

4. RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENT

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Russia's position on Chinese military modernization is an integral part of Moscow's overall posture towards Beijing and its foreign and security policy in general. This policy, including the Chinese direction, has been undergoing a constant change throughout the 1990s. To understand the essence and prospects of the security interests of Russia vis-à-vis China one has to first return to the origins of the foreign policy of the new Russian state, which emerged from the remnants of the communist Soviet Union.

Russian democrats came to power in the end of 1991 with a firm desire to overcome the rift with the West and, as then Foreign Minister Kozyrev put it, "to achieve the historical task of transforming Russia from the dangerous sick giant of Eurasia into a member of the Western zone of co-prosperity."¹ The West was perceived as the principal ideological and political ally, the main source of aid, urgently needed for successful reforms, and finally as a model of development.²

In the framework of this policy, Moscow not only stopped any competition with the West in world affairs, but went out of its way to approve the actions of Western governments, and to follow a similar if not identical line on all major issues. As a consequence, ideological, geopolitical, and economic ties with Soviet partners in the Third World were in most cases suspended or toned down.

This policy did not last long, however. Internally, the failure of "shock therapy" delivered a powerful blow to the camp of the radical reformers. Nationalist and communist forces won the parliamentary elections in 1993 and began to exert strong pressure on the liberal foreign policy. Even more important, representatives of the conservative hawkish school of thought were included in the government and came close to dominating it in 1994-1996.

Among those external factors which produced changes in Russian foreign policy, the behavior of the West should be singled out. It became a common belief among Russians that the West had failed to become a reliable ally, instead treating Moscow as a potential adversary which should be checked and isolated through expansion of NATO to the East and other methods.³ Other complaints were that the West was turning Russia into an economic colony, giving advice on reforms aimed at ruining local society. It was also getting clearer with every passing day that the Kremlin was losing ground in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) zone and other parts of the world.

The Yeltsin-Kozyrev foreign policy became the target of strong internal criticism, which gradually grew into a full-scale national debate. The country became virtually split into four major camps on the issues of overall development and foreign policy strategy, with the attitude towards China fully reflected in these controversies within Russian society.

WESTERNIZERS

The first camp consisted of Westernizers, who had clearly dominated the political scene in 1991-1992. According to the Westernizers, the decades-long “Cold War” was the product of the Bolsheviks’ ideology and policy. This “war” had disastrous consequences for the country that had to be excluded in the future. Russia’s vital interest was to overcome the deep rift with the West, created by the Bolsheviks’ rule and concentrate on building a normal human society (i.e., market oriented and democratic) in close union with the West, which was committed to Russia’s success.⁴

For many, if not all Westernizers, China continued to pose a communist and geopolitical challenge. The Westernizers pointed out that Beijing supported the pro-communist coup d’état in Moscow in August 1991 and that the P.R.C. was hostile towards Russian democracy. In addition, the Westernizers in the Kremlin felt that the days of Chinese communism were numbered and that it would soon collapse in the same manner as the former communist regimes in Eastern Europe. The Westernizers preferred to stay away from “the doomed authorities of communist China.”⁵ Later, the Westernizers realized that the P.R.C. was not about to collapse and that contacts with China could prove useful.⁶

However, the Westernizers, including Yeltsin’s first Prime Minister Egor Gaidar, still characterized Communist China as “the reactionary menace, which exerted backward influence and prevented normal, unrestrained development of the human societies in Asia.”⁷ As characterized in one assessment, “the Westernizers warned that the P.R.C. was quickly turning into an awesome superpower, hungry for power, domination and lands.”⁸ It was argued that Beijing would start by bullying Taiwan and Southeast Asian countries, and then turn to Russia, whose empty spaces in Siberia and the Far East were highly tempting to overcrowded China.⁹

The Westernizers used the Chinese threat as the main pretext to convince doubtful and resentful compatriots of the necessity to continue cooperation and alliance with the no longer popular West. As one of the prominent Russian liberals, Academician Peter Kapitza, noted: “Don’t worry about the NATO expansion, in the near future the NATO zone will become our rear in an unprecedented confrontation with the Chinese giant.”¹⁰ Another well-known Westernizer, member of the Presidential Council and Chairman of the 1st Channel of the All Russia TV Evgeniy Blagovolin, was even more blunt: “China is turning into the principal threat to the West, Japan, the entire Asia and the Pacific and Russia. It is high time to start forming a tacit understanding between Moscow, Washington and Tokyo aiming at deterring the growing China threat. It should not be an alliance as yet, but that’s where we must head eventually.”¹¹ Blagovolin added that “quite a few Americans as well as Japanese demonstrate comprehension of the common challenge of China to Moscow, Washington and Beijing.”¹²

A number of leaders of the pro-Western party The Democratic Choice of Russia, headed by Egor Gaidar, insisted that Russia’s destiny lay in getting closer with Asian countries like Japan and learning from them; China’s influence on Russia would only be “negative and regressive.”¹³ The pro-Western newspaper *Izvestia* wrote in a similar fashion: “Constant appeasing of the anti-Western moods of the military elite and a portion of the public opinion means postponing further prospects of the emergence of the civil society in Russia and establishment of the strategic partnership with the West in

general and with Europe in particular. The latter trend is inevitable: one should expect in the next century China's transformation into an economic and military superpower something that promises for Moscow a new headache in the Far East.]Being engrossed in the propagandistic battles around NATO, Moscow can miss a real chance to participate . . . in the formation of a new system of security not only in Europe, but also in Eurasia."¹⁴

The negative attitude of many democrats towards the P.R.C. was based on ideological grounds: they despised Maoism as an offshoot of Bolshevism and felt that as long as Chinese leadership remained Marxist-Leninist and undemocratic it would present a danger both to the Chinese and to other nations.¹⁵

ANTI-WESTERN CAMP

The second camp was the opposite to the first. Its representatives rejected the notion that the West and Russia could be friends. The thesis was advanced that the West for centuries tried to undermine Russia's strength and influence. Finally, in the last decade of the 20th century, its proponents maintained that the West almost succeeded in eliminating Russia as a great power with the help of "traitors" like Gorbachev, Yeltsin and others. Leaders of the nationalist and communist opposition claimed that all the misfortunes experienced by the USSR and Russia had been planned in Washington and then executed according to this plan.¹⁶

Those who shared fears about the Western threat advanced various recipes on how to counter the West. Quite a few, especially in the communist camp, suggested an alliance with China. One communist leader, Valentin Kuptzon, said at a meeting: "Only by joining forces Russia and China could withstand the growing pressure from the West in its bid to destroy two great powers and civilizations, Russian and Chinese."¹⁷ Another prominent communist, General Alexander Makashov, was even more elaborate in his advocacy of the new Moscow-Beijing axis. In a speech in the spring of 1996 he said: "Is there any real mechanism through which we can deter the adversary and substantially weaken its positions? Yes, it is a military alliance with China. China will compensate easily [for] all losses we encountered in recent years, including Eastern Europe and even the Soviet Republics. China will exert an enormous pressure on Americans in the East, it will create turmoil among American allies there—Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and others. Washington will think then twice before daring to antagonize Russia."¹⁸

It was also quite popular among communists and communist sympathizers to talk about "an invincible alliance of three greatest Eastern civilizations—Russia, China and India." As one communist theoretician put it, "if Russia, China and India join their forces all Western schemes will be crushed without any problem; the future will belong to these three vast, populous, rich and talented nations."¹⁹

Communists pointed out that an alliance between Moscow and Beijing was inevitable not only for geopolitical reasons but ideological ones as well. At a political rally in 1996, a member of the Russia Communist Party leadership stressed: "Russia's destiny is socialism. It was chosen by the majority of our population back in 1917. We'll resume our march along this road. China is the major custodian of the true socialist idea now, and we are bound to close our ranks with China in the fight for the victory of socialism against the decadent and doomed ways of capitalism. Notwithstanding twists

and turns, history will continue its progress to the new ways of life. Russia and China through their alliance will guarantee it."²⁰

Many communists strongly supported exports of large quantities of weapons to the P.R.C. as "a way of making China stronger, pressuring the USA and its allies and tying the Chinese military to Russia psychologically and materially."²¹ It was further argued that "the adversary understands only force, and only by making stronger our ally China we may expect the West to limit its ambitions and alter its aggressive plans."²² Russian communists even praised their former foe, Mao Zedong, for his policy of rejecting foreign domination and advised Yeltsin to remember "Mao's lesson" and stop turning Russia into "a younger brother of the West, its "lackey" and "colony."²³

An interest in allying Russia with China was also found outside the communist ranks—i.e., among some nationalist and simply conservative circles. In 1995, the strongest Russian nationalist leader, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, traveled to China to convince Beijing of the necessity to forge a Russo-Chinese alliance. In conversations with the representatives of the P.R.C., he insisted that after finishing with Russia, the West would concentrate its efforts on splitting China into small and helpless parts. It would start with Tibet and Xinjiang and then would undermine unity among the core provinces of China. According to Zhirinovskiy, he had reliable information on this account and if Chinese intelligence did not possess similar data it should be purged and reorganized.²⁴ Zhirinovskiy saw the way out for weakened Russia and China in a military alliance deterring and finally crushing the enemy.²⁵

There were also people in Yeltsin's entourage, who to a certain degree supported the idea of playing the "China card" against the West. Thus Defense Minister Pavel Grachev repeatedly warned the United States of a possibility of allying Russia with "strong states in the East" as a countermove against expansion of NATO.²⁶ Yeltsin himself alluded during his visit to New Delhi in January 1993 to a new "strategic triangle" emerging among Russia, India and China.²⁷ Proponents in Yeltsin's camp of a "Holy Alliance" of these three countries stressed that they shared a common interest in holding back Islamic fundamentalism and opposing a US-dominated world order.²⁸

ENEMIES ARE EVERYWHERE

The third school of thought in the Russian foreign policy debates united those who spotted enemies everywhere. They called upon compatriots to keep the country closed from external influence and maintain all-round defense.

A typical example of such logic was a study on armed forces reforms by a conservative think-tank, the Defense Research Institute (DRI). The study claimed that Russia had numerous enemies, "who acting more and more openly and arrogantly in the light of the weakness of the Russian state, accelerating degradation of its military and economic potential."²⁹ The report specified that "the most probable adversaries of Russia remained the United States and NATO countries."³⁰ Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Japan also figured among direct threats to the Russian security, while China and Iran were excluded from the list, but only for the present. Later, DRI believed, China might also require nuclear deterrence.³¹ There were also enemies of Moscow on the territory of the former Soviet Union—they were "forces of aggressive nationalism,

which acted with the support from outside and possessed own military formations” (like the Baltic states, Tajik opposition etc.).³²

Some politicians and scholars, being anti-Western, concentrated primarily on the Chinese threat. A prominent Russian historian, V. Myasnikov, argued: “The history of Russia’s relations with China has stretched for over 400 years. But never during this whole period China has been developing so much faster than now. It is precisely from Russia that one can see in the clearest way the achievements of the great dragon and prospects of its further growth. It is not realistic to expect that China will miss its chance to derive profits from this situation.”³³ V. Myasnikov further argued that China’s “people’s diplomacy” was turning into “an illegal ethnic expansion,” that Chinese businessmen “as a giant pump sucking out of Russia resources and hard currency with a psychology of a rich neighbor, who intends to rob the home of an unlucky co-peasant.”³⁴ The historian claimed that Chinese authorities advertised Russia as “a great Northern virgin land” where Chinese citizens could easily cheat and enrich themselves.³⁵ Chinese presumably “look down at Russians and feel sure that they only temporarily should tolerate the historical injustice when the maritime provinces and Amur basin areas belong to Russia.”³⁶ V. Myasnikov believed that P.R.C. authorities used the educational system, mass media, movie industry and other methods to promote the thesis of “the loss” by China of 1.5 million square kilometers of its territory to Russia on the basis of “unequal treaties.” Such an attitude was blessed by Deng Xiaoping himself, and, as a result, Chinese businessmen “sometimes threaten Russian customers to throw them out of the Far East.”³⁷

As for Zhirinovskiy, his party’s official platform as well as many personal written and oral statements included into the category of Russia’s adversaries: China, Turkey, Jews, and the West. China was suspected of encroachments on Russia’s Far East, Turkey was blamed for attempts to revive “the great Turkish empire,” the West was denounced for its plan to turn Russia into an economic colony, and finally Jews for Mafia-type control of the whole world and the design to subjugate Russia as well.³⁸ Similar views were offered in the newspaper *Zavtra*. It said: “Russia, deprived of everything, lacking defense, with the dismembered people, encircled by the enemies, flooded with traitors and scoundrels, is slowly starting to utter its secret thoughts.”³⁹ Considering the depth of Russia’s internal crisis contrasting with the widening gap between Russia and the West in economic development, and the steady and fast progress of China, such paranoid feelings may continue to flourish.⁴⁰

The alarmist views of China were especially widespread in the Russian Far East. There was a growing perception in that area that the Chinese were out to trick Russians, steal from them and take over their territory. Khabarovsk region Governor Viktor Ishaev stated that: “A clandestine policy of Chinese expansionism is being carried out in the Russian Far East, infringing upon and humiliating the Russian people.”⁴¹ A Vladivostok newspaper warned compatriots: “Watch out for a new Mao! He had designs to wrestle Siberia and the Far East from Russia. He did not succeed because China was weak and Russia was strong as well as resolute. Nowadays China is getting more and more powerful while Russia is slipping downwards. Pretty soon Chinese will have the upper hand in all aspects, and then they’ll resume realization of Mao’s aggressive designs.”⁴²

Chinese were blamed for crime, unemployment, housing shortages, contaminated goods, counterfeit money, smuggling, stealing natural resources, price fixing and most

of all for a “territorial expansion to the North.” Quite a few local officials, journalists, and laymen believed that Beijing embarked upon a well-thought and well-organized strategy of peaceful conquest of the Far East and then Siberia. The verdict was made: “In the not so distant future Chinese will predominate numerically in the Eastern Provinces of Russia, will control our economy and will openly demand de-jure possession of these lands.”⁴³ In the eyes of many of these people China became the main threat and foe of Russia, which had to be opposed and deterred with all methods and means available.

BALANCED FOREIGN POLICY

The fourth set of views expounded in the national debates in Russia called for a balanced strategy in the world. Its essence is: Russia does not have enemies, it can and should cooperate with most countries of the world, especially neighboring states; Moscow should not “tilt” to any side; because of its geographical position, size, might, history it must maintain balanced relations with the West, the East and the South without trying to ally itself with one or another (the possible exception is C.I.S. members).

This philosophy can be found in the platforms of the government’s political union “Our Home Russia” (OHR) and an opposition democratic party “Yabloko”. The OHR insists on “partnership, not confrontation with other states, with both the East and the West”, “active participation in creation of such a world order, that is based on the principles of overall security, respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states, democratic choice, protection of human rights, and mutually advantageous economic cooperation.”⁴⁴ The program of the OHR is aimed at creating favorable international environment for internal reforms.⁴⁵ It stresses once and again that Russia will pursue partnership with all countries, including China.⁴⁶ “Yabloko” also rejects any imperial ambitions by Russia. It supports “a large-scale serious dialogue, good relations with USA, Japan, and China.” However, it does not feel that Russia should seek alliances. Instead Russia should cooperate with all of the major powers on equal terms.⁴⁷ As for the threats to Russia’s security, “Yabloko” sees them only on the part of Southern neighbors, such as Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan and aggressive Islamic fundamentalism.⁴⁸ According to “Yabloko,” Russia and the West have in this respect common interests, as well as in such fields as the struggle against terrorism, proliferation of nuclear weapons etc.⁴⁹

Foreign Minister Kozyrev in 1993-1995 increasingly advanced these same views. They are found in pronouncements of his successor, Yevgeny Primakov, who has stated: “Russia must conduct a diversified, active policy in all directions, where Russian interests are involved...; this is a vital necessity in order to create the optimal conditions [to make] internal development more dynamic, more effective—in our changing world.”⁵⁰ There are quite a few other politicians—starting from former State Duma speaker Ivan Rybkin and including participants of the 1996 presidential race, S. Fedorov and Mikhail Gorbachev, who subscribe to this foreign policy philosophy.⁵¹ Even Zuganov, in the obvious contradiction to his other statements, has to talk in similar fashion, when addressing Western audiences. Thus writing for *The New York Times* in 1996, the Communist leader said: “Our state’s unique role is to be the pivot and fulcrum of a Eurasian continental bloc—and its consequent role is a necessary balance between East and West.”⁵²

To counter opposing views on Russo-Chinese relations, proponents of the balanced foreign policy advance the following arguments:

1. An alliance with P.R.C. is impossible and will be detrimental to the national interests of Russia. It is impossible because the Chinese categorically reject such a possibility. Since 1982, Beijing has pursued the policy of non-alignment with major powers, and there are no factors which will shift China from this position. Russia in its turn should not strive for such an alliance because it will destroy vital links with the West. If such an alliance is realized, Russia will be confronted with a certain and aggressive expansion of NATO, a new round of arms race, and termination of close economic cooperation with the West and most Asian-Pacific nations. The predictable outcome of all this will be collapse of economic and political reforms in Russia.⁵³ Some observers add that the West knows perfectly well of the impossibility of the new Moscow-Beijing axis, so threats to create one make Russia and its politicians "a laughing stock" in the USA and European capitals.⁵⁴

2. It is equally harmful to treat China as a potential adversary and to stir up anti-Chinese feelings in the country. The proponents of friendly treatment of China in the political, academic and journalistic circles of Russia stress: "China is the only state in Asia and the Pacific that is really active in contacts with Russia; it is Russia's main partner; if Russo-Chinese relations fail it will be a catastrophe for Russia; China is the biggest and most promising market for Russia in Asia."⁵⁵ It is also emphasized that "China does not pose any threat to Russia; Chinese military plans are restrained."⁵⁶

Some also argue that internal difficulties (i.e., ecological, demographical, social and others) will not permit the Chinese leadership to challenge Russia in any way or even to allow worsening of Beijing-Moscow relations.⁵⁷ It is underlined that Russia's and China's "policy-strategic, diplomatic and economic interests closely correlate," that "maintenance of cooperative relations with each other is one of the most important economic and political imperatives of both Russia and China."⁵⁸ Russia, some scholars suggest, should learn from China how to conduct a self-reliant and independent policy, without any unions. It is said that precisely because of this policy the P.R.C. "has become strong and getting a lot of money from the West."⁵⁹

Summing up the above-mentioned arguments, participants of a seminar in the Russian Foreign Ministry on May 14, 1996 pointed out: "Russia due to its unique Eurasian location has equally important interests both in the West and in the East. Any success in the Western direction reinforces the Russian position vis-a-vis China and other states in Asia. Vice versa is equally true. It would be counterproductive for us to join any groupings in the West directed against the East. Equally dangerous is to create anti-Western groupings in the East, for example, with China. In both cases a danger of others playing "the Russian card" against our interests will arise."⁶⁰

CURRENT STRATEGY

Since 1996, the balanced open approach has been gaining momentum in Russian foreign policy. There are a number of reasons for such a tendency. First and foremost, it is connected with internal developments in Russia and the activation of reform processes there. After his victory in the 1996 presidential election, Yeltsin substantially reshuffled the Russian government in early 1997, once again having included a large number of young liberal reformers, notably First Deputies to the Prime Minister Anatoly

Chubais and Boris Nemtsov. These reformers have effectively stopped some of the conservative trends in Moscow's diplomacy which were on the rise between 1993 and 1996. A crucial role of leading financial circles in the reelection of Yeltsin also has dramatically increased their influence on the internal and external policies of the Kremlin. These circles push for a pragmatic, economic-oriented strategy in the world.

Another important reason is the further transformation of the entire Russian society after Yeltsin's victory in the 1996 presidential election. Even for numerous dissatisfied groups and individuals it has become evident that in the foreseeable future Russia will stay on the track of capitalist reform, and it is therefore necessary to adjust one's views and actions on both domestic and external issues. Although the organized communist and nationalist opposition in the legislature is strong numerically, its influence on the conduct of the foreign policy, according to the new Constitution adopted in 1993, has been reduced. The strengthened executive branch manages to push through its own external strategy, especially when broad strata of the country's population do not care much about such issues and cannot be mobilized by the opposition. The strong personality of the current Foreign Minister helps to solidify the balanced diplomatic line.

Finally, the West, sensing positive shifts in Russia, including termination of the war in Chechnya, has in turn become more receptive to Moscow's interests and thus helps Yeltsin to advocate inside Russia a flexible diplomacy. NATO, for example, concluded the Founding Act with the Kremlin; substantial progress has been achieved in economic interactions; and Russia has been accepted into the exclusive club of eight leading world democracies. The situation has changed so much that Yeltsin claims that there are absolutely no problems between Russia and Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy and all other West European nations. Successes have been scored on other diplomatic fronts—for example, a substantive rapprochement with China, warming up of relations with Japan, improvement of ties with Ukraine, a certain progress towards settlement of conflicts in the C.I.S. zone, etc.

Thus, there are grounds to believe that Russia will continue to move to a open, flexible and balanced foreign policy. This conclusion is confirmed by the analysis of objectives of Russian strategy abroad. As mentioned earlier, in the 1991-1992 period the underlying objective was the desire to join as quickly as possible the "family of civilized Western nations." Later, by 1993-1995, it seemed that Moscow shifted the focus of its attention to security concerns and maintenance of its superpower status. Now, it looks like the requirements of internal reform and development are again dominating the international behavior of the Russian government. The difference with the original attitude of the democrats is that presently the Russian establishment wants to collaborate not only with the West, but equally with many other partners. Moreover, it is ready to compete with the West as well as with other players in the world politics and economics.

In this context, China is regarded as a huge market for military hardware and industrial equipment and as a valuable source of consumer goods and labor. Japan and the "little tigers" of Asia are needed to finance modernization of the Russian Far East. In order to recover debts from former Soviet clients in the Middle East (e.g., Syria, Iraq etc.), Moscow has to smooth relations with them. A good rapport with rich sheiks of the Persian Gulf will help to convince them to buy Russian weapons and to invest in Russian oil and gas projects.

Moscow equally takes into consideration the fact that deterioration of the political and economic climate with its immediate neighbors might destabilize the situation at home, deny access to transportation systems, reserves of natural resources, testing facilities, spare parts, etc. For example, a break in relations with Azerbaijan may leave Russia without a large portion of Caspian Sea oil, problems with Kazakhstan will impede exploitation of the space center and military testing facilities; and a rift with Belorussia will make vulnerable Russian railway, air, pipe and electrical links with Europe.

Security concerns are another motive of the Russian foreign policy. The dream that the end of the Cold War would bring universal peace and harmony is over, and Moscow identifies a number of potential sources of threats or challenges to its security. In the West it is expansion of NATO. In the eyes of the Russians it will lead to the weakening of the geopolitical position of Moscow. As Foreign Minister Primakov likes to reiterate, "the intentions may change while the potential will remain." If Russia's relations with NATO or even if its individual members deteriorate, it could become subject to manipulation and intimidation by the strongest military bloc in the history of mankind.

Security concerns associated with the post-Soviet space are even more obvious. Conflicts between Russia and former Soviet republics (Moldova, Ukraine), among these republics themselves (Armenia-Azerbaijan), inside new states (Georgia), pressures by neighboring countries on C.I.S members (Afghan extremists against Tajikistan) are all perceived as threats or challenges to Russia's national security. The drift of C.I.S. countries to other political and economic poles (the West, Turkey, Arab regimes) is also considered harmful to Russia's security. The same even more strongly applies to the forces supporting separatists inside Russia, especially in the Caucasus region. There is also growing apprehension about the long-term potential of China and emigration of Chinese into the sparsely-populated and economically weak Russian Far East. Fears of a more on going nature also exist: the ever-tense situation in Korea, the drama of the former Yugoslavia, and the Middle Eastern "cauldron."

In the final analysis, the security challenges--rather than pushing Russia back to isolation and extremism--promote a balanced foreign policy, since the sources of these challenges are numerous and the challenges come from various directions. Moscow, being relatively weak militarily at present, has to meet these challenges by employing a strategy of flexibility and diversity. It cannot be too tough with NATO because it has the emerging Chinese giant behind its back. At the same time, the Kremlin is interested in a close partnership with the P.R.C. in order to restrain the expansion of NATO and to deter Islamic extremism in the South.

The same logic can be applied to the analysis of the reemerging great power ambitions of Russia. These ambitions are reflected in the claims to play the pivotal role throughout the former Soviet Union, to be one of the leaders of Europe, to participate in the exclusive club of "G7", to have its own distinctive say regarding every international issue, and to show the Russian flag on all four continents.

Since Russia cannot compete as before on equal terms with the USA for world supremacy, it promotes multipolarity in international relations. This policy for its part requires a balanced approach to various blocs and countries, disregarding their ideological colors, unlike in 1991-1992 when Moscow tried to join the West in spreading the democratic gospel around the globe. Helping to move the world toward

multipolarity constitutes the essence of the current Russian strategy in the world. The Russian ruling elite believes that international relations will be much smoother and satisfactory if instead of American hegemony calling the shots, a number of power centers assert their power and influence.

I personally have certain reservations about this notion. Perhaps the United States is not the perfect superpower, but at least it is a well-examined and reasonably predictable one. From history we know that the United States did not exercise a monopoly with its nuclear weapons in the initial period of the Cold War, never tried to conquer other countries, and even when the U.S. attempted to impose its will on other nations the rationale was the promotion of democracy and human rights and the fight against communism. In practice, however, good intentions did not always correspond with real actions.

As for other potential superpowers like Japan, China, and Germany, can Russia be at ease thinking about their future behavior? In the past Japan used its might to ruthlessly subjugate Asian neighbors, and these neighboring countries would certainly react negatively to the reemergence of Tokyo as a political and military giant. China during the zenith of its power before the European onslaught of the 19th century treated other nations not only as “barbarians,” but as “vassals” of the Middle Kingdom, *de-jure* not equal to China.

On the whole, Moscow realizes the pitfalls in the way to establishment of a multi-polar world. The old system of the balance of power is gone, but the new system of equal partnership has not been established as yet. Russia believes that a number of conditions should be observed in the transition to the new world order.

First of all, new division lines in international relations must be avoided. Outside the NATO issue, attempts are being made to divide the world into civilizations, which are presumably doomed to clash against each other. It is especially evident in regards to the Moslem world, which is sometimes labeled as a foe of modern civilization due to the activities of certain extremist Islamic groups.

As Moscow sees it, the second condition of moving to a just world order is rejection of the notion that states can be divided into winners and losers of the Cold War, and that the winners may dictate to the losers rules of behavior. Russian democracy is certainly not a loser in this war; it is the winner and feels this way.

The third condition is democratization of international economic relations. No one should use economic leverage to achieve egotistical political gains. The Kremlin opposes American attempts to sanction business partners of Cuba or to intensify the economic blockade of Iran and Libya. There are also unjustified discriminatory measures by the West against Russian exports. Russia is still treated as a non-market economy though it contradicts realities and harms Russian foreign trade.

The Russian government favors as the fourth condition of the transition to the stable multi-polar world close coordination and cooperation of the international community in solving the following basic issues:

- settlement of conflicts;
- further promotion of arms reduction and military confidence-building measures;

- strengthening of humanitarian and legal aspects of the security;
- aid and support to the countries experiencing various difficulties in their development.

YELTSIN'S POLICY TOWARDS CHINA

It is evident that the Yeltsin administration rejects extremes vis-à-vis China and strives for close relations with that country in the larger framework of the balanced foreign policy. Russia and China have developed intensive political and military ties with regular exchanges of visits and consultations on the highest levels. The exchanges are characterized by a constructive, friendly atmosphere and the absence of any significant irritants.

The basic position of the Russian government towards the P.R.C. was formulated by President Yeltsin at a Kremlin meeting in July 1995. He said: "China is the most important state for us. It is a neighbor, with which we share the longest border in the world and with which we are destined to live and work side by side forever. On the success of our cooperation with China depends Russia's future. Relations with China are extremely important to us in global politics as well. If we can rely on the Chinese shoulder in our relations with the West, the West will be more considerate to Russia."⁶¹

During Yeltsin's visit to China in April 1996, the two sides announced their desire to develop "a strategic partnership directed to the 21st century." As the Russian president explained, the purpose of this partnership was to promote the emerging multipolar structure of the world and to oppose attempts of hegemony by one force.⁶² Yeltsin described the formula of strategic partnership as "a completely different situation and a new elevations of the level of interactions between the two powers." He stressed that "there are absolutely no controversial issues between Russia and China."⁶³

The April 1997 Russo-Chinese summit in Moscow looked, especially to Western observers, as another important step on the road to an eventual alliance. At the summit, the two sides continued to elaborate their common vision of international relations and even signed a joint declaration on that account, something that Beijing does not normally do.

However, both governments denied any intention to collude against the West and their further actions proved their sincerity.⁶⁴ In the fall of 1997, Jiang Zemin paid a successful visit to the United States during which he talked about "a constructive strategic partnership directed toward the 21st century" with Washington, and showed a great interest in American civilian nuclear technology as well as passenger aircraft and other types of technology.⁶⁵ Throughout the year there were many other manifestations of the P.R.C.'s firm intention to continue a balanced foreign policy, including close partnership with the West. At the Yeltsin-Jiang summit in Beijing in mid-November 1997, the strategic aspect was not even mentioned. By that time the Kremlin, having activated again the reform policy and having improved relations with NATO countries, reduced its interest in playing "the China card." The Chinese similarly were less eager than earlier to play "the Russian card."

There are important motivations that seem likely to ensure continuation of the present pattern of Russo-Chinese relations: active partnership but not at the expense of relations with other countries. First of all, both sides realize that they are neighbors and

have to live in peace and harmony for their own good. Historical experience, including recent periods, have taught Moscow and Beijing about the dangers of a mutual confrontation. Geographical closeness makes it necessary to deal on a daily basis with numerous bilateral issues: the movement of people across the frontier, the sharing of river resources, shipment of goods, dispositions of military units, etc. As one Russian official pointed out, "You can sometimes forget about friends if they live far away, but necessity makes you understand that you have to cooperate with close neighbors, even if they are different and not to your liking."⁶⁶

Of no less importance is the fact that both Russia and China are engaged in drastic reforms and they simply cannot afford a quarrel at such a time. Moreover, they are deeply interested in the stability and development of each other as a condition for their own security and progress. A Russian Foreign Ministry analysis, approved by President Yeltsin, states: "A disruption of the political order and normal economic activities in the neighborly China will have a damaging effect on Russia and the areas of its vital interests in the Far East and Central Asia. An indispensable external condition for Russia's development, especially in the Far East, is continuation of China's strategy of reforms."⁶⁷

As for Beijing, in September 1997 the 15th Congress of the CCP directed the country toward more openness and more cooperation with the outside world. An emphasis was put on foreign investment and other resources for development of the country's central and western regions.⁶⁸ It is obvious that to fulfill these plans the P.R.C. will need close, good-neighborly relations with Russia and acceleration of economic and political cooperation with it.

The ideological differences that ruined the Moscow-Beijing alliance back in the 1960s and marred the initial stage of the new Russia's relations with the P.R.C. have virtually lost all ground. The present Russian elite has learned to respect the achievements of the Chinese communist regime, while Beijing realizes by now that a weak Russian democracy is no challenge to it ideologically. Actually, an ideological affinity of two regimes is growing: both are reform-minded and both try hard to stay in power. Moscow does not support dissidents in China, Beijing in its turn is not anxious to see the return of communists to the Kremlin.

The economic factor also gives a powerful impetus to Russo-Chinese relations. Moscow, desperate for capital and worried about its troubled military-industrial complex, is eager to shower the Chinese with airplanes, tanks, ships, and guns. Explaining the importance of arms supplies to the P.R.C, Moscow underlines the fact that they are "profitable not only economically, but politically as well, [since] they tie Russia and China to each other, and help to build up our mutual confidence."⁶⁹ It is also stressed that "if not Russia then some other country will provide weapons to China, and then we'll lose in every respect."⁷⁰

In November 1996 the two sides signed a bilateral defense cooperation pact which opened new vistas for arms deliveries from Russia to China. So far, Moscow has sold to the P.R.C two Sovremenniy-class guided missile destroyers, two Type-636 Kilo class diesel submarines, large quantities of fighter planes, air-defense systems and other equipment. There is a worry in Asia that with Russian help Beijing will acquire a capability to operate a blue-water navy for the first time and to threaten the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait in future periods of tension. Yet, Russia's Defense Ministry believes that these exports will not alter the existing balance of forces in the region.

Besides, the Russo-Chinese military cooperation does not promise quick progress: the process is slowed by the apprehensions of influential political forces in Russia about aiding the Chinese military build-up, as well as by the unhappiness of Russian military producers with the practices of their Chinese customers.

China is also a huge market for Russian machines and equipment not especially popular elsewhere: they constitute up to the 20% of exports to that country. A number of agreements have been signed on Russia's participation in modernization and construction of large enterprises, especially energy and transportation facilities. There are plans to create special economic zones along the common border and to share the waters and resources of the border rivers. For some time to come, China will continue to be an important supplier of cheap consumer goods and labor to Russia, especially its Eastern provinces. To be sure, all these endeavors are no less useful to China, as well as imports of Russian raw materials. Specialists in both capitals agree that economies of the two neighboring giants will remain complementary for at least several decades. Already, China is one of the most important economic partners of Russia (second only to Germany). In April 1997, Yeltsin and Jiang set a target of \$20 billion in mutual trade and in November 1997 the two sides initiated an estimated \$12 billion gas pipe-line project .

Bilateral cooperation between Russia and China provides a solid foundation accompanying the steady progress in solution of historical problems. Moscow and Beijing have legally fixed the long, over 4,000 kilometer border. The relevant agreements on the Eastern and Western portions of the border were ratified by the Russian parliament in 1992 and 1995. In February 1996, Yeltsin signed a document aimed at a speedy completion of demarcation of the border line. The president and other high officials said once and again: the border agreements have removed a major stumbling block on the way to Russo-Chinese good-neighborly relations; the agreements are of major, eternal importance and will be upheld no matter what.⁷¹ In November 1997, Russia and China agreed on joint occupation of several disputed islands.

Russia and China have also made a great deal of progress on military confidence-building measures in bilateral relations. The two sides have signed agreements on no first use of nuclear weapons and on non-targeting of missiles at each other's territory. Russia and China also managed to conclude in April 1996, together with Kazakhstan, Kirgizia and Tajikistan, an agreement on confidence-building measures in the border zone. This agreement provides a basis for continued peace and stability between Russia and China and their complementing policies in potentially volatile areas of Central Asia. In 1997, the agreement on the mutual reduction of armed forces in the area of the border between the C.I.S. countries and China was signed. It was agreed to establish a zone of stability, restricting military activity to a depth of 100 kilometers along the frontier. Even on human rights issues, the two countries are getting closer. It was Russia, for example, which has repeatedly prevented China's condemnation by the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva. As a result of the above-mentioned developments, Moscow and Beijing on the official level no longer treat each other as potential adversaries. Russia's security and foreign policy doctrines specify the P.R.C. as "a friendly state."⁷²

Taiwan is also not a thorn in Russo-Chinese relations. After a euphoric beginning, Moscow's romance with the ROC has faded, and Russia has been slow to open an unofficial representative office in Taipei, which was approved by Beijing. High officials in Moscow regularly confirm the standard position on "one China, Taiwan being a part of it." Privately, they add that the P.R.C. is too important for Russia to risk its friendship

because of the Taiwanese connection.⁷³ The Chinese leadership in turn supported Moscow on the Chechnya crisis, invariably qualifying it as an internal matter of Russia and stressing that each state had the right to defend its unity.⁷⁴

On the international scene there is now also a remarkable similarity of Russia's and China's interests and approaches. Both Russia and China are concerned with the need to counter the disintegration of multi-ethnic states, to fight against fundamentalist tendencies, especially in Islam, and to stabilize the situation in Central Asia. There is a common objection of Moscow and Beijing to "patronization" by any third parties, and a common desire to move the world toward multipolarity. Moscow and Beijing hold close positions on the "hot spots" in Korea, the Middle East, Bosnia and most others. Of particular significance to Russia is the fact that Beijing has said that it "understands and supports" Russia's reaction towards expansion of NATO.⁷⁵ This Chinese position is not a mere diplomatic gesture, but an expression of the real Chinese opposition to such a drastic tipping of the balance in Europe in favor of the USA and its allies.

The unrestrained build-up of the Chinese nuclear capability is the only issue where the Kremlin has objections against Beijing. However, even in this area Yeltsin derived satisfaction during his 1996 visit to the P.R.C. that China joined the total ban on nuclear testing.⁷⁶

AREAS OF TENSION AND UNCERTAINTY

Not everything, however, is perfect in Russo-Chinese relations. It is sufficient to look back at their difficult history of uneasy cohabitation to be cautious about their future. The problems are not only potential, some of them are already on the agenda as could be projected from the mood of certain Russian circles towards China, as discussed earlier. Areas of tensions and uncertainty can be divided into two major categories: bilateral and international.

Bilateral issues. Among the obvious issues for quarrels and disputes is the common border. If the Kremlin is fully satisfied with the border agreements with the P.R.C., Primorie region authorities are not. The local parliament rejected the ratification by the Federal Parliament in February 1992 of the Russo-Chinese border agreement as "unconstitutional," because "the state borders cannot be changed without the referendum of people."⁷⁷ Primorie authorities blamed Moscow for "selling out Russian lands, and hurting territorial, economic and political rights of [the] local population."⁷⁸ Ever since, the local authorities have made attempts to prevent the completion of the demarcation process. There was also obstruction on the part of Khabarovsk and Primorie governments of the free passage of Chinese vessels in the Amur river.⁷⁹

Far Eastern leaders, especially Primorie governor Evgeniy Nazdratenko, have managed to mobilize a significant number of people against the border settlement with China and have helped to make it a hot issue on the local level. Beijing is also well-known for its obstinacy on territorial issues. The Chinese believe that the Russians illegally gained control over the Far East and much of Siberia in the nineteenth century. Thus, from Beijing's point of view, China has already made more than its fair share of concessions by having ceased making claims on "the eastern territories."

Such feelings run extremely deep in China, and there is no guarantee that at some point a new Chinese government will not resurrect old demands to restore justice and

repay old debts. Such demands may become an expression of the growing nationalism and ambition of a successful post-communist China. Or territorial disputes may be used by the Chinese government to avert the attention of the populace from internal problems, if they develop. The territorial issue may also flare up as a result of a deterioration in Russo-Chinese relations for other reasons, as was the case in the 1960s. But ultimately, Chinese expansionism in the North may be triggered by the disintegration of the Russian Federation and the emergence of splinter regions in the eastern part of the country. If Moscow loses control of these traditionally Chinese lands, it may be China that gains them.

Nevertheless, the Kremlin values highly its agreements with China on the border and intends to proceed with the demarcation of the border line as agreed. In private, President Yeltsin has harshly denounced "political adventurers in the Far East, who in their desire to score political points are prepared to undermine our very important relations with China. . ." It is not in the national interests of Russia to create problems because of a small question that imposes obstacles in successfully developing relations with China.⁸⁰

The earlier discussed illegal immigration of Chinese into the Eastern Russian provinces may also develop into a serious controversy. The problem has two dimensions. The first is the Russian perception of large numbers of Chinese being moved into Russia as a part of the "master plan" of the Beijing leadership. This perception is not necessarily true, but it reflects the inability of underdeveloped and underpopulated Russian Far East to adjust to the new openness in relations with the fast-developing and energetic Chinese North. As such, this perception is not easy to eradicate.

The second dimension is a plausible fear that the Chinese will someday gain a numerical superiority over the indigenous population in some parts of the Russian Far East. Then the Chinese might say: "we are here in majority, everything around here have been built by us and after all these lands used to belong to China." Then Russia and China will have on their hands a dispute much more explosive than what is happening nowadays in former Yugoslavia.⁸¹

Human contacts in general create constant frictions. Russians complain of an enormous number of Chinese criminals roaming around the Far East and disturbing peaceful life there. Chinese are denounced for illegal dealings, the smuggling of narcotics, illegitimate purchase of housing, and unpleasant personal habits.⁸² Similar resentment of Russian travelers can be spotted in P.R.C. Quarrels, fighting, and harsh treatment by the local police are regular features of Russo-Chinese human contacts.

Economic cooperation creates its own problems. The common complaint in Russia is that Chinese export low-quality, faked, and dangerous products, and in exchange rob Russia of its valuable natural resources such as metals, gas, oil, and timber.⁸³ Chinese traders in turn complain of indecent practices of Russian businessmen and the low quality of Russian goods.⁸⁴ Both sides are unhappy about customs, immigration, investments, transportation, and other regulations. In 1997, Russia also suffered a setback in its plans to gain large contracts in China's Three Gorges hydroelectric project.

International problems. At present, the Chinese are rapidly making economic inroads in Mongolia and the former Soviet Central Asian republics without encountering any resistance from Moscow. The situation may change if the democratic

order collapses in Russia and the ultra-nationalist parties gain control of Moscow's foreign policy. These parties would definitely attempt to regain Russian predominance in these areas, and sooner or later they could also find themselves at odds with Beijing. China will not accept Moscow's control of Mongolia and Central Asia regardless of who controls the Kremlin. Russian nationalists may regard Chinese communists as partners in a resistance struggle against the West's supremacy in the international arena. But if they act too arrogantly, they will not necessarily find a partner in Beijing, but a very strong adversary.

Untying the "Korean knot" may also produce tensions between Moscow and Beijing. The prospective dismantling of the communist regime in the North will not necessarily be a peaceful one. South Korea, the USA, Japan, China and Russia will inevitably be involved.

The advancement of cooperation between Moscow and Washington is another potential area of friction between China and Russia. Beijing will be irritated if the United States neglects China and focuses U.S. attention and resources upon helping Russia reinforce democracy and its market economy. indeed, little choice exists for Russia in international affairs if it cares about Chinese goodwill. This goodwill may easily disappear in the case of either of the two following scenarios: (1) if Russia becomes weak and too dependent upon the West; or (2) if the Kremlin attempts to resume hegemonic practices.

Should China continue to develop rapidly, and if Russia remains in deep crisis, Moscow may lose its present admiration for China. Jealousy and Beijing's encroachments upon Russian territories are bound to recur. Moscow and Beijing may again plunge into disputes concerning Indochina, the South China Sea Islands, and India. All these problems, however, appear highly hypothetical at present, as Russo-Chinese cooperation is on the increase. However, trouble spots in the relations between these two neighboring giants should not be overlooked.

SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE

As argued throughout this essay, much of the future of Russo-Chinese relations will depend on the internal developments in both countries. To summarize our findings, we will offer three scenarios on future development of China and Russia, with their repercussions for the respective foreign policies of both countries. For China, three scenarios are possible.

Scenario 1

The People's Republic of China will continue its great march forward. No major convulsions in the upper political hierarchy of the country will take place. The present leadership has been already in place for quite a while; it is united, experienced and able to run state affairs in an orderly and efficient manner. The Communist ideology and system will not collide with the fledging market forces, since the Communist Party apparatus has become the promoter and guarantor of the market reforms. It will play the role similar to Kuomintang's role on Taiwan in the 1960-1980s. The Chinese economy, bolstered by ever-increasing foreign investments, will keep on growing. The inefficient state enterprises, remaining a burden on the China's budget, play, at the same time, a positive role of limiting unemployment and averting social discontent. Other

social tensions in the society are checked by the authoritarian methods of the government.

In the realm of foreign policy Beijing will be increasingly active, assertive, and potentially aggressive. Driven by economic requirements, the nationalistic desire to correct historical injustice, security considerations, and great-power ambitions, China will be striving for a dominant position in Asia and the Pacific.

Vis-à-vis a weakened Russia, China will take a tougher stand on the disputed border areas, incite settlement of the Russian Far East and Siberia by the excessive influx of Chinese population, hurt Russia's economy by flooding it with cheap consumer goods and by buying up for unreasonably low prices Russian raw materials. The P.R.C. will be covertly pushing Moscow out of its traditional spheres of interest—Kazakhstan, Central Asia, Mongolia and finally, Korea.

A stronger China will decisively check attempts of Japan to increase its military potential and its political role in the region and the world at large. Japan will be tied to the Chinese economy and will start feeling Chinese competition in the markets of Asia and the Pacific. Americans will also feel Chinese pressure, both in bilateral issues and throughout the Asian-Pacific region. On a number of issues in this region Beijing and Washington will find themselves in opposing camps, among them disputed islands in South China Sea, Taiwan, and naval activities in the Pacific.

North Korea will no longer be an ideological ally of the market-oriented, pragmatic China. However, Beijing will do everything possible to prevent a sudden collapse of the communist regime in the North out of fear of destabilization near China's borders, and of losing influence in Pyongyang. Due to the Beijing's support and guidance, the communist regime in the North may have a chance of a gradual transformation into a market-oriented, non-ideological society. Simultaneously, China will foster closer cooperation with the South, seizing economic benefits and striving for the political dominance over Seoul. Beijing will be trying to speed up withdrawal of the American military presence from the Korean peninsula. In order to avoid turmoil and to postpone emergence of a new powerful state in the Far East, the Chinese leadership will not be too anxious to see early reunification of Korea.

Scenario 2

Reforms will collapse and China will plunge into chaos. The ruling class will split into warring factions along clannish and regional lines. The Communist apparatus will clash with the new capitalist classes of Chinese society. Ethnic uprisings will rock stability in the border areas of the Middle Kingdom, while social unrest of under-privileged groups in the population will undermine stability in the heartland of China. The economy, burdened with inefficient industry and shortages of arable land and raw materials, will be stricken with a profound crisis. In such a case history of the 1920s to 1940s may repeat itself to a certain degree.

In the process of internal strife, one (or several) political forces may appeal to Russia for help and invite Russia's interference in the domestic affairs of China. The opponents of the pro-Russian factions will in turn ask for American support and assistance. As a result, something along the lines of the Communist Party—Kuomintang rivalry of earlier decades, with Moscow and Washington in the background, will occur again. Under such circumstances (turmoil in China), even Japan may go back to the

policies of aggression against a weak and helpless neighbor, using various pretexts (protection of investments, property and Japanese nationals, restoration of order, etc.). Finally one of the groups (pro-Russian or pro-American) will win and China for a while will become a close ally of one of the two superpowers. Inevitably, though, a unified China will regain full independence and freedom of action in international affairs.

As for Moscow and Washington, their rivalry in weakened China will spoil their relations and return to a confrontational disposition. Only aggressive Japanese behavior in China may allow Russia and Washington to avoid a direct clash and unite in the efforts to oust the Japanese from Chinese territory. In such a case, Beijing will even sooner recover its full independence from the influence of superpowers.

It is also possible that a weakened China would not split into warring factions. It will retain one government. This government will feel increasingly threatened by stronger Russia, which will be overly assertive in bilateral relations with Beijing and will restore Russian hegemony at the perimeters of China's borders. Consequently, China will promote anti-Russian propaganda inside and outside its own borders and will seek an alliance with Washington and Tokyo.

Scenario 3

The last scenario seems the most plausible, at least in a near-term perspective. According to it, Russia and China will remain relatively weak (Russia economically, China militarily), while the United States and Japan will continue to move forward as economic and (in the American case) also as military superpowers. Such a tendency, coupled with tensions between Moscow and Washington in Europe and C.I.S., and China and the U.S. over human rights and trade, may prompt the Kremlin and Beijing to promote mutual ties.

This scenario in fact depicts developments during the last several years. Russia, in order to balance its relations with the West (i.e., of the unequal partnership) supplies China with arms, approves Beijing's foreign and domestic policies, allows immigration of Chinese to Siberia and the Far East, and makes concessions on the border and military issues. Beijing in its turn demonstrates flexibility vis-à-vis Russia. View in such terms, the Moscow-Beijing marriage may continue as long as the two states remain far behind the United States and Japan in their overall might. At the same time, Russia and China will not sacrifice their cooperation with the West.

Russian internal developments will in turn have a direct impact on future Russo-Chinese relations. It would certainly be wrong to assume that the ideological factor has been completely removed from Russo-Chinese relations. Now, as Russia is weak, Chinese Communist leaders have stopped worrying about "evil winds" blowing from the North. But this air of nonchalance may disappear rapidly if reforms in the former USSR begin to work. Simply by leading by example, Russia in its democratic development may inspire the Chinese intelligentsia with a new vigor. In addition, if reforms are successful, Russian democrats will be more confident and may join the Americans in their missionary zeal to transform China into a free country.

A different scenario may develop if the Russian Federation plunges into uncontrollable chaos, which is not implausible in such a case. Neighboring China would sooner or later be flooded with refugees and might find itself in conflict with those groups and even, perhaps, with terrorist groups from the North.

Emergence of a communist or radically nationalist regime in Moscow will almost certainly damage Russo-Chinese bilateral relations. Though communists talk about an alliance with the P.R.C., should they gain power they will behave similarly to Russian nationalists, which will be resisted by the Chinese. For the most part, they would crack down on all foreigners in Russia (including Chinese nationals), they would close borders, restrict flow of goods across them, and resume expansionism towards Central Asia. These actions will be enough to reignite Russo-Chinese controversies.

¹ *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, 1992, No. 3-4, p. 88.

² For details see Yevgeni Bazhanov, "Russia's Changing Foreign Policy," *BIOST*, Koln, Germany, 1996, No. 30.

³ See *Izvestia*, 20 April 1994; *Segodnya*, 15 October 1994.

⁴ For elaboration of such view see Andrei Kozyrev, *Preobrazhenie* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1995).

⁵ See Eugene Bazhanov, "Russian Policy Toward China," in Peter Shearman, ed., *Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 161-162.

⁶ Egor Gaidar, "Vneshnepoliticheskie prioritety," *Obsbaya Gazetta*, 12 March 1996.

⁷ Egor Gaidar, "Nashi prioritety," *Izvestia*, 20 November 1995.

⁸ Meeting of the Council of Foreign Policy Russia, "Problems of security, stability and integration in the APR and Russia's Interests," 15 November 1994, *Proceedings*, Moscow, 1995, pp. 20-21.

⁹ Remarks of Academician Peter Kapitza at the Russia's State Duma roundtable on the United Nations, 16 May 1996, *Proceedings*, pp.30-32 (unpublished).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

¹¹ Meeting of the Foreign Policy Council, *op.cit.*, p. J8.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Russia's Foreign Ministry "Roundtable" on Moscow's diplomacy in 1995, 14 December 1995, *Proceedings*, pp. 12, 20-23, 40-46 (unpublished).

¹⁴ *Izvestia*, 23 June 1995.

¹⁵ Proceedings of an international conference "Democracy in the contemporary world", 14 May 1996, Moscow, *TCIS*, pp. 12, 94-85 (in print).

¹⁶ F. Bazhanov, D. Rivera, ed., *Rossiia yi SSBA v menyayushemysya mire*, (Moscow: Nauchnaya Kniga, 1996), especially pp. 29-61.

¹⁷ *Pravda*, 10 October 1995.

¹⁸ *Patriot*, 16 May 1996.

¹⁹ Proceedings of a seminar on new trends in the international relations, Center for Strategic Studies, 10 April 1996, Moscow, pp.10-11 (unpublished).

²⁰ *Mi Pobedim* (Moscow: Nabat, 1996), p. 18.

²¹ "Security in the North-East Asia," Conference proceedings, 10 February 1996, Moscow, p. 18 (in print).

²² *Rodina*, 8 March 1996.

²³ *Pravda*, 20 January 1994.

²⁴ Interviews with Russian diplomats in May 1996.

²⁵ While evaluating Zhirinovskiy's arguments it must be taken into account that this man is prone to constant changes of mood, views and positions. In other instances, to be discussed later, Zhirinovskiy displayed a completely different, hostile approach to China.

²⁶ For example, P.Grachev's interview for the Russian TV (ORT-1), 10 November 1995.

²⁷ *Rossiiskaya gazetta*, 28 January 1993.

²⁸ "Security in the North-East Asia," *op.cit.*, p. 22.

²⁹ V. Dementiev (Lt-General), A.Surikov, *Armia, Reforma, Besopasnost*, (Moscow: Institut Oboronnykh Issledovani, 1996), pp. 12-13.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 16.

³³ V. Myasnikov, *Dogovornymi statiami utverdili* (Moscow: RIO Mosobluprpoligraphizdata, 1996), p. 413.

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- ³⁴ Ibid., p. 412.
- ³⁵ Ibid., p. 414.
- ³⁶ Ibid., p. 418.
- ³⁷ Ibid., p. 419.
- ³⁸ "Golaya pravda Zhirinovskogo," *Izvestia*, 7 October 1995, p. 4. See also *Izvestia*, 24 May 1996.
- ³⁹ "Sudbonosny chas Yeltsina," *Zavtra*, no.13 (121), 1996. For the paranoid ideas of all-round threats for Russia as well as of the urge to conquer others and to expand empire see, for example, V. Zhirinovskiy's book *Brosok'Na Yuc* (Moscow, 1995); *Derzhava* (Moscow, 1994); and *Za gorizontom* (Moscow, 1995).
- ⁴⁰ Russia's GNP has dropped to the level of 15% of the USA's GNP. While Russia's GNP continued to fall in 1991-1996, China's GNP grows by over 10% annually.
- ⁴¹ *Segodnya*, 7 May 1994.
- ⁴² *Utro Rossii*, 5 March 1996.
- ⁴³ *Tibookeanskaya Zvezda*, 12 April 1996.
- ⁴⁴ *Vneshnya Politika yi Besopasnost* [Pre-election Program of Our Home Russia], (Moscow, 1995), p. 3.
- ⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 2.
- ⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 7,9.
- ⁴⁷ "Programma Yabloko," *Vneshnya Politika* (Moscow, 1995), p. 4.
- ⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 6.
- ⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 7.
- ⁵⁰ Y. Primakov, "Rossiya yisheet novoe mesto v mire," *Izvestia*, 6 March 1996.
- ⁵¹ See, for example, *Izvestia*, 22 March 1996; *Segodnya*, 2 April 1996; *Nezavisimaya gazetta*, 9 April 1996; etc.
- ⁵² G. Zaganov, "Junior Partners: No Way," *The New York Times*, 1 February 1996, p. 15.
- ⁵³ For elaboration of such views See E.Bazhanov, "Russia looks to the East," *Moscow Times*, 15 September 1995; Russia's TV, channel ORT-1, news program "Vremya" on 23 April 1996; *Time*, 6 May 1996, p. 23.
- ⁵⁴ *Segodnya*, 28 April 1996.
- ⁵⁵ *Rossia yi Azia*, conference proceeding, 22 May 1996, (Moscow: RAN, 1996), pp. 11-12 (unpublished).
- ⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 24.
- ⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 26.
- ⁵⁸ *Moskva-Pekin: perspektivi otnoshenii*, (Moscow: Institut Aktualnykh Mezhdunarodnykh Problem, 1996), pp. 28-30.
- ⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 43.
- ⁶⁰ Proceedings of a seminar on the Russian Foreign Policy Strategy, 14 May 1996, Moscow, p.12 (unpublished).
- ⁶¹ "Yeltsin daet ukazaniya diplomatam," in *Diplomatia: Nauka yi Praktika*, no. 4, 1995, p. 4.
- ⁶² *Novoe Vremya*, nos.18-19, May 1996, pp. 34-35.
- ⁶³ *Izvestia*, 26 April 1996.
- ⁶⁴ Evgeny Bazhanov, "Russkie narodnye skazki," *Segodnya*, April 7, 1997, p. 2.
- ⁶⁵ *Izvestia*, 4 November 1997.
- ⁶⁶ Eugene Bazhanov, "Russian Policy Toward China," *op.cit.*, p. 165.
- ⁶⁷ *Vneshnepoliticheskiye prioritety na vneshnem etape*, conference proceeding, (Moscow: ICIS, 1996), p. 19.
- ⁶⁸ *Renmin ribao*, 19 September 1997.
- ⁶⁹ Evgeny Bazhanov, "Bratya po oruzhiu," *Obshaya gazetta*, 7-13 August 1997, p. 4.
- ⁷⁰ Ibid.
- ⁷¹ Yu.Savenkov, "Rossii ne nuzhni dve spornye granizi s Kitaem," *Izvestia*, 24 April 1996, p. 6.
- ⁷² *Dokumenti Rossiiskogo Pravitelstva* (Moscow: Nauchnaya Kniga, 1996), pp. 26, 108.
- ⁷³ "Taiwan dilemma," *Segodnya*, 10 May 1996.
- ⁷⁴ *Zhongquo qingnianbao*, 16 April 1996.
- ⁷⁵ *Renmin ribao*, 28 April 1996.
- ⁷⁶ *Rossiiskaya gazetta*, 30 April 1996.
- ⁷⁷ *Rossiiskaya gazetta*, 12 February 1996.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ *Segodnya*, 20 May 1996.

⁸⁰ *Segodnya*, 10 May 1996.

⁸¹ For a discussion of these issues see F. Bazhanov, "Russia looks to the East," *Moscow Times*, 1 September 1995; and E. Bazhanov, "ATR," *Segodnya*, 21 July 1995.

⁸² "Druzhit trudno," *Kommersant Daily*, 8 April 1996.

⁸³ "Nedobrokachestvennye tovari iz Kitaya," *Trud*, 12 February 1996.

⁸⁴ Proceedings of a seminar on Russo-Chinese trade, 15-16 January 1996, Moscow, ICIP, pp. 12-20 (unpublished).