





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Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan

Seth G. Jones

“What are the major factors that allow an insurgency to develop and stick? Native lawlessness and a foreign safe haven for resting and resupply. The mujahadeen hid from the Soviets in Pakistan, now Pakistan also protects the Taliban. Jones, who has made repeated trips to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India since 2004, stresses the importance of involving local populations in counterinsurgency operations. The history and strategies in this book are important for understanding the nature of unconventional warfare, no matter where in the world it is. Libraries and bookstores can’t go wrong with [this] volume. [It is] indispensable for historians, journalists, academics, and policy makers.”

Foreword Magazine, Editor’s Notes, August 2008

This volume explores the nature of the insurgency in Afghanistan, the key challenges and successes of the U.S.-led counterinsurgency campaign, and the capabilities necessary to wage effective counterinsurgency operations. By examining the key lessons from all insurgencies since World War II, the author finds that most policymakers repeatedly underestimate the importance of indigenous actors to counterinsurgency efforts.

The author concludes that the U.S. should focus its resources on helping improve the capacity of the indigenous government and indigenous security forces to wage counterinsurgency. The U.S. military—along with U.S. civilian agencies and other coalition partners—is more likely to be successful in counterinsurgency warfare the more capable and legitimate the indigenous security forces (especially the police), the better the governance capacity of the local state, and the less external support that insurgents receive.


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Counterinsurgency in Iraq 2003-2006

Bruce R. Pirnie, Edward O’Connell

The authors draw lessons from counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, including the deleterious effects of the U.S. failure to focus on protecting the Iraqi population and the failure of a technologically-driven counterinsurgency (COIN) approach. The Iraq experience offers a combination of factors likely to be replicated in insurgencies elsewhere and thus is particularly germane to drawing lessons about counterinsurgency.

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Summary • Overview of the Conflict in Iraq • Armed Groups in Iraq • Counterinsurgency in Iraq • Accounting for Success and Failure • Building Effective Capabilities for Counterinsurgency • Recommendations

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Analytic Support to Intelligence in Counterinsurgencies


Walter L. Perry, John Gordon IV

This volume examines the nature of the contemporary insurgent threat and provides insights on using operational analysis techniques to support intelligence operations in counterinsurgencies. Techniques such as pattern discernment and predictive analysis show promise of being useful to intelligence analysis. The authors also explore methods of game theory and change detection to examine the interactions between friendly and enemy forces.

Contents


Summary • Introduction • The Nature of Modern Insurgency • The Dominance of Intelligence • The Analytic Questions • Intelligence Analysis • Conclusions • References

84 pp. • 2008 • \$24.00 pb • MG-682-OSD • ISBN: 978-0-8330-4456-3



War by Other Means Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency

David C. Gompert, John Gordon IV, With Adam Grissom, David R. Frelinger, Seth G. Jones, Martin C. Libicki, Edward O'Connell, Brooke K. Stearns, Robert E. Hunter



“There is a firm consensus that the largely American invasion and occupation of Iraq has fuelled rather than quelled Islamist terrorism worldwide, and that flawed US counter-insurgency efforts, at best only partially and tenuously ameliorated by the ‘surge’, have intensified this perverse effect. The RAND Corporation’s capstone counter-insurgency study acknowledges as much. . . . RAND suggests that an excessively militarised approach to counter-insurgency has led to the overstretch of US ground forces and that enhancing counter-insurgency capabilities does not call for the expansion of those forces. Accordingly, the study sensibly concludes that better civil, informational, analytic, management and training—in a word, ‘soft power’—capabilities are needed.”

Survival, August-September 2008

This capstone volume to the RAND Counterinsurgency Study draws on other reports in the series as well as an examination of 89 insurgencies since World War II, an analysis of the new challenges posed by what is becoming known as global insurgency, and many of the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. The authors evaluate three types of counterinsurgency (COIN) capabilities: civil capabilities to help weak states; informational and cognitive capabilities to improve COIN decisionmaking; and security capabilities to protect people and infrastructure and to weaken insurgent forces. The authors conclude by outlining the investments, organizational changes, and international arrangements that the United States should pursue to improve its COIN capabilities.

Contents

Summary • Part I: The Challenge • Defining the Problem • Framing the Problem • Countering Type III Insurgency • Part II: Complete and Balanced Capabilities • Overview of Capabilities Needed to Counter Type III Insurgency • Civil Capabilities • Information Capabilities • Perception and Cognition • General Security Capabilities • Local Security Capabilities • U.S. Security Capabilities • Part III: Organizing and Investing • Multilateral Counterinsurgency • Investment Priorities • Organization: Unsettled Structures for Unsettled Times • Implications and Recommendations • Appendixes


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Byting Back Regaining Information Superiority Against 21st-Century Insurgents

Martin C. Libicki, David C. Gompert, David R. Frelinger, Raymond Smith



The authors argue that today’s military and intelligence networks hamper counterinsurgency efforts and deprive the United States of what ought to be a strategic advantage. They call for current networks to be replaced by an integrated counterinsurgency operating network (ICON) linking U.S. and indigenous operators, based on principles of inclusiveness, integration, and user preeminence.

Contents

Summary • Introduction • The Influence of User Requirements • The Registry-Census • A Well-Wired Country • Embedded Video • A National Wiki • The Principles of ICON • Implications and Implementation • Appendix

194 pp. • 2007 • \$23.00 pb • MG-595/1-OSD • ISBN: 978-0-8330-4189-0

Rethinking Counterinsurgency

John Mackinlay, Alison Al-Baddawy



British and U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) operations have been slow to adapt to the rise of the global jihadist insurgency.

During the period of decolonization in Asia and Africa, the United Kingdom faced more insurgent activity than any other Western power. The authors analyze past British COIN experience, explore the evolving nature of insurgency, and suggest a new COIN framework.

Contents

Summary • Introduction • Successful Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies • Defining the Environment • Rethinking Strategy and Operations

80 pp. • 2008 • \$23.00 pb • MG-595/5-OSD • ISBN: 978-0-8330-4475-4

Pacification in Algeria, 1956—1958

David Galula

“Galula’s ideas have emerged as key elements of American counterinsurgency doctrine. His ‘Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice’ was one of the first texts used by Army officers in 2005 to come to grips with problems confronting them in Iraq. Far more impressive and readable, but less well known is Galula’s ‘Pacification in Algeria’, written, at RAND’s invitation, following his participation in a conference on counterinsurgency in 1962 on similar problems confronting the United States in Vietnam. . . . [This volume] is an exciting story of the difficulties faced by a small-unit commander striving to succeed in a nebulous counterinsurgency environment. It is a story small-unit leaders in Iraq today will find quite familiar.”

Journal of Military History, October 2007

When Algerian nationalists launched a rebellion against French rule in November 1954, France, mired in similar wars for independence in its colonial territories, was in a poor position to cope with further upheaval. The Algerian strategy encompassed varying approaches and was more adaptable than that of the French, necessitating a rethinking of traditional counterinsurgency methods.

In this volume, written in 1963 but until recently not available to the public, David Galula relates the story of his highly successful command in the district of Greater Kabylia, east of Algiers, at the height of the rebellion, and presents his theories on counterinsurgency and pacification. This groundbreaking work retains its relevancy as a challenge to traditional counterinsurgency tactics and presents approaches to predicting, managing, and resolving insurgent and guerilla conflict. The parallels between the Algerian war and modern warfare are striking. A new foreword by counterterrorism expert Bruce Hoffman elucidates the relevance of this historic study in the context of modern times.


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On “Other War” Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research


Austin Long

The challenges posed by insurgency and instability have proved difficult to surmount. This difficulty may embolden future opponents to embrace insurgency in combating the United States. The author makes recommendations for improving COIN based on RAND’s decades-long study of the subject.

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
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Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions

Alan J. Vick, Adam Grissom, William Rosenau, Beth Grill, Karl P. Mueller




United States has engaged in counterinsurgency around the globe for more than a century. But insurgencies have rarely been defeated by outside powers. Rather, the afflicted nation itself must win the war politically and militarily, and the best way to help is to offer advice, training, and equipment. Air power, and the U.S. Air Force, can play an important role in such efforts, which suggests making them an institutional priority.

Contents

Summary • Introduction • The Evolving Insurgency Challenge • The Challenge of Counterinsurgency: Lessons from the Cold War and After • Grand Strategy and Counterinsurgency • A New Framework for Understanding and Responding to Insurgencies • The USAF Role in Countering Insurgencies • Conclusions • Appendixes • Bibliography

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David C. Gompert

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William Rosenau

The author discusses methods for combating subversive activities in the context of the “long war” against violent Islamist extremism.

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Understanding Proto-Insurgencies

Daniel Byman

This study discusses ways to anticipate the possibility of an insurgency developing before it materializes, provide behind-the-scenes training and advisory programs for partner nations, and help inhibit outside support for emerging insurgencies.

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Airlift Capabilities for Future U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations

Robert C. Owen, Karl P. Mueller

Does likely continued U.S. involvement in counterinsurgencies call for adding specialized aircraft, training, or other resources to the general airlift fleet? The authors find that the current U.S. military airlift fleet can perform most counterinsurgency airlift missions effectively but is likely to need reinforcement if such operations continue at current levels.

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Money in the Bank

Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations

Angel Rabasa, Peter Chalk, Ivan Khilko, Paraag Shukla, Lesley Anne Warner

Six historic COIN operations from the 19th and 20th centuries—in the Philippines, Algeria, Vietnam, El Salvador, Jammu and Kashmir, and Colombia—are examined to determine which tactics, techniques, and procedures led to success and which to failure.

102 pp. • 2007 • \$28.00 pb • OP-185-OSD • ISBN: 978-0-8330-4159-3

The Malay-Muslim Insurgency in Southern Thailand

Understanding the Conflict's Evolving Dynamic

Peter Chalk

Current unrest in the Malay-Muslim provinces of southern Thailand has captured growing national, regional, and international attention. This paper assesses the current situation and its probable direction.

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

Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence

The U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1960-1970 and 2003-2006

Austin Long

The author posits that ingrained organizational concepts and beliefs have a much greater influence on operations than written doctrine, and that mental and material preparation for large-scale operations and overwhelming firepower has made the U.S. military poorly suited to counterinsurgency.

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