The RAND/Istituto Affari Internazionali Conference on the New Mediterranean Security Environment

Ian Lesser, Robert Levine (editors)
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Ian Lesser, Robert Levine (editors)

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PREFACE

This report summarizes and presents the key papers from the fourth conference on Security in the Mediterranean jointly sponsored by RAND and the Istituto Affari Internazionali. The conference took place in RAND’s Washington Offices, February 18-19, 1993. It was supported by the United States Mission to NATO, The Ford Foundation, Finmeccanica, S.A. and by RAND using its own research funds.

In addition to RAND and IAI analysts, the approximately 30 participants included American, Italian, Greek, Turkish, and German officials, former officials, analysts, and journalists. The conference was off the record insofar as individual or official comments were concerned.

The summary of proceedings was prepared by Preston Niblack of RAND with assistance from Kathryn Rivas.
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SESSION I: PERSPECTIVES ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE

The prevailing view from this first session was that the challenges facing the United States and Europe today are far different than those subsumed under the rubric of the "new world order," coined after the fall of communism. We are faced with a world in which the role of the United States is uncertain, relations between the United States and Europe are murky, the open world trading system is threatened, the role of international institutions like the United Nations is under question, and in which a growing cleavage appears to divide the West and Islam. Security can no longer be discussed solely in military terms; its economic and political dimensions can no longer be ignored. Finally, the international community is confronted with the challenge of developing policies for dealing with the threats to stability in Europe and in the former Soviet republics posed by the eruption of long-suppressed nationalist yearnings. There was a consensus that not only was it important to distinguish the new problems and risks of the post-Cold War period, but to go further and look at the characteristics, sources, and deeper demands of these new risks.

Leadership in the Post-Cold War Era

Throughout the conference there was a call for leadership: leadership by the United States, Europe, international institutions, and even new countries. Most eyes were cast toward the United States as the leader, at a time when its international role is being questioned domestically and externally. The United States is the only remaining military superpower, but in a world where military power and especially nuclear power are seen to have declining relevance this position is an ambiguous one. Ironically, the traditional military dimensions of security must yield to the increasing importance of economics just when America's economic preponderance is diminishing. Nevertheless, in many areas the United States maintains a leadership role which cannot be replaced. Militarily, the United States must continue to consider
Russian military power, not only because Europe shows little interest, but because only the United States can balance Russia's nuclear capability. In cases like Iraq, Somalia, and Yugoslavia, U.S. leadership was the prerequisite for an international response.

The Americans at the conference argued that there are no signals coming from the Europeans that they are willing to take on more of a political-military role than in the past. It was emphasized that the United States cannot be expected to lead everywhere and will not lead if no one follows. In the Yugoslav case, Europe has not shown a propensity to follow a U.S. lead.

How did the European participants view the U.S. role in the post-Cold War period? The United States will be "first among equals" best describes their position. In addition, some felt a need for sharing of leadership in, for example, a tri-penta polar model: economically tri-polar between the United States, Europe, and Japan, and penta-polar between the United States, Europe, Japan, China, and Russia on security issues. Others underlined the necessity to develop a broader base of cooperation, to move away from a unilateralist approach toward a multilateral one. Not only are Europe and the United States seeking to formulate the dimensions of their new roles, but they are also groping to understand what will constitute the new European-American relationship.

At the forefront of the discussion was the old question of "Europeanist" versus "Atlanticist:" could one be both simultaneously? The answer was yes, with some qualifications. This relationship was described as a number of concentric circles with individual European countries at the core, then the EC, followed by the WEU, with NATO (the Atlantic dimension) enveloping the whole. However it was feared that such a paradigm created too long a radius, that NATO would inherently be subordinated to national and EC interests. On the other hand, if one saw the EC as a whole greater than the sum of its parts, then such a Europe may prove to be a better partner. Therefore there are two ways to be Europeanist and Atlanticist: either the Atlanticist vocation is subordinated, or there can be a division of responsibilities and a sharing of roles. Finally, from the Italian side it was argued that a
true Europeanist is also an Atlanticist and that those in Europe who prefer to denounce the Atlantic connection do so for nationalistic reasons not European ones. Uncertainty remains about the direction of Europe, how inclusive it will be, and what kind of leadership it will exert, as well as what kind of foreign and security policies it will develop. Other factors effecting the U.S.-European relationship also have international security implications, namely the prospect of heightened trade tensions, and the shift from foreign policy issues to domestic ones.

Changes in U.S. foreign policy are leaving our partners as well as ourselves with a feeling of uneasiness and uncertainty as to what role the United States will play in the new era. The last decade has been dominated by administrations with vigorous foreign policy agendas. However, under the new administration, foreign policy is likely to take a back seat to domestic concerns. Not only will foreign policy be subordinate, but its grand outlines have yet to be defined. The traditional rationale for engagement in the world, namely the Soviet threat, is no longer present. That leaves the United States (and NATO) searching to understand its interests and the criteria for military engagement.

The World Trading System

The new U.S. administration has explicitly given priority to domestic economic issues. As a result, American trade policy may become more aggressive. Some American participants tended to view this development with concern, warning of the potential of an all out trade war arising from the growth of regional trade blocs like NAFTA and the EC, while others viewed this prospect as unlikely, given the degree of cross-investment and other economic ties across the Atlantic. Still others foresaw the possibility of the United States turning to Japan, Taiwan, China and other Southeast Asian nations as its principal trading partners.

Some Europeans were more skeptical about this, as well as about the likelihood of the development of regional trading blocs. They tended to view NAFTA and the European single market as extensions of the post-
World War II free trade regime, rather than antithetical to it. Some in fact felt that the European Community as a whole was less protectionist than individual countries, and thus worked to dampen anti-free trade pressures within the Community. At least one American participant disputed this view, however, believing that the Community tends to seek the "least common denominator" position among its members, and thus is more likely to bend to strong protectionist pressures than to shoulder the burden of upholding free trade.

All agreed that the continuation and extension of free trade was a vital interest to both Europe and the United States. Trade is the link between domestic economics and foreign policy. Political and opinion leaders must make its importance clear to their publics.

The United Nations

Faced with the imminent failure of U.N. peacekeeping efforts in Cambodia, Angola, Cyprus, and Yugoslavia, the overwhelming question was whether or not the United Nations is the most efficient instrument for international peacekeeping. The prognosis was grim. The United Nations is faced with tasks it is not prepared to undertake. In theory, the United Nations' role is defined either as "policeman" or "soldier," yet in reality this distinction is muddled. The United Nations entered Yugoslavia as a policeman, but has been forced to become a soldier and consequently finds itself a hostage to the crisis.

The way the United Nations has faced crises has also accentuated its ineffectiveness. U.N. peacekeeping missions are typically deployed for purposes of crisis management. They have waited until the situation was at or beyond the boiling point. Instead, the United Nations should focus on crisis prevention with peacemaking at the heart of prevention. It was widely felt that the United States should take a more active role in preparing the United Nations for these new global tasks.

SESSION II: TURKEY, THE GULF, AND THE FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS

Including Central Asia in a conference on Mediterranean security shows that the international community is faced with a new regional security equation. Although a fair amount was said about the former
Soviet republics, the debate centered around Turkey and its new political, economic, and security role in the region.

Turkey is tied to the Mediterranean, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Persian Gulf as never before. As a consequence, Europe also is developing new links to this region. A common ethnic thread links Turkey with many of the ex-Soviet republics. Affairs in the Caucasus and the Persian Gulf are interrelated with Turkey’s involvement in Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, and with the possibility of Russia seeking a southern route to the Persian Gulf. The main concern for the West is how Turkey plans to develop these new relationships, particularly with regard to the newly emerging Islamic factor.

Concerning Turkey’s membership in the European Community, the traditional response has been “not now, not in the foreseeable future, not ever.” Yet the majority present felt it impossible to think of a European security framework without Turkey and stressed the necessity of establishing a legitimate role for the country. On the other hand, Turkey’s presence in a European security framework may pose problems in its own right. Many in Europe consider Turkey a Middle Eastern rather than a European ally. In addition, the EC must consider the daunting consequence of full Turkish membership in Europe in security terms: common borders with Syria, Iraq and Iran. Even in the existing security framework, Turkey has become the new “consumer of security” in NATO.

Two comments were made about the issue of “in the community or out.” There was a feeling that countries must develop their own identities so they can become leaders on their own. There is also the issue of participation in the WEU. Nonetheless, the fear remains that Turkey, rebuffed by Europe, will turn to a more national and regional orientation: a “Turkish agenda.”

Turkey has the potential to be a model of an Islamic yet secular country for the Central Asian republics, as an alternative to Iran. The difficulty emerges if Turkey chooses to take advantage of its new strategic position and create an alternative pole of attraction to Europe and the United States. The independence of the former Soviet republics provides Turkey with new opportunities. As Turkey interacts with the Central Asian republics and its other neighbors, her foreign
policy may well become more Islamic-oriented. Turkey will have to consider her own Muslim identity, and this will eventually bring Islamic issues ever closer to Europe.

For many in Turkey, the "Turkish option" doesn't exist. The perception of a "Turkish century" is exaggerated to a point of irritation throughout Central Asia. But the time may soon come when Turkey will not feel herself an equal partner in the European and Atlantic community, and it will have to consider the Turkish option. For now, it is doubtful that Turkey could play a leadership role in Central Asia or elsewhere for several reasons. First, her financial status will not permit it; Second, it will cause more problems for Ankara among neighboring states; and last, Turkey will be unable to do so as long she continues to be preoccupied with her Kurdish population. Even though it was clear that the United States, for strategic reasons, cannot afford to treat Turkey as a lesser partner, it along with Europe was warned not to try to turn Turkey into a bulwark for western security. This could only promote anti-Turkish coalitions in the region, in addition to running counter to Turkey's own interests. Therefore, Turkey should be supported without special reference to the country's role in Central Asia.

SESSION III: THE BALKAN CRISIS: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS AND RESPONSES

There were two dimensions to the discussion of the Balkan crisis: what leadership role should be taken by which countries or organizations, and on what basis; and the implications for the role and effectiveness of international institutions. The crisis has illustrated the difficulties in defining new principles to guide international security interventions, and the limitations of international institutions.

In the event, the United States has taken a limited but leading role. Why should this be the case? What interests does the U.S. have in the region which would lead it to take a more prominent role than other European countries or groupings?

The general stakes were easy enough to define: they are humanitarian, the risks of spillover, the implications of a united
Serbia for other countries in the area, the dangers of a precedent, and the impact of further refugee movements and immigration for the Western European countries.

But some participants were bothered by what they perceived as the U.S. stepping in when the countries in the region were most directly implicated and should have taken the lead. Others responded that the fundamental U.S. interest in the stability and security of Europe leads it to intervene in the absence of an effective response by international organizations or individual European countries. Doing nothing would have sent a message that the stakes would never be high enough for U.S. intervention. Nor can others be expected to defend U.S. national interests. The United States must be prepared to draw some lines, separating what is acceptable from what is not. Others argued on grounds of traditional American cultural, economic, and political ties to Europe, creating a community of values to be defended against the chaotic and destructive forces of nationalism.

In addition to Washington's traditional European partners, what role should Russia assume in the crisis? Is she now capable of assuming any role at all? What role should the U.S. and Europe expect Moscow to assume, and what conditions can they impose, playing on the desire for Western aid and ties?

Almost every international collective security organization—the U.N., the European Community, NATO, the CSCE—appears to have failed, highlighting that their effectiveness depends on the will to act and the concert of the members. To some extent, the international institutions have foundered between the Scylla and Charybdis of principles and interests. The United Nations remains wedded to its traditional neutralism, which in this instance cannot be appropriate since it has effectively deprived one side of the ability to defend itself. Nor can the United Nations merely provide humanitarian relief without becoming a part of the conflict—or U.N. troops will merely become powerless hostages to the situation (and as in this case, to the militarily stronger power).

The European Community has shown its weakness by its inability to come up with a common policy on the issue. Indeed, the cleavages within
the community have contributed to the perception of its weakness. Similarly, NATO has been unable to respond, and this failure is the corollary to the U.N.'s difficulties. NATO must reexamine its role, it was argued, because it is the only credible instrument of intervention for the U.N. But some participants were skeptical of any role for international organizations, believing that they could not be effective protectors of national interests, and arguing for a return to a concert of powers approach.

The difficulties of intervention cannot be overemphasized. The potential for spillover and deepening involvement in Kosovo, Macedonia, and even Albania were cited. Nonetheless, the West should stand ready to intervene in Kosovo, some argued, to avoid the mistakes made in Bosnia, when the U.N. and western nations failed to help provide for Bosnian self-defense. But we must first think through the political implications of deep and prolonged intervention. Responding to the proposal for U.N. trusteeship, some cited the cautionary example of Cambodia.

SESSION IV: ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM IN THE MAGHREB AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS.

"The first and main strategic implication of the Islamist phenomenon for North Africa is that it imposes the resolution of the basic political dilemma of the Arab world, that of Democracy." The continued existence of authoritarian regimes and their refusal to make the transition toward participatory politics has been at the root of security risks which exist in the Maghreb, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East. Domestic instability, terrorism, manipulation by external powers of internal opposition, and disruptive attitudes toward regional and international cooperation are a few of these risks. However, even the possibility of Islam entering the political arena through a democratic process left some wary about welcoming such a movement with open arms, no matter how gradual or peaceful the process. There seemed to be a sense of urgency to channel or more specifically, to control the spread of Islam, through dialogues, with economic aid, or through the democratic process. Unfortunately, difficulties arise when building
relations with Islam because of its diversity as well as the lack of a single Islamic foreign policy agenda.

The Islamic "Black Box"

So easily, when discussing issue of Islam, the West categorizes it under one monolithic conception: Islamic politics, or Islamic authoritarianism. The West must learn to disassemble this black box for Islam is not unitary. The need to judge each national movement individually according to its particular political role was emphasized. The dynamics between Islamic movements and the forces in power are unique to each state. They each have different strategies, some violent but some not. Consequently this diversity complicates North-South relations because there is no one formula for dealing with Islamic countries.

Foreign and Security Policy Implications

A dilemma arises in encouraging dialogues and bilateral relations with Islamic states in the Middle East because the West is unsure of their attitudes on foreign affairs. Little is said about North-South relations, or for that matter, about any of the strategic issues that have dominated Western countries' political agendas for years. Difficulty also arises in initiating dialogues: Who will be participating in these exchanges? What will the contents be and where will they lead?

The Islamic movement in Algeria is seen as a second stage of Islamic development (Iran was the first). How it progresses will depend on the reaction from the West. It was recommended that we be cooperative, not confrontational. A recent message from Algeria to the West in general was that it must be ready to compromise in areas of human rights, democracy, free trade, and intervention. It was noticed however, that there is an interest on the part of Algeria in creating bilateral relations with the United States, especially as anti-Arab sentiment colors European politics. On the positive side, the WEU has recently started discussions with North Africa.

The conference was skeptical as to the value of economic aid as a tool to modify behavior. The political risks of Islam are immediate
while attempts to promote economic development must be long term. The question also arises about how to use that aid, as in the case of Iran: Should economic and technological assistance be the incentive or the reward? There are also restraints on the availability of assistance given the current economic climate in the west.

Debate surfaced on Iran and its role in the Middle East. On the one hand it was felt that Iran’s involvement has declined due to domestic preoccupations. Nevertheless, others felt Iran is still active in providing support to opposition parties in the region, especially in Algeria. Turkey deals with Iran cautiously. Turkey, whose national identity is secular, fears that a neighbor like Iran could upset this orientation. We were left wondering if Iran could be trusted to play by the rules of the game, allowing a peaceful change of government.

Though most were uncertain on what avenue to take, the consensus was that strategic misconceptions pose a serious risk to relations between the West and the Islamic states.

"Islam is here to stay"

Faced with the reality that Islamic fundamentalism is here to stay, there was a sense among the participants that the West needed to influence or shape it in some manner. Ideally Islamic movements would take a democratic form, providing a political alternative and playing by democratic rules. The possibility that such movements would come to power, however, was greeted with apprehension. This uneasiness is accentuated by the uncertainty of the foreign and security policy orientations of Islamic opposition groups, and their attitudes toward existing regional conflicts and agreements.

Many factors will influence how these orientations develop. One of the most important relates to how Islam enters the political arena. Arguably, in Algeria, the FIS that eventually comes to power in the future will be very different than if it had entered by means of parliamentary elections last year.

As a further step in the democratic process, once an Islamic party is elected three indicators were suggested to judge their character:
• Is there a debate of substance on key issues among the Islamists?
• What changes do we see in the Islamists after they come to power (do they change their policies in response to political realities?)
• What changes are there in public opinion, especially after one, two, or three years?

The hope is that Islam will lose its "magic" quality and become another ordinary political movement. However, all of this becomes a moot point while the liberalization processes are at a stalemate. Here, the United States and Europe were urged to refrain from giving aid and to demand that the authoritarian regimes hold elections. It was felt that the West's tendency was to prefer the current regimes to the threat of an Islamic state. The actions of these regimes have already been detrimental, as in the case of Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt, which will in turn affect methods other Islamist movements use to gain power. The conclusion of many participants was that Islam is not inherently antidemocratic, but that the West is running out of time and means to encourage its development in a positive direction.

SESSIONS V : PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY

The two final sections addressed two topics that span the divide between the Cold War and the new era: the implications of the proliferation of nuclear and chemical/biological weapons, and environmental issues as vectors of security concerns. Both of these topics have been raised in the past, yet they take on new meaning, new dimensions, and new urgency in the changed Mediterranean security environment.

What are the pressures that accelerate and impede proliferation? The collapse of the international proliferation regime (particularly due to an inability to stop North Korean development) could accelerate pressures for nuclear weapons development in other regions, including the Mediterranean. The dynamics of proliferation in the Mediterranean are likely be affected by events in Asia and the Middle East, either positively or negatively.
Certain recent events have added, if not pressure, at least opportunities for nuclear weapons development programs. The potential for proliferation of nuclear weapons is increased by the availability of nuclear energy technology, a trend likely to be accelerated by the turning away from fossil fuels embodied in the Rio Declaration. And the breakup of the Soviet military-industrial complex, leading to the diffusion of technology, materials, and know-how into an international black market, is a worrisome trend. There was some disagreement on the extent of this proliferation from the former Soviet Union. One participant noted that the number of members in the nuclear club will increase because of the breakup of the Soviet Union: Ukraine is holding on to its inherited nuclear inventory until it feels assured it has mastered the technology and has a virtual arsenal.

But proliferation also has a regional security dimension. Two nations--Libya and Algeria--are poised as potential nuclear states. Even if neither has any clear design for nuclear or chemical use, the mere fact of possession has implications for regional relations. NATO will need to consider its response to regional use.

Development of an arsenal by either of these states may increase the insecurity of others, such as Greece or Spain. What pressures might Turkey feel under if Iran or Iraq were to develop nuclear arsenals? Turkey is probably technically capable, but at the moment it was felt Ankara has no plans to undertake a program--as long as it feels the NATO guarantee is still valid.

One participant noted that the fact that the current NPT regime is stacked in favor of the "haves"--in other words, the West--makes enforcement more difficult. Monitoring of the "haves" under the same rules as potential violators would help mitigate the perception of unfairness.

Some noted and deplored the overwhelming emphasis given to nuclear proliferation. If the nuclear threat is largely "virtual," the chemical and biological threat by contrast is real and present. Although attention is easily focused on nuclear capabilities and intentions, the more pressing problem is the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons capabilities and delivery means. What would have been the
implications of Iraqi use of chemical weapons during the Gulf War? Some felt it would have been significant in terms of straining the fragile coalition, while others saw greater significance in the fact that Iraq did not employ its chemical arsenal.

How should the West, NATO, the United Nations, respond to violations? There was some disagreement on whether the action to be punished was possession or use. Some felt that severe responses should be triggered by use; others felt that even one incident would be catastrophic, and that the risks of non-response are too high to await the eventuality of employment. As for the institutional mechanisms of enforcement, the U.N. Security Council would have to be prepared to take strong and unequivocal actions—which some felt to be a doubtful prospect.

SESSION VI: ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Although the presenter's paper focused on the effects of environmental degradation on development and stability, the focus of discussion was on the effects of environmental accidents (or acts of eco-terrorism, such as Iraq perpetrated during the Gulf War), and the potential for bilateral conflicts between nations over common environmental resources, such as pollution in the Aegean Sea.

Some felt that the desire of the Northern states for stricter environmental standards was in clear conflict with Southern development goals. In this context, a definition of common interests and goals will be essential to addressing environmental issues. Tourism, migration, and trade policies all have environmental dimensions that could be addressed without conflict. The CSCE Mediterranean initiative has already begun to address these issues. Others were less optimistic, while still others felt that environmental issues were not properly at the core of North-South relations in the Mediterranean.
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JOINT RAND-IAI CONFERENCE ON THE NEW MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT.


BY MAURIZIO CREMASCO.

FOREWORD. ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI

This document is composed of two separate but complementary papers.

The first is the paper on which the time-limited presentation at the conference was based.

The second is a "background" paper, which was distributed in advance and which details many of the issues touched upon in the presentatio paper.

PRESENTATION PAPER.

In the past two years, hopes for a "new world order" have been replaced by the cold reality of a "new world disorder" which will presumably last for decades. As we begin 1993, there are 26 conflicts in the world -- either between two warring countries or, within a country, between government and insurgent forces -- and 47 areas in which ethnic tensions and national rivalries could be a source of potential conflict.

The prospects are for a further fragmentation of the international system and, in the longer term, for a deepening of the political and economic divide between North and South, with the additional complication of an Islamic world which appears headed toward deeper anti-Western sentiments and attitudes.

One has the impression of witnessing a return to an earlier historical period, with the re-emergence of the main issues of the closing years of the 19th century -- the Balkan powder-keg, the Eastern Question and the endemic instability of multi-ethnic nations. The international events have again confronted Western decision-makers with old diplomatic dilemmas: Will appeasement of aggression today not bring more costly and bloody results tomorrow? Should the West intervene, even when its vital interests are not at stake? Where, how and with what instruments should the West intervene? Where should the line be drawn
between advocating and supporting territorial change and defending the status quo? When does the intervention cease to be a necessary humanitarian action and become interference in the internal affairs of a country?

Today, the situation is even more difficult because the old dilemmas are mixed with new problems, mainly deriving from the disintegration of the Soviet empire, a tectonic shift in the international scene, with consequences and repercussions which have still to be completely felt and which are bound to influence international events for a long time. New problems are deriving also from the alarming situation in the African continent where several countries (Zaire, Angola, Somalia) are on the verge of total breakdown.

It is open to question if the West has the political will, the military force and the economic power to respond to risks to its security which are multifaceted in nature and multidirectional. This is particularly true if one thinks that the majority of those risks cannot be confronted with the instrument of deterrence as had been done in the past when the West was faced with the traditional Soviet threat.

There could be the temptation of adopting a strategy of containment similar to that applied during the Cold War. In other words, to establish a "cordon sanitaire" around the crisis area, limiting the action to avoiding the spill-over and the enlargement of the conflict.

But this policy would appear too self-centered and strategically, politically and economically counterproductive in the long run. The West cannot isolate itself and refuse to participate in, and possibly manage and direct, this epochal transition.

Moreover, the West would be accused of a double standard unless the policy is applied in every case and everywhere, regardless of geographical proximity or national interests to be safeguarded.

Finally, it would be difficult to rationalize and defend such a policy before the Western public, particularity in cases in which human suffering becomes the main element of judgement such as in Somalia and Yugoslavia.

On the other hand, the West cannot and should not intervene in all crises, playing the role of world's policeman. Some domestic crises simply have no solution which could be imposed from the outside. Does anyone seriously believe that the situation in Somalia will not return to the "status quo ante" as soon as the U.S. Marines and the other forces are withdrawn? Other crises are too complicated or too risky, and probably the less messy solution is to contain the fire and let it extinguish itself, no matter how long it takes.

In this context, the future of the United Nations is of
paramount importance. There would be a significant difference in the successful management of international instability if the UN were to evolve from an organization limited to peacekeeping to one capable of peacemaking with the full participation of all major nations -- Russia, Japan and China included.

In June 1992, the European Council in Lisbon reported on the likely development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and identified areas open to joint European action, ranging from Central and Eastern Europe (Russia, the former Soviet Republics and the former Yugoslavia included) to the Maghreb and Middle East.

However, Europe does not appear willing to go beyond generic commitments to promote political stability; contribute to the creation of political and economic frameworks capable of advancing regional cooperation; and support peaceful solutions in the former Yugoslavia and the Middle East.

In fact, Europe is divided on the approach to the problem of international instability and ethnic conflicts, and its weak and confused response to the Yugoslav crisis is a good case in point.

From a strictly European perspective, there are at least three relevant short-term security issues: the unrelenting pace of migration from the East and the South toward Germany and the Southern European states; the possibility of a trade war between the EC and the United States, a war which will have a dangerous impact on trans-Atlantic security and defense relationships; the spread of the civil war in Croatia and Bosnia to Macedonia and Kossovo, with the Balkanization of the conflict and the possible intervention of external actors. In this context, the recent, new Russian attitude and political posturing in favor of Serbia is an additional element of concern.

It might seem odd to cite migration as a significant security risk. But, in Germany mass migration, which is difficult to stem and control is aggravating an already serious social and economic situation. It is becoming an element of domestic instability with clear political repercussions, which, in turn, might fuel a change in German foreign policy.

A trans-Atlantic trade war would be a tragedy. I do not think it is necessary to explain what this would mean in terms of the continuous viability of the American defense commitment to Europe, the survival of NATO as the symbol of that commitment, and the possibility of unleashing centrifugal forces within the EC.

The spread the civil war in the former Yugoslavia would be an even bigger tragedy, with direct consequences on the whole international situation. As of the date of this paper, no diplomatic solution is in sight and time is running short for preventing the slaughter from expanding to Kossovo. This will certainly trigger a reaction not only in Albania but also in
other Muslim countries.

Europe and the United States are still undecided on the best diplomatic and military course, while the UN contingent is impotent in the face of the spreading violence, incapable of providing a consistent flow of relief aid, and suffering losses. The Clinton Administration has decided to set aside the use of military force for now and concentrate on a new peace initiative. The European countries, on the other hand, appear to favor the Owen-Vance peace plan.

Let us move to a longer term perspective and to different areas.

In the Gulf, Iran is poised to become the dominant power, probably a nuclear one in the early part of next century -- unless Israel will still be willing and able to intervene to stop Iran's nuclear development -- and there is little the other Gulf countries could do to change this outcome. The alternative represented by a "repowered" Iraq as a regional counterweight is not acceptable. This means that stability in the Gulf, particularly in terms of protection of smaller countries and the oil flow will mainly depend on the United States for the foreseeable future.

In the Mediterranean region, the focus is on at least four developments which are bound to have an impact on European security: the continuation of the Arab-Israeli peace process; the proliferation of long range ballistic missiles; the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and high-tech weapons; the diffusion of Islamic fundamentalism in North Africa; the deepening of the economic and social North-South gap, aggravated by insufficient agricultural production (the countries from Morocco to Egypt have become net importers of agricultural products) and an inadequate industrialization process, a high foreign debt burden (foreign debt reduces their export incomes from a fifth to a third) and an explosive population growth.

The risk of proliferation of long-range ballistic missiles in the Mediterranean area is less immediate than it is thought. No Arab country in the Mediterranean has the industrial and technological ability for the domestic construction of long range surface-to-surface missiles with a militarily significant CEP.

Moderate technical competence is required to reverse-engineer and replicate simple systems, while significant technical skill and industrial infrastructure are required for indigenous development. It is more likely that proliferation would be the result of acquisitions from a foreign country -- China, India, Russia -- willing to export its systems.

As a matter of fact, even the 600 km range SCUD-C missiles presently possessed by Iran, Egypt and Syria are not a domestic upgrade of the Soviet SCUD-B systems, but have been provided by North Korea.

Obviously, the deployment of missiles with a range of 2500-3000 km on any North-African country will present Europe -- and particularly Southern Europe -- with a totally new strategic
situation.

But the threat is medium-term and at present no European nation is seriously thinking about the development of an anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) system.

Western means for constraining missile proliferation are limited and partially effective. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), whose membership, as of mid-1992, has reached 18 countries from the original seven, should prevent the transfer of missile systems and technologies. Together with unilateral or bilateral restrictions, it is the only "supply side" approach to stemming missile proliferation. The results of the regime are mixed. It is expected that the MTCR can, at best, extend the development process, increase R&D costs and retard or block qualitative improvements in technology.

However, the risk of proliferation of ballistic missiles should not overshadow the fact that another proliferation, that of high-performance combat aircraft, is already a reality in the whole region.

In military terms, and in terms of offensive capabilities -- considering that the aircraft are capable of carrying nuclear and chemical weapons -- the Tu-22s, the Su-24s, the Mig-27s represent a potential threat, which is not to be underestimated.

The proliferation of chemical and nuclear weapons is even more difficult to restrain and control. The nuclear proliferation opportunities are more numerous today than in the past because of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the possibility of smuggling part of the vast amount of nuclear material, which will be made available by the dismantling of the former Soviet weapons -- according to a recent estimate it would amount to about 500 tons of highly enriched uranium and 96 tons of plutonium.

The question is simple. How far is the international community, and the West in particular, ready to go to stop other nations from acquiring a nuclear military capability? Should military options (limited options?) be considered, and in which cases? How could these options be eventually applied without becoming an element of further destabilization of the international system, considering that the majority of potential proliferators are Islamic countries?

The spreading influence of the Islamic fundamentalist movements is an instability factor for the entire North African region, from Morocco to Egypt, and is a European security liability because of their basically anti-Western political posture. It may be true that the foreign policy of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front, if it takes power -- an event that French Intelligence estimates to be possible in less than two years -- will be different from that of Iran. But it would be easy to predict that the links between Algiers and Tehran will be strong, and that Iran will somewhat influence Algeria's attitudes. Moreover, an Islamic Fundamentalist regime in Algeria will have profound repercussions in Tunisia, Lybia, Egypt, three
countries which are already struggling with strong Fundamentalist movements. Moreover, it will probably influence the future objectives of the Algerian nuclear program, which has been only recently unveiled.

One last note on population growth.

The Middle East and the Maghreb are in the forefront of the world's demographic explosion. From Morocco to Iran, populations are increasing faster than in Latin America.

The population of the Middle East and North Africa (excluding Turkey and including Iran) will increase from the 272.4 million of the 1990 to 562.2 million in 2025.

The demographic explosion is bound to affect all attempts at economic development and socio-political reforms. Already in the 80's, the increases in the gross national products of the Northern Africa countries were basically offset by population growth.

BACKGROUND PAPER.

1. INTRODUCTION.

In the past two years, hopes for a "new world order" have been replaced by the cold reality of a "new world disorder" which will presumably last for decades. At the start of 1993, there are 26 conflicts in the world -- either between two warring countries or, within a country, between government and insurrectionary forces -- and 47 areas in which ethnic tensions and national rivalries could be a source of potential conflict.¹

In this brief overview, I will try to analyze the main elements of the present, fragmented and dangerous international situation, concentrating on the Mediterranean region and on the areas geo-strategically linked to it.

In general terms, apart from the final outcome of the European integration process, the further and stable evolution of the former Soviet Union, and Russia in particular, toward democracy and an open market, and the role that the United States under President Clinton will be ready and willing to play, there are several factors, which are bound to shape the future of the international scene in this decade, and to have an impact on European and American security.

These include the following:

* The gradual return to a more stable international system, or a negative trend toward its further fragmentation and the passage from endemic tensions to open conflict in the 47 areas of the world previously mentioned.

* The role of the United Nations, and its evolution from an organization limited to peacekeeping to one capable of peacemaking. In this respect, the U.S. attitude and policy will be of paramount importance.

* The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of mass impact, i.e. the proliferation of nuclear and chemical armaments, and of long range ballistic missiles and high-technology weapons systems.

* The prospect of nuclear blackmail and terrorism, facilitated by the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and the diffusion of nuclear material and know-how in the Third World. It is expected that the dismantling of the former Soviet nuclear weapons will produce about 500 tons of highly enriched uranium and 96 tons of plutonium. Experts fear the likelihood of smuggling.²

* The increasing "Islamic" sentiment in the Arab world which, even when it is far from the revolutionary zeal of the fundamentalists, appears to find part of its strength in general anti-Western feelings and attitudes.

* The growing social disruption potential and security repercussions of widespread migration to Europe as a result of domestic political instabilities, bleak economic prospects and ethnic tensions in the South and East.

* The deepening of the international connections and the spread of cooperation among mafia-type criminal organizations and the possible use of terrorism for the achievement of their aims.

* The population growth in the South and its impact on domestic social and economic development and migration trends.

* The economic and social impact of environmental risks.

2. THE PROBLEMS.

Let be now more specific. Keeping in mind the general background I have just outlined, I will touch on the main problems of the Mediterranean region which have a direct bearing on security.

I will confine my analysis to some aspects of these problems,

² David Hughes, Arms Experts Fear Nuclear Blackmail, Aviation Week and Space Technology (AWST), 4 January 1993, pp. 61-62.
considering that they will be fully addressed in the course of our discussions.

a. The Gulf. Iran's foreign and security policy.

Internationally, Iran is pursuing an ambitious and wide-ranging foreign policy. Among other initiatives, this involves the attempt to gain greater influence in the Persian Gulf (the occupation and reported fortification of Abu Mussa is a stark reminder of the continuity of Iran's regional ambitions, which date back to the Shah's era) and the attempt to exploit the openings in the non-Arab Muslim Asian republics of the former Soviet Union, which are more likely to be receptive to Islamic fundamentalist credo. Groups of Tajiki militia men reportedly received guerrilla training in military camps in Sudan (where Iran supports Islamic fundamentalism) under the guidance of Pasdaran instructors. They are now back in Tajikistan sustaining the party of Islamic Renaissance and taking part in the fighting against Russian troops and government forces. It is widely assumed that the weaker Tajikistan is only the first target of Tehran's grand design for the emergence of radical Islamic states in central Asia. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are expected to be next.3

Particularly troubling are the patterns of Iran's alliances with Syria, Pakistan, China and North Korea, and its developments in the military and nuclear fields.

Iran appears to be on its way to becoming the most powerful military force in the region.5 In 1991, Iran reportedly paid $5 billion to China, $4 billion to the Russian Federation and $3 billion to North Korea for modern weapons. North Korea supplied 170 SCUD B and SCUD C missiles (presumably more than 100 of the


4. In this context, it is significant that an agreement on joint production of SCUD C missiles was apparently reached in October 1991 during a visit to Tehran of the Chief of Staff of the Syrian Army. See, "Syria and Iran Pool SRBM Resources", Flight International, 16-22 October 1991, p. 15.

C model), while China supplied 600-mile range M-11 ballistic missiles.

Moreover, Iran is reported to have tested two new ballistic missiles in 1991 -- the first with a range of over 700 km. and the second with a range of over 1000 km. These are believed to be the result of a joint Chinese-Iranian project.

In March 1992, Tehran signed a $1 billion contract with the Russian Federation for the delivery of 400 T-72 tanks, including crew training in Russia, as well as maintenance and repair. Another contract for $175 million was signed for the purchase of 500 MBP-2 armored fighting vehicles (AFV), while China has granted a $14 million credit for spare parts for the AFVs already in Iran's possession.

Apart from the Iraqi combat aircraft redeployed to Iran during the Gulf conflict and eventually requisitioned as compensation for the damages of the 1980-1988 war, Russia has recently sold Tehran advanced aircraft such as SU-24s, Mig-29s and, reportedly, even Tu-26 Backfire long range bombers. Moreover, the acquisition of two (with an option for a third) KILO class conventional attack submarines will give Iran a unique undersea capability of disruption of commercial traffic in the Gulf of Oman, northwest Arabian Sea and Strait of Hormuz. The military importance of the KILO submarines should not be overestimated, but it is fair to say that they can provide a measure of sea denial, and a means to intimidate and harass with significant political effects.

This new development will force the other Gulf countries to

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7. It is possible that the same missile was tested over two different ranges. See, Joseph S. Bermudez jr., "Ballistic Missiles in the Third World -- Iran's Medium-Range Missiles", Iran, April 1992 Jane's Intelligence Review, pp. 147-152.


9. The Bush Administration was so worried about the prospective sale that it tried to convince Saudi Arabia to pay Russia the cost of the submarines (about $600 million) in they would abandon the transaction. See, Barton Gellman, "U.S. Sought Saudi Aid on Iran Subs, Washington Post (WP), 30 October 1992, p. A-29.

10. The KILO submarines carry up to 18 torpedoes or 24 mines. The possibility of laying mines is the more subtle element of its sea denial capability.
reassess their security requirements and arrangements. Oman, considering New Delhi's interest in balancing the loose alliance between Iran and Pakistan, is reportedly contemplating the enlistment of India's large anti-submarine warfare capabilities. It is likely that Saudi Arabia will consider the acquisition of submarines or ASW assets of its own. In the longer term, Iraq might follow suit.

There is increasing concern that Tehran may try to acquire nuclear weapons. Suspicions about Iran's nuclear propensity and intentions have grown because of a series of elements which point towards an expansion of its nuclear programs. In the framework of the 1990 scientific agreement with China, which included nuclear cooperation, Iran bought a minitype reactor (27 kilowatt) and an electromagnetic separator (calutron) that produces fissionable isotopes. Though there is no evidence that China is assisting Iran in making nuclear weapons, the equipment could be used to produce fissile material and eventually build an atomic bomb.11

According to other experts, the Chinese small reactor and calutron are not capable of producing significant quantities of bomb-grade material, but they certainly contribute to Iran's nuclear technology and can indirectly facilitate the development of a nuclear weapons program.

Moreover, Iran tried to import nuclear technology from Argentina, Brazil, France, Germany, India and Russia. Considering Iran's large oil and gas resources, there appears to be little justification for the procurement of powerful civilian reactors.

There have been widespread reports that Iran received three tactical nuclear weapons, which disappeared from a former Red Army depot in Kazakhstan,12 but these reports have not been substantiated to date. Nuclear experts believe that even if the Iranians obtained nuclear weapons from a CIS republic they could not explode them in the short term. Their fissile material, however, could be used for weapons of Iran's own design and their devices could provide information about the design and construction of nuclear weapons.

In May 1992, CIA director Robert M. Gates confirmed earlier intelligence assessments about Iran's willingness to pursue a


nuclear military capability,\textsuperscript{13} though it was not to be expected before the year 2000.\textsuperscript{14} But after the Iraqi experience, any predictions about nuclear developments in a country dominated by a dictatorial regime, and in which the only controls are those performed by the IAEA, should be taken with caution.

Iran's expanding military capabilities deserve some considerations.

The high-technology portion of Iran's military build-up is still not fully ready for high-intensity warfare and for the time being it would be difficult for the Iranians to conduct sustained operation with its high-tech weaponry.

Very little could be done to curb Iran's military build-up and its consequences in terms of balance of power and political influence in the Gulf region. Saudi Arabia and the other small countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) will not be able to provide a valid counterbalance, no matter how many modern arms they are willing to acquire, and their security will continue to depend on the United States for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the GCC is divided. There has been tension between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, while an old territorial dispute between Qatar and Bahrain remains unsettled.

The only Gulf country capable of providing a strategic counterweight would be Iraq. But even a "reformed" Iraq to offset Iran would be a bad proposal. Stability in the Gulf could not be predicated on re-arming Baghdad even if Saddam is not in power.

Considering that arms control measures are unlikely to succeed, the solution may be dependent on the GCC's putting aside its divisions and taking the lead in "building a reinforcing network of new and strengthened security ties" to use Jim Baker's words. The new security arrangements should also include the essential participation of Iran, Iraq in due time, and Middle-Eastern countries.


A few words on Iraq to complete the overview of the Gulf region.

Iraq is still a limited-sovereignty state, subject to the conditions imposed by the UN ceasefire and subsequent resolutions

\textsuperscript{13} In October 1991, Iran's deputy president, Ayatollah Mohajerani, explicitly declared that "because the enemy has nuclear facilities, the Muslim states too should be equipped with the same capacity." WP, 30 October 1991, A-1, A-20.

addressing the protection of the Kurds in the north and the Shi’ites in the south. Saddam Hussein, however, is still firmly in power and has not abandoned the goal of rebuilding Iraq’s military power. Moreover, the fact that Iraq offered the GCC countries its support in connection with Iran’s occupation of Abu Mussa is a clear indication that Baghdad has not renounced a role in the regional power game.

Last January’s Iraqi provocations have demonstrated that Saddam is able to call the shots and that the UN sanctions are an inadequate tool to restrain his behaviour. Even though Iraq was not in the position to oppose the U.S. military actions, it reaped clear political dividends: it divided the anti-Saddam coalition; it opened a crack in what had been a solid Russian-American front; it repolished its image as the only Arab country capable of facing Western “imperialism” and it regained political space for further maneuvering.

The problem represented by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq is unlikely to disappear soon and, as Antony Cordesman has written, a "proportionate escalation" strategy, as that adopted during the recent military operations in the Gulf, appears inadequate to weaken the Iraqi leader, or to inflict losses which could put an unbearable pressure on Saddam and constrain his actions. This does not mean that the use of unrestrained military force would solve the problem.

The United States and Europe should devise a long term strategy for the whole Gulf region based on a series of political initiatives and supported by credible military instruments. This strategy should take into consideration the close strategic links between the Gulf and the Mediterranean region and the paramount importance of the successful outcome of the presently stalled Arab-Israeli peace talks.

c. North-Africa.

The major problems of North Africa which have a direct impact on European security can be summarized as follows: the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons and ballistic missiles; the spreading influence of Islamic fundamentalism; and the difficult economic and social situation of many countries, aggravated by high population growth.

15. According to U.N. officials, Iraq has put virtually all of its top rocket scientists and engineers to work at the large research facilities of Ibn al Haytham on the outskirts of Baghdad, possibly to prepare for an eventual renewal of prohibited work on long-range ballistic missiles. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Iraq Consolidates Missile Research, Worrying the UN", IHT, 28 January 1993, p. 5.

Let me touch very briefly on these points.

* Missile Proliferation.
I will not repeat was has been extensively written about missile proliferation. I will just note that today Saudi CSS-2 ballistic missiles can cover up to one third of Libyan territory and, on the north, they can reach beyond the territory of Turkey, Iraq and Iran. Israeli JERICHO II missiles can easily strike Riyadh, Baghdad and Benghazi. Iraqi modified SCUD missiles have demonstrated that they can reach Tel Aviv. The possibility that ballistic missiles with a range of 1500–3000 km. would eventually be acquired by north-African countries will not only change the threat picture of the Mediterranean (Libya would be able to target Cairo and Tel Aviv, while even Algeria could attack Israeli territory with CSS-2 type missiles), but will also present the southern European countries with a totally new strategic equation. The eventuality that the possession of ballistic missiles will be matched with a chemical and/or nuclear capability is an additional strong factor of instability with unifying interregional repercussions.

* Nuclear Proliferation.
Syria is reportedly seeking to proceed with a nuclear program with the eventual goal of building nuclear weapons. Though it might be attributed to a growing sense of isolation stemming from the loss of the Soviet Union as the protector power, it seems odd that Syria would try to become a nuclear power when Iraq’s nuclear ambitions have been drastically curtailed. Furthermore, the Israeli military explicitly stated that it will react to any attempt by Arab countries at acquiring nuclear weapons, and talks with Israel are supposed to address arms control issues and strict security arrangements.

Apart from the small (one megawatt) research reactor bought from Argentina, which has been operational since March 1989, Algeria did not appear to have nuclear ambitions until recently. But in 1991, a significant nuclear project was finally unveiled after having being kept secret for some years: a Chinese-supplied

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18. The Jordan-Israel draft accord considers the discussion of issues regarding arms control and the destruction of unconventional weapons. The same issues could be part of a Syria-Israel agreement.

19. Though Algeria is not a signatory to the NPT, the reactor was placed under IAEA safeguards.
research reactor was being built near the town of Ain Oussera.

Many aspects of this project are cause for concern:
- its initial secrecy, and the fact that the facility is said to be encircled by anti-aircraft guns;
- the military potential of the reactor, the technical feasibility to operate it at higher power than declared, and eventually to enlarge it;
- the scarce justification of a civilian nuclear program in a country rich in oil and gas;
- the fact that Algeria is still not a party to the NPT, and uncertainty following the resignation of the Benjedid government which had pledged to join the treaty and put the facility under IAEA controls;
- the lack of a clear military threat and of security requirements which could stimulate and justify nuclear ambitions.

* Islamic Fundamentalism.*

The problem of Islamic fundamentalism is now deeply felt in all the Arab countries from Egypt to Morocco. In Algeria the prospect of the Islamic Salvation Front taking power is an event that French intelligence services reportedly believe to be possible in less than two years. The future of the Algerian nuclear program should be seen in this prospect, as more militant leaders might have different ideas about the nuclear program remaining totally peaceful. Thus, the future of the program will depend largely on the political future of the country.

A domestic factor with a direct bearing on Tripoli’s foreign policy, and on the ultimate importance of its military arsenal in terms of Mediterranean security, is the serious challenge posed by fundamentalist movements.

The eventuality of a fundamentalist state in Algeria will very likely have deep repercussions in Libya, with long term

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20. The power of the reactor was initially rated at 40 megawatts or larger (a size more appropriate for plutonium production than for peaceful research) and then downgraded to about 15 megawatts. In May 1991, China and Algeria revealed that 15 megawatts was actually the maximum power rating and that normal operations would be conducted at 10 megawatts. See John M. Deutch, "The New Nuclear Threat", Foreign Affairs, Fall 1992, pp. 131-132, and Leonard S. Spector, cit. pp. 190-192.

21. The project was discovered only through U.S. intelligence satellites.


23. On the activism of Libyan Islamic fundamentalists and the problems they have already created, see Jennifer Parmelee, "Moslem Fundamentalists Pose Domestic Challenge to Gadhafi", WP, 10 January 1989, p. A16.
effects on the internal stability of the country. In fact, the possibility that a radical Islamic government in Algeria would be tempted to subvert Gadhafi’s regime cannot be excluded.

A similar development in Tunisia, where radical Islamic movements are becoming stronger, would actually transform the political landscape of the entire Maghreb and radically change the security parameters of the Mediterranean region.

Finally, Egypt is struggling against a fundamentalist movement, which by targeting foreign tourists, attempts to erode one of the main sources income of the state. Cairo is worried about the spreading influence of the movement and, at the same time, concerned about developments in Sudan where Iranian influence is growing, and training and support is provided for Islamic activists and revolutionaries.24

Considering the strong anti-Western attitudes of Islamic fundamentalism -- the byproduct of the necessity to present poverty, disastrous economic situation and relative lack of power in the international world as a result of European hegemony and American imperialism -- the presence of one, and possibly more, Islamic regimes on the southern shores of the Mediterranean Sea is bound to influence European security in the years to come.

This influence could be brought to bear either directly, fomenting instability in the region, or indirectly through covert aid to terrorist groups -- it has been reported that Iran has moved its support from the Heltzbollahs in Lebanon to Islamic fundamentalist groups in Sudan -- and the use of Islamic supporters among the 4.4 million third country foreigners from the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean who are presently living in Europe.

Finally, the aim of Islamic regimes to fully control and regulate all aspects of social and private life will force the more educated and liberal to emigrate, thus enlarging the flow of people toward Europe. It would be difficult for European countries to refuse this new tide of emigrants, since they could rightly expect to be considered political refugees.

* Population growth.
   Just a brief note on population growth.

   The Middle East and the Maghreb are in the forefront of the world’s demographic explosion. From Morocco to Iran, populations are increasing faster than in Latin America.

   The population of the Middle East and North Africa

(excluding Turkey and including Iran) will increase from 272.4 million in 1990 to 562.2 million in 2025.\textsuperscript{25}

The demographic explosion is bound to affect all attempts at economic development and socio-political reforms. Moreover, this will tend to deepen the economic gap between the north and south of the Mediterranean region. Already in the 80's, the increases in the gross national products of the North-African countries have been basically offset by population growth.

Moreover, the countries from Morocco to Egypt have become net importers of agricultural products, while each country depends, though to a different degree, on foreign financial and technical support.

Finally, all north-African countries, with the exception of Libya, are burdened by their foreign debt that reduces from a fifth to a third their export incomes.

d. Russia and Europe.

Let me conclude with some brief considerations about Russia and Europe.

* Russia.

Even though there are still serious uncertainties on the final outcome of the current political and economic process in the former Soviet Union, at least three interconnected considerations can be made regarding Russia and the Mediterranean region.

First, Russia's political and security interests will be necessarily different from and have more limited scope than those of the Soviet Union, and the Mediterranean -- but not the Gulf -- would probably be considered as a lower priority region than in the past.

Second, it would be now very unlikely for the Mediterranean Third World countries to use -- as they often did in the past -- US-USSR ideological differences, political rivalries and confrontational attitudes in the international arena for pursuing national interests, or to utilize their special relationship with the Soviet Union for shielding their foreign policy objectives and somewhat constraining the potential range of American actions.

However, the new Russian positions on the events in the Gulf, and particularly in the former Yugoslavia, appear a telling sign that the Russian pro-Western attitudes cannot be taken for granted and that Yeltsin is willing to push Russia again in the

\textsuperscript{25}. More detailed information can be found in James Wyllie, "Inter-Arab Security - The Demographic Challenges", Jane's Intelligence Review, August 1992, pp. 364-365.
forefront of international politics and regain at least part of its traditional world role.

Third, NATO has ceased to see the East as its potential "enemy". Apart from the eventual changes in the command structure and military posture of the former Soviet forces, SOVMEDRON's presence and operational readiness have already been affected to the point of rendering the NATO maritime forces' mission in the Mediterranean virtually superfluous.

It is fair to assume that in addition to having lost its military tasks vis-à-vis NATO, any residual naval presence will be incapable of performing a credible function as an instrument of foreign policy.

There is another consideration to be made with regard to the dissolution of the traditional threat picture and this is the weakening of the perceptions of NATO as the indispensable framework for European security and defense.

This weakening appears to be greater in the South where unique geopolitical and geostrategic factors play a more evident role. In particular, new requirements seem to be emerging in Greece and Turkey, which are more in line with a national vision of foreign and security policy interests.

The tendency toward the re-orientation of foreign and security policy is clearer in Turkey as a result of its unsuccessful attempt to become an EC member, the emergence of religious and nationalistic sentiments in the population, and the result of the independence of the Islamic republics of the former Soviet Union. This creates new prospects for Turkey's foreign and economic policies.

This re-orientation might, in the long run, not only progressively detach Ankara from Europe -- an outcome which would kill the prospect of a true European security and defense identity -- but also stimulate a national approach to present and future regional crises. Turkish support for the Islamic population in Bosnia-Herzegovina, or Greek involvement in Macedonia are hypotheses which may not be excluded if Yugoslavia's civil war expands. Even in the case of a possible renewal of traditional Greek-Turkish controversies over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea, the uncertainty about the Soviet attitude and potential threat would not play the constraining role on national behaviors that it had in the past.

* Europe.

The prospects of a situation of endemic instability in the whole Mediterranean area with sudden crises and an increase in the North-South confrontation -- in terms increasingly envisioned by both radical and now also moderate Arabs -- is bound to be matched by the prospects of a European Community still unprepared to confront the international challenges of the 90's.

The way the European Community acted throughout the course of the Yugoslav crisis from its warning signs in 1989 to the outbreak of hostilities in June 1991, and the tragedy of the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, says a lot about the EC's political weakness and the uncertainty about the actualization of a true common foreign and security policy (CFSP).
The WEU suffers from the same lack of strong political will and, in scenarios of out-of-area crises, does not possess the military capabilities -- long range air transport, high definition satellite reconnaissance, high-tech weapons systems, total control of the battlefield through JointSTARS, -- which constitute the sine-qua-non conditions for playing a credible role.

This means that for complex crisis management and peace keeping roles, or particularly for peace enforcing roles, the participation of the United States military power -- and the U.S. leadership, as in the case of the 1990 Persian Gulf crisis -- would be of paramount importance.

It is still difficult to foresee if and how NATO will become the military arm of the CSCE. In any case, if hypotheses of crises in the Mediterranean area are taken into consideration -- with the inevitable overtones of North-South confrontation that such crises would entail -- NATO's intervention might radicalize Arab attitudes and policies, unless it is carried out under the authority and within the limits of a United Nations' mandate.

On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine that the potential differences and divisions among the European countries which might emerge in the EC and the WEU would not also arise in the Atlantic Alliance, especially if the intervention is envisaged solely as a NATO operation.

The political and military trends in the region from Morocco to Iran have ominous implications for Europe, particularly if they are added to the signs of political instability and social disintegration evident in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union.

In the southern Mediterranean countries the growing North-South economic gap is bound to fuel domestic instability, radicalization of the political life with chances for the Islamic fundamentalist movements to expand their influence, and eventually gain access to power, and a further increase in migration toward Europe, with direct repercussions on France, Italy and Spain.

In the longer term, the proliferation in the fields of high-tech weapons systems, ballistic missiles, and chemical and nuclear armament will pose serious security problems by radically changing the strategic situation of the whole Mediterranean area.

Unfortunately, the EC is presently divided about its economic and political future and the European countries do not appear ready to take prompt action on these issues with the necessary foresight.
The international community faced with the Yugoslav conflict: Some observations on the new prospects for a stable political settlement following the recent initiative of the Clinton administration.

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"The New Mediterranean Security Environment: Regional Issues and Responses"

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Although it is a matter of discussion whether the six-point initiative recently launched by the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher has the features to improve significantly the prospects for the success of the international efforts to halt the Yugoslav conflict and foster a workable political settlement, it undoubtedly marked a major shift in US policy towards the conflict. The effects of this shift may be felt on at least two levels.

First, the Christopher initiative promises to modify substantially the pattern of the relations between the US and its European allies which has so far prevailed in the management of the
Yugoslav conflict.

Washington finally seems to have stopped viewing the problem of finding a solution for the Yugoslav embrolio as a matter that is primarily a European responsibility.

In retrospect, this attitude, still deep-rooted and probably prevailing in the US Congress, appears to have weakened the ability of the international community to deal successfully with the crisis. It certainly did not allow the international institutions—in particular, the United Nations—to rely, practically and psychologically, on a set of instruments that only the American power could provide. As a result, it also encouraged among the Europeans the reluctance to engage in risky initiatives at both the political and military levels.

It is significant that when the Clinton administration explained its new attitude towards the Yugoslav conflict, it also explicitly blamed the previous administration for letting the situation deteriorate through its inaction. Now, having decided to play a more active role in the ongoing negotiating process, the US has accepted to play a leadership role in the crisis.

Furthermore, the new high-profile US involvement in the diplomatic action seems to imply a related US readiness to lead—or to make a major contribution to—possible military actions. In particular, should the US diplomatic offensive succeed, the Clinton administration will not be able to avoid direct US participation in any enforcement measures required to ensure the implementation of an eventual agreement. (It must be recalled that the Bush
administration, in conformity with its policy of excluding the dispatch of US troops for ground operations, also refused to participate in the UN peacekeeping missions).

The different levels of involvement that the EC countries and the US have had so far in the international efforts to manage the Yugoslav crisis have seriously handicapped the action of the international institutions, and from time to time have given rise to mutual distrust and suspicions. The change in the US policy could now pave the way to closer and more effective co-operation between Washington and the European capitals. Indeed, the Yugoslav case has very clearly shown the general need for such cooperation in dealing with major crises in Europe.

Second, the new approach adopted by the Clinton administration could provide the conditions for a coherent crisis management strategy which, for the first time, could make the diplomatic efforts complementary to the assessment of the possible military options.

It must be noted in fact that the debate over the initiatives needed to put an end to the conflict have often been vitiated by the tendency to discuss the military options separately from the political problems.

Following the US decision to take an active part in the negotiation process and its apparent readiness to contribute to a military effort for enforcing its results, it seems that this distortion, which is at the origin of many illusory ideas of
intervention, could be corrected.

As a matter of fact, the military options have very often been presented as alternatives, rather than as measures complementary to the diplomatic initiatives because of the conviction that the latter had a poor prospects for success. What makes many of these options futile is precisely the lack of a clear political objective. Not surprisingly, several proposals for military action — for instance, the arming of Bosnian Muslims or the bombardment of Serbian strategic targets — seem to be rather random. The weakening of one of the warring parties — i.e. the Serbs — through an action aimed at changing the balance on the ground can certainly be considered a political objective, but it remains quite a limited one, because even in the case of a 'military victory' there would still be the problem of the political solution to be imposed. The formulation of a military strategy is in itself a difficult task in the absence of a definition of its political purposes. This is indeed one of the main points repeatedly stressed by the US military to support their reluctance to provide troops for missions in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

Furthermore, the advocates of one or the other military option often fail to address the problem of whether it can obtain the international support needed to make it politically and legally viable. More generally, it is not rare, in this debate, that the potential effects of a given military action on the cohesion of the international coalition of forces engaged in the management of the crisis are overlooked. The Clinton administration is indeed showing
a new awareness of the need for a more active US coalition-building policy. Of crucial importance is the new administration's search for a closer cooperation with Russia, where the policy towards the Yugoslav crisis has become one of the central foreign-policy matters around which the ongoing dramatic struggle for power is revolving. Avoiding clashes between the Western countries and Russia over the Balkan conflict appears to be a key condition for any successful international initiative for its resolution.

The Christopher initiative marked an evident retreat from Bill Clinton's campaign rhetoric when he stressed, on several occasions, the need of a tougher stance against the Serbs, citing several possible military actions to undertake against them. The new administration seems to have reached the conclusion that, at least for the time being, using force (in particular, through the employment of air power) would not achieve results significant enough to offset the risk involved.

However, the implementation of any political settlement of the crisis agreed on within the UN Security Council - with the consent or not of the parties involved - will undoubtedly require a credible threat of using force. But, once an agreement on the political solution to be imposed is reached, the goal of an eventual military action would be clear: the enforcement of its terms. The attitude of the international community towards each party involved would be based on its concrete cooperation with the peace plan.

Any political settlement on Bosnia-Herzegovina, for instance,
would require a disarmament of the warring parties under UN monitoring. The first step should be the surrendering of heavy weapons - in particular, artillery pieces - which currently ensure the Serbs' military superiority. A refusal to comply with this provision would trigger an international enforcement action whose legal legitimacy could hardly be contested. In the absence of an agreed peace plan, however, proposals for military actions in Bosnia are unlikely to obtain the necessary international support.

The foregoing raises the crucial question of whether or not the international community is making progress towards the definition of a just and enforceable peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The debate has focussed on the virtues and shortcomings of the plan drawn up by Cyrus Vance and David Owen, the two co-chairmen of the London peace conference which is taking place under joint UN and EC sponsorship.

The Vance-Owen peace plan calls for the creation, within the present borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, of a decentralised state made up of ten autonomous provinces and a loose central government in Sarajevo which would be responsible for foreign policy. Three main criticisms have been formulated against this plan.

First, some reject it as an unacceptable ratification of appeasement as it would virtually amount to a mere codification of the existing power relationship on the ground. Less radically, others -- though they recognize that the implementation of the
Vance-Owen plan would deprive the aggressor (the Serbs) of significant portions of territories of Bosnia-Herzegovina currently under their control -- see the plan as a reward for Serbs' aggression as it would contain too many concessions to them. In reply to this criticism, the advocates of the plan insist above all on the concept that it represents the only credible alternative to the partition of the country, as the reconstitution of a multiethnic, unitary republic appears to be the most unrealistic option. Furthermore, they stress that, although President Izetbegovic's present Bosnian government can claim to have international legitimacy, it in fact represents only a minority, albeit the stronger one, of the Bosnian population. By preserving the inviolability of the current borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina while guaranteeing autonomy for each ethnic group, the Vance-Owen plan would instead constitute a fair and workable solution. In particular, the Serbs would be allocated three separated areas which would reduce the risk that they could successfully pursue the plan to incorporate portions of Bosnia-Herzegovina into a «Greater Serbia». Finally, as for the objection that the plan would implicitly amount to an amnesty for war criminals, its advocates respond that the establishment of an international criminal court as part of the agreement would ensure that no such amnesty would occur.

A second criticism of the Vance-Owen plan is that it is unenforceable even if formally accepted by the representatives of the three warring parties. The argument is that people who have
fought so ruthlessly against each other and built up such a strong mutual hatred can not be forced to live together even under a loose central government. Therefore, the plan is unlikely to provide stability. It must be admitted that there is a strong case for this argument. The advocates of the plan, however, assert that the enforcement of a unitary state in Bosnia would be even more difficult to carry out. In fact, it should probably be imposed by force on both the Serbs and the Croats. Based on more realistic assumptions, the Vance-Owen plan would, at least potentially, be worth the efforts of the international institutions. It must be noted that, though the three parties have taken different positions with respect to the Vance-Owen plan, they have all agreed to the general principle that no states should be created within the territory of the Bosnian state.

Third, a major shortcoming of the Vance-Owen plan, according to its critics, is the lack of credible enforcement provisions (this objection is to be considered more moderate than the previous one, according to which the plan is intrinsically unenforceable). The two co-chairmen of the peace conference did not remain insensitive to this objection. They have in fact recently proposed a new set of enforcement measures, such as the establishment of an international court to try people charged with war crimes or the use of NATO aircraft to bomb those forces which refuse to place their heavy weapons under UN control.

The plan has a certain advantage: it has proved to be able to attract wide international support, including the EC, Russia, China
and most Islamic countries. For that reason, the refusal of the Clinton administration to support the plan has been subject to strong criticism. In particular, in some declarations the US officials seemed to have assigned the Bosnian Muslims a sort of ultimate veto power on any plan for the future political settlement of Bosnia-Herzegovina. If confirmed, this position could become a source of considerable complication for the negotiating process. So far, the new administration has not advanced proposals alternative to the Vance-Owen plan. However, many observers doubt that it will be able to convince the parties to agree to a substantially different plan.

On balance, it seems that the most promising course of action is to continue the negotiating process using the Vance-Owen plan as a starting point. The plan could certainly be improved - for instance, through a fairer redrawing of Bosnian territory and a strengthening of its enforcement provisions - but its basic principles should be confirmed. Indeed, any attempt to find a fair and workable solution to the Bosnian conflict should necessarily take into account the two-fold need to preserve the state's territorial integrity and, at the same time, ensuring self-governing rights for its ethnic groups.

The implementation of a peace plan based on these principles would require a strong and long-term commitment on the part of the international security institutions. Which form this concrete commitment should take poses a difficult question, although the Vance-Owen plan offers significant suggestions also in this regard.
It calls for international participation in the elaboration of the new constitution and for the creation of a Constitutional Court in which non-Bosnian judges would represent more than 50% of the panel.

Restoring the political, social and economic conditions for a peaceful coexistence in a failing state after a bloody civil war is certainly a difficult enterprise. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, this enterprise, which is complicated by the highly unstable and hostile surrounding geo-political environment, coincides with the objective of saving an entire community - the Bosnian Muslims - from the incumbent threat of genocide.

The most effective solution to these challenges is the establishment of a UN trusteeship. The UN should be given the responsibility for the administration of the country for an appropriate period of time which would necessarily last several years. To perform this task, the UN should rely on the presence of a strong multinational military force. The legitimation for such an arrangement would be provided by the responsibility the United Nations has under its Charter to maintain international peace and security, as the prospect of a definitive collapse of the Bosnian state represents a formidable threat for both regional and global security.

At the same time, there is an urgent need for measures which can prevent a spillover of the conflict into the neighbouring countries. In fact, the continuing deterioration of the situation suggests that the much feared nightmare of a general Balkan
conflagration could early materialize. The most evident risk is the spread of the war to the South. The UN has already sent peacekeeping units with a preventive purpose to Macedonia although this is not yet a member state. This presence needs to be substantially reinforced — possibly with a contribution of NATO forces — and extended to Kosovo and Albania. It can only be hoped that the international community has learned from its tragic error of having failed to respond to the urgent request made by Bosnian President Izetbegovic during his visit to Washington in December 1991 for a rapid deployment of peacekeeping troops in the Bosnian territory.
THE NEW MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: TURKEY, THE GULF, AND CENTRAL ASIA

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RAND

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New Geopolitics

It is symptomatic of the new international environment that here at a conference on Mediterranean security a paper is being presented that deals not only with Iran, but Central Asia, and even China. What could possibly make these far flung regions of the globe pertinent to the Mediterranean? The answer might be clearer to our Italian hosts, perhaps, than to many other Europeans and Americans, since those regions were part of Italy's political vision even seven hundred years ago when Marco Polo was the first among many Italian travellers to traverse precisely that route. But beyond Italy's historical experience, there are other good reasons to for Mediterranean to have a security interest in points that lie well beyond its eastern shores of the Levant. We are now witnessing the emergence of a new kind of geopolitics—a old discipline with roots in past centuries—that is thrusting itself once again upon policy-makers long steeped in the special logic and demands of Cold War security policy.

The Cold War and nuclear strategy created new kinds of military theaters that tended to be based on geographical abstracts, logical ways of dividing the world to meet logistical needs. Missiles tended to make the space over which they flew largely irrelevant. Certainly the specific languages, cultures and histories of the regions involved in Cold War security planning played only the most marginal role in the

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1This paper was prepared for the joint RAND-IAI Conference on the new Mediterranean Security Environment, Washington DC, 18-19 February 1992.
strategic calculus—and usually only when there was an intense battle
over a specific square on the strategic chessboard.

Today, with the end of the Cold War, more traditional geopolitics
has now returned—with a vengeance. In fact, it might better be called
“neo geopolitics” because ideally it goes beyond classical geopolitical
definitions of geography, trade and communication axes, and the struggle
for raw materials—that is, physical things. In its modern form,
geopolitics must recognize today the need to additionally incorporate
such “soft disciplines” as culture, history, and psychology as powerful
determinants of the psychology and the political rationale of major
political groups and their leaders. Without history and psychology, for
example, the Balkans is meaningless. It is language and myth, not
rivers, mountains, or raw materials, that link the Turkish shores of the
Mediterranean to the shores of Lake Baikal and the rivers of Western
China—in a real political sense. Therefore an understanding of
people’s perceptions of themselves, their history, their ethnic ties,
their grievances, hatreds and aspirations tell us a lot about how states
may actually break apart, reunite, or go to war. These are some of the
factors too, that link the Caucasus, Central Asia and Western China to
this conference here today on Mediterranean security.

Europe and the East

The new geopolitics might not stop with mere ethnicity—such as,
for example, the common Turkish character of peoples stretching from
Anatolia across the Caucasus and the Caspian into Central Asia and
Chinese Turkestan—but would also have to look at religion as well. For
like it or not, Europe and Islam are linked by destiny, both past and
future. Europe cannot avoid this future rendezvous in which Islamic
countries will have major impact on Europe in numerous ways: as sources of
energy, refugees, immigrants, terrorists, workers, naturalized citizens,
restaurateurs and artists, as an arms market, a potential cockpit of
rivalry, and the target of past Western intervention in situations of
conflict and crisis.

Today the Muslim world is coming at Europe from the Maghreb, from
the shores of the Eastern Mediterranean, from the Balkans, and above all
from the Turkish link to Central Asia and all the countries that are now moving into Turkey’s new orbit of concern. The new Europe will inevitably be required to expand its own conceptual and strategic boundaries into much of the Islamic world as part of the process of the new international order. Everything is increasingly interconnected. This reality will complicate European life; but the artificial, rigid, and xenophobic separation of the Islamic world from Europe will create even more dangerous complications and potential confrontations. What we are really talking about here is political, economic and cultural exclusion: where does the West draw the line that says who is in and who is out?

This paper suggests that larger parts of the Islamic world are increasingly moving into the orbit of Europe. At the same time, those Muslim peoples and states already in close contact with Europe are expanding their own orbits—primarily via the ties of religion and ethnicity—with far away places that also come to indirectly affect Europe. Finally, the Mediterranean is itself expanding as an entrepot for the East. In more concrete terms, Europe has of course long felt the tremors of political conflict in the Muslim world such as in the Arab-Israeli conflict; the possibility or actuality of war there has regularly brought intensive Western political and military involvement into Lebanon, Israel, Syria, Jordan and Egypt at a minimum. The Gulf states, all part of the Arab world except for Iran, are similarly directly drawn into the Arab-Israeli politics of the Mediterranean. We have only to note Saddam Hussein’s manipulation of the Palestinian problem in the recent Gulf War. European energy dependency on Gulf oil is additionally linked with the Mediterranean. Oil from the Middle East moves through the Mediterranean, either via tanker from the Red Sea, or by pipelines that debouch into key Mediterranean terminals. European involvement in Desert Storm in 1991 against Iraq further demonstrates these links. The centrality of the old Persian Gulf to Mediterranean affairs is thus fairly well established.
Europe and Central Asia: The Turkey Connection

But the story just begins there. Traditional European ties with the Muslim world have now been transformed by one of the major geopolitical developments of the post-Cold War world: the independence of the old Soviet republics and the emergence of a new Turkic world that was barely perceived during centuries of Tsarist and communist empire. Turkey itself has found its own world transformed. Once at the tail end of Europe geopolitically speaking, Turkey is now at the center of a new constellation of states that are either Turkic or Muslim, many with traditional ties to the old Turkish Ottoman Empire, from the Balkans to Western China and northern Siberia. These links make little geographic sense, but history, and common linguistic and ethnic ties, impose upon geography new conceptual matrices. For a variety of reasons, therefore, the Central Asian camel can now be said to have stuck its nose into the European tent. Already we witness Central Asia--as a part of the old Soviet Union--now as a part of the CSCE, whose security concerns have come to include overseeing the stability of all those former Soviet realms. The other factor linking Central Asia to the Mediterranean, of course, is its links to Turkey and indirectly therefore to Europe.

The Persian Gulf Moves North

Geopolitical change involves more than just the Turkic links to Central Asia and Western China. There is a new Persian Gulf emerging as well that complicates the old Gulf-Mediterranean calculus. The geopolitical Gulf was once thought to terminate in the north with Iran and Iraq. Today three factors have changed that, extending the sense of the Gulf and its political complexity. First, the War for Kuwait has brought Turkey irrevocably into the Iraqi security equation; Ankara will now be one of the key monitors of Iraqi adventurism and Baghdad’s search for regional domination. Prime Minister Demirel’s trip to the Gulf in January 1993 stressed his interest in a Turkish role in helping maintain the security of the Gulf. Gulfis, while not beggars, can’t be choosers. They face too many potential aggressors to reject assistance from any quarter.
Second, the Kurds have emerged more insistently onto the international scene. This people, the fourth largest nationality in the Middle East, has periodically served as a lemon to be squeezed and thrown away by foreign powers as diverse as Britain, the US, Iran and Israel as their conflicts with Baghdad have waxed and waned. This time the Kurdish emergence onto the international scene may be more permanent, with the establishment of an unofficial Kurdish autonomous region of a yet-to-be-federated Iraq. The Kurdish factor now links Turkey, Iran and Iraq—all three of which have large Kurdish minorities—more intimately than before, because all three will be severely influenced by any political evolution of the Kurdish problem. In principle, these three states could join forces to crush the Kurds' national aspirations. But it seems quite unlikely that such disparate states can ever work together. Turkey, with a functioning if imperfect democracy, is furthermore not about to cast its lot in with two repressive and radical ideological regimes who certainly do not wish Turkey well. Nonetheless, Kurdish politics will become part of the coin of this uneasy trilateral relationship forever.

Turkey is of course itself vulnerable to criticism of its treatment of its own Kurds; southeastern Turkey lies under harsh military administration designed to crush the radical Kurdish guerrilla movement that seeks a foothold in Turkey and draws recruits from Turkish repressive tactics. Ankara itself recognizes the need for considerable political liberalization there, but remains vulnerable to criticism from European states who see these human rights violations as a serious bar to any increased Turkish role within the EC. Britain and France are also involved in Operation Provide Comfort, designed to protect the new Kurdish entity in northern Iraq. The EC is thus growing more engaged in monitoring this Kurdish situation which is now well within the realm of European politics—yet a further extension of Europe into Muslim politics.

Lastly, the collapse of the Soviet Union created not only a new Central Asia, but a new Caucasus as well. Both Turkey and Iran are being inexorably drawn into a Balkan-like situation on this narrow strip of land between the Black and Caspian seas known in Arabic as the “mountain
of languages." Iran feels threatened by what is a developing rivalry with Turkey there. Azerbaijan, a Turkic state whose language is almost identical to Turkish, is now independent and oriented towards Turkey and the secular Ataturkist model—with a healthy touch of pan-Turkism thrown in. Azerbaijan’s new government speaks in provocative terms of seeking to unify its six million people into one state with the twelve million or so Azeris who live in Iran. Iran not surprisingly feels deeply threatened by possible loss of a large and historically important chunk of its own territory if a serious separatist Azeri movement should emerge. Azerbaijan will inevitably orient itself primarily towards Turkey, weakening Iran’s voice in the region.

Iran is also worried about Turkish policies and goals towards the Kurds. While there is no love lost between Kurds and Turks, all Kurds recognize that Turkey is by far the most democratic state of all those states where Kurds live, and the one country where Kurds are most likely to achieve their rights by due process, democratic means, and the strong, indirect influence of Europe in Turkey. Turkey, in effect, may be on the way to asserting a position of influence and leadership over the Kurdish world, at the expense of Iraq and Iran. Iran is thus extremely anxious about Turkey’s overall growing influence in the region. The struggle for influence in the Caucasus, therefore, takes on special overtones.

Iran’s political focus can no longer remain concentrated primarily upon the Gulf as it has done historically. The politics of the Caucasus and Iran’s relations with Turkey must assume far higher profile in Tehran’s calculations, with the potential for conflict with Turkey growing. The strategic political triangle of Iran, Iraq, and Turkey now embraces the Caucasus, making that region the northernmost extension of Gulf politics.

**Turkey and the Southern Route to Russia**

The new Caucasian factor of course also circles around to link with Turkey’s new Black Sea Consortium concept—in which all three Caucasian states are represented as well as Turkey, Ukraine, Russia, and the
Balkan states. This provides another direct link to European politics, as well as to the Black Sea-Mediterranean link.

All of these new relationships between Turkey and the newly independent states along the southern periphery of the former Soviet Union of course have great impact on the politics of Russia itself. Needless to say, Russia looks with great ambivalence upon its loss of empire. While Russian liberals see the dissolution of empire as an absolute prerequisite to the emergence of liberalism and democracy in Russia itself, more conservative elements mourn the former sweep of empire, and some would actively consider ways of recovering at least dominant influence in those new states, if not outright control over them.

It is difficult to predict how Russia will look at the developing role of both Turkish and Iranian influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. From a historical point of view, these relationships are absolutely natural; it was the Soviet "iron curtain," closing off its Muslim republics from their southern neighbors, that was unnatural. There is no feasible way that Russia--short of reconquest--can prevent its former Muslim republics from developing strong ties with their southern neighbors. But what will Russian policy actually be there, and of what interest to the West?

Russia has several options, all of which depend in part upon the type of government present in Moscow. First, Russia could welcome Turkish influence in the Muslim republics on the basis that Turkey represents a moderating force in the region, committed to democratic principles, secularism, moderation, and free market principles. These values would help stabilize the region immediately to Russia’s south. While Moscow undoubtedly does see Turkey as representing a more moderate force, Turkish gains in the area still tend to come at Russian expense. Turkey is interested in organizing an alternative to the ruble zone, and speaks of establishing an organization of Turkic states that will bring the five or six (including even non-Turkic Tajikistan) Muslim republics into a grouping under Ankara’s influence. A Central Asian orientation towards Turkey and the West almost directly curtails Russian influence there.
Turkey's influence is also potentially worrisome to Russia's own internal situation. The large number of Muslim and even Turkic peoples within the Russian federation (Tatars, Bashkirs, Yakuts, etc.) also look to Turkey as culturally the closest external power; they even consider attempting to link their policies as Muslims within the Russian Federation. While Turkey does not seek to dismember Russia in any way, sensitivities exist, and Turkey is a symbol to Russia's Muslims even as Turkey remains absolutely neutral. Atavistic feelings run deep in the ancient struggle between Russian power and that of the Tatar-Mongol-Turkic yoke that once humbled Russian tsars for centuries. It is difficult to foresee a purely amicable and cooperative relationship between Russia and Turkey over the longer run, even if both sides retain moderate policies.

Moscow may therefore be tempted to play off Turkey against Iran in both the Caucasus and especially Central Asia, in order to weaken the influence of both states. To some extent such a policy may already be in play with Russian sales of arms to Iran and maintenance of good ties with it, despite Iran's general policies of exporting the Islamic revolution--although highly restrained in Central Asia.

Russian concern for pan-Turkism or pan-Islamism--stemming from Turkey or Iran respectively--has considerable implications for Russia's overall future foreign policy, and hence is of direct interest to Europe. One of the fundamental fault-lines of Russia's great debate over its national interests and foreign policy orientation emerges over a "Western" vs a "Eurasian" orientation. Of course Russia is by definition a Eurasian power, even if it embraces Western political values in its implementation. But the term "Eurasian" in the eyes of many Russian thinkers implies a special relationship with the East, including the Muslim world. Tsarist Russia, after all, was an active player in Middle Eastern politics in the nineteenth and early twentieth century; the Soviet Union maintained a significant range of client states there starting after World War II.

Some Russian thinkers have suggested that Russia's "natural" sphere of influence is linked to the East and South, and with the Muslim world, given the long geopolitical extension of Russian interests southwards
for centuries. Russia under these circumstances should be drawn to
close ties with Turkey and Iran, or possibly with the Arab world. Yet
these links are not all mutually compatible. Russian ties with Turkey
are likely to alienate Iran. Ties with Turkey or Iran may worry the
Arab states, already nervous about a possibly resurgent “neo-Ottomanism”
that would project Turkish power deep into the Arab world. Under these
circumstances a “Eurasian” Russia might find it necessary to cast its
lot in with the Arab states as defender of their special interests
against Western domination and the domination of Turkey acting as the
West’s proxy.

In this context, Russia’s relationships with the new states of
Central Asia takes on special importance since it could have potentially
decisive impact on how Russia’s interests and alliances might fare in
the Middle East. If these new ex-Soviet Muslim states see Russia as a
threat to their own independence—particularly due to Moscow’s concerns
for the status of the many millions of Russians who still live in
Central Asia—then Russian-Central Asian relationships will be poor, and
will negatively impact upon Russian-Turkish relationships as well. An
“Eastern” or Islam-oriented policy for Moscow then might by default have
to side with the Arab world over the Turkic world. Such a situation
would tend to place Russia as the champion of the Arab world against the
West—not in the crude Cold War terms of a bi-polar world, but as a
general sphere of influence. Both extreme Russian nationalists such as
Zhirinovsky, as well as ex-communist thinkers, are inclined to see
Russia as the natural ally of the Arab world against the West.

A last geopolitical scenario also merits Western concern. Any
serious confrontation between Russia and the Central Asian states—that
almost surely would arise most virulently in Kazakhstan where Kazakhs
are a minority in their own republic—could serve as a catalyst to other
elements of Russian nationalist thinking to see the future cast in terms
of Christianity versus Islam terms. A strong nationalist, “Christian,”
Orthodox orientation would also push Russia in classical Slavophile
directions that would treat the West as a rival and even as a threat to
Russia and its traditional culture. Such a Russia would also be far
less congenial to Western values and interests.
In short, the new geopolitics of Turkey, Central Asia, the new Muslim republics, and the Arab world all have quite direct bearing on the future geopolitical orientation of the new Russian state. This orientation in turn directly affects the character of the Russian relationship with the West. It is still far too early to be able to discern in which direction Russia will gravitate—and its choices will depend in significant measure upon the fate of economic and social reforms in Russia. One thing would seem fairly certain: Russia under almost any circumstances is going to seek a "distinctive" foreign policy—much as the French have done for decades within the European context. A distinctive policy will decidedly not automatically march in lock-step with Western or American interests in the region—even if Russia does not single-mindedly embrace ideological opposition to Western policies either. The "Eastern Question" under any circumstances, will exert significant impact upon the course of Russian political evolution, and will in turn be influenced by Russia’s own orientation.

Conclusion

A vital question for the West in the next century therefore will be determination of its relationship with Islam. The Mediterranean is obviously only partially a "Western sea"; more Muslim states adjoin it than do Christian. It is the by and large that links Europe most directly with Islam. And now the Mediterranean itself is becoming increasingly linked to Islamic issues that lie well beyond its immediate shores. We have seen how the transformation of Turkey’s geopolitical orbit causes the Mediterranean today to be influenced by events in the Turkic world right on east into Western China, west into the Balkans and the Adriatic, and south into the Gulf. The concept of Gulf politics now embraces the Caucasus whose troubled relationships must be an integral part of the calculus of the major Gulf powers. Russia’s ties with the new Muslim world to its south exerts major impact on the kind of Russia that Europe will live with. In short, the factors that make up Mediterranean security are expanding rapidly, and most particularly more deeply into the Muslim world. Will changing concepts of the
Mediterranean serve to link it with the Muslim world, or to keep it out? An exclusionary Western policy—in effect opting for de facto confrontation or barriers between the Western and an expanding Islamic worlds—bodes poorly for any new world order.

A final critical factor affecting the disposition of the Islamic world towards the West, both in the Mediterranean and beyond, is the kind of governance that dominates the Muslim states. Perpetuation of authoritarian regimes in power in that region in most cases evokes xenophobic, adventuristic, or extremist ideologies that often leads to confrontation with the West. Former Soviet policies very much served to support and encourage such dictatorial ideological rule in the Muslim world. Western policy today needs to look at the roots of authoritarianism in the Muslim world and to find ways to weaken it. Muslim populations, increasingly aware of Western political life and political values, many of whom are educated in the West, are themselves chafing under authoritarian rule that leads to internal repression and oppression, foreign adventurism that leads to Western armed intervention, and ignorant, arbitrary or willful rule that impoverishes the state and society through absence of reform or any kind of participatory government. A Muslim world that is encouraged to evolve more representative institutions with Western assistance will establish the foundation of a far more cordial relationship between Western and Islamic states than we currently have. It is the character of regimes, and not their geography, that most determines their behavior. Western policies should make human rights and liberalization of politics in the Middle East a key part of its strategic agenda if the ancient fault-lines between Western and Islamic worlds is to be overcome.
CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA:
SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR TURKEY AND THE WEST

by Roberto Aliboni

The huge expanse of land from Transcaucasia to Central Asia (CCA) (1) which comprises the Muslim republics of the former USSR (approx. three times the size of Western Europe) is emerging as an area of instability and is likely to remain so for the medium-long term. Repercussions will be felt in the CIS to the north and the Gulf-Middle Eastern regions to the south. Among the countries bordering the CCA, those most likely to be affected by developments there are Iran, Turkey and Russia. Consequently, CCA area instability is bound to have a significant impact on international security well beyond its regional framework.

This paper focuses on the interaction between the CCA area and the CIS. It will consider the influence of the CCA on the development of the CIS and Russia as democratic states committed to international cooperation. It draws some conclusions about Turkish and Western policies towards the area.

2. Factors of instability in Central Asia

The principle factors accounting for CCA area instability are: (a) the inter-ethnic mix across boundaries both inside the area and in bordering states; (b) the existence of fundamental ecological and economic imbalances within the area; (c) the difficulties of the political transition from the Soviet polity in an environment of growing and disparate expectations ranging from nationalism to islamism.

Ethnic factors - The boundaries of CCA republics within the USSR were often arbitrarily drawn, particularly under Stalin's leadership, and cut across ethnic groups. Also, several boundaries with contiguous countries that were not part of the Soviet Union (e.g. Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey, etc.) divide ethnic groups. Finally, early Russian colonization, followed by more than seventy years of Soviet rule, dispersed Russian and other Slav peoples almost all over the territory of the USSR (approx. 12 million), particularly in Northern Kazakhstan (43% of the entire Kazakh population). Table 2 shows the distribution of the major ethnic groups in former Soviet republics and their neighbouring countries.

The CCA states' ethnic structure may give rise to inter-ethnic and inter-state conflicts both within the CIS and in adjoining states. The Russian presence in different republics and the Uzbek-Tajik inter-ethnic/inter-cultural mix across their borders is already emerging as an element of tension.

Ecological and economic factors - Several CCA countries, such as Kazakhstan, have good industrial and agricultural infrastructures; most countries in the area have substantial mineral resources, particularly hydrocarbons. Broadly speaking,
however, the CCA countries are poor and underdeveloped. Prospects for development are complicated by uncertainties surrounding the economic integration of these countries into the CIS and by the difficulties associated with the transition from integration within the framework of the ex-Soviet Union to integration on a national basis. The major international organizations have begun to assist these countries in their difficult transition from planned economies to market economies, which is closely linked to the prospects for increasing their level of development. These prospects, according to estimates by international organizations, are relatively good, provided that institutional and structural reform are successful (2).

A recent article in *The Economist* (3) points out the fundamental ecological and economic imbalance that seems to affect Central Asia proper. Water, already insufficient, cannot be easily increased and is drying up under the strain of a quickly rising population. Population is increasing at around 3.5% a year (and is very young; two-fifths is under 18).

This trend is symbolized by the Aral Sea disaster. The basin has already lost 60% of its waters because the two main rivers of the region (Amu Darya and Syr Darya) are intensively used for irrigation. Nonetheless, water being drawn off from rivers is generally insufficient for farming and for sustaining the population. The ratio between farm output and population in Central Asia is 0.2 hectares, whereas in arid and semi-arid regions 0.3 is regarded as a minimum.

According to the same report: "Central Asia is a rare case of a region facing Malthusian disaster. Its population is rising. Its capacity to grow food is determined by the availability of water. And water supplies are fixed or falling".

These countries will be required to import increasing amounts of food; however, apart from those countries that will be able to export oil, import capacity will remain very low. In 1992, Soviet subsidies came to an end as a consequence of the end of the Union. In 1991, they accounted for between 20% and 45% of public spending in CCA countries. Even if they receive international cooperation funds, the economic prospects of the CCA area are likely to be bleak, thus exacerbating a situation that is already politically and culturally tense.

**Political transition** - Three forces are shaping the political evolution in the CCA area: (a) nationalism; (b) the old communist ruling class and (c) islamism. The communist parties of the various republics changed their names and became national or nationalist parties. New regime parties have also been established. Situations are very different from country to country, broadly reflecting different degrees of alignment with Mr. Gorbachev's reformist policy within the CPSU before the collapse of the Union and the CPSU in 1991. Turkmenistan appears to be the most conservative country, and Kyrgyzstan is credited as the most advanced towards democracy.

Almost invariably, leadership comes from the CPSU and the administration is in the hands of the old communist bureaucracy. With varying nationalist emphasis (more in Uzbekistan, less in the other countries) the policy of this leadership is intended to maintain the state inherited from the Soviet Union on the basis of secular and inter-ethnic societies. With the exception
of Turkmenistan, the tendency within the CIS is towards maintaining a strong relations with the Slav republics, particularly with Russia. On the average, the leadership is conservative both on the domestic and on the international front because its main preoccupation is with maintaining power while beginning its transformation from a state based on communism to a state based on national principle. The search for stability is their main goal.

Challenges to this stability comes from many quarters. Chauvinistic tendencies, aimed at asserting ethnic and cultural domination within the individual republics, are not very strong. They seem to play a significant role only in Uzbekistan-Tajikistan relations, as developments in the ongoing Tajik crisis now suggest. Nor are democratic and liberal tendencies strong, though in many countries they are more influential than nationalist groups. Islamists are important in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. They are divided along a spectrum of extremism and moderation. Events in Tajikistan have probably contributed to radicalizing islamists, lessening the influence of the moderate religious wing, and reinforcing links between Tajik islamists and the most extreme islamist factions in Afghanistan (Mr. Hekmatyar’s). Islamist tendencies are increasingly perceived by the CCA countries and the CIS leadership as the main threat to stability.

The search for stability by the CCA countries' entrenched leadership, supported by a Russian interest in backing this stability as a mainstay for CIS cohesion, creates a gap between old and new forces and makes change towards more or less stable democracies very challenging and slow. Where change has occurred (as in Azerbaijan), or was attempted (as in Tajikistan) democracy has not been attained and serious crises have arisen. In Azerbaijan, power has been taken over by a definite nationalist government, with pan-Azeri aspirations which threaten Iran and do not contribute to solving the Nagorno-Kharabakh crisis with Armenia. In Tajikistan, the coming to power of an Islamic-democratic front, to some extent willing to compromise with the old communist ruling class, has given way to a harsh civil war. Events in Tajikistan have probably destroyed the moderate basis for new political dynamics, thus blocking the way towards compromise and democracy. These developments are very similar to those preventing political normalization in North Africa and the Middle East, particularly in Algeria.

3. Challenges to transition

We have just seen the factors contributing to instability in the area. Let’s now turn to the main issues associated with them.

First, the difficult economic perspective of this region risks contributing to the isolation of the regimes and the intensification of their opposition, i.e. to preventing dialogue and compromise. In light of what is happening in the Middle East and North Africa, there is no doubt that worsening socio-economic conditions play an important role in driving people, particularly young people, towards more or less radical forms of islamism.
This will be true for the CCA region as well. In addition to good economic management, good government and renewal of the ruling class are important to prevent people from being attracted to radical movements. As noted above, the transformation of the CCA societies is mainly relying on an entrenched bureaucracy that will not be interested in giving up its privileges unless the leadership enforces a gradual change and provide opportunities for new political leaders.

In a recent article, Menon and Barkley (4) have very aptly pointed out that "the transition from Soviet-style command economies to alternative [kinds of economies] plays a decisive role", and that for this reason the most important "frame of reference for viewing Central Asia should be the interplay between the political economy (managing the post-Soviet transition) and security". The main determinant of security will be the management of the transition. In this sense, international economic cooperation should play an important role, particularly since the Slav republics, which had been transferring funds to the CCA countries, are no longer able to continue.

A second issue regards broad international cooperation. As noted above, present regimes are generally committed to international cooperation, from both a political and an economic point of view. In particular, they support the CIS and have joined a number of regional schemes of cooperation (like the Economic Cooperation Organization--ECO, the Caspian Sea Cooperation Zone--CSCZ, etc.). The CCA regimes are fully aware of their difficult economic prospects and of their strict interdependence with the Slav republics. Furthermore, international cooperation is also a good policy for preventing or containing inter-ethnic clashes and other domestic and interstate conflicts.

However, international cooperation --as usual in the post-communist world-- is somewhat paradoxically regarded as a means for strengthening a newly-started nation-building process. Also, it is regarded as an instrument for preserving the power of the old ruling classes. In the CCA republics there is a genuine cooperative mood. Nonetheless, national trends and nation-building policies tend to prevail over transnational ones.

The risk brought about by this contradiction is the same one that the Arab Maghreb Union is running: i.e. using international cooperation agreements (in the event: the CIS) to conserve regimes rather than to integrate economies and polities. This tendency may be detrimental to the success of the region's difficult political transition. It may also contribute to discrediting the CIS, an element otherwise crucial for this transition and for international security.

A third important issue is related to the relations between the CCA republics, on the one hand, and between the CIS and Russia, on the other. Azerbaijan almost immediately refused to become a member of the CIS, in keeping with the nationalist and then ultra-nationalist trends adopted by its leadership. The five republics of Central Asia are all members of the CIS, though they differ in the degree of their commitment to it: Kazakhstan is the most fervent supporter of the CIS and tends to look at its future in rather integrationist terms (though it is reluctant to put its nuclear legacy under Russia's control); in contrast, Turkmenistan
in the last round of discussions about the future of the CIS at the Minsk summit (January 22-23, 1993) clearly stated that it sees the CIS as nothing more than a consultative body.

Because of its unique economic and political circumstances, Turkmenistan can afford to remain rather indifferent to the CIS. This is not true for the other CCA countries. Their leaderships have a more or less important stake in maintaining a form of cooperation among themselves and most of all with Russia, for either economic or security reasons. On the other hand, opposition parties and movements perceive Russia as a danger or an enemy. Nationalists and islamists see Russia as their former colonial power and, what is most important, as the supporter of the old communist leaderships that, as they would sometimes aptly argue, barely changed the name of their parties and illegitimately hinder the ascendancy of the new political democratic forces.

The position of the CCA countries' opposition groups with respect to Russia is very similar to the more widespread feeling in the Slav members of the CIS. The position of the CCA leadership is different because they realize that Russia remains the most important factor for their stability, security and economies. As already noted, this important relationship with Russia is a major irritant for the opposition and probably contributes to radicalizing it. In this sense, it is also a factor of insecurity and instability. On balance, however, the leadership perceives it as a positive factor. In the case of Kazakhstan, the ethnic balance (almost half the population is Slav) is an ineludible reason for pursuing a relationship with Russia.

To the extent that Russia is interested in convincing the other member states, particularly the Ukraine, to develop the CIS, it is also interested in the support of CCA countries. Moreover, Russian interest in Central Asia, while more moderate immediately following independence, changed and increased over time. Russia has realized that the presence of so many Russians in the CCA countries has an impact on its international security and domestic stability; furthermore, as always in its history, it is rightly or wrongly worried by the threat to its security by the instability in its southern approaches; finally, it is worried by the rise of islamism and radical religious trends because they are a threat to its neighbours' stability and to its own domestic stability. Many Muslim communities are still included in Russia and in other parts of the CIS.

This Russian attitude is consonant with the mood and the preoccupations of the CCA leaderships. As the crisis in Tajikistan developed in recent months--since the islamic-democratic coalition took over in Dushanbe by overthrowing the old communist regime of Mr. Nabyev--the collaboration between Russia and the other CCA leaderships has been intense. This cooperation has added to difficult government-opposition relationship discussed in the foregoing, and may possibly have contributed to hindering the political transition in Central Asia.

This is not to put the blame on Russia's policy. On the contrary, Russia cannot but help manage crises in this Asian segment of the "new arc of crisis". On the periphery of the
former Soviet Union, Russia is confronting problems similar to those that are arising elsewhere in the NATO "out-of-area". The question is that there are ambiguities in Russian peace-keeping and peace-enforcing operations. During the last disturbances in Tajikistan, there was evidence that when dealing with a complex reality, the Russian and CIS policy of peace-oriented intervention follows different courses—from defense, to diplomacy to latent imperialism (5). Since the legitimacy of the CIS is not yet well established, interventions are not fully legitimated either. It is not clear whether they are interventions by the CIS or by Russia. In any case, in the eyes of the opposition groups, these interventions are basically devoted to preserving the old regimes. During recent events in Tajikistan, an attempt at sending in Kyrgyz troops failed. The islamic-democratic coalition overthrown by the old regime supporters maintains that Russian troops failed to act as peacekeepers, acting instead as allies of the old regime.

As a conclusion, one can note that, with all its ambiguities, the relationship between the CCA countries and Russia remains particularly important and absorbing, perhaps more so than was thought when the Union collapsed.

4. Western security and the role of Turkey in the CCA area

What Russia is defending in CCA area is not still very clear. The defence and rescue of Russian nationals is a goal that from time to time takes up nationalist overtones. Many in Russia perceive the CIS as an extended security space. At times, the present leadership (Mr. Kozyrev) has construed intervention within the CIS as a contribution to a wider challenge to stability and order concerning the whole of the international community.

Russian action and cooperation in relation to the CCA countries is essential, and the form it takes will be crucial not only to the political future of the CCA countries, but also to that of Russia and the CIS. If Russian policy is motivated by nationalistic considerations or misperceptions of risks to national security, as is currently the case today, it may contribute to the failure or delay of political transition in the CCA countries. This would accentuate the instability in the CCA area which, in turn, would fuel Russian nationalism.

A nationalistic Russia would be a detriment to Western security. The view put forth in this paper is that the CCA area is bound to influence the development of the CIS and Russia as democratic states which have cooperative international policies. It is thus extremely important for both Western and international security. The West should consider this area as an integral part of policies designed to strengthen the stability and democratization of Russia and to reinforce the cohesion and vitality of the security of the CIS. Hence, Western involvement in the developments in this area must not be merely indirect.

Given these considerations, a greater Turkish role is important and desirable, provided that it supports Western solidarity and not that of others (i.e. Muslim, pan-Turkish, etc.) If it leans toward the latter, Turkey will become an
element of competition and conflict in the region, which will complicate the management of what is already a difficult situation. Furthermore, such leanings may compromise its own political balance.

Thus the West is once again faced with the problem of achieving a greater integration of Turkey into its institutional framework. The West should not assume, however, that an international "Turkish" role will necessarily be compatible with Western interests and Turkey's Western identity.

Today, Mr. Demirel is managing to steer a middle course between drives for pan-Turkism, Islamic resurgence and Turkey's strong ties to Western secular and democratic political culture. This middle course will not be easy to maintain with respect to the medium-long term instability of the CCA area. Western encouragement to Turkey to play a role in the CCA area (as well as in the Gulf and the Middle East) may prove to be a destabilizing factor for the Turkish democracy, unless this role is not played within a wider and stronger Western cooperation towards these Eastern area. The "big game" remains big, too much so for the West to delegate roles in the area concerned, or for Turkey to take them up alone.
Notes


(3) "The Silk Road catches fire", The Economist, December 26, 1992.


### Tab. 1 - CCA Republics: area and population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republics</th>
<th>area ('000 sq. km.)</th>
<th>population (1989-million)</th>
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<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>447.40</td>
<td>19.8</td>
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Tab. 2 - Ethnic groups across international boundaries (million - highlighted figures indicate main overlappings)

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<th></th>
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<th>Kazakhs</th>
<th>Kyrgyzs</th>
<th>Tajiks</th>
<th>Uzbeks</th>
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<td>0.6</td>
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<td>1.2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.5</td>
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<td>0.3</td>
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Democracy, Stability and the Islamist Phenomenon in North Africa

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Democracy, Stability and the Islamist Phenomenon in North Africa

by Laura Guazzone

Introduction

Domestic instability, domestic terrorism, manipulation of internal oppositions by external powers, disruptive attitudes towards regional and international cooperation are the main security risks presently posed by Islamist movements in North Africa and the rest of the Arab world.

These risks are not mainly the consequence of Islamist ideology, or of the Islamist movements' political strategy, nor do they stem primarily from local governments' anti-Islamist tactics; rather, they are first of all the result of authoritarian Arab domestic politics that do not allow for peaceful political change and power sharing. In fact, Islamist movements are first of all local political actors engaged in a process of political change which has a significant regional and international dimension, but which remains primarily linked to domestic dynamics.

Dilemmas of democratization in the Arab World

The existence of Islamic movements representing a political alternative is by no means a recent phenomenon in the Arab World and the political dilemmas it poses today are in many ways part of recurrent and broader problem of how to ensure peaceful
political change and political participation in this part of the world. In contemporary Arab politics, all opposition movements—liberal, nationalist, socialist and communist alike—have shared with the Islamists the dilemmas posed by the lack of conditions for participatory politics, and they have always oscillated between accommodation and radicalism to challenge the authoritarian regimes monopolizing the instruments of state power.

These basic patterns of Arab domestic politics remain fundamentally unchanged today, but the combined effects of socio-cultural modernization and limits on the allocation power of the state introduced by the fall of oil revenues are gradually changing the conditions which have allowed these traditional patterns to persist. These changes are in many ways part of that "third wave of democratization" unleashed worldwide by the economic and political failure of centralized socialist systems.

Pressed to respond to worsening political and economic crises during the eighties, and more markedly in the second part of the decade, a number of Arab countries have adopted measures of economic and political liberalization that seemed to lead to a transition towards more liberal economic and political systems in the countries concerned, as well as in the whole Middle Eastern region. In this context the Islamist movements were able to position themselves as the only alternative to the embattled regimes and challenge their legitimacy to direct the change, since all other opposition forces had been either suppressed or discredited.

However, in the Middle East in general and in the Arab
world in particular, the process of liberalization is not proceeding smoothly. Developments in the last three years in North Africa show that completion of the transition remains problematic, while its direction may be shifting towards new forms of authoritarianism and political conflict. Clear symptoms of this are the slow progress or abandonment of economic privatization schemes in Egypt and Algeria as well as the collapse or the limited success of electoral processes in Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt.

Although the economic and political aspects of the transition are deeply intertwined, the main stumbling block in the North African liberalization process seems to lie in the political arena. If democracy is operationally defined as a system in which competing political forces accept common rules by which all political actors are given a voice in government according to their representation, no North African country seems to have reached this stage.

The reason for this are manifold and suggest that the Arab political culture is still locked in a kind of "zero-sum game" mentality, whereby each political force demands exclusive political dominance requiring the literal--if not physical--obliteration of its opponents. A more optimistic view could stress that the consolidation of democracy has taken centuries in most parts of the world, and that the growth of a civil society and the withdrawal of the State from the economy are indications of an incremental process that will eventually lead to true democracy in the Arab world as well.
Evolution in the Maghreb

Whatever view one is inclined to support for the long term, in the short term the political confrontation between Islamist oppositions and governments in Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt reinforces the "zero-sum game" mentality and weakens the incremental progress towards democracy. In 1992, Algeria saw the cancellation of the nation's first free parliamentary elections, the forced resignation of one head of state and the assassination of a second, the seizure of power by a military-backed regime, the declaration of the state of emergency and a deepening conflict between police forces and Islamist insurgents that has claimed the lives of 600 people\(^1\) and shows no sign of being brought under control in spite of an indefinite prorogation of the state of emergency announced on February 7, 1993.

In Tunisia, the Islamist movement an-Nahda, repeatedly accused of terrorist acts and conspiracy, was the target of a string of police crackdowns and of a crucial trial for the plot to kill President Ben Ali which culminated in August 1992 with 279 prison sentences, including that of movement leader Ghannouchi. Security actions were accompanied by the refusal to allow even moderate Islamists to enter electoral politics; the assignment of an increasing number of military and police officials to administrative posts; and the introduction of measures restricting all political activities (e.g. the new law on political associations passed in June 1992).

In Egypt, during a year marked by Islamist attacks on Coptic

\(^1\) 250 security personnel, 218 Islamists and 131 other citizens according to *Le Monde* (Feb. 9, 1993).
Christians, police forces, secular intellectuals and Western tourists, especially in the Southern provinces of Sohag and Assiut, the government introduced the death penalty for anyone belonging to loosely defined 'terrorist' organizations and extended the powers of security forces to include preventive detention without trial. Parallel to the crackdown on Islamist radicals, the Egyptian government seems to be abandoning a policy giving controlled access to political participation to opposition forces. In effect, in early 1993 it amended the electoral law and the rules regulating elections in professional associations to prevent the moderate Muslim Brotherhood's from building a parliamentary bloc in alliance with recognized parties and controlling professional associations. The limitations of the policy of controlled access, however, were made clear by the very low turnout in recent elections and the discrepancy between the Islamists' results in different types of elections (e.g. between Islamists' 1992 results in local elections and those in professional associations).

Summing up, in 1992 the three North African countries saw the political participation of the Islamist opposition either banned, as in Algeria and Tunisia, or seriously hampered as in Egypt. Restrictive measures were taken on two main grounds: on the one hand the seriousness of the commitment of the Islamists to democracy was doubled; on the other, the escalation of violent Islamist attacks against the state and specific components of the national community (women, non-Muslim minorities, secular forces) was seen as a security threat necessitating further reductions of existing civil liberties. Needless to say, these restrictive
measures have affected all political activities, not only those of the Islamists.

Moreover, all three countries (Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt) have accused Sudan and Iran of helping their respective Islamist oppositions. It is well known that Teheran, as well as Al-Turabi's National Islamic Front, in Karthoun have welcomed leaders from Islamic movements from elsewhere in the Arab world and in some cases have provided them with passports. Nevertheless, little concrete proof has been put forward by opponents of Sudan and Iran concerning more threatening activities like financing and infiltrating trained terrorists into other Arab countries.

Without denying the seriousness of the renewed power struggle between Iran and some of its Arab neighbours and whatever the foundations of the charges against Iranian and Sudan, these allegations seem to have mainly the effect of stressing the external versus the domestic origin of the Islamist phenomenon and legitimating the treatment of the issue mainly as a security problem, not as a political one.

In this same framework, North African governments have accused the West of directly and indirectly supporting the Islamists, namely by hosting their exiled leaders (Tunisia vs. France, Egypt vs. US) and magnifying Islamist activity in Western media (Egypt).

Evolution of the Islamist Movements

The Islamist political movements may be described as part of a socio-cultural continuum encompassing individual mysticism,
sufi orders, conversionist associations, reformist movements and revolutionary organizations. This continuum has never ceased to exist in the Arab-Islamic world and its political wings, like other opposition forces, have cyclically oscillated between accommodation and hostility towards their incumbent governments ever since the 1930's. The same may said of the governments' attitudes towards Islamism, wherein conciliation or even support has alternated with repression.

While violence and rejection against the state prevailed in Islamist action in the late seventies (suffice it to recall the Bouyali group in Algeria or Takfir wa-l-hijra in Egypt), in the mid-eighties, the prevalence of a gradualist approach, stressing penetration into the society through the establishment of welfare institutions and educational activities, led to a growth of political consensus around the Islamist alternative that became a clear challenge to the ruling parties' legitimacy and power. At this stage, some movements (possibly in Tunisia) abandoned their gradualist and conciliatory policies and pursued an all-out insurrectional confrontation with the ruling forces that showed no sign of relinquishing their power; in other cases (namely in Egypt and possibly in Algeria) the movements were overconfident and did not take into account the fragility of their recent gains of political and economic access (the restriction on the Islamist activities in investment companies and professional associations in Egypt are a good cases in point).

In Algeria the success of a gradualist, 'democratic' approach of the Islamists to power was denied at the last minute by a palace coup and the suspension of the electoral process. The
Algerian example is not without profound repercussion on the future development of the Islamist movements in the region as it weakens the position of those within the movements who still advocate the reformist way to power.

As a result of the inability of the North African governments and Islamists' movements to practise the sharing and limitation of power which is the basic rule of political pluralism, the liberalization process in North Africa is now in a stalemate, and the Islamist movements, which had experienced a full circle from violence to gradualism, are now back to violence.

Conclusions and Policy Implications

Two main conclusions emerge from the foregoing:

- Islamist movements in North Africa and in the rest of the Arab world are both protest movements fuelled by contingent socio-economic difficulties and the expression of deepseated political forces. The appeal of political Islam is not temporary; it has been expressed in various forms throughout the modern history of the Middle East and is sustained by a deeply shared cultural heritage that, at present, has no ideological counterbalance. As a consequence, when the Islamist movements were allowed to participate in elections, they proved to represent between 30% and 40% of the electorate.

- The Islamists' presence in the society, their pressure on the state and regional role will not disappear; even though they may be presently on the defensive in North Africa where the integration of the Islamist element in the political process is
currently blocked, the process continues elsewhere in the region (Jordan, Occupied Territories, Yemen, Kuwait).

If these conclusions are correct, they engender a number of policy implications:

1) The first and main implication of the Islamist phenomenon in North Africa is that it imposes the resolution of the basic political dilemma of the Arab world, that of democracy. In effect, if the process of political and economic liberalization is to be pursued in the Arab world, the issue of integrating the Islamist forces into the political process cannot be circumvented.

2) The Islamist movements should not be demonized; indeed, this works to the advantage of their propaganda. Instead, Islamist movements must be taken for what they are: opposition forces with different strategies and trends, including violent radical offshoots. As pointed out earlier, the Islamists' recourse to violence is not inherent to their ideology, nor unavoidable; in fact, it seems strictly linked to the availability of other means of political pressure.

3) Regional governments should not be given unconditional support when they present themselves as the only alternative to the Islamist threat. International and namely Western partners, should put political premiums on local governments' continuation of integrationist policies giving the Islamists real access to political participation.

4) Steps must be taken domestically and internationally to ensure that political change is approached within a negotiated framework, whereby all the protagonists set the rules for the
initial stages of the transition. When such a framework is absent or weak, as in North Africa, the political contest inevitably transforms itself into a "zero-sum" confrontation, the transition to democracy is aborted, and another cycle from violence to accommodation begins in domestic politics.

5) Another consequence of strategic relevance of the present stalemate in North African politics is that the embattled regimes may seek an ideological underpinning in renewed nationalism. As the military returns to the forefront in the struggle for national security, external threats are magnified and dormant controversies risk flaring up again. Cases in point are the renewed Egyptian-Sudanese dispute over the Halaib triangle\textsuperscript{2}, and the latent conflict between Algeria and its Southern neighbors (in addition to the oscillating attitude of the present Algerian regime toward the Western Sahara issue).

In any case, it will take time before the political dilemma of the Arab world is resolved. Meanwhile, the region and its international partners will be faced with its domestic instability, terrorism, manipulation of oppositions in the framework of interstate competition, disruptive attitudes towards regional and international cooperation.

Policy actions can only be country- and issue-specific and the notion of a global Islamist threat should be abandoned. As a general rule the West should direct its policies and actions

\textsuperscript{2} Situated on Egypt's southeastern border with Sudan, the Hailab triangle is disputed because of different interpretations of the administrative boundaries set by the British at the time of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium on Sudan.
in light of its ultimate interest in seeing political and economic pluralism established in the Arab world.

In fact, the establishment of pluralistic systems in the Arab world is in Western interest not only became of a commitment to defending human rights or abstract political principles—something that real--politik minded politicians may be ready to bypass for the sake of stability. What is at stake is the long term prospect for more stable and less warprone governments in a region that remains of crucial strategic importance for Western economic and military security.
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
and Implications for Mediterranean Regional Security

Roger Molander, RAND

Introduction

This assessment will attempt to bring four distinctive perspectives to bear on the issue of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and its implication for regional security in the Mediterranean:

- A snapshot view of the current status of global non-proliferation efforts - reflected in the state of play on a key set of on-going international non-proliferation efforts.

- A closer look at where the most important of the proliferation issues - nuclear proliferation - might be going in the long term, both in terms of the expanding number of nations capable of building nuclear weapons and in terms of the actual building of nuclear arsenals by nations.

- An assessment of trends in the United States on the overall proliferation problem, with an emphasis on the nuclear proliferation issue and emerging interest in what is being labeled “counter-proliferation”.

- A focused assessment on those proliferation issues of particular significance to the Mediterranean region, with a particular look at the NATO aspect of this subject.

Status of Global Non-Proliferation Efforts

The status - or perhaps better the fate - of the long-running effort to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction is currently well-captured in five separate on-going international non-proliferation efforts:

1. The unprecedented effort by the IAEA to use the "challenge inspection" powers granted in its original charter, but never previously invoked, to get North Korea to open certain suspect facilities to IAEA inspection. In so doing the IAEA is not only seeking further clarification on the extent of the North Korean nuclear weapons program but also seeking to begin to rebuild global confidence in the IAEA inspection regime - shattered by the post-Persian Gulf War revelation that Iraq had been able to construct a large and impressive nuclear weapons program in spite of being an NPT signator subject to IAEA inspections (limited, to be sure, only to designated sites). It would not be an exaggeration to say that the IAEA inspections regime is increasingly viewed in military circles as somewhat of a Potemkin village whose ability to be a meaningful impediment to a dedicated nuclear proliferator - witness Iraq, North Korea's continued resistance to being the first challenge inspection case, and the emerging Iran problem - remains to be proven. In this kind of "verification" context, trust or confidence, once shattered, is not easily reestablished.

2. The South African "rollback" and the ongoing effort to gain confidence that all significant elements of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program have been identified and disabled or destroyed. One clear objective of the continuing inspection effort in Iraq - that the UN sanctions on that nation can over time be lifted on the basis that the Iraqi nuclear program won't be able to pull itself to its feet and be off on the path toward a covert nuclear arsenal - remains hostage to proof in some larger non-technical court or courts (such as the anticipated NPT renewal ratification processes). This effort represents yet another test for the UN and the IAEA (and by extrapolation the entire nuclear non-proliferation
regime) in terms of its ability to quench effectively a covert nuclear weapons program, once it has been uncovered. This situation and that in South Africa highlight two kinds of challenging new rollback problems - in the first case a program that was 80-90% of the way to the bomb, in the second case, a program that had achieved 6-7 operational weapons - for which rollback ideas and concepts (and temporally/politically sustainable metrics of intrusiveness and effectiveness) have yet to be tested.

3. The ongoing effort to get Ukraine to commit formally - without "non-starter" conditions - to moving toward non-nuclear status an takking concrete steps toward that end. It is increasingly clear that a political debate has been joined in Ukraine on the role of nuclear weapons in their national security strategy, and that that debate is unlikely to soon reach a stable conclusion. The fate of START, and possibly also some nation's ratification of a renewed or revised NPT, will clearly be affected by the pace and outcome of the Ukrainian debate.

4. The ongoing effort to get China to embrace with seriousness the missile technology control regime - to be manifest most importantly in a Chinese commitment to halt sales of long-range ballistic and cruise missiles and directly related technical assistance. If the Chinese do not move much beyond paying lip service to the concept of such a control regime, and in particular if they choose to export some version of their new IRBM, then hopes of effectively slowing the spread of modern missile delivery systems are to all intents and purposes doomed to a limited success that is tantamount in the long term to failure.

5. The ongoing effort to gain global approval of the new Chemical Weapons Convention, with a particular eye to the Middle East and the effort to get reluctant Arab states in
the region to sign the pact. If, as presently appears to be
the case, these nations are going to hold their approval of
this Convention hostage to a Middle East peace settlement
that addresses the Israeli nuclear weapons program or Israeli
acceptance of the NPT, then the extent of the near-term
impact of the Chemical Weapons Convention is indeed
uncertain.

It is frequently argued that the fate of non-proliferation
efforts (and in particular nuclear non-proliferation efforts)
in the Greater Middle East and South Asia are so inextricably
bound up in indigenous regional security issues that they are
virtually independent of broader progress in global non-
proliferation efforts - though the inverse is clearly not
ture. In contrast, at least at present, proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction in the Mediterranean can be
fairly judged to be dependent to a very large degree on
global progress in non-proliferation. If the efforts to halt
or even reverse proliferation in the Greater Middle East and
South Asia are successful, it seems highly unlikely that the
nations of the Mediterranean - with seemingly more modest
security problems - will act counter to such a global trend.
But if proliferation in these two flagship regions is not
halted, then the Mediterranean nations could well find
themselves in a security environment where the less secure
nations of this region will perpetually revisit the weapons
of mass destruction option, particularly the nuclear option,
not the least in the light of the Persian Gulf War and its
aftermath. While the oft-cited Indian defense official who
argued that the primary lesson of the Persian Gulf war was
that you shouldn't fight the United States without nuclear
weapons provides the most quoted perspective on that subject,
there were undoubtedly other high government officials
throughout Eurasia who privately made similar observations
regarding nuclear weapons - and not just vis-a-vis the United
States.
As a bottom line on the present state of things, it is very difficult to be optimistic about the long term fate of global non-proliferation efforts, largely because of the state of the flagship of these efforts - nuclear non-proliferation. It is that subject, and its implications for Mediterranean security, that will be the major focus of the bulk of the balance of my remarks.

The Nuclear Proliferation Problem in the Long Term

Let me start by stepping back and taking a long-term view of the nuclear proliferation problem.

Over the course of the now nearly half-century of the nuclear Age, new nations have been added to the so-called Nuclear Club at an average rate of roughly one every five years. During this same time period, and perhaps of equal importance in the long term, at least thirty nations have developed a nuclear and broader scientific infrastructure sufficient to build nuclear weapons indigenously on some reasonable time scale should they choose - what might be called a "virtual nuclear arsenal." Some of these nations might consciously plan, if deemed necessary, to take their "virtual nuclear arsenal" to an "at-the-ready" state inside some notional "strategic warning time."

Sweden, for example, is among the nations believed to have consciously taken steps, starting as early as 1946, to acquire such a "virtual nuclear arsenal". It is not yet known what kind of sprint/"to the ready" response time to Swedish planned or achieved, nor what that time period might be today. However, considering the Swedish nuclear and military infrastructure, it seems likely that the time to fabricate, say, ten aircraft deliverable weapons - is more likely measured in weeks rather than months. It remains to
be seen whether nations like Ukraine and, maybe down the road India and Pakistan, can find the same measure of security in virtual nuclear arsenals that they today see in the arsenals in their "possession".

The amount of planning and other steps required to move from an inherent or planned virtual nuclear arsenal to an "at the ready" capability of some strategically meaningful size (One? Three? Ten? Thirty?) will over time decrease dramatically and the number of nations judged by their regional or global peers to have a strategically significant "virtual nuclear arsenals" will grow accordingly. Figure 1 portrays the virtual arsenal concept as a function of the time required to bring nuclear forces to a "at the ready" status for the U.S. and a possible proliferator a few years down the road.

![Diagram](image)

Fig. 1--Sizing and Timelines for a Virtual Nuclear Arsenal
Another factor in this calculus is what might be called "the legacy of Rio" - the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development. The turning away from fossil fuels embodied in the consensus manifest at that Conference insures a sustained if not growing global reliance on nuclear power for the foreseeable future.

When the above factors are coupled to the ever-increasing numbers of nations indigenously capable of producing large numbers of modern "strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles" (such as ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, in the former case inherent in indigenous space launch programs), we may soon reach a point where a nation's strategic "virtual nuclear arsenal" capabilities will almost as important a metric as that nuclear arsenal, if any, which it maintains "at-the-ready." Reductions in nuclear arsenal levels beyond START II will further emphasize this factor.

Confronting the above reality of a seemingly inescapable rapid maturing of the Nuclear Age demands that careful attention be given to the articulation and consideration of alternative nuclear asymptotes or end states and our ability to effect one or another of these "possible futures."

In a recent RAND study four illustrative alternative nuclear end states were set forward for consideration:

- "High Entropy" Deterrence - reliance, inter alia, on an expanding web of bipolar or multi-polar (or "all-azimuth") international deterrence relationships to keep the nuclear peace in a highly proliferated world of few "rules of the nuclear road," save possibly a perpetuating (if successful) cultural taboo on nuclear use.

- An Ever-Slowly-Expanding Nuclear Club - acceptance of an inexorable slow growth in the number of nuclear-armed
states with new members of the "club" grudgingly (or sometimes willingly) integrated into the existing nuclear order and carefully educated to a set of nuclear "norms" of behavior and associated deterrence/balances concepts.

- A Two-Tiered Static "Have-a-Lot/Have None" International System - a handful of "haves" (nominally the permanent members of the UN Security Council) maintain substantial (but limited by treaty) "at-the-ready" nuclear arsenals and commit to maintaining the security of the "have-nots."

- The Virtual Abolition of Nuclear Arsenals - virtual elimination of existing "at-the-ready" nuclear arsenals (a handful of states maintain tens to hundreds of nuclear weapons "at-the-ready") underwritten by an unprecedented comprehensive and highly intrusive international inspection and collective enforcement regime.

It can readily be seen that a global trend any one of these long-term outcomes would present a different global context in which to consider the issue of nuclear proliferation in the Mediterranean. It would probably also not be an exaggeration to say that a trend toward either of the first two outcomes could tend to stimulate greater interest in the proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction and associated delivery vehicles.

The forces that are work that could affect the outcome on this issue of the long-term outcome on the nuclear proliferation issue are many. The most important include:

1. The future of the UN Security Council as a strong new instrument - and flagship forum - for global peacekeeping.
2. The degree to which the nuclear and missile technology and technologists of the former Soviet Union diffuse out into rest of the world and in particular into the troubled regions of Eurasia.

3. New decision-making, if any, in the United States on the appropriate or preferred future role of nuclear weapons in the U.S. national security arsenal, which of necessity would have to include a vision of where other nations should also be going on this critically important issue.

4. The posture adopted by those individuals and elements of government worldwide that have been the stewards of the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime.

If the latter community is unwilling or unable to imbue the U.S. and other key regional and global policy and strategy decision-making processes with a sense of urgency about the state of the existing non-proliferation regime and its place on individual national security agendas - the need to critically examine whether the regime and in particular the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in its current form can "work the non-proliferation problem" - then the smart money will assuredly be on the first two of the above long-term outcomes. The outcome on this question - in movie terms "the showdown at the OK Corral" - will be the 1995 NPT Renewal Conference. It would not be an exaggeration to argue that the outcome of that conference will go a long way to determining just what path the human community will take on the critical issue of the weapons which we in the long-term will fight each other with.

Nuclear Proliferation Policy Trends in the United States

The title for this section is deliberately misleading. There are as yet no clear trends in U.S. nuclear proliferation
policy and strategy, albeit much activity in the general area as described above. In looking for trends it is noteworthy that the Departments of Defense, the nuclear weapons component of the Department of Energy, and the U.S. intelligence community are all orienting increasing share of their previously Cold War-rationalized assets toward the proliferation problem as a future threat of potentially substantial character. Though few see the proliferation threat as leading to anything of the proportions of the threat once presented by the former Soviet Union, there is a pervasive feeling that further nuclear proliferation will lead to a far greater threat of nuclear weapons "use" of some kind.

In a cold-blooded institutional survival sense the rather abrupt appearance of the proliferation threat on national security horizon and its allies - in the form of the breakup of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, the realization of the magnitude of the Iraqi program, the harsh realities of the North Korean program, and suspicions about Iran's nuclear intentions - was almost like a life raft to institutions looking for a post-Cold War rationale. But in the period since the Soviet collapse and the end of the Persian Gulf War the proliferation problem that was initially seen as a possible new raison d'être for sustaining defense and intelligence establishments has been replaced by the sober realization that the problem, for example, may not be soluble by traditional military means. The Cold War may simply have ended too late and too fast to give the winners (and the losers) of that war a chance to get the nuclear proliferation problem in hand by traditional military means. The principal reasons for this state of affairs can be captured in the examination of a single operational challenge - "target acquisition" - and a single performance criteria - "zero leakage".
In the calculus of the Cold War, the performance criterion for U.S. or Western nuclear forces was offensive damage against the other side - the assured retaliation of the mutual deterrence concept - expressed in probabilistic terms that recognized that not all of one's nuclear forces (and perhaps as few as a half or less) would survive attack, fly toward the Soviet Union, penetrate defenses as expected, and explode within the required kill radius of their targets. In contrast to this rough statistical calculus, it was quickly recognized that the performance criterion for the world of proliferation: (1) was going to be expressed in terms of damage limitation to one's own side, (2) was going to involve an analysis of outcomes involving small and discrete numbers of attacking weapons and most importantly (3) the criterion for success was to be that none should get through, i.e. zero leakage. Even more importantly, this zero leakage criterion was appropriate not just to the protection of the United States but also to the protection of our friends and allies, for example those we might help to defend like Saudi Arabia or Israel or Italy. Can such a criterion conceivably if one faces a dedicated adversary with more than a few weapons?

The character of this military challenge was dramatically emphasized in the post-DESERT STORM assessment that U.S. and allied forces failed almost completely in the effort to find and destroy the Iraqi SCUD launchers and didn't do much better in effectively intercepting the SCUDs that were launched against targets in Israel and Saudi Arabia. In looking to the future the harshness of the DESERT STORM lessons is even further emphasized by the recognition that the nuclear arsenal of a future adversary, even if very small in size (e.g. from a few to a few tens of warheads), could quite easily be imbedded in a force of hundreds of ballistic and cruise missiles - a shell game of massive and daunting proportion.
In the face of this reality U.S. analysis of the counter-proliferation challenge appears to be moving toward a greater focus on what might be called the low end of the threat curve (see Figure 2) with a growing recognition that counter-proliferation, if it is to work at all, will have to take place when the threat has not yet become operational or at most is at the level of a handful of nuclear warheads. There is an accompanying strong interest in countering these modest threats or would-be threats with conventional weapons, both because of the onus of nuclear weapon use and the desire to not provide any further rationale for acquiring nuclear weapons than already exists..

Fig. 2--Nuclear Threat Development and Response

Looking beyond responding to nascent or minimal-sized threats, the most common reaction of defense analysts to the nuclear proliferation threat is to fall back on deterrence, but without much confidence that classic concepts of deterrence can be relied on in an environment of emerging new nuclear powers who are neither well-schooled or experienced
in the subtleties of U.S.-led nuclear theology nor necessarily inclined to adopt or see themselves in a lesser-included case role in such frameworks – witness the South African nuclear strategy.

The Proliferation Problem in the Med

The above long introduction and stage setting was designed to emphasize the need to bring a long-term perspective to the table in considering the issue of proliferation in the Med.

It would appear that the principal factors affecting an assessment of the proliferation problem in the Med are the apparent strong interest in Libya in acquiring nuclear weapons (presumably through purchase, at least in the near term), the Libyan chemical weapons program, the Algerian nuclear program, and the virtual nuclear arsenals of nations with well-developed nuclear infrastructures such as Italy. As emphasized above it is a matter of speculation as to the global context in which these proliferation problems specific to the Med will be maturing.

If efforts to halt or reverse nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia are unsuccessful and the trend is toward a state of high nuclear entropy, and Algeria appears in line (for reasons good or bad) to be the twelfth or fifteenth nuclear-armed nation and Libya the seventeenth or twentieth, then one can only assume that Mediterranean nations such as Italy will take a hard look at their non-proliferation commitments. The outcome could be a decision to invoke supreme national interests and leave the NPT to build a small nuclear deterrent force or a move toward a more quickly converted virtual nuclear arsenal. Such moves by nations like Italy, Greece, or Turkey would presumably be accompanied by the hope that a kind of global taboo against
nuclear use will prevent any use of such weapons in the region.

If instead one is looking at a slowly expanding Nuclear Club at a pace akin to that seen historically, then the biggest problem will probably be the development of virtual nuclear arsenals in countries like Algeria which might be expected to eventually join the NPT but which will presumably further develop its civilian nuclear power program. In such a context, if the IAEA has not successfully established its right to challenge inspection there will be a real premium on "watchdog" intelligence by other nations in the region. Neighboring nations might initiate advanced planning of their own on the path toward a viable virtual nuclear arsenal - should they judge that such an arsenal is needed to deter an arsenal developed covertly by one of the other nations in the region.

If either of the last two of the canonical end states cited above - a limited and tightly constrained five-nation nuclear Club or virtual abolition - become manifest in the prevailing trend lines, then the proliferation problems for the Mediterranean should become tractable and the security problems specific to the region more traditional.

A final point concerns the impact of a possible nuclear threat from the Maghreb or the Greater Middle East on NATO - an alliance struggling in a post-Cold War "To be or not to be" state. Few things on the horizon would challenge the future of that uncertain alliance more than the appearance and brandishing of a nuclear IRBM threat that could reach some NATO Nations and not others, e.g. to the southern capitals of NATO but not to those farther north. It is at this writing far less clear just how NATO could or might respond to such a threat when brandished or used in support of some position in a future Mediterranean region crisis -
than it is clear that this is a threat prospect that must be faced.
Environmental Security in the Mediterranean

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I will make some general comments about the environment as a security issue and then focus on the Mediterranean as a case study.

GENERAL COMMENTS

How is the environment a security issue?

- Protecting the Commons:

-- Air and water pollution cross borders. Countries share rivers, aquifers, animal populations, and other natural resources → environmental quality and economic development for one country's citizens linked to environmental and natural resource management actions in other countries. Can occur on regional basis, like Mediterranean water quality or globally like ozone depletion or climate change.

-- Implication is that countries have to concern themselves with regulatory decisions in other countries if they want to deal with such problems.

-- Disagreements have potential for degrading relations between states, e.g. Turkey’s Great Anatolia Project on the Euphrates which would seriously reduce Syria’s supply of fresh, clean water.

-- Commons problems can occur among developed states, among developed and developing states, or among developing states. I will argue that we have made some progress with dealing with commons problems among developed states, but not much when developing states are involved.

- Environmental Contributions to Instability

Many environmental problems don't cross borders, but can nonetheless be a security concern if environmental degradation or natural resource depletion is sufficiently severe to undermine economic or political life. Unless there are some unforeseen calamities (e.g. climate change more serious then we now predict), this is likely to be a problem only for the developing world. But consequences of political instability could be a serious concern for western states via collapse of friendly governments, conflict, mass migration.

-- A team of researchers at University of Toronto has done an interesting series of case studies on what they claim are instances of environmental degradation which help lead to conflict. e.g. in Philippines, poor land management by very poor peasants in upland areas leads to massive soil erosion, which decreases crop yields, which leads to greater poverty and worse farming methods, which leads to further erosion. This downward spiral contributes to the success of the insurgency in these areas according to the researchers.

-- Serious problems looming in Mediterranean region, e.g. not clear how long countries like Syria, Egypt, Algeria can maintain current population growth rates before they overrun their supplies of fresh water. On estimate is that water/capita in Egypt and
Algeria will drop by 1/2 over next thirty years. This conference has been discussing a number of reasons for political instability in these countries. Running out of water could set off a serious chain of event which would concern us greatly.

Environmental Issues Illuminate Changing Role of States in Facing New International Problems

- **Non-State Actors are Important**

  - UNEP driving force behind UNCED, which presents one model for biodiversity. The recent bilateral agreement between the U.S. pharmaceutical firm Merck and the government of Costa Rica presents a radically different model.

  - US chemical companies were key in Montreal Protocol

  - Domestic environmental groups are important players in politics of western states, and these groups all talk with one another. e.g. when the British government says a certain level of emissions reductions are impossible, British environmental groups got data from German environmental groups which showed the German government had come to a different conclusion.

- **States Don't Always Have Control Over Domestic Actors**

  - Mexico's environmental laws are as strict as the US, but have less effect because the Mexican government has limited enforcement capability.

  - In U.S., superfund tends to clean-up little though much money is spent on litigation.

  - Population explosion is ultimate example of situation where decentralized decision-makers are key.

- **States Must Take Great Interest Over "Domestic" Issues in Other States**

  - As previously noted.

**MEDITERRANEAN AS EXAMPLE**

Med is an interesting case of environmental security because it has been one of the most active areas of regional environmental cooperation.

- **The Problem**

  - 80-90% of coastal sewage was dumped without treatment

  - Lots of oil tanker traffic with dumping and spills

- **Med Plan**

  - Med Plan founded in 1975 by 14 Med states and the EEC. First regional seas program launched by newly created UNEP.
-- Impetus was growing general world wide concern with environmental protection, evidenced by 1972 UN Stockholm conference on Man and the Environment, and specific fears that Med was dying. The issue was popularized by Jacques Cousteau.

-- Purpose of Med Plan is to act as an information conduit to coordinate research and national environmental policies and practices, and to support technology transfer, the administrative infrastructure is minimal. A central administrative agency with 6 specialists and 12 support personnel is located in Athens. France hosts a research program on integrated development (in Sophia-Anapolis) and a Priority Actions Programme is headquartered in Split, Yugoslavia. In 1987, concentrated action programs called CAMPs (Coastal Areas Management Programmes) focusing on specific cases of local marine pollution were launched. CAMPs are now operating in Turkey, France, Yugoslavia, Syria, Egypt, Tunisia, Albania, Algeria and Morocco.

-- Funded by member state contributions, about $4 M/yr in 1980s.

-- Numerous meetings, some at Ministerial level, over twenty years. Now 18 members. Albania, the last to join, did so when it realized the impact of pollution on its fisheries.

-- Recently began setting specific targets for pollution reduction and water quality which are supposed to be meet during the 1990s.

Assessment of Med Plan

-- The Med Plan has generated a reasonably good, common understanding of extent of pollution in the Med and the sources of that pollution.

-- This is not a trivial undertaking and is very useful. Among the things learned:

- - The Med is not dying, but is undergoing slow decay.

-- The importance of controlling the entire Med watershed, not just coastal pollution sources

-- Med is less a single commons than a group of commons, since the mixing between areas is less than originally thought. This is importance because it means there is at present less impact from Norther pollution on the South and visa versa.

-- Med Plan contributed to development of national environmental agencies and a cadre of skilled environmental scientists and administrators. All the Med Plan member states now have environmental agencies.

-- Impressive collection of states with divergent interests have agreed on Med Plan protocols. This agreement is what so interested University of Massachusetts political scientist Peter Hass in his study of epistemic communities.

-- Some real improvements in the Med environment.

-- Unsafe beaches down from 33% in 1976 to 20% in 1986.
--- General pollution levels have stabilized, which is impressive given the growth in the region over the last twenty years.

--- Less oil spilled, and oil ballast facilities being build at several Med ports.

Doubts About Med Plan

-- Not clear how important the Med Plan actually was in reducing pollution levels

o Most significant reductions were by France, Italy, and Spain. All have strong self-interest to make these reductions (largest polluters, tourism threatened, active domestic environmental concern). These countries also faced EC sanctions for environmental transgressions. Med Plan was probably useful to help these states coordinate their own actions, but does not seem like it was necessary.

o Fewer reductions by other states. This is consistent with the other priorities of these states, the lower pollution levels, and the lack of impact of their pollution on the richer European states.

o Information gathering and tech transfer was useful for shaping Med Plan agreements and evolving plans. But not clear what other effect it has had. May prove important for future reductions by more states in the region, but it hasn’t been tested yet by events or scholars.

Looking Ahead

o The Med Plan demonstrates that we seem to have a handle on arranging environmental cooperation between interested developed states. If the problem is clear and there is domestic support for action, the institutions exist to allow states to jointly address the problem and have been used successfully. There are even example of such institutions ratcheting up the level of compliance above the lowest common denominator.

o Not clear that we have made much progress at developing ways for developed and developing states to cooperate in solving common environmental problems. Med Plan approach is institution building and tech and expertise transfer. Not clear whether or not this will lead to emission reductions in the future.

o In particular, the biggest environmental security problem in the Med region is the potential for severe environmental constraints in the developing countries contributing to political breakdowns. Population growth overrunning water supplies is one concern. The Med Plan has largely ignored this issue. It touches to the heart of this blurring of the traditional lines of state sovereignty. How does the international community, with most of the money and expertise located in the developed states, help developing states -- most with very different cultural and ethnic heritages -- with changing the way citizens of those states make the most personal of decisions regarding family planning and day-to-day management of their farms and factories? We have very little experience with this problem, although it may be the most serious environmental security issue we face.