TOTAL FORCE READINESS
CHALLENGES TO THE ARMY IN THE FUTURE FIGHT
CURRENT AND EMERGING CAPABILITY GAPS
SOLDIERS AND FAMILIES
SECURITY ASSISTANCE
For 70 years, the RAND Corporation has worked side by side with government as a trusted adviser. Through high-quality, objective research and the development of sophisticated analytic tools, RAND researchers from diverse disciplines and perspectives collaborate to create strategies and solutions to keep our nation strong.
Dear Soldiers and Leaders,

This short document offers insights and courses of action to help the U.S. Army meet five of its highest priorities.

Readiness to implement the National Defense Strategy is, of course, the top priority, as described by both Secretary Esper and General Milley. The supporting priorities addressed here are

- preparing the Army to meet challenges in the future fight
- identifying and closing current and emerging Army capability gaps
- fulfilling the Army’s obligations to soldiers and families
- improving the military capabilities of U.S. allies and partners through security force assistance.

As the Army’s sole federally funded research and development center for studies and analysis, RAND Arroyo Center shapes its annual analytic program to focus on the priorities of Army leadership. In these pages, I highlight the results of nine recently completed analyses focused on the five priorities above.

To illustrate our recent support of the readiness priority, I have selected two analyses:

- The first addresses urban combat. Several methods have proven effective in recent urban operations, such as exploiting new sources of intelligence and employing mobile protected firepower. But tailoring them to specific urban environments requires commanders to be adaptive and creative.
- The second analysis addresses high-intensity conflict with a peer adversary, focusing on Russia. Russia’s military forces are postured to defend their homeland and can employ overwhelming firepower, especially artillery, near Russia’s borders. Because Russia lacks the economic resources to sustain a long-term conventional war with a peer adversary, Russian doctrine and tactics are designed to terminate high-intensity conflict quickly.

To illustrate research on meeting challenges in the future fight, I have selected an analysis that addresses the need for defensive and offensive cyber capabilities at the tactical level. Because of the complexity of the cyber domain, the analysis highlights the importance of building strong relationships with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners and of preparing to operate within existing authorities.

To illustrate research on identifying and closing current and emerging Army capability gaps, I have included two analyses:

- One analysis examines the potential for using land-based multi-domain operations (MDO) capabilities to deter or defeat aggression in the western Pacific. The analysis identifies several potential missions for Army systems, including anti-ship coastal defense, theater maritime interdiction, and lethal blockade...
enforcement. The Army could develop and test these multi-domain anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) concepts by fielding a prototype multi-domain fires battalion.

- The other analysis examines the capability of key European allies to generate and deploy armored brigades for a hypothetical contingency in the Baltics. It would take a few weeks or a month for Britain, France, and Germany each to muster and sustain a single heavy brigade. Reducing these timelines would require both economic resources and political will.

Like readiness, fulfilling the Army’s obligations to soldiers and families has been a perennial priority for Army leaders. Two analyses illustrate our recent research on this priority:

- We surveyed approximately 60,000 active component soldiers to determine what problems they and their families face, what resources they use to address these problems, and how effectively their needs are met. They reported that effective resources are available, both military and nonmilitary. But soldiers and their families need more assistance to identify and navigate these resources, and some resources, including childcare and health care, need more capacity to reduce wait times.

- The second analysis focuses on improving soldiers’ employment prospects in the civilian world. Soldiers gain valuable knowledge, skills, and abilities through their military service that they can leverage in their civilian careers if they can find the right jobs. Arroyo developed a new tool that provides soldiers with substantially more and better job matches than do current tools, such as My Next Move for Veterans.

The last two analyses illustrate our recent research on improving the military capabilities of U.S. allies and partners through security force assistance (SFA):

- The first analysis finds that SFA efforts are most effective when they balance a focus on improving the partner’s military force structure, capabilities, and readiness with a focus on increasing the military’s participation in nation-building. Such participation helps the partner forge a strong national identity and promote state legitimacy.

- The second analysis examines the value of regionally aligned forces (RAF) in Army security cooperation. It finds that aligning units to combatant commands has the potential to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of security cooperation missions. More-focused training of RAF units and more-collaborative planning with regional commands would help the Army realize this potential.

I am pleased to present these summaries for your use. Please contact me if you wish to receive information about any of the analyses conducted by Arroyo. We also welcome opportunities to discuss any topic of relevance to the Army and suggestions for additional analyses that would help inform the decisionmaking of Army leaders.

Arroyo’s publications are posted online at www.rand.org; if printed copies are available, they are free to Army soldiers and leaders.

Thank you for your service and for helping RAND Arroyo Center help the U.S. Army and the nation it serves.

With best regards,

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Shaping the Urban Battlefield

Mobile protected firepower is a necessity in urban operations but does not guarantee success.

Urban operations also demand innovative forms of intelligence, including new sources and new methods of collection, particularly for nonmilitary open-source information.

Troops engaged in urban combat constantly need to reduce the challenge to a manageable scope, but how to do so successfully will vary considerably depending on the city and the enemy confronted.

The key to reducing the challenge of urban combat is creative military leaders who can think beyond established methods and norms of operation. The nature of the battlefield is as complex as the enemies within it. Urban environments in particular—with dense populations, narrow streets, subterranean passages, and multistory buildings that can serve as enemy defensive positions—pose significant challenges for mechanized infantry assault forces and have traditionally been avoided when at all possible. However, history and recent combat experience have repeatedly demonstrated the need for these kinds of forces to engage in urban operations. Further, the rise of urbanization makes conflict within dense population centers more likely. Thus, the U.S. Army today must prepare for combat operations in urban environments.

To help the U.S. Army prepare for urban operations, RAND Arroyo Center conducted a historical analysis of the ways in which militaries have deployed light and mechanized infantry during close urban combat. The objective was to examine the comparative advantages and costs of this warfighting approach and identify lessons for the future.

The analysis performed case studies of five battles: the U.S. Army in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1993; the Russian Army in Grozny, Russia, in 1994 and in 1999; the U.S. Army in Baghdad, Iraq, in 2003; the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Army in Fallujah, Iraq, in 2004; and the U.S. Army in the Sadr City suburb of Baghdad in 2008.

The table summarizes the effectiveness of various techniques to reduce the scope of the operational challenge in the case studies.

Mobile Protected Firepower Is a Necessity in Urban Operations but Does Not Guarantee Success

A key aspect of solving a combat problem in an urban area is to “shrink” its dimension to one that is tractable given the capabilities and capacity of the available force. Armored ground forces enable freedom of movement in urban areas, providing the basis for shrinking the operational problem of a large urban area down to a neighborhood.

Troops in urban environments need armored protection. Typically, the enemy is fighting on home terrain and knows which routes are restricted. Standoff weapons can be used, but ground forces must first develop clear situational awareness so those weapons can be applied with good effect.

Armored vehicles cannot operate in cities without infantry, but transporting infantry within cities is challenging. Thin-skinned vehicles that are designed to transport soldiers, such as the Army’s Stryker, do not survive well in urban combat. The Army lost six Strykers in its initial forays into Sadr City. And in 2005, Strykers could not be employed without unacceptable risk in Tal Afar, Iraq. Russian BMPs, a type of infantry fighting vehicle, routinely fell victim to rocket-propelled grenades in the first battle of Grozny, as did...
Russian tanks. When employed properly, however, mobile, armored vehicles are indispensable in urban operations.

The Importance of Intelligence in Urban Operations

By nature, urban operations are intelligence-intensive, and this need is likely to increase as urban areas grow in size and complexity. In the second battle for Grozny, the Russians undertook substantial intelligence preparation of the battlefield, dividing the city into sectors. They also enlisted Chechen loyalists to help them identify key terrain and provide detailed knowledge of the city—an effort that was critical to eliminating Chechen rebel strongpoints.

The principal challenge for intelligence in urban operations will be to integrate and make sense of data from a plethora of sources. Addressing this challenge will require new thinking about the strengths and weaknesses of various intelligence disciplines in an urban setting and how they can be fully leveraged. Urban operations will also demand innovative forms of intelligence, including new sources and methods of collection—particularly, nonmilitary open-source information, such as from private citizens with cellphone cameras and companies’ security cameras.

Forces Need to Be Creative and Adaptive

The key to reducing the challenge of urban combat to a manageable scope is creative military leaders who can think outside established methods and norms of operations.

In the battle for Sadr City, U.S. forces erected a 12-foot concrete barrier along a key route, thus denying the Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM) forces firing positions that could span the Green Zone locations of the Iraqi and U.S. government agencies and forcing JAM forces out of their hiding places. JAM forces lost their advantage and eventually, the battle.

In Fallujah, U.S. forces spread word that operations were about to commence, which caused the civilian noncombatants of the city to leave. This approach greatly reduced the problem of identifying enemy forces, and it minimized loss of life and the resulting press accounts of dead and wounded noncombatants that could have diminished global opinion of the war.

What Urban Combat Implies for the U.S. Army

The study brings into relief how different military approaches have managed to shrink the problems inherent to urban combat down to dimensions that are solvable with the capabilities of the available force. Such lessons can inform how the U.S. military might confront similar foes in complex urban environments in the future.

To determine how best to apply these lessons, the U.S. Army needs to conduct a review of the warfighting challenges from an urban combat perspective and then modify policy and training in response. This will not be easy, cheap, or quick. But given that urban combat somewhere is a near certainty, it must be done.

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www.rand.org/t/RR1602
High-Intensity Conflict Between Russia and a Peer Adversary

Russian military forces are primarily postured for defense, but their defensive capabilities also provide a shield for offensive actions near Russia’s borders.

Facing NATO superiority in a prolonged campaign, Russian operations would emphasize speed and attempt to manage escalation of the conflict.

Russian irregular forces will be present on the battlefield to provide information about adversary forces and potentially operate against high-value targets.

The Russian military will aim to hit hard and move fast, using speed, surprise, and combined arms maneuver to disrupt and overwhelm adversaries.

Because of reforms that have increased several key capabilities, Russia’s military has improved to the extent that it is now a reliable instrument of national power that can be used in a limited context to achieve vital national interests. **Russia’s forces are primarily postured to defend their homeland**—particularly population centers and industry—using layered, integrated air defenses and a number of defensive bulwarks and buffer states to buy space and time to react to potential strikes or invasion. Russia’s military capabilities have not improved to the extent that Russian leadership would use them against a near-peer adversary in the absence of a clear external threat to the survival of the Russian state. However, these new capabilities provide Russian leadership with more options to assert its positions and support national interests and are therefore worth examining to better understand how Russia would fight in a high-intensity conflict.

RAND Arroyo Center performed an analysis to outline how the Russian military might conduct combat operations in the event of a high-intensity conflict with a capable peer or near-peer adversary. The analysis draws on what Russian theorists and leaders have written about modern warfare, as well as on Russia’s demonstrated capabilities and history.

**Reducing the Risk of Escalation**

In the event of a high-intensity conflict, Russia would likely attempt to quickly terminate the conflict, using measures that aim to control escalation dynamics. Russia is clearly disadvantaged in both numbers and economic power in a conventional long-term contest with the United States, European NATO countries, or China. Thus, it would likely use indirect-action strategies and asymmetric responses to reduce the potential for escalation. There would be a concentrated effort to achieve surprise (if possible), leverage superiority in firepower, seize objectives using highly mobile forces, and terminate a conflict before an adversary with superior long-term potential military power could bring the full weight of a response to bear. **Russia could also threaten to employ its nuclear weapons, or actually employ them, in response to a conventional attack** that would undermine the regime’s control of the state or threaten Russia’s nuclear deterrent.

**Conventional and Unconventional Warfare**

If pressed to carry out sustained operations against a peer or near peer, Russia would likely draw on a combination of conventional and unconventional warfare approaches. Russian commanders would place a high priority on...
disrupting and destroying an enemy’s headquarters and communications capabilities. Many of their efforts—including the emphasis on deception, electronic warfare, and strikes against command and communications—would be intended to slow an adversary’s ability to respond to battlefield developments.

**Russian operations would likely also emphasize speed and maneuver.** Recent reforms have made a substantially larger percentage of the land components of the Russian armed forces available at higher readiness for short-notice contingencies. Russia’s small but elite special forces and its naval infantry regiments and brigades are highly mobile and able to put light mechanized forces in the field and conduct combined arms maneuver.

**Russia might use a mix of conventional and unconventional forces on the battlefield.** For example, special operations forces, paramilitaries, and sympathetic civilians could assist in providing information about adversary forces and potentially operate against high-value targets.

### Tactics: Hit Hard, Move Fast

**Russia’s military can employ overwhelming firepower against any of its neighbors,** and Russia has invested heavily in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities to mass fires quickly and effectively. These capabilities allow Russia to hit hard and then move fast—using speed, surprise, and integrated combined arms in maneuver forces to disrupt and overwhelm enemies, once encountered.

Russia has a limited number of long-range conventional precision-strike capabilities that could be used against key operational and strategic targets, especially those at fixed, known locations. On the ground, Russian tactics would likely reflect a heavy emphasis on massed indirect fires (particularly long-range fires), with the effects of these fires exploited by highly mobile vehicles with substantial direct-fire capability. Russia’s combination of a layered integrated air defense system and a variety of ground-based indirect-fire systems is intended to pose a significant joint and combined arms integration challenge to adversaries.

The figure shows Arroyo’s assessment of the typical volume of indirect fires available to a U.S. armored brigade combat team compared with that of a Russian motorized rifle brigade. On a one-for-one basis, **U.S. Army ground units would face an adversary with quantitatively superior artillery**, a broader variety of munitions available, and the ability to strike at long ranges. However, Russian units vary in their ability to carry out such approaches.

### Conclusion

Russia no longer has massive manpower advantages over its potential adversaries, nor can it trade space for time in light of the speed, range, and hitting power of modern aerial-delivered munitions. However, Russia’s military leaders have adapted in ways designed to enable an effective defense of their homeland, and Russian forces have demonstrated an increasing array of capabilities that would challenge adversaries at the tactical and operational levels of war.

This summary is based on PE-231-A, *The Russian Way of Warfare: A Primer*, by Scott Boston and Dara Massicot, 2017. For questions about this analysis, contact Scott Boston, sboston@rand.org. www.rand.org/t/PE231
A Strategy for Tactical Cyber Support

Tactical units need defensive and offensive cyber capabilities to defend tactical assets and important cyber terrain (critical systems, services, and key nodes), as well as to enable effects through tactical cyber operations.

General guidelines for executing tactical cyber operations include respecting constraints, having patience, learning by doing, seeking win-win scenarios, and building relationships between personnel who conduct tactical offensive cyber operations and partner agencies and organizations.

The practicality of a tactical offensive cyber operation depends on a combination of proximity, frequency, expertise, and containment.

The U.S. Army’s increasing reliance on cyber capabilities requires strategies to provide support for both offensive and defensive tactical cyber operations—i.e., those at the corps and lower echelons. Several factors affect the cyber arena at the tactical level: Tactical networks have limited bandwidth, intermittent connectivity, and error rates that are too high and are highly mobile. The U.S. Army Cyber Command’s G35 office asked RAND Arroyo Center to develop a strategy for providing tactical cyber support to corps and below that describes how the Army should use available resources to achieve mission objectives related to tactical cyber operations.

As part of the strategy, Arroyo developed the following vision statement:

The Army will be able to employ organic cyber capabilities at the tactical echelon with dedicated personnel in support of tactical units while operating with existing authorities; build trust and operate with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) partners; and prepare to operate with authorities it might gain in the future to enhance current capabilities.

What Cyber Capabilities Are Needed?

In addition to defensive cyber capabilities—the ability to safeguard the Army’s own cyber operations—the Army has a fundamental need for an offensive cyber capability at the tactical level. Enabling tactical offensive cyber operations requires the capability to collect intelligence by rapidly exploiting captured digital media in a unit’s area of operations and preparing to exploit new devices, among other capabilities.

To collect lessons learned for tactical offensive cyber operations, Arroyo observed pilot exercises with embedded cyber personnel and then performed case studies: operations of the Joint Interagency Task Force–South, based at Naval Air Station Key West; U.S. Marine Corps use of signals intelligence capability at tactical echelons; and use of armed drones during Operation Enduring Freedom.

What Is Needed for Cyber Operations?

Observations and analysis of the cyber exercise demonstrated that tactical units need capabilities to do the following:

- defend tactical assets and important cyber terrain (critical systems, services, and key nodes), including mission command systems, weapon systems, and vehicles
- enable effects through tactical cyber operations.

The case studies shaped the development of guidelines for implementing the vision, as well as for identifying goals and best practices. Each of the cases illuminated overarching requirements for offensive cyber operations:
• **Respect constraints.** Until authorities are clarified and potentially devolved, plan to coordinate with higher echelons.

• **Be patient.** When working with JIIM partners, independence, cooperation, access, and other benefits must be acquired incrementally, not all at once. Although such efforts will build on each other, they take time.

• **Learn by doing.** Reap the benefits of doing exercises with joint partners and at home stations when brigade combat teams or elements at other tactical levels are not deployed.

• **Seek win-win scenarios.** When approaching a partner, make explicit the value of the proposition to cooperate.

• **Be there.** Establish and maintain relationships between personnel who will conduct tactical offensive cyber operations and the partner agencies and organizations with which they will most frequently interact.

### What Types of Tactical Offensive Cyber Operations Are Practicable?

Not all offensive cyber capabilities can reside practicably at the tactical echelon. Four factors help determine which tactical offensive cyber operations can be reasonably accomplished: **proximity, frequency, expertise, and containment.**

Proximity is how physically close a soldier needs to get to the target to perform a cyber operation. The less proximity needed, the more feasible a cyber operation would be.

Frequency is how often a tactical unit expects to perform an operation. Greater frequency increases the practicability.

Expertise is the extent to which highly trained experts are needed. The fewer needed, the better.

Containment is whether collateral damage can be prevented. Ideally, there would be no collateral damage.

Because not all tactical cyber capabilities can be part of forward units, **one approach being considered across the military to increase operational flexibility for tactical forces is tethering.** Tethering is the practice of allowing remotely supported cyber operators to perform activities at tactical levels, with reachback support from national-level agencies to obtain authorization.

### What Is Arroyo’s Proposed Strategy?

The proposed strategy for tactical cyber army operations encompasses seven goals:

1. Defend tactical assets and key cyber terrain.
2. Enable effects through tactical offensive cyber operations.
3. Provide the means to enable cyber-derived intelligence to support the tactical commander.
4. Integrate cyber planning with other planning processes at the tactical level.
5. Utilize reachback capabilities to support offensive and defensive cyber operations.
6. Create sufficient training facilities and opportunities to use them.
7. Develop and leverage needed capabilities through partnerships and collaboration.

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This summary is based on RR-1600-A, *Tactical Cyber: Building a Strategy for Cyber Support to Corps and Below*, by Isaac R. Porche III, Christopher Paul, Chad C. Serena, Colin P. Clarke, Erin-Elizabeth Johnson, and Drew Herrick, 2017. For questions about this analysis, contact Isaac Porche, porche@rand.org. [www.rand.org/t/RR1600](http://www.rand.org/t/RR1600)
CURRENT AND EMERGING CAPABILITY GAPS

Can Land-Based, Multi-Domain A2/AD Forces Deter or Defeat Aggression?

Facing a peer or near-peer adversary with strong anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, the United States will find it difficult to project land, air, and sea forces out of allies’ regional bases.

An effective counter may be for the United States and its regional allies and partners to field strong Blue A2/AD capabilities to deter or defeat aggression by increasing costs on peer or near-peer adversaries.

As part of Blue A2/AD, a mix of anti-ship, surface-to-surface long-range strike, and short-range air and cruise missile defense capabilities have value against China and Russia.

China is increasingly emphasizing capabilities to counter U.S. forces coming to the aid of U.S. allies in the western Pacific. China’s ambitious modernization program is fielding a formidable anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) force to limit U.S. air and naval forces’ access to conflict zones, as well as to degrade their ability to operate or maneuver freely. Russia also poses an A2/AD challenge, with its forces in Kaliningrad well positioned to block NATO reinforcements for the Baltic states. RAND Arroyo Center analyzed the role that friendly land-based, multi-domain forces could play in defeating aggression by adversaries shielded by strong A2/AD forces, with a focus mostly on China but also including Russia.

Approaches to Defending Allies
Against a peer or near-peer adversary with effective A2/AD forces, it would be difficult for the United States to operate land, air, and sea forces out of allies’ regional bases. In Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the United States and its allies deployed forces to regional bases to reverse Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait. U.S. forces defended these bases while projecting power from them.

But using this traditional approach against China (or Russia) now would be very hard. For example, if the United States were to assist Japan in defending the Ryukyu Islands from an attack by China, regional airports and seaports would be well within range of Chinese forces estimated to possess hundreds of ballistic missiles, as well as within range of modern aircraft and cruise missiles.

An alternative approach would be to defend allies with effective, friendly A2/AD forces fielded by the United States or its regional allies and partners. Imposing Blue A2/AD challenges on peer or near-peer adversaries would limit risks to allied forces as they contest maritime areas. Blue A2/AD capabilities might be a particularly effective way to deter or defeat aggression by increasing the costs of that aggression and might give the U.S. military graduated options to respond to threats. For example, land-based anti-ship missiles are affordable by U.S. allies and can be dispersed, hidden, and moved to better survive attack than can power-projection forces operating from fixed facilities. Rather than requiring the U.S. military to build and employ these systems for its allies, the United States could instead field A2/AD capabilities with or in support of its allies. In peacetime, the United States might begin by working with key allies and partners to develop new operational concepts, modernize equipment, and participate in combined training and exercise events, such as Pacific Pathways. In times of crisis, the United States could increase its support to allies by providing key A2/AD enablers, such as robust communications and intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (ISR&T). If a conflict begins or appears imminent, the United States could help allies defend key facilities, bases, or strategic locations. Finally, the United States could reinforce allies to defeat aggression.

As part of Blue A2/AD, a mix of anti-ship, surface-to-surface long-range strike, and short-range air and cruise missile defense capabilities could deny adversaries the ability to enter or operate within key maritime areas by threatening them with attack over water. Potential Army missions include anti-ship tactical coastal defense, theater maritime interdiction, and lethal blockade enforcement. Surface-to-surface long-range strike missions would deny enemy operations within range of Army missile forces, as well as an option to conduct strike operations in areas denied to U.S. air and naval forces. And the short-range air and cruise missile defenses would defend mobile forces from air attacks. Analyzing missions that employed these A2/AD capabilities demonstrated that they would have value in deterring and defeating aggression by such adversaries as China and Russia.

Recommendations

- The Army should organize and field a prototype multi-domain fires battalion to develop, test, and exercise joint and combined A2/AD concepts.
- Existing U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, and allied systems should provide long-range ISR&T capabilities.
- For the anti-ship role, an initial A2/AD capability could be established by buying existing anti-ship missile systems from U.S. allies. This capability could then be expanded as needed or augmented by building combined units with select allies, such as Norway, Poland, or Japan, with additional allies joining as they develop the requisite capabilities.
- An existing Multiple Rocket Launch System (MRLS) or High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) battery should be assigned to provide surface-to-surface fires.
- If versions of the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) or the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) become available with a terminal guidance package for anti-ship operations, the U.S. Army multi-domain battalion should incorporate them in its HIMARS batteries.
- A short-range air and cruise missile defense battery could be assigned from the forces being formed to operate the Indirect Fire Protection Capability–Increment 2 (IFPC-2).
- After an initial set of joint operating concepts has been developed for Blue A2/AD, the Army should work with key allies and partners to build combined concepts and tactics, techniques, and procedures.
- The Army should develop and deploy small engagement packages for A2/AD exercises and demonstrations with allies and partners.

This summary is based on RR-1820-A, What Role Can Land-Based, Multi-Domain Anti-Access/Area Denial Forces Play in Deterring or Defeating Aggression? by Timothy M. Bonds, Joel B. Predd, Timothy R. Heath, Michael S. Chase, Michael Johnson, Michael J. Lostumbo, James Bonomo, Muharrem Mane, and Paul S. Steinberg, 2017. For questions about this analysis, contact Tim Bonds, bonds@rand.org, www.rand.org/t/RR1820
CURRENT AND EMERGING CAPABILITY GAPS

How Quickly Could Allies Generate and Deploy Armored Brigades?

Britain and France could marshal and sustain at least one battalion-sized combined arms battle group within a few weeks.

Surging more forces to get the deployments up to brigade strength would take more time: a few weeks for France and possibly more than a month for Britain and Germany.

The effort would represent a major commitment for all three countries and leave them with little spare capacity for other contingencies.

Implications for U.S. planners include lift concerns and the European countries’ abilities to operate at the level required for a conflict with Russia.

With the end of the Cold War and the perceived reduction of Russia’s risk, Britain, France, and Germany began cutting their military budgets and restructuring their forces, leaving them with reduced abilities to generate, deploy, and sustain forces and reduced capacity to engage in high-end conventional warfare against peer or near-peer opponents. The countries made these reductions by balancing the desire to preserve as much military capability as possible against fiscal exigencies and their views of the kinds of military operations they would most likely be engaged in. But the Russian intervention in Ukraine revived the possibility of a land war against a peer adversary and suggested scenarios in which the three countries might need to quickly deploy highly capable forces to potential flash points, such as the Baltics.

A RAND Arroyo Center analysis, using information from 2016, assessed the capacity of Britain, France, and Germany to generate and sustain heavy armored units for a hypothetical deployment to the Baltics. The analysis sought to determine whether each country could muster a full brigade, how quickly that could happen, and how long a brigade could be sustained.

What Did We Do?

Arroyo sought approximate rather than precise answers to these questions to keep the analysis unclassified. Specifically, this entailed drawing on British, French, and German government documents; articles written by military officers that have appeared in military publications; and local press coverage. Arroyo also consulted with British, French, and German defense analysts, whose assessments helped move the analysis beyond official descriptions of what the three militaries have and can do. Finally, Arroyo had conversations with the British, French, and German defense attachés in Washington, D.C.

The hypothetical deployment scenario represented a crisis—one that required rapidly deploying armored brigades to Russia’s doorstep. The scenario also needed to be sufficiently threatening to motivate the three countries to set aside existing force generation schemes or policies about such matters as leave and the length of overseas deployments, to increase resources available to their militaries, and to reprioritize resource allocation within current budgets and deployments. The probability of such a scenario and whether the allies would deploy full brigades to the Baltic states in such a crisis were outside the scope of this study,
the focus of which is not “would they?” but “could they?” Arroyo also did not look at logistical issues, such as how the deployed forces might reach their destinations.

What Did We Find?
Britain, France, and Germany could each muster and sustain a single heavy brigade, albeit at different rates (as shown in the table); sustaining these forces would also cause significant strain. The French forces probably would get to the Baltics first, possibly within the first week. Britain would be able to marshal and sustain at least one battalion-size combined arms battle group within a few weeks, with Germany perhaps taking longer. Surging more forces to get the deployments up to brigade strength would take more time: a few weeks for France and possibly more than a month for Britain or Germany.

What Are the Implications?
For U.S. planners, these estimates should help set realistic expectations of what European militaries can contribute to defend the Baltics. Beyond rushing initial units of light infantry into theater (each could probably generate light companies within a day), perhaps to serve as a trip wire, the three allied armies would have a hard time quickly generating and deploying armored forces and subsequently sustaining those forces. A single armored brigade per country appears to represent the maximum sustainable effort. There are also questions about the countries’ abilities to operate at the level required for a conflict with Russia, because of training cutbacks, neglected skills, and limited organic support capabilities.

The arrangements, plans, and resources in place during the Cold War to ensure the movement of allied personnel and equipment require updating. The faster that British, French, and German forces would need to get to the Baltics, the more direct assistance they would need from the United States in the form of strategic airlift. Of the three countries, only Britain has a fleet of C-17s or comparable strategic-lift aircraft. The ability to quickly move large formations by rail through Germany must also be considered; however, mobilization plans need to take into account that the railroads in the Baltics use a different gauge.

A British plan to station up to 1,000 soldiers in Poland raises the general question of whether the three countries could shorten mobilization timelines by placing troops or equipment sets forward in Eastern Europe. France and Germany could follow Britain’s lead by rotating battalions and even brigades through forward positions. Prepositioning equipment might also help, but none of the three armies has the kind of inventories that would make it possible to keep large quantities of top-quality gear at a ready-but-idle state forward.

For all three countries, positioning battalions forward would represent a major commitment, given the overall size of their forces. For Britain, this would be tantamount to reversing a decadelong commitment to withdraw its forces from the Continent and, in a sense, revert to a Cold War posture, albeit at a much smaller scale. For France, a comparable move might require backing away from current commitments to homeland defense and its focus on its “southern flank”—i.e., the Sahel and the “arc of instability,” which extends to Syria and the Persian Gulf. For Germany, the biggest challenge might be political and could hinge on the willingness of Germans to station troops in Eastern Europe and on the willingness of Eastern Europeans to host German troops.

This summary is based on RR-1629-A, The Abilities of the British, French, and German Armies to Generate and Sustain Armored Brigades in the Baltics, by Michael Shurkin, 2017. For questions about this analysis, contact Michael Shurkin, mshurkin@rand.org.
Addressing Soldiers’ Problems

The most-pressing problem areas reported by soldiers were military practices and culture, followed by work-life balance, soldiers’ own well-being, the health care system, and relationships.

To address their problems, soldiers reported needing advice or education, activities, general information, counseling, and emotional support.

Soldiers sought different kinds of help from a variety of military and nonmilitary resources, with generally satisfactory results.

Soldiers with unmet needs had more-negative attitudes toward the Army than did those who both accessed resources and had their needs met.

Military life can be challenging for soldiers and their families. In addition to the typical day-to-day challenges that all people face, this population experiences unique stresses related to military life, such as frequent moves and military deployments. Recognizing these stresses and the problems they create, the U.S. Army has established a wide range of programs to help soldiers and their families, and it frequently surveys soldiers about their satisfaction with these programs.

At the Army’s request, RAND Arroyo Center conducted a different kind of survey, one that provides a holistic assessment of the challenges that soldiers and their families face, how they go about getting help with those challenges, and whether their needs are met. An assessment focusing on people rather than programs is important for understanding whether Army families have needs that fall outside the scope of existing programs and for providing insights into how the Army might realign its current program resources. The survey invitations were sent to approximately 60,000 active component soldiers stationed in the continental United States, in all enlisted ranks and in commissioned ranks of O-1 to O-8, across 40 installations.

What Problems Do Soldiers Have?

When asked which problem areas were pressing for them, soldiers most frequently reported military practices and culture (e.g., problems adjusting to military language, organization, and culture and lack of guidance or sponsorship), followed by work-life balance (e.g., finding time for sleep, a healthy diet, and physical exercise), their own well-being (e.g., feeling stressed, overwhelmed, or tired and dealing with mood changes, including anxiety and depression), problems with the health care system (e.g., accessing military health care), and relationship issues (e.g., problems communicating or expressing feelings and trouble starting relationships). Junior enlisted soldiers appeared to fare worse than other groups did: They reported not only having more of the common problems described by other soldiers but also having more of the less common problems.

What Types of Help Do Soldiers Need, and What Resources Did They Use?

To address their problems, soldiers reported needing advice or education (21 percent), activities (21 percent), general information (21 percent), counseling (21 percent), and emotional support (20 percent). However, soldiers who experienced problems did not necessarily believe that they needed assistance.

Junior enlisted soldiers were more likely to report needing many types of help than were soldiers of other ranks.

Soldiers sought different kinds of help from a variety of resources, with generally satisfactory results. The
large majority (85 percent) of soldiers who reported problems and needs also reported reaching out to resources, whether individuals or programs. Of those who used resources, 61 percent used both military and nonmilitary resources. On average, soldiers reported reaching out to four military contacts and two nonmilitary contacts. More than half (58 percent) of soldiers reported contacting four or more resources.

Popular military resources that were accessed were the chain of command (40 percent), unit members not in the chain of command (39 percent), and a doctor or counselor provided by the military (33 percent). Popular nonmilitary resources were personal networks of family and friends (38 percent) and internet resources, such as search engines, information pages, and social media sites (25 percent).

How Well and Easily Were Needs Met?
Navigating the system is a challenge for about a quarter of soldiers surveyed, in terms of figuring out where to go and with whom to talk to access help or information. Reported barriers to resource use by soldiers included long waiting lists or response times for military counselors or medical doctors (26 percent), as well as for child and youth services (21 percent); the perception that contacting the chain of command might hurt a soldier’s career (19 percent); and the experience of the chain of command being unwelcoming or unfriendly (18 percent).

Although Army programs are designed to deal with the full spectrum of soldier and family needs, some needs still go unmet. About 11 percent of all soldiers in the study had at least one unmet need. Soldiers with unmet needs had more-negative attitudes toward the Army than did those who both accessed resources and had their needs met. The presence of unmet needs raises the question of whether soldiers and families are fully aware of the resources available to them—and, if so, whether they can access those resources. It also raises questions about the effectiveness of leaders, service providers, and programs in communicating with soldiers and families about available resources.

Recommendations
To improve support to soldiers and their families, the Army should consider the following:

- In existing leadership training, discuss negative perceptions that soldiers hold of the chain of command and the potential consequences of those perceptions. Ensure that leaders know where to refer soldiers for each type of problem.
- Seek additional ways to make soldiers and those who assist them more aware of available resources and how to access them. Options for increasing awareness include additional training to noncommissioned officers, marketing of Army referral sources, and email announcements and social media posts.
- Improve user navigation of resources and coordination among resources to improve efficiency, leveraging existing program staff and program descriptions when possible.
- Increase capacity for childcare, professional counseling, and medical care to alleviate long wait times and related challenges.

This summary is based on RR-1893-A, Today’s Soldier: Assessing the Needs of Soldiers and Their Families, by Carra S. Sims, Thomas E. Trail, Emily K. Chen, and Laura L. Miller, 2017. For questions about this analysis, contact Carra Sims, csims@rand.org.

www.rand.org/t/RR1893
Improving Soldier Employment Prospects in the Civilian World

Drawing from occupational surveys given to soldiers in ten Army military occupational specialties, researchers identified a broad range of civilian occupations that use knowledge, skills, and abilities developed in the Army.

Researchers identified more and higher-quality matches (in terms of required knowledge, skills, and abilities) between military and civilian occupations than there are in existing military-civilian occupation crosswalks, such as My Next Move for Veterans.

Soldiers develop many soft skills in the Army, such as teamwork, and accounting for these skills often leads to high-quality job matches.

Each year, 50,000 soldiers leave the U.S. Army, most seeking to enter the civilian workplace. Some—especially young veterans—struggle to find employment. To help the Army improve the transition of new veterans to the civilian workplace, RAND Arroyo Center assessed the knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) of soldiers in ten of the most populous Army military occupational specialties (MOSs). This information is useful for identifying close matches between military and civilian occupations (in terms of required KSAs) and for helping soldiers describe their work experience to potential civilian employers.

Survey Design
RAND Arroyo Center administered civilian occupation surveys developed by the U.S. Department of Labor to soldiers at four Army installations. Using existing surveys meant that researchers could see soldiers’ and civilians’ survey responses side by side, which allowed for directly comparing military and civilian occupations in terms of job characteristics and the importance and level of KSAs. A “distance” metric using the data from these surveys identified the closest matching civilian occupations for each of ten MOSs—five combat MOSs (e.g., 11B, infantryman) and five noncombat ones (e.g., 31B, military police). Forty percent of soldiers are in these ten MOSs.

The distance metric compared soldiers’ average responses to each survey question, by MOS, with the average responses of civilian workers in 761 U.S. civilian occupations. The distance metric was scaled so that the best match across all MOSs and civilian occupations had a score of 100 and the worst match had a score of zero. High-quality occupation matches are those that scored 80 or higher.

The survey results should help soldiers market their KSAs to civilian employers. Soldiers can easily identify which of their survey responses are associated with soft skills—such as leadership, teamwork, persistence, and attention to detail. Armed with this information, transitioning soldiers can cite these skills when communicating with potential employers.

Identifying High-Quality Civilian Occupation Matches
One of the ten MOSs—MOS 11B (infantryman), which is the largest MOS in the Army and which does not have an obvious civilian counterpart—illustrates the advantages of Arroyo’s survey approach. The distance metric identified a broader range of civilian occupation matches and higher-quality matches for the MOS than other military-civilian crosswalks did. The table compares Arroyo’s top
Arroyo’s Job-Matching Approach Provides Transitioning Soldiers with More and Better Civilian Occupation Matches (Example: MOS 11B, Infantryman)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Matches from Arroyo’s Approach</th>
<th>Distance Metric</th>
<th>Matches from My Next Move for Veterans</th>
<th>Distance Metric</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Firefighters</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>Police and sheriff’s patrol officers (E4)</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captains, mates, and pilots of water vessels</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>Supervisors of transportation machine and vehicle operators (E5)</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisors of firefighting and prevention workers</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>Correctional officers and jailors (E4)</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisors of mechanics, installers, and repairers</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>Emergency management directors (E7)</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Septic tank services and sewer pipe cleaners</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>Supervisors of correctional officers (E5)</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millwrights</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>Construction laborers (E1)</td>
<td>64</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fire inspectors and investigators</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>Maintenance workers, machinery (E4)</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft cargo handling supervisors</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>Training and development managers (E7)</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ship engineers</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>Probation officers and correctional treatment specialists (E4)</td>
<td>55</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manufactured building and mobile home installers</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Training and development specialists (E6)</td>
<td>53</td>
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<tr>
<td>Structural iron and steel workers</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Light truck or delivery service drivers (E4)</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police and sheriff’s patrol officers</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Security guards (E4)</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Distance metric is normalized to a scale of 0 to 100, with 100 indicating the best match.

civilian occupation matches for MOS 11B with those recommended by the website My Next Move for Veterans, a commonly used military-civilian occupation crosswalk designed for U.S. veterans looking for jobs.

On the left side of the table, the occupation matches from Arroyo’s approach are listed in descending order by the quality of the match (with the cutoff at 80); on the right side, matches generated by My Next Move for Veterans are ordered similarly. As shown by the shaded cells, only one civilian occupation—police and sheriff’s patrol officers—is on both lists. Some occupations recommended by My Next Move for Veterans—such as construction laborers, delivery service drivers, and security guards—scored very low on the distance metric, which means that they do not leverage infantrymen’s KSAs.

More generally, some civilian occupations match well with multiple MOSs, because they use KSAs common to all soldiers. However, most MOSs, especially noncombat arms MOSs, also have civilian occupation matches that use MOS-specific KSAs.

Recommendations

Based on the findings, the Army should

- provide information about the best civilian job matches to transitioning soldiers in the ten MOSs analyzed, including the types of employers soldiers should target, the KSAs they should emphasize in their discussions with employers, and potential skill gaps or credentials they may need
- develop a communication plan for employers in these occupation categories, identifying which MOSs are good matches for their hiring needs and the KSAs these soldiers have developed in the Army, as well as provide information to employers about the number of soldiers in these MOSs leaving the Regular Army each year and their planned geographic locations
- expand the use of the occupation surveys to develop crosswalks for additional MOSs.

This summary is based on RR-1719-A, Helping Soldiers Leverage Army Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities in Civilian Jobs, by Jeffrey B. Wenger, Ellen M. Pint, Tepring Piquado, Michael G. Shanley, Trinidad Beleche, Melissa A. Bradley, Jonathan Welch, Laura Werber, Cate Yoon, Eric J. Duckworth, and Nicole H. Curtis, 2017. For questions about this analysis, contact Jeffrey Wenger, jbw@rand.org. www.rand.org/t/RR1719
A New Approach to Security Force Assistance

Partner states have used their militaries and SFA in different ways to build cohesive nations. Ideas and ideology appear critical to nation-building and combat effectiveness.

Focusing SFA on partners’ force structure, capabilities, and readiness at the expense of strong ideological identities risks leaving nations at the mercy of threats to their legitimacy by armed opposition.

The success of SFA depends on the extent to which a host nation takes seriously the need to build a military force that complements its larger nation-building efforts.

Security force assistance (SFA), a form of military assistance aimed at helping partner nations strengthen their security forces to address internal or regional threats, has been a central part of U.S. international security policy at least since the late 1940s. Yet SFA efforts have not always achieved their intended goals. To identify better approaches, RAND Arroyo Center analyzed the relationship between SFA and nation-building to test the hypothesis that SFA tends to focus too much on operational readiness, force structure, and military capabilities and not enough on the partner armies’ potential contributions to nation-building.

Six Nations’ Experiences Tell Different Stories

RAND Arroyo Center conducted six case studies to assess armies’ place in nation-building and the role of SFA programs in promoting a coherent national identity. Three cases involved large-scale SFA efforts:

- **The army of the Republic of South Korea during the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s:** The South Koreans, helped by the United States and the United Nations, achieved independence, and the army developed from a small security force to a highly capable conventional military.
- **The army of the Republic of Vietnam from the 1950s to the 1970s:** For a variety of reasons, despite massive support from the United States, the Republic of Vietnam failed to achieve victory against the North.
- **The Iraqi army in the late 1990s and early 2000s:** This army could not overcome the disruptive influence of various factions. Although the United States attempted to rebuild the Iraqi army after the fall of Saddam Hussein, it collapsed in 2014, when the country was attacked by the Islamic State.

The other three cases involved nation-building efforts in culturally diverse and fragile African nations, where the United States has offered limited SFA:

- **The Ghanaian army:** Ghana has benefited from a leadership with a relatively clear vision for the Ghanaian nation; however, the Ghanaian army, through its direct interventions in Ghanaian politics, has often played a disruptive role. More recently, the army has contributed to Ghanaian nation-building through its own commitment to remain aloof from politics and act as a vehicle for promoting national unity.
- **The Malian army:** This army has helped enforce the government’s exclusion of particular minority groups and therefore has hindered social cohesion. It performed poorly in 2012 when faced with an Islamist rebellion, notwithstanding U.S. SFA.
• The Nigerian army: Despite being a champion of Nigerian identity and self-conscious in its efforts to foster this identity, the army has interfered in politics and displaced elected governments in regional disputes. Its record is therefore mixed.

Analysis of these six very different cases yielded several insights about the potential contributions of SFA to nation-building.

Assistance Must Focus on Helping Strengthen Legitimacy

Ideas, identities, and ideology are critical to nation-building because they promote cohesion and the legitimacy of the state. This point is evident in the sharp contrasts between the outcomes for South Korea and those for South Vietnam and Iraq. To the extent that SFA programs focus only on augmenting military strength and readiness, they risk missing the point of what is needed for nations to defeat threats to legitimacy.

Achievement of national cohesion and identity may be better indications of success than military capability. This point is exemplified by the success of South Korea, as well as by the contrasts among the postcolonial African nations in their efforts to forge national ideologies.

Host-Nation Commitment to Nation-Building Is Critical

U.S. SFA is unlikely to be of much assistance unless the governments of the host nations are committed to comprehensive nation-building efforts, including promoting specific national identities to support their own legitimacy. For example, South Korea’s leaders have pursued vigorously robust nation-building activities and striven to elaborate and promote clear ideas about what it means to be South Korean; they used the army as a nation-building instrument. The United States, in addition to helping build force structure and operational capabilities, helped the South Koreans cultivate national identity within the military. In contrast, South Vietnam’s first leader was less committed to identity formation and nation-building, as well as less effective; after he was deposed, his successors had little interest in either. U.S. SFA focused almost solely on building force structure and capabilities.

U.S. SFA efforts seem most effective where the United States has emphasized and supported broad nation-building endeavors rather than simply improving force structure, capabilities, and readiness. Moreover, attentiveness to the importance of identity formation and nation-building can promote a more realistic understanding of what can be accomplished through SFA activities.

Recommendations

This analysis suggests two guiding principles for future use of SFA:

• SFA providers should focus less on improving the partner military’s force structure or military readiness and more on the partner military’s role in the overall nation-building effort.

• SFA efforts should emphasize force identity and cohesion and the extent to which they serve the nation-building project. Military capabilities alone often are insufficient to counter enemies with compelling rival claims on legitimacy.

This summary is based on RR-1832-A, Building Armies, Building Nations: Toward a New Approach to Security Force Assistance, by Michael Shurkin, John Gordon IV, Bryan Frederick, and Christopher G. Pernin, 2017. For questions about this analysis, contact Michael Shurkin, mshurkin@rand.org

www.rand.org/t/RR1832
The Value of Regionally Aligned Forces in Army Security Cooperation

To support the United States as it prepares for future conflicts and tries to prevent the need for large-scale military commitments, the U.S. Army has been aligning specific units with geographical regions (to create regionally aligned forces [RAF]).

The alignment of the 2/1 ABCT to U.S. Africa Command improved the efficiency of security cooperation planning and preparation.

The Army should consider selecting one division to align to each combatant command permanently and should base the type of assigned unit on the dominant operational environment of the region.

A planning framework can help match security cooperation activities to theater strategic objectives and partner-nation resources, and training should incorporate a regional focus.

The United States has been increasing its strategic focus on preparing for future conflicts while also shaping the international environment to prevent the need for large-scale commitments of U.S. military personnel. In support of this strategy, the U.S. Army has been aligning specific units to geographic commands to strengthen the units’ cultural awareness and language skills, facilitate force management, and improve security cooperation (SC) efforts around the world. These regionally aligned forces (RAF) improve combatant commanders’ access to forces capable of helping shape the international environment and are expected to reduce future U.S. involvement across the spectrum of conflict. Military planners think that RAF will also decrease the likelihood of regional crises and enable partners to manage their own security threats more effectively.

Given the substantial expectations that the Army has for RAF, it is important to understand how the concept is being implemented, the value of RAF in making SC more effective, and where adjustments may be needed. To develop this understanding, the Army asked RAND Arroyo Center to assess the first time an Army unit was used in the RAF role in Africa, focusing on SC.

Assessing and Better Aligning SC Missions

In 2012, the first RAF executive order aligned Fort Riley’s 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division (2/1 ABCT), to U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). U.S. Army Africa staff employed the newly aligned force to execute SC and operational missions. Arroyo’s evaluation of this first RAF effort spanned the entire process—from assessing the planning and execution to identifying the capabilities that proved critical to mission success. The evaluation aimed to help the Army, geographic combatant commands, and the Department of Defense better align SC missions with national interests and security goals and to help design a planning framework to assess SC missions in different environments.

RAF Can Help the Army Undertake Its SC Missions More Effectively

Arroyo found that the alignment of the 2/1 ABCT to AFRICOM improved the efficiency of SC planning and preparation. However, mission effectiveness might have been further heightened with more planning time and a more structured planning process. Continent-wide
missions, such as the one in Africa, are complex and entail great uncertainty. Nations that use nonstandard equipment present additional challenges to SC. In addition to structured planning, success in future RAF efforts will depend on agility and access to the right personnel.

Recommendations for a Planning Framework Based on Lessons Learned
The evaluation of the RAF aligned to AFRICOM provided a rich source of lessons on which to base recommendations for future missions. The Army should

- increase specificity by adding concrete examples to RAF guidance to better identify personnel
- increase use of senior-leader public comments and informal communication to better clarify how to implement formal RAF guidance
- consider selecting one division to align permanently with each combatant command
- consider selecting the type of assigned unit according to the dominant operational environment of the assigned region
- identify, catalog, and publicize opportunities for RAF units to obtain support and make better use of options for increasing cultural awareness, knowledge transfer, and other training skills
- more thoroughly review and maintain unit readiness within the context of RAF
- conduct an annual RAF assessment workshop
- encourage brigade combat teams to go through a validation exercise before deploying on SC missions
- use subject-matter experts to support RAF brigades
- task RAF planners with matching SC activities to theater strategic objectives and partner-nation conditions (see figure).
- collaborate with special operations forces to institutionalize how forces within each combatant command plan and prepare for missions involving nonstandard equipment.
- ask force planners to amend guidance slightly to ensure that RAF units, early in their training, incorporate a regional focus and consider the relevance of that training to SC.

This summary is based on RR-1341/1-A, Assessing the Value of Regionally Aligned Forces in Army Security Cooperation: An Overview, by Angela O’Mahony, Thomas S. Szayna, Michael J. McNerney, Derek Eaton, Joel Vernetti, Michael Schwille, Stephanie Pezard, Tim Oliver, and Paul S. Steinberg, 2017. For questions about this analysis, contact Angela O’Mahony, aomahon1@rand.org.

www.rand.org/t/RR1341z1

RAF Planners Should Match SC Activities to Theater Strategic Objectives and Available Resources

Top-down, goal-oriented planning process

- National security strategic objectives
- Theater strategic objectives (TSOs)
- Identification of priority countries by TSO
- Country-specific military objectives

Bottom-up, resource planning process

- Available Title 10 and Title 22 programs
- Partner-nation preferences
- Personnel availability
- State Department goals
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The problem should be well formulated, and the purpose of the study should be clear.

- The study approach should be well designed and executed.

- The study should demonstrate understanding of related studies.

- The data and information should be the best available.

- Assumptions should be explicit and justified.

- The findings should advance knowledge and bear on important policy issues.

- The implications and recommendations should be logical, warranted by the findings, and explained thoroughly, with appropriate caveats.

- The documentation should be accurate, understandable, clearly structured, and temperate in tone.

- The study should be compelling, useful, and relevant to stakeholders and decisionmakers.

- The study should be objective, independent, and balanced.

For more information, see www.rand.org/standards
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