Beyond the Shadow of 9/11

Ten Years Later, a Moment for Reflection
Respectful Assistance to Afghan Solutions
A Diplomatic Strategy to Counter al Qaeda’s Narrative
Air Passenger Security at a Reasonable Cost
Compensation Policies for Social Resilience

After Nearly a Decade of War, Servicemembers and Families Report Stress, Resilience

Management of Change: RAND Responds to a Transforming World
—By James A. Thomson
Get the Big Picture

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The Humility of Leadership

A colleague and I were recently marveling over the leadership skills that have made it possible for the RAND Corporation to change so much with so little disruption over the past two decades. That span of time has borne witness to a whirlwind of transitions that could have triggered a welter of confusion within many organizations.

Once known mostly for its Cold War analyses in defense of the United States, RAND has gone local and global at the same time. As indicated by the stories in this issue, the scope of RAND’s work today ranges from New Orleans families to Arab economies. The cover story on America’s response to terrorism since the 9/11 attacks of ten years ago typifies RAND’s multidisciplinary approach, encompassing issues of international diplomacy, military sustainability, homeland security, and social resiliency.

The expanding scope of work, however, only scratches the surface of RAND’s transformation since the 1980s. After all, the subjects of RAND research have been vast and eclectic since at least the 1960s. What began to change most profoundly with the fall of the Berlin Wall was the nature of RAND’s work, as the focus of research clients began to shift away from known, stable, long-term problems toward unpredictable or variable challenges requiring quick responses.

As James Thomson, RAND’s outgoing president and chief executive officer, explains here in his farewell column, RAND “had to rethink everything” in the 1990s to adjust to a new world. What he does not explain is that he has continued to rebuild everything since, including research units, the physical RAND headquarters, the virtual RAND online presence, and new overseas offices.

My colleague and I concluded that one key to Jim’s success has been his humility as a thinker. He has not placed too much stock in his own training or assumptions. He has felt comfortable working across numerous fields and extending his flexibility as a generalist. He has been less interested in proving his point than in pursuing whatever works.

What I have found most charming about working with Jim over the years has been his disinterest in tooting his horn. “I’m from New Hampshire, and we have a saying up there,” he put it best during a luncheon a few weeks ago. “If you need to keep saying how great you are, you aren’t.”

—John Godges

On the Cover
The Statue of Liberty can be seen at first light from Jersey City, New Jersey, as thick smoke darkens the lower Manhattan skyline on September 15, 2001.

AF-IMAGES/DAVID LOCHER
Higher Coverage Rates, State Costs Seen Under U.S. Health Reform

As a result of U.S. health care reform legislation, the proportion of nonelderly people with health insurance will rise by 2020, but so will state government spending in many cases. These are the principal results of a RAND study estimating the effects of the new legislation on California, Connecticut, Illinois, Montana, and Texas.

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) has several requirements aimed at increasing the rates of health insurance coverage. These include expanding Medicaid programs to cover people in households with incomes below 133 percent of the federal poverty level, requiring states to develop health insurance exchanges through which individuals and small businesses can purchase coverage, requiring large and mid-size employers to provide qualifying coverage to their employees, and mandating that individuals obtain coverage.

Many of these provisions, to be fully implemented by 2016, will impose new costs on state governments. For example, the states will have to pay a growing percentage (to be capped at 10 percent in 2020) of the costs for those newly eligible for Medicaid. The individual mandate will spur many people who are currently eligible for Medicaid but not receiving it to apply for it. State governments will have to pay higher shares of the cost for these recipients.

Researchers found that with ACA, the proportion of nonelderly people with insurance across these states will vary from 94 percent to 97 percent. Without ACA, the proportions would vary from 72 percent in Texas to 89 percent in Connecticut, as shown in the figure.

The individual and employer exchanges will account for most of the increase in the insured. The nonelderly population obtaining insurance through the exchanges by 2020 will range from 10 percent in Connecticut to 20 percent in Montana.

Medicaid will also be a substantial source of new insurance coverage. In 2016, the increases in Medicaid rolls will range from 31 percent in Connecticut to 80 percent in Texas. These increases will drive upward the annual state government spending on health care in four of the states by 2020, adding $2.8 billion to the annual costs in Texas and $4 billion to those in California. In Connecticut, because people now enrolled in a state program will become eligible for Medicaid, the annual state spending will decrease by $290 million in 2020.

“State decisions in how to implement the ACA could alter these projections,” said David Auerbach, a RAND policy researcher who led the study. “The extent of outreach to enroll new individuals in Medicaid could affect coverage rates and state costs. States may also bundle payments or regulate hospital rates to limit growth in health care costs.”

Not all aspects of the ACA were accounted for in these estimates. Reforms affecting Medicare and health care delivery systems could affect state costs but were beyond the scope of this study. The research also did not account for potential reductions in state payments for uncompensated care or for potential state savings from re-categorizing certain groups of currently enrolled Medicaid recipients as “newly eligible.”


Interactive Graphic
Scan the code with your smartphone to view additional comparisons of estimated insurance coverage and state spending before and after implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.

Also available at www.randreview.org/online/
One of the consequences of having a predominantly employer-based health insurance system is that it can discourage workers from going into business for themselves, according to a recent RAND study published in the *Journal of Health Economics*.

With almost three-quarters of all full-time U.S. workers receiving health insurance from their employers, there have been concerns about a phenomenon called “entrepreneurship lock”—an unwillingness by those who have such employer coverage to leave their jobs to start new businesses because of the high cost of health insurance premiums or the possibility of disrupting or losing their coverage.

The study, by the Kauffman–RAND Institute for Entrepreneurship Public Policy, takes a novel approach to examining the issue of entrepreneurship lock. Using data from the Current Population Survey, the study examines whether people with employer-based health insurance are more likely to become self-employed (a) if they have an alternate source of health insurance through a spouse or (b) if they have reached the age of 65 and become eligible for Medicare.

The study found evidence of entrepreneurship lock in both cases. In the first case, “Men and women with poor family health and no access to a spouse’s health insurance were significantly less likely to give up an employer plan and start a new business than were those with access to insurance through their spouses,” said Robert Fairlie, a RAND economist. “Those with access to a spouse’s health insurance plan are much more likely to become self-employed.”

Among the entire U.S. adult population, the annual base business creation rate is 3 percent. Among U.S. men, entrepreneurship lock reduces business creation by 1 percentage point. Among U.S. women, the business entry rate is lower overall, but similar patterns emerge with respect to the effect of health insurance coverage.

Self-employment rates also rise when Medicare becomes available to U.S. workers at age 65, as shown in the figure for men. There is a large and statistically significant increase in business ownership rates when U.S. workers turn 65 and qualify for universal health care coverage under Medicare. The study determined that self-employment rates did not jump up at any other age (between 55 and 75) and that the increase in business ownership in the month when people turn 65 was not the result of other factors, such as retirement, Social Security, or pension eligibility.

“The analyses provide some evidence entrepreneurship lock exists, which raises concerns that bundling health insurance and employment may discourage business creation,” said Fairlie. “The availability of affordable health insurance for the self-employed has an important impact on whether individuals are likely to become entrepreneurs.”

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“How Employer-Based Health Insurance Curbs Entrepreneurship”

When U.S. Men Qualify for Universal Health Insurance Through Medicare at Age 65, Their Business Ownership Rates Increase

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Business ownership rates among U.S. men (percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Just over age 65</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At age 65</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just under age 65</td>
<td>24.6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


“Those with access to a spouse’s health insurance plan are much more likely to become self-employed.”

WWW.RAND.ORG

RAND REVIEW / SUMMER 2011 5
Europe Can Raise Employment for Young and Old, Cut Inequality

The aftermath of the economic crisis of 2008 has undone much of the progress in improving employment and growth in Europe over the past 20 years. However, targeted help to place young people into jobs and job training combined with efforts to update the job skills of older people would be a "win-win" strategy for European leaders, according to a RAND Europe study.

European policymakers should increasingly focus on encouraging people to achieve their full productive potential and to participate in the labor force as complements to traditional social insurance approaches, the study recommends.

The study examined ways to increase employment rates among vulnerable groups and to reduce income inequality within groups of comparable workers. In terms of employment, the study focused on those between the ages of 16 and 24 who are not in school or working and are thus at great risk of long-term unemployment, along with those between the ages of 55 and 64, who have low labor force participation rates in general.

Importantly, the study found that what works to promote the labor force participation of one group may not harm another. For example, there are no significant trade-offs between increased female participation in the workforce and the employment of younger and older workers.

For the young, the recent shift toward service-sector jobs is associated with an overall increase in the probability of employment. For the old, however, trying to move them toward white-collar jobs presents a risk that they will stop working altogether, since their skills may need updating.

“That’s why it is important to combine job placement and training for the young with job skills updating for the old,” said Christian van Stolk, the lead study author. Evidence from Nordic countries shows that such work-enabling interventions can mitigate poverty and long-term unemployment.

As for income inequality, researchers found that unlike in the United States, European inequality often occurs within groups: Groups with the same education, age, gender, and employment profiles exhibit high degrees of wage inequality. This within-group inequality is often associated with flexible labor markets, such as those in Europe, which allow part-time and flexible working arrangements.

Increasing labor force participation among the young and old would help reduce income inequality. In addition, policymakers could combat within-group inequality by providing basic income support and a higher guaranteed minimum income, the study concluded.

RAND Europe conducted the study for the Directorate-General for Employment, Social Policy and Equal Opportunities at the European Commission.

For more information: Life after Lisbon: Europe’s Challenges to Promote Labour Force Participation and Reduce Income Inequality, RAND/MG-1068-RE, 2011, Web only: www.rand.org/t/MG1068
RAND Assesses Alternative Policies for Geoengineering Governance

Geoengineering—the large-scale, deliberate altering of the earth’s climate—is increasingly mentioned as a potential response to global climate change, but many find it a risky proposition. Should the United States encourage research on geoengineering, and if so, how? Is it better to conduct research to learn more about the viability of geoengineering systems, or would this research only make it more likely that such a system would be deployed inappropriately?

A new RAND study addresses these questions by conducting a risk assessment of three potential U.S. government policies toward geoengineering research, using an approach called robust decision-making. According to Robert Lempert, the study’s lead author and a RAND senior scientist, “There have been no systematic efforts to analyze the risks of different policies toward conducting geoengineering research, because of the complicated and uncertain string of events that flow from such research.”

To show the potential utility of risk analysis under such conditions, the study focused on one kind of geoengineering technology: solar radiation management. Solar radiation management would involve reflecting a small amount of radiation back into space, thereby cooling the planet and offsetting some of the heat trapped by greenhouse gases.

Researchers compared the risks of three commonly debated alternative international policies that the United States might endorse for governing research on solar radiation management: strong norms, an outright ban, and no norms. The table defines those policies and explains when each one would make sense and why.

The study considers only a small set of the options available to the U.S. government and focuses only on the decisions of national governments, not private firms or other nongovernmental actors. A more complete analysis would likely suggest additional vulnerabilities and identify ways to ameliorate at least some of them.

“Even though the current study is deliberately limited, it provides useful contributions to the growing policy debates over geoengineering,” said Lempert. “And it shows that it is possible to conduct risk analysis under conditions of deep uncertainty. In an expanded form, this analysis could help U.S. policymakers develop and evaluate robust policies toward geoengineering governance.”


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**U.S. Policies on Solar Radiation Management Depend on Many Factors**

|-------------------------|---------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|
| Strong Norms: Encourage establishment of international norms to govern geoengineering research | When they believe some type of technology for managing solar radiation is possible | • Increases likelihood of successful deployment in cases in which geoengineering proves useful  
• Reduces likelihood of failed deployments by nations struggling to respond to serious climate impacts |
| Ban: Promote prohibition on any geoengineering research | When they believe no technology for managing solar radiation is likely to succeed and that climate change is highly unlikely to prove catastrophic | • Increases likelihood of reaching international agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions  
• Reduces risks of overconfidence—or of deploying a geoengineering system that works in theory but fails in practice |
| No Norms: Actively discourage formation of norms governing research | When they believe no technology for managing solar radiation is likely to succeed but that climate change could prove catastrophic | • Might prove more effective than a ban at preventing unsuccessful geoengineering deployments by nations that defy the ban |
Worksite Program Can Improve Parent-Teen Chats About Sex

A worksite-based program can help parents become more skilled at communicating with their adolescents about sexual health, according to RAND research.

“Parents can play a crucial role in promoting their kids’ healthy sexual development, but many are too embarrassed or find it too hard to have conversations about such topics as love, relationships, and pregnancy prevention,” said Mark Schuster, a RAND senior behavioral scientist and the lead researcher. “And while programs can help parents overcome these barriers, such programs are often not easily accessible to busy parents. That’s why RAND and UCLA developed a program for delivery in worksites, where it’s easier for parents to participate.”

Called Talking Parents, Healthy Teens, the program was implemented in eight weekly one-hour sessions at 13 worksites in Southern California from April 2002 to December 2005, involving 569 parents of 6th- through 10th-graders. The parents were randomly assigned to intervention or control groups. Both the parents and their adolescent children completed baseline surveys and follow-up surveys at one week, three months, and nine months after the program.

As shown in the figure, the program helped parents communicate with their teens better than they had done prior to the program (at baseline). More specifically, parents and youth in the intervention group reported more discussions about sexual topics, a greater ability to communicate with each other, and more open communication.

As an example, nine months after the program, the parents in the intervention group were much more likely than those in the control group to talk about seven or more new topics with their adolescents (38 percent versus 8 percent) and considerably less likely to discuss no new sex-related topics (8 percent versus 29 percent). All told, there were 24 topics in the program, from how boys’ and girls’ bodies change as they grow up to how to prevent sexually transmitted diseases.

Some of the improvements also grew over time. For example, parents in the intervention group were much more likely to discuss condom use with teens one week after the program ended, and that gap grew substantially at the nine-month follow-up, well after the program was complete.

“The study shows that bringing a program to the worksite can be effective at getting parents involved in the process of communicating with their teens about sex,” said Schuster. “The program also seems to have had a sustained effect on increasing communication between parents and adolescents and on the openness of their communication.”

New Orleans Families Were Especially Vulnerable to Breakup

The composition of households in New Orleans made the city’s families particularly vulnerable to breakup during the chaos that followed Hurricane Katrina, according to a RAND study published in the *Journal of Marriage and Family*.

“Household breakup can have severe consequences, including homelessness, for both single-parent families and single adults,” said Michael Rendall, author of the study and director of the Population Research Center at RAND. The study suggests that policymakers should take into account the structure of households before disasters to design appropriate post-disaster services to help people and communities recover.

New Orleans had a high percentage of multigenerational households when Katrina hit, a factor that likely contributed to the disintegration of families after the storm. One-third of New Orleans households broke up within a period of just over a year following Katrina, compared with one in seven nationally over a similar period.

“We would expect that some families might have to separate briefly following a disaster such as a major hurricane,” said Rendall. “But in New Orleans, where extended-family households were very common, the hurricane had a large and longer-term impact on the breakup of households.”

Extended-family households are often formed and maintained because of economic and physical needs. Adult children provide care for an elderly relative who would otherwise be in a nursing home. Older adults provide child care so parents can work. Unemployed adults get financial support until they find a job.

Before Katrina, households in which adult children were living with their parents were especially common and were 50 percent more prevalent in New Orleans than nationally. Children of household heads made up around 30 percent of all other household adults, compared with 20 percent nationally. “Research conducted after Hurricane Andrew in 1992 found that recovery programs tailored to nuclear families did not accommodate extended-family households,” said Rendall.

Whether a family’s house was habitable or uninhabitable after Hurricane Katrina played a role in whether the household remained intact, but physical damage to homes did not alone account for the breakup of families. The figure shows that little more than a year after Hurricane Katrina, 38 percent of New Orleans adults from uninhabitable residences and 23 percent from habitable residences separated from their former heads of household, compared with the national rate of 13 percent over a similar period. With respect to adult children of household heads in particular, more than half separated from their New Orleans households, compared with one-fifth nationally.

**“Recovery programs tailored to nuclear families did not accommodate extended-family households.”**

**More Than Half of Adult Children Left Their New Orleans Households After Hurricane Katrina; Among All Adults from Habitable Homes Who Were Not Household Heads, Nearly a Quarter Left**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of individuals who were not living with their former heads of households</th>
<th>13–16 months after Katrina</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adult Children of Household Heads</strong></td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All Adults Who Were Not Household Heads</strong></td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| From uninhabitable homes | 38.2 |
| From habitable homes | 21.0 |

SOURCE: Displaced New Orleans Residents Pilot Study.
Time to Cram
L.A. Schools Superintendent Deasy Sees No Excuse to Delay Reform

AS THE U.S. ECONOMIC SLUMP weighs down the nation’s public sector, America’s public schools are bearing a heavy share of the burden, what some observers have called an “educational budget crisis” facing communities across the country. This crisis is particularly acute in the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD)—the nation’s second-largest district, home to more than 1,000 schools that enroll approximately 700,000 students.

Overseeing the district’s $7 billion annual operating budget, new LAUSD Superintendent John Deasy views the crisis as an opportunity. In a conversation at RAND in April just prior to assuming the reins of his new job, he said that his challenge is to “use the opportunities found in California’s budget crisis to fundamentally reshape the LAUSD to serve students and parents.”

What that means for Deasy is a recognition by all stakeholders—district offices, principals, teachers, parents, and unions—that students come first. His plan involves cutting middle management expenses at the district, giving principals more resources and accountability, recruiting good teachers to replace bad ones, and expecting more from all students. “The system must embrace an unfailing and nonnegotiable belief that all children can achieve at high levels.”

It’s About Schools, Not the District
Deasy wants to shift resources—both money and support services, such as help in designing teacher evaluation systems—down from the school district’s “vast middle layer” directly to the schools themselves, where he thinks the resources can do the most good. “The district must be far more agile and far more responsive to the sites, less involved with compliance, and more involved with encouraging innovation,” he said.

He described one high school where the teachers had innovative ideas but were afraid of getting into trouble by pursuing them. “Such schools need to stop asking for permission and just lead with what they know they can do.”

Deasy also stressed the need to expedite the process. “Upping the pace is critical; we don’t have the luxury of going slowly on the issue. It’s all right for my management team to make mistakes if it’s because of the pace of rapid improvement. The key is not to allow the system to grind to a halt.”

Now Is the Time for Every Good Teacher
To improve instruction, Deasy promised to target teachers, bad and good. His aim is to weed out poor teachers and to make LAUSD a “talent magnet” for those who are committed to bringing innovation into the classroom.

“If you are outside the district and have an interest in fundamentally altering the trajectory of youth, we want you to come to LAUSD. If you are in LAUSD and are struggling with your skill sets to help every youth achieve, we are with you,” he said. “But if you are in LAUSD and don’t quite buy the agenda, then you’ve got to go.”

Making sure that the right teachers are in front of the kids requires a good teacher evaluation system. “We know that teachers cannot get better as teachers unless they are told how to get better,” Deasy said. “Ensuring that teachers get evaluated is an obligation of the system, but we can’t get good performance reviews if the process focuses, as it tends to now, on such things as how clean the teacher’s classroom is and tends to avoid discussing the actual pedagogy of teaching.”

Systemic Barriers to Success
Another key to his agenda is spurring the success of disadvantaged kids, who are often students of color, students with handicaps, and students with limited English proficiency. Unfortunately, he said, such youth are often discouraged from achieving.

“The overwhelming majority of teachers are starving for reform-oriented leadership.”
—John Deasy, superintendent, Los Angeles Unified School District
He cited the course requirements for entrance into the University of California or California State University systems. “You wouldn’t believe the number of students who are systematically guided, prevented from, or moved out of courses that carry such credit.” For algebra, he said, many kids are directed into courses that sound like they will provide the needed foundation for higher math but actually do not. “Many youth are being given orange drink, not orange juice.” He also decried limited access to Advanced Placement courses as another example where certain kids are steered away from success.

“Many reasons are given for doing this, including that such kids, who almost all live in poverty, are not ready for such courses, or that it’ll hurt their self-esteem if they take them and fail. As superintendent, my job is to remove barriers to all such courses.”

**Four Prongs of Reform**

Deasy said he was drawn to his new position because the current LAUSD Board of Education “has provided a policy platform for very powerful reform.” As he sees it, his job is to be very clear on where he is going and to move that policy forward in dealing with other stakeholders.

One of the largest and most vocal stakeholders is the teachers’ union, United Teachers Los Angeles. Deasy acknowledged that the union’s goal of negotiating the best deal for its members may at times conflict with his vision, but he also stressed this point: “The overwhelming majority of teachers are starving for reform-oriented leadership.”

He said his style is to strive for negotiation, citing a settlement he reached with parties to a lawsuit involving teacher seniority in a time of teacher layoffs. “When teacher seniority is the driver determining who can be let go, it tends to disproportionately harm the most impacted schools, which are generally those in areas of high poverty,” he said. “The negotiated settlement agreement we created prevents such disproportionate harm from happening to the schools in question.”

But he is aware that there are other tools at his disposal. “We will use a four-sided strategy of negotiation, regulation, legislation, and litigation. If that is what is needed to ensure that youth achieve at all levels, then all four tools will be brought to bear,” he promised.

“I’d like to move forward collaboratively and even boldly with labor side-by-side,” he said. “But I’m not going to turn around and say to the kids, ‘Sorry, didn’t work out.’”

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**New Research Shows Summer Programs Can Stem Learning Loss**

In what *Education Week* has called the “first comprehensive evaluation of . . . summer learning loss,” RAND researchers have found that summer vacation can take a toll on the skills and knowledge that students achieve during the school year, leaving them, on average, a month behind where they left off in the spring. Summer learning loss disproportionately affects low-income students, particularly in reading. Over time, the cumulative losses contribute substantially to the achievement gap between low-income and higher-income students.

The good news is that summer learning programs can prevent such learning loss. “One way school districts can make summer learning programs affordable and more effective is by partnering with community-based organizations,” suggested coauthor Catherine Augustine, a RAND senior policy researcher. “They are often less expensive than school district staff, and they offer enrichment opportunities that encourage students to enroll and attend, both of which are critical to program effectiveness.”

**Related Reading**

By Brian Michael Jenkins and John Paul Godges

Brian Michael Jenkins, senior adviser to the president of the RAND Corporation, initiated RAND’s research on terrorism in 1972. John Paul Godges is editor-in-chief of RAND Review. They are coeditors of The Long Shadow of 9/11.

It is, at this moment, nearly ten years since 9/11. The deadliest attacks in the annals of terrorism and the cause of the greatest bloodshed on American soil since the Civil War, the 9/11 attacks provoked the invasion of Afghanistan, which has become America’s longest war. The attacks also prompted America’s global campaign against terrorists and terrorism—a campaign that soon broadened to include the invasion of Iraq, a fundamental reorganization of the intelligence community, and a continuing national preoccupation with domestic security marked by the creation of a new national apparatus, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, dedicated to the protection of American citizens against terrorist attacks.

The death in May of Osama bin Laden, founder and leader of al Qaeda, who declared war on the United States in 1996 and who was the driving force behind the 9/11 attacks, would seem to bracket, if not the war on terrorism, at least an important chapter in that war. Despite a brief display of national euphoria after the killing of bin Laden, few analysts believe that his death spells the end of al Qaeda or its terrorist campaign. His demise is a semicolon in the ongoing contest, not a period.

Al Qaeda’s future trajectory is not yet discernible. The organization has warned of retaliation and is under pressure to demonstrate to its foes and, more importantly, to its followers that the global terrorist enterprise inspired by bin Laden is still in business. With no other al Qaeda leader possessing his symbolic authority, one way of asserting leadership is to demonstrate prowess as a terrorist commander. Further terrorist attacks must be anticipated. As the tenth anniversary of 9/11 approaches, apprehension will increase. But the threat will persist for many years.

A Chance to Reflect

Even before bin Laden’s death, the tenth anniversary of America’s response to 9/11 seemed an appropriate time for a thoughtful review of progress and future strategy. The perspective of a decade would reveal broad trends not apparent in shorter time frames. When we, the editors of The Long Shadow of 9/11: America’s Response to Terrorism, first discussed the idea of such a review with RAND’s management and staff, we made it clear that we did not want just a tenth-year anniversary anthology, a sampler of related RAND research. We wanted the participants in this project not only to draw upon...
their accumulated expertise and accrued knowledge but also to go beyond what they had already published and reflect upon broader issues.

Did America overreact to 9/11? What did America do right? What did the country get wrong? Have there been lost opportunities or unwise approaches? What lessons have been learned? What might the country now do differently? What can Americans realistically expect from security? Has 9/11 changed how Americans view war? And has 9/11 changed us as Americans?

The contributing authors to this volume did not disappoint. Their essays are agile, yet muscular, recognizing the progress made in some areas but offering criticism where it is needed. Excerpts from four of the 16 essays follow in this issue of RAND Review. The first two excerpts, from Arturo Muñoz and Eric Larson, address foreign policy. The last two excerpts, from Jack Riley and Lloyd Dixon and his colleagues, address homeland security.

The long shadow of 9/11 sometimes makes it difficult to recall what things were like before terrorists crashed hijacked airliners into New York skyscrapers and the Pentagon, killing thousands. The United States had been concerned about the growing phenomenon of terrorism since the late 1960s and had played a major role in international efforts to combat it. Terrorism escalated in the 1980s and 1990s as terrorists increasingly demonstrated their determination to kill in quantity and their willingness to kill indiscriminately. Terrorist attacks on American targets abroad had already provoked a military response on several occasions, but these were single actions.

Prior to 9/11, neither Washington nor the American public was psychologically or politically prepared to launch not simply retaliatory strikes but a continuing military campaign against a terrorist movement—to wage war on terrorism, whatever that meant. Without 9/11, it would have been hard to imagine the subsequent American response. And even given that response, few in 2001 anticipated that the effort would last so long or prove so costly.

**An Honest Accounting**
The United States has accomplished a great deal in the past ten years. Al Qaeda’s capacity for centrally directed,
The United States cannot prevent every terrorist attack, but it is much better equipped today to handle future terrorist threats. U.S. intelligence has shifted its priorities from nation-states to transnational actors and has reconfigured itself to meet the new threats. The intelligence operation that led to the successful raid on bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, displayed this greatly increased effectiveness. Al Qaeda’s ranks have been decimated, its capabilities degraded, not only as a result of U.S. intelligence, military, and Special Operations but also very much as a consequence of unprecedented international cooperation among the world’s security services and law enforcement organizations.

The authors of *The Long Shadow of 9/11* do not flinch at the invasion of Afghanistan, the continuing use of military force to destroy al Qaeda, or current efforts against the Taliban. They do, however, criticize the invasion of Iraq on grounds that it diverted attention from Afghanistan and the pursuit of al Qaeda, that the United States sidelined even willing allies to pursue military missions largely on its own, that military operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq ended up being stretched thin, and that the requirements of both counterinsurgency campaigns were ignored until late in the campaigns. The United States has been forced to learn—and to relearn—a great deal the hard way, especially about counterinsurgency operations.

The authors remain skeptical of current U.S. efforts to build up a large national army and police force in Afghanistan without simultaneously building up local forces, which seem closer to that country’s traditions. There is further dissatisfaction with the continuing failure to deliberately combat al Qaeda’s ideology or to support those who can. From the outset, preventing further terrorist attacks took precedence. America pounded on al Qaeda’s operational capabilities, not its beliefs, which were largely dismissed as fanaticism. But military power alone does not suffice.

The authors sometimes harp on America’s foibles, but they also harbor great hopes for America’s future. Some authors assert that America overreacted after 9/11, both abroad (in Iraq) and at home (at the airports). Yet the authors also see opportunities for strengthening America that have arisen partly because of 9/11—from reinforcing our public health system to redesigning our laws to promote community solidarity in times when we most need to rely on each other.

**An American Perspective**

This volume offers an explicitly American point of view. It was our intent to look critically at America’s experience and performance. This reflects the fact that America has often chosen to go it alone, determined to run its own show, unwilling to be fettered by assistance from others, ignoring advice that did not accord with its own perspectives—showing hubris. It was our mandate as authors and editors to comment upon that American experience.

Nonetheless, we are aware of the enormous cooperation and collaboration that have taken place with international allies, not only in the areas of intelligence and law enforcement, as pointed out, but also on the battlefield. As the continuing terrorist threat inspired by al Qaeda’s ideology becomes more diffuse, this collaboration will become even more critical.

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**America’s struggle against terrorism has been national in name only. Except for the heavy burden borne unequally by those in the military and their families, the conflict remains a distant reality show to the rest of society.**
A Better Criterion

Americans frequently ask, Are we safer now? The question betrays the perspective of a victim. The answer is probably yes, but surely that cannot be the sole criterion of progress. Instead, we might ask, Is America stronger now? Can the country defend itself against current and would-be foes? Can the country sustain the perpetual state of preparedness in which, it seems, we must live? Is America capable of achieving its objectives?

Assessment here is more difficult, beyond the reach of research, but the answer seems mixed. America is probably organizationally and militarily better prepared now. It has gained a better understanding of this new kind of adversary. Having survived 9/11, Americans may be better prepared psychologically to deal with another terrorist attack. But national strength derives from more than the accumulation of warriors, weapons, and endurance. It encompasses public spirit. A civic spirit. A sense that everyone is in it together.

America’s struggle against terrorism has been national in name only. Except for the heavy burden borne unequally by those in the military and their families, the conflict remains a distant reality show to the rest of society. Conspicuous displays of patriotism disguise the absence of national sacrifice. The national treasury has been emptied, but private profit is preferred over public interest, while growing political partisanship erodes any sense of national unity. The political class has not served the country well. Or perhaps its constituents have demanded too little of it. In a genuine democracy, after all, the people are responsible for the nation’s actions.

At the same time, Americans will defend their liberties. They are ferocious when angered and keen to rise up when thrown on the defensive. And despite the instances of prisoner abuse and torture that have sullied America’s honor since 9/11, the American people, on the whole, remain determined to behave virtuously: No cities were leveled after 9/11. Citizens sought to participate in the effort to secure the homeland (but were told to stand aside—and to keep shopping). Most Americans have remained tolerant of the Muslim community, although that sentiment is under assault. Americans are deeply concerned about the country’s condition, which they do see as their responsibility to remedy. They are irked by those who blame America for the world’s problems and then blame America when it tries to solve them, but in general, Americans continue to believe that their country has an important role to play in the world, and they are eager to play it.

While fighting al Qaeda since 9/11, America has waged a political war with itself. This is nothing new in American life. It may be intrinsic to the nature of our contentious federal republic. But the shadow of 9/11 across America has exacerbated the internal conflicts. Fear may lie at the heart of much of America’s response, just as the terrorists intended. But the terrorist attacks have not destroyed America. If anything, they have magnified the extremes within America, from the isolationist impulse to go it alone to the internationalist impulse to remain a beacon of freedom for the world, from the reluctance to engage to the desire to sort things out. In what could be the final legacy of 9/11 and also the most self-defeating consequence of al Qaeda’s campaign to extinguish America, the terrorist attacks have compelled America to become an exaggerated version of itself, with its own internal contradictions heightened and intensified. It remains in the hands of the American people to write the next chapter of their history. That is as it should be.

Related Reading


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After Nearly a Decade of War, Servicemembers and Families Report Stress, Resilience

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have put America’s all-volunteer force to its most severe test since its inception in 1973. Between 1996 and 2002, 31,000 to 77,000 U.S. servicemembers were deployed abroad on active duty at any given time. Between 2003 and 2007, however, that range reached 74,000 to 294,000:

This overall increase has been sustained through successful military recruiting and incentive strategies. But how are the troops and their families faring?

A growing body of RAND research is helping to illustrate the consequences so that support programs and other policies can better serve the populations in need.

For more information about RAND research on this issue, including insight into the ways the military is sustaining readiness, see www.rand.org/feature/military-well-being


Along certain measures of functioning and well-being, children from military families are no different from other children. However, they do report experiencing more anxiety symptoms, emotional difficulties, and problems with family functioning.

Many Problems Persist for at Least a Year for Military Kids

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Summer '08</th>
<th>6 months later</th>
<th>12 months later</th>
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<tr>
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<td>8.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>(caregiver-reported)</td>
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<tr>
<td>issues</td>
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<td>Family functioning</td>
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<td>difficulties</td>
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<td>Anxiety symptoms</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peer functioning</td>
<td>1.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>difficulties</td>
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</tbody>
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Values are mean scores.

Military Kids Compared with Their Peers

- Peer functioning difficulties: comparable
- Academic engagement problems: comparable
- Risk behaviors: comparable
- Emotional or behavioral difficulties: elevated
- Anxiety symptoms: elevated
- Family functioning difficulties: elevated

Emotional Difficulties, Anxiety Symptoms

- 34% In a sample, percentage of military kids experiencing moderate or high levels of emotional difficulties, according to caregivers
- 30% In a sample, percentage of military kids reporting elevated anxiety symptoms
- 19% Estimated percentage of youth in the general population with these emotional difficulties
- 15% Estimated percentage of youth in the general population with these anxiety symptoms

NOTES clockwise from upper right: (1) Based on a RAND survey of families that applied to the Operation Purple camp program; see Views from the Homefront: The Experiences of Youth and Spouses from Military Families, RAND/FR-183, 2011, p. x, www.rand.org/FR183. (2) Based on some studies (green percentages) and a RAND survey of families that applied to the Operation Purple camp program (red percentages); see Views from the Homefront, pp. 24, 28. (3) Based on a RAND survey of families that applied to the Operation Purple camp program; see Views from the Homefront, p. 25.
More than two million U.S. servicemembers have been deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan. Many of these troops experience trauma while deployed and return home with mental health conditions. A variety of barriers may be preventing many of those in need from seeking care.

### Traumatic Experiences Are Common During Deployments

My friend was seriously wounded or killed 50%

I saw dead or seriously injured noncombatants 45%

I witnessed serious injury or death 45%

I smelled decomposing bodies 37%

I was physically moved or knocked over by an explosion 23%

I was injured but not hospitalized 23%

I received a blow to the head in an accident or injury 18%

I was injured and hospitalized 11%

### Deployment Effects in Three Key Areas

- **Child-related problems**
  - Worse: 52%
  - Improved: 7%
  - No change: 41%

- **Employment-related problems**
  - Worse: 44%
  - Improved: 9%
  - No change: 48%

- **Financial problems**
  - Worse: 29%
  - Improved: 35%
  - No change: 36%

### Views from the Homefront: Greatest Challenges

- I took on more responsibilities at home 82%
- I helped my child deal with life without the deployed parent 80%
- People in my community didn’t get what life was like for me 52%
- I spent more time with my children 52%
- I talked to teachers about my child’s school performance 50%
- I felt like I had no one to talk to about my stress, sadness 49%
- I lost contact with other military families 29%
- I no longer spent time with other military families 18%

NOTES clockwise from upper right: (1) Based on RAND research into probable rates of PTSD and major depression among servicemembers returning from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) or Operation Iraq Freedom (OIF) and into suicide rates; see Invisible Wounds of War: Psychological and Cognitive Injuries, Their Consequences, and Services to Assist Recovery, RAND/MG-790, 2008, pp. 18, www.rand.org/t/MG790, and The War Within: Preventing Suicide in the U.S. Military, RAND/MG-983, 2011, pp. xx, 16, www.rand.org/t/MG983. (2) Based on a RAND survey of families that applied to the Operation Purple camp program (red percentages); see , pp. 24, 28. Operation Purple Spouses from Military Families Views from the Homefront: The Experiences of Youth and clockwise from upper right: (1) Based on RAND research into probable rates of PTSD and major depression among servicemembers returning from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) or Operation Iraq Freedom (OIF) and into suicide rates; see Invisible Wounds of War: Psychological and Cognitive Injuries, Their Consequences, and Services to Assist Recovery, RAND/MG-790, 2008, pp. 18, www.rand.org/t/MG790, and The War Within: Preventing Suicide in the U.S. Military, RAND/MG-983, 2011, pp. xx, 16, www.rand.org/t/MG983. (2) Based on a RAND survey of families that applied to the Operation Purple camp program (red percentages); see , pp. 24, 28. Operation Purple Spouses from Military Families Views from the Homefront: The Experiences of Youth and clockwise from upper right: (1) Based on RAND research into probable rates of PTSD and major depression among servicemembers returning from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) or Operation Iraq Freedom (OIF) and into suicide rates; see Invisible Wounds of War: Psychological and Cognitive Injuries, Their Consequences, and Services to Assist Recovery, RAND/MG-790, 2008, pp. 18, www.rand.org/t/MG790, and The War Within: Preventing Suicide in the U.S. Military, RAND/MG-983, 2011, pp. xx, 16, www.rand.org/t/MG983. (3) Based on RAND research into rates of trauma exposure among servicemembers deployed to OEF or OIF; see Invisible Wounds of War, p. 97. The lives of spouses and caregivers from military families change dramatically during deployment. There are both challenges and benefits, but, for many, child- and employment-related problems appear to worsen.

### Troops Report Barriers to Seeking Care

The medications could have too many side effects

It could harm my career

I could be denied a security clearance

My family and friends would be more helpful than a mental health professional

My coworkers would have less confidence in me

I don’t think my treatment would be kept confidential

My commander or supervisor might respect me less

My friends and family would respect me less

I could lose contact with or custody of my children

My commander or supervisor asked us not to get treatment

NOTES clockwise from upper right: (1) Based on RAND research into probable rates of PTSD and major depression among servicemembers returning from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) or Operation Iraq Freedom (OIF) and into suicide rates; see Invisible Wounds of War: Psychological and Cognitive Injuries, Their Consequences, and Services to Assist Recovery, RAND/MG-790, 2008, pp. 18, www.rand.org/t/MG790, and The War Within: Preventing Suicide in the U.S. Military, RAND/MG-983, 2011, pp. xx, 16, www.rand.org/t/MG983. (2) Based on a RAND survey of families that applied to the Operation Purple camp program (red percentages); see , pp. 24, 28. Operation Purple Spouses from Military Families Views from the Homefront: The Experiences of Youth and clockwise from upper right: (1) Based on RAND research into probable rates of PTSD and major depression among servicemembers returning from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) or Operation Iraq Freedom (OIF) and into suicide rates; see Invisible Wounds of War: Psychological and Cognitive Injuries, Their Consequences, and Services to Assist Recovery, RAND/MG-790, 2008, pp. 18, www.rand.org/t/MG790, and The War Within: Preventing Suicide in the U.S. Military, RAND/MG-983, 2011, pp. xx, 16, www.rand.org/t/MG983. (3) Based on RAND research into rates of trauma exposure among servicemembers deployed to OEF or OIF; see Invisible Wounds of War, p. 97. The lives of spouses and caregivers from military families change dramatically during deployment. There are both challenges and benefits, but, for many, child- and employment-related problems appear to worsen.

### Deployment Challenges

- Household responsibilities: 40%
- Emotional or mental: 39%
- Childcare issues: 26%
- Financial or legal: 15%

### Deployment Benefits

- 28% Family closeness
- 24% Patriotism, pride ...
- 20% Financial gain
- 20% Independence, confidence ...
- None: 14%
- 13% None

### Deployment Effects in Three Key Areas

- Child-related problems
- Employment-related problems
- Financial problems
- Worsened: 52%
- Improved: 7%
- No change: 41%
- 44%
- 9%
- 48%
- 29%
- 35%
- 36%
Respectful Assistance to Afghan Solutions

By Arturo Muñoz

Prior to joining RAND as a senior political scientist in 2009, Arturo Muñoz served 29 years at the Central Intelligence Agency, where he created and managed counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and counternarcotics programs for Latin America, Southwest Asia, the Balkans, the Middle East, and North Africa.

Small teams of CIA and U.S. Special Operations Forces advisers, working closely with local Afghans, overthrew the Taliban regime in Kabul on November 14, 2001. It was not an invasion. Afghans did all the fighting on the ground, supported by American air power and high technology, a campaign that has been hailed as an innovation in modern warfare. By making alliances with key Afghan leaders and bringing to bear very intimidating lethal force when needed, these small teams were able to exert political and military influence greatly disproportionate to their number.

As soon as victory was achieved, however, the United States abandoned the advisory model. Instead of honoring Afghan terms of peace, utilizing village institutions to maintain security, training Afghans to do most of their own fighting, and rebuilding from the bottom up, the United States and NATO tried to impose Western ways of doing things from the top down. In doing so, the Westerners received the support of an Afghan ruling elite determined to build a strong central government. However, this approach has often proved to be counterproductive.

Even in those cases where counterinsurgency success has been achieved, the crucial concern now is sustainability. The best way to preserve these hard-fought gains is to adapt American military and civilian efforts more closely to Afghan norms. This essay argues for an approach in which the West provides respectful assistance to Afghan solutions—what might be called the Afghan-Lead model—in place of the Western-Lead model that has prevailed since late 2001.

What an Afghan-Lead Model Could Have Looked Like

First, the United States should have backed Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s effort to reconcile with the Taliban in December 2001. A peace process among the Afghans was being discussed at the time, only to be repudiated by the Americans. U.S. reconciliation with the defeated Taliban forces could have prevented them from regrouping and launching an insurgency—and thus could have allowed the United States to maintain the modest military posture with which its intervention began.

Second, much greater emphasis should have been given to training and expanding professional, multiethnic Afghan National Security Forces rather than increasing the reliance on the International Security Assistance Force, which culminated in the current U.S. troop surge. Likewise, a relatively small number of experienced advisers could have accelerated and expanded the training of Afghans as administrators of humanitarian and development projects, rather than bringing in scores of foreign personnel to do those jobs.

Third, at the local level, more should have been done to integrate traditional Afghan forms of consensus-based democratic expression (through local jirgas and shuras) with the centralized, national government apparatus being created in Kabul. And fourth, instead of rejecting the concept of local defense forces, both the Afghan and U.S governments should have done more to develop them as force multipliers to bring security, good governance, and development to rural communities.

Regarding the first element—the peace process with the Taliban—some counterterrorism officials in
2001 wanted to target only al Qaeda. They worried about the danger of getting involved in a prolonged guerrilla war in Afghanistan against native tribesmen. That attitude changed under the Global War on Terror agenda, which conflated the Taliban with al Qaeda. Even though, after 9/11, an ulema (religious council) of 1,000 Taliban clerics had formally asked that Osama bin Laden leave Afghanistan, reflecting deep divisions within the Taliban over his presence, U.S. policy lumped all Taliban and al Qaeda together, categorizing them as terrorists.

In his capacity as the Pashtun tribal chief who had just been named at Afghan peace talks in Bonn to lead an interim Afghan government, Karzai negotiated a peace plan with the Taliban in early December 2001. In so doing, he followed the pashtunwali norm of nanawatayi (offering sanctuary or reconciliation to defeated enemies). Karzai’s peace initiative, launched at the time when the Taliban was in disarray and its leaders most receptive to peace talks, was scuttled by U.S. officials.

As The New York Times reported on December 7, 2001, “Karzai . . . said that Taliban militants would turn over their arms and ammunition to a council of tribal elders and would be allowed safe passage to their homes. That process, he said, should be completed within a few days.” In Islamabad, meanwhile, “Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, a Taliban spokesman and former ambassador to Pakistan, announced the surrender agreement had been reached to save civilian lives. ‘Tomorrow the Taliban will start surrendering their weapons to Mullah Naqibullah. . . . The Taliban were finished as a political force,’ said Mullah Zaeef, adding, ‘I think we should go home.’” Mullah Zaeef also said that “Mullah Omar would be allowed to live in Kandahar under the protection of Naqibullah,” in peace and dignity.

But U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld quickly abrogated that peace agreement, stating that peace agreement, stating that the United States would not stand for any deal that allowed Taliban leader Mullah Omar “to remain free and ‘live in dignity’ in the region.” Rumsfeld stated his intention to continue military operations in Afghanistan,
The current U.S. administration is eager to promote peace talks. But times have changed. A decade of war has had a radicalizing effect. The influence of al Qaeda among certain elements of the Taliban is stronger than before, as can be seen in the adoption of terrorist tactics—such as suicide bombers, car bombs, attacks in mosques, and the deliberate targeting of civilians—that are not typical of Pashtun warfare. The Taliban are more divided. It will be hard to get them all at the same negotiating table or to make common agreements. A generational gap has emerged in which “neo-Taliban” leaders exemplified by Mullah Abdul Qayum Zakir, who spent six years in Guantanamo, are much more radical than the old leadership. At the end of this long learning curve, America may have learned a lesson that can no longer be implemented.

To achieve the second element of an Afghan-Lead approach—a greater emphasis on training Afghans and building up the Afghan government and military—a close working relationship with American advisers is required. This does not call for large numbers of Americans on the ground. It is better to have fewer people who know what they are doing, and are experienced and respected, in the mold of the British political agents of the past in Pakistan. Instead of deploying American combat units to do the fighting, more American trainers should have been brought in.

It has been argued that the results of training the Afghan National Security Forces have been disappointing, but this does not take into account that the training for years was disappointing. Numerous studies and press reports have documented the shortcomings of this training. Moreover, when an intense effort to provide the best training is given, as with the training of the Afghan Special Forces, the results are correspondingly positive. An equally intense effort should have been made to develop the Afghan civil service, creating mechanisms for accountability and transparency in handling funds.

Regarding the third element of an Afghan-Lead approach—more reliance on traditional or tribal forms of governance that stress consensus-building—the United States and the West in general have sided with the top-down Kabul elites and have not taken seriously alternatives that could have achieved a more democratic system. A critical challenge in seeking to build on Afghan consensus-building traditions, rather than relying solely on Western-inspired mechanisms, is even though the Taliban had been defeated. Echoing the White House declaration that “those who harbor terrorists need to be brought to justice,” Rumsfeld threatened Karzai with loss of support if he persisted in trying to negotiate peace. If any Afghan anti-Taliban leader made a deal with Mullah Omar, Rumsfeld noted pointedly, “our cooperation would take a turn south.”

No one can say with certainty what would have happened had Karzai’s peace plan been implemented. Mullah Omar may have surrendered and come to Kandahar only to rebel again for any number of reasons. Some key Taliban commanders may have refused to go along with the plan and kept on fighting on their own, forming the nucleus of the new insurgency. On the other hand, peace could have been established. That possibility cannot be discounted either.

For centuries, Afghanistan has sought to build a strong central government, and the idea of a “unitary” state along the French model is deeply rooted among Afghan intellectuals, politicians, and bureaucrats. Nonetheless, such an ideal state has not existed in Afghan history.
how to integrate the traditional jirgas and shuras with national decisionmaking.

This issue is part of a wider, more fundamental debate regarding the nature of the Afghan state. For centuries, Afghanistan has sought to build a strong central government, and the idea of a “unitary” state along the French model is deeply rooted among Afghan intellectuals, politicians, and bureaucrats. Nonetheless, such an ideal state has not existed in Afghan history. Instead, there has been a constant tension between the efforts of the national government to impose itself and the regional and tribal resistance. The bottom line is that the informal jirgas and shuras in the countryside have never disappeared. They still serve as a potent forum locally, not only to express opinions but also to rally people for or against the government. Taliban commanders regularly appear before jirgas to make their case. American war fighters do the same.

The fourth component of an Afghan-Lead approach would have placed greater reliance on Afghan local defense forces. Although it is true that civilian forces have been badly misused in the past, such forces have worked well in other instances. Afghan kings relied on them throughout history because they were effective. During the Musahiban Dynasty (1929–1978), the Pashtun arbakai (traditional village guards) in eastern Afghanistan maintained order successfully, without committing abuses, and protected Afghan control over a disputed border area with Pakistan.

Implementing the four elements of an Afghan-Lead approach could have saved the United States and Afghanistan considerable grief over the past decade. It is still possible for U.S. and Afghan leaders to reconcile with the Taliban, to focus on training Afghan government and military leaders, to integrate tribal with national forms of governance, and to rely more heavily on local defense forces to secure rural communities. But the missteps of the past decade have made each of these elements more difficult to achieve. Nonetheless, they still offer the best hopes for bringing long-term peace and stability to Afghanistan.

Related Reading


A Diplomatic Strategy to Counter al Qaeda’s Narrative

By Eric V. Larson

A RAND senior policy researcher, Eric Larson has led studies of al Qaeda’s jihadi strategy, ideology, propaganda, and discourse, and of public support for terrorism and insurgency.

At the heart of al Qaeda’s effort to build a violent social movement based on its transnational ideology of Salafi jihadism—a violent fundamentalist form of Islamism—is a contest over the true nature of Islam: whether Islam is merciful, compassionate, and tolerant, imposing substantial constraints on the permissibility of violent jihad, which is the view of most mainstream Muslim thought, or whether Islam is intolerant and permissive of violent jihad, in accordance with al Qaeda’s reading. This contest has aptly been described both as a civil war within Islam itself and as being analogous to the West’s own century-long Reformation and Counter-Reformation of the 16th and 17th centuries.

The harms that have befallen the Muslim world as a result of al Qaeda’s practice of violence have led to severe criticisms from outside the Salafi-jihadi movement and from within the movement as well, and most of the available public opinion survey data suggest a decline in support for al Qaeda within the Muslim world. The principal implication for U.S. policy is as follows: The best strategy is to pursue actions that erode the persuasiveness of al Qaeda’s narrative while avoiding actions that play into the narrative and impede al Qaeda’s ongoing self-destruction.
Al Qaeda Under Attack

The conventional wisdom typically has it that al Qaeda’s jihadi propaganda and media activities are hugely successful within the Muslim world and that al Qaeda is dominating the “information war,” humbling America’s own meager capabilities to influence Muslim attitudes. To be sure, al Qaeda’s propaganda and media strategy benefit from its ability to employ various symbols and slogans of Islam and Islamism in support of its program; for instance, al Qaeda’s leaders have identified themes—the liberation of Palestine being the preeminent one—that find resonance at a deeply emotional level for much of the Muslim world. However, al Qaeda’s ideological and propaganda weaknesses are more apparent than its strengths.

Al Qaeda’s leaders and propagandists view themselves as being on the defensive in a media war in which they are vastly overmatched by mass media organizations that are in thrall to the Crusader United States, Zionist Israel, and local apostate regimes. Al Qaeda’s Internet-based propaganda and media production and distribution capabilities thus reflect an effort to overcome the organization’s great weaknesses, both in competing with the well-financed public diplomacy, propaganda, and other informational capabilities of Western and Muslim governments and in gaining access to those same Western and Muslim mass media, which it views as inherently hostile to its cause. Even pan-Arab media stalwarts, such as Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya, are viewed as enemies of the movement.

In its “framing contests” with those who promote a more tolerant view of Islam, al Qaeda appears to be vastly outgunned. Moreover, the fact that al Qaeda Central figures (al Qaeda’s core leadership) are being forced to spend so much time deliberating over how best to demonstrate their theological and jurisprudential bona fides and defending themselves against attacks by detractors within their own theological circles is a highly encouraging sign.

Implications for U.S. Strategy and Policy

With al Qaeda already under considerable pressure from within the Muslim community, what, if any, fruitful role can the United States play in what is essentially an intra-Muslim debate about the nature of Islam and the permissibility of violent jihad? In short, U.S. strategy and policy should take the long view, which means focusing on three objectives: (1) reducing or eliminating the irritants that fuel support for al Qaeda, (2) promoting universal democratic and humanitarian values, and (3) avoiding actions and rhetorical missteps that reinforce al Qaeda’s narrative.

Reducing or eliminating the irritants that fuel support for al Qaeda. Al Qaeda’s grand strategy is based on the dual assumptions that attacks on the United States can lure it into intervening militarily in Muslim lands and that Muslims can then more easily be mobilized into jihad beneath al Qaeda’s banner. With a withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq by the end of 2011 and substantial reductions of forces in Afghanistan envisioned to begin by the end of 2014, this irritant will diminish, and al Qaeda will find it increasingly difficult to exploit this issue in mobilizing jihadists. Osama bin Laden’s own radicalization appears to have been fueled by the 1991 Gulf War, the deprivations experienced by Iraqis in the war’s aftermath, and the prolonged presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia following that war. Future decisions to deploy or permanently station U.S. military forces in Muslim lands must be carefully weighed against their potential consequences for fueling recruitment and mobilization into al Qaeda extremism.
The United States can weaken al Qaeda’s ability to exploit the Palestinian issue by continuing efforts to expand the writ and influence of the Palestinian Authority and to promote a broader settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. Al Qaeda has judged that the Israeli occupation of Palestine is the issue that is most salient to Muslims worldwide—and the most easily exploited in its propaganda and recruitment efforts. Thus, despite the current impasse in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, it is crucial that the United States continue its decades-long effort to promote a broader settlement.

Promoting universal democratic and humanitarian values. By promoting and supporting democratic reform in the Muslim world, the United States aligns itself with the aspirations of most ordinary Muslims and is better positioned to marginalize al Qaeda because of the organization’s outright rejection of democracy and peaceful political competition. The overthrow of corrupt and despotic leaders and the opening of political space, as occurred in the recent revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, can help sap support for al Qaeda’s extremism and channel energies toward peaceful political competition.

Efforts by the United States to secure the release of political prisoners also can provide tangible signs of the U.S. commitment to democratic values. Finally, by providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as it did following the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami that struck Indonesia and other nations in the region and the October 2005 earthquake that struck Pakistan, the United States can soften its image abroad, build goodwill in Muslim nations, and help to inoculate their populations against al Qaeda propaganda and rhetoric promoting violence against America.

Avoiding actions and rhetorical missteps that reinforce al Qaeda’s narrative. U.S. efforts to directly influence intra-Muslim debates over the nature of Islam and the permissibility of violent jihad seem highly unlikely to be effective. The theological and jurisprudential conditions and constraints that bear on the conduct of violent jihad are complex and subtle, and official U.S. efforts to opine on or influence such matters carry grave risks of both alienating potential friends and allies within the Muslim world and reinforcing al Qaeda’s narrative that the United States aims to refashion Islam into a moderate or even secular form. U.S. deeds of the types outlined above matter far more than words, but U.S. words can also cause great harm. Characterizing U.S. efforts against al Qaeda as part of a “crusade” or clash of civilizations may play well with some domestic audiences, but ultimately, it is likely to reinforce al Qaeda’s narrative of an Islam that is under attack by the non-Muslim world.

This is clearly not a strategy for quick, short-term results. Rather, as was the case with the earlier U.S. sustained effort to promote democracy, open markets, and individual freedom over totalitarian communism, it is a strategy that is likely to require decades or generations of effort. However, only by taking the long view will the United States be able to establish conditions that favor the triumph of a merciful, compassionate, and tolerant Islam over the violent nihilism of al Qaeda and its fellow travelers.

**Related Reading**

Air Passenger Security at a Reasonable Cost

By K. Jack Riley

Jack Riley, vice president and director of the RAND National Security Research Division, previously served as associate director of RAND Infrastructure, Safety, and Environment and director of the RAND Homeland Security Center.

The phrase “don’t touch my junk” became part of the lexicon of air passenger security in late 2010 thanks to the controversial decision by the U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to increase the physical scrutiny of air travelers. John Tyner, a software engineer attempting to fly from San Diego, uttered the now-famous words when he refused to walk through a whole body image scanner and subsequently also refused to submit to a full-body frisk. The latter would have involved a TSA agent touching his “junk,” or genitals.

That national attention focused on the anatomy of a private citizen is one small indication of how distracted the country has become in its efforts to ensure air passenger security. The focus of these efforts should be on what works best and at least cost, but the traveling public remains doubtful that the focus has been put in the proper place. TSA has moved toward this kind of screening in reaction to the December 2009 attempted bombing of an airplane over Detroit by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the so-called Christmas bomber, who had concealed explosive material in his underwear.

TSA annually spends about $5 billion on a workforce numbering an estimated 60,000. These screeners man the walk-through metal detectors, operate the baggage x-ray systems, search for liquids that exceed the established thresholds, man the whole body image devices, conduct pat-downs, implement behavioral profiling, and conduct other screening functions. One reason for the workforce and expenses being so large is that the screening functions are imposed virtually uniformly on every traveler entering an airport in the United States.

Missed Opportunities

The high level of scrutiny to which U.S. airline passengers are subjected is a curious departure from the levels implemented in other areas of transportation and border security that use more risk-based approaches, such as the highly selective screening of shipping containers and the limited placement of federal air marshals aboard U.S. commercial flights. Another departure from the “inspect everyone and everything” approach involves TSA’s own workforce. TSA employees are not screened when they enter the secure area of an airport throughout the course of the day, because they are trusted employees who have had a background check.

There are two main opportunities for improving the risk management system for passengers. Because flights originating in the United States are at much lower risk of being attacked by terrorists than are flights originating overseas, the first opportunity would be to differentiate between domestic and international enplanements. One way to do this is to subject travelers who wish to come to the United States to a higher level of scrutiny than those already in the United States. This could be accomplished by maintaining current levels of inspection of travelers coming to the country and reducing the use of advanced equipment and intrusive methods inside the United States. Such a step would yield big savings in equipment and personnel by reducing the number of machines and agents required at U.S. airports.
Recognizing the security of flights originating in the United States and thus returning all passengers to the domestic procedures that existed before the recent additions would save, at minimum, about $1.2 billion annually. Additional savings could be achieved by eliminating the supplemental searches of passengers that now occur as they board planes and the use of roving teams to test passengers’ beverages for explosive residue in the secure parts of airports.

The second opportunity, specifically for domestic enplanements (at least initially), would be to develop a trusted traveler program. The current security regime applies the same procedures to all 700 million passengers who board planes each year in the United States. That we have not developed a reasonable way to reduce that inspection workload is perhaps the biggest missed opportunity of the past decade.

Because a very small fraction of fliers account for a very large proportion of trips, a trusted traveler program could be relatively small (with 5 million enrollees or less) and could still provide significant benefits. Such a program could initially be organized around one or more of these three characteristics: possession of a security clearance issued by a U.S. government agency, a profile that involves frequent travel, and a willingness to submit to the equivalent of a security-clearance process. Some travelers would find it well worth the time and expense to obtain such a credential in exchange for the ability to move through an airport more quickly. Several programs, including Global Entry, NEXUS, and SENTRI, already allow certain travelers to be preapproved for expedited clearance for entry at U.S. borders. Extending the privileges of these programs to security at U.S. airports would be a relatively trivial and easily justified action.

The savings from a trusted traveler program would depend largely on how it was configured, on what fraction of the traveling public was qualified to be trusted travelers, and whether security procedures were relaxed for U.S. enplanements. If procedures were relaxed for all U.S. enplanements, the incremental savings from a trusted traveler program would be smaller. However, if procedures were not relaxed for all U.S. enplanements, the savings from a trusted traveler program could be substantially greater. The savings would rise with the fraction of travelers who are trusted and could easily approach those associated with relaxing the standards for all U.S. enplanements. Even greater savings could be achieved if trusted traveler status were something for which travelers had to pay.

Had these steps been implemented in the years after 9/11, the savings would now likely total in the tens of billions of dollars, with no discernible reduction in security.

In the meantime, some travelers have reacted to the new security measures by choosing to drive instead of fly, but they may be placing themselves at greater risk. Researchers have estimated that the 9/11 attacks generated nearly 2,200 additional road traffic deaths in the United States through mid-2003 from a relative increase in driving and a reduction in flying resulting from fear of additional terrorist attacks and associated reductions in the convenience of flying. If today’s security measures are generating similar, or even smaller, substitutions and the driving risk has grown as hypothesized, the savings would now likely total in the tens of billions of dollars, with no discernible reduction in security.

The first opportunity would be to differentiate between domestic and international enplanements. The second opportunity would be to develop a trusted traveler program.
the air security measures could be contributing to more deaths annually on U.S. roads than have been experienced cumulatively since 9/11 from terrorism against air transportation targets around the world.

The potential of a trusted traveler program and the risk of driving rather than flying both point to the same conclusion: TSA should be required to analyze proposed security measures and regulations, using clear, transparent, peer-reviewed risk management principles. One reason for the current situation is that security measures have been grafted on or layered on in response to specific incidents, with little regard to an integrated assessment of cost, effectiveness, and impact. Risk management modeling can be used to assess these variables.

For most of the past decade, the United States has pursued policies with very little regard to the costs they impose on travelers or the net reduction in risk that they generate. It is imperative that we use the next decade to develop smarter, more sustainable, and more practical solutions to air passenger security. We should start by rolling back the procedures that were implemented in late 2010. Further savings could likely be gained by subjecting other security measures—such as shoe removal, the ban on liquids, gate inspections, and the use of behavioral-detection officers—to careful scrutiny.

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**Beyond the Shadow of 9/11**

**Compensation Policies for Social Resilience**

By Lloyd Dixon, Fred Kipperman, and Robert T. Reville

A RAND senior economist, Lloyd Dixon was the research director of the RAND Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy (CTRMP), which ceased operations after completing its four-year mission to inform debates related to the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 and its extension. Fred Kipperman and Robert Reville were associate director and codirector, respectively, of CTRMP.

The focus of much of the nationwide debates sparked by 9/11 has been on the prevention of future attacks. Largely overlooked has been a basic question: When Americans are injured or killed or when their property is damaged by terrorists, who, if anyone, should pay to cover the losses? The answer can have important implications for the resilience of the country’s economy and society to terrorist attacks. Americans should think not only about the most effective ways to prevent terrorist attacks but also about the programs and policies that provide compensation for the individuals and businesses affected by the attacks that do occur.

Many businesses no longer have insurance that covers terrorist attacks. The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, the federal program adopted to increase the availability and reduce the cost of terrorism insurance, is set to expire in 2012. Today’s dire budget environment seems to rule out a generous federal compensation program. Little guidance has emerged from the courts on when private firms can be held responsible for losses caused by terrorist attacks. The
absence of legal precedence or clear guidance from government virtually guarantees future legal wrangling about liability and damages following terrorism events. Consequently, while we may be better prepared to prevent attacks, we may be less prepared to recover.

Expression of National Unity

Probably the best-known means of compensation following the 9/11 attacks resulted from congressional action to set up the federal September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001. This fund was designed to compensate those who suffered serious physical injury, to compensate the families of those killed in the attacks, to limit litigation, and to provide a visible government response to the unfortunate citizens who arguably were standing in as proxies for all Americans.

Kenneth Feinberg, the special master of the fund, has described it as “vengeful philanthropy”—showing the terrorists that they cannot hurt or divide the country, because the United States will support the families of the dead and seriously injured. It can also be argued that the fund itself, by providing relatively rapid compensation and avoiding protracted legal disputes, demonstrated national unity against terrorism and, to some extent, frustrated the ultimate goals of the terrorists.

There is no guarantee that the federal government will step forward with a compensation program as generous as the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund in the event of another large terrorist attack. Feinberg counsels against a similar program because the fund tied compensation to the income of the deceased or injured party. Instead, he advocates for a federal program that would offer a flat, more modest level of compensation to promote equity, ease of administration, and solidarity.

Compensation policies that encourage social cohesion and solidarity could frustrate some of the terrorists’ goals. As was seen in the unifying aftermath of 9/11, all levels of government scrambled to offer assistance to businesses and individuals, which undoubtedly reassured citizens and countered the fear stoked by the terrorists. Likewise, Israel’s willingness to compensate victims of terrorism in a prompt and equitable manner is seen as a tool to restore life to normalcy as soon as possible after a terrorist attack.

Policies that spread the cost of compensation broadly may further the perception in the United States that a terrorist attack is an attack on the nation as a whole and may thereby reduce fear and promote national unity. Paying victims a set amount regardless of their economic circumstances could also promote unity. Although promoting solidarity in these ways may not immediately deter future attacks, it could deter them in the long run by causing terrorism to be less effective in inciting fear and division.

Compensation policies that help reduce the economic impacts and social divisiveness of attacks could further dampen terrorist motivations by undercutting the economic costs of terrorism to the country. Even if compensation policies do not reduce terrorist activity, they can reduce the cascading social and economic consequences of terrorism.

After the 9/11 attacks, policymakers limited the liability of businesses, set up the victim compensation fund, and established other economic recovery programs in the heat of the moment. It would be far preferable to work out the roles of the tort system, private insurance, philanthropy, and government compensation and renewal programs in advance of the next attack. Doing so would be an important contribution to our national terrorism strategy.

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Compensation policies that encourage social cohesion and solidarity could frustrate some of the terrorists’ goals.
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL UPHEAVALS associated with the “Arab Spring” have rocked the Arab World since December 2010. In commentaries published in global media outlets, RAND experts have shared their perspectives on the enduring effects of these events.

To read the full text of these and related RAND commentaries, visit www.rand.org/feature/north-africa-middle-east

“The message of the Arab Spring is that Arabs can shape their own future through democracy. The message’s capacity to deflate global jihadist movements was in evidence . . . when news of Osama bin Laden’s death was met with a collective shrug. Why? Because in Egypt and Tunisia, citizens are currently focused on building, shaping, planning, and other actions associated with fulfilling their dreams.”

—JULIE TAYLOR, “IN OBAMA SPEECH, WILL THERE BE AID FOR ARAB SPRING NATIONS?” CNN.COM, MAY 20, 2011

“One can hope the turmoil is a good thing, but it’s far too soon to be sanguine. First, the Arab Spring may prove to be as transitory as the European revolutions of 1848, which did not immediately produce functioning democracies. Second, if some measure of democracy does result, the elected governments likely will reflect the popular antipathy that the ‘Arab street’ has for both the United States and Israel. As a result, the United States could face some unpleasant consequences. Western and American counterterrorism efforts could be undermined.”

—DAVID AARON, “IS THE ARAB WORLD CHANGING FOR THE BETTER?” CQ GLOBAL RESEARCHER, MAY 3, 2011

“Even if Washington and the [Muslim] Brotherhood find ways to live with each other, big foreign policy breakthroughs are unlikely. Wielding more power in Egypt could make the Brotherhood more pragmatic, but opposition to U.S. policy in the region is the cornerstone of its agenda—and that probably won’t change.”


During a demonstration demanding the resignation of President Ali Abdullah Saleh in Sana’a, Yemen, on July 2, 2011, Yemeni women carry wood on their heads in protest of a gas shortage. AP Images/Hani Mohammed

In Sfax, Tunisia, a woman looks at dresses in a clothing shop. The Tunisian government fell in January after weeks of protests driven by anger over joblessness, corruption, and repression. The country’s high unemployment and entrenched corruption might take years to fix. AP Images/Emilio Morenatti
Arab World Needs Liberalization for Economic Growth

MUCH HAS BEEN WRITTEN about the “Arab Spring” political movements, but there are economic forces at work as well. In coming decades, the Arab World—the Arabic-speaking countries stretching from Morocco to Oman—will continue to face economic challenges.

Oil production will remain a source of strength. The region will continue to produce a third of global oil output, with its value nearing $1.4 trillion by 2020. But oil will not suffice to drive economic growth, especially as large numbers of youths enter the workforce. Corruption, meanwhile, afflicts some countries more than others, but it afflicts “energy-poor” and “energy-rich” countries alike.

To increase economic output, Arab nations will need to reduce trade and investment barriers and pursue other policies promoting economic liberalization, including privatization of state enterprises, according to RAND senior economist Keith Crane. Privatization in “energy-poor” countries has helped boost productivity and employment by lowering the cost of business and making the labor market more flexible.

Value of Oil Production in Arab Countries Is High and Rising

Corruption Rankings Vary Widely Across Arab Countries

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Management of Change
RAND Responds to a Transforming World

By James A. Thomson

James A. Thomson is president and chief executive officer of the RAND Corporation.

When I became president and CEO of RAND in August 1989, newspapers were covering the end of Poland’s communist regime and the push to form a new government under Solidarity leader Lech Walesa. Christians and Muslims were shelling one another in Beirut. The United States was again importing more than half of its petroleum, after having reduced its appetite for foreign oil for 12 years. And the state of New York was weighing whether to limit how often Medicaid patients could visit their physicians.

Now, as I prepare to leave this job after 22 years, I am struck by how much the world has changed and yet also by how similar some of today’s public policy problems are to those of two decades ago. I am struck just as keenly by how RAND has been able to react, reconfigure its operations, and continue offering trusted guidance on matters of utmost concern.

The transformation of Eastern Europe in 1989 marked a tectonic shift for RAND. Seemingly overnight, events overran the Cold War analysis for which this institution had become renowned. We had to rethink everything—strategy, research orientation, organization, hiring, and business practices—to adjust to the changing policy topography. We extended our assistance to decisionmakers across the public, private, and nonprofit sectors. We became an international institution, advising policymakers around the globe. And we worked hard to make RAND a philanthropic priority for individuals and institutions that value objective analysis and its role in solving intractable problems.

The results speak for themselves. During the past two decades, RAND has done some of its most influential research. RAND analyses have saved U.S. taxpayers billions of dollars by helping policymakers streamline how they acquire airplanes, ships, and other military systems and by identifying ways to make the military logistics and personnel systems more effective and efficient. Just one strand of this research, focused on how the U.S. Army manages spare parts, has saved $1 billion since the start of the Iraq War.

Other seminal RAND work during this period has included these projects:
• examining the psychological health of soldiers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan
• analyzing terrorism and devising counterterrorism policies
• determining how much financial, societal, and military support is needed to conduct peacekeeping and nation-building operations
• demonstrating how European governments can manage economic and social challenges posed by declining fertility rates and aging populations
• guiding the post–Cold War drawdown of forces and the expansion of NATO
• helping governments identify and implement policies to manage pandemic flu
• evaluating community strategies to improve the quality of policing
• helping Qatar’s government redesign its education and health care systems.

During this time, we also expanded our international work. In the past year alone, we began helping the People’s Republic of China establish a new “Knowledge City” in Guangdong Province; signed contracts to conduct research out of our newest office in Abu Dhabi; and initiated health, education, labor, and management analyses for the Kurdistan Regional Government.

I am immensely proud to have headed RAND during this creative period. The essence of policy analysis is helping clients and the public manage change, and at every turn RAND has been able to remain the world’s leading policy analysis institution by adapting, regrouping, and responding to the needs of policymakers and society. It has been a distinct privilege to oversee RAND for the past two decades, and it will be a continuing joy to watch it grow and evolve in the decades to come.
Advancing Education for Our Children

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—Presently retired, James A. (“Jay”) Greer II was a partner with LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae in New York. He is a longtime member and former Chairman of the RAND Institute for Civil Justice Board of Overseers.