to adjust this data according to the certainty of the respondents' expressed or implied decision to migrate or to stay. The strength of their desire to relocate or stay may be measured by the stated certainty of their responses (interpreted below as "certainty" and "stability" of the decision) and by the preparations they have made toward fulfilling their stated intention (interpreted as representing "confirmation" of the decision to migrate).

The certainty of respondents' decision to relocate can be characterized by comparing the number of potential migrants whose answers include elements of uncertainty (answering "more yes than no") to those who without hesitation expressed their desire to relocate (answering "yes"). On this basis we have constructed indices of uncertainty of migratory intentions, the values of which are 0.253 in Uzbekistan, 0.523 in Kazakhstan and 0.625 in Kyrgyzstan. This indicates that survey respondents in Uzbekistan are most determined to emigrate, while those in Kyrgyzstan are most uncertain about whether to migrate.
Table 9.1
Steps To Prepare ForRelocation
(percent of all surveyed)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Steps Taken Toward Relocation</th>
<th>Uzbekistan</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Of All Surveyed</td>
<td>Willing to Relocate</td>
<td>Of All Surveyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No steps taken</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First-stage (information gathering)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- housing search</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- job search</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- applied for information</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- applied for help from local authorities</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- applied for help from a private organization</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First stage steps taken only</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second stage (preparing for relocation)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- prepared to file or filed documents</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- prepared to move or moved personal property</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- applied to consulate of destination country</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- resolved other logistical issues</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some second stage steps taken</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some first or second stage steps taken</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>98.8</td>
<td>41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third stage (complete preparedness)</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Confirmation of the decision to migrate is revealed in responses to questions regarding measures undertaken to prepare for relocation (the “second stage” in Table 9.1) and by the estimated date of relocation. Specific steps taken to prepare for relocation may indicate a serious intention to relocate. These steps are referred to as the “implementation stage” steps. Approximately 40 percent of the respondents in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, and 51 percent of those from Uzbekistan, responded that they had undertaken at least one step to begin the relocation process. The frequency of these answers is high and is relatively
consistent across all three states. Although having taken any of the steps indicates a positive decision to migrate, not all of these steps reflect the same probability of actually implementing the decision to migrate.

In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the overwhelming majority of respondents had only begun the first stage of steps towards relocation—primarily investigating ways to resolve logistical problems. Uzbekistan had the highest share of respondents who had implemented second stage steps and had resolved all the organizational issues and were at the third stage (complete preparedness). In Uzbekistan, 44 percent of the respondents indicating their desire to leave had taken some second stage steps, while in Kazakhstan this number is 18 percent, and in Kyrgyzstan—10 percent. This confirms the results of the uncertainty index, which indicated that respondents in Uzbekistan were least hesitant in their stated desire to emigrate. However, when considering only those who responded that they intend to migrate, nearly all of those respondents in each country had taken at least one first or second stage step toward that goal.
Table 9.2
Estimated Date For Relocation
(percents of all surveyed and of possible migrants)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimated Dates of Relocation</th>
<th>Uzbekistan</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Of All Surveyed</td>
<td>Willing to Relocate</td>
<td>Of All Surveyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within the week</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within the next few months</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within the year</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total for within one year</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within two to three years</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within three to five years</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total for within two to five years</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After implementing certain steps (house sold, financial issues, etc.)</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not know at this time</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>40.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents in Uzbekistan gave specific dates of possible relocation two or more times more frequently than those questioned in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (Table 9.2). However, the role of this parameter as an indicator of acknowledgment of the decision to migrate is not decisive. Simply because they were unable to specify a date for relocation does not exclude them from potentially migrating at some point in the next five years. Still, answers regarding the dates of possible relocation demonstrate a higher level of certainty in the migratory intentions of those surveyed in Uzbekistan in comparison with the two other states, where respondents either indefinitely postponed the date of possible migration or gave no response.

The stability of the decision to migrate can be evaluated on the basis of the respondents' answers to questions regarding the circumstances under which they could change their decision, as well as the terms under which they would consider relocation to be a real option. This is evaluated only for those respondents who indicated they were willing to relocate to another country.
Survey respondents in Uzbekistan appear to be the least prepared to alter their migration decision, while those in Kazakhstan were the most prepared to change their minds (Table 9.3). The stability index for those expressing a desire to relocate from Kazakhstan is two times lower than for those surveyed in Kyrgyzstan, and more than three times lower than in Uzbekistan. This pattern is close to that observed for the uncertainty and confirmation tests described above. The main conclusion to be derived here, as above, is that respondents in Uzbekistan are the most determined to migrate and are also most active in taking steps towards that goal.

Table 9.3
Willingness To Change Migratory Decision (percents of those willing to relocate)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option to Stay</th>
<th>Uzbekistan</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Yes” under certain circumstances*</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>70.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“No” under any circumstances</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability index for the decision to relocate</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: The circumstances which respondents mentioned could alter their migratory intentions include: stabilization of ethnicity problems (including deferring legislation regarding the state language issue and introduction of policies toward elimination of ethnic discrimination), establishment of legal guarantees of rights, integration with Russia, overcoming “isolation and feelings of alienation” (including passage of a dual citizenship law), social and political stabilization, and economic improvements in the quality of life.
Table 9.4
Most Important Conditions For Relocation
(percents of those willing to relocate)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Uzbekistan</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under any circumstances</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removal of property</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preservation of social guarantees and benefits (pension, seniority, etc.)</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communal settlement</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Option to relocate to a city</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of comfortable housing</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>62.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of any housing</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of a land plot</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of a job matching professional qualifications</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of any job</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family cohesion</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friendly environment</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of funds for relocation</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In comparison with Uzbekistan, respondents in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan attach many more conditions to their decision to migrate, i.e., their decision depends on the existence of a certain set of conditions. In Table 9.4, a higher positive response rate to the conditions required for relocation indicates that the migration decision may be unstable and may change if some of those conditions are not met. However, 9 percent of respondents in Uzbekistan said they would migrate under any circumstances, regardless of whether they would be able to secure a work position or place of residence in advance. For Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, only 4.3 percent and 1.4 percent, respectively, of respondents intend to migrate under any circumstances. The most important requirement for relocation appears to be the provision of housing, with 42 percent of respondents in Uzbekistan, 55 percent in Kazakhstan, and 63 percent in Kyrgyzstan requiring comfortable housing. It is interesting to note how many fewer respondents would be satisfied with provision of any housing; the response rates drop to between 12 percent and 17 percent.
Decision to Stay

In addition to exploring the decision to migrate, the survey results also allow us to analyze the intentions of members of non-titular groups who intend to stay. The specific weight of this group is an important factor in assessing the migration situation in the countries under investigation. For those indicating a desire to stay, the stability index for the decision to stay is very low, and very similar, for all three states (Table 9.5). This is evidence of the uncertainty of the circumstances in the near future for the non-titular populations in all states under investigation, and perhaps also of the low degree of ethnic and cultural integration.

Table 9.5
Stability Of Decision To Stay Of Those Willing To Stay
(in percents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option to Stay</th>
<th>Uzbekistan</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Yes” under certain circumstances*</td>
<td>80.00</td>
<td>81.10</td>
<td>85.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“No” under any circumstances</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>10.80</td>
<td>9.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability index for the decision to relocate</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>8.10</td>
<td>5.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: *The circumstances which respondents mentioned could alter their intention to stay include: serious civilian or military conflicts, other life threatening situations, increased political authoritarianism, border closings, discrimination against the non-titular population, imposition of a new state language policy, “if most of the Russian-speaking population leaves,” or “if most family and friends leave,” educational or employment difficulties, worsening of the economic situation, starvation, and other circumstances.

Evaluating the Likelihood of Relocation

Taking into account the certainty, confirmation, and stability of the migration decision (as defined above), we have calculated that 49 percent of the non-titular population in Uzbekistan, 20 percent in Kirghizstan, and 18 percent in Kazakhstan are likely to act on their intention to relocate, if the circumstances remain the same as at the time of questioning (Table 9.6).
Table 9.6
Likelihood Of Relocation Of All Surveyed (in percents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Uzbekistan</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Will relocate with a high level of probability (group A)</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will possibly relocate (group B)</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total expected outflow:</strong></td>
<td><strong>49.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>18.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>20.4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More likely to leave than stay (group A')</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>46.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More likely to stay than leave (group B')</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will most likely stay (group B'')</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, by the percent of respondents reporting a decision to relocate and having a high probability of implementing that decision (group A), Uzbekistan takes first place, Kyrgyzstan takes second place, and Kazakhstan takes third place. Looking instead at the shares of respondents reporting a high probability of staying (group B''), this order is reversed (although the numbers are very low).

Designation of non-titular population groups with different intentions and different probabilities of implementation is very important for evaluating the size of such populations who are the targets of various migration policy measures. Two groups (A, A') are potential migrants who are most likely to migrate and need organizational assistance in relocating and integrating into the new country of residence. There is a chance that some of these (in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in particular) may change their decision if the situation changes for the better in their present country of residence, or due to the absence of certain conditions for relocation. In the latter case, relocation would simply be postponed. The more hesitant groups (B, B') may be the most responsive targets of migration policies. And, finally, the fifth group (B'')—reporting the intention to stay—may still need assistance in adapting to their countries of residence.

The above analysis of migratory intentions of the non-titular population in the CAR supports the preliminary conclusion that the greatest migration potential is from Uzbekistan, with much less migratory potential in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.
Estimating the Potential Migration Flow to Russia

The survey data may be used in attempting to forecast actual migration behavior of non-titular residents of Central Asian states. In addition to those who stated they would definitely migrate, either permanently or temporarily, potential migrants who gave exact dates for their estimated relocation within a five-year period were also taken into account. Respondents giving a longer time frame for their decision to migrate may be included with those who responded, "do not know at this time," unless they are restricted by certain, known conditions which may be implemented within known time limits. The survey data here did not include that type of information. However, potential migrants who did not give an estimated date of relocation but who stated conditions for that decision (accumulating funds, resolving housing issues, etc.) were taken into account. Part of this group may migrate given the appropriate conditions in a five-year period.

Table 9.7
Country Of Destination
(percentage of total possible migration outflow from groups A and A')

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Uzbekistan</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>81.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>0.3*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.7*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anywhere</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not know yet</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far Abroad</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: *Koreans

Among those questioned, the vast majority of likely migrants intend to relocate to Russia (Table 9.7). This is primarily, but not entirely, due to a high share of Russians and other Slavic groups among the non-titular population. Among representatives of non-Russian ethnic groups, the decision to relocate to Russia is quite popular (Table 9.8). For example, potential migrants of Ukrainian origin are more willing to relocate to Russia from the CAR (50 percent of Ukrainian respondents in Uzbekistan, 80 percent in Kazakhstan, 50 percent in Kyrgyzstan), than to Ukraine (7 percent, 11 percent, and 10 percent, respectively). Russia is a possible destination for 50 percent of Belarusians and more than 80 percent of Armenians.
Table 9.8
Migratory Intentions Of Different Ethnic Groups
(percentage of those surveyed in various ethnic groups)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Uzbekistan</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>To Russia</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total expected outflow—groups A, A'</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Koreans</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Germans</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Russians</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Tatars</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ukrainians</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probably will relocate, than stay—group B:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Koreans</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Germans</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Russians</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>50.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Tatars</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ukrainians</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>44.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probably will stay—groups B', B'':</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Koreans</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Germans</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Russians</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Tatars</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ukrainians</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: *No data (-) indicates groups for which sample size is too small for analysis.

Ethnic groups which do not have national administrative formations on the territory of the former USSR are also oriented to relocating to Russia. For example, among potential migrants, 60 percent of Koreans from Uzbekistan, and 57 percent of Germans from Kazakhstan would relocate to Russia. Though the migration of Germans to Russia may be considered as an ethnic group returning to a country with a history of a German population with its own territorial-administrative formation, this migration currently is transitory: for the majority of Germans from the CAR, Russia is a temporary stop on the way to relocation to Germany.

The survey results indicate that Russia will likely remain as the primary destination country within the former Soviet Union for non-titular migrants from the Central Asian region. In contrast to other receiving countries—such as
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia—Russia will tend to receive substantial flows not only of ethnic Russians, but of other nationalities, as well.

Table 9.9
Calculation Of Potential Migration Flows Using Population Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Uzbekistan</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,000s</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>1,000s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total population, including:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koreans</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>1,360</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>5,783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatars</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-titular and non-Central Asian ethnic groups:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>included in research</td>
<td>1,850</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>7,131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not included in research*</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1,030</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: No data (-) indicates groups for which sample size is too small for analysis.
*CAR ethnic groups not residing in their titular republics were excluded from the survey, but their potential migration flows have been calculated elsewhere.

The proportions of various ethnic groups in the non-titular population of each country varies significantly and the migration potential for each group is different. In each of the Central Asian republics, the strongest determination to relocate is found among Russians (Table 9.8). The Tatars are somewhat less inclined to migrate, and the Ukrainians are significantly less inclined. Kazakhstan is the exception; there the intent to migrate among these three ethnic groups is almost equal. Therefore, the absolute value of potential migration flows to Russia should be estimated using an assessment of the migratory intent of the different ethnic groups and their population size in each of the states under investigation. The results of such calculations are presented in Table 9.9.

Utilizing data from the beginning of 1995 on non-titular ethnic concentrations and our estimates of the potential migratory behavior of each of these groups, the migration flow may reach approximately 850,000 persons from Uzbekistan, 200,000 from Kyrgyzstan, and about 1.5 million from Kazakhstan over the next five years. Thus, the flow from all the countries under research could total over 2.5 million people over a five-year period.
The first approximation is, however, based on the proportion most likely to migrate—equivalent to the share who had stated their decision to migrate without hesitation in the survey. Russia can also expect some of those who are currently hesitant, but more inclined to leave than stay, to migrate sometime in the next five years. Taking into account the proportion in the survey who gave exact dates for relocation, the total estimated migration flow over five years increases by another one million people.

Thus, by our estimate, total migration flow of (non-titular) residents of Central Asian republics to Russia could total 3.5 million people during the next five years. Statistical analyses of actual flows have produced similar results. In forecasts, such estimates match the most favorable scenarios (for example, under Sergei Panarin’s first scenario, described in his chapter included in this volume). It should be noted that the total estimate does not include migration of the titular population of the Central Asian countries, which, according to expert estimates, is expected to be significant.

The Motivation to Migrate

Contextual influences on migratory behavior of non-titular populations in the regions under study can be analyzed based on motivating factors underlying the decision to migrate. In Uzbekistan, the top four responses concerning the motives for migration were ethnic issues related to changes in the status of the non-titular population. In contrast, economic motives were in fifth place (Table 9.10).

In Kazakhstan, however, economic motives took second place, with practically the same frequency as ethnic-based motives. In Kyrgyzstan, ethnic motivations were in first place. Finally, only in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan was some of the respondents’ motivation related to crime, whereas in Uzbekistan, potential migrants were not concerned about that issue (Table 9.10). Other motives such as fears for their children’s futures, social and political instability, and personal issues were mentioned with nearly equal frequency in the three countries under investigation. Fears for their children’s future holds second and third place for each country, pointing to a concrete target for migration policies.
Table 9.10
Motives For Potential Migration, Percentage Of Probable Outflow, Groups A, A'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motives for migration *</th>
<th>Uzbekistan</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Place</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Ethnic motives</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Fears for the children's future</td>
<td>28.7/2</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Isolation from Russia</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV Uncertainty about the future</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Anti-democratic regime</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI Social and political instability</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>VI</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII Economic motives</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII Poor ecological conditions</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>IX</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX Criminal situation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X Personal motives</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>VII</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: *In the survey, the question regarding motivation to migrate was open, i.e., respondents did not have the option of a multiple choice answer. The responses were diverse and were categorized into twelve groups. These categorizations are imperfect as some answers may correspond to more than one group. Examples of responses representative of five of those categories follow below:

Ethnic motives*: concerns about national "ethnic policy," including seizure of power by the titular ethnic group and intent to create a monoethnic state; "ethnic discrimination," including non-titular ethnic groups becoming second-class citizens and experiencing civil rights infringements, employment discrimination, unequal access to higher education, etc.; popular nationalism, including experiences with harassment, hostility; "language barrier," including lack of schooling in Russian, lack of information in Russian, unofficial status of the Russian language, etc.; "other ethnic-based reasons for discomfort" including local cultural traditions, communication difficulties, desire to live among people of the same nationality, ethnic barriers to family creation, etc. "Fear for their children's future": limited education possibilities, and direct responses "fear/apprehension for my children's future"; "Isolation/alienation from Russia": deprived of contacts with Russia, loneliness, many Russian families leaving, relatives left to Russia, difficulties in communicating with relatives/friends, nostalgia, break-up of economic ties with Russia, dual citizenship not possible, absence of ruble currency zone, cultural isolation, etc.; "Economic reasons": deteriorating and unstable economic situation, closure of industrial enterprises, threat of energy crisis, poor economic policy prospects, no jobs or no professional jobs available, threat of unemployment, housing problems, low salary, irregular salary payments, impoverishment, poor quality products, poor medical services, ineffective social insurance, high prices, etc. "Personal motives": to study, for family reasons, health problems, a change of climate, etc.
Respondents who named more than one motive for migration did not prioritize them. However, some respondents named only one reason to migrate. Naming only one reason to migrate does not necessarily mean that there are no other motives, but it may be assumed that the named motive is the dominant reason, or incorporates several motives. A somewhat different picture of the motivation to migrate appears if we consider only those responses in which just one reason to migrate was provided. This approach certainly cannot be taken as representative of the non-titular populations of the CAR, but it does point to some interesting conclusions. Table 9.11 provides the distribution of responses for these "dominant motives" for potential migration.

Considering only the "dominant motives," in the case of Uzbekistan ethnic motives remain in first place, while problems of isolation and alienation move up to second place (from third place). In both approaches, economic motives remain far below, registering at fifth place. This evidence suggests the presence of a distinct hierarchy in the structure of migration motivation for the non-titular population in Uzbekistan, with ethnic issues prevailing.

Table 9.11
Dominant Motives For Potential Migration,
Percentages of Potential Outflow, Groups A, A'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motives for migration*</th>
<th>Uzbekistan</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Place</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only ethnic</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>I (I)*</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only isolation from Russia</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>II (III)</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only fear for children's future</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>III (II)</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only absence of uncertainty about future</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>IV(IV)</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only economic</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>V(V)</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: *For comparison, the position of the given motive when cited in conjunction with other motives, from Table 9.10, is provided in parentheses.

In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the structure of the motivation to migrate changes more significantly than in Uzbekistan when single responses are compared to multiple responses. In these two countries, motives directly tied to the consequences of disintegration of the Soviet Union move from third and fourth place to first place. Economic motives shift to third place in both countries, and ethnic reasons move to second place in Kazakhstan, and to fourth place in Kyrgyzstan.
This analysis allows us to consider the migratory intentions of the non-titular population in Uzbekistan as almost entirely motivated by ethnic issues. About 30 percent of potential migrants in Uzbekistan connect the intention to relocate to concerns about ethnic problems and isolation from Russia.

In Kazakhstan, these concerns also play a significant role and are cited as the only reason for relocation by almost one-quarter of all potential migrants (calculated by combining the “only ethnic” and “only isolation” responses in Table 9.11). But here the dominant place belongs to motives relating to the consequences of disintegration (isolation from Russia). In contrast to Uzbekistan, a strong secondary factor in the motivation to migrate from Kazakhstan is the deterioration of the economic situation.

In Kyrgyzstan, ethnic disintegration and economic issues were cited with equal frequency by potential migrants. Evidence of a dominant motivation in this case is much less than in the two other countries under research.

While economic motives to migrate are easy to understand, the connection between ethnic motives, disintegration, and concerns about isolation may not be so apparent. The three countries selected for research have clearly demonstrated their interest in integration among themselves. This is not surprising considering their geographic proximity, cultural similarities, economic ties, and shared history. A corollary to this tendency, however, is the disintegration of relations with the other states of the former Soviet Union.

Statements by the leaders of the Central Asian region about regional integration and economic and political reorientation towards Turkey, Iran, China, and other Asian countries diminish the probability of integration with Russia in the minds of the non-titular population. These statements confirm feelings of fear of isolation from Russia and other European countries of the former USSR. They also fuel fears of “Islamization” and of deepening ethnic differences and ethnic-based problems in their country of residence. As a result, disintegrational processes and isolation from Russia are dominant motivations for migration of the non-titular population.

**Disintegration, Citizenship, and the “Motherland”**

In addition to forcing the establishment of new currencies and customs barriers, the disintegration of the Soviet Union forced upon its former citizens either new citizenship or problems of legal status. This process has been accompanied by the disruption and dissolution of cultural, communication, and economic links. Furthermore, for various members of the non-titular populations in the newly
independent states, the concept of a “motherland” was destroyed. The “motherland” had been a huge, indivisible country, which suddenly no longer existed. As a result, the non-titular populations have experienced feelings of nostalgia and serious psychological discomfort.

A large portion of the non-titular populations could point to a second, or “minor motherland” in addition to the USSR—the republic where an individual was born or had resided for a significant part of his or her life. The vast majority of the non-titular population of the countries of Central Asia—83 percent in Kyrgyzstan, 86 percent in Uzbekistan, and 90 percent in Kazakhstan—were born either in their country of residence or in Russia (Table 9.12).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Uzbekistan</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>45.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In each country, the largest share of respondents were born in the country where they currently reside. In Uzbekistan, 62 percent of those questioned were born there, and only 24 percent in Russia. The corresponding shares for respondents in Kazakhstan were 59 percent and 31 percent; and in Kyrgyzstan—46 percent and 37 percent (Table 9.12). This implies that for a large portion of the non-titular population, the “minor motherland” is not Russia, but the Central Asian countries where they now reside.

Many researchers assume that those born in Central Asian countries are less prone to emigrate. The results of our survey indicate, however, that only in Kyrgyzstan is there evidence of a relationship between the intent to stay in Kyrgyzstan and the respondent having been born in that state (Table 9.13). For Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the relationship is in the expected direction (place of birth mitigating the desire to emigrate), but the relationship is much weaker. This may be interpreted to indicate that, as inter-ethnic problems grow, new circumstances may have a stronger impact on the decision to stay or emigrate than a person’s natural affection toward their native country. Therefore, under
conditions of deepening disintegration and deteriorating ethnic relations, having established roots in a Central Asian country may be a restraining factor, but is not necessarily the deciding factor in the migration decision.

Table 9.13
“Minor Motherland” As a Factor In Migratory Intentions
(change in frequency of responses, in percents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State of birth</th>
<th>Uzbekistan want to relocate</th>
<th>Uzbekistan want to stay</th>
<th>Kazakhstan want to relocate</th>
<th>Kazakhstan want to stay</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan want to relocate</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan want to stay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>-14</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+8</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>+14</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>+7</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>+5</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>+5</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>+9</td>
<td>-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>+15</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: No data (-) indicates groups for which sample size is too small for analysis.

It is interesting to note that, for each of the Central Asian republics, respondents who were born in Russia show a fairly strong preference for relocating, with this effect apparently most significant in Kyrgyzstan (Table 9.13). It is increasingly difficult to relocate to Russia, but those of Russian origin may perceive their chances for successful relocation more positively than Central Asian residents not born in Russia. Whether or not this factor will have an impact on actual migration will depend in part on Russia’s immigration policies.

Citizenship and Migration

To many living in the former Soviet Union in 1992, the breakup of the nation left them without citizenship. Perhaps the most surprising result relating to the survey questions on citizenship is the large share of respondents who consider themselves to still be citizens of the USSR. For all survey respondents, 12 percent in Kyrgyzstan, 29 percent in Uzbekistan, and 59 percent in Kazakhstan consider themselves either citizens of the USSR or without citizenship (Table 9.14). This is a clear rejection of their true legal status. Under an international agreement between the newly independent states (NIS) under consideration here, if a person did not reject the citizenship of his country of residence within a designated time frame, he automatically becomes a citizen of his country of residence without any additional procedures. The survey results reflect the popular mood and the extent of hopes for reunification of the USSR. The
numbers presented here vividly characterize the degree of nonadaptation of the majority of the population to the existing situation.

Residents of the NIS can either become a citizen of their country of residence, and, accordingly, a non-citizen of Russia, or they can accept Russian citizenship. Russia is the only country of the NIS which provides the right of citizenship to individuals outside its borders. According to data from the president’s administration on citizenship, not more than 600,000 persons residing outside Russia have claimed Russian citizenship. In Uzbekistan, the share of Russian citizens among those surveyed is higher than in the other two countries (Table 9.14). As a rule, those people are most likely to relocate, as accepting Russian citizenship in practical terms leaves them no other option but relocation. Claiming Russian citizenship can be a first step toward migration, particularly since it is much more complicated to acquire Russian citizenship after relocation to Russia. For those surveyed who have Russian citizenship, those intending to stay in Uzbekistan number 4.5 times fewer than potential migrants. In Kyrgyzstan, none of those who intend to stay have or intend to acquire Russian citizenship.

Table 9.14
Self-identified Citizenship* (in percents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-identification as citizens of:</th>
<th>Uzbekistan</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other states</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No citizenship</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*NOTE: I—of all surveyed; II—of potential migrants; III—of those intending to stay.

In Kazakhstan, the picture is different. Here, among those with Russian citizenship, more intend to stay than migrate (Table 9.14). This may indicate a hope for the re-establishment of the Soviet Union. Evidence of the strength of popular support for reunification was found in a 1994 survey conducted by the Kazakh Republic Center of Social studies. In this survey, 46 percent of all
questioned (all nationalities including Kazakhs) expressed support for resurrection of the USSR on voluntary and equal terms, 27 percent supported creation of a confederation with Russia and other countries, and only 22 percent of those questioned favored complete independence and international cooperation based on bilateral relations. Preservation of the NIS in its current form was acceptable to only 3 percent of all surveyed. Furthermore, most Slavic organizations and political movements in Kazakhstan support the formation of autonomous territories. Therefore, those that have taken Russian citizenship but choose to remain in Kazakhstan may hope to establish a Slavic-majority, autonomous region within Kazakhstan.

The decision to accept Russian citizenship while still a resident of another former Soviet state brings with it the loss of some crucial rights—not only of the right to vote in their state of residence, but also of the right to acquire property (and participate in privatization), employment rights, social guarantees including pension rights, etc. Moreover, in some states, non-citizens find themselves in confrontation with the authorities, as rejection of citizenship is considered to be a gesture of disloyalty. The stricter the political regime and the stronger the tendencies toward a mono-ethnic policy in the country, the greater the consequences of such confrontation for the non-titular population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for Not Accepting Russian Citizenship</th>
<th>Uzbekistan</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Don’t want another motherland</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t see any profit from it</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of confrontation with authorities</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear for children’s future</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear loss of rights, including:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- civil</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- economic</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- social security</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9.15
Reasons For Not Accepting Russian Citizenship
(percent of all surveyed)

It is not surprising, then, that the most frequent response to the question, “Why have you not accepted Russian citizenship?” is the fear of loss of rights, including civil and economic rights (Table 9.15). Fear of confrontation with authorities may accompany fear of loss of civil rights, but a close correspondence between these two indicators is apparent only in Uzbekistan. However, in each of the countries under study, respondents were more concerned with their children’s future than
with possible confrontations with authorities (11.2—4.3 percent feared for their children’s future, while 8.3—1.7 percent feared confrontation with authorities).

A simple analysis of the decision to relocate regressed against stated citizenship shows a clear relationship between Russian citizenship and migratory intentions (Table 9.16). But the question of the degree to which citizenship is an indicator of the intention to migrate, or is a factor in the migratory decision, remains open (Table 9.14). It is important to note that a large portion of those surveyed refused to answer the question on citizenship. This may reflect the sensitive nature of the issue of citizenship, but is also a reminder that the results obtained do not tell the whole story.

Table 9.16
Citizenship As a Determinant Of Migratory Behavior
(deviations in average shares of all surveyed, in percents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer that they have citizenship</th>
<th>Uzbekistan</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Want to Relocate</td>
<td>Want to Stay</td>
<td>Want to Relocate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of residence</td>
<td>-14</td>
<td>+10</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>+18</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>+8</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No citizenship</td>
<td>+8</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: No data (−) indicates groups for which sample size is too small for analysis.

Conclusions and Policy Implications

The results of the survey showed that a large proportion of residents in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan who are not members of Central Asian ethnic groups are willing or intend to emigrate. Of those surveyed, 75 percent in Uzbekistan, 66 percent in Kazakhstan, and 62 percent in Kyrgyzstan responded they would like to emigrate. The survey also showed that of those considering the option to migrate, the most likely to actually implement that decision live in Uzbekistan. The seriousness of the intent to migrate for non-titular residents of Uzbekistan is evident in the certainty of their responses, the stability of that decision given varying external conditions, and the number of steps taken towards that objective. All of these indicators are higher for survey respondents in Uzbekistan than in the other countries included in the survey.
A large share of survey respondents in each country indicated, however, that they are not prepared to migrate unless certain conditions are met. Approximately half would migrate only if comfortable housing were available in the receiving country, while only 9 percent of respondents in Uzbekistan, 4.3 percent in Kazakhstan, and 1.3 percent in Kyrgyzstan would migrate under any circumstances. However, taking into account the certainty, confirmation, and stability of the migration decision (as defined above), by our calculations 49 percent of the non-titular population in Uzbekistan, 20 percent in Kyrgyzstan, and 18 percent in Kazakhstan are likely to act on their intention to relocate, if the circumstances remain the same as at the time of questioning.

In each of the Central Asian republics, the strongest determination to relocate is found among Russians. The Tatars are somewhat less inclined to migrate, and the Ukrainians are significantly less inclined. Kazakhstan is the exception, where the intent to migrate amongst these three ethnic groups is almost equal. Therefore, the absolute value of potential migration flows to Russia should be estimated using an assessment of the migratory intent of the different ethnic groups and their population size in each of the states under investigation. By our estimates, the migration flow of non-titular residents of Central Asian republics to Russia could total 3.5 million people during the next five years. Most of these migrants, including ethnic Ukrainians, will be headed for Russia.

The survey revealed a distinction in the motives for migration among respondents in the three Central Asian countries under study. Respondents in Uzbekistan were much more concerned about ethnic issues and isolation from Russia than economic problems, per se. Even though Uzbekistan had the largest share of survey respondents born in that country, and the lowest share born in Russia, they were much more likely to have claimed Russian citizenship than respondents in the other two countries. Opting for Russian citizenship while still a resident of a Central Asian country may indicate a strong likelihood to emigrate, in part because it may severely restrict that person's rights in his country of residence.

Even though fewer respondents in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan had claimed Russian citizenship, 12 percent in Kyrgyzstan, 29 percent in Uzbekistan, and 59 percent in Kazakhstan consider themselves citizens of the USSR or without citizenship. These people may either hope for reunification of the USSR, and may elect to stay on the basis of that hope, or they may eventually opt for relocation to Russia (or another country). It has been demonstrated elsewhere that non-titular ethnic groups in Kazakhstan look forward to reunification of the USSR, and this may explain the high share of respondents in that country who intend to stay rather than migrate. Potential migrants in Kazakhstan were more
motivated by economic concerns than in the other two countries. In Kyrgyzstan, ethnic motivations were in first place as a reason for contemplating migration. Other motives such as fears for their children's futures, social and political instability, and personal issues were mentioned with nearly equal frequency in the three countries under investigation. Finally, in each of the countries under study, respondents were more concerned with their children's future than with possible confrontations with authorities.

On the basis of our survey results, various policy measures may be suggested. Given the differences across the countries studied here, different policy measures could be developed to target potential migrants in each country. For example, potential migrants in Uzbekistan seem most determined to emigrate, and are most likely to emigrate to Russia. Relocation assistance, therefore, could be focused on Uzbekistan. Potential migrants in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan seem relatively less prepared to migrate, and may opt to stay if certain conditions in their country of residences improve. Various policies could be targeted to alleviate the stresses likely to solidify their decision to migrate, such as maintaining or improving transportation, communication, cultural, and economic ties to Russia, supporting the civil rights of non-titular ethnic groups in Central Asia, and fostering local community support networks for those groups. The survey results also point to policies to improve educational opportunities for the children in non-titular ethnic families as a way to reduce the emigration potential in each of the Central Asian countries.
10. Migration and Contemporary Ethnopolitical Conflicts in the North Caucasus

Larisa L. Khoperskaya*

Since the 14th century, the North Caucasus region has been economically, politically, and ethnically homogeneous.¹ This has been a consequence of successive migration patterns that, in turn, have served as both cause and effect of local conflict. In short, migration has provided the foundation for intra-Caucasian, as well as Caucasian-Russian (Slavic) relations in the region.

The first wave of intensive migration in the region was prompted by the ethnic-based deportation policy promulgated by the Soviet leadership under Stalin. In 1944, the indigenous peoples of the North Caucasus—such as the Balkars, Karachaevs, Ingushes, and Chechens—were evicted from their native lands and sent to Central Asia and Kazakhstan. The vacated territories were subsequently re-populated by extra-regional nationalities, such as the Cossacks and groups from Dagestan—themselves displaced from their own native lands.

In 1957, the groups exiled from the North Caucasus were permitted to return. Despite this official policy reversal, not all groups took advantage of the opportunity. In fact, it was not until 1991, when the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR (the Russian Federation) passed the "Law on Assisting Rehabilitation of Oppressed Peoples and Nations," that the Chechens, Balkars, and Karachaevs returned to their homelands in significant numbers from Central Asia. This sudden explosion of migration, however, exacerbated political instability throughout the region. For example, the mass migration of Ingushetians to the Prigorodny province of North Ossetia precipitated the first armed conflict in the newly independent Russian Federation.

Similarly, the return of previously exiled national groups severely complicated pre-existing ethno-political tensions in the Kabardino-Balkaria region. Despite the Russian president's tacit endorsement of the Balkar people's territorial claims on the eve of the 50th anniversary of their deportation, official action

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¹ The North Caucas region includes Adygea, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, North Ossetia, and Chechnya, and also Krasnodar, the Stavropol territories, and the Rostov region.
encountered prolonged delay. Representatives of the National Council of the Balkar People (NSBP), in particular, opposed the initiatives embraced by the president of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic (KBR), V. Kokov, and rejected the proposal for creating a confederation of Caucasian nations that would concede division of the KBR and preempt attempts to establish an autonomous Balkar republic. In fact, it was not until Moscow signed bilateral agreements with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan for assistance in the re-location of the Balkar people to the KBR that the legal and practical provisions for the return of 15,000 “refugees” were finally in place. These agreements, in practice, broke the political stalemate by apportioning land rights, social security, and financial stability among the returning migrants.

According to the leaders of the NSBP, the political rehabilitation of the previously deported victims constituted the crux of the relocation program. They hoped that such rehabilitation would pave the way for a national referendum conferring Balkar national status to a group of regions in the republic. It was hoped that such measures would be the precursor to the formation of an autonomous Balkar republic. The clear intent of these measures was to provide a constitutional basis for reasserting Kabardin control of the region. Popular Kabardin spokesmen insisted, in particular, that the Russian government fully rehabilitate the oppressed descendants of the Muchadzirs that were expelled as early as the Caucasian War. This was motivated primarily by Kabardin ambitions to secure majority representation in the newly reconstituted republican government.

These designs notwithstanding, republican leaders, as well as the heads of several prominent Kabardin (and Cherkess) social movements such as KNK (the Congress of the Kabardin People), Adyge Khasse (the Adygean National Congress), lost patience and acquiesced to the compromise proposal. In justification, these proponents of a quick settlement argued that demands for federal assistance and privileged residential status would inevitably carry deleterious consequences for intra-regional ethnic relations.

As demonstrated by this episode, the Russian government’s approach to providing formal restitution to previously oppressed peoples (via Article 13 of the “Law on Assisting Rehabilitation of Oppressed Peoples and Nations”) has been misguided. In general, it has fostered massive and uncontrolled ethnic migration that has carried negative externalities for regional security. First, such large-scale relocation has exacerbated conflict between local ethnic groups over the division of scarce resources and access to political privileges. Second, the migration has intensified the search for allies among political opposition groups. In this context, the division of national movements into pro-president, pro-
government, and opposition forces has significantly intensified local disputes and incited different political groups to play the nationality card on peripheral issues. Third, migration to the North Caucasus has altered the demographics within the region. Since 1990, Caucasians who had earlier resided in other regions of Russia (Azerbaijan, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan, and Georgia), have returned to the different republics of North Caucasus and demanded permanent residency status (citizenship). Roughly 22,000 people, for instance, were registered in Dagestan over the past five years as a consequence of the "administrative discrimination" practiced by the Caucasian leaderships.

This influx of Caucasians has prompted Russian and non-titular minorities in the region to leave in greater numbers than in the past. While the decline of the local Russian population has been part of a broader trend that originated in the 1960s, the intensity of the current wave of emigration is noticeably more severe. In fact, the Russian presence in the region has plummeted from 20 percent in 1959 to 7.26 percent in 1995, including the departure of over 150,000 Russian nationals from Chechnya and Ingushetia.

Regional political reform measures have provided the impetus for the mass Russian exodus from the North Caucasus. Specifically, Russian minorities have reacted negatively to the constitutional codification of new language requirements for the conduct of official business and political activity, and access to education in the region that have compromised their previously privileged official status in these spheres. This anxiety has also been fueled by initiatives designed to promote greater titular majority representation in regional governing structures at the expense of traditionally dominant local Russian minorities. In general, these trends have bolstered national unity among local majority groups, empowering them with political rights to challenge the traditionally elevated status of the local Russian minorities.

In contrast to the Caucasian peoples, who have formed strong national movements that are premised on the protection of political and economic interests, the local Russian population lacks political cohesion. While the Cossacks have become more adept at exploiting ties between ethnic groups and republican administrative bodies in defense of Russian interests, they have provoked a reaction among indigenous national groups. The agitation of the Cossacks in Dagestan, Adygea, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, for example, fostered resentment among other national movements, which, in turn, accentuated inter-ethnic tension throughout the region.

Under these conditions, the prevailing migration patterns will have several distinct political consequences for the region. First, the exodus of the Russian-
speaking population will continue until measures are adopted at both the federal and regional levels to secure the political status of the remaining Russian minority groups in the region. Second, given the economic recession and significant departure of highly trained personnel from the region, the percentages of professionals that will emigrate will continue to soar. Finally, the population explosion among titular groups in the North Caucasus will spill over into neighboring regions, such as Krasnodar, Stavropol, and the Rostov province. The attendant spread of the Caucasian cultural affinity for collective ownership of property will, in turn, compel other groups to rally in defense and demand special ethnic privileges from the federal government.

These trends break from the traditional migration flows in the region. Traditionally, large-scale industrial development in the region stimulated a flow of Russian immigration because the natives, with less education and professional training, could not be employed in industries requiring technically advanced skills (for example, in the oil refining complex in Chechno-Ingushetia). Today, in contrast, acute population increases and shortages of arable land in the mountain regions have spurred indigenous migration to the plains and urban areas. For example, the populations of the Agul and Kurakh provinces of Dagestan decreased by 24.5 percent and 26.2 percent, respectively, in one decade (1979-1989). At the same time, the number of people arriving from the republics of the North Caucasus has increased sharply in the Krasnodar, Stavropol, and Rostov provinces. Studies of migration patterns among North Caucasians reveal that for every two officially registered migrants, there is at least one more unregistered relative or clan “sibling.” Moreover, this migration has precipitated a resurgence of inter-ethnic conflicts within each of these territories. In the Rostov province, for example, the sudden migration of groups from Central Asia and the North Caucasus has disrupted the delicate ethnic balance that existed on the banks of the Don River and preserved peace among various national groups for centuries. Conflicts have broken out as migration led to a labor surplus in the region and intensified rivalries among national groups for scarce land and capital resources.

Such competition has assumed an ethnic character because migrants from Central Asia, the Trans-Caucusus, and the North Caucasus dominate certain sectors of the local economy and are suspected of conducting illicit business activities that are disapproved by titular majority groups. The majority of these migrants, for instance, are employed in the service sector and act as transactions “facilitators.” Given that market mechanisms remain inchoate and that the demands for surrogate measures for reducing uncertainty in business transactions are acute, the opportunities for speculation presented to entrepreneurial “facilitators” in the region reinforce national stereotypes.
regarding the criminal disposition of clan-oriented Caucasian groups. Thus, within the fluid and uncertain economic environment, such informal mechanisms for organizing business activity reinforce primordial prejudices that, in turn, fuel ethnic tensions.

In addition, this dynamic has provoked a visceral reaction on the part of non-Caucasian groups. The Cossacks, in response to the perceived criminal predisposition of the Caucasian migrants, have closed ranks and sought to preempt an expected ethnic backlash. In particular, the Cossacks have taken the initiative to organize rallies calling for the expulsion of Caucasian immigrants. Typically these efforts are carried out in violation of the law and tend to spiral out of control. Moreover, discrimination against citizens on the basis of national affiliation occurs not only in the form of calls for “national” defense and vigilantism, but has formed the basis for the propagation of negative ethnic stereotypes designed to coerce Caucasian emigration. The Cossacks, in particular, have asserted the principle of “collective responsibility” toward the non-Russian peoples, attributing the sins committed by individual members of the group to an ethnic “peculiarity” shared by all members of the “outside” group.\(^2\) In addition, the Cossacks tend to refer to these groups with derision.\(^3\) This resort to unsubstantiated accusations is part of a broader campaign designed to manipulate Russian primordial anxieties towards the Caucasian peoples.\(^4\)

In Rostov, the provincial legislative assembly enacted a “Law on Measures Directed to Strengthen Control of Migratory Processes in the Territory of the Rostov Province.” At present, there is widespread dissatisfaction with the law, as opponents attack it for being both too lenient and authoritarian. Against this backdrop of political manipulation by the Cossacks, the local media has drawn special attention to the ills of migration. In response, however, more sophisticated claims have materialized that draw attention to the economic costs

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\(^2\) A very representative example of this principle is the repeated announcement of the head of the local government of one village, Mr. I. Balakhnin, on the cause of the conflicts in his village: “For about the last 1.5 years, the behavior of the Kurdish nationality has become very defiant. . . .” But since “Kurdish nationality” as a whole cannot assume legal responsibility for crimes committed by one of its people, this characterization of the situation can be considered a negative ethnic stereotype and a violation of human rights based on the individual’s nationality.

\(^3\) One example can be taken from the local newspaper *Vecherny Rostov*, dated June 29, 1994, in which an article quotes the words of the *ataman* (chief) of Rostov Province, V. Zentsov, comparing non-Russian Peoples to “mushroom-parasites.”

\(^4\) Examples of this can be found in speeches by citizens held at public meetings, in arguments regarding the reasons for conflicts between the locals and the Kurds (the migrants from Middle Asia), and by I. Balakhnin himself, the head of the local government of the village of Novopol’tavskiy, in the newspaper *Pravda* for that area. For instance, in a speech by the *ataman* (chief) of Rostov Province, V. Zentsov, there are statements about the Kurds asserting that they “don’t work, steal, insult, or rape women.” Herein also is contained the threat directed, judging by the context, to all people of this nationality: “I’ll show you the rapes!”
of overtly suppressing migration. This commentary typically stresses the constrictions of the local tax base in reaction to measures aimed at disrupting profitable business activity performed by Caucasian immigrants. In fact, there have been rumbles among certain groups for a differentiated approach to regulating migration that provides assistance to those parties whose activities generate high revenues for the local economy. There is talk of charging immigrants not only a fee for registering as a local resident, but for use of regional communications, transport, and infrastructure services in economic sectors that compete favorably against Slavic businesses.

The other important problem tied to the issue of migration is the inefficiency of federal regulatory practices. Administrative bans on the relocation of citizens from Central Asia and the North Caucasus in the Rostov province would likely intensify corruption within administrative and regulatory bodies. According to the estimates of experts, it would also lead to the proliferation of “illegals” residing in the major urban areas of the province. The inevitable swelling of this number to 30,000-50,000 “illegals” would impose a crippling burden on local law enforcement offices. This would also reinforce stereotypes that depict Caucasians as criminals, thus exacerbating inter-ethnic tensions. Moreover, the promulgation of legislative acts in North Ossetia (“About Migratory Politics in RSO-A”), Kabardino-Balkaria (“About Migratory Processes in KBR”), Krasnodar (Charter of the Krasnodar Territory), and the Rostov province (“Law on Measures Directed to Strengthen Control of Migratory Processes in the Territory of the Rostov Province”) have proved to be inconsequential for reconciling ethnic rivalries. In sum, these local ordinances have tended to contradict the rulings of the federal government by circumscribing the constitutional rights and freedoms of all Russian citizens, and to undermine the coherence of the national legal system and the precarious stability of nascent Russian federalism.
11. Forced Migrants in the Commonwealth of Independent States

Vladimir I. Mukomel*

Forced migration first appeared in the USSR in the late 1980s, just prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the fall of 1991, over 710,000 persons from Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia and Uzbekistan were registered as having been "forced to leave their permanent residence."¹ As the USSR disintegrated, forced migrations abruptly increased. Ethnopolitical and regional conflicts, political instability, violations of human rights and rights of minorities in some of the newly independent states became major factors producing a mass exodus of forced migrants from those territories.

Currently, there are over 2.7 million forced migrants in the states of the Commonwealth registered as refugees, forced resettlers, and internally displaced persons. All states of the Commonwealth have had to face problems of population displacement to some extent. This chapter is an attempt to examine the issues and problems of interstate cooperation in the Commonwealth with regard to rendering assistance to displaced persons in the region.

Taking into consideration that terminology in national legislation differs significantly across CIS countries, definitions of refugees and forced migrants were agreed upon in the text of the Agreement on Assistance to Refugees and Forced Migrants by the CIS states in September, 1993. A refugee is a person who crosses a state border to escape ethnically or politically-motivated violence or persecution.² A forced migrant is someone who has crossed a state border, and

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¹ As of September 15, 1995, according to Ministry of Internal Affairs data. Refugees of Georgian nationality who came to Georgia from the Ossetia Autonomous Region are not included. According to data of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia, as of May 1, 1991, these refugees exceeded 17,000 people.

² More specifically, a "refugee" is a person who is not a citizen of the host country and has been forced to leave his or her original place of permanent residence on the territory of another state as a result of violence or persecution committed against that person or the members of his or her family, or because of the fear that he or she was about to be persecuted based on racial or national origin, religion, language, political beliefs, and also on their affiliation to a social group formed in response to armed or inter-ethnic conflicts. This definition differs from the definition in the 1951 United Nations Convention and the 1967 Appendix of Procedural Records and is not applied to refugees who came from the "far abroad." According to agreement, provisions, a forced resettler is a citizen of the country which granted that person refuge. This term is also sometimes translated as "forced migrant," although that term is used here to include all types of displaced persons.
has or obtains citizenship in the receiving state. People who migrate within a state to escape ethnic or political violence or persecution are referred to as "internally displaced persons." Throughout this discussion, the term "forced migrant" will be used to include all the above groups.

Table 11.1
Refugees, Forced Resettlers, and Internally Displaced Persons in the States of the CIS (in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Refugees</th>
<th>Forced Resettlers</th>
<th>Internally Displaced persons</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan (1)</td>
<td>203.7</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>683.6</td>
<td>917.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia (2)</td>
<td>309.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>381.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus (3)</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia (2)</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>281.7</td>
<td>282.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan (4)</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova (5)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia (6)</td>
<td>327.4</td>
<td>560.3</td>
<td>133.2 (8)</td>
<td>1020.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadjikistan (2)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine (7)</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan (9)</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>907.1</td>
<td>602.6</td>
<td>1193.2</td>
<td>2702.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
(2) As of early 1995. Re-registration is in process.
(3) Persons which arrived through 1995 and applied for refugee status.
(4) As of January 1, 1996. Source: Statistics Committee of the CIS.
(7) Refers to refugees from Chechnya registered in compliance with the "Provisional Status Regarding Rendering Services to Persons Forced from Their Permanent Residence Located in Chechnya," No. 119, February 16, 1995. In 1994, 8,739 people were registered as applicants for refugee status. The number of actual petitioners for refugee status was much higher. In March 1995, 17,600 people who had been forced out of their places of permanent residence located in the areas of armed conflicts in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Tadjikistan, and Russia were registered.
(8) As of July 4, 1996, 446,000 people from Chechnya were not registered under the appropriate status. (Displaced persons who migrated to other regions of the Russian Federation are qualified to receive services under the Law Regarding Forced Migrants, but only 8.7 percent of those who arrived in regions neighboring Chechnya after December, 1994 obtained such status. The aforementioned law does not fully apply to people migrating within the Republic of Chechnya.)

Additional Statistics: As of 03/31/1996, 16,528 refugees and forced migrants from Latvia were registered in Russia, 2,558 from Lithuania, and 1,215 from Estonia. From 1992-1995, 6,699 applicants for refugee status arrived in Belarus from Latvia, 2,539 from Lithuania, and 1,215 from Estonia.

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3 A widely-recognized definition of people displaced within the country has not been formulated. Suggested draft definitions are based on the precedent established by United Nations ("Practical U.N. Experience in Relation to Internally Displaced Persons," Department of International Protection, U.N., September 1994, p. 76).
According to national statistical data updated in compliance with these definitions, 98 percent of forced migrants were located in four states of the Commonwealth: Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia (Table 11.1.). The largest share (44 percent) of all persons migrating to escape persecution and violence in the states of the CIS are considered to be internally displaced persons. Mainly, they are escapees from ethnopolitical and regional conflicts in Azerbaijan, regions of Armenia bordering Azerbaijan, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia (Georgia), the zone of the Ingush-Ossetia conflict, Chechnya, and Tadjikistan. In Moldova, there are also over 800 families of displaced persons who left their permanent residence as a result of the conflict in Pridnestrovie (1992) and are at present occupying the right bank of the Dniester River.

Approximately 33 percent of forced migrants in the CIS states are refugees. They are mostly refugees who arrived in Russia from the other newly independent states, but they are also Armenian refugees who left Azerbaijan for Armenia, and Azerbaijani refugees who left Armenia for Azerbaijan.

About 22 percent of forced migrants in the CIS are forced settlers. The overwhelming majority obtained Russian citizenship after arriving in Russia. Approximately 30,000 forced settlers arrived in Azerbaijan from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and 12,000 ethnic Kyrgyz left Tadjikistan for Kyrgyzstan as forced settlers. The other states of the CIS do not have statistics on forced settlers, therefore the above indicators of relative shares of forced migrants cannot tell the entire story and should be interpreted with caution.

**Social and Political Consequences of Forced Migrations**

Forced migrations raise a multitude of problems for the states from which they come. Economic recovery and growth become even more difficult for these states, if only because highly qualified personnel are normally among the first to leave.\(^4\) Mass emigration makes balanced economic development, even economic survival, even more difficult without external assistance. That is precisely the situation in Tadjikistan.

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\(^4\) Over 1.6 million people (in 1989-1993, from Azerbaijan, Moldova, in 1989-1992, from Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan) emigrated from the former Soviet countries. A considerable portion was made up of forced migrants, those who were promptly evacuated from areas of ethnopolitical and regional conflicts on the territory of Moldova, Tadjikistan, Georgia and who migrated to the far abroad, and those who could have been eligible to apply for refugee status (about 700,000 emigrated to Germany, over 600,000 to Israel, and about 140,000 to Greece). If they left for another CIS state, they would be eligible for refugee (or forced settlers) status.
Awareness of the pernicious effects of such mass emigration on long-term economic development has prompted the leadership of some newly-formed independent states to acknowledge Russian as a state language and enter into bilateral agreements with Russia (e.g., Russian-Kazak, Russian-Kyrgyzstan agreements). These measures are designed to instill confidence in the future among potential refugees and thereby reduce the exodus of Russian-speaking residents.

The states receiving forced migrants (host states) are faced with even more serious problems. There, the forced migrants represent extraordinary costs to the state. The costs of migrants’ assimilation are beyond each state’s individual means, and are often the subject of intense political debate. Furthermore, in areas receiving a mass influx of forced migrants, social tensions rise. Flare-ups of social unrest ignited by an influx of refugees may be extremely destabilizing for the overall social and political climate of host states, which are already under severe economic strain and are often unable to resolve the problems of employment, housing, and social security for forced migrants.

This is especially noticeable in the states of Transcaucasia, where forced migrants currently make up from 5 to 12 percent of the population. With an unemployment level of 8.1 percent (in January 1995) and with 101 applicants competing for each job opening, it is extremely difficult for Armenia to provide refugees with steady jobs. As a result, over 65 percent of refugees in Armenia are unemployed. In Azerbaijan, only 30 percent of displaced persons have temporary work. Moreover, these countries differ in the types of unemployed, forced migrants they attract. In contrast to Armenia, moreover, where over 90 percent of refugees are from urban areas and were previously employed in oil extracting and oil refining industries, the majority of refugees and internally displaced persons in Azerbaijan are from rural areas and have a hard time finding a job and adapting to life in the city. (More than half the refugees and 40 percent of internally displaced persons in Azerbaijan are concentrated in three cities: Baku, Gyanga, and Sumgait.)

The mass influx of forced migrants seriously complicates the housing problem. The situation in Azerbaijan is characteristic: over 210,000 people huddle in tents, prefabricated houses, railroad cars, or even in primitive mudhuts and dug-outs. The situation in Armenia is even more difficult since the country is still suffering from the effects of a highly destructive earthquake in 1988, which left nearly half

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a million residents homeless. The interruptions in power and gas supplies take an especially heavy toll on refugees living in temporary housing.

Because of the lack of proper living conditions and a paucity of medical personnel, the epidemiological situation in areas of mass concentration of migrants is deteriorating. Last year, in Azerbaijan, 50 percent of nutritional requirements and 45 percent of requirements for housing, power, and municipal services were met by the efforts of international organizations.\(^6\) Physicians warn that local outbreaks of dangerous diseases still are a distinct possibility, despite periodic vaccinations against infectious diseases. The absence of medical records for forced migrants also complicates the administration of proper care. Socially at-risk groups (elderly, handicapped, and children) are in an especially difficult position. An analogous situation exists in Georgia, where the lack of resources prevents the provision of effective assistance to internally displaced persons. In the Transcaucasian states, assistance for forced migrants is almost entirely provided by humanitarian aid from abroad.

Since internally displaced persons and refugees hope to return soon to their original place of residence and are not trying to integrate into the new social environment, they put great pressure on government services. Intensification of housing problems, unemployment, and epidemiological concerns in areas where migrants are concentrated create tension between them and the native population. Clashes and conflicts erupt between forced migrants and natives, often sparked by ethno-cultural differences. Politicians and local leaders are strongly tempted to take advantage of these situations in their own interests, even if their actions conflict with the national constitution. In areas of the North Caucasus such as North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Stavropol, Krasnodar, and Rostov, legislation has been passed limiting constitutional rights to freedom of relocation and choice of residence. Local authorities argue that these limitations are required to prevent open ethnic conflicts. For Georgia and Azerbaijan, solving the problem of internally displaced persons is essential to domestic political stabilization.

Unlike refugees, who are not citizens of the host country, forced resettlers and internally displaced persons can do without protection by the world community. However, like refugees, they need every kind of assistance and support, including from the world community. Experience shows that no state of the CIS can solve the problem of forced migrants single-handedly. Even Russia, which

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possesses significant resources, has difficulties absorbing the ever-increasing influx of forced migrants. The CIS and the world community confront a dilemma: either assist the forced migrants in the former Soviet region and find an effective solution to their current problems or conduct peace-keeping operations tomorrow. The first approach is clearly preferable.

Aid to refugees and forced resettlers in the host countries of the CIS does not meet current international norms and is clearly insufficient. In addition to the limited resources of these states, imperfect aid distribution mechanisms, corruption of official services, lack of public support (and even opposition to assisting forced migrants) further aggravate the situation. As far as is known, not one CIS state is rendering another even symbolic assistance for refugees or displaced persons. This is especially unsettling because of all the assistance that is being provided by dozens of countries outside the former Soviet region, and by international governmental and non-governmental organizations. Western countries and international organizations have been more inclined to take joint actions and to establish constructive cooperative programs in the region than the countries that only yesterday were members of the same country. One may conclude that the international community is more worried about the problems of forced migration in the former USSR than the countries of the CIS and the Baltics themselves.

Over the long-run, it will be impossible to rely exclusively on foreign aid. There are over 30 million refugees and others around the world who may hope for assistance from the United Nations. All of these people need help, but the United Nations is not capable of satisfying all their needs. The budget of this organization for 1994 totaled 1.2 billion U.S. dollars. The resources of other such organizations are also limited. The only way to solve the problems of forced migration in the CIS states, therefore, is through the combined effort of the CIS states, supplemented by assistance from the world community and the host states. What are the obstacles to achieving this?

Problems of Cooperation Amongst CIS States

Opposing interests of host and originating states. The states from which forced migrants come tend to deny the forced character of relocation and the presence of socio-political instability and human rights violations in their countries. The


\[8\] I bid., p. 276.
situation in the former Soviet territory is not exceptional in this regard. Everywhere “refugees are a symbol of collapse. No single government likes to admit that its citizens feel that they were forced out of their own country.”

Conversely, host countries, either out of internal political considerations or because of their ardent desire for foreign aid, are prone to exaggerate the scale of forced migrations.

For host countries, the largest groups of forced migrants tend to have highest priority. In Georgia and Azerbaijan, where internally displaced persons make up, respectively, over 99 percent and 75 percent of forced migrants, this group gets the most attention (Figure 11.1). In contrast, Armenia is interested, first and foremost, in finding solutions to the problems of refugees, who make up 81 percent of forced migrants in the republic. In Kyrgyzstan and Russia, the problems of forced resettlers (respectively, 92 percent and 54 percent of forced migrants) are of greatest importance.

For Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, the problem of greatest importance is the prevention of illegal immigration from far beyond their national borders. For Tadjikistan, it is the return and reintegration of refugees and displaced persons. The priorities of CIS states in relation to forced and other migratory groups were formulated for the first time in preparation for the Regional Conference for the Consideration of Problems of Refugees, Displaced Persons, People Returning to CIS States and Other Neighboring States, and Other Cases of Involuntary Relocations, held under the aegis of the United Nations.

Differences in national legislation. The collapse of the USSR resulted in each newly independent state establishing a national legal structure defining different approaches to the problems of forced migration. The legal context for forced migrants in every CIS state is determined by:

- accession to the provisions of the Agreement on Assistance to Refugees and Forced Migrants. The Agreement was approved and signed by all states of the CIS except Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, and was ratified by Armenia, Russia, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan (Table 11.2);

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9 Ibid., p. 267.
• legal acts regulating the conditions of refugees, forced resettlers, internally displaced persons, and other groups of people applying for appropriate status (Table 11.2); and

• national constitutional definitions of rights to asylum and provisions concerning consistency between international and domestic laws.

Table 11.2
Legislative Acts Regulating the Status Of Forced Migrants In CIS States
(as of January 1, 1996)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Refugees</th>
<th>Forced Resettlers</th>
<th>Internally Displaced Persons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>law</td>
<td>law</td>
<td>law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>provisional regulation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>law (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>executive decree (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>executive decree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>provisional regulation</td>
<td>provisional regulation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>law</td>
<td></td>
<td>provisional regulation (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td></td>
<td>law</td>
<td>law (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadjikistan</td>
<td>law</td>
<td></td>
<td>law (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>law (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES:
(1) Displaced persons are assigned the status of “forced migrants.”
(2) This law is not yet in effect.
(3) Internally displaced persons are assigned the status of “refugees.”
(4) Internally displaced persons are referred to as “refugees forced to leave their places of permanent residence located on the left bank region of the Republic of Moldova.”
(5) Internally displaced persons are referred to as forced migrants.

Some states have passed laws regulating procedures for determining the status and range of rights and responsibilities of forced migrants. Other states simply use provisional regulations, while in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan a legal basis for assigning status does not exist. Differences in terminology and procedures for granting status formulated in various legislative acts complicates attempts at interstate cooperation. Displaced persons are referred to as refugees in Georgia and Moldova, forced resettlers in Russia and Azerbaijan, and forced migrants in Tadjikistan. The status of “forced resettler” can also be granted to those who only intend to leave their states of origin (Azerbaijan). In some states, the status of “refugee” is granted as an exception to the general rule: in Armenia, it is applied only to refugees from Azerbaijan; in Ukraine, only to those who arrived
from non-neighboring states; and in Kazakhstan, only to individuals belonging to the "Kazakh Diaspora."

There are many contradictions in the criteria for identifying and categorizing forced migrants, as well as of violations of the agreed-upon criteria in practice. The majority of CIS states have not brought their national laws into accord with accepted international norms—or even their own national constitutions. In some states, the relevant laws have been passed but are not being implemented.

Poorly organized registration systems. The appropriate functioning of registration systems for forced migrants depends on the existence of effective normative or legal acts regulating its process. In most Commonwealth countries a periodic monitoring system has yet to be established. Data on forced migrants are recorded sporadically at best and are not recorded at all in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. In Belarus and Ukraine, where existing laws are not being implemented, applicants for refugee status are, nonetheless, being registered. The registration system functions best in Russia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tadzhikistan, but the system of quarterly summary reports and proper classification of forced migrants is administered correctly only in Azerbaijan and Russia. Still, even in these states the recording and registration systems are not entirely accurate or comprehensive.

Many forced migrants simply do not register with the national authorities. Because people do not expect to receive benefits from registering, they see no need to do so. In Russia, according to estimates by the Federal Migration Service (FMS), the number of persons who could have applied for refugee or forced migrant status is several times higher than the number of those who actually registered. At the same time, because of the imperfections in registration, as well as the lack of established channels for exchange of statistical data between regions and states, registrants may be double-counted. There have been cases in which the same individuals were registered as refugees in several states.

Finally, even those countries that register migrants do not keep track of refugees and forced migrants who have voluntarily returned, departed to third countries, or obtained naturalization in the host country. Many refugees leave the state that originally granted them refuge. For example, approximately 30 percent of those who had earlier found asylum in Armenia leave for economic reasons, primarily for the Russian Federation and the far abroad. A special problem that will be addressed further below is the registration of persons who are not eligible for

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status as forced migrants. As a result of these problems, at present it is practically impossible to make valid comparisons between countries or reliable estimates of numbers of forced migrants.

**Refugee Policies for the CIS**

As already indicated, the problem of forced migrants in the CIS cannot be solved by the individual efforts of member states. Assistance to forced migrants has to be cooperative and based on the following objectives:

- monitoring and preventing conflicts that can produce forced migration;
- resolving conflicts which generate forced migrants, and creating conditions which encourage the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons;
- integrating refugees and forced migrants in host countries when voluntary return to the places of former permanent residence is not feasible;
- resettling refugees in third countries (other Commonwealth member states) when repatriation is not possible and it is unreasonable to expect a safe and prosperous future in the original host country.

Attainment of these objectives will depend on whether the CIS states are guided by the following principles in their cooperative efforts:

1. **Transparency of state policies.** Information on policies for helping forced migrants must be made freely available, including information on normative acts, regulatory aspects of registration systems, statistics, and the type of assistance provided to forced migrants. Neglect of this principle, especially in the country of origin, can lead to tensions and further stimulate the outflow of refugees. As an example, the repatriation of Kazakhs from Mongolia and China was conducted in an atmosphere of secrecy. This engendered suspicion among the Russian-speaking population of Kazakhstan about their own imminent expulsion from the country, thus encouraging their exodus.

2. **Coordination** of actions by the CIS states in protecting human rights and rendering assistance to forced migrants. The states should agree on the minimal rights of forced migrants, uniform definitions of refugee status, and uniform registration procedures.

3. **Cooperation** in the form of methodological (technical) assistance from the states of the Commonwealth with experience in addressing the problems of record-keeping, absorbing migrants, and regulating the voluntary return of
forced migrants to other states of CIS. Financial assistance should also be provided to forced migrants in host states while in transit or preparing to voluntarily return to their states of origin.

4. Recognition of mutual responsibility by the countries of origin and host states for solving the problems of forced migrants.

The states of the Commonwealth have signed potentially useful agreements, including the Agreement on Refugees and Forced Resettlers, the Agreement Regarding Priority Measures to Protect the Victims of Armed Conflicts, the Provision Regarding Establishment of an Interstate Fund for Aid to Refugees and Forced Resettlers, and other documents. However, because of internal opposition, effective mechanisms for cooperative and coordinated assistance to refugees and forced resettlers have not been created in most CIS states. Each country follows its own policies in dealing with refugee problems.

Experience shows that the most difficult problems are the questions of returning forced migrants and rendering assistance in host states. Years of fruitless debate over who is to blame suggest that a solution to these problems cannot be found without the acknowledgment of mutual responsibility, possibly amongst all CIS states.

Objectives For Cooperation between CIS countries

Establish Measures to Protect Basic Freedoms and Rights of Minorities

Since violations of human rights are a cause of forced displacements, a mechanism to protect these rights would be one of the most effective instruments for preventing forced migrations. The threat of violation of human rights is a serious obstacle both to the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons to their countries of origin and to their integration in the host country. A necessary condition for creating a favorable political climate in which the CIS states can deal cooperatively with the problems of refugees and forced resettlers is a joint public pledge to approach these problems cooperatively and in a way which is consistent with internationally accepted norms. This means that those states that have not formally adopted the provisions of the International Bill of Human Rights and the Human Rights And Fundamental Freedoms Convention of the Commonwealth of Independent States must do so. Prompt establishment of an international human rights monitoring agency in the CIS is the next step.
At present, the majority of Commonwealth countries formally recognize the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights and its Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, collectively included in the International Bill of Rights. The Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Convention of the Commonwealth of
Independent States was approved in May of 1995. According to Article 34 of the
Convention and Article 33 of the Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent
States, the Human Rights Commission of CIS is entrusted with monitoring the
preservation of human rights. In view of the fact that the Convention has been
ratified only by the Russian Federation and has not yet taken effect, the Human
Rights Commission has not yet been formed.

Since discrimination and persecution based on national and racial affiliation are
the main causes of forced migration in the CIS, the protection of the rights of
national minorities has special importance. The Convention on Human Rights of
National Minorities was approved in October of 1994 by most CIS states, but has
yet to take effect. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan declined to participate in the
Convention. In accordance with Article 14 of the Convention, the nonexistent
Human Rights Commission of the CIS has been entrusted with monitoring the
execution of the Convention’s provision.

Establishing measures of trust regarding human rights is a necessary condition
for reaching an agreement on refugee policies and assistance between diverse
and sometimes contradictory interests. In practice, this means that the
conventions on Essential Human Rights and Freedoms and on Human Rights of
National Minorities must be put into effect.

Reaching Agreement Between the Countries of the Commonwealth

If common interests between host countries and countries of origin are not
recognized, all efforts to decrease the burden of migration flows in the CIS are
doomed to fail. It is also imperative to consider the interests of states where there
are internal conflicts, since the number of internally displaced persons may be
reaching the critical point.

Special attention should be focused on developing procedures to identify
common interests and create the means for implementing agreements.
Unfortunately, the CIS states continually sign documents whose objectives
cannot be met because mechanisms for their realization have not been devised.
An example is the fate of the Agreement on Assistance to Refugees and Forced
Migrants, signed in September of 1993. The key instrument for carrying out the
provisions of that agreement is the Interstate Fund for Aid to Refugees and Forced Migrants. However, the agreement has only been ratified by five states—Armenia, Russia, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—of which only the first three approved establishment of the fund.

In May 1996, the participants in the United Nations conference on problems of migration in the former Soviet territory, held in Geneva, adopted a “Program of Activities.” This potentially important document was signed by representatives of all CIS states except Moldova and Uzbekistan. However, this document may share the sad fate of its predecessors.

*Modifying and Harmonizing National Legislation of CIS States*

National legal norms regulating and defining the status of various groups of forced migrants should be based on international and regional agreements. Major principles of international protection and minimum rights for refugees are described in the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Approval of these documents by CIS states would be very useful in supporting efforts toward policy coordination and cooperation—their principles have been approved by Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia, and Tadjikistan; and Belarus and Kyrgyzstan are considering approving them. However, notwithstanding their importance, these documents are not binding and represent only an expression of goodwill by the signatory countries.

The failure of the other CIS states to adopt the principles of the U.N. Convention and Protocol stems from their reluctance to assume the attendant responsibilities. Most CIS countries view themselves as potential host states, and fear that approval of the Convention and Protocol would expose them to a possible influx of refugees from the “far abroad,” pressure to legalize illegal immigrants, greater financial burden, and potential social, economic, and political destabilization.

The Agreement on Assistance to Refugees and Forced Migrants could become an effective regional instrument for the protection and support of refugees and forced migrants in the CIS countries. This agreement would meet the U.N. guidelines concerning the creation of “regional legal instruments to protect refugees and to define a common regional approach to refugees’ problems by proceeding from the principles of international cooperation and division of obligations.”

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Applying the agreement to forced resettlers, which would mean expanding the definition of “refugee” from that of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, would allow a significantly broader spectrum of migrants to utilize the protection and support services of the participating countries. Since the social and economic environment as it relates to refugees can change rapidly, relevant legislation must incorporate provisions for regular review and prompt adaptation to new situations. It is, of course, also necessary that legal acts and normative documents comply with the national constitution, basic state laws, and international obligations. Fortunately, all the CIS states understand the necessity of making revisions to national legislation and assign a high priority to migration policy.13

Establishing and Improving National Refugee Assistance Organizations Registration Systems

A majority of CIS countries acknowledge the importance of establishing government agencies to address the problems of forced migrants.14 Such state agencies have been established in all CIS countries except Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. For both political and technical reasons, however, there is still no coordination of national policies for refugees within the CIS. As one example, in 1992-1993, almost 9,000 people migrated from Azerbaijan. Those that arrived in Armenia and Russia qualified for refugee status; in other CIS states, however, they could not register as refugees. In Russia, the Federal Migration Service as a rule does not assign the status of “forced resettlers” to those who have moved from republics within the Russian Federation (with the exception of those who came from Chechnya and North Ossetia). There is strong reason for concern, however, that some internal migrants in Russia are guided not by economic, but ethnic and political motives, and are indeed forced migrants.

Deteriorating economic conditions in most of the CIS member states have given rise to the phenomenon of “pseudo-forced” migrations. Given that Russia’s economy has fared better than most, it is not surprising that net migration into Russia exceeded 1.3 million people in the last two years. The role of economic motives in this influx is indicated by a noticeable growth in the number of migrants from Ukraine and Armenia, republics that are politically stable but which suffer from serious economic problems.

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13 “Priorities for the Countries of the CIS”, CISCONF/1996/CPR/1/Rev. Uzbekistan has not submitted data to the Conference Committee Secretariat.
14 Ibid.
Although most of these “economic” migrants do not fit the definition of refugees and forced resettlers, they are often registered as such. Despite the fact that Russian legislation grants the status of refugee or forced resettler only to victims or potential targets of violence or persecution, or to those who are in real danger of violation and persecution, the Federal Migration Service (FMS) of Russia does not require proof of discrimination and persecution before granting this status to migrants from CIS states, especially migrants from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. While some of the migrants probably qualified as victims or targets of violence and persecution, this was clearly not true of all of the 500,000 migrants whom Russia’s FMS has registered as refugees and forced resettlers since 1992. Kazakhstan’s officially expressed doubts about whether the majority of migrants into Russia are truly forced clearly have some justification. It is no accident that other signatories of the Agreement do not recognize the status of those registering in Russia and other CIS states as either refugees or forced migrants (Figure 11.2).

Pseudo-forced migrations and the misidentification of true forced migrants hinder the establishment of effective mechanisms of protection and assistance to refugees and forced migrants. One of the top priority goals should be identifying who are truly forced migrants. This task can be solved only by coordinated actions of the Commonwealth states.

**Establishing An Interstate Organization to Address Problems of Migration**

Many aspects of interstate cooperation in the CIS will require the establishment of a formal governing or coordinating body. In regards to forced migrants, the tasks such an interstate agency could perform include:

- identifying the shared interests of the CIS countries;
- conducting efficient information exchanges, estimating and prioritizing requirements for assistance, and producing unbiased estimates of the migration situation in host countries and countries of origin;
- monitoring forced migrants’ rights;
- planning long-term assistance programs and short-term and emergency responses to rapidly-changing situations;
- training migration service personnel; and
- exchanging experience on the design and administration of migration programs. Effective programs have been developed and successfully implemented in Russia and Armenia. The experience of Moldova also
deserves analysis as it is the only CIS country which has managed relatively
painless and within just a few months to return about 100,000 displaced
persons and refugees to their places of permanent residence.\textsuperscript{15}

Such a permanent, active body in the CIS could closely interact with the CIS
Human Rights Commission, the relevant agencies of the United Nations, and
other organizations. It is reasonable to ask whether any of these objectives could
be met by other existing international organizations. But there are several
reasons why an international organization outside the CIS cannot replace the
need for a new regional agency. International organizations are limited by their
mandates, their organizational capacities, and financial resources. Furthermore,
the positive experience already gained in coordinated decisionmaking among the
CIS states should not be dismissed. Certainly, it makes more sense to coordinate
these efforts in Minsk rather than Geneva. Additional arguments can be made,
but one thing is obvious: a regional agency would only supplement, not replace,
international organizations in the region.

\textsuperscript{15} By September 20, 1992, two months after military operations had ended, less than 5 percent of
officially registered displaced persons remained on the right bank of Dniester River.
Fig 11.1—Forced Migrants In the CIS States

SOURCE: Official data (see Table 11.1 notes).
Fig 11.2—The Countries Of Origin Of Refugees and Forced Resettlers In the CIS
12. The Legal Dimensions of Preventing Forced Migration

Arthur C. Helton*

Introduction

Population displacements are caused by a wide variety of factors. Some are in the nature of emergencies. Armed conflicts and widespread violations of fundamental human rights often precipitate mass population movements. Environmental catastrophes and natural disasters frequently produce forced movements of people. Other factors are chronic in character. Economic underdevelopment and disparity, environmental degradation, deforestation, desertification, and failures of governance can promote population movements. Often, involuntary displacements result from a complex interaction of numerous causes for which the identification of solutions is sometimes elusive.

An international legal regime is emerging which may contribute to preventing or ameliorating the causes of forced migration. This includes the development of normative standards concerning such matters as refugees, migrant workers, human rights, humanitarian need, peace, development, and environmental protection. This emerging regime, however, is characterized by conceptual lacunae, uneven institutional capacities, inadequate remedies, and operational fragmentation.

This chapter argues for a reformulation of legal standards and institutions to permit the international community to undertake the responsibility to prevent and ameliorate the causes of forced migration. New and effective legal and institutional frameworks could enhance the security of states as well as persons at risk of displacement in the new world disorder.

*Arthur C. Helton is director of Migration Programs, Open Society Institute. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Ms. Kakoli Ray, a Ph.D. candidate at the Columbia University School of Architecture and Planning, in the preparation of this chapter.
The Current Regime: Legal and Institutional Frameworks

There are a myriad of normative arrangements and institutional mechanisms which are relevant to issues of forced migration. These include traditions of providing legal protection and humanitarian assistance to victims of displacement. Implementation and enforcement possibilities vary widely. A brief review follows of some of the central arrangements and mechanisms.

Refugees

The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and its 1967 Protocol, defines the term “refugees,” (those with a well-founded fear of individualized persecution) and delineates rights and obligations relating to refugees. These include rights that must be respected even when asylum seekers are unlawfully present in a territory, such as the substantive norm articulated in Article 33 of the Convention and Protocol, which declares the right of a refugee not to be forcibly returned to a place where his or her life or freedom would be threatened. This precept of non-refoulement is perhaps the foundation of all refugee protection. Indeed, many commentators have concluded that Article 33 has achieved the status of customary international law in that it is reflective of state practice and recognized by states as legally binding. As of this writing, 130 states are party to the Convention and/or Protocol. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), a specialized U.N. agency, is responsible for supervising the application of the Convention and Protocol. States are obliged under the treaties to cooperate with UNHCR for this purpose.

Regional instruments, such as the 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration (endorsed again at a colloquium in 1994), and the 1989 Central American Refugee Conference documents utilize a broadened refugee definition which includes those fleeing civil strife or public disorder. Since 1989, a Comprehensive Plan of Action has addressed solutions for Vietnamese and Laotian asylum seekers in Asia. Asylum sharing arrangements are also currently coming into force in Western Europe.

Internally displaced persons—those who have not yet crossed a national border—are not covered under the ambit of the international refugee treaties. Nor are there other international instruments which expressly relate to them.
International Migration

At the international level, an individual has a right to leave any country, including his or her own, but no corresponding right of admission into another country. This right to leave, coupled with no privilege of admission elsewhere, reflects a basic dilemma in current practice—a lack of symmetry to the freedom of international movement, reflected in the tension between individual autonomy and state regulation. Consequently, multilateral arrangements are rare regarding international migration.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM), an intergovernmental organization outside of the United Nations system, is frequently involved in logistical arrangements regarding the movements of non-citizens, including those forced to migrate. IOM also provides technical assistance to governments on migration-related matters. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has begun to consider questions of the human dimension of migration in a diplomatic context.

Armed Conflict

In terms of multi-lateral arrangements, the U.N. Security Council has political responsibilities concerning conflict prevention and resolution. Peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention (the use of force for humanitarian objectives) has emerged recently as possible approaches to ameliorating emergencies, with mixed success. The emergence of special war crimes tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda provides another possible approach. No entity within the international community, however, has a specific legal responsibility or obligation to prevent or resolve conflict.

Protection is provided to civilian non-combatants under the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Protocols Additional. The International Committee of the Red Cross, a nongovernmental entity recognized under the treaties, has implementation responsibilities with respect to the Conventions, including training and dissemination activities.

Regional mechanisms such as OSCE are also involved in activities concerning conflicts. This includes OSCE’s High Commissioner for National Minorities, which was established in 1993, and which has a mandate to ameliorate conflicts relating to minorities within states. Such efforts of preventive diplomacy and action seek to avert conflict.
Human Rights

International human rights law provides a broad set of substantive norms from which a right to remain in peace and safety in one’s country of origin can be derived. Implementation mechanisms under the U.N. system include monitoring, reporting, and certain forms of individual case adjudication. Regional human rights arrangements in Europe and Latin America provide remedies under certain circumstances which are judicial or quasi-judicial in character.

With limited exceptions, human rights law applies to non-citizens. The detention of a non-citizen, for example, can be analyzed under prohibitions upon arbitrary detention under international human rights law. General sources of rights for non-citizens include the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1966 International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, as well as several more specific human rights instruments concerning women, children, workers, and stateless persons.

Migrant Workers and Economic Causes

Discussions of forced migration has tended to center on asylum seekers who have fled state persecution or armed conflict. To a large extent, international migration is an economic phenomenon. Global economic restructuring has been a significant factor in prompting movement. People have sometimes been forced to migrate for economic survival, and this movement has been largely unregulated.

International standards concerning migrant workers have evolved on such matters as working conditions, social security, and protection of employment rights. These labor standards find their origin in broader human rights concepts. The recognition of human rights corresponded to the recognition of the particular vulnerability of migrant workers, whose rights were addressed and amplified in other international documents, particularly the International Labour Organization’s conventions and recommendations concerning migrant workers. The 1990 U.N. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families also establishes standards. The Convention defines a “migrant worker” by acknowledging his or her status as engaged in economic activity outside his or her country of origin. The Convention sets out general entitlements enjoyed by migrant workers that are also guaranteed to all other persons under human rights law, modeled on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It also extends an
additional set of rights on behalf of migrant workers and their family members who are "documented." Convention concerns, as well provisions applicable to particular categories of migrant workers and members of their families, include cross-border or "frontier" workers, seasonal workers, and so forth. Protections are weaker for undocumented workers. Very few states have acceded to the migrant workers Convention.

Environmental Causes

Environmental reasons for involuntary movements are varied. Populations may be displaced through natural or anticipated disasters or environmental emergencies. Still others are affected by the lure of economic prosperity. For example, environmental disasters have caused increased levels of environmental damage over the years, compounded by the effects of high population versus land ratios. Deforestation is intimately linked to the global economy. Often, there are few alternatives available other than to market resources which deplete natural resources. Drought emergencies, which engender poor agricultural yields, are major causes of migration. Development projects, in order to be effective, must take into account issues of biodiversity, wildlife conservation, deforestation, and the appropriate resettlement of indigenous people who may be affected by such projects.

The 1992 Rio Declaration had the mandate to develop international law in the area of sustainable development. Two treaties adopted at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Convention on Biological Diversity, although primarily aimed at sustainable development, had provisions to develop human rights standards. Agenda 21, adopted by states at UNCED 1992, was the program of action designated to implement and make policy according to the agreements made in Rio. Agenda 21 reflected the importance of law in enforcing agreements among countries to promote compliance with sustainable development initiatives and environmental equity. The Rio Declaration, which proclaims the principle of common responsibility, is a starting place to promote strategies to prevent migrations which result from environmental causes.

The Need for New Approaches to Cope with Forced Migration

A new comprehensive approach is necessary in order to cope with the complex set of factors that cause involuntary population movements. A normative
framework could be derived from the various areas touched upon in this paper. The development of a restatement of these precepts, focusing particularly on forced migration, would clarify application and identify lacunae in coverage. A more effective institutional framework would require a new treaty regime.

It is difficult to choose the optimal international approach from the myriad of available models concerning movement of persons. An intriguing possibility would be to look to recent efforts to regulate the movements of capital and trade—the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—as an international legal framework to manage migration and protect the human rights of non-citizens. The GATT is a set of centralized arrangements between contracting parties who make decisions which are implemented by a professional secretariat. Sub-agreements negotiated among limited groups of countries have been used under the GATT, reflecting the legitimacy of regional approaches. Finally, the GATT contains a formal dispute settlement mechanism. Such a mechanism could be used for arbitration or mediation of disputes between states or between individuals and states concerning forced migration.

**Conclusion**

The need is pressing to strengthen the normative and institutional frameworks concerning forced migration. In this fashion, genuine policies of prevention could be pursued. Governments, acting through the United Nations and regional intergovernmental organizations, must not only expand coverage of international law, but also improve its enforcement.

Until governments establish comprehensive international standards and meaningful implementing mechanisms, the treatment of those forced to migrate will continue to be reactive, inadequate, abusive, and discriminatory. Many internationally homeless persons will simply remain insecure and subject to human rights violations. The international community in its widest sense should, therefore, act immediately to achieve a new international order to address issues of forced migration.
13. On the Future of the "Post-Soviet Region"

Dmitrii E. Furman

Contradictory trends and events appearing after the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union five years ago present analysts with a weighty challenge in attempting to anticipate the political future of the former Soviet region. Will the new states solidify their independent status, or will they tend towards convergence, cooperation, and even reunification? The decision of Russia’s State Duma to denounce the Belovezhsky Agreements and make new agreements on the “extended integration” of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Belarus strongly contrasts with the Russian president’s assignment of nearly independent status to Chechnya. These apparently contradictory actions demonstrate the indefinite political borders and instability of the post-Soviet region. Neither in Russia, nor in the other countries of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), is there yet a sense of “naturalness” or stability in the present political situation. In almost every republic, separatist movements, and some self-proclaimed (i.e., “illegal”) states have emerged. Meanwhile, all manner of integrationist ideas and initiatives are proposed simultaneously. It could take decades for the region to assume a stable form, and there is no guarantee that by then all of the present states will still exist.

In 1989–1991, anti-Soviet feelings were on the rise. Politicians, publicists, and scholars strove to harness these feelings and express them in compelling terms. At that time, while various “anti-imperial” thoughts and phrases filled newspapers and magazines, nobody was concerned with consistency or logic. The idea of sovereignty for the republics was presented side by side with the idea of ethnic minorities’ rights to independence from Russia. People called simultaneously for the weakening and even elimination of the “center” and for the “center” to take Karabakh from Azerbaijan and give it Armenia. In all of the republics, including Russia, exacting calculations were published claiming to demonstrate the losses each republic incurred by remaining in the USSR, how much it was being exploited, and how much better off it would be on its own. The intensity of feelings against the Soviet Union allowed the pundits to

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1 Although full independence is still being sought in a protracted civil war.
overlook the contradictions and dangerous implications of these ideas and proposals.

The USSR fell apart, but the quality of life in the newly independent states deteriorated instead of improving. In the face of this reality, the prevailing mood began to change. Blueprints for various new unions were proposed. New financial calculations were offered showing how much each republic loses as a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The concept of "geopolitics" came into fashion, as well as all sorts of arguments that Russia was preordained by its nature and its history to be the nucleus of a large, politically unified expanse. The Communists and Zhirinovsky's crowd became Russia's most powerful political parties, and Yeltsin started speaking of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as Russia's "sphere of interest." The main threat to Russia's security was now the expansion of NATO, while Dudaev was declared the ringleader of a criminal gang of separatists. All of these developments pointed to a strengthening of the political cohesiveness of the region, based on Russian dominance, or, simply, a harkening back to Soviet times.

The most unusual and unexpected events can take place in the post-Soviet realm as a result of such swings in the public mood. This instability is reinforced by politicians' desire to promote these vacillations and use them for their own interests. Although one may postulate a multitude of possible events, ranging from Russia's involvement in wars with its neighbors to the formation of some sort of a "confederation," there is a limiting "corridor of possibilities" of what may occur in the former Soviet region. The established characteristics of the region and long-term tendencies point to a particular direction of movement within this "corridor of possibilities"—movement beyond which is highly unlikely. The goal of this chapter is to describe the basic characteristics of the region based on its political and cultural history, and the "corridor of possibilities" for the future of the region.

The most fundamental (and, at the same time, most superfluous) characteristic of the region is that the former USSR originated on the territory of the former Russian Empire, which was formed by the Russia's continuous expansion at the expense of its weaker neighbors. This is the most objective factor by which to define the region. The ties between the various states of the region are numerous and multifaceted, but there is a single element shared by all: each had once been part of the Russian Empire and the USSR. Considering other characteristics of Russia's provinces and neighboring states, the Lamaist Buryatia would not be in the same community with the distant Protestant Estonia, or Shiite Azerbaijan.
Once having been part of the Russian empire and the USSR links the territories and peoples of this region. The Ottoman Empire had little in common with the British Empire. Nonetheless, one thing empires have in common is the unification by force of many different peoples. The Russian Empire was unique in many ways. In particular, it was a “compact” formation, in which the annexed territories were geographically contiguous, in contrast to the colonial empires created by the Western powers. Russia was the “nucleus” of the empire, and as such, was a rather “heavy” center of gravity. Russian land comprised over half its territory and ethnic Russians comprised nearly half the total population. The non-Russian populations spread around Russia’s perimeter (and within Russia) were much smaller populations. And so the USSR inherited this organizational structure—the heavy Russian “nucleus” and the “medley” periphery—from the Russian Empire. This structure remains in that we tend to consider the post-Soviet region as a whole, which is an accurate view in many ways.

No matter how this expanse is defined both politically and legally (whether it is an empire, the USSR, CIS, or something else), it is still the realm of “Great Russia,” which is the “nucleus” of the empire incorporating the heterogeneous republics located along its perimeter, and which previously were part of Russia. What is obvious is that the established characteristics of relations within this region (the aforementioned “corridor of possibilities” of events and processes taking place there) must correspond to this genesis and to the established organization and history of the entire region.

The comparison, widely used by proponents of integration, of the post-Soviet world with Western Europe (“everybody is uniting while we are breaking up, everybody is removing barriers, while we are putting them up”) does not take into consideration the basic differences in the organization of such regional groupings. The integration of Western Europe within the European Union (EU) is not an integration around a powerful national center which was once the center of a former empire in that region. This is an integration (formally) around Brussels and Strasbourg, and not around Rome, Paris, or Berlin. This is the integration of several relatively equal countries (Germany, France, England, Italy), with smaller countries able to find their “place” amongst them, not fearing subordination or absorption. We should compare our expanse not to that of western Europe, but rather to some hypothetical, centrifugal grouping of Luxembourg, Austria, and the Czech Republic around Germany, for example. And, finally, the EU is an integration of countries which are culturally a great deal closer to each other than the countries of the post-Soviet region.

Within this region, EU-style integration would inevitably stumble upon the real “unequal weights” of the post-Soviet countries, making the establishment of
equal rights among the states as difficult a task as between Gulliver and the Lilliputians. A union where Russia has one vote equal to that of Uzbekistan or Belarus would likely be unstable. This type of integration would stumble across the legacy of the past. Different histories and different balances of power amongst states produce “psychological structures” of political relations between them, and the psychological structure of the former Soviet Union (FSU) region differs greatly from that between West European nations. The historical nature of the FSU region (the features of its genesis and the correlation of forces within it) lead FSU nations to presume Russia would return to its habit of dominating if a strong regional conglomeration were reestablished. Russia’s neighbor states fear dealing with the former “boss,” which continues to be a very powerful neighbor. The intense pride of the former subjects, who have not yet liberated themselves of their “subordination complex,” could eventually lead to the former subjects exacting revenge against Russia for past wrongdoings and to prove Russia is no longer the “boss.” All this makes EEU-style integration within the FSU region practically impossible. The only possible integration would reinstate Russia’s role as the nucleus and head of the union.

In the same way, the disintegration of the FSU region can only be characterized as a scattering away from Russia. All other republics have either nothing to share or connect them (what do, say, Estonia and Turkmenistan really have in common?). However, some do have reasons to establish close ties with each other and could create integrated communities made up of a few nations in geographic and cultural proximity (the Baltics, Central Asia, and, theoretically, the Caucasus). These smaller regional groupings would either replace former ties with Russia—countervailing them and breaking apart the FSU region completely—or conflicts within these groupings could reinforce dependency on Russia, and actually lead to “Russo-centric” reintegration.

Essentially, the FSU retains elements of a community, with Moscow as its natural center. The evolution of relations between the presently independent states of the region will either be Moscow and Russia “gathering the territories,” or the scattering of these territories away from Moscow and Russia. So which will dominate: integration, or disintegration and scattering?

The Evolution of Empires

We may extrapolate on past trends in order to understand what could happen in the future. Recently, Yeltsin, while defending himself against accusations that he was responsible for the Soviet Union’s collapse, said that the process had started at least ten years prior to the Belovezhsky Agreements. This, of course, is not so.
The disintegration of Russia's "imperial realm" began not ten years prior, but at least 100 years prior to 1991. Of course, it is impossible to pinpoint a specific date for the beginning of the disintegration, just as you cannot pinpoint the exact starting point of a person's aging process. However, for imperial Russia, the onset of decay can be traced back to the times of Alexander II. At that time, while the empire was still expanding, the first signs of its disintegration were visible. What was the cause? The same thing that led to the collapse of all empires—the irreversible democratization of public life and culture, leading to the consolidation of nations and independence movements. Cultural and power gaps between those who had built the empires and those who had been subordinated and subjugated by them were beginning to decrease. Growing literacy, the emergence of a national elite, intelligentsia, culture and consciousness—all these natural, irreversible processes began long before the formation of the Soviet Union. All were processes leading to the disintegration of the Russian Empire and, ultimately, of the Soviet Union.

Despite some differences, a general process can be identified in the cultural and political development of the colonized territories of all empires as they evolved towards nationhood. For example, the emergence of a nationalist, political movement by the Ukrainians is analogous to that of the Czechs. Heroic figures such as Chokan Valikhanov, a Kazakh, or Kazimbebek, an Azeri, expressed their devotion to the empire, while, at the same time, they tried to stir up their people. They are very similar to figures in other empires. There is much that can be learned from the history of these processes by comparing and contrasting them, however, it is obvious that there were common patterns and a common logic to these processes in different empires.

In all empires, the actions of those trying to strengthen it ultimately lead to the same result as for those consciously trying to pull it apart. The emphasis placed by Russia's government on the Russian character of the monarchy, supported by rising Russian nationalism, was responsible for the disintegration of the empire in the same measure as the emerging separatist movements. In addition, the emergence of a strata of devoted, Russian-educated functionaries, officers and intelligentsia for the purpose of managing the outlying districts in the end led to the creation of leaders of separatist-nationalist movements, as had occurred in the British and French empires. Repression produced heroes. Resistance symbols like T. Shevchenko were partially responsible for Russia's disintegration, but concessions made by the top echelon of power were also responsible.
The Russian Empire Recreated As the Soviet Union

By the time of World War I and the Revolution, Russia was a noticeably weaker formation than it had been in the 19th century. It was being devoured from within by a multitude of autonomous movements which were becoming more and more popular, and on the other hand, by Russian nationalism. A gradually shifting balance of power between the center, "the nucleus," and the periphery was by then apparent, with the center experiencing increasingly greater difficulties in controlling the periphery. However, World War I, which turned into the Civil War in Russia, served as a powerful catalyst for the separatist processes, certainly prompting the periphery's nationalists to take advantage of the situation and declare independence. However, the Bolshevik victory led to the revival of unity within the imperial territory, with only the loss of Poland and Finland (which were always ready to secede from Russia) and, for a period of twenty years, the Baltic countries. Does this mean that the Soviets managed to arrest the disintegration process? The Bolsheviks were perhaps able to slow the internal decay of the empire by radically altering it. Nonetheless, the aging and disintegrating processes continued.

There are two reasons why it was relatively easy for the Bolsheviks to reintebrate the empire. First of all, the disintegration which took place in 1917-1918 was partly the result of attacks from the outside and, in some ways, was premature. All nationalist movements experience periods of rapid growth alternating with periods of retreat and stagnation, periods of enthusiasm alternating with periods of despair. To attain independence on the first attempt is very rare. If, by the time of the Russian revolution, the national movements of the Poles, Finns and, to a lesser extent, the Baltic peoples, could have supported independent, modern states and were kept in the empire by sheer force, the Ukrainians, Kazakhs, and others were not ready for independence. Even in 1917, the majority of peoples making up the Russian empire did not think about total independence and, instead, strove only for autonomy. For these people, the attainment of independence during the period of civil war in Russia was the first and unsuccessful attempt.

Secondly, the Bolsheviks were able to disarm the ethnic movements, which were struggling and unsure of themselves, by their arguments for "internationalism" and by the fact that the country being created (or recreated) by them, was a country called USSR and not "Russia." The new country was proclaimed to be a union of equals. We can say that the preservation of the major portion of the Russian empire was "bought" by the Bolsheviks, and the price paid was the creation of a state without the word "Russia" in it, and the division of the empire
into republics. The indigenous people of the outlying territories were given the opportunity to develop along their national lines, an opportunity never before presented to them.

Toward the end of the Stalin years, the imperial Russian character of the USSR became obvious, being manifested in its ideology, symbolism, and politics. Although Lenin apparently wanted to create a union of equal republics, he had essentially recreated the empire because the republics as semi-autonomous could not have been anything more than fiction at that time, given their level of development. Stalin later strove for the creation of a highly centralized, totalitarian state with a markedly Russian, imperial character. He succeeded in this, but he could not stop the natural process of disintegration of the empire as the republics continued to develop politically, economically, and culturally. Moreover, the disintegration was exacerbated by Stalin’s own actions.

Even under a completely totalitarian regime, there are powerful limitations imposed on this power, the mechanism of which is not always clear. Stalin could move entire ethnic populations from one location to another, but he could not do away with the constitutional formula of a union of free republics with a right to secession. We can say that he did not even want to do away with it—the formula seemed to be harmless demagogy. But as the republics developed, they were able to progressively consolidate their power and extract concessions from Moscow. With all the repression, and with all the “Russianizing” politics, the Stalinist regime also paid tremendous “tribute” to the ethnic republics. This included the strengthening of the republican governing systems with their own central committees, ministries, academy of sciences, etc.\(^2\) It also included the cultivation of national intelligentsia and the creation of written languages for those ethnic groups which did not have them before, as well as recording and studying their folklore, etc. All this was the continuation of work begun in the Russian Empire and which, regardless of the goals of the officials, resulted in rousing the people in the regions bordering Russia, helping them to become modern nations. These developments served to fundamentally alter the balance of power between the “nucleus” and the outlying districts and contribute to the disintegration of the empire.

\(^2\) Russia did not have its own Central Committee, or Academies of Art and Sciences, because the Russian leadership was the Union leadership, and Russia represented not just one of the republics but a “nucleus.”
After Stalin: Consolidation of Republic Elites

The USSR can be seen as a transitional formation, a compromise, corresponding to a certain balance of power between the “nucleus” and the outlying districts of the empire. The outlying districts were at a point of development that a pure empire was no longer possible, but full independence was not yet possible. This balance, however, was gradually disturbed, particularly after the Stalinist reign of terror. A new elite began to consolidate along the regional and republican borders, within the party-bureaucratic system. Even under Brezhnev, the republican elite had already attained a level of “semi-independence,” and S. Rashidov, G. Aliev, D. Kunaev, etc., were no longer simply Moscow’s governors-generals, but, rather, smaller tsars of their emerging nations.

The resistance encountered by M. Gorbachev when he sent an ethnic Russian, G. Kolbin, to Kazakhstan—essentially an attempt to disturb the existing real independence of the republican government—demonstrated how far these processes had evolved. Under Stalin’s appointee, F. Goloschekin, one-third of the Kazakhs were annihilated, while at the same time the Kazakh language, intelligentsia, and bureaucracy continued to develop. Under Kunaev’s rule, Kazakhstan was moving steadily toward modern “Nazarbaev” Kazakhstan, and still continues to move ahead.

The ease with which the breakup ultimately occurred—the almost obscenely simple process of doing away with the USSR in the Belovezhsky Woods—attests to the level of preparedness the republics had reached for this result. The “children” finished off the “old man,” which was easy because he had no strength left in him. But was the collapse of the USSR the final disintegration of the “imperial realm”?

The 1991 Collapse of the Soviet Union

The non-Russian republics were better prepared for the 1991 disintegration than for the 1917-1918 disintegration. By 1991, the republics were more viable as independent states than the ephemeral formations, approximating republics, had been after the Russian Civil War. However, there are indicators that even in 1991 not all the republics were equally prepared for independence. In this author’s view, there is no doubt that the best scenario for all the republics would have been to preserve the union longer, but as a “looser” union based on treaties, which is what Gorbachev tried to attain. Within such a union, the center (Russia) would have provided a certain level of stability necessary for further development of the republic governments and inter-republic relations. This new
arrangement would not have saved the imperial union from ultimate
disintegration, but could have slowed the breakup and made it less painful. But
this view was not widely held. Most believed that if the destruction of the Soviet
Union were delayed, it would regain its strength. This possibility was widely
feared, while defenders of the Soviet Union were naive in thinking that if they
were to forestall the death of “the old man,” he would never die.

In their current state, the majority of the Soviet Union’s former republics are
much less viable as independent states than their formal status may lead us to
believe. The formal structure does not necessarily reflect the underlying reality.
Unity of the region is maintained because the republics continue to be connected
to one another by numerous economic, cultural, personal, and other ties. These
ties are still tighter than those with countries located on the other side of the FSU
region’s border and which otherwise appear closer to them in language, religion,
and culture. Even the Baltic republics show by their reactions to any hints of
imperial encroachment emanating from Moscow that they have not
psychologically fully left the realm. In many aspects of inter-state relations in the
FSU region, Moscow remains the center, and Yeltsin is still “the boss.”

Only the Baltic republics, the ones most prepared for independence in terms of
the level of national self-consciousness and political organization, were able to
completely cut formal ties with Russia and the CIS. All the other former Soviet
republics joined the CIS, the successor to the USSR, just as the USSR was the
successor to the Russian Empire. Georgia and Azerbaijan at first refused, but
they were eventually incorporated.

In theory, all states are equal in the CIS. But, in the face of actual inequality, this
theoretical equality becomes fiction, though not to the extent it was in the USSR
since the balance of powers has changed. The formal structure of equal states
simply does not work and is gradually emerging, instead, as a system of bilateral
relations primarily between Russia and each of the other states. Not Minsk, but
Moscow is becoming the capital of the CIS, and Yeltsin is its head. The chairman
of the CIS parliamentary assembly is the chairman of Russia’s Federation
Council. In the case of Belarus, Russia is in the process of forming some sort of a
confederation with that state, essentially absorbing it as Belarus is very weak in
terms of national self-consciousness. The very poor republics with large Russian
communities, like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, are far more conscious than
Belarus of having a unique national character. For those states, relations with
Russia will be close, but they won’t form a confederation. Russia’s relations with
Armenia will be special because Armenia depends on Russia for assistance in
defending against its neighbors. Tadjikistan is in a similar position, having won
their civil war with the help of Russia’s army, and which generally depends on
Russia. After total disintegration, vestiges of the former empire are gradually being restored.

The psychological structure inherent to the region, with Russia as the leader and focal point, persists. Although Russia is weaker in its relations with the former republics than it was in the Soviet Union, it is still stronger than the other FSU states. An air of superiority is always present in Russia’s relations with the other CIS countries, although this attitude is somewhat strained and frustrated under the constraints of formal equality.

The leaders of the CIS countries are constantly paying visits to Moscow, while Yeltsin does not return the favor. Russia continually plays the role of a stronger state slighting the weaker ones. A key example is Russia’s unilateral decision to initiate price liberalization, thereby sending the economies of all the other republics into convulsions. However, Russia cannot retain its position as leader in the region by force alone, forcing Russia to be cautious and in some cases even make concessions to its weaker neighbors. Russia may at times take advantage of conflicts between neighbors, although it has also shown a tendency to abide by international law. Each time, for example, the reconfiguration of borders is proposed, Russia stops short—Russia did not recognize Karabakh or Abkhazia, and avoided supporting Russian separatists in the Crimea, Moldova’s Left Bank region, and Kazakhstan.

The attitude of Russia’s weaker neighbors is as complex as Russia’s attitude toward them. The notion that Moscow is the inevitable center is deeply rooted in the CIS states. Assumptions about Russia’s mighty power are also often exaggerated, although the Georgians and Azeris have learned that they can’t make Moscow change its mind. At times, the CIS republics also attempt to take advantage of Russia, playing on its vulnerabilities—such as when Karabakh claims to be Russia’s outpost in the Caucasus. The leaders of the newly independent states also try to maintain their pride in relations with Moscow and, undoubtedly, dream about a future when they will no longer depend on and have to pay tribute to Russia.

The Future of the CIS

The USSR is dead, but its influence lives on in the CIS. However, the same processes which began over 100 years ago and which led to the fall of the Russian Empire, and later the formation and collapse of a less imperial formation, the USSR, which in turn eventually gave rise to the CIS, continue to operate today.
As long as a formal structure, combined with informal ties, links the entities of the region together, the "aging process" will continue.

Since the majority of the republics were not prepared for independence, they encountered great difficulties after the disintegration of the USSR. The euphoria of independence was quickly replaced with disappointment and tendencies toward reintegration. To a certain extent, what occurred after the fall of the Russian Empire is repeating itself. But this is a development along a downward spiral. Each time the cohesiveness of the region under Moscow's dominance is broken, it is restored in a more truncated and looser form.

This tendency towards disintegration of regional cohesiveness can now be observed in all spheres of life. Migration is producing greater ethnic homogeneity of the republics. National languages are gradually replacing Russian, while the influence of a single Communist ideology has disintegrated throughout Russia, giving way to a variety of religions. Non-Russians are reorienting to their national culture and are establishing closer ties with nations more culturally similar to their own, rather than with Russia. Economic ties are also shifting away from Russia, towards markets outside the FSU region. State governing systems are developing, and diverging, making it impossible for the systems of, say, Turkmenistan and Estonia, to be "combined" as part of a unified state. Perhaps within a generation, the people of Russia and the other former Soviet states will consider as normal the independent existence of each of these states which were once part of a single empire.

The tendency toward disintegration affects Russia's own territory to some extent. This primarily does not concern the Russian oblasts (which I believe are not in danger of seceding), but rather the relations between Russia and the culturally distinct outlying districts within the Russian Federation. Relations with Ilyumzhinov's Kalmykia, Galazov's Ossetia, or Shaimiev's Tatarstan under Yeltsin are very similar to the relations with Kunaev's Kazakhstan or Rashidov's Uzbekistan in the USSR under Brezhnev. At the same time, the real differences between Russia and these cultures may not be compatible with their (somewhat incidental) legal status. Relations between Russia and these territories (in the extreme case, with secessionist Chechnya) promise to be a source of tension within the Russian Federation, and within the region as a whole, for a long time.

The cohesiveness of the region continues to disintegrate despite Russia's resistance and, as was the case with the Belovezhsky Agreements, the resistance itself leads to further disintegration. Perhaps none wishes for the reintegration of the Soviet Union more than Zhirinovsky, yet nobody is doing more to prevent it from happening. Russia's actions intended to avert disintegration in reality can
actually foster it. For example, Russia’s support of Abkhazian separatism was intended to “punish” Georgia and preserve it in Russia’s sphere of influence, but it actually spurred Chechen separatism and Georgia’s desire to leave Russia’s sphere of influence as soon as possible.

Conclusion

The overall tone of this chapter is somewhat somber. This is natural, since the processes described are the processes of dying. Of course, the death of an empire is followed by the emergence of new states, and a new, “non-imperial” Russia. It is possible to focus on these developments and speak only of the new growth processes in a more optimistic tone. It seems to me, though, that this tone would be artificial and insincere.

One of the most peculiar aspects of Soviet ideology was that, although the state we lived in was classified as an “empire” (defined as involuntary unification of peoples by use of force), we, nonetheless, had been taught that an “empire” is something bad and vile, a “prison of all peoples.” This partially explains why, as soon as the USSR became known as an “empire,” we began to destroy it. However, empires may also be viewed as a great human community, where life is in some ways richer, more complex, more varied and interesting than in individual national states. The Soviet “empire” embodied the contradiction of oppression of the peoples while simultaneously allowing them to develop.

When the English, the French, the Russians, and others built empires, they not only oppressed and exploited the people subjugated by them, but also formed them into modern societies. We could sing praises to their role in development and to their constructive impacts on the territories that they colonized. It is sufficient to compare Afghanistan, which succeeded in fighting off the British, with India and understand that Afghanistan may have been much better off had it not dispelled the British successfully. An empire is not entirely negative, and, accordingly, its disintegration is not entirely positive.

When an empire first breaks apart, it is accompanied by cultural, economic, and social disruption. Sometimes, as seen in a number of African countries, civil or tribal wars erupt. The former colonizers, without whom many of the newly free people might have been living in worse conditions, are accused of all manner of sins. After the collapse, life is especially difficult for those of the colonizing nation who remain on the territory of the new states, such as the French in Algeria, the English in Africa, and the Russians in the states along its perimeter. Many of those who previously complained of the empire find themselves longing
for it later. As with London and Paris after the collapse of their empires, Moscow is attracting migrating “colonial intellectuals.”

A beautiful story by the Austrian writer Joseph Rota entitled “Kaiser’s Bust” tells of nostalgia for the lost empire when a general living in free Polish Galicia gives a reverential burial ceremony to a bust of the Kaiser Franz Joseph, after it was no longer considered proper to display it in his yard. Such a feeling of nostalgia certainly exists among those who had been citizens of the USSR. However, it is one thing to feel sad about the past, but yet another to attempt to bring it back. The USSR was an “old man” that should have been protected, and not killed. But it cannot now be brought back.

The process of disintegration of the Soviet empire was perhaps accelerated artificially in the Belovezhsky Woods. The creation of a border between Russia and Ukraine, with border guards, guard dogs, and night alarms is an absurd extreme. We do have to understand clearly, however, that the dependence of the republics on Moscow will disappear with time. The Baltic states will have closer relations with Scandinavia, Moldova will have closer relations with Romania, and the Turkish states will have closer relations with Turkey, than with Moscow. Sooner or later, Russia will have to agree to Chechen independence. The stronger Russia’s resistance is to it, the more rapidly and painfully the inevitable result will come. In the last few years, Russia has already committed a number of stupid and cruel acts, for which Russia will have to pay later. The next several generations of Chechens, for instance, will certainly be raised on the epic story of the struggle between their heroes and the “bloodthirsty, cowardly Russian butchers.” Russia does not and will not have the strength for reunification of an empire by force. It is better not to start again for the third time, which could only lead to an embarrassing end for Russia.

An empire is not necessarily bad, and independence is, by far, not always good. However, empires are formations whose time has past for the people of the former Soviet region, and for humanity as a whole. The cohesiveness of the region will continue to disintegrate further. It will be increasingly more difficult for Russia to control this disintegration. But Russia can live peacefully amongst neighbors which are not under its control if peace is maintained and if Russia has not created around itself a ring of adversaries. Russia’s goal in the post-Soviet region must not be to reinstate dominance, but to transform it into a peaceful region with productive relations between neighboring states. As simple as this task may seem, it is the most complicated option. It requires Russia to exercise self-control over its own habits and impulses, and this, as many know from personal experience, is the most difficult task of all.
14. The Future of the Political Integration of the CIS Countries: The View From Ukraine

Valdimir A. Malinkovich*

Over four years after the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the future of relations between the former Soviet states is still uncertain. The Soviet Union did not suddenly collapse with the signing of inter-republic agreements on December 8, 1991, in the Belovezhsky Woods. Ukraine had by then already declared itself to be an independent state, first by an act of the republic’s Supreme Rada on August 24, 1991, and later by a national referendum on December 1st of the same year. The other republics of the USSR also proclaimed themselves independent prior to December 8th. Therefore, what the Belovezhsky agreements decided was not the USSR’s fate, but what would happen after the collapse of the empire. Formally, the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was announced, but what kind of entity that might be or become remains unclear even today. What is obvious, however, is that the CIS must take on a new form, as it is not viable in its present one. The key issue for the future of the region is whether the newly independent states will pursue political and economic integration or disintegrate further. The actions of Russia and Ukraine will to a large degree determine the potential for successful integration.

It is by no means clear that Ukraine wants to pursue integration with its neighbors. Ukraine’s first president, L. Kravchuk, immediately upon his return from Belovezhsky Woods, announced that the CIS was a form of a “civilized divorce” and that Ukraine must be a neutral state, unaffiliated with any political bloc. He declared Ukraine would develop relations with Russia and the former Soviet republics just as with any other countries, based on mutual interests. But President Kravchuk had domestic political motives. He understood that only an alliance with the Ukrainian nationalists, who opposed close relations with Russia, would guarantee his political power in the country. At that time, a democratic opposition party did not exist in Ukraine, and the role of the opposition was played by the nationalists. Together with President Kravchuk, they managed to convince the majority of the population that Russia and other

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former Soviet states have been "eating Ukraine out of house and home," and that they would do better to limit their relations with Russia. By 1993, however, Ukraine had learned that it could not survive economically without closer relations with Russia and other former Soviet states. It became clear that more channels for integration were needed than those provided within the CIS framework.

It is very likely that a single, uniform approach to integration would not be acceptable to all 12 countries of the CIS. A differentiated approach is necessary. The CIS could be more productive if a solid nucleus were formed by its most economically and politically powerful states: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, in addition to those states willing and ready to join them. This arrangement may be called the "Four-Plus Union." Why should the foundation of the union be made up of these four countries? First of all, because these are "the big four," incorporating over 90 percent of the territory, 80 percent of the population, and the lion's share of the natural resources of the former USSR. If these states could overcome their economic crises by working together, they could, like a locomotive, pull up the rest of the CIS member states. Moreover, economic and political conditions are already improving in these countries, and there is public support for integration (which is absent, for example, in the Baltic states).

The Central Asian and Trans-Caucasian countries, although also supportive of integration, are developing differently from Russia and Ukraine in some important ways—towards Islam and Pan-Turkish ideas in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan; and toward greater ethnocentrism in Armenia and Georgia. Furthermore, large oil and gas deposits in Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and, probably, in Uzbekistan, suggest the possibility of independent development for these countries. This may make them less inclined toward integration with Russia and Ukraine. Political instability in Armenia, Georgia (and Moldova), and civil war in Tadjikistan make these countries unlikely candidates for providing a foundation for regional economic growth and political development. Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have a much better chance of successfully playing that role. The first three, along with Kyrgyzstan, in fact, have already begun to form such a union on the basis of a Commonwealth Agreement, signed on March 29, 1996. But this is not truly a "Four-Plus Union." It is better thought of as a "union of three plus Kyrgyzstan," since Kyrgyzstan cannot contribute significantly to forming the basis of a strong union, which is, in any case, impossible without Ukraine.

The absence of Ukraine in the March 29 agreement is not the only problem hindering the establishment of a strong union under that agreement. The March
agreement was dictated by the demands of the moment. It represents a step in
the right direction, but the authors of the agreement should have:

- waited until after Russia’s presidential election, which was only a couple of
  months away, to ensure confidence in the agreement;¹

- prepared it in advance, and not quickly improvised the text of the agreement
  in the midst of Yeltsin’s re-election campaign. The purpose of this timing
  was apparently to draw the support of pro-integration voters. It is
  unfortunate, and perhaps indicative of Yeltsin’s commitment to resolving
  these issues, that Yeltsin did not invest sufficient time during his five-year
  presidency to develop a workable integration strategy within the framework
  of the CIS, which by that time had practically stopped functioning;

- developed it jointly with Russia’s legislature, presenting it first to the
  appropriate committees in the State Duma. During the document
  preparation stage, public opinion on this matter should have been taken into
  consideration. Instead, the public was informed of the agreement only after
  the fact;

- explicitly excluded the possibility of policy dictation by Russia. Integration
  must be based on voluntary cooperation of sovereign countries based on
  equal rights, and should not resemble recreation of the Russian empire or the
  USSR;

- included Ukrainian representatives in preparing the agreement. The
  interests of Ukraine and its 52 million citizens were ignored in drawing up
  the agreement.

It is true that Ukraine has shown strong indications of opposition to any kind of
union. Neither the Ukrainian nationalists, nor the new government bureaucrats
(the majority of which are from the old nomenklatura), nor the media in Kiev,
favor integration. Part of the impetus behind this anti-integrationist posture is a
fear that a pro-integration stance will jeopardize assistance from the West, which
is seen as a sine qua non for a happy future. Moreover, Moscow still tends to treat
Ukraine as a province subordinate to Russia. This explains why Ukraine’s
leaders are prone to extending more efforts toward developing relations with the
West than with Moscow, even though they may sincerely believe Ukraine would
benefit from greater integration with Russia.

¹This paper was prepared and presented prior to Russia’s presidential elections, when it was
unclear who would hold that office after July, 1996.
The general public and its priorities will ultimately define the attitude of Ukraine’s government toward integration with Russia and the CIS. According to the latest (fall 1995) public opinion polls, conducted by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology, the prevailing sentiments favor integration. This trend in public opinion, however, has not yet manifested itself in a liberal, democratic political movement. Neither the nationalist groups, which fiercely oppose integration, nor the leftist groups, which favor the re-establishment of a union with Russia as the dominant power, appear to represent the broader public.

The Ukrainian nationalists have been losing support amongst the general population. Although they retain influence in the Western regions and, to some extent, in Kiev, there too their influence is declining. If at the end of 1993, 15 percent of Kiev’s population supported the moderately nationalistic Rukh, by the end of 1995, only 4 percent did. It is important to understand that neither Rukh nor the more extreme Derzhavinist group are democratic. They are not united by liberal or democratic ideas, but by anti-Russian sentiments. Over 70 percent of parliamentary deputies from these factions oppose publication of official communications in Russian, despite the fact that 55 percent of Ukrainian citizens still prefer to speak Russian. These nationalist factions approach Russia not as a friendly or even a neutral state, but as an exceptionally dangerous neighbor. Ninety-five percent of Rukh members and 86 percent of Derzhavinist deputies insist that Ukraine quit the CIS. However, the majority of the population has a very different opinion.

Only 9 percent of those polled were in favor of Ukraine’s leaving the CIS, while 80 percent were in favor of developing closer relations with Russia than exist today. Thirty percent were in favor of forming an economic and political union of Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. An additional 12.5 percent were in favor of economic, political, and military union of these countries, and 29.5 percent were in favor of creating a single state. In 1994, even more Ukrainians supported recreating a single state (36–38 percent), but their number has decreased as a result of Russia’s civil war in Chechnya. However, the total number of those in favor of integration within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States remained unchanged from 1994 to 1995. No less than 72 percent of Ukrainians are willing to support the integration of former Soviet countries at least to the level of an economic and political commonwealth. At the same time, the nationalist ideas of a Ukrainian “renaissance” and emphasis on “Ukrainian statehood” are considered a priority by only 9.5 percent and 21 percent, respectively. It is clear that support of integration predominates over separatism and nationalism in Ukrainian society.
Obviously, the preferences of the majority can influence the overall direction of government policies, but they are of greatest importance during elections. The desire of the majority of Ukrainian society to establish closer relations with Russia and the other CIS countries, as well as their opposition to aggressive Ukrainian nationalism, was clearly demonstrated in the presidential election of 1994, which was won by Leonid Kuchma. (Five out of six Russian-speaking Ukrainians voted for Kuchma.) However, Kuchma has not satisfied the demands of his electorate. In the first two years of his presidency, he has compromised with the nationalists and the centrist nomenklatura in the Rada in order to defeat his leftist opponents and introduce economic reforms. How much this has cost him in popular support is indicated by the fact that, whereas previously 75 percent of the industrial eastern and southern regions supported him two years ago, only 20–25 percent do so today. Although his support in the nationalist, western part of the country increased from 24 to 50 percent, the western Ukrainian votes cannot produce a victory for Kuchma in the next presidential election, since the overwhelming majority of the population lives elsewhere, and since, when the time comes, western Ukraine will find a more suitable, more nationalist Kuchma—L. Kravchuk, B. Chernovil, or someone else.

The media has promoted the notion that only the “reds” want a rapprochement with Russia and the CIS, while the democrats are opposed to it. This makes sense, as the 60 percent of Ukraine’s parliament who support integration are representatives of leftist parties. However, this is true only for the parliament. The majority of the general population supporting integration are not leftist.

Only 11 percent of all people who support the idea of a Union of Independent Eurasian States subscribe to Communist and socialist ideas, although the most visible supporters of integration are those demonstrating with (Communist) red flags. If a liberal, democratic movement emerges in support of integration, its victory is assured in any election, assuming that it promotes a union of independent states as opposed to a single, centrally-controlled state.

Certainly, prospects for integration do not depend only on Ukrainian politics. Much will depend on Russia’s position. Presently, the Russian authorities do not have an integration strategy. Whether they will develop one is difficult to say. Objectively speaking, to what extent is Russia interested in integration within the former Soviet region? Russia is much less economically dependent on the countries of the CIS than they are on Russia. Complete economic integration would be very costly for taxpayers in Russia, and Russia’s entrepreneurs could probably attain more favorable conditions for themselves through bilateral dealings than they could within the framework of a union in which each participating country demanded equal participation in the economic decision-
making process. The situation in the political sphere, however, is completely
different. Russia is a unique state in that it does not have clear-cut external
borders. Moreover, it is impossible today to redraw these borders, even if only
because the border would have to pass through the north of Kazakhstan, where
half the population is ethnic Russian. Naturally, Russia, having transparent
borders between it and its neighbors, is especially interested in its neighbors
becoming its strategic allies. This is particularly true in the sense that Russia
fears that powerful forces outside the region may try to take advantage of the
situation. Ukraine and Belarus are especially important as strategic allies for
Russia in terms of the forthcoming expansion of NATO to the East.

Under the best of circumstances, it will take a long time for the former Soviet
region to establish political and economic stability. Until then, continuing and
possibly escalating crises and social disasters among its neighbors will disrupt
Russia as well, not least because they threaten to produce huge immigration
flows. Whether or not this threat materializes will depend importantly on how
quickly a "Four-Plus Union" can be achieved. In order to achieve it, it is
necessary to determine the level of integration that would be acceptable to each
one of the countries wishing to participate, and to allow each participant to
maintain its independence. On this basis, a Eurasian union based on the
democratic principles of equality of all peoples, religions, and ethnic groups
could eventually emerge and become a zone where, among other things,
potentially explosive conflicts between European and Muslim values could be
successfully contained and sublimated in broader patterns of coexistence.
making process. The situation in the political sphere, however, is completely different. Russia is a unique state in that it does not have clear-cut external borders. Moreover, it is impossible today to redraw these borders, even if only because the border would have to pass through the north of Kazakhstan, where half the population is ethnic Russian. Naturally, Russia, having transparent borders between it and its neighbors, is especially interested in its neighbors becoming its strategic allies. This is particularly true in the sense that Russia fears that powerful forces outside the region may try to take advantage of the situation. Ukraine and Belarus are especially important as strategic allies for Russia in terms of the forthcoming expansion of NATO to the East.

Under the best of circumstances, it will take a long time for the former Soviet region to establish political and economic stability. Until then, continuing and possibly escalating crises and social disasters among its neighbors will disrupt Russia as well, not least because they threaten to produce huge immigration flows. Whether or not this threat materializes will depend importantly on how quickly a “Four-Plus Union” can be achieved. In order to achieve it, it is necessary to determine the level of integration that would be acceptable to each one of the countries wishing to participate, and to allow each participant to maintain its independence. On this basis, a Eurasian union based on the democratic principles of equality of all peoples, religions, and ethnic groups could eventually emerge and become a zone where, among other things, potentially explosive conflicts between European and Muslim values could be successfully contained and sublimated in broader patterns of coexistence.