Good evening. I would like to thank the sponsors of this conference for their efforts to put such an important and timely event together.
The issues you have brought this audience to address are critical if we are to achieve success on the battlefields of tomorrow. I also want to thank each of you who have taken the time to attend and for your contributions to our efforts to improve our ability to conduct urban operations. Alone we will not find the answers but together we can create solutions to the myriad challenges posed by urban operations.

As the new millennium approaches, society is undergoing a transformation about which many have written and lectured. We are in an age of uncertainty that has been labeled, among other things, the information age, a “clash of civilizations” (Prof. Samuel Huntington), and the “urban century” (Marine Corps Intelligence Activity). We do not know which, if any or if all, of these titles is accurate. But we can rest assured that the armed forces will be called upon to pursue national interests in a chaotic world against a variety of opponents and most likely in an urban area.

The challenge for us is to determine how societal changes will transform the conduct of warfare. We need to determine if our existing military doctrine, force structure, and equipment will be effective in a new security environment. Each of us should be asking a very basic question—will societal shifts and demographic changes make our current military operationally irrelevant, and if so, can we take steps now to ensure we are prepared to meet the nation’s needs in future crises and conflicts?

A specific challenge we face is how to project power into the urban sprawl in which much of humanity will reside. This conference is an attempt to examine that challenge. As you reflect on today’s presentations and listen to those scheduled for tomorrow, keep in mind my basic question. Our nation demands that we answer this question, and many others prior to our next battlefield challenge. The marines, sailors, soldiers, and airmen you lead demand an answer. This is no small task, so I encourage you to devote every effort to this undertaking.
How will societal changes impact military operations in general and urban operations specifically? The question gets at the heart of this conference. War is and will remain a clash of human wills. If the society in which those wills are created, developed, and influenced is altered, there is a great propensity for war to also be altered. While the nature of war—that is, its inherent violence, chaos, and danger—will remain constant, we do not know the full extent to which societal changes will alter the character and conduct of war. I venture to say that it will be immense.

One of the most significant changes is the proliferation of information technology. Societies are being radically altered by the impact of the personal computer, the Internet and the World Wide Web, cellular communications systems, and the like. The transition from industrial societies to information societies is dramatic. Digital technology is shrinking the impact of geography on global events to a minimal consideration while simultaneously increasing the amount of information available to individuals. We must strive to understand the impact on military operations.
The ideological shackles of the Cold War system are gone. No longer do two superpowers seek to control violence in order to prevent a world war. Nations, city states, ethnic groups, and religious societies are all feeling the freedom to pursue self-determination without the restraint imposed by the United States and the former Soviet Union. According to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, “a significant source of conflict is to be found in the competition to fill power vacuums, especially during times of transition within the states and often as a result of the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union.”

The Carnegie Commission further specified that “much of the violence wracking the world since 1989 has been attributed initially to ethnic causes, rooted in immutable history, or to the unavoidable release of tension or redress of grievances held too long in check by the last vestiges of colonialism or the bipolar international structure. The conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, for example, have had ethnic, historical, and broad social components, but they also have had a strong, immediate political component. In these
cases, the precipitating motivation for conflict stemmed from actions designed to achieve political goals. Leaders within factions steered the conflict toward violence, tapping into long-standing, deep-rooted ethnic tension as an accelerator. Later, those historical and ethnic forces surged out of control, fed by momentum, suffering, and acts of retribution."

The rise of intrastate conflict and the relative decrease in interstate conflict during this decade is an indication that political battles are occurring within states as people and groups vie for power. Many of the leaders involved in these essentially domestic political battles are choosing military means to achieve victory.
I would like to present some statistical data to demonstrate the dramatic upheaval the world is experiencing. This information was compiled variously from the United Nations, the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, and the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity.

- Over the past 40 years, the number of urban dwellers has more than tripled, from 737 million to 2.5 billion.
- By 2005, the majority of the world’s population will live in urban areas.
- Over 160,000 people per day migrate to developing world cities.
- New York City reached 8 million in 150 years, while Mexico City and Sao Paulo will reach 8 million in 25 years.
- By 2000, 21 of the world’s largest 30 cities and 264 of its 414 “million” cities will be in the developing world.
The UN predicts that while the population of the developed world will increase by 50 percent by 2050, the developing world population will rise 80 percent in the same period. Significantly, one-fifth of the world’s population accounts for less than 2 percent of global income.

While developed nations are able to plan for increases in population and to develop the infrastructure necessary to support large concentrations of humanity, the majority of nations and states in the developing world are incapable of similar achievements. They are literally being overrun by humanity. Thus the developing world is more prone to conflict as the lack of resources and services causes competition to reach violent levels. We must understand how these demographics will compound the impact of the societal shifts previously mentioned.

Recent UN forecasts predict that 85 percent of the world’s population will reside in urbanized areas by the year 2025. We are witnessing a massive worldwide migration from agrarian to industrialized societies. What you see on the screen is a representation of human activity across the face of the globe. The location of humanity along the littoral regions of the world is indisputable.

Please note that the main image on this slide does not contain a map. I say again . . . there is no map on this slide. The image you see was produced by depicting the data collected by sensors. What you see is a summary of electronic activity as measured over a 30-day period. If there are any doubts about the importance of the littorals, sea lines of communications, or urban areas, then this image should dispel them.

You may conclude for yourself what areas of the world are important for mankind. You may also conclude what locations will most likely serve as the battlefields of tomorrow. As the global trend toward
urbanization increases, the military significance of cities is likely to increase proportionally.
There are many within the defense establishment who do not believe we should allocate significant resources toward the development of capabilities necessary for urban operations. I politely but strongly disagree. To those who espouse the idea that we can bypass or lay siege to a modern city, I ask them to reconsider their position. To those who believe that there are no valid reasons to pursue military operations, I ask them to reconsider their thinking. To those who state that combat in cities is too difficult, I challenge them to contribute to our efforts. There are myriad reasons that we may have to fight in the city.

Over the last ten years, American military personnel have operated in the urban areas depicted on the screen before you. If you extend this timeframe back another seven years, we can include Beirut, Grenada, and Tripoli. I would like to emphasize that this list does not include the major wars of this century and the many urban operations from Bastogne to Manila, and from Inchon-Seoul to Hue City.
The list includes humanitarian assistance, security, noncombatant evacuation, support to domestic authority, and combat operations. These operations represent the day-in and day-out reality for our forward-deployed forces. Our marines, sailors, airmen, and soldiers are living, fighting, and dying in urban areas around the world because that is where many of America’s national interests reside. When those interests are put at risk, we must be prepared to take the necessary action, which may include urban operations, to further national objectives.

In addition to the strategic and operational requirements for conducting urban operations, I believe we are moving out of an agricultural and industrial era where the majority of the world’s population lived in rural or suburban areas to an information age wherein most humans will reside in an urban setting. This dramatic shift of the world’s population will only serve to increase the need to create military capabilities adequate to successfully execute urban operations at an acceptable cost. I would like to present the factors that lead me to believe we are entering an urban century.
At first glance it seems that these two military leaders are espousing opposite, even contradictory, points of view. Sun Tzu warns us of the dangers of fighting in the city. The wise strategist, according to Sun Tzu, “skilled in war [will] subdue the enemy’s army without battle” and will “capture his cities without assaulting them.” We should take seriously the warning Sun Tzu provides of the dangers of fighting in the city.

General Krulak has told us that the enemy “watched CNN” and learned that we will defeat him if he engages us in open battle. Therefore the logical move is for our future adversary to select close terrain wherein he can attempt to meet us on an even battlefield. We may have no alternative to fighting an enemy in the city. We can attempt to besiege the city, but that move risks creating an enclave from which and in which he can operate and survive. We can attempt to bypass him and ignore his moves against us, but that risks providing him with targets to attack. It also requires us to divert much-needed combat power toward protecting lines of communication. We can attempt to blast him out, but that risks destroying the
very city we are attempting to save. We can attempt to attack him directly, but that risks suffering heavy casualties. Therefore, if our opponents choose to give battle in the city and refuse to come into the open, we are in a quandary as to how to engage them.

Keeping with our warfighting philosophy of maneuver warfare, we must maintain the ability to pick the time, location, and manner of engaging an opponent. This is the challenge we face regardless of whom or where we fight. This challenge is greatly complicated when the opponent elects to operate in an urban area. We must develop the means to engage and defeat an enemy who selects the city as his battleground at the time and place of our choosing. How do we accomplish this task while addressing the risks outlined above?
The aim of Sun Tzu’s strategy was to mentally defeat the opposing general and thus achieve a physical battlefield victory. “His primary target is the mind of the opposing commander…” The maneuver warfare philosophy of the Marine Corps holds that same objective as the top priority.

We are now faced with the challenge of applying this philosophy to a situation where the opponent has purposely selected a battlefield that “mutes” our traditional strengths of mobility and firepower. His selection of the urban battlefield gives him an asymmetric advantage. Therefore we must examine how to develop new means of employing firepower on and providing mobility to a battlefield that traditionally hinders the use of these warfighting capabilities.

As mentioned briefly, our history includes many urban operations. The idea of conducting urban operations is nothing new and is certainly no revelation. However, we believe that we can and must execute urban operations in new ways.
We seek to find ways to avoid destroying the city in order to save it. In fact we . . .
There will soon be six billion human beings on Earth. According to the latest population estimates released by the United Nations, this will happen on October 12, 1999. As noted previously, most of these people will rely on the services provided by the urban centers of various societies. Any approach to conducting urban operations must build on a foundation that considers the impact of two features, people and infrastructure, on military activities.

The military commander must approach MOUT with a philosophy that views the city or urban area as a living entity rather than as a battleground or just a piece of terrain. He must understand that the city is more than a battlefield; it is a home, a place of business, a source of nourishment, a seat of government, as well as a location of religious, cultural, and social significance.

The operational challenge for the joint force commander is to design and execute a campaign that will resemble a surgeon cutting away a cancerous growth while keeping the patient alive. This statement should not be construed as meaning that hard, violent fighting will
not be needed. We will in fact need to maintain the capability to conduct traditional, tactical-level, conventional operations against a determined foe. However, the campaign design must ensure that all urban operations are not reduced to tactical fights consisting of block-clearing, house-to-house fighting. If we successfully restore mobility to the urban battlefield and create precise fires of minimal collateral damage, we should be able to selectively execute these operations at critical nodes within a city.

As always, the prudent military commander will focus on the enemy, but urban operations provide the added dimensions of protecting and providing for the survival of noncombatants and minimizing damage to the infrastructure upon which they depend for survival. We must not destroy the city in order to save it. We must also not allow the enemy to achieve an asymmetric advantage by choosing to fight in a city and stripping us of our firepower and mobility advantages.
Our attempts to conduct urban operations are complicated by the fact that the missions we will be called upon to accomplish span the spectrum of conflict. We must simultaneously be able to field a force capable of winning a major theater war that is fought in a region that includes urban centers while also preparing that same force to execute Operations Other Than War in similar geographic settings. Military personnel will be called upon to distribute food, execute police functions, fight a determined foe, and deal with the destruction of major portions of a city.

The two distinguishing features of cities, people and infrastructure, will have equal influence on military activities in major theater war and operations other than war. Our preparations for tomorrow’s conflicts and crises must address the entire spectrum of conflict. We must not attempt to categorize urban operations as either a MTW or an OOTW scenario. Urban operations will conceivably be conducted at every point along the spectrum of conflict.
One fundamental question comes to mind: Can a military organiza-
tion trained, equipped, and prepared to conduct a major urban bat-
tle also be capable of conducting humanitarian assistance operations
in the city? The question applies equally in the opposite direction:
Can a military force prepared to conduct a noncombatant evacua-
tion from an embassy also be capable of warfare of the utmost inten-
sity? These are the difficult questions I encourage you to wrest-
tle with, debate, and try to solve. The Marine Corps believes the
answer is a resounding “yes.” The key to fielding this type of military
organization rests squarely on the shoulders of our junior leaders. I
commend to each of you an article that appeared in the January 1999
issue of the Marine Corps Gazette. In this article, our Commandant
states: “In many cases, the individual Marine will be the most con-
spicuous symbol of American foreign policy and will potentially
influence not only the immediate tactical situation, but the opera-
tional and strategic levels as well . . . he will become, as the title of
this article suggests, the Strategic Corporal.”
The Commandant of the Marine Corps has described a scenario of the future that he calls the “three-block war.” In simple terms we believe a marine will be engaged in humanitarian assistance at sunrise, peacekeeping at noon, and conventional combat at sundown. These three activities will all occur within a three-block area on the same day. What are the implications of such a scenario? While I encourage you to consider the impact on equipment design, weapon system requirements, force structure, command and control, intelligence, and logistics, I charge you to focus on recruiting, training, and education.

What are the requirements for adequately preparing our young service members for the challenge of the complex, high-stakes, asymmetrical three-block war? How do we develop junior leaders prepared to deal decisively with the sort of real-world challenges that they will confront? How do we instill the mental agility necessary to apply the philosophy of maneuver warfare during rapid-paced, extremely deadly, chaotic urban firefight?
One answer lies in recruiting and another in professional development. We must continue to recruit high-quality men and women of character. We must not lower our standards. The challenges a young NCO will face in the three-block war demand intelligence, creativity, resilience, and a strength of character. These traits and characteristics must be nurtured and developed through a demanding training and education curriculum. Such a curriculum must emphasize leadership, integrity, courage, initiative, decisiveness, mental agility, and personal accountability. We must provide our NCOs with the training and education that will enable them to successfully negotiate the obstacles of the three-block war.
The implications of my views on urban operations cut across doctrine, organization, training and education, equipment, and support (DOTES). I believe there are no single-point solutions—no silver bullets. We must pursue solutions to the challenges we will confront in the urban century with a holistic approach. In the Marine Corps we utilize the Concept Based Requirements System to develop new operational capabilities. This tool allows us to examine the impact of a concept across all the categories of DOTES.

The characteristics we will need throughout our operational forces are:

- Flexibility
- Agility
- Multifunctionality

We must field people, organizations, and equipment that can execute multiple missions in a variety of situations throughout the spec-
trum of conflict. We need a military force that can alter its output based not upon a total refit of the organization but through mental agility. In short, the focus of our efforts to create more effective capabilities for urban operations is the individual marine, airman, soldier, or sailor.

The single most important implication of the urban century is how we recruit, train, and educate our personnel. We must, as previously mentioned, recruit men and women of character who have the potential to be conceptual problem solvers.

In addition to these implications I would like to cover two other topics before I close. The first is a need and the second is a first-order issue that we must resolve if we are to make significant progress toward improving our capabilities to conduct urban operations.
There is significant discussion within the Joint community on the following related question: “Are urban operations a distinct ‘mission area,’ or do military operations on urbanized terrain represent an ‘environment’ in which existing doctrine and forces may effectively operate without significant alteration?” Stated differently: “Are military activities in urban areas so distinct that they require a different doctrinal approach than other mission areas, or does a city simply present another, more complex terrain set?” If the first part of these questions can be answered in the affirmative, than we must examine the entire spectrum of issues related to doctrine, organization, training and education, equipment, and support systems (DOTES). If it is the second part that better describes the situation, improvements in tactics, techniques, and procedures will suffice to help us prepare for future urban operations.

The Marine Corps has not determined the answer to these questions. We continue to examine urban operations to determine whether they represent more than a complex environment and if they merit treatment as a mission area.
Whether you agree with us or not on this issue is less important than the fact that we, as a defense establishment, address the challenges of conducting urban operations. What is not debatable is that urbanized terrain poses a complex and challenging set of circumstances in which to conduct military operations. It has all the characteristics of the natural landscape, coupled with manmade construction, resulting in an incredibly complicated and fluid environment that influences the conduct of military operations in unique ways. This manmade construction dramatically increases the complexity of warfare and creates a multitude of friction points with which a military force must deal. The addition of large numbers of people in a dense area, in extremely close proximity to combatants, further enhances the difficulties of conducting military operations on urbanized terrain. We must investigate the requirements for using military force in an urban operation and then determine how to meet those requirements.
In closing I would like to provide a glimpse into where are we headed. We have started down the path we need to be on. The creation of Joint Pub. 3-06, Joint Doctrine for Urban Operations, is a tremendous step toward a future warfighting capability. This particular document is notable in that it is the result of the JWCA process. Many of the attendees of this conference worked tirelessly in a joint effort to convince the services, the Joint Staff, and the CINCs that this document is needed. There are other positive signs, such as the

- Continuation of experimentation in urban operations, such as the Army–Marine Corps MOUT ACTD, the Army’s Dismounted Battlespace Battle Lab, and the Marine Corps’ Urban Warrior;
- Development of Minimum Collateral Damage Weapons for Urban CAS by the Air Force and the creation of the Urban CAS Range by the Marine Corps;
- Efforts by the Joint Special Operations Command to examine the need for a SOCOM urban operations concept;
• Insertion of language in OSD and JCS planning documents that addresses the reality of urban operations;

• Creation of Service Urban Working Groups or Task Forces in three of the four services.

These steps demonstrate that we have come a long way in just a few short years. But let no one here rest on their laurels, for these efforts only scratch the surface. We all have much more work ahead of us than behind us before we can truly say we have addressed the needs of urban operations. A fertile field has been plowed due to efforts of many people in this audience. We must take advantage and plant the seeds that will grow into a capable joint urban operations capability.
Before I conclude and we engage in a dialogue, on behalf of General Charles Krulak, the 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps, I extend a debt of gratitude to the organizers and sponsors of this conference. You have helped the Department of Defense begin to address the complexities we will face in the urban century.

I also would like to extend my personal thank you for the honor of serving as your keynote speaker. I hope that in some small way my remarks have done justice to your gracious invitation.

I look forward to your questions.