Good morning. I’m very pleased to have this opportunity to talk to you about some of the work we have been doing at TRADOC in the area of homeland defense. By its very nature, homeland defense will
almost always include some form of domestic urban operations. We need to make sure that we have the necessary doctrine, training, and equipment to handle them. During the next few minutes, I also hope to be able to share some of my personal experiences as an active component brigade commander during the Los Angeles riots. Hopefully, my comments will stimulate your interest in the subject and lead to some challenging questions during the panel discussions.
As most of you know, homeland defense is a new area of emphasis for many of us. Currently, the Department of Defense has no official definition of the term “homeland defense.” Therefore, one of the great challenges for us at TRADOC has been to arrive at a definition that accurately captures the multiple dimensions of the task. This is the definition that we have included in our TRADOC White Paper entitled “Supporting Homeland Defense.” We believe it properly emphasizes that the Army plays a supporting role to efforts by U.S. civil authorities to defend against attacks on our national infrastructure and other critical assets, whether they come from foreign or domestic sources. We are also working on crafting the appropriate policies, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for the Army’s role in this effort. While we now think of most of our military operations as joint and interagency in nature, the multi-jurisdictional dimension of homeland defense has added another layer of difficulty to the problem. In homeland defense operations, we must work with federal, state, and local government agencies that in some situations do not habitually work well with one another. Even within layers of the government there can be problems, as the well-publicized feud
between the mayor of Los Angeles and the Chief of Police demonstrated to us in 1992.
# Categories of Threats

- International terrorism
- Domestic terrorism
- Conventional attacks
- Transnational threats

Large civil disturbances may also occur before, during, or after a consequence management operation.

The four traditional categories of threats against which we must be prepared to conduct homeland defense operations include international terrorism, domestic terrorism, conventional attacks, and transnational threats. This audience needs no explanation of these terms.

One of the additional missions that we in the active component find particularly challenging for a variety of historical reasons is responding to riots and other forms of civil disturbances. While not a traditional homeland defense function, civil disturbances of the kind that rocked Los Angeles in 1992 will continue to be a mission for both active and reserve component military forces. Weapons of mass destruction and other infrastructure attacks may also provoke panic or general civil disturbances. In the case of such attacks, the military will be called upon to help restore order so that consequence-management activities can take place.
Homeland Defense--
The Urban Realities

- Cities will be a primary target for WMD attacks
- Critical infrastructure will be targeted in future conflicts
- Military forces will be required to support civil authorities

We must be ready now

It is hard to talk about homeland defense without emphasizing the threat posed to our urban areas by individuals or organizations that have access to weapons of mass destruction. The unfortunate reality is that a WMD-equipped terrorist will most likely attempt to attack a city. The combination of people and media access in cities make them lucrative targets.

Future enemy forces can also be expected to attack cities in an effort to disrupt our ability to deploy our forces to overseas areas of operations. Major port and rail facilities tend to be located in or around urban areas, and defending them will require forces well trained in urban operations.

However, in both situations, WMD attacks and infrastructure sabotage, the requirements for local defense and immediate response will likely well exceed the traditional capabilities of local civil authorities. Therefore, U.S. military forces must be prepared to support the civil authorities across a wide range of possible mission areas.
This chart outlines the nature of the organizations involved in typical homeland defense missions and suggests the order in which each organization will likely respond to an incident. While the military must be ready to support civil authorities during homeland defense operations, rarely will the Army be the first unit on the ground. However, rapid escalation of a dangerous WMD situation or a large civil disturbance will require the almost simultaneous deployment of local, state, and federal assets.
Domestic Urban Operations: Likely Objectives and Challenges

- Provide a visible military presence to help reestablish stability
- Prevent and help control: Rioting, looting, fires, and panic
- Maintain control of “cleared areas”
- Impose curfews, if necessary
- Support Consequence Management efforts
- Protect the force
- Maintain Situational Awareness

Whether in support of consequence-management activities or large civil disturbances, the military’s objectives and challenges will tend to be similar. Highly visible military forces tend to deter criminal activity and have a reassuring effect on local populations. Military forces can also work closely with local law enforcement agencies to help maintain order after the initial response activities. During homeland defense operations, one challenge for the commander will always be to protect his forces without engaging in the application of unnecessary force against American civilians.

An additional problem for the commander will be establishing and maintaining an accurate picture of the urban “battlespace.” As we found in Los Angeles, local law enforcement agencies will usually serve as the hub of this effort. They are familiar with the local area and will have detailed maps and information networks already in place.

Finally, from an operational perspective, military operations in American cities will take on many of the same characteristics that we
assume for them in other situations. Small units will be conducting localized operations throughout the city in close coordination with law enforcement officials, individuals from federal agencies, and a wide variety of additional “partners.”

As we all know too well, urban warfare is hard in the best of situations. Even when we are operating literally in our own backyard, as is the case in domestic urban operations, situational awareness becomes the key element necessary for our successful accomplishment of the mission. The Los Angeles riots, the Oklahoma City bombing, the World Trade Center bombing, and dozens of smaller similar events have taught us this lesson again and again.
Domestic Urban Operations: Ongoing Issues

Command and Control

- Unity of Command (Federal, State, Military)
- Multiple levels of approval
- Centralized planning (ROE, tasks)/Decentralized execution
- State/Federal status of National Guard units
- Compatibility/Integration of communications/intel systems (military, government agencies, civilian law enforcement agencies, cellular phones, fax, e-mail, police scanners, messengers, …)

There are a number of issues we are currently examining with respect to urban homeland defense operations. They tend to fall into two large categories: command and control issues and operational concept issues.

We have already mentioned most of the command and control issues. Military forces will usually be employed in support of some civil authority—local, state, or federal. We need to examine how we will communicate with these civil authorities and develop processes to ensure that our doctrines and policies are compatible.

Because of the sensitivity of domestic urban operations of all types, centralized planning and decentralized execution will be the order of the day. Small-unit operations are by their very nature decentralized to a certain extent, and this will certainly be the case in domestic urban operations.

One command and control challenge that must be recognized by active component military planners is that the status of National Guard assets may change over the duration of the operation. They
may be under the governor’s control as the mission begins, become federalized during part of the operation, and then return to state control to better facilitate law enforcement activities.

One final command and control challenge is a technical one. The wide variety of communications platforms in use in domestic urban operations will tax the communications SOPs in even the best organizations. However, each of the civil systems in use contributes unique capabilities to the commander’s situational awareness, and so each must be incorporated as fully as possible.
The second large basket of issues contains challenges of an operational nature. Most active component units do not have the resources to adequately train for the tasks outlined in domestic support planning documents. Add to this challenge the fact that federal agencies other than DoD have the lead responsibility for training local law enforcement agencies to handle domestic incidents, and we can end up with some serious operational concept mismatches. We need to make sure that both our active and reserve component doctrine and training support the type of homeland defense or civil disturbance missions likely to occur. One lesson we took away from Los Angeles is that small units need to be able to employ both riot-control techniques and more aggressive small-unit tactics as the situation on the ground changes.
Just as they long have our forces overseas, terrorists and enemy military forces are now targeting the military forces, civilian population, and critical infrastructure in American cities for destruction. It is our responsibility to protect them. And while MOUT takes on some unique dimensions when we talk about it in the domestic context, many of the concepts and skills we are currently working on developing will prove invaluable when we have to conduct urban operations in the streets of America.

Thank you for your attention. I look forward to your questions.
ANNEX 2: FBI CONCERNS DURING DOMESTIC MILITARY URBAN OPERATIONS
Mr. Jim Rice, FBI

Washington Field Office Talking Points

1. The WFO has made response to WMD incidents a priority.
   - The largest increase of agent assignments is in counter-terrorism squads.

2. The FBI has initiated several plans to combat this threat:
   - Creation of a WMD coordinator in each office; the WFO has the largest contingent of WMD personnel.
   - Creation of WMD teams, similar to ERT teams; the WFO has the first team in FBI.
   - Enhanced bomb tech capabilities; the bomb data center now has the most advanced anti-bomb capabilities in America, including DoD assets.
   - Creation of HMRU and increased lab capabilities.

3. The FBI, at the request of the Attorney General, has created the nationwide National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO) to assist state and local authorities with major terrorist incidents and WMD preparation.

4. The National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) has been established at FBI Headquarters.
   - The center exists as an international center/joint agency effort to counter threats to U.S. infrastructure systems, including cyber-terrorism.

5. Training for agents has increased awareness of the WMD threat and the nature of the threat:
   - The threat from military-style weapons versus improvised devices and pathogens.
• While military nerve agents are deadly beyond belief, improvised devices are not usually similar in lethality. Homemade pathogens, poisons, and chemical compounds, while deadly, have not had sophisticated delivery systems. This means the chemical may be deadly, but there is no good way to deliver it, meaning mass casualties are virtually impossible to achieve. The anthrax letters are a perfect example. Even if the letters had been real, only the person who handled the plastic bag inside the letter, opening it up and breathing in or eating the spores, would have been affected—not the entire building. A homemade pipe bomb is probably a threat to a greater number of people than a homemade chemical/biological agent.

6. WFO/National Capitol Region specific FBI responses to threat:
• Addition of WMD-trained agents over the last year (500 percent increase).
• Creation of first FBI field office WMD team.
• Addition of a chem/bio capability to the WFO ERT team.
• Addition of chem/bio capability to WFO SWAT team.
• Formation of the “National Capitol Special Response Unit” to co-locate and coordinate all WFO ERT/WMD/SWAT/bomb tech capabilities and efforts, including rapid deployment.

Coordination with Other Agencies

1. The WFO is dedicated to the idea that all WMD responses must be a group effort.

2. The FBI is the lead agency for crisis management under PDD-39, but it leads a team; this is not a single-agency effort.

3. State and local authorities will not relinquish their vital role as first responders in these events.

4. Local/state authorities will always have an equal voice in the decisionmaking process:
• The role of the FBI is unchanged; it is the lead crisis management/investigative agency, not the lead political entity. We are a law enforcement agency. That’s our role.

5. In the National Capitol Region, the FBI will function as first responders also. Increasing threat, specifically to the federal government and the continuity of government provisions, requires this function. However, everything is to be done in conjunction/coordination with local authorities.

6. There is continued joint training/exercising/intelligence sharing with all other agencies, including specific DOD assets.

7. There is an increase in the size of joint terrorism task forces

8. A terrorism working group has been created in Washington, D.C. for non-JTTF agencies.

9. DoD/national guard assets are included in contingency plans
   • The activation of DoD assets requires either governors’ activation of national guard assets or the Attorney General requesting DoD assistance via national command authority; this is unchanged. However, the process has been streamlined for speed and clarity of authority. Civilian authority is not relinquished when this occurs: DoD assets simply assist local/federal authorities at the scene with their increased numbers or specialized skills and materials.

10. The transition from crisis management (FBI) to consequence management (FEMA) is being practiced and streamlined.
    • The federal response plan is constantly updated

11. The FBI Strategic Information Operations Center (SIOC) is the national-level command post expanded to handle several Oklahoma City–sized incidents at the same time. It is the most sophisticated civilian command and control structure in law enforcement today. It can and will function as a joint operations center (JOC) for the national capital.
The FBI, as the largest federal law enforcement agency, was given the leading role in responding to terrorist incidents in the United States under Presidential Decision 39 (PDD-39). Also by presidential decision, the FBI is the lead federal agency dedicated to responding to any use or threatened use of a weapon of mass destruction for crisis management. This, however, does not mean that when the FBI arrives on the scene of an incident it pushes all other agencies aside. Rather, it requires the FBI to identify, support, and work with any and all other agencies involved due to their mission or jurisdictional requirements. The FBI takes this role seriously and has dedicated itself and its resources to increasing our ability to meet this challenge now and in the 21st century. The Attorney General of the United States agrees with these mandates and supports all the efforts of the FBI in this regard.

The federal government’s role in consequence management is delegated to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). FEMA’s role in these events is to support local and state law enforcement and emergency service agencies. A major portion of the responsibility for law enforcement activities during an incident like this lies within the sphere of state and local authorities. In the event that a governor deems that these resources are overwhelmed by either the scope of the disaster or the length of time of the recovery, the governor can activate his National Guard and request other federal assistance, such as that from the Department of Defense or Public Health Service. Federal policy requires that all such requests during the crisis phase of an operation be submitted via the local FBI office. The local office then forwards the request to FBI Headquarters, where these other federal assets already have representatives prepositioned. However, now as always, it has been the policy of the FBI to respond to any request for assistance in an emergency to prevent the senseless loss of human life.

Of major concern to everyone in law enforcement during the last decade has been the rise in the specter of terrorism. The Washington field office now has dedicated more resources to counter this threat than at any other time in the history of law enforcement. The creation of new methods, technologies, and abilities to counter this
threat gives the FBI the ability to stay one step ahead of these threats. Increased funding has given the FBI the ability to respond to major acts of terrorism anywhere in the world that an American is threatened. Increased abilities at home have given each FBI field office the ability to investigate, coordinate, and counter the threat of chemical or biological terrorism as never before. Increased cooperation among law enforcement and intelligence agencies has given the law enforcement community the ability to detect and deter acts of terrorism prior to the event rather than simply responding to it after the fact. Preventing another Oklahoma City is certainly preferable than responding to, investigating, and solving another terrorist incident.

These abilities were recently seen in the Washington field office’s response to the bombing of two American embassies in Africa. The worst-case scenario, two major acts of terrorism in two different countries far from the supply lines of the United States, finally occurred. The WFO responded by sending teams to both sites within hours to evaluate the scope of the situation. FBI legal attachés, stationed in American embassies across the world, responded first, followed by FBI agents from Washington, D.C. Immediately, FBI agents with special skills, such as evidence recovery teams, explosive technicians, terrorism experts, investigators, communications specialists, and intelligence analysts were dispatched by both commercial and military airlift to the scene.

This constituted the largest overseas deployment of FBI personnel since the Second World War. During the African deployment, teams of FBI agents, in conjunction with the local African authorities and in coordination with the Department of State, conducted extensive crime scene searches, recovered and cataloged a tremendous amount of evidence, accumulated intelligence on the event, and facilitated the identification and arrest of several of the terrorists involved in the event. The other terrorists, who managed to slip through an ever-tightening net of international law enforcement, are today among the most hunted criminals in history. The WFO still has agents in Africa today, continuing to hunt for these criminals.

At home, the Washington field office’s ability to respond to the ever-increasing threat of the use of a weapon of mass destruction, such as a chemical or biological weapon, has vastly increased. Each FBI field office, regardless of size, now has a weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) coordinator to facilitate WMD investigations. WFO has five agents assigned full time to this task—the largest number and the best trained of any FBI field office. These experts make their knowledge, expertise, abilities, and network of other chem/bio experts available to state and local law enforcement whenever needed. These agents can help coordinate the activities of the FBI with these local law enforcement agencies and fire departments, HAZMAT teams, and they also increase the intelligence available to these units, something that was virtually unknown two years ago. Law enforcement has traditionally been reluctant to share information with non-law-enforcement agencies such as the fire departments. Now the WFO has dedicated resources to do just that.

The FBI has also created a national response team for major chem/bio incidents: the hazardous materials response unit or HMRU. This specialized unit, which is a division of the FBI laboratory, has the ability, much of it classified, to detect, deter, and mitigate WMD events anywhere in the United States. The bomb data center of the FBI, the national center for training, research, and development, and coordination for civilian bomb squads have all greatly increased the FBI’s ability to respond to and handle large and sophisticated explosive devices in the United States. In addition, the FBI, at the request of the Attorney General, has formed The National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO). This office exists for the single purpose of helping state and local agencies to acquire training, resources, information, and increased abilities to respond to incidents of terrorism. All of these national assets are located within the National Capitol Region and the WFO division; they work closely with WFO agents to provide support directly to the area.

The Washington field office of the FBI, the field office with the direct responsibility for the District of Columbia and Northern Virginia—the National Capitol Region, has greatly increased its ability to respond to terrorism and WMD incidents. The Evidence Recovery Team in the WFO is the most experienced in the FBI today. The bomb technician complement is being greatly enhanced (400 percent) at the Washington field office, and today coordination and cooperation between area bomb squads is at an all-time high. The WFO’s weapons of mass destruction program is the largest and most sophisticated of any FBI field office. The team, which includes agents with advanced degrees in nuclear engineering, chemistry, and
hazardous material management, also obtains specialized training from the Department of Defense, FEMA, other federal agencies, and the private sector. In addition, for the first time, WFO has dedicated resources to coordinate WMD activities directly with the HAZMAT teams of area fire departments. As these teams are often the first called to a chemical incident of any type; this is an essential link in the chain, but an often-overlooked link until this time. Also, the Washington field office is reorganizing its existing resources to facilitate a faster, better-equipped, and more streamlined response to these incidents. This restructured unit, a “National Capitol Region–Special Response Squad,” will have the ability to handle a multitude of incident types within the region.

The WFO’s dedication to counter the specter of terrorism, both in the nation’s capital and abroad, is ever expanding. The FBI currently has 16 joint terrorism task forces across the United States, of which the WFO’s is the second largest. These joint agency counterterrorism units have proved so effective at their mission that the FBI is going to fund the expansion of these units to every major metropolitan area in the United States. Plans for an expansion to almost 40 of the task forces are planned. The FBI’s dedication to this effort is based on long-range plans for the FBI to deal with this threat for decades to come. The WFO’s dedication to constantly prepare to face this threat will not falter, but grow with the cooperation with all of the partners in this fight.
The purpose of the briefing today is to discuss weapons of mass destruction in an urban environment. You’ve heard about the riot control and the civil disturbance parts. You’ve heard of the terrorist part. Well, there are also threats from weapons of mass destruction; they create a unique challenge for response forces and response planning.
As General Buckley indicated, two significant strategic changes have taken place since our overwhelming victory in Operation Desert Storm. The first was a push by many nations and terrorist organizations to acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them to help compensate for the West’s conventional asymmetric advantage. Secondly, we have created enclaves here in the United States for our military forces. And what we’ve done by becoming more of a CONUS-based military force and relying on a very select number of power projection platforms is that we have created some very visible targets of opportunity for weapons of mass destruction. They’re very convenient targets and they’re very vulnerable, and not all of them are military installations. Many of them are civilian airfields. Many of them are ports. Many of them are logistics and commercial communications facilities. And we have to protect all of them. They are national strategic assets and it’s part of our mission to protect them.
Weapons of Mass Destruction

• Nuclear
  - Detonation
  - Orphaned Radiation Sources
  - Radiological Dispersion

• Biological
  - Bacteria
  - Rickettsia
  - Viruses
  - Toxins

• Chemical
  - Nerve
  - Blister
  - Blood
  - Choking
  - Riot Control

Nuclear

• Detonation: A fission or fusion device explodes. Requires “weapons-grade” fissile material, detailed technical knowledge to build. Russia’s internal condition makes it possible to buy: no knowledge required, only cash.

• Radiological dispersion: Radioactive material is dispersed by mechanical means. Does not require weapons-grade fissile material or detailed technical knowledge.

• Orphaned radiation source: Legal sources (licensed to DOT, construction companies, hospitals, etc.).

The slide provides examples of biological and chemical agents.

Weapons of mass destruction are in fact NBC materials, nuclear, biological, and chemical materials, that create hazards. They kill, injure, or incapacitate. They also contaminate material and environments. In many cases you have to remove hazardous materials, you can’t
destroy them. You have to neutralize some chemical and biological materials, and afterwards you have to prove that you’ve met civilian safety and occupational health standards. The effects can be tailored.

We’ve always had the nuclear weapons threat, but in the past, it’s been a very high-tech business requiring weapons-grade materials and high technology. With the disintegration of the former Soviet state, that technology has become more readily available, both internationally and here in the United States. There are orphaned radiation sources that might be a contamination source. Materials from such sources can be dispersed as radiological dispersion weapons. I’ll talk to you about one example of that from Desert Storm below.

Biological materials include toxins and materials that cover the entire spectrum of pathological materials. Toxins are basically poisonous chemicals that are of a biological origin. As for chemicals, they have a wide range of possible effects on human beings. They include attacks on your nerve system, blisters on the skin, various incapacitating mechanisms, choking, and blood agents. These materials can be either persistent or nonpersistent. They may be in vapor, liquid, or solid form.
Threats

- Tokyo Subway
- Narita
- Yokosuka Naval Base
- Matsumoto, Japan
- Oregon Salad Bars
- Moscow Park
- Sydney, Australia

- Yokosuka naval base, Japan, 1990. ASC conducts unsuccessful anthrax attack (see Narita above).
- Oregon salad bars, 1984. A religious cult sprays salad bars in The Dalles, OR, with salmonella, to attempt to alter local elections by reducing opposition turnout. 750 sickened.

There are several great examples of nuclear, biological, and chemical terrorism. The Tokyo subway in 1995: 12 killed, 5,000 injured by a cult. This was a sarin nerve agent attack. There was a similar attack in Japan in 1994 by the same cult. That time they killed seven. There have been several attacks with anthrax. There was also an attack in Oregon in which salmonella was spilled across a salad bar that caused 750 to become sick. This was an attempt by a local religious group to affect the outcome of an election and keep these 750 people from voting. A Chechen terrorist planted a radiation dispersal weapon in a Moscow park in 1995. The local authorities had to go in and render that device safe.

What history is telling us is that terrorist threats are real. They can kill and injure. They can certainly terrorize. In the United States as well as overseas, they are low tech and include all the full range of nuclear, biological, and chemical threats.
Threats

• Accidents/Incidents
  – Bhopal, India
  – Chernobyl
  – Sverdlosk

• Orphaned Radiation Sources
  – Hospitals
  – Construction Sites

• Flame

Accidents/Incidents

• Bhopal, India, December 3, 1984. 2,000 killed outright, up to 300,000 injured, as many as 8,000 have died since.

• Chernobyl (Chornobyl), Ukraine, April 26, 1986. 31 site workers killed in accident. Between 1986 and 1990, 5,700 cleanup workers died, according to Ukrainian government figures (mostly men in their 20s).

• Sverdlosk. Estimated 1,500–2,000 casualties, including cleanup crews.

• Milwaukee, 1993. Water supply, crypto sporidium, 400,000 casualties, 111 fatalities.
Orphaned Radiation Sources

- Hospitals. Cobalt 60 source found in a dump by a man paid to monitor dumps for low-level radiation. In briefcase, no shielding, lethal dose in under an hour; how did it get there?
- Construction sites. Sources contained in machines that gauge the thickness or density of roads, foundations, pilings, etc.

There are other possible threats that are not overt. These incidents involve nuclear, biological, chemical, or industrial facilities. In Bhopal, India in 1984, 2,000 were killed outright, 300,000 were injured, and many have died since. At the Chernobyl nuclear power plant complex in 1986, 31 site workers were killed in the initial accident, and between 1986 and 1990, 5,700 cleanup workers were reported to have died. We’ve had a number of reported finds of abandoned cobalt 60 sources found in dumps, abandoned office spaces from hospital radiological analytical equipment in hospitals, or construction sites.

Flame

And, finally, one of my favorite areas is flame. What happens if you throw a concussion or CS grenade into a structure with propane tanks? You’re going to blow the whole structure up. If you’re working in the DEA environment, drug laboratories often contain combustible solvents. Combustible materials have been also deliberately used as weapons. Commercial propane bottles are a favorite terrorist means of boosting explosives. When Margaret Thatcher was nearly killed in an English hotel, the front three stories of the hotel came down. Two recreational propane bottles and a quarter-pound block of TNT brought the whole front of that building down. Luckily, she was in the loo at the time and survived.
Considerations

- Detection
  - Medical Monitoring

- Spread of Contamination
  - Ventilation Systems

- Enclosed Space
  - Oxygen Displacement
  - Flammable Atmosphere

There are several considerations that I’d like you to think about as we discuss this. Early detection is absolutely essential to support evacuation and the control of casualties. Unfortunately, in the case of nuclear, biological, and chemical exposures, symptoms may be the first indicators. That’s where the medical community becomes so important to us. Emergency medical care providers, and certainly security and fire teams, must be aware of the potential terrorist use of NBC materials. They must know how to respond and who to report to. With respect to spread of contamination, urban areas tend to channel NBC effects. You heard from General Delk that riot control agents don’t go where you think they’re going to go in an urban environment. Not only do cities channelize and contain the NBC effects and hazards, they also conduct them into the ventilation systems. One of the things that happened in the Tokyo subways was that the Tokyo police set up their command post right on top of a subway ventilation system. Guess what? They had casualties associated with the ventilation of the agent up through the subway vents and they had to move their CP, but they lost eight people who were incapacitated. Subways are an ideal place to employ biological weapons. They are
out of the sunlight; biological agents don’t like the UV rays that are a part of sunlight. It’s a moist environment and it has good temperatures. If you move them along the tracks, the agent can be taken from one station to the other. You get a lot individuals going in and a lot of individuals departing. It’s an almost ideal place for contaminating a large number of people. What’s the number one contamination related problem we have? Casualties. We’ve got to make sure that we keep the casualties under control and clean them up. We cannot allow them to take contamination into the hospital. Contamination is beyond most hospital capabilities.

Here are some discussion points I’d like you to think about. Attacks must be treated as real until such time as we can absolutely prove differently. Was it a weapon of mass destruction? Is there a residual hazard that’s of concern? Where in the heck is it? What is it? How do we determine who is affected, so that we can get them under control and get them support as quickly as possible?. Who must be notified to get help? Where can you get help?

Two final areas of concern:

Enclosed Space

- Oxygen displacement: in enclosed spaces, oxygen can become displaced. Rescue personnel should be equipped with an O2 monitor. Do they need SCBA to accomplish their mission?
- Flammable atmosphere, dusts, aerosols and vapors can create explosive atmospheres. How do you detect this condition, especially if you need to use distraction devices or CS grenades/projectors? And are your flashlights mine-safety approved?
Emergency Response

• Identification
  – First Responders

• Confirmation
  – RAID Team

• Mitigation
  – DOMS

Identification
• First responders: Must recognize that the event is a WMD event.

Confirmation
• RAID Team confirms (see backup slide).

Mitigation
• DOMS makes military units available to support the on-site commander (see backup slide).

We’ve got to train those first responders, those emergency medical personnel, security force personnel, and fire department personnel to recognize the key indicators of WMD use.
Discussion

Explicit threats have to be treated like attacks until proven otherwise.

Questions to be answered:
- Was it a WMD attack?
- Is there a residual hazard?
- Where? What?
- Who was possibly affected?
- Who must be notified?
- Who can you ask for help?
COL DANIEL F. UYESUGI
RAID Team Concepts

- **Mission**
  - Assess
  - Advise
  - Facilitate

- **Operational Phases**
  - Pre-incident
  - Alert
  - Deploy
  - Response
  - Recovery

- **Training**
  - Certification
  - Validation

Backup slide 1
NBC in Stability & Support Operations

FM 3-21 under development, publication 4Q FY99
- Supports FM 100-20, Stability & Support Operations
- Supports consequence management
- Geared toward Chemical Units and NBC staffs

Chemical Corps Role in stability & support operations
- NEO
- Arms Control
- Support to Domestic Civil Authority
- Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
- Security Assistance
- Nation Assistance
- Support to Counterdrug operations
- Combating Terrorism
- Peacekeeping Operations
- Peace Enforcement
- Show of Force
- Support to Insurgencies & Counterinsurgencies
- Attacks and Raids

Backup slide 2
C/B-RRT Mission

Deploy to support LFA with crisis and consequence management under possible control of the CINC/RTF or JSOTF, as directed

- Provide dismantlement (render safe), transport, disposition/disposal, and neutralization support
- Provide agent monitoring, hazard prediction, detection, laboratory analysis, mitigation, and containment support
- Provide medical advice and support for patient decon, triage, transport, and treatment
- Provide advice and/or technical expertise on chem-bio issues to federal, state, and local agencies

Backup slide 3
**C/B-RRT Summary**

- C/B-RRT is tailored from pre-existing, specialized, joint assets
- C/B-RRT under operational control of CINC or specific assets under operational control of LFA
- C/B-RRT Supports crisis and consequence management
- C/B-RRT leverages geographic distribution for faster response
- C/B-RRT deploys an organic command and control system with reach-back capability

Backup slide 4
CBIRF Mission

“When directed, forward deploy Domestically or Overseas to provide Force Protection or Mitigation in the event of a CBR-N incident. Be prepared to initially respond to no-notice CBR-N incidents with a rapidly deployable response force. Continue to be innovative in the development of CM concepts, doctrine, organization, tactics, techniques, procedures and equipment. Conduct force protection training for Fleet Units and Assist Federal State, and Local Response Forces in Developing training programs to manage the consequence of a CBR-N incident.”
CBIRF Background

- Established in April 1996 as part of CMC’s planning guidance
- In response to the increasing threat of a CBR-N terrorist event (PDD-39)
- Available to Marine force Commanders and the National Command Authorities
- Suited for operations in a wide range of military-civilian contingencies
ANNEX 4: Q & A FROM DOMESTIC MOUT/WMD PANEL

**Question:** Would it help to deploy miniature biological and chemical sensors and video cameras in all major cities? My second question is, would the use of foam have helped during the 1992 Los Angeles riots?

**MG Delk:** I’m going to answer the last part and look for help on the first part. First of all, foam would have been of no help. Potential targets very rarely got close to us. I can remember one case in which a gangbanger did get close. He came up to a soldier and tried to take the rifle out of his hands. We were exercising a lot of restraint, but not so much restraint so that his NCOIC didn’t butt stroke the gangbanger. That was the last time they got close to us. As for biosensors and video cameras, I’ll look for help from my compatriots here.

**BG Buckley:** I don’t think it’s affordable, number one, and I’m not sure our society would allow it, number two. We would also have a hard time affording a good sensor suite just to accommodate the military requirements.

**Question:** A common theme that I heard each of you discuss dealt with the difficulties in making progress via the interagency process. Do lessons from homeland defense operations offer anything we can turn to and use as a guide?

**BG Buckley:** I would tell you that there is some energy being generated on this topic. The Department of Justice is the lead agency for many of these activities. The President has talked about it, so I think the opportunity is there, but it’s hard to get the various agencies to take time out because they typically, unlike the military, don’t have a lot of planning capability. Most of them are in the execution business. Their budgets don’t allow for sitting down and working out SOPs or how they are going to cooperate. So even though I’m cautiously optimistic, it’s going to be a struggle.

**MG Delk:** I’d also point out that the Army’s JAG school in Charlottesville is going to be getting together to address some of those issues. I know there is Army-wide concern about the issue.
Question: You mentioned intelligence integration problems. What can we do on the military side that would help with the integration of our intelligence-collection effort in homeland defense matters?

MG Delk: First of all, I would tell you that I didn’t see it as a problem. Any problems disappeared almost immediately and everyone involved threw their arms around each other and made it all work. Any time you go into something like that there’s going to be an intelligence void when the event is not anticipated. Our military intelligence community is very quickly getting a handle on intelligence preparation of the battlefield and getting word to the troops. If there’s any part of the Army that has made great strides in the last twenty years, it’s our intelligence community.

Mr. Rice: The biggest thing we’ve seen is that you can’t wait until the event happens to meet each other over the smoking hole in the ground. You’ve got to know who your counterparts in other agencies are beforehand. In my case it’s a little easier because I’ve got ten different agencies and we all sit there and share intelligence. There are agencies in addition to those from the DoD. We sit down once a month.

BG Buckley: The military intelligence community has to be careful to identify where their lane is. In domestic environments, the FBI and local law enforcement agencies are the collectors and processors of information and we’re a recipient. Our intel folks can do some analysis and provide information, but we can’t do any collecting.

It gets to the command and control issue. You had a couple presentations here today that have addressed the lack of interface between the communications systems. We’ve got a problem in the military, but ours is very small compared to the problems within communities, between the police department, the fire department, the county, the state, and federal agencies. None of these organizations’ systems talk to each other. It’s incredible. So when you go into emergency situations there is a need for a whole bank of radios and liaison people just to have the ability to interface. Unfortunately, everybody makes their budget decisions without consulting one another.

COL Uyesugi: Speaking for the combat development side in the U.S. Army Chemical School, I know that we have taken a look at each one of our critical battlefield operating systems and our NBC reconnaiss-
sance vehicles to ensure they are Y2K compliant. But I heartily sup-
port what General Buckley just said and General Delk’s previous
remarks. The big problem is lack of interoperability between the
various federal agencies. Period. Even assuming that we’re Y2K sur-
vivable, the C4I systems we have must be compatible. In many cases
we’re not even compatible on the same military installation, let alone
with systems out in the community itself.

**Question:** As the National Guard and Reserves start to take on the
role of homeland defense, what do you think the challenges are?

**MG Delk:** First of all, homeland defense is not new to the Guard.
We’ve assumed that mission for over 200 years, but our role has been
greatly expanding recently. As was briefed, we now have these RAID
detachments. They’re being given a very complex and important
mission. We’re starting off with 10 of them. They won’t be opera-
tional until January 2000. We will have some additional light RAID
detachments that will be coming along later, some 44 of them. All of
this is expensive; all of it takes time, and even then it isn’t going to
completely solve the problem.

**COL Uyesugi:** Sir, if I could pick up on that. This is a real challenge
for the total force. We’ve got to standardize the entire DTLOMs, or
document, training, leader, organization, material, and soldier-side, of
this. Right now we’ve got a number of different organizations going
out and claiming they know what is needed. Well, it has to be
brought under a single organization, and that’s what TRADOC does
as a combat developer. But for the military forces, when it comes to
TO&E and TDA go-to-war units, we have doctrine. We have stan-
dardized training based upon an analysis of METL, those basic tasks
that are critical for an organization. What we have not done is
determine what this civil support mission is all about and how that
impacts upon the total Army and its ability to “go to war.” Right now
we’re still tasked to go to two major theaters of war. We’re resourced
to do that. We’re not resourced to do the homeland defense mission
yet, and we haven’t established a civil support joint task force com-
mand that we understand is yet to come. To standardize this, we’ll
first have to get the mission, which FORSCOM doesn’t have quite yet.
Second, we’ve got to deconflict what we’re asking active component,
Reserve, and National Guard units to do in support of homeland
defense and civil support. You have units that are TPFDL’d and have
missions to go to a CINC overseas. Now you’re going to assign them an additional duty that could get them decisively engaged in a city or a state on four hours’ notice within any one of ten federal regions. We’re not resourced to do that yet, but we’re doing it as an additional duty in our chemical defense, engineer, military police, transportation, and medical units. All of these units are going to be asked to come forward and support regional RAID teams and relevant civil and federal agencies in association with this domestic support mission. You have to remember that National Guard and Reserve units only have about 37 days a year to train. Now you are asking them to add entirely different tasks to their training load. The equipment for such missions is often nonstandard. It’s not TDA. In many cases it may be CTA—common table of allowances. Soldiers have not been trained how to maintain that equipment. That’s going to have to be done centrally; it is going to be a bit of a challenge. We’ve got to bring 180 units on board in the TOE Army to support the 10 RAID teams over the next two years. There are some real challenges yet to be addressed.

**Question:** You mentioned anthrax and other biological agent attacks. What if it’s an unwarned attack? How will we get health care providers on the front lines in time? How do we determine that those five people with headaches are the leading edge of an anthrax exposure?

**COL Uyesugi:** We need to reach out to the health providers, first responders, and first caregivers and give them an appreciation for exactly what a nuclear, biological, or chemical agent might do and what symptoms would look like. That requires specialized training. Now when you get the fifth, sixth, seventh cases, a large group of affected individuals from the same location, the authorities will likely start to realize that a problem exists. Such cases would go through the public health service into the Centers for Disease Control and should result in notice of an attack.

**Question:** Can you describe the RAID team organization?

**COL Uyesugi:** The RAID teams’ mission is to assess incidents on a regional basis. There is one team for each of the ten standardized federal regions. They’re to advise the civil authorities on what type of agents might have been involved, the hazards associated with these
agents, and the type of immediate action that might be necessary. The teams would then facilitate any support that the federal government might have available. Initially they’re supposed to go through new equipment training. They’ll also go through validation training under the direction of the Director of Military Support and then undergo certification before being turned over to Forces Command and the two continental U.S. armies.

BG Buckley: The ten teams are AGR Title 32. They are going through very specialized training at this time. The initial ten teams are regionally located so they have the ability to respond quickly. They’ll use Air Guard assets to get to their destination in many cases.

Question: I had a couple of questions, one for Colonel Uyesugi. I was a little bit troubled, I guess, by one statement that you made concerning biological agents in which I understood you to say something to the effect of “We could haul these people off to hospitals, give them antibiotics and we don’t really need to worry about them too much because they could be cured by antibiotics.” Is there recognition of increasing natural antibiotic resistance worldwide? Of deliberately designed antibiotic-resistant threats? The second part to that question: have you given a lot of thought to agents that can be transmitted person-to-person and the facilities required to contain a contaminated patient population? My last question was for General Delk. You described Guardsmen’s twelve-hour work/rest cycle. It sounded like these soldiers were sleeping in unoccupied buildings, and I’m wondering what their exposure to rats, mice, other vectors was.

COL Uyesugi: My degree is in nuclear physics and chemical engineering and I will have to defer to the medical community in a moment. If you can start the antibiotic therapy early enough, you have at least a chance of preventing death. It is my understanding that prior to symptoms manifesting themselves, antibiotic therapy gives you an increased chance of surviving the exposure. Once you’ve had a vaccination, it gives you that much better a chance of resisting the initial exposure and surviving with the help of antibiotics later. Early notification of exposure is thus important both on the battlefield and in the civilian community. It’s important to know who was exposed and to get them under control and observation.
With respect to the agent threat, the licensing of vaccines is an extremely time-consuming, difficult, and costly venture. It’s not something that any one nation can take on alone; it’s currently being undertaken on a multinational basis with a number of different countries, specifically the Canadians and the Brits. Under JVAC they are in fact pursuing eleven different biological vaccines that are based on an international task force listing of threat agents and variations thereof. Each of the three nations is looking at the research and development side, side effects, and licensure and indemnification requirements. We’re going to share in the long term. But that’s a long-term plan. Smallpox is a big issue right now. I’d refer to Roy Flowers and the folks from the medical center and school if you want some more information.

**MG Delk:** To answer your question about hygiene, it was an issue. First of all, the soldiers thought they might be on duty for two or three days. They ended up being there for weeks. They didn’t bring enough underwear. But like any good soldier does, these men and women solved the problem very quickly. First of all, you let the Salvation Army know what a soldier needs and they take care of you. They took care of us in grand style. In addition, soldiers solved it as soldiers do everywhere, whether it was asking a pretty girl down the street for some help, or calling home and saying, deliver me such and so. They got their showers. I’m not aware of any hygiene problems that lasted for more than one or two days. That’s one of the risks, by the way, when you scatter soldiers two-by-two. You’ve just got to count on them doing the right thing. The chaplains can’t see them all and the docs can’t see them all. Bless their hearts, as is so often the case, if you have good soldiers, they’ll do what’s right. And they did.