INTRODUCTION

I am not an expert on military manpower, nor am I an academic like many who presented papers in this symposium. Perhaps I was asked to make a presentation from my point of view as a businessman with quite a number of years of experience and some knowledge acquired through doing things wrong. And while the proceedings of this conference will be published as a learned symposium, my contribution is not a research paper. Pacific Century Institute, which is cosponsoring this forum, has an interest in stimulating thought and discussion that will benefit the lives of people beyond the academic circle. I offer some observations to stimulate discussion of the topic of how to obtain the greatest benefit for the expenditure of funds in military manpower utilization.

I am a U.S. citizen and my business is located there. What I am most familiar with is events in the United States. The premise of this chapter is rather basic: there is a cost-benefit in maintaining military manpower strength through the use of reserve forces. I have not studied the Korean reserve system, and I do not suggest that I am in a position to advocate a structure for their reserve. I began with a single idea, that of getting more “bang for the buck.” This is the kind of thing businessmen do. The objective of this chapter is to examine the development of the military reserve system of the United States.
to determine if, and how, it gets more “bang for the buck.” How can military spending be stretched to accomplish more?

If there are lessons to be learned from this history, then I feel others will be able to apply them.

As I contemplated our second conference on air power, I reflected that to determine an air power structure, we should specify the goal we are trying to achieve through air power. In other words, why do we have military air power; what do we intend for it to accomplish? The question is deceptively simple. We have air power for national defense. But what is it we are defending? In the case of Korea, we do not want North Koreans or anyone else invading this country again. A strong military is conceived of as a deterrence to the abhorrence of war. We want the economy to continue to develop without the setback of an armed conflict or the despoiling of a plundering invader. We want the political system to be developed by citizens rather than have one forced upon us. We want personal freedoms. We want to protect and continue our national traditions and heritage.

I am at the age and stage in my professional career that I find myself thinking more and more about what I have worked for. What do I want to pass on to my children? I am not much concerned that I pass on to them a wealthy estate, but rather that I can succeed in passing on a rich family legacy. Our family tradition has its roots in the background my father passed on to me, the culture of my first homeland, Korea. Throughout the world there are large communities of expatriate Koreans who, like me, look back to that same heritage. It is important that we recognize the importance of not only defending and preserving this legacy but also considering what we can do to strengthen it so that it can endure.

KOREAN SCENE

As I visit with my friends in Korea, I hear of the following problems in its political-economic community.

1. Unemployment is up to two million in a country that has not experienced anything more than 2.5 percent unemployment in the past 30 years.
2. There is much underemployment of college graduates who are not being hired or are underutilized in their employment.

3. There exists a very high cost of infrastructure building due to: (i) high wages, (ii) high material cost, (iii) high land price, and (iv) inefficient management.

4. We see a need for renewed commitment to ethical practices in all aspects of society: police, tax collection, tax evasion, political practices, education, and business practices.

5. There are out-of-work people becoming homeless, which is creating social problems.

6. Unemployment benefits of up to one half of salary are being offered for up to six months, and political pressure is building to extend this.

7. Make-work is becoming widespread due to disorganization and inexperience in those agencies trying to cope with an economic downturn.

8. Military costs are escalating arising from the need to modernize technology and maintain high manning levels. Between 1974 and 1996, Korea spent US$246 billion on domestic/foreign military material procurement which represents 31.8 percent of the total defense budget. The balance of 68.2 percent was used to maintain armed forces at a high degree of readiness due to the often tense military environment. The 1998 defense budget was originally US$3.1 billion which was cut to $2.91 billion due to IMF actions.

MY BUSINESS ORIENTATION

I read the scriptures and try to guide my life by their teachings. Sometimes I fall short. In business, Peter Drucker has come to be looked upon as having written business dogma. He has said that one should not try to solve two separate problems with one solution because the parameters of two problems are not the same. If they were the same, they would not be two separate problems. I have always found this to be sound advice, and maybe I am violating Peter Drucker’s doctrine by suggesting we look at a particular solution to maximizing manpower utilization.
I am going to suggest that there is good reason to look at the concept of a “total force” integration of Korea’s military reserve and regular manpower. As I said, I am not an authority in this area, but I have read materials prepared by the experts. Using the publications to which I am going to refer, I suggest that those responsible for Korean Air Force manpower planning can learn a lot from others’ experiences.

Reserve forces can have both military (conflict) and nonconflict objectives. These might include employment of underused manpower; supplementing the police force in national disasters; training of skills with beneficial application to military or civilian life; instilling of work force discipline; inculcating patriotic attitudes that support military and national will in crisis situations; and utilization of reserve forces in infrastructure building. For example, in the United States, the Marine Corp Reserve sees community outreach as its secondary mission, and includes: (a) the Drug Demand Reduction Program aimed at youth drug prevention, (b) the Young Marines Program aimed at instilling pride, discipline, patriotism and personal commitment, and (c) Toys for Tots, providing toys at Christmas for needy children.\(^1\)

It has even been suggested that the reserves could be used for military-based training to improve basic skills of high school dropouts in accomplishing rehabilitation and renewal of community facilities. I think that may be getting too far into Peter Drucker’s warning about solving two problems with one solution. However, in thinking about national manpower as a resource, it is appropriate that these items be given consideration as supplemental benefits. It is even possible that is the area where there may be the greatest marginal return on expenditures that could alleviate some of the problems mentioned above.

Another principle that Peter Drucker is fond of promoting is that it is the job of an effective manager to change problems into opportunities. This is a good mental set when approaching problems. During the “Great Depression” of the 1930s the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was given the task of creating employment

\(^1\)Marine Corps Order 5726.14E and MCO P1001R.1H (Marine Corps Reserve Administrative Manual).
through public works. While the problem was unemployment, the opportunity was to develop many projects which the Corps had previously studied and had proposals ready to advance. The Corps of Engineers predated their involvement in the depression-fighting public works projects, but it was largely because they had an inventory of project studies that enabled them to be in the forefront in the federal government’s efforts to overcome the Depression.

The Corps recognizes that a future economic crisis if and when it happens will occur in a different context, and so the range and type of potential projects will be much different now and need to be given careful consideration.

Possibly, in addition to new projects, consideration would be given to reconstruction or modernization of many of the older projects completed before, during, or after the Depression. New areas such as massive urban renewal, energy, fuel storage and pipeline systems, sewer and sanitation systems, and rebuilding the nation’s railroads might be suitable, labor-intensive endeavors that would benefit the general public.

No matter what happens in a future Depression, the Corps of Engineers will be well served by recalling some of the key factors of its success during the 1930s:

1. An efficient, decentralized organizational structure that delegated authority to professionally staffed offices that were responsive to local needs and requirements.

2. Special single-project districts were set up for major projects to assure their completion without undue disruption of other Corps work.

3. Professional, cautious, politically astute leadership at the headquarters level retained the respect and cooperation of the president, the Congress, the general public, the New Deal agencies, and other departments of the Executive Branch.

4. A carefully developed collection of surveyed, useful, and feasible (both from engineering and political aspects) projects was readily available for execution by the Corps or other federal construction agencies.
5. There developed a cadre of well-trained, knowledgeable engineering experts, both military and civilian, with solid administrative and management experience.\(^2\)

Because there has been little attention given to nonconflict purposes in the writings I have surveyed, this chapter can do little more than suggest that consideration ought to be given to them.

**THE RESERVE EXPERIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES**

The issue to which I will direct the rest of this chapter is that of the potential for reducing regular military manning levels with reserve forces. In the United States the history of the reserve goes back to the founding of the nation when the constitution set up a federal military component and a state militia in each state. For more than two hundred years, the role of reserve forces in the United States has ebbed and flowed in different directions, seeking to find a structure that is both effective and politically acceptable. There was never a master plan. What has evolved has been a pragmatic solution to the tugs and pulls of the differing points of view of military practitioners and civilian politicians. Much can be learned of how politics and experience have produced compromises that have generated an effective reserve structure under the concept of total force.

The total force concept is defined by the U.S. Department of Defense as (1) reliance on reserve forces as the primary augmentation for the active forces and (2) the integrated use of all available personnel, both active duty and reserve. The key idea is the concept of integration. Reserves elements are trained and administered to be an integral part of the total military force.\(^3\)

State militias evolved into state National Guard units, which have become federalized and integrated into the reserves, but which are still available for call-up by state governors.

\(^2\) *The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Great Depression (1929–1941)*, the U.S. Corps of Engineers Historical Division, July 2, 1980, unpublished.

In addition to serving federal missions, the National Guard also has responsibilities for state missions. During fiscal year 1989, the National Guard was called upon to assist state governors in four civil disturbances and 53 natural disasters.\(^4\)

Aircraft, of course, were not part of the military service until the beginning of the century, but airplanes were quickly incorporated into the military soon after their development even when they still had to be considered to be in their introduction stage. The Air Service acquired more definite status with the passage of legislation on July 18, 1914, which directed the creation of the aviation section of the Signal Corps. Anticipating the need for more trained personnel than provided by law, in 1914 the Chief Signal Officer requested legislation establishing a reserve aviation service.\(^5\)

The Air Force Reserve was begun because it was desired to have more Air Force components than Congress had allowed, and a recognition that air power could offer an important advantage in military action. The number of Reserve Military Aviators that had completed military and civilian flying school programs before the United States entered World War I was negligible. After entry into the war, however, flying schools sprang up overnight. By November 1918, nearly 9,000 Reserve Military Aviators had graduated from schools in the United States.\(^6\)

After WWI, the United States was quick to demobilize the military. This included the reserve as well as the regular forces. The military leaders fought to maintain at least a minimum of strength and were able to obtain some recognition from Congress, but as the experience of WWII disclosed, the military had not been well supported.

The Organized Reserve contemplated by the National Defense Act of 1920 was unlike any of its predecessor reserve programs. With the past offering no guidelines, the War Department was without guiding experience in developing the reserves. Although the Organized


\(^6\)Ibid., p. 7.
Reserve annually increased in numbers, it was not stable between the wars.\(^7\)

World War II required an all-out mobilization. What reserve and national guard existed were brought into active service with some difficulty and disorientation. During 1940 and 1941, the frantic efforts to integrate regulars and reservists, guardsmen, and draftees created problems: (1) morale was low; (2) guardsmen complained about the extension of their active tours beyond one year; (3) draftees felt discriminated against in the National Guard units to which they had been assigned; and (4) National Guard units resented having officers from other components assigned over them.\(^8\)

After World War II President Truman and Chief of Staff George C. Marshall were concerned that a drop in military preparedness like that following World War I would occur.

Recalling U.S. behavior after World War I, Marshall believed the voters would reject a large peacetime military establishment. He was also certain that advanced technology would deny the United States much time to prepare for another major war. His solution was to have well-trained National Guard and reserve components fed by a system of universal military training.\(^9\)

The National Guard’s post–World War II reinstatement as the Army’s first line reserve component was the compromise committed to by General Marshall in exchange for the Guard’s endorsement of universal military training. Maj. Gen. Ellard A. Walsh, president of the National Guard Association, gave his public support to universal training during the Woodrum Committee hearings in June 1945. General Marshall reciprocated by advocating the guard as the second line of defense.\(^10\)

However, while the National Guard was being supported by this compromise, the Air Reserve program was susceptible to budget re-

\(^{7}\)Ibid., p. 21.
\(^{9}\)Ibid., p. 26.
\(^{10}\)Ibid., p. 33.
ductions because Army Air Force officials could not, or would not, defend its importance.11

In 1947 a commission studied the civilian components of the military. It noted that the Air Force had given reserve pilots the opportunity to maintain flight proficiency, but then largely negated the effort by failing to give them the aircraft to fly. Moreover, it had done little to maintain the efficiency of its non-flying reserve personnel. The commission regarded the Air Force Reserve composite units as ineffective because they lacked a comprehensive training plan, and it criticized the Air Force because it gave a little training to many people rather than concentrating its efforts on an essential hard core.12

By 1950, things had not changed much. In December 1950 a review concluded, “Because the Air Force lacked proper plans for its reserve forces, its concepts for the organization and development of reserve forces were faulty.”13

**THE AWAKENING: THE KOREAN WAR**

Then in 1950 the Korean war threw 193,000 civilian airmen into service. On July 7, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the Air Force’s projected deployment of units to the Far East. As General Vandenberg, the Chief of Staff, later observed, the United States Air Force in 1950 was “a shoestring air force.” The active duty establishment’s cupboard was bare, and to satisfy the needs of the war, it had to call upon the Air Force Reserve.14

However, the reserve units were not prepared for mobilization. Reservists had to be called on an individual basis. Two problems dominated the mobilization of organized units. One was that orders had to be given to reorganize the units concurrently with their mobilization. The other was the poor condition of individual records. Many reservists could not be located because of out-of-date files. Airmen’s records often contained incomplete forms. Many files were

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11 Ibid., p. 35.
12 Ibid., p. 60.
13 Ibid., p. 85.
14 Ibid., p. 90.
missing, and one mobilized unit had files for hundreds of people not assigned to it.

Many airmen, both those who had been active in reserve units and those who had not, did not want to be mobilized for this unpopular war. Using the accepted reasons to merit exemption, reservists of mobilized units called in by the hundreds to claim ineligibility and request delays because of suddenly acquired dependents, critical job status, and ailments they had never had before.\textsuperscript{15}

The breaking up of reserve units upon mobilization evoked a flurry of protest from the reservists and from congressmen representing the states in which the units were located.\textsuperscript{16}

The Air Force hesitated to withdraw manpower from the organized units of the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard, the only trained augmentation resource available. Therefore, the individual replacements to satisfy demands of the first phase of the Korean War as well as expansion requirements, came from reservists who had not been participating in any organized program. The unfairness of this circumstance aroused great bitterness among affected reservists and became the occasion for subsequent congressional legislation.\textsuperscript{17}

NEW ROLES FOR THE RESERVE

In the presidential campaign of 1952, Dwight Eisenhower criticized the Truman Administration’s reserve program. Upon election, Eisenhower appointed a commission to study the need for military strength, both the regular and the reserves. In 1954 the administration, after a great deal of political maneuvering, developed the National Reserve Plan, which was passed as the Reserve Forces Act of 1955. Late in 1955, the Air Force published \textit{Reserve Mobilization Recall Requirements}. This provided for the Continental Air Command, which began to develop the reserve force into a combat-ready mobilization asset.

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 93.
\textsuperscript{16}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 98.
\textsuperscript{17}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 110.
The structure and vision of an effective reserve program were in place, and many people spent numerous hours on its implementation. Now the president and the Congress had new options when faced with a national interest conflict.

The first test of the new reserve program came in 1961 when the Russians blockaded Berlin.

The Assistant Air Force Chief of Staff for reserves testified before the House Armed Services committee:

> All things considered, the mobilization of Air Reserve Forces in October 1961 was accomplished with a minimum of confusion and compromise with requirements. The total Air Reserve Forces recall significantly augmented the Air Force at a time when the cupboard was otherwise bare—a 17 percent augmentation in troop carrier forces, 28 percent in heavy transport, 28 percent in tactical reconnaissance, and 37 percent in tactical fighter strength.\(^\text{18}\)

A second test of the concept came in October of 1962 when President Kennedy confronted Khrushchev over the missiles being shipped to Cuba. Suddenly there was a need for shifting military units to the southeastern states. Eighty C-119s flew 1,232 hours the weekend of October 12th. The buildup of forces in the southeast had begun. More than 40 Navy ships involved got under way October 15th. At scattered posts, 40,000 Marines were loaded on ships heading toward the Caribbean to augment the 5,000 at Guantanamo Bay. The Army gathered more than 100,000 troops in Florida. Strategic Air Command bombers left Florida airfields to make room for tactical fighters flown in from bases all over the country. Activating the reserves involved much more than just political posturing.

Robert Kennedy recalled, “I returned to the White House. The President was not optimistic, nor was I. He ordered twenty-four troop carrier squadrons of the Air Force Reserve to active duty. They would be necessary for an invasion. He had not abandoned hope, but what hope there was now rested with Khrushchev’s revision of his course within the next few hours. It was a hope, not an

\(^{18}\)Ibid., pp. 182–183.
expectation. The expectation was a military confrontation by Tuesday and possibly tomorrow (Sunday).”

In evaluating the performance of the reserve at this call up, it was said,

The Air Force Reserve did absolutely all that was asked of it between October 13 and December 29, 1962. It augmented the active force in assembling material in the southeastern corner of the country. When the President thought he might need an invasion force and the Department of Defense mobilized Air Force Reserve troop carrier units as essential to the task, they responded quickly and were prepared to do their part. Then individual crew members stayed on to help redeploy the assembled force.

VIETNAM

Before Kennedy had become president in 1961, the United States had become involved in Vietnam. The United States had tried to stabilize the government and train its military forces to subdue internal guerrilla activity by the Viet Cong and resist invasion from North Vietnam. The north had declared their intention to extend the “national democratic revolution” to South Vietnam and unify Vietnam under the communist regime. Lowly but steadily over the next thirteen years, the involvement of the United States in the conflict escalated. But the United States did not mobilize reservists for use in Southeast Asia before 1968, and when it did mobilize, relatively few were called because Lyndon B. Johnson did not wish to do so. By refusing to make very extensive use of the reserve forces during the Vietnam War, President Johnson allowed the reserves to be viewed as a draft avoidance haven, and the active force came to distrust their availability in a crisis.

As the war in Southeast Asia subsided, the Air Force passed more modern equipment to the Air Reserve Forces and included the reserve in force planning as part of the total Air Force. By 1973, the

21 Ibid., pp 198–199.
Department of Defense had expanded the Air Force’s Total Force concept into departmental policy.\textsuperscript{22}

The 1970s and 1980s saw a further developing and refining of the total force concept. The Reagan administration’s military strategy was to have sufficient military strength to convince our friends to stay closely aligned with us and to convince the Soviets they could not win any war they might start against us or our allies. The defense buildup of the early 1980s affected the Air Force Reserve in many ways. The Air Force followed through on the force modernization commitment which was central to “Total Force.”

**PANAMA**

Another opportunity to test the total force preparedness came in 1989 in the Panama military action. During the six weeks of “Just Cause,” Air Force Reserve units flew a total of 621 sorties and more than 1,500 hours in direct support of the operation. They moved more than 5,000 passengers and 1.385 tons of cargo. Tankers delivered more than 1.1 million pounds of aviation fuel to 18 receivers. In combat operation they expended 220 rounds of 40-mm and 2,000 rounds of 20-mm ammunition.\textsuperscript{23}

**THE BIG TEST: WAR WITH IRAQ**

It was Desert Shield/Storm which stands as the largest test of the total force concept. Mobilization began August 9, 1990, one week after Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait, and reached its peak in March 1991. Even when the war ended in April 1991, the use of reserves continued until late June when most reservists had been demobilized.

In August, reserve unit commanders began to ask members which personnel might be available to serve as volunteers if they were needed. By August 20, more than 15,300 had volunteered to serve, about 22 percent of all Air Force Reservists. Although many reservists served as volunteers throughout the war, the Department of

\textsuperscript{22}Ibid., p. 347.

\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., pp. 362-363.
Defense soon realized it needed the authority to recall portions of its reserve components to support the rapidly expanding commitment of forces in the Persian Gulf. President Bush authorized the call-up of 200,000 reservists for 90 days. Under this authority, by March 12th 23,500 Air Force Reservists were called to active duty. Of these, more than 20,000 were assigned to 215 reserve units, 2,300 were individual mobilization augmentees, and 960 were members of the individual Ready Reserve or retired reserve.24

Evaluations of the effectiveness of reservists called to active duty during the Gulf War found performance was quite satisfactory. There were factors that made this conflict rather unique. At that period of time, the United States was at a state of high military preparedness, and many of the combat and support formations came from active forces deployed in Europe, which were at a point of being reduced as the Cold War wound down. There was an extended period of time during which the United States was able to build up forces. There were support infrastructures in Saudi Arabia and Turkey which were available, and the war was very short and losses were slight. A senior U.S. commander said, “Desert Storm was the perfect war with the perfect enemy. . . . We had the perfect coalition, the perfect infrastructure, and the perfect battlefield. We should be careful about the lessons we draw from the war.”25

Each of the Services and their reserve components had notable successes. The Army was very successful in deploying and using CS/CSS (combat support/combat service support) units. The Air Force proved the utility of its associate units, the readiness of its reserve fighter force, and its ability to integrate reserve aircraft squadrons into deployed wings. The Navy’s Selected Reserve structure facilitated the call-up of medical personnel with specialized skills. The Marine Corps’ ability to integrate company-sized units into its total deployed force was impressive.26

Judged by most criteria, the Air Force was the best service component in accomplishing reserve mobilization and augmentation.

24Ibid., p. 365.
26Ibid., p. xxxix.
Reserve units, aircrews, maintenance crews and support personnel required little to no post-mobilization training before performing their respective missions. All activated reserve flying units mobilized in 24 hours or less, and were prepared to deploy or did deploy in less than 72 hours.

There were three primary reasons for this success: First, the Air Force holds its reserve units, both Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve, to the same readiness standards expected of active units.

Second, the Air Force provides its reserve component with funds, equipment, and full-time personnel that allow for greater training opportunities than the Army does. While the Air Force provides fewer flying hours to the Air Reserve Component than to active units, it still gives the reserves relatively more training hours than the Army gives “ground miles” to its reserve units—an average reserve/active ratio of 0.64 for the Air Force and 0.29 for the Army. This difference translates directly into cost savings. Air Force reserve units are only one-third less expensive than their active counterparts, while Army reserve units are two-thirds less expensive than their active counterparts.

Third, the vast majority of Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve officers and enlisted personnel have prior active duty experience. Over the last two decades the proportion of prior service to non–prior service has shifted from 30/70 to 70/30.27

NATO AND KOSOVO

The story of reserve participation is yet to be written for the U.S. participation in the NATO campaign against Yugoslavia. Certainly without the existence of the Reserve component of the U.S. military, the options for President Clinton would be greatly reduced. One newspaper reported on April 15, 1999:

The 1.5 million men and women in military reserve and National Guard units are so integrated into the missions of a scaled-back active duty force that no combat operation can go on for long without

27Ibid., pp. 56–57.
their support. . . . The Defense Department’s request to activate what is likely to be tens of thousands of reservists to fulfill specific combat-support and civil-affairs functions should reach the president in a matter of days. . . . More than 50 percent of all Air Force refueling is done by reserve crews, and a significant amount of airlift capacity is handled by reservists, too.28

RESERVISTS AS CIVILIANS

An issue that has not yet been mentioned is what happens to a reservist’s job when he is mobilized. Of course the government wants his reemployment rights to be protected. An attempt to ensure protection was made in 1994 when President Clinton signed the Uniformed Services and Reemployment Rights Act. This law rewrote previous legislation and strengthened the provisions ensuring that reservists cannot be refused hiring, denied promotion, or fired because of their military service.

To meet the Air Force’s operational requirements, the Air Force has asked its personnel to volunteer for an extraordinary range of activities. Some exposed the reservists to hostile action. This degree of reliance on the willingness of reservists to respond quickly became a topic of great concern to the Air Force Reserve’s senior leadership. Some theoretical limit must exist on the amount of support reserves will provide on a voluntary basis. With each additional crisis, the senior leaders’ concern became more palpable.

Events, however, have not yet revealed this point. A survey conducted by the Headquarters AFRES revealed that, as of February 1995, approximately 80 percent of all reservists were willing to volunteer more time than they had in the past, although only 65 percent of aircrew personnel expressed a willingness to do more. The survey revealed that most were more willing to volunteer for short periods (one to four weeks) perhaps once or twice a year for overseas humanitarian and domestic relief missions. Most expressed

concerns that longer or more frequent service might cause problems with their employers.29

Even with the law supporting the reemployment rights of reservists, military leadership would prefer non-compulsory support of employers. The Department of Defense has organized the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve. Its statement of purpose is to work with employers, reservists, military leadership, and 54 (state) volunteer committees to build and maintain a strong base of support for the role of the National Guard and Reserve in our Nation’s defense. Their material can be accessed worldwide through their Web site at http://www.ncesgr.osd.mil.

It is a wise man who learns from his own experiences, but it is even better if one can learn from others’ experiences. Korea’s military needs and experience are quite different from those of the United States. However, as a case study, the two-hundred-year experience offers many lessons for those who want to study them.

A model closer to Korea’s is the Israeli Defense Forces. Both Korea and Israel are small countries with regional concerns. A very good, brief summary is given as Appendix A in a RAND publication and is abridged below.

**ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCES**

Purpose. The Israeli Defense Forces are structured and trained for conflict. The IDF also performs another significant function more closely related to police activities than to combat: patrolling Israeli-occupied territories.

Active/Reserve integration. Because of its small size, Israel cannot afford to depend on large standing forces. Instead, reserves account for approximately 80 percent of the IDF. The Israeli Reserve Forces are unusual among reserve forces in that they are the country’s most important operational components rather than being follow-on and reinforcing forces.

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The basic combat formation in the Israeli army is the brigade. Some IDF reserve brigades round out active divisions and others form all-reserve brigade divisions.

Manning and training. Israel has universal military service. Males typically serve three years on active duty and unmarried females two years. After leaving active service, all males serve in the reserves until age 55.

Reserve combat units are commonly composed of people who served together on active duty and remain together throughout the lifetime of their unit. Crews perform their refresher training and annual training together for several years, learning each other’s abilities and personalities.

Typical reservists serve about 45 days per year. Of these, 30 to 35 days are spent on active duty. Half of the active duty time is spent training for wartime missions and the other half on operational missions, e.g., border patrols and patrols in Israeli-occupied territories.\(^{30}\)

**CONCLUSION**

Military manpower represents a vast expenditure of resources for most countries. This expenditure is generally productive only during a period of armed conflict. When an all-out effort is needed, the cost of winning a conflict does not seem material. But in the absence of hostilities, expenditures on military preparedness might seem ill-used.

Korea is experiencing an economic downturn that has unmasked a number of societal problems. Use of reserve forces seems to offer a way to reduce military expenditures without damaging military capabilities while at the same time uplifting the economic well-being of the nation.

Money invested in the reserve forces can go beyond the purpose of maintaining military strength. It can raise the skill levels of the reservists which can enhance manpower resources of the nation. Reserve forces can be utilized for nonmilitary objectives of creating

and maintaining national infrastructures, and reservists can be trained to be used for meeting national emergency situations.

One of the problem/opportunity areas for Korea is the need to develop an aerospace infrastructure for the future. Korea has lagged behind some other Asian countries in developing aerospace facilities and production capacities. There is a convergence of a national need and a military need in this respect.

Korea’s military planners have undoubtedly faced the difficulty of aligning what they see as military needs with what the civilian politicians see as priorities. It might well be useful to look at the experience of the U.S. military in facing the same kinds of problems.