My name is Dave Patton and I’ve been asked to discuss the role that military police soldiers and nonlethal weapons played during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti.
I'll first address the limit of my personal experience in Haiti and its impact on my observations. I arrived in June 1995 at the request of the UN Force Commander, MG Joe Kinzer, to serve as the UN Executive for Haitian Security. In that role I provided both General Kinzer and the Senior Representative of the Secretary General (Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, the senior UN civilian in country) overwatch of the programs under way to rebuild the Haitian criminal justice system: police, prisons, and courts. After four months in this position, General Kinzer asked me to stay and command the U.S. Support Group Haiti, which was to be the bilateral U.S. military contribution to the effort once the United States ceased its involvement in the UN Mission in Haiti. I took command of the Support Group in November 1995, led it through the departure of the U.S. UNMIH forces in March 1996, and relinquished command in October 1996. Thus I was not in Haiti during Phase I and, because of my position on the UNMIH staff, my observations of the military police during Phase II were from the vantage point of an interested observer rather than an active participant. The nonlethal weapons program began in Phase III.
This chart portrays the military police organization within UNMIH. The MP battalion was assigned to the U.S. contingent as part of the task force structure of both the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment and later, the 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division. The MP company was a standard combat support unit with all of its firepower, mobility, and communications assets. The Indian MP Company was actually a reserve component crowd-control unit that was well trained and disciplined, but came with few vehicles or weapons and little communications equipment.
Military police were used to patrol the most critical areas of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. The central city contained the principal shopping district for the majority of the residents. Petionville was a relatively wealthy enclave that was home to the Haitian elite, the diplomatic corps, and the upscale business establishments that still existed in the city. Carrefour was a portion of the city on the south side that harbored a significant segment of the disaffected population. MPs provided critical overwatch of police and prison facilities during the transition phase from the removal of military regime personnel, through the period in which these facilities were manned by interim elements, and into the introduction of newly vetted and trained professional police and prison guard forces.
Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY  
(Haiti)

Observations

• MP teams were properly configured for urban patrolling
• MPs commanded respect, but were able to build rapport
• MP presence deterred IPSF and HNP misconduct
• MP presence deterred prisoner abuse in prisons

U.S. MP units normally operate in three-soldier teams: NCO team leader, driver, and gunner. Use of two-team patrols became the norm and, because of their lack of organic mobility assets, Indian MPs were integrated with the U.S. MPs for patrol operations. Larger Indian MP elements functioned as a response force, prepared to move to incidents anywhere with the U.S. AO. Because of their police training and habits, MPs were able to quickly establish respect among the population in their role as peacekeepers while also developing those relationships that provided a continuous source of “street intelligence.” In many situations, the mere presence of U.S. MPs in overwatch positions prevented Interim Public Security Forces and, later, the Haitian National Police from overreacting or losing control of situations in the stations and on the streets. Likewise, the continuous MP presence in the National Prison was credited by many international observers with preventing violence directed against prisoners by Haitian guards and with quelling several uprisings.
Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti)

Non-lethal Weapons (NLW)

- Began use with first Support Group Security Force (USMC FAST Platoon)
- Threat primarily criminal
- Munitions provided by Army Materiel Command
- Training provided by Army Military Police School MTTs

Because the threat against the Support Group was postulated to be primarily of a criminal nature, the use of NLW was considered to be a viable option for both the defense of U.S. facilities and for crowd control. Each time the security force would rotate (generally every three to four months), a MTT would come down and take the unit through the training described in the next slide.
Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY
(Haiti)

NLW Training Concept

- Classroom instruction
- Range firing/familiarization
- Situational Training Exercises (STX)
- Reinforcement by unit leadership

From a purely mechanical standpoint, the preliminary marksmanship instruction in the classroom and the actual shooting on the range gave the marines and soldiers a great deal of confidence in the NLW munitions. Perhaps the most important training, though, was the use of Situational Training Exercises (STX) crafted by the Support Group Provost Marshal and Staff Judge Advocate to test the judgment and temperament of both individual sentries, small units, and leaders.
This chart depicts the munitions that we had available to us in Haiti. In my 16 months in Haiti, we never used one round outside of training.
ANNEX 2: NEOs
Col T. W. Parker, USMC

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

“SHARP EDGE”

COLONEL T.W. PARKER, USMC
I’m not going to bog down on details regarding Liberia and Operation Sharp Edge today. I want to say that I think Liberia is the kind of a case study that represents a classic NEO operation; it took place in a city, in an American embassy, and in an urban area accessible by ships. It had all of the pieces that we read about in the doctrinal publications. There’s only one problem: doctrine must remain flexible because it begins to fall apart during execution.
MISSION

• SECURE THE US EMBASSY
• EVACUATE US NATIONALS AND DESIGNATED FOREIGN NATIONALS
• PROVIDE LOGISTICS SUPPORT TO THE EMBASSY
I've kept this fairly simple. I want to deal with impressions and bigger-picture items rather than the details of this operation. One of the things that was absolutely critical to our success in the Liberia NEO was having a forward command element ashore. Somebody has to be there on the ground to be able to talk directly back to the command. We were lucky enough to be able to get in one of the last fixed-wing aircraft that entered Liberia. Were able to get our unexploded ordnance (UXO) and his forward command element ashore in the embassy. Now we had practiced and rehearsed with twenty people or so. The actual forward command element we put ashore was six individuals. One of these six was especially critical: a captain who was a CH-46 helicopter pilot. He became absolutely essential during the operation because he could tell us what LZs looked like, what kind of helicopters could go where, and what fit given LZs. There are a lot of plans out there. There are a lot of people out there who can tell you that you can land on the tennis court, you can land on the basketball court, you can land in between these buildings; we've measured them and we think they're good. Our helicopter pilot was able to tell us exactly what it looked like, and, by the way,
the embassy plans were wrong. Where they said you could land, you couldn’t. Places where they said you couldn’t land, you could. New information is a critical requirement. However, there is such a thing as too much information. We were finally at that point. We got flooded. Our little S2 shop simply got flooded with information. The problem became sorting it out and trying to figure out which pieces of it were really important and which were irrelevant. Maps—we got flooded with maps. The lesson learned from Grenada was maps. We had 2,200 people; I think everybody had a map by the time it was over with, so maps did not become a problem. What was also critical to us was the ability to have a three-dimensional picture of Monrovia and of the embassy in particular. We were able to get them by employing two methodologies. One was taking photos and maps and having our topographic platoon detachment on board ship construct scale models of the city and the embassy. Secondly, computer-generated video was used to show us routes into the city, particularly air routes. Putting all of that together, we felt as at home in Monrovia as we would have walking out the back door. That is absolutely true.
An earlier presentation addressed communications. I think the key here is to have a backup to the backup and also to design a plan that can be executed without communications. That means it has to be simple and everybody has to know what it is. There have also been discussions here about infantry requirements. The requirement for infantry is probably larger than what is on hand. We immediately turned our artillery battery into a provisional rifle company since we weren’t going to use artillery. Essentially, you can’t have too much infantry. A very small embassy like the one in Monrovia is probably not much larger than this building. We had a battalion of four rifle companies plus a provisional rifle company. The requirements for infantry were extensive.

When you are dealing with hundreds and thousands of civilians, you have to have the ability to treat their medical problems. We did not have enough doctors. The ability to treat mass casualties is important. Medical personnel need to have rehearsed what they are going to do in those mass casualty situations.
Helicopter availability was also a consideration in our planning. We always planned to have fewer helicopters available than we actually needed. That way when they broke we had a plan prepared.

Screening of evacuees—there is much made of screening evacuees in the doctrinal publications. I've got to tell you that screening evacuees on the ground and trying to sort out who’s a good guy and who’s a bad guy in a group of five hundred to a thousand individuals doesn’t work. You have to do a very cursory screening. Put them on helicopters, get them out of the area, get them to a safe place, and then screen. The ones you don't want you can take back. We found one guy who wanted us to take him back. He was an Iraqi. In August 1990, Iraqis were no longer people that we wanted to evacuate.
LESSONS LEARNED

- INFANTRY REQUIREMENTS
- THERE IS NO PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT
- SPEED
- SIMPLE PLAN THOROUGHLY REHEARSED
- FLEXIBILITY

When dealing with cities with their many small areas, buildings, and other places where people can hide, your infantry requirements go up. When you need to handle hundreds of evacuees, your infantry requirements go up. Regarding the second bullet there, there is no permissive environment. I know that even in the Marine Corps, at that point anyway, we were talking about permissive NEOs and non-permissive NEOs. We went by the rule that there is no permissive environment. There is no such thing. Plan for it not to be permissive. If it is, that’s great.

Speed is critical during a NEO. There are people shooting in all directions at anything that moves, and the more rapidly you get your people out, the more rapidly you move them back to a safe area and the better off you are. As I said, screen those people on board ship; screen them in a safe area. Do it somewhere other than in the landing zone.

A simple plan thoroughly rehearsed and flexibility are key. We developed very simple plans that were rehearsed over and over and
over at sea. We rehearsed them over and over and they were flexible. The Sharp Edge plan for Liberia, we had a half-dozen separate subsets of evacuation plans. None went according to the plans that we had when we left the ship, not one of them. But all of them were such that we were able to adapt the plan that we had rehearsed.

The last point that I would make, and I don’t have it up here, regards people. As we talk about technological breakthroughs, the ability to see through walls and nonlethal weapons and communications gear and all the rest, I think that the most impressive thing about our experience with marines who came under fire for the first time was how well they did. General Krulak talks about his strategic corporal and what the requirement is for the strategic corporal: a guy who’s smart, physically fit, and one who will make decisions in difficult environments that could have strategic implications. The strategic lieutenant is also part of that. We have to be mindful that there will be NCOs and lieutenants who will make strategic decisions in front of CNN that will affect National Command Authorities decisions, decisions that will affect the way forces are used. I think that when we talk about MOUT operations and NEOs the importance of people is absolutely critical: having the right people, building the right force with the right people. Thank you.
ANNEX 3A: GROZNY I: ASYMMETRY IN URBAN WARFARE
Mr. Timothy Lee Thomas, FMSO

Asymmetries in MOUT:

The Case of Grozny

Asymmetry

(1) Not symmetrical;
(2) the unexpected, non-traditional approach
(3) using offsets against a stronger foe (terrorism; PSYOP; WMD; computer attacks; guerillas, etc.)
Former Chechen Vice President Yanderbeiyev on the Battle of Grozny:

“the situation did the organizing”

Urban Warrior 1997

“the difficulty of the fight would increase as the organization of the opposing force decreased”
Urban Combat:
Then versus Now

• Diplomacy follows
• sledgehammer
• artillery preparation
• tanks in the lead
• surface discipline and training
• linear attrition
• no maps
• infantry walk

• Diplomacy leads
• vapor tactics
• artillery support
• tanks in support
• psychological discipline and training
• avoid linear attrition
• pagers
• infantry ride on discs

The Nature of Urban Combat and the Future of US Forces

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ANNEX 3B: THE BATTLE OF GROZNY: DEADLY CLASSROOM FOR URBAN COMBAT
Mr. Timothy Lee Thomas, FMSO

Best policy in war—thwart the enemy’s strategy; second best—disrupt his alliances through diplomacy; third best—attack his army in the field; worst strategy—attack walled cities.

—Sun Tsu, The Art of War

The battle for Grozny, the capital of the small Russian Republic of Chechnya, took place in January 1995. It pitted a hastily assembled and unprepared Russian force against a Chechen force of regulars and guerrillas equipped with Russian weapons and a belief in their cause. The Chechens held their own for three weeks but eventually lost the city to the Russian armed forces in late January (the Chechens retook the city in August 1996).

Both sides learned or relearned many lessons of urban combat, most of them the hard way. This article examines the most important of those lessons, the interesting and perhaps surprising conclusions drawn by the Russians about modern urban warfare, and their implications for U.S. soldiers and urban warfare theory.

Background

The Russian Republic of Chechnya is located in the southeastern part of Russia near the northwestern end of the Caspian Sea. Chechnya declared its independence from the Soviet Union in October 1991.

1This material appeared as Tim Thomas, "The Battle of Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat," Parameters, Vol. 29 (Summer 1999), pp. 87–102 and is printed with the kind permission of the editors.

This declaration by Chechen President Jokar Dudayev was not unexpected; the region’s history is scored by episodes of intense Chechen-Russian battles that encouraged hatred toward Russia and a desire for independence. Further, Russia was in disarray at the time, with then Russian Republic President Boris Yeltsin in confrontation with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev over the issue of sovereignty. Yeltsin encouraged Soviet republics (but not semi-autonomous ones like Chechnya) to “take all the sovereignty they could swallow.” Dudayev interpreted Yeltsin’s words to fit his situation.

Grozny had nearly 490,000 residents in 1994. It included many multiple-story buildings and industrial installations and covered some 100 square miles. (By comparison, the Joint Readiness Training Center for urban combat in the United States covers less than a tenth of a square kilometer, offering but one indication of how urban training can differ from reality.) A Chechen opposition movement developed in 1993, finally attempting to overthrow President Dudayev in late November 1994 through an armed attack. The attack was repulsed by Dudayev’s forces. Russian complicity was at first denied by Moscow, but then acknowledged when Dudayev paraded several captured Russian soldiers before TV cameras.

The indignity and embarrassment over the exposure of Russian involvement caused Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin, in his third year in office after ousting Gorbachev, to order troops to start moving into Chechnya on 11 December. Planners had less than two weeks to move and position forces and supplies. By New Year’s Eve, Russian forces had Grozny surrounded on three sides and entered the city from the north, moving headlong into hell.

The first unit to penetrate to the city center was the 1st battalion of the 131st “Maikop” Brigade, the latter composed of some 1,000 soldiers. By 3 January 1995, the brigade had lost nearly 800 men, 20 of 26 tanks, and 102 of 120 armored vehicles. For the next 20 days and nights, Russian artillery rounds rained down on the city, sometimes at the rate of 4,000 an hour.3 Local residents left the city or took refuge in basements while the Russian armed forces fought Chechen

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“freedom fighters” or “bandits” (depending on one’s perspective) on the streets and in the buildings above them.

When more captured Russian soldiers were shown on TV, the mothers of some went to Grozny to negotiate their sons’ release. Those negotiations took place in the center of the city without Russian government assistance and while under Russian artillery bombardment. Dudayev extracted a promise from the Russian soldiers he released of eternal indebtedness to their brave mothers.

The struggle continued until 20 January, when the Russians finally took the city center and raised the Russian flag over the Presidential Palace.

Before delving into the lessons learned from this battle, we may note several contextual factors that conditioned the outcome.

The Chechen armed force spoke Russian, had served in the Russian armed forces, and had Russian uniforms. This made it much easier to understand Russian tactics and plans, and to use deception techniques. The Chechen force was not a typical army but rather a composite force of armed home guards (guerrillas) and a few regular forces. Much of the equipment in their possession had been left by Russia’s armed forces in 1993 when departing Chechnya. By one account the Chechens had 40 to 50 T-62 and T-72 tanks, 620–650 grenade launchers, 20–25 “Grad” multiple rocket launchers, 30–35 armored personnel carriers and scout vehicles, 30 122mm howitzers, 40–50 BMP infantry fighting vehicles, some 200,000 hand grenades, and an assortment of various types of ammunition.

The Russian armed forces that attacked Grozny, while well equipped, were not the same professional force that opposed the West during the Cold War. Russian Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev, in a top-secret directive, listed some of the problems of his armed forces just ten days before the start of the war. He noted that the combat capabilities of the armed forces were low, the level of mobilization readiness was poor, and the operational planning capability was inadequate. Soldiers were poorly trained. Their suicide rates as well as

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the overall number of crimes in the force were up. Knowing the situation so clearly, Grachev’s bold prediction that he could take Grozny with a single airborne regiment in two hours is incomprehensible.\(^5\) Perhaps Grachev privately understood the true problems in the force but put on the face of public bravado to support the presidential directive he had received.

Other analysts confirmed the dismal state of readiness, estimating the capability of the Russian armed force to carry out combat missions as five or six times lower than what it had been in just 1991.\(^6\) Not only was the force poorly trained, it also was undermanned. On the eve of the operation, Grachev apparently had a force of some 38,000 men, only 6,000 of whom entered Grozny on New Year’s Eve. Dudayev is believed to have had 15,000 men in Grozny. This means that the 6:1 force ratio desired for attacking a city (a doctrinal norm derived from combat experience in World War II) clearly was not attained. On the contrary, the correlation of forces was 1:2.5 against Russian forces at the start of combat. In addition, the force that entered Grozny was a composite force, with some battalions composed of members from five to seven different units. Crews often hardly knew one another. One Russian officer noted that a rehearsal for taking a built-up area had not been conducted in the last 20 to 25 years, which contributed to decisions such as sending the force into the city in a column instead of in combat formation.\(^7\) These facts, combined with the bad weather, the hasty political decision to enter the city, and the lack of training, offered the Russian force little chance for quick success.

**Lesson One: Know Your Opponent and His Turf**

Societies are run by different methods. Some are governed by the rule of law, others by the rule of men. Some are governed by reli-

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\(^6\)Ibid., p. 21.

igious or local tradition, and still others by the tradition or customs of the clan. Chechnya was a society run by the rule of the clan.

Two traditions of the clan that unify the Chechen people are *adat* and *teip*. *Adat* is an ancient system of retribution, an unwritten code that is followed more closely than the Russian penal code or other imposed civil laws. The code is reputedly based on revenge, incorporating an “eye-for-an-eye” sense of justice. For example, after two of their comrades had been killed, Chechen fighters took a building in Grozny and seized some Russian prisoners. They killed two and let the rest go. The Chechens’ Eye for Eye Vendettas Shape War,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 8, 1995, pp. 1, 13.

The traditions of clan or tribe (*teip*) relationships is equally important and should have been stressed to Russian forces. *Teip* members fight fiercely to preserve their clan’s independence, culture, and separate identity. Relations between *teips* “are based on blood feuds.” There are more than 150 *teips* in Chechnya, whose membership “ties a Chechen to a large extended family and to an ancestral piece of land.”

If an opponent of the Chechens fails to take into account both *teip* and *adat* (as well as the long Chechen tradition of looking to older men for wisdom and to younger men for the “warrior” spirit), then he will not understand the fundamental issues uniting Chechen society and their will to fight foreign domination. Such will can outlast outside weaponry and presence. This lesson becomes more and more important to U.S. planners as the American armed forces move to an expeditionary posture. An outside force can’t stay forever, and the will of the local populace may win in the end.

In Chechnya there was even more at work than these internal cultural factors, however. There also existed an intense historical hatred of Russia and Russians among elements of the population, a reaction to the lack of respect shown by Soviet leaders and their Russian predecessors. In 1816, for example, Russian Caucasus commander General Alexei Yermolov insisted that “the terror of my name should guard our frontiers more potently than chains or fortresses.”

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9Novichkov et al., p. 5.
a scorched earth policy, treating the Chechens with extreme cruelty to perpetuate his claim. In 1949 Soviet authorities erected a statue of General Yermolov in Grozny. The inscription read, “There is no people under the sun more vile and deceitful than this one.”\textsuperscript{11} This unbelievably callous and calculated insult by Soviet authorities ensured the eternal hatred of many Chechens, demonstrating how poorly Soviet authorities understood their own people. During the 1970s and 1980s, the Chechens repeatedly attacked this statue.

Joseph Stalin earned the further enmity of the Chechen people by deporting the entire population to Central Asia in 1944. Many died during these deportations, which Chechens viewed as genocide. They returned to their homeland 13 years later during the premiership of Nikita Khrushchev.

Yeltsin and his military planners failed to consider the “receptivity” of the people in Grozny to their demands and intentions. The Russian army lacks civil affairs units, and this missing element compounded its problems. In the same manner, any force considering an attack in an urban environment must evaluate both the type of opponent it is attacking (guerrillas, regular forces, etc.) and its will. If the opposing force has deep and persistent antipathy toward the attackers, then it will be impossible to achieve victory without a decisive confrontation and military conquest. The local force has the advantage; if it can persevere, it can pick the attacker apart in both the short and long term, eventually wearing him out. In this sense, the moral-psychological orientation of the defenders adds an important element beyond mere weaponry to the “correlation of forces.”

In addition to understanding one’s opponent, an attacker must know the urban terrain over which he will fight. The Chechens obviously had a huge advantage in Grozny, as does any native defender. Not only did they know the city’s sewer, metro, and tram systems intimately, they also knew the back alleys, buildings, and streets. Russian forces were not so prepared. They had 1:100,000 scale maps when a scale of 1:25,000 or even larger was needed. As a result they often got lost, finding themselves in Chechen ambushes or exchanging fire with friendly units. Chechens took down street signs and

\textsuperscript{11}Ibid., pp. 39, 41, 62.
repositioned them in cleverly misleading positions to confound the Russians. Unit boundaries were almost impossible to coordinate because of the lack of adequate maps. Tactical maps were often made from plain blank paper by hand, with Russian soldiers filling in the sheet with the city vista (streets, buildings, etc.) in front of them.

Modern urban sprawl continues to make this aspect of military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) more appealing to the defender. The Chechens reverted to a battle of “successive cities” after the Grozny battle ended, hoping to recreate their Grozny successes elsewhere. They moved their operations base to Shali, Argun, and other city centers. They recognized that they could accomplish two things with this tactic: they could negate Russian advantages of firepower in the open from helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, and tanks, and they could blend in with the local population to their advantage. This not only continued to make it difficult to distinguish combatants from civilians, but it also helped the Chechens get the local population on their side. This was usually the result when Russian forces entered a city, destroyed property and buildings, and killed or wounded civilians while searching for their armed opponent.

The average Russian soldier possessed neither the cultural savvy nor the street smarts for such confrontations. Since urban combat is resolved at the squad and platoon level, well-trained soldiers are essential. Too often this fact is ignored by forces contemplating an urban action. For Western armies, particularly expeditionary forces, there must be civil and public affairs units attached to help the soldier prepare for urban combat. A cultural understanding of the battlefield can greatly assist both the commander in understanding his mission and the average soldier in fulfilling it. An understanding of the city infrastructure offers similar advantages.

Lesson Two: Don’t Assume—Prepare, Prepare, Prepare

When planning for the intervention into Chechnya, the Russian force made several questionable assumptions. First was that the Chechen force would not resist or stand up psychologically to the concentration of large groups of state troops. Soviet forces had succeeded in Czechoslovakia in 1968 with such an operation, and they may have banked on a repeat performance in Chechnya. A second assumption was that qualified planners were still present on the General Staff.
Much of the intellectual strength of the General Staff probably had atrophied along with the general dissipation of the armed forces over the previous five years. But even if the General Staff was fully operational and capable, any operation of this complexity may have been beyond its ability to prepare in two weeks (in preparation for the Czech invasion, for example, there were at least six extensive Warsaw Pact exercises over the course of several months to practice ground operations, air defense, logistics, and other elements before the intervention).12 Finally, the plan presupposed a trained, coherent force that was as capable as the old Soviet military. None of the Russians’ assumptions stood the test of reality.

Many outright errors were committed during the hasty preparation of the force as well. For example, the operations plan omitted technical support resources (such as communication equipment), and there was no coordinating agency linked with the president’s administration to resolve political problems. The administration’s information/propaganda machinery also failed to prepare the mass media to report positively on the reasons for the intervention or to illuminate the national interests at stake. Thus Russia lost the political and information battles in the first days of the conflict. Many of these problems were aggravated by the fact that at the time of the intervention, Russia did not have a national security concept, and only an outdated military doctrine.

In addition, three powerful ministers (Defense, Internal Affairs, and Internal Security) all had troops in the fight but failed to integrate their efforts.13 As one source noted, “The enormous losses of the early days were caused by the poor level of professionalism of the command/staff element, which underestimated the enemy and was staggeringly negligent in coordinating actions among individual units and subunits as well as among the various types of forces.”14

Other Russian problems included complacency as to the location of the main and reserve force, poor highway traffic control, a lack of

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13Novichkov et al., pp. 28–30.
knowledge of the area, and no clear-cut troop instructions on how or when to use their weapons. Soldiers were sometimes prohibited from massing fires and lacked clear rules of engagement and target adjustment criteria. Some troops had just arrived from training units and had no idea how to operate as part of a unit. All they knew were individual soldier skills.\textsuperscript{15} According to one report:

In the 81st Motorized Regiment of the 90th Tank Division, out of 56 platoon commanders, 49 were yesterday’s [civilian college] students. More than 50 percent of the men sent to war had never fired live shells with their tank cannons, and had no idea of how to do so. Military cooks, signalers, and mechanics were appointed to shoot antitank guns and missiles as well as machine guns.\textsuperscript{16}

Just days before kicking off the operation into Grozny, a unit that was deployed at the Mozdok staging area conducted the following training: assembly and disassembly of equipment; range firing and field training; company tactical exercises and driving combat vehicles; battalion field training; driver testing; and alert drills.\textsuperscript{17} Not a word about training on combat in cities.

Perhaps the most serious deficiency in the preparation phase was in intelligence data. The Russians had almost no information about the situation in the city, especially from human intelligence sources. Military intelligence did not delineate targets for air and artillery forces, and electronic warfare resources were not used to cut off President Dudayev’s communications. Reconnaissance was poorly conducted, and Chechen strong points were not uncovered. There was little effective preliminary reconnaissance of march routes, reconnaissance amounted to passive observation, and reconnaissance elements appeared poorly trained.\textsuperscript{18} Simply put, the Russians did not do a proper intelligence preparation of the battlefield—indeed, there does not seem to be an established procedure for processing data for the intelligence preparation of the battlefield in the Russian armed forces. Commanders and troops tried to overcome this short-

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., pp. 23, 25.


\textsuperscript{17}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{18}Novichkov et al., pp. 34, 35.
coming in the course of combat actions, leading to delays in operations and reduced effectiveness.

These first two lessons (know your opponent and battleground, and the importance of preparation) may seem elementary, but they may also reveal aspects that U.S. planners are most likely to miss. Analysts writing urban doctrine should raise their focus from tactics to consider also overarching concepts such as political considerations, limitations of city fighting, worldwide integration of economic assets, characteristics and types of opposing forces (guerrillas, regular force, willingness to violate international law), city size and infrastructure, and probable enemy methods for negating U.S. operating superiority. It is a combination of these latter facts that will drive the tactics and operations when going into a city. Neither strategy nor tactics can be developed in isolation from them. U.S. forces thus need an urban combat courses-of-action methodology to help select the optimum approach to each situation.

Lesson Three: Choose the Right Weapons

The Chechen weapon of choice was the rocket-propelled grenade launcher (RPG). The RPG was most feared by the Russians because of its multiplicity of uses. It could be used to shoot over buildings like a high-trajectory mortar, and it could be used either as an area weapon when fired over troop formations or as a precision weapon when fired directly at armored vehicles. Some destroyed Russian tanks were hit more than 20 times by RPGs.

A second weapon of choice for the Chechens was not really a weapon at all. It was the multitude of information-technology gadgets, especially cellular phones and commercial scanner systems, that allowed the Chechens to communicate easily with one another, ensured the coordination of combat operations, and allowed Chechens to listen in on Russian conversations (thereby proving to be a force-coordination multiplier). On many occasions, the Russians felt the Chechens knew what they were going to do ahead of time, and for this reason believed these communication devices were like weapons. The Chechens also used mobile TV stations to override Russian TV transmissions and to deliver messages from President Dudayev directly to the people. The Internet was also used, especially to raise funds and assistance from abroad.
Flame-throwers appear to have been a weapon of choice for the Russian force. One article written after the fighting noted that the Kalashnikov assault rifle, the Mukha grenade launcher, and the Shmel flame-thrower were a “soldier’s best weapons.” The flame-thrower was chosen as much for its psychological effect as its ability to flush people or snipers out of buildings at a considerable range. Evidence supporting the view that this is an important Russian weapon was provided when an improved, jet-powered model was advertised for sale abroad in October 1998. It reportedly was capable of the same effectiveness as 152mm artillery rounds, and had a maximum range of fire of 1,000 meters (over a half mile!). With its portability and range, it may prove to be an adequate substitute where the use of supporting artillery would be difficult.

A “weapon” of choice for both Russians and Chechens was the sniper, who caused panic and havoc with just a few well-placed shots. There are reports that the Chechens employed female snipers from the Baltic region. Snipers were extremely effective in slowing a convoy’s movement and forcing a column to take another route. One observer wrote:

One experienced sniper is capable of doing what will prove to be beyond the capability of a tank, gun, or entire infantry subunit: disable a commander, destroy a gun or mortar crew, control one or two streets . . . and, most important, instill in the enemy a feeling of constant danger, nervousness, and expectation of a sudden shot. Everyone fears the Chechen snipers in Grozny. . . . There are many cases where a sniper wounds a serviceman, and then kills the wounded person and those who come to his aid.

The sniper could also use an RPG in conjunction with a sniper rifle. A real problem for Russian troops was identifying snipers who shot at

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19Vladimir Berezko, “Flame Throwers: A Second Birth,” Krasnaya Zvezda, December 29, 1995, p. 2. The Mukha antitank weapon was second in popularity to the RPG. There were also reports that the flame-thrower was underutilized, but these were deemed a mistake.

20ITAR-TASS, 0943 GMT, October 2, 1998, as translated by FBIS and downloaded to its Web page. The high accuracy is due to an engineering development in which the motor and fire satchel inside the bore (container) separate.

them and then donned a Red Cross armband and mingled with the local populace and the Russian soldiers he was killing. To counteract this, Russian checkpoints began forcing the Chechen men to take off their shirts. Soldiers would look for bruises on the shoulder from weapon recoil, for powder burns on forearms, or for a silver lining around cuffs (from mortar or artillery propellant bags). They also smelled clothing for gunpowder and looked for traces of it under fingernails or on arms or legs. Russian forces also employed snipers, but not with the same degree of success as the Chechens. A March 1995 article decrying the neglect of sniper training attests to this fact.22

The correct mix and employment of weapons in the city were also important. Grozny was a three-tiered fight (upper floors of buildings, street level, and subterranean or basement), and the weapons had to fit. Russian tanks could not lower their main gun tubes and coaxial machine guns low enough to shoot into basements harboring Chechen fighters. To correct this problem, the Russians put ZSU-23-4 self-propelled, multi-barreled, anti-aircraft machine guns forward with columns to fire at heights and into basements.

The use of artillery and air power in the city was counterproductive in many instances. Indiscriminate bombing and shelling turned the local population against the Russians. The locals included some Russian citizens who were inhabitants of Grozny (and who found it incomprehensible that their own leaders had such disregard for the lives of civilians). Most of the Russian population of Grozny lived in the center of the city. Since this is where the most severe fighting took place, Russian civilian casualties were high.

Lesson Four: Adapt Tactics to the Situation

The principal Chechen city defense was the “defenseless defense.” They decided that it was better not to have strong points, but to remain totally mobile and hard to find.23 (Some strong points did exist...
but were limited to dug-in tanks, artillery, or BMPs to engage targets head-on.) Hit-and-run tactics made it difficult for the Russian force to locate pockets of resistance and impossible to bring their overwhelming firepower to bear against an enemy force. Russian firepower was diluted as a result and could be used only piecemeal.

Chechen mobile detachments composed of one to several vehicles (usually civilian cars or jeeps) transported supplies, weapons, and personnel easily throughout the city. Chechens deployed in the vicinity of a school or hospital, fired a few rounds, and quickly left. The Russians would respond by shelling the school or hospital, but usually after the Chechens had gone. Civilians consequently viewed this action as Russians needlessly destroying vital facilities and endangering their lives, not realizing who had initiated the incident. The Chechen mobility and intimate knowledge of the city exponentially increased the effect of their “defenseless defense.”

The slaughter of the Russian 131st Brigade was a result of this tactic. Russian forces initially met no resistance when they entered the city at noon on 31 December. They drove their vehicles straight to the city center, dismounted, and took up positions inside the train station. Other elements remained parked along a side street as a reserve force. Then the Chechens went to work. The Russian lead and rear vehicles on the side streets were destroyed. The unit was effectively trapped. The tanks couldn’t lower their gun tubes far enough to shoot into basements or high enough to reach the tops of buildings, and the Chechens systematically destroyed the column from above and below with RPGs and grenades. At the train station, Chechens from other parts of the city converged on the station and surrounded it. The commander of the Russian unit waited until 2 January for reinforcements, but they never arrived. His unit was decimated.

The most lethal Chechen force in those early days of January was led by one of President Dudayev’s most trusted warriors, Shamil Basayev. Basayev’s “national guard” force consisted of some 500 men who had fought in Abkhazia against Georgians in 1992–1993. Battle-hardened, they moved in groups as large as 200 at times, showing up in cars with guns blazing.24 The more typical Chechen

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24Gall and de Waal, p. 205.
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combat group was a three- or four-man cell. Five of these cells were usually linked into a 15- to 20-man unit that fought together.

Some Chechen soldiers pretended to be simple inhabitants of Grozny, volunteering to act as guides since it was so difficult to navigate in the City.25 They subsequently led Russian convoys into ambushes. Russian forces tried to counter Chechen ambush tactics by using a technique called “baiting,” in which they would send out contact teams to find Chechen ambushes. In turn, the Chechens used a technique called “hugging,” getting very close to Russian forces. This technique eliminated the Russian use of artillery in many cases, and it exposed baiting tactics.

The Chechens were proficient at booby-trapping doorways, breakthrough areas, entrances to metros and sewers, discarded equipment, and the bodies of dead soldiers. Some command-detonated mines were also used, but this weapon found greater use in other cities the Chechens defended. (A detailed 1998 Russian article about the importance of initially using plenty of expert engineer-reconnaissance forces in MOUT was published to teach how to counteract such threats.)26

Russian forces became wary of moving into a building and learned to proceed methodically. They began taking one building at a time, and moving block by block instead of rapidly moving into the city center as they had at the beginning of the intervention.

Another significant Russian problem was the delineation of boundaries between units owing to the nonlinear nature of urban combat. For the Russian force, this problem was complicated by four factors: poor communications that prevented units from knowing where other units were; the absence of an integrated communications system tying together different units from the Ministry of Internal Security, the army, and the other services; different operational tempos in

25In addition, Chechen artillery observers operated in the rear of Russian forces disguised as peaceful residents or refugees. Some Chechens, especially Russian-speaking women, reported on Russian forces. Chechens also took hostages to coerce family members to serve as artillery spotters in the rear of Russian forces. See Armeyskiy Sbornik, No. 1 (January 1996), pp. 37–42.

different parts of the city that caused one unit to get ahead of another; and dealing simultaneously with both vertical and horizontal boundaries within a building. This difficulty in ascertaining boundaries resulted in several incidents of fratricide and instances in which units were pinned down by friendly fire for up to an hour. Aware of these problems, the Chechens exploited boundary conditions whenever possible. To help overcome such difficulties, a Russian expert recommended that units wear pagers and use a map display system known as Cospas-Sarsat during future operations. (Cospas-Sarsat is a system of geostationary satellites that act as a global positioning system, especially for search and rescue.)

A final tactical issue was the Russian use of assault detachments and tanks to seize buildings and drive the Chechens from the city. Initially the Russians relied heavily on tanks in Grozny, but this approach was soon abandoned, with infantry and marines then becoming paramount. The initial instruction pamphlet issued to Russian soldiers in Grozny noted that a tank platoon should move at the head of the column, covered by motorized riflemen and flame-throwers. Reserve teams advancing in armored personnel carriers behind the tanks would fire against second and third floors. Three months later conflicting advice appeared in Russian army magazines. Tanks were advised to seal off city blocks, repel counterattacks, and provide cover. In providing supporting fires along streets, tanks were expected to occupy covered positions or operate only in areas controlled by motorized rifle units. During movement, tanks would move behind infantry at a distance beyond the effective range of enemy antitank weapons, but close enough to support the infantry with grazing fire from machine guns. The same principle was to be used for calculating the follow-on distance for other armored vehicles. Additionally, metal nets and screens were mounted 25 to 30 centimeters away from the armor to create protection from Chechen antitank rounds.

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A proper explanation of the concept of employing assault detachments requires a separate article.
Lesson Five: Anticipate and Resolve Communications Problems

As we have seen, a lack of training was the biggest problem for Russian troops and staffs in planning and executing the urban combat mission. The most significant technical problem was establishing and maintaining communications. In 1997–1998, no issue received more attention on the pages of the Russian army’s most prestigious journal, Armeyskiy Sbornik. Obviously, this problem greatly complicated the execution of missions. If you can’t coordinate and control units, how can they bring firepower to bear effectively?

The breakdown in communications occurred at the platoon, company, and battalion levels. Some of the problems were clearly the fault of Russian planners, such as the decision during the battle for Grozny to transmit all messages in the clear. This misstep obviously allowed the Chechen force not only to monitor all transmissions and thus prepare for what was coming next, but also to insert false messages in Russian communications traffic. Later, the Russians used message scramblers.  

The chief factor in the communications breakdown, however, was simply the vertical obstacles posed by urban structures. High-rise buildings and towers impeded transmissions, especially those in the high to ultra high frequencies. Communication officers had to consider the nature of radio wave propagation and carefully select operating and alternate frequencies, and they had to consider the interference caused by power transmission lines, communications lines, and electric transportation contact systems.


29 Kudashov and Malashenko, p. 30. Other recommendations to improve communications included: using radios with automatic frequency tuning together with devices for guaranteeing scrambling and masking speech; using HF radios of armored vehicles with a supplementary receiver; using an “architectural waveguide” and “signal amplification by obstacle” plan (bouncing signals off of buildings or retransmitting them at intersections or via airborne platforms); locating VHF/UHF radios at a distance of three to five times the height of reinforced concrete upper stories or iron roof structures; putting antennas near windows or doors of upper stories when a radio is in a building; remoting radios from basements by using 10–15 meters of coaxial cable mounted to local objects with brackets or feeding into an existing television
Many radio transmitter operators were killed in the initial battles, as Chechens focused on soldiers carrying radios or antennas. To solve this problem, Russian radio operators began concealing their antennas. However, this led them to hide their whip antennas in a pocket or under a shirt and, in their haste to reassemble the radio while under fire, forget to reconnect the antenna.\(^{30}\)

After-action recommendations by Russian communication specialists included developing more convenient and lighter-weight gear for radio operators, including wire-type antennas; outfitting units with cellular and trunk-adaptable radios; putting an indicator lamp on the radio sets to highlight problems; developing a common radio storage battery; and providing alternate antennas in follow-on models, capable of automatic connections in case primary antennas become disabled.\(^{31}\)

The Russians noted that the Chechen forces used Motorola and Nokia cellular radios, and leased satellite channels on foreign relays. This enabled them to establish communications between base stations and to maintain quality mobile radio communications.\(^{32}\)

**Looking to the Future**

When considering the initial failure of the Russian forces in Grozny in January 1995, it seems apparent that the issues outlined above, drawn from one-on-one discussions with participants as reported in Russian military literature from January to March 1995, would be at the center of the lessons-learned discussion. But Russian conclu-

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30Osyanin et al., p. 41.

31Ibid., p. 43.

32Vladimir Komashinskiy, Valeriy Kamosov, and Nikolay Burenin, “In the Interest of Continuous Command and Control,” *Armeyskiy Sbornik*, No. 10 (October 1996), pp. 48–49. Two other interesting articles on future communications techniques or adaptations are Aleksandr Anatolyevich Ivanov, “A View of the Future,” *Armeyskiy Sbornik*, No. 11 (November 1996), pp. 6–8; and Nikolay Kochetov, Vladimir Artamonov, and Yevgeniy Komarov, “Flexible Command and Control,” *Armeyskiy Sbornik*, No. 9 (September 1995), pp. 36–38. One report stated that some commercial cellular communications were used to support Russian formations and units in Grozny, but no further information was provided.
isions about the types of weapons and methods for attacking in future urban combat were much more imaginative than originally expected, focusing largely on the low end of the technological hierarchy. Such Chechen strategies as “defenseless defense” and “successive cities” seemed to force an innovative response.

For example, one of the lessons learned by Russian forces and underscored in their critique of combat in Grozny is the increasing utility of nonlethal weapons in future urban combat. This conclusion primarily refers to chemical weapons not banned by the Geneva Convention, such as tear gas and other agents.33 The principal lesson Russian commanders seem to have learned is, “Don’t fight this type of battle unless there is no other option.” Gas is an option because it debilitates opponents and allows friendly forces to disarm them without lethal combat.

But the Russians are also considering high-tech, debilitating nonlethal means (rays of light causing blindness or seizures, subsonic sounds that penetrate concrete or metal and induce vomiting or spasms, electromagnetic waves, etc.).34 New types of psychological operations, an old nonlethal technique, were under discussion as well. Psychological warfare techniques have been seriously upgraded through information technology developments. For U.S. forces concentrating on the high-technology solutions and approaches (firing around corners, devices to measure heartbeats through walls, etc.), it is important not to overlook counters to Russian innovations. At the very least, improvements should be made to U.S. soldier protective devices. Despite the standard U.S. aversion to the use of most of these Russian nonlethals, they may be more than attractive to other armies, especially if they are underbudgeted, undermanned, and undertrained.

The Russians learned other lessons from their Chechnya experience as well. They will likely now do everything in their power to persuade political figures to solve conflicts by peaceful means,35 and their

34Novichov et al., p. 164.
35Kilunin, p. 41.
preparation phase for urban combat probably will be comprehensive and exhausting in the future, since it is clear that Chechnya was not like Czechoslovakia. There will be more instruction on urban combat in their academies. The correlation of “other forces” (customs, religion, belief in the cause, receptivity to friendly forces, etc.) will be considered during the preparation phase, as will such factors as types of forces (guerrillas, regular, mercenaries), building materials, communications potential, local customs and resistance, friendly forces available, and the use of chemicals. Those chemicals may include “traction interrupters” to interfere with the working parts of equipment or to change a road surface, pyrophoric materials to burn nonflammables, or even biological materials to destroy electric and insulating materials.\footnote{Novichov et al., p. 164.} It is clear that the Russian armed forces learned that if they can disable a person or piece of equipment, then it will be much easier to achieve their objective.

If force is used, there will be no preparatory fires (because it turns the population against you), but only supporting fires during the operation.\footnote{Kilunin, p. 41.} This concept may result in an extended use of direct fire artillery and a greater reliance on flame-throwers. It will be imperative to get civilians out of a city before fighting starts. Army aviation will be used to adjust artillery fires, provide battlefield command and control of troops, mark and coordinate boundaries, evacuate the wounded, and insert air assault forces at critical points in the city.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 42–43.} Finally, as the United States learned in Somalia, it is not always the best-equipped force that wins. Patience and discipline will play a greater role in the long run than the Russians acknowledged going into Grozny. This lesson must be learned by those who rely too heavily on precision weapons and think that victory is possible in the short term. Long-term engagement works against the intruding force; as civilian casualties mount, every move is scrutinized in the media, and the international community bands together to scold the “perpetrator.”

Finally, a lesson learned by medical personnel and participants was the psychological stress of urban combat. Like the war in
Afghanistan, the Chechen conflict produced severe cases of combat stress and psychological trauma. A psychologically well prepared and trained Russian force was not available during the initial fight for Grozny. As a result, Russian commanders began establishing a reserve force only a few hundred meters away from the main force during the fighting. This reserve acted as a relief force that replaced the main force when it became psychologically spent. This usually occurred after about three hours of house and booby-trap clearing, which were the most stress-inducing activities other than clearing obstacles during the most intense days of the fight. A recent article about Chechnya noted that younger members of the native population there are also having serious troubles with stress-induced injuries from the war. One physician in Grozny, speaking about the children, noted: “They have become more aggressive, nervous, cruel. They have no respect for elders. They’re dangerous to be around. They have psychological illnesses, terrible illnesses. Some can solve problems only with a gun.”

The first visible indicator of the traumatic nature of the attack on the Russian psyche was an article in *The Journal of Military Medicine*, just four months after the start of serious fighting. Major General V. S. Novikov, a professor in the medical service, gave a scathing account of the neurological disorders he was observing in Chechnya. Novikov screened 1,312 troops in his survey. He found that 28 percent were healthy, while the other 72 percent had some type of psychological disorder (46 percent exhibited asthenic depression symptoms—insomnia, lack of motivation, anxiety, neuro-emotional stress, or tiredness—and the other 26 percent exhibited psychotic reactions such as high anxiety or aggressiveness, a deterioration of moral values or interpersonal relations, and excitement or depression). The longer a soldier was stationed in the war zone, as expected, the more radical the change in his neuropsychological condition. Novikov termed this condition Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome, using the English acronym for this affliction in the Russian

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40 V. S. Novikov, “Psycho-physiological Support of Combat Activities of Military Personnel,” *Military Medical Journal*, No. 4 (1996), pp. 37–40. The discussion and information in this section were taken from this article.
original. He had obviously studied the U.S. experience in Vietnam. The percentage of troops with combat-induced deficiencies was higher than in Afghanistan.41

Novikov’s research also revealed that some 32 percent had experienced extreme stress while preparing for combat actions. These soldiers were taught active and passive muscular relaxation; others received psychological therapy or even pharmacological treatment (to treat insomnia or stress). After their removal from combat, troops’ asthenic symptoms decreased while their psychotic disorders increased.42

Conclusions

The lessons of the fight for Grozny are several and sobering for anyone who contemplates using troops in an urban environment. While some of the lessons learned by Russian and Chechen combatants are peculiar to that region, others have wider applicability. No army wants to engage in urban combat, but increasing urbanization and the danger of strikes from high-precision weapons may well force the fight into the city, where the defender has all the advantages.

Preparation for urban combat should begin in peacetime. There is a vast array of possible courses of action, options, constraints, limita-

41Ibid., pp. 37–38.
42Ibid., pp. 38–39. Novikov recommended collective suggestive influences and pharmacological treatments as the most effective, and that there should be five specialists at army level (two psycho-physiologists, and one psycho-pharmacologist, one psychiatrist, and one medical psychologist). This group can assess 200–250 people per day and provide help. Ibid., p. 39. There were also urban combat “lessons learned” offered by some of the more savvy reporters who were present during the fight for Grozny that should be studied. Their experiences and opinions were colored differently than those of the combatants and remain valuable. Anatol Lieven, for example, offered three telling observations: that the effectiveness of even the best technologies for urban warfare will depend on how confused and afraid the man using them is; that Russians missed the capacity of Chechen social tradition to mobilize fighters and impose a discipline on them that goes beyond the “surface discipline” (imposed by basic training) of a modern army that does not provide nearly as strong a cause for the individual soldier to fight for (although it did not immunize young Chechens from PTSD); and that the Russian failure again demonstrates the limitations of firepower when fighting a dispersed infantry opponent behind good cover. Anatol Lieven, “The World Turned Upside Down,” Armed Forces Journal, August 1998, pp. 40–43. Lieven’s article is worth the time to look up and read.
tions, force mixes, enemy compositions, legal factors, and city characteristics that must be studied and understood. The most important point may be that there is no “standard urban combat operation.” Each is unique to the opponent, the city, specific operational and tactical issues, and geopolitical considerations, among other factors. Understanding the elements and ramifications of urban combat is a difficult but crucial task for any army, but especially for one moving from a forward-deployed to an expeditionary state. In the latter case, the tasks required to sufficiently sustain or support urban combat are enormous.43

43The author would like to offer a special thanks to Mr. Les Grau of the Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, for his help with this manuscript.
### Russian Logistics and the Battle for Grozny

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### Establishing Logistics Support

- Built on infrastructure of North Caucasus Military District
- Majority of logistics support facilities and units located near Mozdok garrison/railhead/airfield
- Built tent city of 3,000 tents with heaters, 114 mess halls, a shower and laundry train, shower and bath units, and vehicle wash points
- Established depots, supply dumps, and supply points from Mozdok to Grozny
- Established vehicle refueling points and rest stops with mess tents and heating tents on LOCs. Over 200,000 tons of POL used in first phase of conflict
- Established ad hoc traffic control service

Food Service
- Food provided 150% of normal daily ration per soldier—over 5000 calories
  - 300 grams meat
  - 50 grams heavy cream
  - 30 grams cheese
- Field bakeries-Mozdok, Vladikavkaz, & Kizlyar
- Three field bakeries north Grozny airfield—daily capacity of 8 tons of bread
• The KP-125 and KP-130 mess trailers could not be hauled behind ZIL-130 and GAZ-66 trucks in many areas during the thaw.

• Mess trailers were hauled behind fuel and water trucks in combat formations.

• Fuel trucks could not enter Grozny due to danger from small arms fire and shrapnel. Therefore, hot food had to be delivered in mermite containers carried in armored vehicles.

• Troops often ate dry rations.

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**High Demand Items**

• Hand grenades
• Smoke grenades
• Demolition charges
• Grenade launchers
• Grappling hooks and ropes
• Light-weight ladders
• Night-vision equipment
• Smoke pots
• Smoke artillery rounds
• White phosphorus artillery rounds
• ZSU 23-4 and 2S6 ammunition
• Mortar ammunition
• Tear gas grenades
• Water

Transportation Support

• Primary long haul on train and plane.

• Prep period (11-30 Dec 94): Ground forces alone required 2850 long-haul trucks. Of these, 90 had serious breakdowns, 83 were written off.

• Battle for Grozny: Ground forces alone required 6700 long-haul trucks.
Railroad Troops

- Majority of heavy-lift into theater on rail
- Railroad troops restored 260 kilometers of track, cleared mines from 70 kilometers of main line, and repaired LOCs by restoring switches and electric power to the lines.
- Trains brought under mortar, artillery, and sniper fire

Supply Lessons Learned

- Winter weather necessitated additional specialized clothing and boots
- The majority of supply vehicles were not durable enough
- Fuel trucks could not enter Grozny due to danger from small arms fire and shrapnel. Fueling armored vehicles was a major problem
Water supply was a major problem. Inadequate and purification methods were outmoded.

No place for crews to stow tents, sleeping bags, kits bags, field ranges, and heaters on the outside of combat vehicles.

Chronic need for an armored supply vehicle.

Need at least a traffic control brigade during the preparation phase.

Captured POL stocks invaluable.

### Armored Vehicle Loss & Breakdown Rate

- Forward support maintenance repaired 217 armored vehicles.
- Depot maintenance repaired 404 armored vehicles.
- 225 armored vehicles written off.
- 846/2221 armored vehicles (38%) out of action for some time during two-month fight.
Repaired Vehicles: January 1995

- Two vehicle collection points established, one each axis-forward and rear
- 1286 vehicles repaired and returned
  - 404 armored vehicles
  - 789 wheeled vehicle
  - 75 artillery systems

The “Hangar Queen” Syndrome

- Prior to operation, 646 vehicles arrived needing repair
  - 41 artillery systems
  - 217 armored vehicles
  - 338 wheeled vehicles
Spare Parts and Accessories

- 573 tons for armored vehicle repair
- 605 tons for wheeled vehicle repair
- 60 tons for artillery system repair

Maintenance Lessons Learned

- Stop production of T-80 with gas-turbine engine
- Quality control of vehicles coming into theater required (prevent arrival of hangar queens)
- Large quantity of replacement vehicle accessories and spare parts needed
Medical Support

- Four special emergency medical treatment detachments dispatched in addition to TO&E medical support
- Companies reinforced with physician’s assistant
- Battalions reinforced with doctor and ambulance section
- Regimental aid post where primary surgical treatment rendered

- Medevac helicopters to division hospital and beyond
The City's Many Faces

**Major Diseases**

- Viral hepatitis
- Cholera
- Shigellosis
- Enterocolitis
- Diptheria
- Malignant anthrax
- Plague

**Medical Lessons Learned**

- Burns, shrapnel wounds, and sniper wounds are far more common in city fighting. Normal ratio of 3:1 or 4:1 wounded to killed is reversed to 1:3
- Armored ambulance needed for frontline service. BTR-80 usually pressed into service. Often had to wait until nightfall to evacuate the wounded due to snipers
• Forward air evacuation rare after several medevac helicopters shot down
• Conventional war treatment system much more effective in city fighting than counter-insurgency treatment system developed in Afghanistan
• Medical units forward in the city need to be protected and dug in. The best situation is the entire hospital in basements connected by trenches
• Clean water forward in quantity is essential

• 205th Separate Motorized brigade rendered combat ineffective by viral hepatitis (15% of force)
• Wounded usually seen by doctor in 15-20 minutes and reached surgical assistance within two-three hours
• Mortar was biggest casualty producer in city fighting
• Lice and skin diseases were a problem due to the difficulty in bathing and getting clean clothes
• Psychiatric casualties are high in urban combat. Units need to be rotated frequently.

Overall Logistics Lessons Learned

• No empty cities. Requirement to provide food, shelter, water, and medical treatment to civilians may outstrip same requirements for own force
• Requirement to restore sewage, water, electricity, and public order falls on military
• Rail and air transport essential
• All logistics functions are insufficiently staffed and supplied for urban combat
ANNEX 4B: SOFT LOG AND CONCRETE CANYONS: 
RUSSIAN URBAN COMBAT LOGISTICS IN GROZNY 
Mr. Lester W. Grau and Mr. Timothy Lee Thomas, FMSO

Logistics make up as much as nine tenths of the business of war, and . . . the mathematical problems involved in calculating the movements and supply of armies are . . . not unworthy of a Leibnitz or a Newton.

—Martin Van Creveld

Although logistics is a major concern of warfare, comparatively little has been written about it when compared to writings about the tactical and strategic aspects of various wars. As a subset, very little has been written about logistical support of urban combat. One historic precept of urban combat logistics is that ammunition expenditure increases dramatically when fighting in cities. Recent Russian experience in fighting for the Chechen capital city of Grozny in January/February 1995 demonstrated that ammunition resupply was not the only problem. Demands on maintenance, supply, transport and medical support surpassed the capabilities of TO&E logistics units. Logistics demands were further increased by the requirement to provide humanitarian relief during the course of the fighting.

Russian tactics, techniques, and operational concepts for urban combat were based on their broad experience in the Great Patriotic War [World War II]. There were three underlying assumptions that shaped the Soviet/Russian concept of future urban combat: First, urban combat would be fought in nearly “empty” foreign cities where the bulk of the local civilian populace had left. Second, the enemy force in the city would be a conventional military force. Third, the army would have a period of conventional combat to fully develop procedures and identify problems before it began that most-
difficult mission—fighting in a city. None of these assumptions proved correct in the fighting in Grozny. The civilians had no place to go and did not expect such extreme fighting, so they sat tight while the fighting engulfed the city. The Russian Army, as the sole government representative, was expected to provide food, shelter, clean water, sewage, electricity, and medical treatment to the civilians (who were citizens of the Russian Federation). The Russian TO&E combat service support units were barely able to sustain the Russian Army, let alone the large civilian populace, due to the increased demands of urban combat. It was beyond their capability and the civilians suffered. Eventually, the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations (EMERCOM) helped restore these facilities.

Russian urban warfighting concepts were designed for fighting against another conventional army. The Chechen opposition were primarily guerrillas and irregulars backed by a small, fledgling regular force. The Chechens conducted a mobile “occasional” defense. They would hold one strong point one day and another on the next. The only exception was the Presidential Palace in the middle of the city, which they defended continually. Therefore, the Russian Army would stockpile supplies and munitions for projected attacks, but the attacks would frequently fall on empty buildings (or worse, buildings full of civilians). The enemy had moved, sometimes to the rear of the advancing Russian Army. This made it very difficult to direct combat service support to the critical sector in time. The Russian Army wanted to fight a linear battle, but the Chechen opposition made them fight a nonlinear battle. The Russian logistics units were un-prepared for this.

The Russian Army began the fight in the capital city of Grozny—a modern city of 490,000 people mostly living in concrete and brick high-rise apartment buildings (an area over 100 square miles). The city is served by a major rail line, airfield, and is on a major highway net. Intercity movement relied on buses, trams, and private automobiles. Large factories and chemical plants competed with the oil industry for labor. A major oil and gas pipeline passes through the city. It is a difficult place for any army to begin a campaign.
Establishing the Theater Logistics Structure

The conscript-based Russian Army that entered the breakaway Republic of Chechnya in December 1994 was not prepared for the fight. There was not a single combat-ready division in the entire Russian force structure. Their deployed force was a composite grouping of various units that were rapidly cobbled together. The logistics units were in equally bad shape and were hurriedly assembled for the effort. To further complicate logistics support, the ground campaign against the city of Grozny was mounted on three separate axes—from the west, northwest and east (map). The fight for the city lasted one month, and cleanup operations took another month. The city was left in ruins.

Still, the Russian military planners and transportation personnel did an excellent job in assembling the composite force from all over Russia. Almost all the force and supplies initially traveled on rail or aircraft. Since Chechnya is part of Russia, the logistics buildup was founded on the existing logistics infrastructure of the North Caucasus Military District. The majority of the logistics support facilities and units were positioned near the Mozdok garrison. Mozdok has a good railhead and airfield and is located some 110 kilometers from Grozny. The Russian rear services built a tent city with some 3,000 heated tents, 114 mess halls, shower and bath units, and vehicle wash points. The rear services also brought a shower and laundry

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46The Russian logistics system was a direct descendant of the massive Soviet logistics system—a system which, to a large degree, depended on the immediate transfer of trucks and drivers and other material from the civilian economy to the military upon mobilization. Russian industry had privatized and civilian trucks and drivers were no longer available—yet new arrangements had not been enacted. The use of composite logistical units further disrupted the logistics system, which was based on the premise that the higher echelon supplies the next two lower echelons. The echelons were no longer clearly defined, and the staffs at each level had little or no experience working together. It was a recipe for logistics failure.

train forward to Mozdok. Long-haul was by rail and air, and soon depots, supply dumps, and supply points were established at Mozdok extending toward Grozny. Three truck LOCs were established—one per main axis. Vehicle refueling points with rest stops containing mess tents and heating tents were set up along the LOCs. Trucks were essential to move supplies from the airfield and railhead forward toward Grozny.

**Food Service**

The fighting for Grozny began on New Year’s Eve 1994. Chechnya is mountainous and the winters are cold and snowy. The planners

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48Mikhail Shchepakin, “Tyl v Chechne” [Rear Service in Chechnya], *Armeyskiy sbornik* [Army digest], June 1995, p. 20. Unfortunately, the front-line troops seldom were able to use the laundry and bath facilities. As a result, skin diseases and lice were a problem among combatants.

49Ibid.
decided to provide 150 percent of the normal ration to each soldier. This would exceed 5,000 calories and included a daily 300 grams [10.5 ounces] of meat, 50 grams [1.75 ounces] of heavy cream, and 30 grams [1.05 ounces] of cheese. Field bakeries were established on each of the main axes at Mozdok, Vladikavkaz, and Kizlyar. Later, when the north Grozny airfield was captured, the Russians positioned three field bakeries there—with a daily capacity of eighteen tons of bread.50 There should have been plenty of food for every soldier.

However, the Russians had trouble delivering rations to the forward fighting positions. Meals were prepared on the KP-125 and KP-130 mess trailers. These are very serviceable cooking units that are hauled by the ZIL-130 or GAZ-66 trucks. However, when the ground around Grozny thawed, these trucks could not haul their mess trailers through the soupy mud. Then, the only way to haul the mess trailers forward was behind fuel or water trucks. Fuel trucks could not enter the city, since a single bullet might set the entire vehicle ablaze, so mess trailers often got no further than the outskirts of the city. Therefore, the food had to be ladled into mermite-type containers, which were then loaded into armored personnel carriers for transport into the city.51 This absence of “hard log” transportation was a constant problem.

Often the troops at the forward positions had to eat dry rations.52 These dry rations did not provide the minimum daily required amount of calories or vitamins.53 Often, the troops who needed the extra calories the most were not even getting the minimum daily

50Shchepakin, pp. 20–21.
51Ibid., p. 21. A mermite container is a U.S. Army insulated food container.
52Dry rations are similar to the old U.S. Army C-ration. There are three types of dry rations. The first contained a can of meat, some crackers or toast, some jam, and a tea bag. The second contained two cans of meat mixed with oatmeal. The third contained a can of meat and a can of vegetables or fruit. Lester W. Grau, The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan, London: Frank Cass Publishers, Inc., 1998, p. 5.
53Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress, The Bear Looks Back: A Russian General Staff Retrospective on the War in Afghanistan, manuscript awaiting publication.
requirement. Thus, the initial plan to provide 5,000 calories per day went widely astray, primarily due to inadequate transport.54

High-Demand Items

Besides small arms ammunition, front-line infantry used copious amounts of hand grenades, smoke grenades, smoke pots, demolition charges, flame thrower rounds, RPG-7 rounds, and single-shot disposable antitank grenade launchers. Tear gas grenades were often required at certain points on the battlefield and had to be pushed forward. The front-line infantry also had an immediate need for quantities of grappling hooks and ropes, lightweight ladders, and night-vision equipment. Many of these items were delivered by emergency airlift to Mozdok. Where there was a shortage of night-vision equipment, the Russians used mounted and dismounted searchlights to illuminate the battlefield and dazzle the Chechen opposition.55

Mortars produced the most casualties on both sides, and HE and smoke mortar ammunition was always in demand. Artillery was also used, often in a direct fire role. One-fifth of the artillery ammunition fired was smoke or white phosphorous—consequently, these were high-demand items. Smoke screened infantry movement, and white phosphorus smoke had the additional advantage (or disadvantage) of being lethal, capable of penetrating existing protective mask filters, and not banned by any international conventions.56

One of the most effective Russian weapons in city fighting was the venerable ZSU 23-4—a lightly armored self-propelled antiaircraft gun whose four 23mm barrels spat out up to 3,200 rounds per minute. The elevation and deflection of the system, as with its modern equivalent, the 2S6, provided an excellent countergunner

54There have also been accusations that much of this food was diverted to the Russian black market.
55Sergey Leonenko, "Ovladenie gorodom" [Capturing a city], Armeyskiy sbornik [Army digest], March 1995, p. 32.
56Ibid., p. 33.
weapon for city fighting. However, keeping the ZSU 23-4 and the 2S6 in 23mm and 30mm ammunition was a constant problem.\textsuperscript{57}

Clean drinking water was a high-demand item, but delivery of clean water forward often proved too difficult. Individual water treatment panticides took too long to work. Fighting is thirsty work, and soldiers drank what was available. Viral hepatitis and cholera were the result.\textsuperscript{58}

POL was critical, as the Russians used over 200,000 tons of POL during the battle for Grozny. Captured POL stocks proved very useful to the Russian ground forces. A major problem was moving the POL stocks up close to the units in contact.\textsuperscript{59}

**Transportation Support**

Primary heavy-lift long-haul into the theater was on rail. Railroad troops had to restore 260 kilometers of track, clear mines from another 70 kilometers, repair switches, and restore electric power to electric rail lines. Trains had to be protected as they came under mortar, artillery, and sniper fire.\textsuperscript{60}

Air transport played a significant role in the long haul of men and supplies. High-demand items were almost always shipped by air. Practically the entire Russian Military Transport Aviation (VTA), plus some commercial aviation, was involved in supporting the effort.

In theater, truck transport was essential. During the short preparation period (11–30 December 1994), 2,850 long-haul trucks sup-

\textsuperscript{57}Vladimir Suzdal’tsev, “Chechenskie uroki voyskovoy PVO” [Air defense lessons from Chechnya], *Armeyskiy sbornik* [Army digest], September 1995, pp. 23–24.

\textsuperscript{58}P. I. Ogarkov, V. V. Malyshev, S. A. Tsutsier, and N. V. Mikhaylov, “Epidemiologicheskaya kharakteristika i laboratomaya diagnostika virusnykh gepatitov v federal’nykh voyskakh na territorii chechenskoy respubliki” [Epidemiologic characteristics and laboratory diagnosis of viral hepatitis among federal forces deployed in the Chechen Republic], *Voenno-medicinskij zhurnal* [Military-medical journal], August 1996, p. 48.

\textsuperscript{59}Pavel Gorupay, “Sluzhba goryuchego v Chechenskom krizise” [POL support in the Chechen crisis], *Armeyskiy sbornik* [Army digest], May 1995, p. 37.

\textsuperscript{60}Vadim Fedotov, “Magistral” [Magistral], *Armeyskiy sbornik* [Army digest], March 1995, pp. 48–49.
ported the ground forces. Of these, 90 had serious breakdowns and 83 were written off as not economically repairable. During the battle for Grozny, the long-haul truck requirement for ground forces increased to 6,700 trucks. Controlling all this traffic was a problem. The Russians had forgotten about their Afghanistan experience, where the Soviet 40th Army had a traffic-control brigade assigned to control convoys. Consequently, the Russians had to assemble an ad hoc traffic-control brigade at the same time that they were conducting a major operation. Traffic control is just one example of where the lack of adequate time in the preparation phase can cripple the entire effort. Getting logistics in place and ready takes time. Political leaders did not give that time to the Russian Army.

The fighting in Grozny highlighted several problems. Supply trucks were soft-skinned, not rugged enough, and could not be exposed to urban combat. One of the major problems with supplying forward forces was that trucks could only go forward to a certain point. Then all the cargo had to be transloaded onto BTRs, MTLBs, or other armored vehicles. The armored vehicles were not designed primarily for carrying cargo and had to make several trips to haul a single truck’s load. This meant that the combat commander lost the use of many, if not most, of his armored combat vehicles for combat. They were busy hauling ammunition, food, and water or serving as ambulances. There was a chronic need for an armored supply vehicle that could move right up to the forces in contact.

Connected with this problem was the lack of load-carrying racks on the outside of Russian armored vehicles. Tents, sleeping bags, kit bags, squad stoves, and the like were carried in the supply trucks. The trucks could not get forward and there was no place to carry soldiers’ gear on or in the armored vehicles. As a result, combatants had to do without individual gear for days at a time.

63In the late 1980s, the Soviets designed a prototype armored supply truck, but it apparently was not produced in quantity before the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Rearming and refueling combat vehicles was particularly difficult. It usually had to be done at night. Rearming and refueling on site meant that lots of soldiers carried fuel cans and ammunition boxes forward—a long, arduous, and hazardous process. Withdrawing vehicles, particularly tanks, to rearm and refuel is also difficult.64 Forward-deployed troops did not always get the word that their supporting armor was being withdrawn only for rearming and refueling, sometimes misinterpreting a withdrawal of tanks as part of a general withdrawal.

**Maintenance**

Maintenance requirements exceeded expected maintenance norms for conventional combat during the two-month urban fight.65 Armored vehicle maintenance was especially critical, and unit maintenance officers tried to keep control of their vehicles and repair as many vehicles as possible at regiment or brigade level. Still, during the two-month fight, forward support maintenance repaired some 217 armored vehicles, depot maintenance repaired some 404 armored vehicles, and 225 vehicles were written off as being non-repairable. Thus some 846 of 2,221 armored vehicles involved in the fight (38 percent) were out of action for some period of time—although not simultaneously.66 Combined with the armored vehicles detailed for supply runs and medical evacuations, some combat commanders were lucky to have 40 percent of their armored vehicles present for combat.

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64 A good example from another war is Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau, The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War, Quantico: U.S. Marine Corps Study, 1998, pp. 198–204.

65 The authors are unable to find any indication that the Russians had meaningful, contemporary logistics norms for urban combat. Their great urban battles of World War II (Stalingrad, Warsaw, Konigsberg, Budapest, Berlin) were fought primarily with foot infantry and little mechanized support. The mechanized forces were used to encircle the cities and fight on the city approaches.

In order to meet increased maintenance demands, the Russians formed three separate maintenance battalions and two maintenance detachments in addition to the deployed TO&E units. The Russians established collection and repair points on each axis. In the west, the rear point was in Vladikavkaz, while the forward was located near the trains of an airborne division. In the north, the rear point was in Mozdok, while the forward was with the trains of a motorized rifle brigade. In the east, the Russians established three forward collection and repair points: with the trains of a motorized rifle division, an airborne regiment, and a motorized rifle regiment.

During the month of January 1995, forward support and depot maintenance repaired 1,286 vehicles and returned them to their units. These included 404 armored vehicles, 789 wheeled vehicles, and 75 artillery pieces. Maintenance personnel evacuated another 259 damaged armored vehicles from Grozny during January fighting. Due to the complexity of fire control systems, automatic reloading systems, electric systems, and communications systems, 26 percent of some types of armored vehicles had to be repaired by factory representatives.

Combat damage and equipment failure were not the only maintenance problems. Money was not available to repair many vehicles prior to the war, and so 646 “hangar queens” were shipped into the theater. All these 646 vehicles (338 wheeled vehicles, 217 armored vehicles, and 41 artillery pieces) had to be repaired prior to the initiation of combat. Maintenance demands exceeded norms to such a degree that 573 tons of armored vehicle spare parts and accessories, 605 tons of wheeled vehicle spare parts and accessories, and 60 tons of artillery spare parts and accessories had to be brought into theater to supplement the on-hand repair parts. As a result of its poor performance and high fuel consumption during the fighting in

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67Maev, p. 55.
68Ibid.
69Ibid., p. 58. Factory representatives were especially needed to repair the T-72 and T-80 tanks; the 2S1 SP 122mm and 2S19 152mm SP howitzers; the 2S5 SP 152mm gun and the 2S6 air defense system.
70Ibid.
Grozny, the Russian high command canceled production of the gas-turbine engine for the T-80 tank.\textsuperscript{71}

\section*{Medical Support}

Russian Army care of the wounded was usually well planned and executed once the patient reached the battalion aid station. Three weeks before the Russian incursion, the Russian Army established and trained special emergency medical treatment detachments in each military district. Four of these detachments deployed to Chechnya to support the maneuver units and supplement their TO&E medical units.\textsuperscript{72}

The Russians utilized their normal conventional war evacuation system and usually employed ground medical evacuation as the quickest and safest form of evacuation. Each maneuver company was reinforced with a physician’s assistant, and each maneuver battalion had a medical doctor plus the ambulance section. Surgeons, anesthetists, and additional nurses manned the regimental medical post.\textsuperscript{73} Wounded were normally evacuated to the regimental medical post by makeshift armored ambulances (BTR-80), since the Chechens fired on the soft-sided ambulances. Forward medical stations and hospitals needed to be dug in or deployed in basements, as the Chechens also shelled these. Patients requiring more extensive medical care were evacuated by MEDEVAC helicopter and MEDEVAC aircraft.\textsuperscript{74} Forward air evacuation was not used much, particularly after the Chechens shot down several MEDEVAC helicopters. The fighting in Grozny proved the need for a specially designed armored ambulance.\textsuperscript{75}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{71} Mikhail Zakharchuk, “Uroki Chechenskogo krizisa” [Lessons of the Chechen crisis], \textit{Armeyskiy sbornik} [Army digest], April 1995, p. 46.
\bibitem{73} Ibid., p. 132.
\bibitem{74} Ibid., p. 134.
\bibitem{75} Yuri Savvin, “Za zhizni voinov” [For the lives of the warriors], \textit{Armeyskiy sbornik} [Army digest], March 1995, p. 45.
\end{thebibliography}
City fighting produced a different percentage of casualty types. Red Cross statistics for limited conflicts usually reflect 23 percent wounded from mines, 26 percent from bullets, 46 percent from shrapnel, 2 percent from burns, and 3 percent miscellaneous. In the city fighting of Grozny, however, there was a higher percentage of burns, and the majority of wounds were caused by mortar fire. The majority of those who were killed or died from wounds were hit in the head and chest by sniper fire (particularly among the civilians who did not have flak jackets and helmets). Whereas the normal ratio of wounded to killed is 3:1 or 4:1, this was reversed in the Grozny city fighting, where three were killed for every wounded. [This ratio is probably skewed and reflects that many of the wounded could not be reached and given first aid in time. The actual initial ratio was probably closer to 2:1 wounded to killed.] Snipers presented a problem for medical evacuation, and frequently the wounded could not be evacuated until nightfall.\textsuperscript{76}

The Russian Army record in disease prevention was nowhere near as impressive as its handling of the wounded. Russian soldiers frequently lacked clean drinking water, clean clothing, hot rations, and washing facilities. Personnel suffered from viral hepatitis, cholera, shigellosis, enterocolitis, diphtheria, malignant anthrax, and plague. One combat brigade had 240 simultaneous cases of viral hepatitis. Since Russian field units were down to 60 percent strength or less at this time, a brigade would be lucky to muster 1,500 personnel. Over 15 percent of this one brigade was down with hepatitis. The brigade was combat ineffective due to disease, and contaminated water was the main culprit. Bacilli from the human intestinal tract were present in 60 to 80 percent of dishwater tested. Some 4 percent of the sick worked in food handling or water distribution.\textsuperscript{77}

Psychiatric casualties are higher in urban combat. Most of the fighting in Chechnya was in cities (first in Grozny and then a succession of smaller cities and finally towns). A Russian military psychia-


trist conducted a survey of 1,312 soldiers during the combat. Soldiers surveyed were still capable of performing combat functions. The survey found that 28 percent were healthy and the other 72 percent had some type of psychological disorder (46 percent exhibited depression; a weak, apathetic, or retarded motor state; or simple insomnia). Other disorders in the 46 percent included a lack of motivation, high anxiety, neuroemotional stress, tiredness, and hypochondriacal fixation or panic attacks. The other 26 percent exhibited psychotic reactions such as high anxiety or aggressiveness, and a deterioration of moral values or interpersonal relations, excitement, or acute depression. About 40 percent of the soldiers screened demonstrated a lack of neuropsychological stability. The longer a soldier was stationed in the war zone, the more radical the change in his neuropsychological condition. The percentage of troops with Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome (PTSD) was higher than in Afghanistan—reflecting the impact of urban combat.

The Russians noted that they should have rotated units frequently to allow the soldiers to bathe, sleep, train, and readjust. This would have required much larger reserves than were available and created an additional logistics load. The Russians recommended that future urban combat include more psychiatric support—including professionals who would work forward in the units.

**Prisoners and Detainees**

Separating combatant from noncombatant was a difficult problem for the Russian armed forces. They began by simply examining suspects for bruises in the pocket of the shoulder to see if they had fired

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78V.S. Novikov, “Psikhofiziologicheskoe obespechenie boevoy deyat’nosti voen-

79Ibid., pp. 37, 38. The unanswered question is, What were these soldiers like before combat? The Russian Army is a conscript army that draws from the segment of society not smart or connected enough to avoid conscription. An inordinate number of conscripts have dropped out from school, have criminal records, and are in poor health. In many units the Russian barracks environment is stressful, with severe hazing and physical abuse viewed as a normal part of army life. Many of the Russian soldiers were probably “damaged goods” before they arrived in Grozny.

80Ibid., p. 39.
a weapon and looking for powder or burn marks on suspects’ forearms and shirt cuffs. By the second month, the Russian internal troops resorted to a simpler method: rounding up most Chechen males and putting them in “filtration” camps. The camps were designed to identify and separate those Chechens who had possibly fought against the Russians from peaceful civilians. Prisoner gathering and maintaining filtration camps, run by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), required a considerable amount of vehicles, food, POL, water and security support—much of which apparently came from Ministry of Defense assets. The Russians were not prepared to handle the mass of prisoners. As a consequence, the prisoner situation was so disordered that the International Red Cross had difficulty locating camps and found it impossible to trace individual prisoners.81

**Handing Off Support to Government and Nongovernment Agencies**

The Russian Armed Forces could not simultaneously fight and restore food delivery, sewers, water processing, public health, and public services in the city. This task was eventually handled by the Ministry of Emergency Situations (EMERCOM). EMERCOM is the successor to the Soviet Union’s civil defense organization. It is a rough equivalent to the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

EMERCOM managed to do a great deal to restore vital services to Grozny. The EMERCOM technical directorate dispatched its epidemic prevention service, which monitored/inspected food supplies; performed bacteriological testing on the sick; conducted disinfection, disinfestation, and rat control in the city; educated the public on health issues; and restored Chechnya’s epidemiological and health centers. It also set up water distribution points at three hospitals; equipped three bathing facilities for patients and medical personnel; removed fallen debris and regular garbage; put three hospital cafeterias back in order; delivered medical and equipment and

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81 Erik Reumann, “Red Cross Ready to Return,” *Passport*, July/August 1996, p. 54. There are allegations of vile treatment and summary execution of prisoners by both sides. Both sides clearly committed gross violations of human rights.
drugs; provided all hospitals with a fully equipped ambulance; restored a maternity center; and provided 190 oil heaters.

EMERCOM technical services further restored more than 50 kilometers of high-voltage power lines; restored three heat and power plants; and set up eight diesel electric stations and repaired another. It restored 5,331 meters of gas lines; delivered gas to 34 high-rise apartment buildings and 21 private buildings; and restored a gas distribution point in the center of Grozny. It set up a field bakery and delivered bread-making ingredients.

Finally, EMERCOM cleared mines from five water pumping and purification stations; performed engineer and medical reconnaissance of water sources; set up water-collection stations on the Sunzha River; provided emergency repair to water and sewage systems, and restored 21 damaged segments on major waterlines on eleven streets. EMERCOM also inspected and tested Grozny’s radioactive and chemical sites; tested fifteen dangerous interagency sites; and exchanged NBC information with the Interior Ministry.82

Beginning in January 1995, EMERCOM assisted UN agency assessment efforts to help displaced persons. As a result, the UN issued a “Flash Appeal” for immediate assistance in February. The appeal requested $25.1 million for shelter, water, sanitation, food, health, community services, distressed children, and support.83 Expected donors included the UN High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), the UN International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Program (WFP), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the International Migration Organization (IOM). Although all the requested aid was not given, these organizations eventually aided some 220,000 people (200,000 from Chechnya, and the rest from North Ossetia plus some from Georgia). Further, the International Red Cross distributed some 250,000 food packages monthly, established a soup kitchen in Grozny, reopened a hospital in Grozny, and

82All material in this section were the result of conversations between Mr. Thomas and the Public Affairs Office of EMERCOM.

opened a “contact service” where people could apply to reestablish contact with lost relatives and friends.\textsuperscript{84}

Conclusion

The Russian Army was poorly prepared for combat in Grozny. It muddled through and even improved somewhat over time. However, the lessons learned from its combat are not limited to the Russian Army, but apply to any modern, mechanized force fighting a determined enemy in a city. The logistics lessons also apply. Urban combat will demand increased amounts of ammunition and special equipment, yet a major problem will be getting the supplies forward to where they are needed. There is a need for a rugged, armored supply/medical evacuation vehicle and a better way of rearming and refueling combat vehicles in the forward area.

There are no empty cities, and the ground commander should conduct contingency planning in case he must care for the needs of the civilian population and restore critical services. The military commander may become the de facto city manager and should be prepared to keep the civilian populace alive and healthy, should this be required. To limit the time spent in this area, the commander should learn to work effectively with other government and nongovernment agencies. This means that a higher percentage of combat service support personnel may be needed before combat begins. Rail and air transport are critical to the logistics effort. Port and rail rehabilitation units may need to be among the first units into an urban theater.

Currently, logistics units in many armies are insufficiently staffed and equipped for urban combat. Urban combat greatly stresses ammunition, water, food, and POL resupply. Maintenance demands greatly increase during urban combat. Vehicle evacuation/obstacle clearance will be an essential engineer/maintenance task. Factory representatives will need to accompany the force, additional maintenance units are needed, and additional spare parts will need to be on hand prior to the initiation of combat. An aggressive screening program is required to keep “hangar queens” out of the theater.

\textsuperscript{84}Reumann, p. 54.
Medical support will also require reinforcement, and preventive medicine will play a major role in preserving the force, as waterborne diseases are very dangerous to its well being. Mortar wounds, burns, and psychiatric trauma increase dramatically in urban combat.

None of these are exclusively Russian problems or observations. Actually, the Russian logistics services performed reasonably well considering the monumental handicaps they had to overcome. The extensive logistics system designed in the Soviet era was no longer in place, and the Russian Army did not have a viable replacement. Logisticians had just over a two-week buildup phase with no logistics rehearsals. [The Soviet Army conducted six major exercises to prepare for the invasion of Prague in 1968. Logistics rehearsals were an essential element of these exercises.]\(^8^5\) The political masters gave the commanders no time to develop the theater, although there was no military reason to hurry. The logistics units were often composite units cobbled together on site. There were few habitual relationships among the participating staffs. Equipment was often broken on arrival. The logisticians were supporting a battle for which the planning norms were outdated. They were faced with the challenge of caring for a large civilian populace while other government and non-government agencies, which could help deal with this problem, were slow to arrive. Yet Russian logisticians adapted to their shortcomings and provided adequate support under very trying circumstances. Other armies would be wise to study the difficulties they encountered and adjust accordingly.

**ANNEX 5: Q&A FROM RECENT OPERATIONS PANEL**

**Question:** Is the culture of the Serbs similar enough to that of former Warsaw Pact nations that we’re going to have the same attitude regarding the low value of life during operations in the cities of Kosovo?

**Mr. Thomas:** I personally call it the Son of Sam psychosis. It happened in Bosnia earlier. This killing begets killing. And it keeps going and going and going. We had a Russian down at a NATO PSYOP course talking about human factors; he said people are kind of like squirrels. When we get too many of them, we’ve just got to thin out the population. It’s a very different cultural mindset. I’m certainly not sitting here telling you that all Russians are like this or that all Serbs are like this, but that comment from him and another one made right after Grozny reinforced the point that there is a diverse cultural difference in the way some people approach life and death. Over in Bosnia they were putting people on table saws; the horrific nature of the way they were killing just stunned us. There are sick folks out there and I think there’s a lot of sick warriors in the world right now. I personally don’t know how we’re going to stop them.

**Mr. Grau:** When you’re fighting for national survival, the survival of your culture, you’re going to fight a lot harder because you’re fighting the ultimate battle.

**Question:** Did Haitian cultural considerations impact your decision to use nonlethal weapons?

**COL Patton:** The situation down in Haiti was very bleak; it still is today. There’s a lot of vigilante justice down there and they are a somewhat violent people. What we had going for us and one of the reasons that we chose to use nonlethal weapons was that they love Americans for the most part. They had a great affinity for our presence down there. We had a significant PSYOP campaign to let the country know that we were down there for benevolent reasons. We were repairing schools and hospitals and digging wells. We felt that the nonlethal weapons provided us with an option short of deadly force that would probably serve us well in most situations. As I men-
tioned, we never had to use them while I was there, but we were prepared to use them for crowd control because we did get gatherings of large groups around our compounds.

**Question:** What’s the most urgent need for young soldiers and marines right now regarding deficiencies in equipment and organization given our discussions over the past two days?

**COL Patton:** As I sit here thinking about my experience in Haiti, in that particular environment I don’t know that we really had a deficiency, especially of an equipment nature. I think our equipment was adequate. I think what that environment proved to us is that well-disciplined, well-trained, well-led troops can still accomplish missions in that type of environment. It was nothing like what’s been described in previous discussions today about city fighting, urban combat. We just didn’t face that type of threat. We had good soldiers and good marines down there.