INTRODUCTION

As the 21st century looms on the horizon, mankind is witnessing powerful changes in both the characteristics and patterns of warfare. As a result, the very fundamentals of warfare are no longer the same. Until World War II, virtually all wars took the shape of positional warfare, prolonged warfare, or wars of attrition.¹ Their similarities lay in their characteristics of absoluteness. As Clausewitz so aptly put it, "War is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."² According to this point of view, victory can be the only objective of any war. This type of warfare involving the direct confrontation of ground forces inevitably led to heavy human and economic losses on both sides.

The Industrial Revolution brought about innovations in scientific technology, introducing flying machines to the battlefield and moving wars into three dimensions. In the early 20th century, pioneers of air power theory, such classical air theorists as Italy’s Giulio Douhet,³ Britain’s Hugh Trenchard,⁴ America’s William

³Douhet was the first to write a comprehensive theory of air power; his book, The Command of the Air, published in 1921, addressed air warfare in terms theoretically
Mitchell,\(^5\) and the Russian-born American Alexander de Seversky\(^6\) predicted that, “In the future, air superiority would decide the outcome of war.” Farsighted as they were, these innovators faced great difficulty in obtaining public support for their views.

The concept of strategic bombing, emphasized by the early theorists, overlooked the limitations of these early weapons systems and the development of antiaircraft weapons. Doubts emerged regarding whether air power could achieve its objectives. Even after the U.S. Air Force 8th Bomber Squadron’s successful strategic bombing of the German Schweinfurt ball-bearing factory in the fall of 1943 during World War II, an event which led to the development of independent air forces in most of the advanced nations, the concept of strategic bombardment continued to struggle with its past limitations. Hence, when it was employed again with lackluster results during the Korean and the Vietnam wars, there was no silencing its critics.

Fortunately, in the Gulf War air power fundamentally broke with its past. Air Vice Marshal Tony Mason, RAF (ret.) wrote, “the Gulf War marked the apotheosis of twentieth-century air power.”\(^7\) Air power, employed strategically, proved that the attainment of air superiority could, indeed, decide the outcome of war. Furthermore, the manner in which the power was deployed showed that by simultaneously destroying several targets through selective destruction methods, victory could be achieved in a much shorter period of time and with far less sacrifice than could ever be gained through the use of mass destruction.\(^8\) Throughout the Gulf War, air power also demonstrated that it was no longer an extension of fire power for ground and naval forces, but was, instead, a mature capability that could itself directly achieve the national objective. During the Gulf War, air power finally applicable to any industrialized state. “To conquer command of the air means victory...”

lived up to the expectations of those beleaguered early pioneers of air power theory.

In order to profit from the recent validation of such air doctrines, the Korean Air Force must continue to develop in the area of early warning systems, intelligence warfare, stealth aircraft, and overall accuracy. Furthermore, there must be consensus among military services that air power will take the initiative in future warfare. In this regard, the efforts of the Korean Air Force to construct a “Strategic Air Force,” by initiating appropriate methods and providing direction for the Republic of Korea Air Force in future conflicts on the Korean peninsula, are a laudable and effective course of action in accordance with the changed war pattern.

As part of that effort, this chapter considers the current status and emerging trends in Korean aerospace power strategies. It aims to forecast the shape of future warfare, and to help bring about changes in the understanding of the uses of air power. At the same time, it will analyze security threat factors, taking into consideration that Korea is surrounded by regional superpowers and that North Korea has demonstrated a consistent pattern of invading South Korea. Finally, this chapter seeks to address the future direction of aerospace power strategies and the construction of military power in Korea for purposes of national security and unification. Discussion focuses on strategic objectives and how they are achieved; this chapter does not address the aerospace industry or resources that deal with issues such as the distribution of the national defense budget or military organization.

The reason the term “aerospace power” is used instead of “air power” is to emphasize the need for the orchestration of all resources utilizing three-dimensional space. These include the Air Force, Army, and Navy aerospace power systems, as well as civilian aviation and military satellites, which will be active components in the future. I would like to note that this chapter does not represent official policy or strategy of the Korean Air Force; it is an individual opinion prepared for scholarly presentation. As a former frontline fighter pilot and retired general, I feel that it is my duty and responsibility to improve Korean military strategy for our national security.
FUTURE WARFARE AND AEROSPACE POWER

Changes in War Pattern

War, defined as a “collision between two opposing wills and organized forces,” requires the employment of one of two military strategies. The first possible employment is to destroy the enemy’s organized forces such that they must surrender their will. The second is to paralyze the enemy’s will and so destroy its ability to take effective action.

Wars prior to World War II generally took the shape of the former wherein destroying the enemy’s ability to wage war was considered the only way to fight. Even if the strategists of the past could have conceived of directly challenging the enemy’s will, they had no substantial method by which to do so. As the French Revolution and the Napoleonic War introduced the concept of a “peoples war: national war” and the industrial revolution brought new developments to the waging of war, war patterns started to take the shape of two massive forces colliding in a fierce battle zone. If one side did not possess superior strategy or military operations, then the eventual result was positional warfare, prolonged war, or a war of attrition.

During World War II, the concept of “blitzkrieg” was introduced. Its fast maneuvers enabled the enemy’s strong points to be avoided. Furthermore, by penetrating his weak points, one could attack the enemy deep within his territory and, subsequently, bring confusion and massive destruction to his military power. These strategies were attempts to bring an early termination to the war. They departed from previous warfare where military strategy had been aimed at destroying the enemy’s military force and not at attacking his will to fight.

After two world wars revealed that technology had advanced to the point of permitting unlimited destruction, war patterns began to change. After World War II, military strategists adopted the method

of suppressing the enemy’s resistance by paralyzing his will to fight. Again, the concept was a departure from past warfare where fighting by two well-trained and heavily armed forces not only consumed excessive time and resources but brought heavy casualties and high insecurity, not only to the fighting parties, but to the rest of the world as well.

Wars have always begun because one of the parties involved believes that there is some benefit to be gained through the means of war. Today, wars for the sake of war, wars to appease emotions, such as a war of revenge bent on total annihilation of one’s enemy, are no longer permitted. As the world becomes more aware of the interconnectedness of nations and peoples, such wars are no longer tolerated by the global community. There is sound reason for this lack of tolerance.

Modern science and technology have increased the destructive ability and the precision of weaponry to an alarming level. The spread of war technologies has led to a worldwide proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Paradoxically, if one nation or group should attempt to force its will upon another in an attempt to gain something through war, that group or nation would likely have to resort to the kind of destruction of its enemy that would also destroy the benefits (e.g., land, resources, etc.) that it sought to attain in the first place. Moreover, wars of that nature can escalate to a level of such massive destruction to both sides, to surrounding populations and beyond, that they can no longer be endured.

In other words, mankind has at last reached a level of wisdom where no emotional reason for war can be acceptable, and no war can be permitted to continue to the point of total annihilation of an enemy. Such a war destroys vanquished and victor alike. However, war remains pragmatic. Should the international community deem that a particular war is necessary, will that pragmatism still prevail? By the same token, should a measure be known that will end the war with the least amount of casualties on either side, that measure must be taken.

The humanitarianism which came to the fore after World War II has greatly influenced the strategies of war. Military strategists now consider costs in terms of human life rather than in material terms. In
other words, it is better to spend more money on sophisticated weaponry than to sacrifice many human lives. Past methods of mass destruction are eschewed in favor of more indirect approaches. Maneuverability has became a key factor in fighting methods.\textsuperscript{11} Primary strategic attack patterns now include attacking enemy troops before they set their position at the front line, while they are in the midst of mobilization, or causing shock, confusion and paralysis by seeking them out for attack deep within their own territory.

Future military deployments will be very limited in comparison to those in the past. Where once victory was proclaimed through territorial conquest and the destruction of the enemy forces, today it is defined through showing one’s will to fight while, at the same time, suppressing the enemy’s will. I believe that in wars of the future, victory will be achieved not by direct confrontation, but by identifying the extent of the enemy’s will and then conducting a precision attack on the enemy’s strategic center of gravity.

Because of scientific advances, a typical representation of future warfare will involve the employment of a limited military force that has the capacity to inflict a high level of indirect damage at the enemy’s strategic center of gravity. Situational battles commensurate with the changes in the strategic environment will be the general pattern of war. Political victories will be achieved through intense battles of relatively short duration, thus minimizing unnecessary expansion. This more advanced form of war, and the transition in war patterns themselves, will meet the demands of the international strategic environment.

**Changes in Aerospace Power Awareness**

Since the new concept of fighting in the air or “victory through air power”\textsuperscript{12} was introduced into two-dimensional ground and sea war, the contours of war have changed dramatically. Still, not everyone is convinced that air power will lead the way in future wars.


These lingering doubts about air power stem from two major criticisms. The first concerns a lack of sustainability as compared to ground and naval forces. Airplanes must land in order to refuel, rearm and exchange flight members and therefore, they can not control the battlefield for a long period of time. The second criticism centers on the fact that air missions are limited in bad weather conditions and at night. Thus, it is argued that because air power can not seize or conquer ground or marine territory, it can not perform the same role as ground or naval forces. Then, there is the cost-effectiveness issue. Generally, the cost of possessing air power is tremendous and, for this reason, it is argued that it is better to use other less-costly measures. However, it is unfair to conclude that air power is not useful or effective simply because of its inability to control every battlefield detail. As this chapter will demonstrate, air power is too forceful a battle element to ignore.

In truth, warfare requires diverse strategies and diverse weapons. Although a specific force may dominate a war, it is very rare that it assumes sole responsibility for the tactics of the whole war. Elements such as the characteristics of the enemy, the war itself, and the cost that the population must bear, decide the kind of military tool, and in what ratio it must be applied as the mode of warfare. Looking at it from this perspective, a nation’s dependence upon air power is enormous. Air power, which has one of the best surprise-attack abilities and maneuverability among all military strategies, can be relied upon as the major strategy in a war or a conflict. Indeed, that is the case, especially with recent technological developments, for we are now seeing more and more political and strategic needs met by air power.

Dr. Edward N. Luttwak of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in the United States made the following remarks regarding past perceptions of modern air power’s ability to achieve political and strategic objectives: “. . . seventy years of overpromising by air power advocates had left a deep residue of distrust in Washington’s military culture because air power was thought to have failed in Indochina in some very general sense and because it was not
deemed to have been ‘decisive’ in either the Korean War or the Second World War...”13

That perception persisted right up until the war against Iraq. Many people were convinced that air power in that endeavor would also be “indecisive” while others predicted outright failure. Those who held those views did not foresee the profound impact that air power had in Iraq and more recently, in Kosovo. During the Iraq war in January 1991, aircraft such as the F-15Es, F-111s, and F-117s fighters dropped laser-guided bombs within three feet of their intended targets. The whole world watched the actual filming of the attack sequences on TV, electronically witnessing the devastating impact of the bombings. Today air power has revived belief in the capabilities of air power that General Giulio Douhet, General Billy Mitchell, Air Marshal Hugh Trenchard, and the other theorists of the 1920s assumed. The bold assertion, “To have command of the air is to have victory” was finally borne out in the Iraq air war. The 1991 Gulf War, which took place exactly eighty years after the first employment of air power by the Italians during the North African War in 1911, marks a turning point in our perceptions of air power.

The Future Roles of Aerospace Power

War is an extension of politics, and the objective of military operations is to achieve political goals. The political objective of a war ranges from securing the unconditional surrender of the enemy to making the enemy accept a cease-fire under favorable conditions. No matter what the objective, however, it is safe to say that the formation of a political objective emanates from leadership decisions by the adversary. In other words, a nation decides what kind of concession must be gained based on its enemy’s actions. Clearly, if the enemy’s command structure is of the utmost importance, then in every war activity the enemy’s leadership, as the enemy’s center of gravity, should be considered the designated target.

However, it is not always prudent to directly attack an enemy’s command structure. The reason is quite simple. If I know that the enemy’s command structure is important, then so does the enemy, and he will protect it with heavy defensive structures. If it is to be attacked, the attack must be successful. If success cannot be assured, then it is more prudent not to attack. This is precisely why destroying the will of the enemy leadership was not considered a military objective in earlier warfare. There simply were not the appropriate means to overcome the enemy defense line and penetrate the leadership command structure.

But that is not the case now. Today, we have the means. Most definitely, air power has closed the gap between strategies and tactics and brought changes in every dimension. John A. Warden III, professor of the USAF Command and Staff College who planned the air campaigns for the Gulf War, says, “Air power’s role in strategic warfare is to bring strategic paralysis so that the enemy can’t physically respond to it. Whether it will be direct or indirect, all efforts should be aimed at the enemy’s strategic center.” As seen in the Gulf War, air power has matured to the ideal level of capability that the air power pioneers once dreamt of.

Air power can now play its role as the most effective method of attacking the enemy’s center of gravity, and this air power, which has developed so much in recent years, will dominate the warfare of the 21st century. Aerospace power of the future, as an ideologist of air power once said, will become a core force that will execute a new way of warfare, and become the definitive concept of the term, decisive war. In the past, air power was employed in order to support the mobilization of ground forces. In the future, the opposite will occur: ground and naval forces will mobilize in order to support air offensive operations. Just as territorial conquest, which was the main issue in past two-dimensional wars, has lost its importance in the three-dimensional war, so too, the tactics that were once conducted as serial strategies have given way to air campaigns in which multiple air operations occur simultaneously.

As we witnessed during the Gulf War in which all air operations were conducted in parallel, aerospace power now makes possible the “attack that can be done simultaneously anywhere” just as Clausewitz foresaw that it would. Parallel warfare has overcome the limitations of the serial warfare we knew in the past. It can now strategically paralyze the enemy to bring a fast conclusion to a war. This will be aerospace power’s major role in future warfare.\footnote{Professor Meilinger of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies also describe some of airpower’s unique characteristics such as “Airpower can simultaneously conduct parallel operations at all levels of war.” Phillip S. Meilinger, “Ten Propositions Regarding Airpower,” \textit{Airpower Journal}, Spring 1996, pp. 52–53.}

The Gulf War may well be remembered as the war that helped the United States overcome the failures of the Vietnam War and achieve a brilliant military victory. “The Persian Gulf War was the first major conflict after the end of the Cold War. The victory was a triumph of coalition strategy, of international cooperation, of technology, and of people. It reflected leadership, patience, and courage at the highest levels and in the field.”\footnote{Dick Cheney, “Overview: The Conduct of the Persian Gulf War,” \textit{Conduct of the Persian Gulf War} (Department of Defense, April 1992) p. 159.} What are the lessons of the Gulf War? There are some who argue that it was a fight between an adult and a child and that a U.S. victory was inevitable. Others contend that because the Gulf War was a desert war, it contained the geographic conditions that most effectively showcase the value of air power. It is also argued that one can not expect the same performance in another sort of environment, such as on the Korean peninsula, where the two sides have relatively similar forces and a shared, mountainous terrain. While these arguments are certainly not without merit, when analyzing the Gulf War, we would do better to focus on more fundamental questions.

During the Gulf War (January 17–February 28, 1991), it is generally acknowledged that the United States conducted most of its offense through the use of air power. When the war was over, there were only 100 hours of ground forces operations. Air power, which dominated most aspects of the war, attacked extensive targets in the early stages. It also conducted selective and systematic precision surgical attacks on Iraqi command, control, communication systems, SCUD missile sites, and chemical and air defense targets. Having lost its command
centers and its nerve system, Iraq became strategically disabled. The United States then focused its air power on the Iraqi supply line and executed compounding damage.

By the time ground operations started, air power had already destroyed the Iraqi force response ability. The multinational force destroyed three times more targets during the 40 days of the Gulf War than the U.S. 8th Air Force did during the whole year in 1943 when World War II's strategic bombing was at its height.

For this reason, the Gulf War will be remembered as the war in which air power forever ceased being the support of ground and naval operations and came into its own as an independent firepower that directly aims at achieving the war objective with the support of ground and naval forces. In fact, the Gulf War demonstrated that the systematic operations of air power, using high technology such as satellites, airborne warning control systems (AWACS), electronic warfare aircraft, joint surveillance target attack radar systems (J-STARS), advanced fighter planes, and strong and precise destructive weapons, can destroy almost any enemy target without the support of ground forces.

The Gulf War is likely to be the beginning of futuristic warfare which will be conducted in a new pattern with new methods. We have learned from the Gulf War the lesson that "Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur." Although we cannot predict what advanced weaponry the rapidly changing technologies will develop, we can be sure that aerospace power will play a decisive role in the outcome of future wars.

SECURITY THREATS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

The Strategic Environments and Security Threats

Though the New International Order which came about with the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s has not yet reached its potential dimensions, Francis Fukuyama has caught our attention with his famous characterization of today’s period as “the end of history” and

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his statement that “what we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”\textsuperscript{18} He argues his optimistic view by interpreting the past in the following way: “... for human history and the conflict that characterized it was based on the existence of contradictions. ... But in the universal homogeneous state, all prior contradictions are resolved and all human needs are satisfied. There is no struggle or conflict over large issues. ...”\textsuperscript{19}

On the other hand, the more pessimistically inclined Samuel Huntington argues that “the end of the Cold War does not mean the end of political, ideological, diplomatic, economic, technological or even military rivalry among nations. It does not mean the end of the struggle for power and influence. It very probably does mean increased instability, unpredictability, and violence in international affairs. It could mean the end of the Long Peace.”\textsuperscript{20}

Regardless of varying interpretations such as these, the end of the Cold War can certainly be said to have brought about many changes in the international system. Today’s economic, national, religious and racial conflicts, the steady increase in traditional armament as seen particularly in the Middle East and Northeast Asia, and the proliferation weapons of mass destruction throughout the world,\textsuperscript{21} are clear signs of post–Cold War strategic insecurity. The Gulf War and the Kosovo Conflict are prime examples of this insecurity.

In this strategically insecure international environment, the Korean peninsula exists in a Cold War situation of confrontation that is just beginning to enter a transitional period, riding the tide of international changes. North Korea, in the midst of economic decay,

\textsuperscript{19}Francis Fukuyama, ibid, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{21}Former Defense Secretary William J. Perry sees the potential security threats on the horizon: Weapons of mass destruction could spread to nations hostile to the United States, such as North Korea or Iraq, in his book, \textit{“Preventive Defense”} (\textit{The Korea Herald}, March 16, 1999.)
has shown signs of structural collapse. Despite this, it continues to strive for a communist unification of the peninsula and to make political, diplomatic, economic and military responses very difficult because of its constant nuclear and chemical weapons threats. It is widely known that the security on the Korean peninsula is, in the short run, directly related to the situation in the North. It is also closely related to the strategic situations of neighboring nations. In fact, the entire Northeast Asian region is representative of the elements of strategic insecurity inherent in the defunct Cold War international system.

China is moving away from its past territorial centered defense policy and is rigorously trying to construct a modern military through its so-called "Positive Offshore Defense" policy which attempts to interdict an enemy before it reaches Chinese territory.22

Japan, which has been under pressure from the United States since the 1980s to increase its military commitments, is now increasing its military power. In 1993, Japan announced the adoption of the "Miyazawa Doctrine." Under this doctrine, Japan plans to build a political superpower suitable to the strength of its economy. In 1997, the United States and Japan concluded an agreement on guidelines for closer defense coordination. Despite the agreement’s call for pan-Asianism, many see Japan’s increase in military, political, and economic influence as a harbinger of its hegemony and the advancement of its military power.

Russia is still suffering from political and economic problems stemming from the fall of the Soviet Union, and it is predicted that it won’t be able to overcome its severe domestic problems for some time to come. However, its military influence is still strong in the international arena. There is reason to surmise that, to gain popular support and recover its past glory, Russia will strengthen its military influence, especially in the Northeast Asia region.

Although the United States is not a regional member of Northeast Asia, it is the main superpower in keeping world order after the Cold War era, and it is a prime influence in the Northeast Asian region. There is every indication that for some time to come U.S. military

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22 Chinese People’s Newspaper, September 15, 1989.
influence will remain necessary in this region. However, the imbalance in the power structure leaning toward the United States, and domestic problems arising out of economic ones have reduced the U.S. desire to become involved in numerous small-scale conflicts. This phenomenon is a result of the national security strategy of “engagement and enlargement” wherein the United States is trying to selectively engage itself in conflicts around the world that directly affect its national interests. This may well be an important variable affecting strategic insecurity, not only on the Korean peninsula, but in the whole of Northeast Asia.

In this new international order, the Northeast Asian strategic environment displays more insecurity than it did during the Cold War era. The situation on the Korean peninsula is complex, comprising an acute confrontational position between the North and the South and various interactions regarding national security with the neighboring powers such as the United States, Russia, Japan, and China.

Even though the safeguarding of a nation from military offensives is not the only objective of a government, it is the absolute condition for the pursuit of democratic social values, such as political freedom. If a country possesses a certain level of military force to maintain national security, then, to be sure, that military force must be viewed as a liberating one enabling the nation to use its energy and resources for other purposes, such as development. Thus, military force itself is a mandatory element, not only of national security, but also of prosperity.

The two Korean states and their neighboring countries recognize the usefulness of increasing their military power. Unfortunately, however, efforts toward expansion in this area sometimes cause political conflict and, with this, the possibility of military conflict also exists, where one state’s security comes to be defined as another state’s insecurity. Given this perspective of Northeast Asia’s security environment, it is possible to analyze and predict the extent of military threat in the area.

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North Korea is a present danger for South Korea and it will remain so in the near term. In the early decades of the 21st century, however, its threat will decrease gradually. However, even though North Korea is showing signs of collapse, if it does not abandon its goal of communist unification, the threat of full or limited war caused by a North Korean invasion of the South will continue to exist. North Korea may already possesses nuclear arms and surface to surface ballistic missiles such as the No Dong I and II and Taepo Dong I, with a radius that can reach neighboring countries. North Korea launched a three-stage Taepo Dong I missile last August, insisting that it merely put a small satellite in orbit to briefly broadcast a song in praise of the late Kim Il-Sung. "While we expected a Taepo Dong I launch for sometime, its use of a small third stage in the attempt to deploy a very small satellite was not anticipated," U.S. State Department spokesman James Rubin said in a press briefing.

Although the Taepo Dong I still has technical kinks to be worked out before it can deliver a small payload at intercontinental range, the new and improved Taepo Dong II could deliver a somewhat larger payload. "North Korea could be able to test-launch this missile in 1999," said Rubin. Taking this into account, we must recognize that should a military conflict occur, the possibility of mass killing due to nuclear-bio-chemical weapons could be a rather high possibility.

The concerns surrounding North Korea’s possession of nuclear sites in Yongbyun and Kumchang-ri and ballistic missiles are not limited to the Korean peninsula. The fact that a country like North Korea, recognized as a terrorist country by international society, possesses a nuclear delivery capability is closely related to issues regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons and could become a serious international political problem.

Korea also confronts problems with its neighboring countries that must be solved through diplomatic means. However, it must consider the potential military threat from neighboring countries and it cannot afford to lessen its military preparation. There is a possibility that conflicts could arise with regard to the environment.

\[24\text{The Korea Herald, February 5, 1999.}\]
\[25\text{Ibid.}\]
After unification, China's northern border claims and Japanese claims on Tokdo, and disputes over marine resources and sea lanes of communication could also create conflict. Although it does not have a direct relationship to Korea, the South China Sea dispute between China, Taiwan, Vietnam, and the Philippines, the Daioyu/Senkaku dispute between China and Japan, and the Kuril Islands dispute between Japan and Russia could all have an indirect effect on Korea's security. Therefore, Korea should also prepare for these kinds of indirect threats.

**Future Warfare on the Korean Peninsula**

Today the Korean peninsula is a region with a high potential for a major conflict, possibly more so than any other region in the world. Korea has spent 46 years with a cease-fire agreement, but without a peace treaty. Both sides have maintained intensive war preparations. As a result, both North and South Korea have strong military capacities, capable of causing massive destruction on both sides.

The military power possessed by the two Koreas developed as each responded to the other's military force and each focuses on winning through consecutive decisive battles. If a war breaks out in the current situation, North Korea would undoubtedly attempt rapid penetration of the South, using its superior numbers of troops, tanks, aircraft, maneuvers and firepower to try to destroy South Korean forces quickly. It is believed that the North would attempt to penetrate rapidly into the deepest zones of the South, employing special forces to establish a second frontline and using a fighting concept, such as the operational maneuver group tactics used by the former Soviet Union or the guerrilla warfare favored by Mao Zedong. The possibility exists that North Korea already possesses nuclear arms and surface-to-surface ballistic missiles such as the No Dong I and II and Taepo Dong I, with a range capable of covering all of South Korea.

In response to such North Korean military strategies, the South, under the Korean-U.S. combined defense system, would apply the U.S. air-land battle operations concept. This would establish three-dimensional maneuver warfare. By quickly responding, South Korea could achieve dominance at an early stage of the war and,
subsequently, by means of its offensive defense strategy, achieve military victory and the unification of the Korean peninsula.

A nation’s security environment should be viewed within the context of the regional constellation of which it is a part. History teaches us the lesson that the composition of such constellations fundamentally operates according to the principle of power. Korea’s neighboring countries are some of the most powerful in the world, and they stand to possess much stronger national and military power in the foreseeable future. As noted earlier, conflict could arise between Korea and its neighboring countries over marine resources, territorial disputes, environmental issues, and sea lanes of communication. Furthermore, conflicts between neighboring countries could also have an indirect effect upon Korea.

Most of these elements of potential conflict should be resolved through political and diplomatic methods. However, military power lends force to these methods, thus playing an important role. Military power is also a last resort to be used in the interests of national security. If we consider size, characteristics and methods, the use of force in conflicts between South and North Korea and in conflicts between Korea and its neighboring countries would be viewed as fundamentally different. The reason being, first of all, that the purposes for using force would be different. A war with North Korea would be for survival, while a war with a neighboring country would for national interest.

If a war should occur with a neighboring country, it would be characterized as a local limited war with a limited number of targets. Its aim would be to force subsequent political negotiations. Korea’s neighbors possess highly modernized weapons systems and they have the capability to do severe damage to the Korean center of gravity in a short period of time. For this reason, if a conflict should occur with a neighboring country, the method of response would be determined by the objective, the size of military force, the level of modernization, the war fighting capacity of each unit, and its employment. Unlike war against the North which would follow Alvin Toffler’s so called “second-wave” pattern of warfare, using massive firepower and maneuvers, war with Korea’s other neighbors would
likely be limited to “third-wave” warfare. These conditions of facing two distinct types of potential warfare make it impossible for South Korea to work out a single military strategic objective. Instead, South Korea must prepare for two very different and complex types of war.

KOREAN AEROSPACE POWER STRATEGIES AND MILITARY POWER CONSTRUCTIONS

Military Power and Aerospace Power Strategies

Military power is an element of national power just as are politics, diplomacy, economics and scientific development and, like these, it has its own methods to accomplish its particular purpose in the overall schema of national power. Every writer on military or naval affairs has a different definition of strategy. For example, Liddell Hart writes that it is “. . . the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy. . . .” 27 Karl Von Clausewitz defines strategy as “. . . the use of the employments for the object of the war. . . .” 28 Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie, U.S. Navy, writes that strategy is “. . . a plan of action designed . . . to achieve some end: a purpose together with a system of measures for its accomplishment. . . .” Former Professor William P. Snyder of the Air War College points out that two elements are common to all of these definitions. The first is an objective, a goal, something that is to be accomplished. For Liddell Hart, that objective is “the ends of policy”; for Clausewitz it is “the objective of war.” The second common element in these definitions is that military strategy is seen as something to work with, it is a resource or, to use a more currently popular word, an asset.

What links resource and objective together is a plan. The definition of strategy embraces all three concepts: objective, resource, and a

26Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century (Little, Brown and Company, 1993) pp. 38–43, pp. 64–80, “The Industrial Revolution launched the Second Wave of historical change. . . and war once more mirrored the changes in wealth creation and work. . . . Something occurred in the night skies and desert sands of the Middle East in 1991 that the world had not seen for a new form of warfare that closely mirrors a new form of wealth creation. . . . more accurately, it applied two different war forms, one Second Wave, the other Third Wave.”
plan tying the two together. To put the definition in a military context, military strategy is a broad concept that includes a military objective and a plan for achieving that objective by means of military resources. General Maxwell Taylor, the former U.S. Commander in the Vietnam War, also said that military strategy includes objective, method and means. His definition is very close to that of Professor Snyder who says that the core elements embodied in strategy are an objective, a plan or concept, and resources.

We find the definition only slightly altered in General Andre Beaufre’s notion: “la Strategie Militaire s’agit de l’art d’employer les forces militaires pour atteindre les resultats fixes par la politique.” The military strategies discussed by these military strategists include every kind of military power that one nation might possess. Air power is one of the components of military power and it is the most practical one for accomplishing particular objectives.

The air power doctrine of the Royal Air Force states: “air power strategy is the comprehensive plan for employing air power during wartime.” However, when we add to this notion the three elements of development, deployment, and employment which any military strategy must consider, then air power can be understood as a way of thinking that develops, prepares, and employs air power according to the dictates of national policy.

Air strategy may have a specific practical objective in its employment but, fundamentally, air power has the same objective as an overall military strategy. Not too long ago, when air power’s chief role was to serve as an extension of firepower and be there only to support ground and naval forces, there was a gap between an air power employment objective and an overall military strategy. Today’s aerospace power, which now contains strategic effects, has narrowed the gap between strategy and tactics and, with that, it has also narrowed the gap between aerospace power’s employment objective and the overall military objective.

29William P. Snyder, Strategy: Defending It, Understanding It, and Making It (Air War College, Air University, Maxwell AFB AL, 1 June 1995, p. 8.
If aerospace power’s inherent practical objective for achieving Korea’s military objective is to deter war in peace time and to bring victory during times of war, then its fundamental objective is also the same as Korea’s overall military objective. To achieve this mutual goal, the Korean concept of aerospace power must encompass the objectives of its employment in order that capabilities and resources be secured for the achievement of those objectives.

DETERRENCE AND COMPELLENCE STRATEGIES IN PEACE TIME

In his discussion on military strategies and political objectives, Robert J. Art writes, “although there may be differences depending on each nation’s objective and goal, the military’s contribution to a political objective takes four shapes of defense, deterrence, compellence, and demonstration.”32 Let us take a look at these shapes. First, a defensive use of military power means to defend against enemy attack before it occurs, or when attacked, its objective is to minimize the damage incurred. Here the aim is at the potential or actual forces of the enemy. Defense can be nonviolent but it does not avoid the use of violence. Defensive military power is applied when there is a clear threat of attack from the enemy, in which case defense consists of conducting a preemptive attack. Defensive military power is also applied after an attack. However, since the advent of absolute destructive weapons such as nuclear weapons, it is no longer possible to assume that a nation can even survive a first attack. Pragmatically, therefore, the defense strategy has been abandoned and deterrence has come to be recognized as a more realistic alternative.

The deterrent use of military power, the second of the four delineated by Robert J. Art, dominated strategic thinking during the Cold War era. Thanks to the proliferation of nuclear and long-range missiles after the 1950s, it became paramount that a collision of two military forces be avoided. Hence, deterrence became the dominant mode of military strategy. In past strategies, the use of power and technology were the main focus, but all this changed with the

dominance of deterrence. Instead, what we might call a disuse, or the avoidance of the use of power and technology became the main focus. As a strategy, deterrence can best be defined as getting “a message” to the enemy that severe damage to its territory can be inflicted; and when the enemy correctly reads this message, the information in it deters them from engaging in any activity that might trigger such an event.

In other words, deterrence works to prevent undesirable situations by threatening and making the enemy realize that there is more risk than benefit in taking an antagonistic action. How the enemy responds to the information in the message determines the effect of deterrence. If the threat fails and force must be used to retaliate, then deterrence has failed. However, sometimes the reasons why deterrence fails as a strategy are unknown to the participants of either side.

Cultural differences and perceptions sometimes cause a threat to be interpreted in a way other than intended, and often times the deterring message and the method of delivering it to the presumed aggressor are interpreted differently by sender and receiver. Sometimes, too, conflicts arising from a sudden situation or nonrational or illegitimate activity cannot be deterred. The environment of military strategies in today’s world, characterized as it is by various stages of transition, certainly points up the notion that there are limits to deterrent use of military power as a means to prevent conflict including small-scale or low-intensity conflict.

Let us turn now to the third contribution of military power, compellence strategy, and see how it fares in today’s world. A compellence use of military power should influence an enemy’s decisions and actions by making them feel pain or damage. If the enemy has already made its decision, then through the use of military power it may be influenced to retract its action or stop an undesirable action.

In his book, *Arms and Influence*, Thomas Schelling notes: “the problem of compellence, that is, convincing an enemy to stop an attack once it has begun, or to change its behavior in other ways, is essentially similar to the relationship between these two forms of co-
Alexander George defines compellence as “threatening another nation in order to stop its action, or return to its original state what they have done or return whatever they have accomplished.” Alexander George defines compellence as “threatening another nation in order to stop its action, or return to its original state what they have done or return whatever they have accomplished.”

In other words, compellence can be defined as deterring the enemy from starting any adverse activity. If they have already begun their adverse activity, then compellence, like deterrence, would involve stopping the enemy from achieving its objective and making enemy leaders repair damages that have already been inflicted.

Robert J. Art contends that “the compellence use of forces is for both peaceful and physical purposes.” In compellence, the use of force for peaceful purposes should work toward a diplomatic conciliation. This, of course, involves talk, negotiation, and compromise. But there is also another use of force common to compellence, and that is the use of a punishing attack to persuade the enemy to retract or take another stance. We see that force is used when threat is not “compelling” enough. But it must also be carefully orchestrated. When force is necessary, it should be limited and selective and its aim should be to clearly make the enemy reconsider or bring an early end to the conflict with terms agreeable to both sides. Strategists consider that compellence is both possible and effective not only for purposes of experimental and selective control, but for maintaining a steady state of control as well.

There are, of course, differences between deterrence and compellence strategies. Deterrence uses passive force in order to prevent any potential action before it occurs, but compellence actively uses force and considers further action and the enemy’s responses to those actions. Compellence strategy appears to have a clearer objective than deterrence, however because the objective must take into account the opponent’s possible reactions, planning can be complex and difficult in actuality. Deterrence can temporize a situation through appropriate deception or dissembling, but compellence requires an outward, observable change based on the enemy’s clear understanding of the compellence message. The nature of dissem-

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35 Robert J. Art, Ibid., p. 27.
blinding and deception is disguise and obfuscation, not understanding. Therefore, compellence strategies must always avoid being involved with any sort of deterrence method that calls for disguise in any form. Despite the restrictions put upon delivering the compellence message, it is hailed in the arena of international relationships as the third strategy to use because it is recognized as a viable alternative to the limitations imposed upon defense and deterrence strategies by weapons of mass destruction. The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and the Gulf War in 1991 led by the United States are two good examples of the use of compellence strategies.

The multinational forces forced the Iraqis to give up their intention by steadily increasing the level of compellence through isolation. Such gradual and successive coercive methods coincided well with the “politically oriented limited military employment” concept, demanded of modern military employment. Furthermore, since coercive methods were employed with clear intention and calculation, they were typical representations of compellence strategy. With the enactment of these coercive methods, the first stage of compellence had begun and, in this way, the United States and international society unequivocally made known their intention and demanded that Iraq give up its will and cease its aggression toward Kuwait.

It is true, however, that, in the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein did not abandon his intention early in the day as had Nikita Khrushchev, the former Soviet Union leader during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In fact, he did not give up his intention even when he recognized that his efforts were failing. Iraqi leadership stupidly waited until its national defense was completely paralyzed and only then did it accept the United Nations’ proposal. Does this sort of example demonstrate that the compellence strategy is a failed one that has seen its day?

My answer to this is no. Something else was operating in this situation that is not always present in other similar situations. If Iraq had a more rational decisionmaking process at its disposal, the decision to accept the United Nations’ proposal would have been made much sooner, at the least when it became clear that Saddam Hussein’s military strategies were failing. Military strategists who favor the compellence strategy often appear to take for granted that the enemy nation is one which operates under a rational deci-
sionmaking mechanism, perhaps, one much like their own. In making this unfounded inference they unfortunately ignore the pervasive influence of cultural perspectives and the effect of one’s culture upon one’s world and political views.

When trying to test the intention and will of enemy leadership through a compellence strategy, their national cultural characteristics, political ideology and military doctrines must all be considered because these always have a profound effect upon the manner in which a particular nation responds to a coercive action. In other words, before choosing to use a compellence strategy, the opponent’s will must be clearly analyzed in terms of cultural perspectives. If cultural characteristics and world views are not considered, the scope of the conflict might actually be expanded.

If one’s national and military power is not significantly superior to those of the enemy, then it might not be prudent to consider the use of a compellence strategy. In using a compellence strategy, one must be prepared not only to increase the level of threat but also be prepared to carry out one’s threats if the enemy’s responses so demand. An empty threat does no more than increase the enemy’s will.

Indeed, it is important to ascertain the tenacity of an enemy’s will, and its intention to carry out that will. A carefully researched assessment of the enemy’s will should determine the level of the compellence strategies to be used. War is an intricate calculation of benefit and loss. Conflict occurs when the benefits for engaging in it appear to be greater than any losses that might be incurred. And it is avoided only when the losses incurred appear to be greater than any benefit to be had by initiating or continuing the conflict. The argument to increase the level of loss in order to overcome the enemy’s force of will, rests on the credibility of the threat.

If, for example, a nation has a strong will to maintain its national security, then, even though it may not possess superior national or military power, it can deter the enemy. A nation fully determined to protect its national security can use destructive force as a compellence strategy, without escalating or expanding the conflict. Indeed, we saw this very phenomenon when Israel responded to Iraqi effort
to possess nuclear bombs by destroying the Osirak atomic plants on August 5, 1981.

As noted earlier, over the last ten years, many regional powers have greatly accelerated their weapons development, consequently and with good cause, international concern has also increased with regard to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. If Iraq had possessed nuclear arms, the Gulf War would have had completely different characteristics. If a leader such as Saddam Hussein possesses nuclear arms, then he probably does not plan to use them for purposes of deterrence. His inhumane use of weapons of mass destruction during the Iran-Iraq war provides ample evidence for this belief. Finally, we must be concerned with whether and how international pressure and restrictions will actually stop leaders such as Saddam Hussein or Kim Jong Il of North Korea from trying to develop weapons of mass destruction.

Even though the international community is in accord that peaceful methods such as pressure and restrictions must continue as efforts to stop irresponsible leaders from producing weapons of mass destruction, the past history of such cases does not show satisfying results. If peaceful methods do not work, then the use of force must be carefully considered. The Israeli decision to destroy Iraq’s nuclear production facility must have been a difficult one. Nonetheless, this bold, practical effort to stop the danger Iraq presented must be admired. Israel could not break Iraq’s will by its attack, yet using force was probably the only viable method by which to stop production of the nuclear bomb.

Violent use of military power in this case was certainly an extension of politics and the message was that the benefits of continuing the conflict were not greater than the losses would be. It is a widely known truth that if loss from a war is so great that it renders benefit meaningless, then at that point, war will cease to exist. Putting it in a different way, deterrence of war must be based on the credibility of retaliation.

South Korea, like Israel, has a fundamental need to deter war. It has much reason to retaliate against provocation and aggression in order to deter such acts as well. South Korea’s level of need and provocation is different from that of Israel, however. Of course, a nation
need not respond to provocation in a military way. It is possible to respond in a nonviolent mode, such as seeing to it that the aggressor nation is politically, diplomatically, or economically isolated. A deterring retaliation is most efficient when its objective and method are commensurate to the provocation. If the provocation has been very violent and cruel then, to be credible, the retaliatory measures must be powerful, for only if the aggressor nation feels the will and determination will it find cause to desist from carrying out its will.

For example, South Korea and the United States have never carried out a retaliatory action in response to North Korea’s many provocations, a list which includes the so-called “1·21 Incident” in which North Korea attempted to raid the Blue House in 1968, the capture of the Pueblo intelligence ship in 1968, the downing of the EC-121 in 1974, the Panmunjom axe incident in 1976, the terrorist bombing at Awungsan in Myanmar in 1983, the blowing up of a KAL airplane in 1984, or the infiltration by submarines in 1996 and in 1998. The reason South Korea and the United States have not sought to respond to these provocations with a show of force has partly been due to political considerations, but it has also been due to the fact that they simply did not have the military means available to use in any sort of response that would guarantee victory.

The very fact that North Korea persists in its challenging activities indicates that the South’s deterrence has failed and that North Korea still has its will and intentions intact. In other words, South Korea and the United States failed to teach a lesson to North Korea, because they did not adhere to the law of international society which insists that “challenging activities will lead to retaliation.” In the end, what has happened is that South Korean and U.S. credibility for deterrence has been seriously undermined, and, in its weakened state, provides incentive for North Korea to continue its violent provocations.

The times have long demanded that military strategies take into account the potential for mass destruction and annihilation which now exists in the world. It is naive to think that the steady provocations of North Korea will not escalate to intolerable levels. South Korea should take heed of the inherent dangers of inaction and acquiescence and develop a military means of deterrence while, at the same time, it should devise military retaliatory measures, to be used
at times of challenge, which would serve to deter North Korea from continuing its violent acts of provocation. If South Korea could prove its credibility by a show of its determination and ability to powerfully retaliate, then the North would be far less likely to engage in violent provocation.

The first point of a compellence strategy is to so influence an opponent that it will not continue its course of aggression; the second, upon which the first is most dependent, is that the compellence strategy employed must reflect the user’s will and determination. In South Korea’s case, it is no more than prudent that it be prepared to meet challenges from neighboring countries or from North Korea. The security environment in Korea is quite tense at this time. As noted earlier, there are conflicts with neighboring countries such as the resources problem in the Yellow Sea, the Tokdo dispute, the territorial dispute, and environmental problems that have contributed to this tense security environment. If it is to survive the possibility of a neighboring country’s attack, Korea needs to possess the ability to carry out a compellence strategy.

Compellence strategies can be used in peace time and in a limited war but not in a full-scale war. The logic in this guide for use is apparent; a large scale war can be in effect only if compellence strategies have failed and, at such a point, compellence can not resolve the conflict.

Military strategy must have, as its basis, an objective that is a conceptual notion of military employment. With this, it must also have the means to carry out its objective. Needless to say, there must also be a reason for the compellence. Just cause is not enough, however. One must also know how to achieve the strategy’s aim and possess the military capability to realize that know-how. Clearly, acquiring the military force to put a compellence strategy into action, is the highest priority for preparedness.

Korea’s strategic environment is one that faces terrorist activity from the North. It is constantly confronted by the possibility of a limited war which, in turn, possesses the spectre of a full-scale war. If we look ahead at the possibilities for conflict inherent in the present situation with neighboring countries, it is easy to observe that South Korea has a more-than-ordinary need to see that compellence
strategies are put in place. For this reason, South Korea should develop and employ compellence strategies in addition to deterrence as part of its national strategy and acquire enough military power to put compellence strategies into action. This should have a higher priority than any other area of development.

Sustaining peace and achieving a peaceful unification of Korea in the long run are South Korea’s objectives and, unless there is some sort of military invasion, we are not considering preventive attack. President Kim Dae-jung’s top priority is to eliminate the possibility of war on the Korean peninsula permanently and to do so in close cooperation with neighboring countries. To this end, the Korean government has devised a Comprehensive Engagement Policy, the so-called Sunshine Policy, and plans to pursue a multilateral Northeast Asian security organization which would include South Korea, North Korea, the United States, China, Japan, and Russia. The goal of such an organization would be to improve security around the Korean peninsula and construct a consolidated regional security order.

Peacetime forces should focus on securing a strategic environment so that nonmilitary resolutions for peacekeeping and peaceful unification can be effective. Under our current national policy, deterrence is our primary policy; and if it fails, we go into a defense mode. Defense and deterrence are our basic objectives in military strategy.

Recent scientific and technological developments have brought about an imbalance in the destructive capability of weapons. On the first strike, deadly damage to an industrialized and urbanized country can occur. That this can be done may become the reason for such an attack but, it can also become a reason to devote our attention to devising methods for preventing such attacks. Even though a nation has convincing deterrence capability, it still can not deter every potential war situation. When we look at today’s global strategic environment, we can not escape concluding that enhancing the credibility of deterrence and preparing for any violent conflict needs to be the highest priority of all nonaggressive countries. Korea surely can be no exception.

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If the main objective of compellence strategy is to destroy the enemy’s will through force and to increase the efficiency of deterrence, or if deterrence fails to stop the enemy’s challenge and normalize the situation, then Korea must overcome its limitations in deterrence and put into practice compellence as a national strategic objective.

Aerospace power, with its surprise attack capability, dynamic employment, and precision destruction capability, is the strongest candidate on the list of compellence strategies. Aerospace strategy, practical for a national strategy, must be well employed in order for it to support achieving the national objective. If South Korea’s national strategies are to include the concept of compellence, then its aerospace power employment concept must be redefined and developed in order to construct appropriate compellence strategies and their necessary strategic military power supports.

**Parallel Warfare for a Wartime Strategic Paralysis Strategy**

South Korea always faces the threat of invasion from the North, and should therefore establish a military strategy to meet such full-scale confrontations, too. This chapter argues it should establish a credible compellence strategy for peacetime, as well. There is no other way to prevent the North from the continual probing challenges that have marked their relationship with the South since the Korean War, and support the national objective for unification at the same time.

As noted earlier, North Korea could attack with conventional warfare employing its superior number of troops, weaponry, and fire power, and invade from the rear with its special forces using nonconventional warfare. In this way, it could try to destroy the South’s major force and destroy its will to fight. An attempt such as I have described could as Alvin Toffler predicted in another context, be the start of a war employing the so-called second wave pattern which depends on powerful, yet poorly maneuverable machines, and focuses on the destruction of military force.37

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If North Korea should use this second-wave pattern of war, how would the South respond? Knowing what we do about North Korea’s capability, we can predict that any full-scale confrontation with them would be fierce. We might also predict from history, ancient and recent, that South Korea’s response could not only mitigate the potential damage, but end the confrontation quickly. Let us look at the Iraqi war once again. Like the advent of the arrow and the spear in battles using swords, armored vessels in trench warfare, or the shock of the German’s blitzkrieg against defense-oriented France, the U.S.-led multinational force in the Gulf War was a shock to the Iraqis. The strong Iraqi force collapsed without much of a fight.

Even though we predict that any war on the Korean peninsula will be a fierce battle with firepower, maneuvers, and without front and backlines, if South Korea has a strong strategy concept in place and the military capability to neutralize North Korean forces, we can also credibly predict victory for the South. Should the North attempt a war aimed at the South’s territory and military force, the South, prepared as I have described above, could destroy the North’s command and control system, neutralize its communication system, and paralyze North Korea by means of selective annihilative destruction so that it would not be able to efficiently deploy its forces. In this way, the South could not only avoid massive destruction and casualties and arrest destructive damage, it would also achieve victory within a short period of time, and the Korean peninsula would be undemolished and geographically intact.

If South Korea possessed a strong aerospace power that could destroy the enemy’s center of gravity with parallel warfare, then, at the start of a war, the South could destroy the enemy’s command, control and communication means through selective destruction and neutralize them. Because Seoul is the center of politics and the nation’s economy, and because it has such a large population and is very close to the frontline, it is not a sufficient geographical zone in which to absorb the shock of attack. For this reason, the South’s response method needs to be twofold and can not focus on strategically paralyzing the enemy. The North’s war intent is not to put limitations on the South’s political will. Rather it aims for the collapse of the South’s political system, and this would lead to a war that not only would be selective, but annihilating as well. Here the words selective and annihilative refer to the method of destruction. Selective
destruction focuses on breaking the enemy’s will so that it can’t use its force, while annihilative destruction focuses on destroying the enemy’s military force, thus neutralizing their will to resist.

Selective destruction chooses only high-priority targets and attacks only certain selected ones. Munitions that have low precision are not used, only precision guided munitions (PGM) are, so that unnecessary destruction of civilian areas and over-destruction of non-civilian areas is avoided. Selective Northern targets for aerospace power would be its major strategic center of gravity, such as the national leadership center, the C4I systems, major military facilities, industrial production facilities, complex weapons systems, and the air command system.

In order not to waste effort or have our forces incur damage, rather than simultaneously attacking everything with parallel warfare, expending massive aerospace force to do so, precise and strong forces, capable of inflicting sustained damage, should be used in selective destruction air operations. Selective destruction of this order could destroy North Korea’s major targets. In addition, support organizations and systems can render North Korea unable to use its force.

An air attack on North Korea should be a thorough annihilative destructive one, as well. Annihilative destruction focuses on destroying the enemy’s strategic center of gravity. In other words, a retaliatory annihilative air attack in response to provocation establishes credibility of will and, thus demonstrating determination and resolve to carry through, serves to make the enemy desist from its purpose. When we say that an enemy’s system can be paralyzed through selective attack on major targets and its related systems, it should in no way be taken to mean that we intend to totally annihilate the enemy. What is meant is that we intend to paralyze its operational ability, (hence, to annihilate it) so there can not be even partial resistance.

The annihilative destruction methods described here are employed only after selective destruction has taken place and the enemy still possesses means to resist. It is to these means that annihilative destruction is applied. In this regard, we might look at ground forces that, for example, have lost their capability or been neutralized. In this kind of instance, after selective damage, it would be far more ef-
icient to use ordinary weapons, or weapons that resist local use and have a high destruction effect.

In the Gulf War, the United States strategically paralyzed Iraqi targets through the use of three stages of air power with parallel warfare. Before the start of ground operations, the United States began to destroy the Republic Guards of Iraqi troops. Using the “Five-ring model” initiated by John A. Warden, who planned the air campaign in the Gulf War, strategists analyzed the enemy as if it were a single system. By parallel attacks on Iraq’s core targets, which had a direct relationship to the national leadership, they were able to construct a parallel warfare plan which destroyed Iraq’s leadership and its nerve system.

South Korea’s military strategies and the North’s war intent share little in common with the events of the Gulf War. South Korea probably will not be able to possess more domineering aerospace power than will North Korea within the foreseeable future, and we can’t expect the North’s military force to greatly weaken any time soon. Bearing this in mind, we must assume that unless changes are deliberately made, the South probably won’t be able to conduct selective destruction and annihilative destruction operations. This being the case, it becomes imperative that Korea focus on building aerospace strategy and aerospace power construction capable of simultaneously conducting selective and annihilative destruction. Rather than simply employing a parallel warfare which focuses on selective destruction and paralyzes strategic targets and their related systems, we should concentrate on developing parallel warfare strategies capable of simultaneously conducting selective and annihilative destruction according to the situation of the battle.

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38 John Warden, who makes the concept of an enemy system useful and understandable, makes a simplified five-ring model (Leadership–Organic Essentials–Infrastructure–Population–Fielded Military). The most critical ring is the command ring because it is the enemy command structure, be it a civilian at the seat of government or a military commander directing a fleet, which is the only element of the enemy that can make concessions, that can make the very complex decisions that are necessary to keep a country on a particular course, or that can direct a country at war. . . The next most critical ring contains the organic essentials. . . The third most critical ring is the infrastructure ring. . . The fourth most critical ring is the population. . . The last ring holds the fielded military forces of the state. John Warden, “The Enemy as a System,” Airpower Journal, Spring 1995, pp. 44–51.
Although our discussion so far has expanded upon the meaning of parallel warfare through aerospace power, this expansion does not simply signify increased aerospace power. This strategic concept is possible only if we employ strategic thinking and build a strategic air force capable of conducting parallel warfare in both selective and annihilative destruction modes. Therefore, an aerospace power-driven compellence strategy in peacetime could inhibit the North’s will before damage is inflicted, and, should a full-scale confrontation occur, then aerospace power-driven parallel warfare strategy could be used to achieve strategic paralysis.

CONCLUSION

Depending upon the changes in where, how and with which means we choose to fight, the fundamental characteristics of waging war will necessarily change as well. It has not been a century since the advent of air vessels in war and air power has already become a revolutionary power, changing the pattern of war. The unfortunate situation of the early air theorists was that they overestimated the capability of their weaponry, strategies, and air fighting tactics. Now those capabilities have become commensurate with the early visions, and aerospace power has taken its position as the major military force within a century of its birth.

"The Persian Gulf War will be studied by generations of military students for it confirmed a major transformation in the nature of warfare: dominance of air power. Simply put, air power won the Gulf War. It was not the victory of any one service, but rather the victory of coalition air power projection by armies, navies, and air forces."39 In other words, aerospace power was transformed from its past role of assisting in military strategy to conducting the military strategy itself. And it is being recognized more and more that aerospace power strategy will embody military and national strategies in the future.

South Korea must consider that security threats from North Korea and neighboring countries are greater than any posed to other Asian nations in this post–Cold War era. To meet the conditions of that

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threat, it must develop a strategic concept that encompasses not only the means of deterring a war but, should war occur, would have ready a strong strategy capable of destroying the enemy’s intent. Aerospace power strategy is the core of compellence and parallel warfare strategies; there is no question that South Korea should concentrate on its development.

North Korea possesses a strong military force and its avowed aim is to unify Korea under communism. It has never slackened in its intent to invade the South with its superior number of troops, weaponry, and fire power. In responding to any future war threat then, the manner in which the South might strategically paralyze North Korea and, through annihilative destruction, bring about victory, will depend upon how appropriately aerospace power is used. Thus, in the event that South Korea needs to employ aerospace power strategies against North Korea, those strategies should comprise parallel warfare, that is, selective destruction to destroy the enemy’s will and annihilative destruction to eradicate the power of its forces.

Winston Churchill once admonished us to examine our methods of war with the drama of a chillingly rhetorical question: “If the cost of victory is fatal damage then what use is a decisive victory?” In order to protect our nation and our goal of unification, I strongly advocate preparation for employing a compellence aerospace power strategy with parallel warfare in addition to a deterrence strategy. I believe that this combination will revolutionize South Korea’s military power; therefore, it is my hope that it will become the new direction of Korean military power construction.

Some worry that a compellence strategy could result in a local or a full-scale war, but there is really strong cause not to make this assumption. In fact, there is more evidence to assume that as long as the North Korean regime understands that war would lead to its collapse, it will find a way to follow our guidelines and change its behavior gradually. Remember that the extremely dangerous crisis in 1994, that arose out of our concerns regarding North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, was defused at the last moment by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s dramatic meeting with Kim Il Sung in
Pyongyang. Whether one argues that Carter convinced the North Koreans or whether his visit provided them with the face-saving means to deter from their plan of the time is immaterial. The point is, that in that instance, the North did receive the message and they did acquiesce.

President Kim Dae-Jung’s Comprehensive Engagement Policy, the so-called Sunshine Policy which is believed by both the opposition and the conservative members of the ruling party to be a policy of appeasement, will gain more strength and will promote national security if a compellence strategy is employed. A compellence strategy will also help to unite the conservatives, and ease their concern regarding national security, since it will be a bona fide part of our national defense policy and military strategy.

I believe that we can more effectively contain any armed provocation and control the North’s development and exportation of nuclear weapons and missiles by employing Korea-U.S. combined compellence strategies with the concept of parallel warfare for strategic paralysis, while we pursue the Sunshine Policy, which, after all, has the support of the four major powers. In this way, the Sunshine Policy, aimed, as it is, at opening North Korean society, will fully materialize a better relationship between South and North Korea and between the United States and North Korea. In the long run, the Sunshine Policy, bolstered by sound compellence and parallel warfare strategies and strategic aerospace power’s construction, will truly accomplish the peaceful unification of Korea.

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40The United States had to seek the elimination of the North Korean nuclear program. . . On June 14, 1994, therefore, William Perry, the secretary of defense, called a meeting of the U.S. military leaders who would be most intimately involved if a military conflict broke out. General Luck flew back from Korea to report on his assessment of the situation, and how he would execute OPLAN (Operation Plan) 5027 . . . Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America (The Brookings Institution, 1999) p.129.

41North Korea Policy of the Kim Dae-Jung Administration: first, South Korea will never tolerate any armed provocation that destroys peace; second, South Korea does not have any intention of pursuing unification by absorption of the North; and third, South Korea will expand reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea.
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