SELECT RAND RESEARCH ON SECURITY COOPERATION 2006–2019
This brief volume is an important resource for those interested in gaining an informed understanding of security cooperation, an umbrella term that refers to the wide variety of activities that the United States undertakes to strengthen its military partners and partnerships. Specific goals depend on the partner nation; examples include improving regional security environments and securing access for U.S. military forces for them to more effectively operate abroad. The U.S. Department of Defense conducts about 3,000 to 4,000 security cooperation events each year in more than 130 countries. Other U.S. agencies and departments, including the U.S. Department of State, conduct related activities. Total U.S. assistance to foreign militaries and police forces runs from $15 billion to $20 billion per year. A perennial concern is how to maximize U.S. returns on this complex and substantial portfolio of investments.

In the past two decades, the RAND Corporation has studied many aspects of security cooperation. These include authorities and planning; activities aimed at building partner capacity, security force assistance, and defense institution building; activities aimed at enhancing interoperability; approaches to assessing, monitoring, and evaluating security cooperation activities; and lessons learned and best practices. This volume succinctly surveys the best examples from this ongoing body of research that are cleared for public release and synthesizes their collective results.

Readers of this volume will not only learn what is currently known about which strategies and practices are likely to succeed in security cooperation but also develop a nuanced appreciation for how much success depends on local context. RAND research has shown that security cooperation investments can pay off—under certain favorable conditions.

Valuable as past research has been in shaping America’s security cooperation enterprise, continuing research is needed to refine our understanding of security cooperation so that policymakers can select and implement activities that are appropriate to the partner and are relatively likely to achieve U.S. objectives. Research could also help to establish reasonable expectations about the costs, risks, and benefits of security cooperation activities in contexts where a strong partner is needed but the conditions are not generally conducive to success. This volume should help to identify opportunities for additional analyses to fill in knowledge gaps, address emerging questions, or extend the scope of past research. We welcome your suggestions.

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This volume is one of a series initiated by RAND Arroyo Center, the Army’s federally funded research and development center for studies and analysis. Inaugural titles include Security Cooperation; Counterinsurgency, Stability Operations, Support to Foreign Internal Defense, Nation-Building, and Special Operations; China; and Information Operations, Information Warfare, and Influence. Each succinctly synthesizes decades of RAND research and analysis on topics that represent perennial and evolving challenges to our nation’s security.

RAND conducted each of the analyses at the request of a senior leader, uniformed or civilian, who faced a major decision and required high-quality, objective research to help inform it. As a result, each analysis was designed to be not only rigorous and reliable, but also responsive, relevant, and immediately useful. These studies also display the variety of analytic capabilities, methods, and tools that RAND has applied—and sometimes originated or extended—to address our national security challenges. They illustrate the power of applied transdisciplinary research to address complex policy issues through engagement with stakeholders and continual adaptation to exploit improved data sources and advanced analytic methods. The studies highlighted and synthesized here were sponsored by the U.S. Army, the U.S. Air Force, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense and conducted in three federally funded research and development centers managed by RAND: RAND Arroyo Center, Project AIR FORCE, and the National Defense Research Institute.

Though intended to be timely, these analyses have retained their value over time. Together they provide a coherent accumulation of innovation, knowledge, and insights, and they demonstrate the value of sustained, strategic investments in defense analysis.

In short, they fulfill RAND’s mission to improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis and exemplify its core values of quality and objectivity.

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The term security cooperation refers to the broad category of activities undertaken by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) “to develop partnerships that encourage and enable partner nations to act in support of US strategic objectives.” A variety of other programs and activities (and associated terms) spanning the strategic, operational, and tactical levels fall under the umbrella of security cooperation. These include efforts to build partner capacity, security force assistance, and defense institution building. Security cooperation activities range from the expensive and visible—training, equipping, and exercising together—to low-key but valuable bilateral talks, workshops, personnel exchanges, professional military education, and efforts to achieve interoperability with partners in terms of processes and equipment.

Security cooperation is an important and expanding instrument of U.S. foreign policy that is employed widely to accomplish a diverse set of objectives. Security cooperation goals vary depending on current U.S. strategic and operational objectives and the partner nation that is being engaged. Goals can include building the capacity of partner security forces to improve the security environment, strengthening relationships with foreign militaries and governments, and securing access for U.S. military forces so they can more effectively operate abroad.

The type of security cooperation that DoD deploys depends on the objective at hand and capabilities of the partner nation. DoD tends to deploy building partner capacity programs and security force assistance to less developed partner nations in an effort to improve their tactical and operational capabilities, while defense institution building initiatives are used in similar contexts to strengthen ministries of defense at the strategic level. On the other hand, programs aimed at interoperability tend to be targeted at more-developed allies. DoD conducts about 3,000 to 4,000 security cooperation events each year in more than 130 countries, while total U.S. assistance to foreign militaries and police forces runs from $15 billion to $20 billion per year. Security cooperation activities touch tens of thousands of foreign security forces around the world every year. What do we know about security cooperation? Are the strategic and operational goals of the enterprise being met? Does security cooperation “work”? If so, under what conditions?

The RAND Corporation has studied the field of security cooperation extensively over the past two decades. By pulling together RAND’s security cooperation research in one collection and highlighting what we have learned about the enterprise in this document, we seek to help answer these questions. The bulk of the works in this summary focus on DoD security cooperation, although a few studies also look at the security sector assistance activities of other agencies and departments, including the U.S. Department of State. Notably, in recent years, resources and authorities for security cooperation have shifted toward DoD and away from other agencies. The large number of security cooperation actors, programs, and activities across departments and agencies presents a number of challenges, particularly in measuring the effects of a specific program that is part of a broader U.S. engagement strategy.

This brief introduction discusses the main findings from RAND research in the main areas of security cooperation. The first section addresses the literature on security cooperation authorities and planning. The second section focuses on security cooperation activities aimed at building partner capacity, security force assistance, and defense institution building, while the third distills the findings from research on security cooperation activities aimed at enhancing interoperability. The fourth section discusses RAND work on the relatively new area of assessing, monitoring, and evaluating security cooperation activities. In conclusion, the final section highlights lessons learned and best practices in security cooperation.

**Security Cooperation Authorities and Planning**

One thread of RAND research has focused on how to improve security cooperation authorities, prioritization, and planning. Although sometimes overlooked, the issue of authorities is essential to the execution of security cooperation activities and one that continues to create challenges. There are a large set of potentially overlapping authorities that security cooperation planners need to navigate.
A 2016 study entitled From Patchwork to Framework: A Review of Title 10 Authorities for Security Cooperation analyzed legislative authorities for security cooperation and found 160 total authorities, 123 of which are under Title 10. The report identified 106 “core” statutes that directly authorize activities and 17 supporting ones that legislate the transfer of funds or mandate reports to Congress. Dozens of interviews and focus group sessions revealed frustration and confusion about perceived gaps, overlaps, and ambiguities surrounding these authorities, a need for greater flexibility in addressing multifaceted or emerging threats, and a desire to improve on this patchwork that has developed over many years.

The study created a framework to organize authorities into several categories: authorities focused on particular activities (e.g., exercises), particular missions (e.g., counterterrorism), and particular partners (e.g., Pakistan). The study also identified opportunities for consolidating and revising existing authorities, starting by reducing the 106 core authorities to 91. Although the U.S. government has made recent progress in clarifying and reducing security cooperation authorities, much still needs to be done to better integrate Title 10 and Title 22 authorities, assess the effect of appropriations on security cooperation, and align notification and reporting requirements.

Even with clear authorities, working with foreign militaries is more art than science. But it certainly should not be abstract art, argued RAND’s Michael J. McNerney in his 2016 Senate testimony entitled Department of Defense and Security Cooperation: Improving Prioritization, Authorities, and Evaluations. Observers might assume that security cooperation failures in such places as Iraq, Mali, and Syria are the result of DoD having no strategy or no plan to manage this vast effort. But this assumption oversimplifies the problem. DoD produces thousands of pages of guidance, strategies, planning documents, and after-action reports. Hundreds of officials coordinate their plans and share information. Success stories abound concerning more-professional forces, successful counterterrorism missions, countries that can better protect their borders, and countries that can deploy on peacekeeping missions or in coalitions with the United States. But to what end? A true strategy aligns ends, ways, and means and links to detailed strategic plans.

RAND researchers have identified several strategies for improvements in planning. RAND research shows that security cooperation is most effective when it is based on coordinated planning and informed by rigorous analysis. Strategy and planning documents should provide sufficient detail for senior leaders to understand what is likely to work, what is working, and what is not. A 2013 study, The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool, created a customizable diagnostic tool to help planners better understand when security cooperation is likely to work in a given country.

Also relevant to authorities and planning is the question of setting up a set of useful metrics to guide evaluation. In a 2016 study, SMART Security Cooperation Objectives: Improving DoD Planning and Guidance, RAND researchers evaluated DoD’s effectiveness in developing security cooperation objectives that are specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and results-oriented, and time-bound (SMART). The study found that most individual country objectives did not meet the SMART criteria. In particular, most objectives were not yet measurable or time-bound, and their achievability could not be determined. Combattant command security cooperation planning was “SMARTer” than individual country objectives. Although most country plan objectives failed the SMART test, country plans overall and other supporting documents showed more-positive results.

The SMART framework develops a five-step cycle for integrating ways to assess, monitor, and evaluate security cooperation activities. The framework consists of an initial environmental assessment, incorporates the results into planning (step two) and program design (step three), monitors plan and program implementation (step four), and concludes with centralized evaluation (step five). An organization can create a SMART system by combining detailed objectives and tasks with measures of effectiveness for use in future evaluations. Such a system can help clarify exactly what an organization is trying to do, how it plans to do it, and how senior leaders will know whether it is making progress. Other RAND research has also focused on how to improve security cooperation planning and prioritization for the Army and Air Force, and
in specific geographic regions, based on resources, strategic objectives, and opportunities.

RAND research on security cooperation planning shows that although inherently difficult, DoD components have made considerable strides in this area. DoD has added rigor to its planning processes through more-detailed guidance, theater campaign plans, country cooperation plans, and extensive coordination processes. Various stakeholders help shape these planning processes, with combatant commands and Ambassadors playing an important role. Recent component- and geographic-specific research provides strategies to help further improve security cooperation planning. The vast scope and scale of these activities, however, creates enduring oversight and evaluation challenges.

### Building Partner Capacity and Security Force Assistance

Another thread of RAND research has focused on building partner capacity, security force assistance, and defense institution building. These activities focus on states with less capacity and weaker security forces and are intended to improve the skills and processes of partner militaries as a way to support domestic and regional stability and rule of law. DoD defines programs falling under the building partner capacity rubric as “targeted efforts to improve the collective capabilities and performance of the Department of Defense and its partners.” Past RAND work has used the terms building partner capacity and security force assistance interchangeably.

In a 2013 study, *Review of Security Cooperation Mechanisms Combatant Commands Utilize to Build Partner Capacity*, RAND researchers sought to better understand the real value of building partner capacity activities. The study found uneven security cooperation mechanisms and results across the combatant commands that may reflect both different partners and also different strategies. It revealed that U.S. European Command has been able to effectively utilize some funding programs with coalition partners that other commands find less effective, while a lack of training and equipping authorities in the Southern and Pacific Commands forced reliance on indirect mechanisms for building partner capacity in counterterrorism. Other RAND research has examined the conditions that are most conducive to successful building partner capacity efforts and how developmental approaches can be utilized to more effectively build sustainable security-sector capacity abroad. RAND researchers have also considered steps that the United States can take in planning and resourcing security cooperation to support effectiveness. A 2009 study, *International Cooperation with Partner Air Forces*, suggested three focus areas: (1) increased visibility into activities; (2) strengthening processes for planning, evaluation, and resourcing; and (3) creating institutions that treat security cooperation the same as other major Air Force priorities.

A series of RAND studies also focus on security force assistance. In a 2018 study, *Building Armies, Building Nations: Toward a New Approach to Security Force Assistance*, RAND researchers used six case studies (South Korea, South Vietnam, Iraq, Ghana, Mali, and Nigeria) to analyze the relationship between building armies and building nations and potential U.S. contributions. The study found that the extent to which a client military contributes to nation-building by enhancing state legitimacy might be more important to U.S. security force assistance goals than its military capabilities. It also revealed that national cohesion and identity can matter as much as, if not more than, military capability.

Several RAND studies have focused on security force assistance in Afghanistan, an important question given the amount of resources dedicated to this effort. In a 2011 study, *Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan: Identifying Lessons for Future Efforts*, RAND researchers analyzed U.S. and international approaches to building the Afghan National Security Forces from 2001 to 2009. The report offered lessons for how to better provide security force assistance during active combat operations, recommending that U.S. military leaders need to understand the interdependencies between operations and security force assistance and be able to link security force assistance to success in operations. Other RAND work in this vein focuses on how best to conduct security cooperation in challenging contexts that lack favorable characteristics and how to improve Army, Air Force, and special operations forces’ efforts to build partner capacity and conduct security force assistance.

Another strand of RAND research has focused on defense institution building. DoD defines defense
institution building as follows: “Security cooperation activities that empower partner nation defense institutions to establish or re-orient their policies and structures to make their defense sector more transparent, accountable, effective, affordable, and responsive to civilian control.” A 2016 study, Defense Institution Building: An Assessment, found that defense institution building roles and responsibilities were not adequately defined at the program and project levels. In particular, the relationship among the regional centers, combatant commands, and defense institution building programs were not adequately defined in current policy or guidance documents. The study concluded that more and better coordination mechanisms are needed to avoid the implementation of redundant security cooperation programs.

Overall, this strand of research has found shortcomings in the support provided in the context of defense institution building, resulting in a situation in which partners may make cosmetic changes to defense institutions and best practices but lack the skills and understanding to maintain and operate within these institutions without U.S. support. Yet RAND research found that defense institution building can play an integral role in delivering positive security cooperation outcomes. In a 2018 study, Reforming Security Assistance for Africa, RAND research concluded that durable improvements in security typically occur only when the United States makes long-term commitments to a partner, constructs a comprehensive political-military strategy, invests in building security governance institutions, and provides personnel on the ground over long periods.

RAND’s work on building partner capacity, security force assistance, and defense institution building again demonstrates that the success of these activities depends heavily on the local context, perhaps even more so than on the nation’s military development.

Security Cooperation Activities Aimed at Enhancing Interoperability

Although the U.S. military often works to build the capabilities and capacity of less developed partners, for more-developed allies, security cooperation activities tend to focus on interoperability. RAND’s research on this topic has considered both the value of interoperability and how best to increase it. Significant literature exists on all types of interoperability, with the common refrain being that more and better interoperability is needed. And, with few exceptions in recent decades, the United States tends to engage with multinational partners and allies in military operations, thus bringing multinational interoperability to the fore.

In a 2019 study, Targeted Interoperability: A New Imperative for Multinational Operations, RAND researchers sought to understand the impediments to interoperability. The study developed a framework consisting of five main interoperability “outputs”: (1) having common equipment, (2) sharing the art of command, (3) having individual interoperability, (4) having interoperable communication and information systems equipment, and (5) having interoperable processes. It argued that interoperability allows access to additional forces and that building interoperability is also linked to having alliances and building coalitions.

Other RAND research focused on interoperability in specific regions. In a 2012 study, Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe, RAND researchers assessed how the Air Force could build partnerships most efficiently in European Command’s theater while ensuring that the requirements for maintaining key alliances and partnerships continued to be met. The study found that forward basing facilitates important capacity-building activities along with coalition operations and forecasted that the need to build relationships, capacity, and access in the European Command’s area of responsibility for coalition operations will continue beyond Iraq and Afghanistan.

RAND research in this area reveals the challenges to improving interoperability. These challenges include a lack of understanding of the significant resources that interoperability takes, a reluctance to expend time and money when the value of doing so is not clear, and a one-size-fits-all attitude toward finding solutions. Interoperability requires not only having compatible platforms and equipment but also common processes and the means to communicate and share information. RAND research also reveals the need for better prioritization and planning regarding interoperability. Indeed, simply “more” interoperability is insufficient.
Assessing, Monitoring, and Evaluating Security Cooperation

Given the large scope and scale of security cooperation activities—and severe limitations on available data and challenges—tracking progress and unraveling causal relationships to evaluate impact in a systematic way are difficult tasks. But at a time when the United States is increasingly relying on foreign partners for its security and attempting to build their military capacity, security cooperation activities and expenditures can no longer be justified with anecdotal evidence. What is working and what is not? How do we know?

To understand these critical questions, DoD has begun to develop a process of assessment, monitoring, and evaluation, consisting of baseline assessments, monitoring of performance, and evaluations of effectiveness. RAND research in this area has focused mainly on two areas: (1) how DoD and service components undertake the process of assessment, monitoring of performance, and evaluation and (2) conducting actual evaluations of security cooperation activities and programs.

Assessments aim to provide senior leaders with a baseline assessment. Monitoring means that priority efforts must be closely tracked to determine whether inputs (e.g., money and effort) are translating into outputs (e.g., equipment, training, education, and information). These outputs then serve as the basis for evaluating progress toward objectives (i.e., outcomes). Evaluation is the ultimate goal of this overall process and requires that all other components work well. Providing a piece of equipment or training a military officer is not an end unto itself. Investments require follow-up to make sure that they yield the full potential benefits that were expected.

In a 2016 study, Developing an Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Framework for U.S. Department of Defense Security Cooperation, RAND researchers addressed the numerous challenges involved in creating a DoD-wide security cooperation assessment, monitoring of performance, and evaluation system. The report found that although many parts of DoD conduct some form of security cooperation–related assessments, monitoring, and/or evaluation, the processes were ad hoc, irregular, and understanding and implementation of such practices varied widely. Building on the SMART framework outlined earlier, the authors explain how assessment, monitoring of performance, and evaluation methods could be applied, integrated, and implemented by major security cooperation organizations so that they conform as closely as possible to analytic best practices and existing DoD policies, plans, and processes. Other RAND research included in this volume focuses on developing assessment, monitoring of performance, and evaluation frameworks for the Army and Air Force and evaluating specific security cooperation efforts, such as DoD’s Global Train and Equip program.

An important challenge facing policymakers in the area of assessment, monitoring of performance, and evaluation is what metrics should be used to evaluate security cooperation activities. Ideally, researchers would be able to observe directly how security cooperation activities contribute to such goals as regional stability, stronger alliances, deterrence of adversaries, and others. In reality, however, it is exceedingly difficult to collect data on many of these outcomes. Nevertheless, several RAND studies have focused on evaluating past security cooperation activities, using what observable metrics are available and relying on proxies for these outcomes elsewhere. For example, some studies have attempted to qualitatively assess partner capacity before and after security cooperation activities. Others have looked at the stability and conflict propensity of a given country or region before and after security cooperation activities. Still other studies have considered whether security cooperation increases U.S. influence or the alignment of partner nations with U.S. policy preferences.

In a 2013 study, What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances? RAND researchers collected and compared 20 years of data on 29 historical case studies of U.S. involvement in building partner capacity. The report found that capacity-building efforts since the September 11, 2001, attacks have been far more effective at improving the ability of partner militaries to carry out core tasks (e.g., counterinsurgency, reconnaissance, rapid deployment, maintenance and sustainment, and others) than those of the preceding era. It also revealed that higher spending correlates with greater effectiveness, but when resources are used to “buy friends” (or to win influence), the
correlation between expenditure and capacity built is weaker. The study also found that the characteristics and regional context of the partner nation are critical to the effectiveness of capacity-building efforts, and that a broad alignment between the interests of the United States and the interests of the partner is a powerful contextual predictor of effectiveness.

A 2014 study, Assessing Security Cooperation as a Preventive Tool, used statistical analysis to assess the relationship between security cooperation spending and state fragility using data on security cooperation spending and fragility scores over the period from 1991 to 2008. The study found a strong relationship, especially at lower levels of spending and in countries that were more democratic and had a higher level of stability in the first place. Education-based funding impacts had the largest positive effects, while foreign military financing (to support weapons or equipment sales) had the smallest benefits. Yet more recent RAND research found that these findings do not hold across all geographic regions. A 2018 study focused on security sector assistance—a broader category than security cooperation that includes Department of State programs. The study, Reforming Security Sector Assistance for Africa, found that during the Cold War period, security sector assistance to Africa was correlated with an increase in the incidence of civil wars, while security assistance appears to have had little or no net effect on political violence in the post–Cold War era.

More recent RAND research has reported related results. A 2018 study, Assessing, Monitoring, and Evaluating Army Security Cooperation, conducted a statistical analysis reviewing more than 9,000 security cooperation activities carried out between 2009 and 2014. The report found that three types of countries tend to be most engaged in U.S. security cooperation—those in need of greater engagement, those with which the United States would like to improve relations, and those with which greater engagement will be most productive. The report goes on to identify a variety of ways that the outcomes of the benefits from each type of cooperation can be tracked over time. Possible metrics could include achievement of specific objectives, characteristics of the political, economic, or security environment, or performance on various dimensions as assessed in an operational context or through after action reviews.

RAND’s work on developing the SMART framework has helped to establish best practices in the assessment, monitoring of performance, and evaluation space and RAND’s own evaluations have helped identify ways in which the measurement challenges associated with security cooperation activities can be overcome. The research in this area demonstrates that security cooperation programming can work, but it is much likelier to succeed in specific contexts, specifically in well-developed democracies with strong militaries where the United States makes substantial investments and U.S. and partner country goals align.

Lessons Learned and Best Practices in Security Cooperation

Much of RAND’s security cooperation research, including many of the studies highlighted in this document, sought to answer the critical question of whether security cooperation works, and, if so, under what conditions. Despite myriad anecdotes of high-profile security cooperation failures, RAND researchers have established a statistically significant correlation between U.S. investments in security cooperation and desired outcomes, such as reduced regional and domestic fragility, improved partner military capacity and competencies, stronger relationships, and in some cases closer alignment with the United States. This correlation, however, is stronger with certain types of countries (less autocratic, less fragile), in certain regions, and with certain types of security cooperation tools. Indeed, one of the most consistent findings from RAND researchers is that the specific characteristics of the partner nation matter greatly in determining security cooperation successes or failures.

Security cooperation spending has also advanced U.S. interests more directly by building the ability of partner militaries to support those objectives, for example supporting counterterrorism or counternarcotic efforts. For instance, focused train-and-equip programs have certainly been valuable in supporting U.S. counterterrorism objectives in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere. In sum, security cooperation can work, under certain conditions.
Yet RAND research suggests that we should be wary of overvaluing these expedient and near activities at the expense of longer-term efforts to create more-resilient, well-governed, and stable partners. Security cooperation spending to support “partners of convenience” that does not also work to support efforts to impart best practices, to root out corruption, and to support the long-term health and effectiveness of the partner military will fall short. These findings have significant implications for how DoD can and should deploy security cooperation around the globe.

RAND’s research on defense institution building underscores this tension between near-term and longer-term objectives. RAND’s research on defense institution building found that many of those involved in security cooperation had a poor understanding of institution-building tools and were inadequately trained in explaining relevant U.S. programs to officials from partner countries. These gaps have contributed to a significant imbalance in U.S. security cooperation. A former U.S. official revealed to RAND researchers that “because of the U.S. focus on immediate operational objectives. . . . The whole model is upside-down. We train and equip our partners first, then worry about institution building.”

Much work remains to be done to fully understand the impact of defense institution building specifically and security cooperation more generally. But these findings suggest that such security cooperation tools as the International Military Education and Training program, the Institute for Security Governance (formerly the Defense Institutional Reform Initiative), DoD’s Regional Centers, and other professional military education programs should play a more prominent role in security cooperation efforts moving forward. Such a rebalance away from the operational and toward the institutional level could help mitigate a variety of unintended consequences and potential security cooperation pitfalls, including the possibility of strengthening the military at the expense of civilian oversight institutions.

In addition to readjusting the types of security cooperation tools that DoD employs, RAND research also shows that DoD may wish to reconsider how it prioritizes and where it targets its security cooperation. When everything is a priority, nothing is a priority, and DoD could do better at managing expectations in contexts that do not have conditions that are conducive to success. One simple way to improve this process would be for each combatant command to identify three countries where they expected the greatest return on investment for the next two to five years. For these bullish partners, there would be a surge in security cooperation activities or efforts to substantially deepen interoperability. On the flip side, the combatant command could also identify three countries where a strong return on investment is less likely for the next two to five years. For these bearish partners, activities could be reduced to offset costs to support increased investments in bullish partners. Return on investment should take into account the importance of the objectives being pursued, expected benefits, relative costs, and risk.
Annotated Bibliography

SECURITY COOPERATION AUTHORITIES AND PLANNING SECURITY COOPERATION ACTIVITIES

**Friends, Foes, and Future Directions: U.S. Partnerships in a Turbulent World: Strategic Rethink**
Hans Binnendijk
RR-1210-RC (2016)

This report is the third in RAND’s ongoing Strategic Rethink series, in which RAND experts explore the elements of a national strategy for the conduct of U.S. foreign and security policy in this administration and the next. The report evaluates three broad strategies for dealing with U.S. partners and adversaries in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East in a time of diminishing defense budgets and an American public preference for a domestic focus. The three strategies are to be more assertive, to be more collaborative, or to retrench from international commitments. All three of these alternative approaches are constrained and a balance will need to be struck among them—that balance may differ from region to region. In general, however, the United States may need to follow a more collaborative approach in which it seeks greater collaboration and burden sharing from strong partners who have until now not been pulling their weight. To further reduce risk, the United States should seek to prevent deeper security ties from developing between China and Russia. It should work closely with its most vulnerable partners not only to reassure them, but to coordinate crisis management with them to limit the risk of unwanted escalation of incidents. And it should sponsor new trilateral efforts to draw together partners in both Europe and Asia that face similar security, political, economic, societal, and environmental problems. Only by working together across regions can many of these challenges be effectively managed. Trilateralism might serve as a useful follow-on strategy to the pivot to Asia.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR1210

**Security Cooperation Amidst Political Uncertainty: An Agenda for Future Research**
Larry Hanauer and Stephanie Pezard
WR-1052 (2014)

Security cooperation, through which the United States provides a wide range of military training and assistance to partner states, is a central element of U.S. foreign policy. This working paper examines the challenges that may arise when the United States seeks to intervene in uncertain political environments, such as instances in which the United States’ partner—which may be a besieged government or a non-state actor—is actively engaged in military conflict. The existing body of security cooperation literature notes key yet standard challenges that the U.S. government must address before deciding whether or not to offer
Select RAND Research on Security Cooperation, 2006–2019

military training and equipment to potential partners operating amidst uncertainty. Based on a careful review of these challenges, the working paper suggests avenues for future research.

Find the full document at www.rand.org/t/WR1052

**Department of Defense and Security Cooperation: Improving Prioritization, Authorities, and Evaluations**

Michael J. McNerney  
**CT-454 (2016)**  
Testimony presented before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities on March 9, 2016.

Find the full document at www.rand.org/t/CT454

**From Patchwork to Framework: A Review of Title 10 Authorities for Security Cooperation**

David E. Thaler, Michael J. McNerney, Beth Grill, Jefferson P. Marquis, and Amanda Kadlec  
**RR-1438-OSD (2016)**  
The accelerated proliferation of legislative authorities for the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) in Public Law and Title 10 in the U.S. Code since the September 11, 2011, attacks has created an increasingly unwieldy and complex catalog of statutes, which has generated severe challenges to DoD’s security cooperation activities. The large set of authorities for security cooperation has become known as a “patchwork” because of the need to patch together multiple authorities and associated yet unsynchronized processes, resources, programs, and organizations to execute individual initiatives with partner nations. As defense headquarter staffs shrink and planning grows increasingly complex, the risk of canceled or ineffective events has grown significantly. Moreover, policymakers and congressional staffers face growing challenges providing guidance and oversight and evaluating progress toward larger objectives.

This report develops a framework and options to streamline the patchwork of authorities in Public Law and Title 10 in the U.S. Code that DoD employs for security cooperation with partner nations. The objective is to frame Title 10 security cooperation authorities in a holistic, logical way, identify redundancies and gaps, and offer recommendations for changes in authorities that reduce the complexities involved in implementing them and make it easier for DoD’s security cooperation workforce to use them to work with partner nations in support of U.S. national security strategy.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR1438

**How Successful Are U.S. Efforts to Build Capacity in Developing Countries? A Framework to Assess the Global Train and Equip “1206” Program**

Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Joe Hogler, Beth Grill, Lianne Kennedy-Boudali, and Christopher Paul  
**TR-1121-OSD (2011)**  
The U.S. government has long worked with allies and partners in a security cooperation context. Assessing the effect of such activities, and particularly how they contribute to U.S. objectives, is extremely important. The Global Train and Equip “1206” program is a multiagency security cooperation program that would
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benefit from an improved framework for thinking about, planning for, and implementing security cooperation assessments. The program, established in Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, supports U.S.-led capacity-building activities focused on counterterrorism and stability operations with foreign military partners. The process to develop an assessment framework for the 1206 program began with a series of discussions with policymakers and subject-matter experts to identify current roles, data sources, and assessment processes. These discussions formed the basis for a survey of program stakeholders on the processes, responsibilities, assessment guidance, and skills needed to conduct assessments. An analysis of the survey results revealed the need for formal guidance on the assessment of 1206 projects, gaps in data collection and reporting, unclear roles, and inconsistent levels of communication across the program. However, it also showed that a two-track (short- and longer-term) approach to implementing an assessment framework, closing gaps, and improving coordination would be the best fit for the 1206 program's structure.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/TR1121

The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool

Christopher Paul, Michael Nixon, Heather Peterson, Beth Grill, and Jessica Yeats

TL-112-OSD (2013)

With increased pressure on defense spending, DoD may need to scrutinize and reevaluate current and proposed security cooperation efforts to ensure that expected benefits align with costs and corresponding policy priorities. Using 29 historical case studies of U.S. efforts to build partner capacity since the end of the Cold War, this study identified practices and contextual factors associated with greater or lesser degrees of success in security cooperation. The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization and Propensity Matching Tool produces an overall security cooperation propensity score for each of the world’s 195 countries. In conjunction with strategic thinking and nuanced understanding of individual countries, planners can compare these scores with available funding and security cooperation priorities to develop specifically tailored and sound security cooperation policies.

Find the full document at www.rand.org/t/TL112

SMART Security Cooperation Objectives: Improving DoD Planning and Guidance

Michael J. McNerney, Jefferson P. Marquis, S. Rebecca Zimmerman, and Ariel Klein

RR-1430-OSD (2016)

Translating security cooperation goals into effective action is challenging, given the multitude of stakeholders, changing political and security environments, and resource limitations. To help ensure that limited security cooperation resources are properly directed for greatest effect, the DoD has highlighted the need to develop security cooperation objectives that are specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and results-oriented, and time-bound (SMART). The SMART concept has been used for several decades in the private sector to develop objectives that facilitate assessment, monitoring, and evaluation.
This report evaluates DoD’s effectiveness in developing SMART security cooperation objectives. It also proposes a systematic approach to developing security cooperation objectives for use by policymakers, planners, program managers, and resource managers. The authors present a detailed evaluation of the extent to which the security cooperation objectives used by U.S. European Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Southern Command meet the SMART criteria, and they recommend changes to improve DoD security cooperation guidance and planning.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR1430

**Security Cooperation Organizations in the Country Team: Options for Success**

Terrence K. Kelly, Jefferson P. Marquis, Cathryn Quantic Thurston, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, and Charlotte Lynch

TR-734-A (2010)

Security assistance and security cooperation are interrelated missions that rely on military staffs in U.S. embassies in partner countries. In countries threatened by insecurity or instability, actions may be required that are not easily accomplished under current systems. This report examines three options for improving current approaches to security assistance and cooperation. The options range from changes in current practices to options requiring new policies, procedures, organizations, or authorities.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/TR734

**A Capabilities-Based Strategy for Army Security Cooperation**

Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Adam R. Grissom, and Jefferson P. Marquis

MG-563-A (2007)

U.S. Army planners working on the problem of multinational force compatibility require a planning framework to guide and focus the service’s long-term compatibility investments with partner armies of varying capabilities. This report defines and describes such a framework, called the Niche Capability Planning Framework. It provides a conceptual template for integrating the various considerations, ranging from U.S. Army capability gaps, to the politics of collaborating with foreign armies, to the coordination of Army and DoD security cooperation activities, implicit in a strategy for cultivating compatible niche capabilities in non-core partner armies, which lack a stable, long-term, collaborative program of assistance with the U.S. Army. The report concludes with specific recommendations for implementing the Niche Capability Planning Framework, which should, at a minimum, incorporate analyses of projected Army capability gaps, key partner characteristics, and the resources required to match capabilities with partners in a systematic way.

Find the full document at www.rand.org/t/MG563
**The Global Landpower Network: Recommendations for Strengthening Army Engagement**

Angela O’Mahony, Thomas S. Szayna, Christopher G. Pernin, Laurinda L. Rohn, Derek Eaton, Elizabeth Bodine-Baron, Joshua Mendelsohn, Osonde A. Osoba, Sherry Oehler, Katharina Ley Best, and Leila Bighash

RR-1813-A (2017)

The U.S. Army has introduced the global landpower network concept as a means to integrate, sustain, and advance the Army’s considerable ongoing efforts to meet U.S. national security guidance emphasizing the importance of working closely with partner nations to achieve U.S. strategic objectives. This report develops the global landpower network concept further and addresses three questions: What benefits can a the global landpower network provide the Army? What are the essential components of a the global landpower network? What options exist for implementing the global landpower network concept? By developing the global landpower network concept, the Army has the opportunity to transition the way it engages with partners from an often ad hoc and reactive set of relationships to one that the Army more self-consciously prioritizes and leverages as a resource to meet U.S. strategic objectives.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR1813


David E. Thaler, Beth Grill, Jefferson P. Marquis, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, and Stephanie Pezard

RR-2351-AF (2018)

Security cooperation is a key component of U.S. national security strategy, a high priority in DoD guidance, and a key mission of the U.S. Air Force. The Air Force must explicitly factor security cooperation into its plans and programs for organizing, training, and equipping the force. This report reviews two core Air Force decisionmaking processes—the strategy, planning, and programming process and the concept development and acquisition process—to determine the extent to which decisionmakers consider security cooperation impact and to recommend ways to make such considerations systematic and explicit.

The authors explored four case studies of security cooperation-related programs and initiatives to draw lessons from their decision outcomes: (1) undergraduate pilot training, (2) the light-attack aircraft, (3) the C-17 Heavy Airlift Wing, and (4) the Air Advisor Academy. They tell a story of this key Air Force activity that is underrepresented in core Air Force decisionmaking processes and not systematically or explicitly factored into decisions that could affect Air Force’s capacity to engage with foreign partners.

The authors recommend that, regardless of any change in corporate planning structure, Air Force factor security cooperation impact into decisions and trade-offs in the early stages of organizing, training, and equipping processes and make these trade-offs explicit to top Air Force decisionmakers.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR2351

Heather Peterson and Joe Hogler

TR-1186-AF (2012)

DoD has placed a renewed emphasis on planning for security cooperation with foreign militaries, but it has yet to develop comprehensive guidance on how to conduct this type of planning. As a result, the combatant commands and their U.S. Air Force components have had to develop country plans with little guidance as to what these plans should look like and what purpose they should serve. This report synthesizes best practices in country planning and presents them using a simple five-step country planning cycle and a three-part country plan format. The country planning cycle begins with the issuance of strategic guidance, which informs the development of a country plan that is then resourced, executed, and, finally, assessed. The three-part country plan format is centered on the development of measurable objectives and the identification of the activities and resources needed to achieve the objectives. This report presents detailed information on each step in the country planning process to help combatant command and U.S. Air Force planners understand and leverage existing DoD processes. It concludes by recommending that the Air Force and DoD develop standard guidance for country planners and that they synchronize the resourcing process for their respective programs.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/TR1186

**Integrating the Full Range of Security Cooperation Programs into Air Force Planning: An Analytic Primer**

Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Joe Hogler, Lianne Kennedy-Boudali, and Stephanie Pezard

TR-974-AF (2011)

The Air Force and other DoD entities conduct a host of security cooperation activities with partner air forces. Many programs are available for use when working with partner countries in a variety of contexts. However, there is currently no process for systematically tracking all these programs and activities. This report supplies Air Force planners with more-accessible information about resources for security cooperation, the rules that govern their use, and their application methods. It does so via an analytical construct created to illustrate how these resources can be employed in partner countries with varying degrees of capability, capacity, and willingness to work with the United States. The authors present an illustrative vignette to demonstrate how this construct may be used in a situation that requires a security cooperation plan. A set of program pages is also included to help security cooperation planners determine the key components of a security cooperation plan: the partner countries to be addressed by the plan, the programs to be used, the types of activities to be conducted through those programs, and program funding information.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/TR974

**Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe**

Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Patrick Mills, David T. Orletsky, and David E. Thaler

TR-1241-AF (2012)

U.S. European Command views building partnerships as its highest theater priority. U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) seeks to build partnerships and partner capacity in the European Command area of responsibility. In spite of the potential benefits of USAFE’s building-partnership activities, USAFE’s posture and its building-partnership activities do come with a cost. In an austere fiscal environment, it is appropriate to assess how the United States and the U.S. Air Force can build partnerships most efficiently while ensuring that the
requirements for maintaining key alliances and partnerships continue to be met. This report characterizes the current policy debate on security cooperation and force posture in Europe through a review of the literature and discussions with key policymakers and legislative officials in Washington, develops a framework to describe the current building-partnership approach and environment for the USAFE, defines several alternative postures for conducting building-partnership activities using a building-block approach to cost out each high-payoff building-partnership activity, and recommends efficiencies to improve the Air Force’s building-partnership activities in Europe.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/TR1241

**Authority to Issue Interoperability Policy**

Carolyn Wong and Daniel Gonzales

RR-357-NAVY (2014)

Achieving interoperability among systems is instrumental to enabling critical functions, such as timely information exchange during operations and efficiencies in acquisition, so it is important to understand which parties have authority to issue policy that governs the facets of interoperability. This report presents an approach and framework for determining what parties have authority to issue interoperability policy, the legal and policy origins and implementation paths of the authority, and the extent of the authority. The approach includes rigorous analysis by researchers to identify pertinent authorities in federal law supplemented by a means to facilitate discovery of roles and responsibilities in DoD and service-level policies. The approach results in a roles and responsibilities network that traces the paths of authority available to issue interoperability policy. The authors use as a case study the authority of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development, and Acquisition, Chief Systems Engineer to issue Navy interoperability policy related to mission area systems engineering to demonstrate the use of the framework and methodology. They find that there are 13 different paths of authority that could be cited by four different parties to claim authority to influence interoperability policy related to mission area systems engineering. The approach used in this report might be developed, along with complementary analytic techniques, to provide the government with the ability to create and maintain consistent and comprehensive bodies of policy that will ensure the effective and efficient operation of defense agencies.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR357

**Department of Defense Training for Operations with Interagency, Multinational, and Coalition Partners**

Michael Spirtas, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Harry J. Thie, Joe Hogler, and Thomas Young

MG-707-OSD (2008)

The nature of recent challenges and the types of missions DoD has undertaken highlight the need for DoD to consider ways to help the military prepare to work with other government agencies, international organizations, private and nongovernmental organizations, and foreign militaries. These challenges require DoD to combine military and nonmilitary means, such as intelligence, diplomacy, and developmental assistance, to advance U.S. national security interests. Moreover, exhibiting cultural awareness and sensitivity vis-à-vis non-DoD partners is paramount to successful operational planning and execution. To build
or bolster local governance, to foster economic growth, and to respond to natural disasters, the United States must also use different types of tools, military and otherwise, simultaneously. It is no small task to synchronize these different tools so that they work in tandem, or at least minimize conflict between them. This report provides suggestions for how the U.S. military can help prepare its personnel to work successfully with interagency, multinational, and coalition partners. The authors found that almost all of the requirements for integrated-operations training can be found in existing joint and service task lists. Current training programs aimed at headquarters staffs need to be revamped to focus on high-priority tasks that are amenable to training.

Find the full document at www.rand.org/t/MG707

**Developing and Assessing Options for the Global SOF Network**

Thomas S. Szayna and William Welser IV

RR-340-SOCOM (2013)

The January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance calls for small-footprint, low-cost approaches where possible in ensuring U.S. security in a 21st-century world of transnational threats. In response, U.S. Special Operations Command has developed and put forth its Global SOF Network vision, which calls for a distributed overseas posture for special operations forces as part of a new approach based on creating a structure that responds more effectively to emerging threats and deters future ones. U.S. Special Operations Command posits that increasing special operations forces’ forward presence and creating these networks will deepen existing partnerships and provide new ones. This, in turn, will provide greater insight regarding conditions on the ground, shape the environment more effectively, and better enable local special operations forces partners to meet security threats. Building and employing a global special operations forces network and strengthening partners forms the core of the Global SOF Network vision. U.S. Special Operations Command asked RAND researchers to develop options for implementing the vision by creating and then applying an analytically rigorous methodology, and to investigate whether changes to command and control arrangements or DoD funding and budgeting processes might be needed for its effective execution.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR340

**Pacific Engagement: Forging Tighter Connections Between Tactical Security Cooperation Activities and U.S. Strategic Goals in the Asia-Pacific Region**

Stephen Watts, Christopher M. Schnaubelt, Sean Mann, Angela O’Mahony, and Michael Schwille

RR-1920-A (2018)

Security cooperation events should forge strong relationships with U.S. partners, help develop partners’ military capabilities and ability to operate with U.S. forces, and facilitate access to foreign countries in the event of a contingency. This report examines U.S. Army security cooperation processes in the Pacific Command area of responsibility to forge stronger links between strategic and tactical levels in the planning and execution of security cooperation activities. Researchers developed a framework to link tactical- and operational-level security cooperation activities with strategic goals and found ways to identify information requirements for units executing security cooperation activities and improve evaluations. Researchers found that planning for security cooperation events could be improved by providing additional clarity in the orders process and strengthened knowledge management to aid tactical planners. Security cooperation evaluations at the strategic level could be improved through better specifications of the linkages between security cooperation events and expected outcomes and at the tactical level through process improvements in the conduct and dissemination of after-action reports.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR1920
ASSESSMENT, MONITORING, AND EVALUATION OF SECURITY COOPERATION ACTIVITIES


Jefferson P. Marquis, Michael J. McNerney, S. Rebecca Zimmerman, Merrie Archer, Jeremy Boback, and David Stebbins

RR-1611-OSD (2016)

At a time when the United States is increasingly relying on foreign partners for its security and attempting to build their military capacity, security cooperation activities and expenditures can no longer be justified with anecdotal evidence. This report seeks to address the challenge of creating a DoD-wide system for security cooperation assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (AME): first, by analyzing existing planning and AME processes and practices inside and outside DoD to understand what works and what does not in contexts relevant to security cooperation; and second, by presenting a conceptual framework that explains how AME methods might be applied, integrated, and implemented by major security cooperation organizations so that they conform as closely as possible to analytic best practices and existing DoD policies, plans, and processes.

Without leadership from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the results of improved AME will be almost impossible to regularize and aggregate in a manner useful for security cooperation planning and management at various levels or for coordination and collaboration with security sector assistance partners outside DoD. OSD should clarify AME roles, responsibilities, and reporting relationships with respect to security cooperation. OSD should work with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to develop general theories of change and a set of logic models for common partner capability development areas, such as engagements, exercises, education, train and equip activities, and institution building. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency and OSD should identify funding for a centralized, independent evaluation organization and an organization to support and synchronize performance and effectiveness monitoring.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR1611

SMART Security Cooperation Objectives: Improving DoD Planning and Guidance

Michael J. McNerney, Jefferson P. Marquis, S. Rebecca Zimmerman, and Ariel Klein

RR-1430-OSD (2016)

Translating security cooperation goals into effective action is challenging, given the multitude of stakeholders, changing political and security environments, and resource limitations. To help ensure that limited security cooperation resources are properly directed for greatest effect, DoD has highlighted the need to develop security cooperation objectives that are specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and results-oriented, and
time-bound (SMART). The SMART concept has been used for several decades in the private sector to develop objectives that facilitate assessment, monitoring, and evaluation.

This report evaluates DoD’s effectiveness in developing SMART security cooperation objectives. It also proposes a systematic approach to developing security cooperation objectives for use by policymakers, planners, program managers, and resource managers. The authors present a detailed evaluation of the extent to which the security cooperation objectives used by U.S. European Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Southern Command meet the SMART criteria, and they recommend changes to improve DoD security cooperation guidance and planning.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR1430

Assessing, Monitoring, and Evaluating Army Security Cooperation: A Framework for Implementation

Angela O’Mahony, Ilana Blum, Gabriela Armenta, Nicholas Burger, Joshua Mendelsohn, Michael J. McNerney, Steven W. Popper, Jefferson P. Marquis, and Thomas S. Szayna

RR-2165-A (2018)

The U.S. Army conducts security cooperation activities with partner nations to achieve several objectives, including building relationships that promote U.S. security interests and developing partners’ capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations. Evaluating the effectiveness of these activities, however, has been difficult. To examine this issue, this report addresses two questions: when can Army security cooperation have the greatest impact, and how should the Army assess, monitor, and evaluate security cooperation? The authors conducted a literature review of both security cooperation and international development assistance studies; they identified factors corresponding to when assistance was provided and where it was effective. They followed this up with a statistical analysis in which they reviewed more than 9,000 security cooperation activities conducted between 2009 and 2014 for how well they aligned with lessons learned from the literature review. They found that Army security cooperation generally favors countries in need of greater engagement, countries with which the United States would like to improve relations, and countries for which engagement will be the most productive. And while Army security cooperation activities have aligned fairly well with what previous analyses have found contribute to effectiveness in both security cooperation and international development assistance, the lack of systematic assessment, monitoring, and evaluation across activities makes it difficult to know whether the activities effectively met their objectives. Thus, the authors present a framework and portfolio tool to help the Army implement an assessment, monitoring, and evaluation process that is in line with current Army doctrine and emerging guidance from the U.S. Department of Defense.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR2165

Assessing Security Cooperation as a Preventive Tool

Michael J. McNerney, Angela O’Mahony, Thomas S. Szayna, Derek Eaton, Caroline Baxter, Colin P. Clarke, Emma Cutrufello, Michael McGee, Heather Peterson, Leslie Adrienne Payne, and Calin Trenkov-Wermuth

RR-350-A (2014)

U.S. security cooperation is often asserted as a means to ameliorate fragility in partner states. By employing statistical analysis of SC data and state fragility scores for 107 countries from 1991 to 2008, this study tested the assertion and found that the provision of security cooperation by the United States did indeed correlate with a reduction in partner state fragility. The strength of the correlation did not increase proportionally with
additional funding, however; most of the impact was concentrated at the low end of security cooperation funding. In addition, the effectiveness of the relationship between these variables depended on key characteristics of the recipient country and the type of security cooperation provided. Conversely, security cooperation provided through the equipment-focused Foreign Military Finance program, which forms the majority of U.S. security cooperation, failed to correlate with reduced fragility in recipient countries.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR350

**Department of Defense and Security Cooperation: Improving Prioritization, Authorities, and Evaluations**

Michael J. McNerney

CT-454 (2016)

Testimony presented before the Senate Armed Services Subcommitteee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities on March 9, 2016.

Find the full document at www.rand.org/t/CT454

**Follow the Money: Promoting Greater Transparency in Department of Defense Security Cooperation Reporting**

Beth Grill, Michael J. McNerney, Jeremy Boback, Renanah Miles, Cynthia Clapp-Wincek, and David E. Thaler

RR-2039-OSD (2017)

The scope of DoD's engagement in security cooperation has expanded significantly over the last decade as Congress has authorized billions of dollars in new programs to meet an ever-widening set of U.S. national security objectives. As funding of security cooperation has increased, DoD has faced new demands for transparency to allow greater public awareness and internal accountability. Yet DoD's program management and financial systems were not designed to provide the level of detail on security cooperation expenditures needed to meet new international, congressional, and internal DoD reporting requirements. In this RAND report, authors analyze the mechanisms that DoD uses to track security cooperation spending and the obstacles that it must overcome to meet new reporting requirements. It provides an assessment of DoD's compliance with international transparency reporting standards and maps out the current processes of data collection for five Title 10 security cooperation programs. It highlights some of the program-level practices that have been developed to overcome these challenges. Authors then look at the lessons that can be learned from the U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development in improving transparency in foreign assistance reporting. Finally, the report concludes with recommendations for how DoD might streamline the security cooperation reporting process in preparation for the implementation of 2017 National Defense Authorization Act and new internal requirements for increased accountability and strategic prioritization.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR2039
Evaluating the Impact of the Department of Defense Regional Centers for Security Studies
Larry Hanauer, Stuart E. Johnson, Christopher Springer, Chaoling Feng, Michael J. McNerney, Stephanie Pezard, and Shira Efron
RR-388-OSD (2014)

The five DoD Regional Centers for Security Studies have been helping partner nations build strategic capacity for almost 20 years. However, recent DoD budget constraints have put pressure on the regional centers to increase efficiency. This study investigates the overall impact of the regional centers, their effectiveness in advancing DoD policy priorities, the ways in which they assess their programs, and ways in which they could improve their impact and efficiency and the resulting outcomes. Centers are high-impact components of U.S. security cooperation and engagement efforts—despite their relatively small budgets. This study identified 24 ways—building partner capacity, building relationships, fostering pro-U.S. outlooks, offering unique opportunities for engagement, promoting regional dialogue, and others—in which the centers advance U.S. interests.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR388

Assessing the Value of U.S. Army International Activities
Jefferson P. Marquis, Richard E. Darilek, Jasen J. Castillo, Cathryn Quantic Thurston, Anny Wong, Cynthia Huger, Andrea Mejia, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Brian Nichiporuk, and Brett Steele

A number of important steps have been taken in recent years to improve the planning and management of Army International Activities (AIA). Still, a need remains, and is widely recognized, for a high-level assessment mechanism to allocate AIA resources more efficiently, execute AIA programs more effectively, and highlight the contributions of AIA to the National Military Strategy, the DoD Security Cooperation Guidance, and The Army Plan. This report presents a framework for assessing the value of the Army's non-combat interactions with other militaries. It provides an overview of AIA programs and establishes their connection to the U.S. government's current strategy for security cooperation. It also provides a matrix of eight AIA “ends,” derived from top-level national and Army guidance, and eight AIA “ways,” which summarize the various capabilities inherent in AIA programs. Next, the report presents a method for linking AIA “ends” and “ways” that involves a theoretical rationale for security cooperation, selection criteria for AIA “output” and “outcome” indicators, and related measures of performance and effectiveness. The report also describes the new online AIA Knowledge Sharing System that is being used to solicit programmatic and assessment data from AIA officials in the Army's Major Commands. In addition, the report includes the results of three test cases—involving the Army Medical Department, the National Guard Bureau, and U.S. Army South—that helped to identify potential problems in evaluating AIA and to suggest improvements in the proposed AIA assessment mechanism. Finally, the report contains an extensive list of “output” and “outcome” indicators that have been reviewed by AIA officials throughout the Army.

Find the full document at www.rand.org/t/MG329
Assessing the Value of Regionally Aligned Forces in Army Security Cooperation: An Overview

Angela O’Mahony, Thomas S. Szayna, Michael J. McNerney, Derek Eaton, Joel Vernetti, Michael Schwille, Stephanie Pezard, Tim Oliver, and Paul S. Steinberg

RR-1341/1-A (2017)

The U.S. Army has been aligning specific units with geographical regions (regionally aligned forces) to strengthen cultural awareness and language skills, facilitate force management, and improve security cooperation efforts around the world. Given the substantial role that the Army plays in U.S. security cooperation, it is important to understand the value of regionally aligned forces in making security cooperation more effective. To develop this understanding, the Army asked the RAND Arroyo Center to assess the initial use of an Army unit as regionally aligned forces in Africa, focusing on security cooperation. The study results are intended to assist the Army, geographic combatant commands, and DoD in better aligning security cooperation missions with national interests and security goals. The report provides some recommendations and analytic tools for the Army's leadership and regionally aligned force planners to improve regionally aligned force implementation.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR1341z1

Developing an Assessment Framework for U.S. Air Force Building Partnerships Programs

Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Joe Hogler, Jefferson P. Marquis, Christopher Paul, John E. Peters, and Beth Grill

MG-868-AF (2010)

Working with allies to build their defense capacity, acquire access to their territories for potential operations, and strengthen relationships with their air forces is an important U.S. Air Force activity. To determine the value of this activity, the authors outline an assessment framework that planners, strategists, and policymakers can use to see whether Air Force security cooperation activities are achieving the desired effects. They recommend that the Air Force incorporate an assessment process at the program level into its current security cooperation assessment process to meet the needs of the OSD, the combatant commands, and the Air Force. They also point out that it is important for Air Force stakeholders to assess security cooperation with the intent to inform decisionmaking. Because of the limited assessment guidance and the need for efficient assessment processes, the Air Force should clarify and specify stakeholder assessment roles and responsibilities for security cooperation assessments.

Find the full document at www.rand.org/t/MG868
Adding Value to Air Force Management Through Building Partnerships Assessment

Jefferson P. Marquis, Joe Hogler, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Michael J. Neumann, Christopher Paul, John E. Peters, Gregory F. Treverton, and Anny Wong

TR-907-AF (2010)

Confronting an era of persistent global conflict with stable or declining defense resources, the United States needs partners to augment their own security-related capabilities and capacity. The U.S. Air Force has worked for many years with allies and friendly nations to build strong and enduring partnerships, reinforce other nations’ capacities both to defend themselves and to work in coalitions, and ensure U.S. access to foreign territories for operational purposes. The activities conducted by the Air Force range from training, equipping, and exercising with others to holding bilateral talks, workshops, and conferences and providing education. Yet it is often challenging to specify how much and in what ways these activities have contributed to U.S. policy objectives.

This report builds on prior RAND research that developed a conceptual framework for assessing the Air Force’s security cooperation efforts. In this follow-up study, researchers worked with Air Force leaders to better understand and attempt to overcome certain obstacles to the implementation of RAND’s proposed framework. This report presents the results of surveys of and focus groups with a variety of Air Force leaders on security cooperation assessment. It presents a refined framework, based on these results, that focuses on four questions—Why assess? What to assess? How to assess? Who should assess?—and provides examples of how the framework could be applied to two example Air Force programs, the Operator Engagement Talks and the Military Personnel Exchange Program. The authors conclude with a discussion of problems identified and recommend a four-part strategy for establishing a new, integrated approach to Air Force security cooperation assessment.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/TR907

A Framework to Assess Programs for Building Partnerships

Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Jefferson P. Marquis, Cathryn Quantic Thurston, and Gregory F. Treverton

MG-863-OSD (2009)

Security cooperation activities conducted by DoD entities with other nations’ defense organizations range from the very visible — training, equipping, and exercising together — to those that are less obvious, such as holding bilateral talks, workshops, and conferences and providing education. Yet it is often challenging to determine if these activities have contributed to U.S. objectives. This monograph, based on themes that emerged from a May 2008 assessment workshop held at RAND that included DoD security cooperation assessment experts, planners, and program managers, lays out a framework for security program assessment in terms of five general areas: setting direction, designing assessments, preparing for assessment, conducting assessments, and explaining assessments to others. Participants stressed the need for injecting a greater level of objectivity into the overall assessment process, thus moving away from the current, largely self-assessment approach to security cooperation programs.

Find the full document at www.rand.org/t/MG863


**A Building Partner Capacity Assessment Framework: Tracking Inputs, Outputs, Outcomes, Disrupters, and Workarounds**

Christopher Paul, Brian J. Gordon, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Lisa Saum-Manning, Beth Grill, Colin P. Clarke, and Heather Peterson

*RR-935-OSD (2015)*

For both diplomatic and national security reasons, security cooperation continues to be important for the United States. DoD conducts an assortment of programs aimed at building the capacity of partner nations, and training is an important element of these efforts. The needs and existing capabilities of various nations differ, however, as will results. Planning for each building partner capacity effort carefully, assessing progress while the effort is in progress, and assessing results are all important to ensure that it meets U.S. goals and partner expectations. This report presents a framework intended to aid all these steps. Before execution, the framework can help determine and plan for what might go wrong with the intended building partner capacity effort. During building partner capacity execution, the framework can help monitor progress to discover whether everything is going according to plan and, if not, what is wrong and what can be done about it. Finally, the framework can help determine whether the building partner capacity has achieved its objectives and, if not, why and what can be done about it in the future.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR935

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**Review of Security Cooperation Mechanisms Combatant Commands Utilize to Build Partner Capacity**

Jennifer D. P. Moroney, David E. Thaler, and Joe Hogler

*RR-413-OSD (2013)*

Building partner capacity is an important instrument of the U.S. government and DoD for advancing national security objectives vis-à-vis allies and partner countries. Assessments of prior and ongoing building partner capacity activities have become increasingly important given the current fiscal climate and budgetary limitations, but it is no easy task to assess the value of what are essentially qualitative activities, and data limitations severely hinder assessments. This report characterizes mechanisms used by combatant commands for building partner capacity, produces a detailed database of the mechanism elements, and develops and applies a preliminary means of evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of select tools for optimal building partner capacity with partner countries. It goes on to recommend ways to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of those mechanisms in the future.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR413
How Successful Are U.S. Efforts to Build Capacity in Developing Countries? A Framework to Assess the Global Train and Equip “1206” Program
Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Joe Hogler, Beth Grill, Lianne Kennedy-Boudali, and Christopher Paul
TR-1121-OSD (2011)

The U.S. government has long worked with allies and partners in a security cooperation context. Assessing the effect of such activities, and particularly how they contribute to U.S. objectives, is extremely important. The Global Train and Equip “1206” program is a multiagency security cooperation program that would benefit from an improved framework for thinking about, planning for, and implementing security cooperation assessments. The program, established in Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, supports U.S.-led capacity-building activities focused on counterterrorism and stability operations with foreign military partners. The process to develop an assessment framework for the 1206 program began with a series of discussions with policymakers and subject-matter experts to identify current roles, data sources, and assessment processes. These discussions formed the basis for a survey of program stakeholders on the processes, responsibilities, assessment guidance, and skills needed to conduct assessments. An analysis of the survey results revealed the need for formal guidance on the assessment of 1206 projects, gaps in data collection and reporting, unclear roles, and inconsistent levels of communication across the program. However, it also showed that a two-track (short- and longer-term) approach to implementing an assessment framework, closing gaps, and improving coordination would be the best fit for the 1206 program’s structure.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/TR1121

Assessing the Effectiveness of the International Counterproliferation Program
Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Aidan Kirby Winn, Jeffrey Engstrom, Joe Hogler, Thomas Young, and Michelle Spencer
TR-981-DTRA (2011)

The threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is among the central strategic national security challenges that the United States is facing. The breadth and scope of this challenge requires interagency cooperation, as well as coordination with a broad array of international partners. To effectively confront the threat of WMD proliferation, the United States relies on the will and capacity of its allies and international partners for assistance. This cooperation often requires investments in security cooperation programs aimed at enhancing partner capacity. Assessing the impact of security cooperation efforts is inherently difficult. However, such assessments generate data on which more-informed decisions about program funding at all levels of government can be based. In addition to serving the needs of decisionmakers, assessments provide information to those directly involved in the planning and implementation of security cooperation programs. This report demonstrates how an assessment framework developed in previous RAND research can be applied to combating WMD programs by illustrating its utility for the International Counterproliferation Program.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/TR981
Assessing Security Cooperation as a Preventive Tool

Michael J. McNerney, Angela O’Mahony, Thomas S. Szayna, Derek Eaton, Caroline Baxter, Colin P. Clarke, Emma Cutrufello, Michael McGee, Heather Peterson, Leslie Adrienne Payne, and Calin Trenkov-Wermuth

RR-350-A (2014)

U.S. security cooperation is often asserted as a means to ameliorate fragility in partner states. By employing statistical analysis of SC data and state fragility scores for 107 countries from 1991 to 2008, this study tested the assertion and found that the provision of security cooperation by the United States did indeed correlate with a reduction in partner state fragility. The strength of the correlation did not increase proportionally with additional funding, however; most of the impact was concentrated at the low end of security cooperation funding. In addition, the effectiveness of the relationship between these variables depended on key characteristics of the recipient country and the type of security cooperation provided. Conversely, security cooperation provided through the equipment-focused Foreign Military Finance program, which forms the majority of U.S. security cooperation, failed to correlate with reduced fragility in recipient countries.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR350

Finding the Right Balance: Department of Defense Roles in Stabilization

Linda Robinson, Sean Mann, Jeffrey Martini, and Stephanie Pezard

RR-2441-OSD (2018)

The pendulum regarding the level of U.S. military participation in stabilization efforts has swung dramatically since 2001, from a low level of preparation and participation in the early days of the Afghanistan and Iraq operations in 2003, to widespread stabilization activities costing billions of dollars in the ensuing years, to significantly scaled-back forces and resources devoted to stabilization in recent years. To remedy the initial lack of preparation, DoD issued a directive with guidance on stabilization requirements in 2005 and then updated it with more expansive requirements in 2009. This report supports DoD efforts to update this guidance by assessing the accumulated experience of the past 17 years and evaluating the appropriate roles for the U.S. military and its ability to execute them in conjunction with interagency and other key partners.

Without stabilization, successful warfighting often does not produce desired political outcomes. Yet warfighters are not the most capable actors for many stabilization tasks. Therefore, the authors recommend shifting DoD guidance on stabilization away from requiring high levels of proficiency in a large number of tasks to emphasizing three key roles for DoD: prioritizing security tasks; providing support to other actors performing stability functions; and performing crosscutting informational, planning, coordination, and physical support roles.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR2441
Defense Institution Building: An Assessment
Walter L. Perry, Stuart E. Johnson, Stephanie Pezard, Gilian S. Oak, David Stebbins, and Chaoling Feng
RR-1176-OSD (2016)

A key element in DoD’s Defense Strategic Guidance is building the capacity of partner nations to share the costs and responsibilities of global leadership. To implement this goal, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy uses several security cooperation and assistance programs to work with partner countries to support defense institution building (DIB), i.e., build the capacity of their defense ministries. In addition, the combatant commands engage in DIB in response to the security cooperation focus areas in the Guidance for Employment of the Force. DIB has four primary components—Wales Initiative Funds-DIB, Defense Institutional Reform Initiative, Ministry of Defense Advisors, and Defense Institute of International Legal Studies—but includes all security cooperation activities that develop accountable, effective, and efficient defense institutions. The primary objective of many existing DIB activities is to help partner nations develop and manage capable security forces subject to appropriate civilian control.

This report presents an analysis of a range of DIB activities, recommends a set of goals and objectives for achieving them, identifies partner nation and DIB activity selection criteria, develops a strategy for coordinating DIB activities, and recommends procedures for achieving accountability and assessment. It also identifies the most critical challenges DIB programs will face as they go forward: the inherent complexity of the DIB enterprise, the difficulty of measuring the long-term success of short-term endeavors, and the challenges of selecting partner nations for DIB activities.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR1176

Defense Institution Building in Africa: An Assessment
Michael J. McNerney, Stuart Johnson, Stephanie Pezard, David Stebbins, Renanah Miles, Angela O’Mahony, Chaoling Feng, and Tim Oliver
RR-1232-OSD (2016)

This report assesses U.S. efforts in DIB in Africa and suggests possible improvements to planning and execution. It first defines DIB and reviews some best practices from DIB and security sector reform experiences. It also highlights how DIB activities serve U.S. official strategic guidance for Africa. The report then examines how DIB is currently planned and executed in Africa and describes the range of programs that are available to U.S. planners for that purpose. It also provides a structured approach to aid in the prioritization of such programs. The report then analyzes DIB efforts in two African nations—Liberia and Libya. Finally, it examines how other institutions and countries undertake DIB by taking a closer look at the DIB activities of DoD’s regional centers and the relatively extensive experience of two key U.S. allies—the United Kingdom and France—in this domain.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR1232
A Building Partner Capacity Assessment Framework: Tracking Inputs, Outputs, Outcomes, Disrupters, and Workarounds
Christopher Paul, Brian J. Gordon, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Lisa Saum-Manning, Beth Grill, Colin P. Clarke, and Heather Peterson
RR-935-OSD (2015)

For both diplomatic and national security reasons, security cooperation continues to be important for the United States. DoD conducts an assortment of programs aimed at building the capacity of partner nations, and training is an important element of these efforts. The needs and existing capabilities of various nations differ, however, as will results. Planning for each building partner capacity effort carefully, assessing progress while the effort is in progress, and assessing results are all important to ensure that it meets U.S. goals and partner expectations. This report presents a framework intended to aid all these steps. Before execution, the framework can help determine and plan for what might go wrong with the intended building partner capacity effort. During building partner capacity execution, the framework can help monitor progress to discover whether everything is going according to plan and, if not, what is wrong and what can be done about it. Finally, the framework can help determine whether the building partner capacity has achieved its objectives and, if not, why and what can be done about it in the future.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR935

What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity in Challenging Contexts?
Christopher Paul, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Beth Grill, Colin P. Clarke, Lisa Saum-Manning, Heather Peterson, and Brian J. Gordon
RR-937-OSD (2015)

For both diplomatic and national security reasons, security cooperation continues to be important for the United States. The needs and existing capabilities of various nations differ, however, as will results. In previous research, RAND researchers identified a series of factors that correlate with the success of building partner capacity efforts. Some of these are under U.S. control, and some are inherent in the partner nation or under its control. Strategic imperatives sometimes compel the United States to work with partner nations that lack favorable characteristics but with which the United States needs to conduct building partner capacity anyway. This report explores what the United States can do, when conducting building partner capacity in challenging contexts, to maximize prospects for success. The authors address this question using the logic model outlined in a companion report and examining a series of case studies, looking explicitly at the challenges that can interfere with building partner capacity. Some of the challenges stemmed from U.S. shortcomings, such as policy or funding issues; others from the partner’s side, including issues with practices, personalities, baseline capacity, and lack of willingness; still others from disagreements among various stakeholders over objectives and approaches. Among the factors correlated with success in overcoming these challenges were consistency of funding and implementation, shared security interests, and matching objectives with the partner nation’s ability to absorb and sustain capabilities.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR937
Evaluating the Impact of the Department of Defense Regional Centers for Security Studies
Larry Hanauer, Stuart E. Johnson, Christopher Springer, Chaoling Feng, Michael J. McNerney, Stephanie Pezard, and Shira Efron
RR-388-OSD (2014)

The five DoD Regional Centers for Security Studies have been helping partner nations build strategic capacity for almost 20 years. However, recent DoD budget constraints have put pressure on the regional centers to increase efficiency. This study investigates the overall impact of the regional centers, their effectiveness in advancing DoD policy priorities, the ways in which they assess their programs, and ways in which they could improve their impact and efficiency and the resulting outcomes. Centers are high-impact components of U.S. security cooperation and engagement efforts—despite their relatively small budgets. This study identified 24 ways—building partner capacity, building relationships, fostering pro-U.S. outlooks, offering unique opportunities for engagement, promoting regional dialogue, and others—in which the centers advance U.S. interests.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR388

Developing an Army Strategy for Building Partner Capacity for Stability Operations
Jefferson P. Marquis, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Justin Beck, Derek Eaton, Scott Hiromoto, David R. Howell, Janet Lewis, Charlotte Lynch, Michael J. Neumann, and Cathryn Quantic Thurston
MG-942-A (2010)

The U.S. government is facing the dual challenge of building its own interagency capacity for conducting stability operations while simultaneously building partner capacity for stability operations. The purpose of this study is to assist the U.S. Army, DoD, and other U.S. government agencies in developing an integrated building partner capacity for stability operations strategy. To accomplish this goal, a RAND Arroyo Center study team conducted an exploratory analysis of key strategic elements within the context of building partner capacity and stability operations guidance as well as ongoing security cooperation programs, using a variety of analytical techniques. In general, this study concludes that building partner capacity and stability operations are receiving a good deal of attention in official strategy and planning documents. However, insufficient attention is being paid to the details of an integrated strategy. A baseline analysis of existing security cooperation programs needs to be undertaken to comprehend the type, scope, and target of activities related to building partner capacity for stability operations. An assessment of these activities should then be conducted, focusing on both process outputs and operational outcomes. In addition, the Departments of State and DoD should develop a rigorous method for selecting and prioritizing partners whose stability operations capacity they wish to build. Ideally, the results of these analytical processes will have a significant impact on the set of building partner capacity for stability operations activities and partners, aligning relevant and effective activities with appropriate partners.

Find the full document at www.rand.org/t/MG942
Review of Security Cooperation Mechanisms Combatant Commands Utilize to Build Partner Capacity
Jennifer D. P. Moroney, David E. Thaler, and Joe Hogler
RR-413-OSD (2013)

Building partner capacity is an important instrument of the U.S. government and DoD for advancing national security objectives vis-à-vis allies and partner countries. Assessments of prior and ongoing building partner capacity activities have become increasingly important given the current fiscal climate and budgetary limitations, but it is no easy task to assess the value of what are essentially qualitative activities, and data limitations severely hinder assessments. This report characterizes mechanisms used by combatant commands for building partner capacity, produces a detailed database of the mechanism elements, and develops and applies a preliminary means of evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of select tools for optimal building partner capacity with partner countries. It goes on to recommend ways to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of those mechanisms in the future.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR413

How Successful Are U.S. Efforts to Build Capacity in Developing Countries? A Framework to Assess the Global Train and Equip “1206” Program
Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Joe Hogler, Beth Grill, Lianne Kennedy-Boudali, and Christopher Paul
TR-1121-OSD (2011)

The U.S. government has long worked with allies and partners in a security cooperation context. Assessing the effect of such activities, and particularly how they contribute to U.S. objectives, is extremely important. The Global Train and Equip “1206” program is a multiagency security cooperation program that would benefit from an improved framework for thinking about, planning for, and implementing security cooperation assessments. The program, established in Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, supports U.S.-led capacity-building activities focused on counterterrorism and stability operations with foreign military partners. The process to develop an assessment framework for the 1206 program began with a series of discussions with policymakers and subject-matter experts to identify current roles, data sources, and assessment processes. These discussions formed the basis for a survey of program stakeholders on the processes, responsibilities, assessment guidance, and skills needed to conduct assessments. An analysis of the survey results revealed the need for formal guidance on the assessment of 1206 projects, gaps in data collection and reporting, unclear roles, and inconsistent levels of communication across the program. However, it also showed that a two-track (short- and longer-term) approach to implementing an assessment framework, closing gaps, and improving coordination would be the best fit for the 1206 program’s structure.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/TR1121
**Building Partner-Nation Capacity Through the Defense Education Enhancement Program**

Alan G. Stolberg, Stuart Johnson, and Laura Kupe

PE-286-OSD (2018)

In response to new global challenges, defense education practitioners have promoted multinational and multistakeholder training in defense education institutions. The United States, working in close cooperation with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) headquarters, has signaled the importance of defense education in its engagement with a number of former Soviet Union states and NATO partner nations of interest through the creation of the Defense Education Enhancement Program.

This document reviews Defense Education Enhancement Program by defining the program, its functions, and why it is valuable to participating nations. The authors describe its specific purpose, the efforts that have been made to gauge the program’s effectiveness, some select accomplishments, and the significant lessons learned about the program.

Find the full document at www.rand.org/t/PE286

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**A Developmental Approach to Building Sustainable Security-Sector Capacity in Africa**

Stephen Watts, Kimberly Jackson, Sean Mann, and Stephen Dalzell

RR-2048-AFRICOM (2018)

In this report, RAND researchers analyze options to improve the sustainability of security sector assistance in the U.S. Africa Command area of responsibility. They derive insights from the development community that might usefully be modified to meet the unique challenges of the security sectors of African partner nations. More specifically, they outline five development principles (and associated “good practices”) that have particular relevance to building sustainable partner capacity: local ownership; a comprehensive approach; selectivity; harmonization; and long-term, iterative adaptation. The authors review the many challenges that DoD faces in applying these principles. Finally, the authors recommend changes to overall security sector assistance structures and specific practices to enhance the sustainability of partner capacity gains.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR2048

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**U.S.–Japan Alliance Conference: Strengthening Strategic Cooperation**

Scott W. Harold, Martin C. Libicki, Motohiro Tsuchiya, Yurie Ito, Roger Cliff, Ken Jimbo, and Yuki Tatsumi

CF-351-GOJ (2016)

Defending the U.S. and Japanese homelands, protecting and maintaining a safe and secure online environment, and ensuring that territorial and maritime disputes are resolved peacefully in an orderly process free
from coercion represent some of the most important aims of the U.S.–Japan alliance. In 2015, Washington and Tokyo issued new defense guidelines to guide their security cooperation in support of these goals. The new guidelines expanded the areas of applicability of the alliance to include threats not limited to situations in areas surrounding Japan, thus going beyond a limit that appeared in the 1997 U.S.–Japan Revised Defense Guidelines. The new guidelines also expand allied defense cooperation to include the increasingly important domains of space and cyberspace. To better understand the rapidly changing and deepening cooperation between the United States and Japan, as well as the prospects for the future evolution of their partnership (including with regional states in South and Southeast Asia and Oceania), the RAND Corporation commissioned a series of papers by leading experts and hosted a two-day conference in Santa Monica, California, in March 2016. The findings of those efforts illuminate important options for continuing to tighten alliance cooperation and suggest prospective pathways forward as the two countries look to respond collectively to the rise of China, a more aggressive Russia, and an increasingly risk-acceptant and provocative North Korea.

Find the full document at www.rand.org/t/CF351

Lessons Learned from the Afghan Mission Network: Developing a Coalition Contingency Network
Chad C. Serena, Isaac R. Porche III, Joel B. Predd, Jan Osburg, and Brad Lossing
RR-302-A (2014)
Recent and likely future U.S. military operations depend on coalitions of foreign military and nonmilitary partners, and a coalition mission network is necessary to support those operations. The Afghan Mission Network is the primary network for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, allowing the United States and its coalition partners to share information and data across a common Secret system. Many view the Afghan Mission Network as a successful enabler of coalition information sharing. It is thus critical that the Army understand the principal lessons of the development of this network as it plans to develop future coalition contingency networks. To this end, the Army Chief Information Officer/G-6 asked RAND Arroyo Center to provide an independent review and assessment of the operational and technical history of the Afghan Mission Network and to identify lessons learned for future coalition networks. The history of the Afghan Mission Network provides an example of how to develop information systems to support operational missions, but perhaps more important, it also yields tactical, operational, and policy-relevant lessons that can inform future efforts to create contingency networks that are both effective across the range of military operations and useful to a host of military and nonmilitary partners. This report presents findings drawn from interviews with key Afghan Mission Network developers and maintainers and the documentation they produced during the network’s development.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR302

Building Partner Health Capacity with U.S. Military Forces: Enhancing AFSOC Health Engagement Missions
David E. Thaler, Gary Cecchine, Anny Wong, and Timothy Jackson
TR-1201-AF (2012)
The U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) has developed an approach to planning for, assessing, and enhancing the effectiveness of missions to build partner capacity in health. These missions are systematic, long-term efforts to enhance the ability of governments in developing states that are important to U.S. interests to deliver essential medical, dental, and veterinary services to vulnerable populations. Helping to improve local public health and providing health services is expected to support the extension
of good governance and counter insurgent and terrorist infiltration, recruitment, and exploitation. AFSOC believes that its health assets can be more effectively and systematically used by combatant commanders in achieving their theater security cooperation objectives, in conjunction with other organizations. This report documents the results of three research tasks undertaken to assist AFSOC in executing its mission: (1) placing health security in the context of U.S. strategy and security cooperation efforts; (2) drawing lessons from outside organizations on ways U.S. military forces can maximize their effectiveness in helping build partner health capacity; (3) developing a framework for planning and executing partner health capacity missions. Key findings are presented, along with recommendations for maximizing the effectiveness of efforts to build partner health capacity.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/TR1201

**Building Partner Capacity to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction**

Jennifer D. P. Moroney and Joe Hogler, with Benjamin Bahney, Kim Cragin, David R. Howell, Charlotte Lynch, and S. Rebecca Zimmerman

MG-783-DTRA (2009)

Limited resources, access, and incomplete knowledge of WMD threats create a need for working with appropriate partner countries around the world to address these challenging threats. This RAND National Defense Research Institute monograph outlines and then applies a four-step process for developing regional approaches to building partner capacity to combat WMD. These steps include identifying capabilities and desired end states relative to the WMD threat, working with potential partners, identifying relevant building partner capacity ways and means, and developing a framework to assess the effectiveness of building partner capacity programs and activities. In doing so, the monograph identifies seven key themes that are linked to the recommendations. These key themes include improving guidance, increasing visibility of ongoing activities at a global level, improving coordination, encouraging collaboration, implementing procedures, conducting assessments, and securing resources.

Find the full document at www.rand.org/t/MG783

**Assessing the Effectiveness of the International Counterproliferation Program**

Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Aidan Kirby Winn, Jeffrey Engstrom, Joe Hogler, Thomas Young, and Michelle Spencer

TR-981-DTRA (2011)

The threat posed by the proliferation of WMD is among the central strategic national security challenges that the United States is facing. The breadth and scope of this challenge requires interagency cooperation, as well as coordination with a broad array of international partners. To effectively confront the threat of WMD proliferation, the United States relies on the will and capacity of its allies and international partners for assistance. This cooperation often requires investments in security cooperation programs aimed at enhancing partner capacity. Assessing the impact of security cooperation efforts is inherently difficult.
However, such assessments generate data on which more-informed decisions about program funding at all levels of government can be based. In addition to serving the needs of decisionmakers, assessments provide information to those directly involved in the planning and implementation of security cooperation programs. This report demonstrates how an assessment framework developed in previous RAND research can be applied to combating WMD programs by illustrating its utility for the International Counterproliferation Program.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/TR981

**The Long March: Building an Afghan National Army**

Obaid Younossi, Peter Dahl Thruelsen, Jonathan Vaccaro, Jerry M. Sollinger, and Brian Grady

MG-845-RDCC/OSD (2009)

The Afghan National Army (ANA) is critical to the success of the allied efforts in Afghanistan and the ultimate stability of the national government. This monograph assesses the ANA’s progress in the areas of recruitment, training, facilities, and operational capability. It draws on a variety of sources: in-country interviews with U.S., NATO, and Afghan officials; data provided by the U.S. Army; open-source literature; and a series of public opinion surveys conducted in Afghanistan over the past several years. Although the ANA has come a long way since the outset of the recent conflict in the country, the authors conclude that coalition forces, especially those of the United States, will play a crucial role in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future, particularly in light of the increased threat from Taliban forces and other illegally armed criminal groups.

Find the full document at www.rand.org/t/MG845

**Courses of Action for Enhancing U.S. Air Force “Irregular Warfare” Capabilities: A Functional Solutions Analysis**

Richard Mesic, David E. Thaler, David Ochmanek, and Leon Goodson

MG-913-AF (2010)

The U.S. Air Force leadership plans in the near term to identify and implement a range of initiatives for enhancing the service’s contributions to irregular warfare (IW) operations and to meet DoD guidance that directs its components to “recognize that IW is as strategically important as traditional warfare.” This monograph is the result of a “quick-turn” study to provide the leadership with a menu of actions it could consider both in the very near term and over an extended period to strengthen and expand the Air Force’s capabilities to take part in joint and interagency efforts in irregular warfare. Rather than developing detailed endpoints for Air Force capabilities or structure in the future—e.g., what the USAF could look like in, say, 2015—the authors propose solution vectors that could enable the Air Force to move out quickly while continuing to consider responses to emerging demands in a dynamic IW environment.

Find the full document at www.rand.org/t/MG913
SECURITY COOPERATION ACTIVITIES AIMED AT ENHANCING INTEROPERABILITY

Targeted Interoperability: A New Imperative for Multinational Operations

Christopher G. Pernin, Jakub P. Hlavka, Matthew E. Boyer, John Gordon IV, Michael Lerario, Jan Osburg, Michael Shurkin, and Daniel C. Gibson

RR-2075-A (2019)

In modern warfare, hardly a conversation about military capabilities occurs where interoperability with another organization—multinational or not—does not come up. Significant literature exists on all types of interoperability, with the common refrain being that more and better interoperability is needed. With few exceptions in recent decades, the United States tends to engage with multinational partners and allies in military operations, thus bringing multinational interoperability to the fore. So, with all this interest, why is the United States not interoperability when and how it wants? There are several reasons why, including a lack of understanding on the significant resources it takes, a reluctance to expend time and money when the return on the investment is not clear, and a one-size-fits-all attitude when it comes to finding solutions. This report looked at what motivations do exist, and defined a reasonable framework from which to work if and when interoperability needs and investments meet strategic language.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR2075

Authority to Issue Interoperability Policy

Carolyn Wong and Daniel Gonzales

RR-357-NAVY (2014)

Achieving interoperability among systems is instrumental to enabling critical functions, such as timely information exchange during operations and efficiencies in acquisition, so it is important to understand which parties have authority to issue policy that governs the facets of interoperability. This report presents an approach and framework for determining what parties have authority to issue interoperability policy, the legal and policy origins and implementation paths of the authority, and the extent of the authority. The approach includes rigorous analysis by researchers to identify pertinent authorities in federal law supplemented by a means to facilitate discovery of roles and responsibilities in DoD and service-level policies. The approach results in a roles and responsibilities network that traces the paths of authority available to issue interoperability policy. The authors use as a case study the authority of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development, and Acquisition, Chief Systems Engineer to issue Navy interoperability policy related to mission area systems engineering to demonstrate the use of the framework and methodology. They find that there are 13 different paths of authority that could be cited by four different parties to claim authority to influence interoperability policy related to mission area systems engineering. The approach used in this report might be developed, along with complementary analytic techniques, to provide the government with the ability to create and maintain consistent and comprehensive bodies of policy that will ensure the effective and efficient operation of defense agencies.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR357
Enhancing Interoperability Among Enlisted Medical Personnel: A Case Study of Military Surgical Technologists

Harry J. Thie, Sheila Nataraj Kirby, Adam C. Resnick, Thomas Manacapilli, Daniel Gershwin, Andrew Baxter, and Roland J. Yardley
MG-774 OSD (2009)

One way to enhance the interoperability of medical service personnel is by training service specialists to a common standard. A methodology is outlined for defining a common standard of practice (SOP) that can be applied to any enlisted medical specialty with the goal of consolidating training for enlisted military personnel across the services. The methodology involves three analytic tasks: Define a common SOP for the specialty, validate it through reviews by military and civilian subject matter experts, and identify a set of training options that will result in the required number of specialists trained to a given level of proficiency. The methodology is illustrated by applying it to the military surgical technologist specialty. The authors examine the commonality of work across services rather than commonality of training as currently provided to define a common scope of practice. They identify and evaluate different training methods and different ways of obtaining qualified medical personnel. However, the authors note that achieving common training is a necessary but not sufficient condition for achieving interoperability and that interoperability may be more easily achieved in future years as other transformational initiatives are implemented.

Find the full document at www.rand.org/t/MG774

Working with Allies and Partners: A Cost-Based Analysis of U.S. Air Forces in Europe

Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Patrick Mills, David T. Orletsky, and David E. Thaler
TR-1241-AF (2012)

U.S. European Command views building partnerships as its highest theater priority. U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) seeks to build partnerships and partner capacity in the European Command area of responsibility. In spite of the potential benefits of USAFE’s building-partnership activities, USAFE’s posture and its building partnership activities do come with a cost. In an austere fiscal environment, it is appropriate to assess how the United States and the U.S. Air Force can build partnerships most efficiently while ensuring that the requirements for maintaining key alliances and partnerships continue to be met. This report characterizes the current policy debate on security cooperation and force posture in Europe through a review of the literature and discussions with key policymakers and legislative officials in Washington, develops a framework to describe the current building-partnership approach and environment for USAFE, defines several alternative postures for conducting building-partnership activities using a building-block approach to cost out each high-payoff building-partnership activity, and recommends efficiencies to improve the Air Force’s building-partnership activities in Europe.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/TR1241
Department of Defense Training for Operations with Interagency, Multinational, and Coalition Partners
Michael Spirtas, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Harry J. Thie, Joe Hogler, and Thomas Young
MG-707-OSD (2008)

The nature of recent challenges and the types of missions DoD has undertaken highlight the need for DoD to consider ways to help the military prepare to work with other government agencies, international organizations, private and nongovernmental organizations, and foreign militaries. These challenges require DoD to combine military and nonmilitary means, such as intelligence, diplomacy, and developmental assistance, to advance U.S. national-security interests. Moreover, exhibiting cultural awareness and sensitivity vis-à-vis non-DoD partners is paramount to successful operational planning and execution. To build or bolster local governance, to foster economic growth, and to respond to natural disasters, the United States must also use different types of tools, military and otherwise, simultaneously. It is no small task to synchronize these different tools so that they work in tandem, or at least minimize conflict between them. This report provides suggestions for how the U.S. military can help prepare its personnel to work successfully with interagency, multinational, and coalition partners. The authors found that almost all of the requirements for integrated-operations training can be found in existing joint and service task lists. Current training programs aimed at headquarters staffs need to be revamped to focus on high-priority tasks that are amenable to training.

Find the full document at www.rand.org/t/MG707

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

Conceptual Design for a Multiplayer Security Force Assistance Strategy Game
Elizabeth M. Bartels, Christopher S. Chivvis, Adam R. Grissom, and Stacie L. Pettyjohn
RR-2850-AFRICOM (2019)

The authors explain the conceptual underpinnings and basic rules for a RAND-designed security force assistance strategy game. The game is a tool to explore the potential benefits and risks of different security force assistance strategies under different conditions. The game engine draws on empirical evidence and best practices and, thus, can be applied in many contexts.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR2850
Building Armies, Building Nations: Toward a New Approach to Security Force Assistance

Michael Shurkin, John Gordon IV, Bryan Frederick, and Christopher G. Pernin

RR-1832-A (2017)

This report proposes an alternative approach to security force assistance derived from an interpretation of nation-building and legitimacy formation grounded in history; it highlights the importance of ideas, identities, and ideology and argues that security force assistance efforts often err by focusing too much on force structure, capabilities, and readiness, while not sufficiently considering the extent to which a force’s development complements the larger nation-building project and the formation of appropriate ideas, identities, and ideologies within the force. The report uses six case studies (South Korea, South Vietnam, Iraq, Ghana, Mali, and Nigeria) to analyze the relationship between building armies and building nations as well as potential U.S. contributions.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR1832

Improving Implementation of the Department of Defense Leahy Law

Michael J. McNerney, Jonah Blank, Becca Wasser, Jeremy Boback, and Alexander Stephenson

RR-1737-OSD (2017)

The protection of human rights is an essential American value. One way Congress has extended this value in foreign policy is through the “Leahy laws” (named for their author, Senator Patrick Leahy, D-Vt.). These laws prohibit the U.S. government from providing assistance or training to members of a unit of any nation’s security forces that has perpetuated a gross violation of human rights with impunity. This report examines the process by which individuals and units are vetted in compliance with the Leahy law applicable to DoD to help the department improve its role in the existing system and to build further capacity to implement the law effectively, with transparency and accountability for results. The authors examined relevant laws, documentation, and data and interviewed over 75 officials from DoD and the U.S. Department of State. The objectives were to understand the requirements and processes, to identify challenges and best practices, and to offer recommendations for improvement. Our research found that Leahy-vetting requirements are generally not a roadblock to security cooperation, but its oversight is challenged by inadequate governance structures. In addition to describing a more robust working group structure, the report outlines about a dozen additional recommendations detailing improvements in six categories: process and policy challenges and best practices, time lines for vetting, clarity of scope for vetting, information used for vetting, adequacy of training and resources, and partner relationships.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR1737
Reforming Security Sector Assistance for Africa

Stephen Watts, Kimberly Jackson, Sean Mann, Stephen Dalzell, Trevor Johnston, Matthew Lane, Michael J. McNerney, and Andrew Brooks

RB-10028-OSD/AFRICOM (2018)

The United States has sought to combat security threats in Africa—whether terrorism or, in a previous era, communism—principally by providing security sector assistance to partner governments on the continent. Proponents of such assistance claim that it is a cost-effective tool for advancing U.S. interests on the continent while being welcomed by the African partners. By strengthening partners’ security capabilities, the United States can help partners deter challenges by militants and degrade and ultimately defeat those challenged that do arise. Moreover, byprofessionalizing and socializing partner security personnel, the United States can stabilize governments through improved civil–military relations and human-rights practices. Critics, on the other hand, contend that security sector assistance has been at best ineffective, leading to brief but unsustainable improvements in security, or at worst detrimental in undercutting precisely the goals the United States has tried to achieve by inflaming inter-communal tensions, undermining civil–military relations, or contributing to human-rights abuses.

RAND Corporation analysts have conducted research to evaluate these contending claims and recommend improvements in security sector assistance practices. This research brief summarizes the results of two RAND studies: one sponsored by the Office of African Affairs in the OSD and one sponsored by U.S. Africa Command. Together, these studies suggest that U.S.-provided security sector assistance in Africa has largely failed to achieve its goals. For most of the past quarter-century, security sector assistance has been highly inefficient, achieving no aggregate reduction in insurgencies or terrorism in the countries that received the security sector assistance. During the Cold War, it appears to have even been counterproductive, increasing the incidence of conflict in recipient countries. But there is also evidence that, under the right conditions, security sector assistance can reduce violence and human-rights abuses.

Find the full document at www.rand.org/t/RB10028


Terrence K. Kelly, Nora Bensahel, and Olga Oliker

MG-1066-A (2011)

Security force assistance is a central pillar of the counterinsurgency campaign being waged by U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. The outcome of the campaign hinges, in large measure, on the effectiveness of the assistance given to the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, and other security forces, assistance that the International Security Force must provide while fighting the insurgents. Yet senior U.S. military and civilian officials have posed many questions about the effectiveness of security force assistance in Afghanistan, and no empirically rigorous assessments exist to help answer these questions. This monograph analyzes security force assistance efforts in Afghanistan over time and documents U.S. and international approaches to building the Afghan National Security Forces from 2001 to 2009. Finally, it provides observations and recommendations that emerged from extensive fieldwork in Afghanistan in 2009 and their implications for the U.S Army.

Find the full document at www.rand.org/t/MG1066
Identifying and Mitigating Risks in Security Sector Assistance for Africa’s Fragile States

Stephen Watts

RR-808-A (2015)

This report explores the nature of the risks inherent in U.S. security sector assistance to the fragile states of Africa and how the United States might better anticipate and mitigate these risks. It examines these issues through a review of qualitative and quantitative literature from both the academic and policy fields and through interviews conducted throughout the agencies of the U.S. government. The quantitative literature suggests a stark dilemma for those responsible for U.S. security sector assistance to the U.S. Africa Command area of responsibility: The countries that are most in need of assistance are usually the ones least able to make positive use of it. Case studies of security sector assistance in the fragile countries in Africa are used to trace multiple specific pathways by which such assistance can have negative second- and third-order effects. Finally, the report provides numerous recommendations about ways in which the United States can improve the processes by which it monitors and evaluates, plans, and implements security sector assistance in the fragile states of Africa and more generally.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR808

A Developmental Approach to Building Sustainable Security-Sector Capacity in Africa

Stephen Watts, Kimberly Jackson, Sean Mann, and Stephen Dalzell

RR-2048-AFRICOM (2018)

In this report, RAND researchers analyze options to improve the sustainability of security sector assistance in the U.S. Africa Command area of responsibility. They derive insights from the development community that might usefully be modified to meet the unique challenges of the security sectors of African partner nations. More specifically, they outline five development principles (and associated “good practices”) that have particular relevance to building sustainable partner capacity: local ownership; a comprehensive approach; selectivity; harmonization; and long-term, iterative adaptation. The authors review the many challenges that DoD faces in applying these principles. Finally, the authors recommend changes to overall security sector assistance structures and specific practices to enhance the sustainability of partner capacity gains.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR2048
LESSONS LEARNED AND BEST PRACTICES IN SECURITY COOPERATION

What Works Best When Conducting Security Cooperation?
Christopher Paul
CT-441 (2015)
Testimony presented before the House Armed Services Committee on October 21, 2015.
Find the full document at www.rand.org/t/RR1475-1

What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances?
Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, Stephanie Young, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Joe Hogler, and Christine Leah
MG-1253/1-OSD (2013)
The United States has a long history of helping other nations develop and improve their military and other security forces. However, changing economic realities and the ongoing reductions in overall defense spending related to the end of more than a decade of war will affect the funding available for these initiatives. How can DoD increase the effectiveness of its efforts to build partner capacity while also increasing the efficiency of those efforts? And what can the history of U.S. efforts to build partner capacity reveal about which approaches are likely to be more or less effective under different circumstances? To tackle these complex questions and form a base of evidence to inform policy discussions and investment decisions, a RAND study collected and compared 20 years of data on 29 historical case studies of U.S. involvement in building partner capacity. In the process, it tested a series of validating factors and hypotheses (many of which are rooted in “common knowledge”) to determine how they stand up to real-world case examples of partner capacity building. The results reveal nuances in outcomes and context, pointing to solutions and recommendations to increase the effectiveness of current and future U.S. initiatives to forge better relationships, improve the security and stability of partner countries, and meet U.S. policy and security objectives worldwide.
Find the full document at www.rand.org/t/MG1253z1

What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity in Challenging Contexts?
Christopher Paul, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Beth Grill, Colin P. Clarke, Lisa Saum-Manning, Heather Peterson, and Brian J. Gordon
RR-937-OSD (2015)
For both diplomatic and national security reasons, security cooperation continues to be important for the United States. The needs and existing capabilities of various nations differ, however, as will results. In previous research, RAND identified a series of factors that correlate with the success of building partner capacity.
efforts. Some of these are under U.S. control, and some are inherent in the partner nation or under its control. Strategic imperatives sometimes compel the United States to work with partner nations that lack favorable characteristics but with which the United States needs to conduct building partner capacity anyway. This report explores what the United States can do, when conducting building partner capacity in challenging contexts, to maximize prospects for success. The authors address this question using the logic model outlined in a companion report and examining a series of case studies, looking explicitly at the challenges that can interfere with building partner capacity. Some of the challenges stemmed from U.S. shortcomings, such as policy or funding issues; others from the partner's side, including issues with practices, personalities, baseline capacity, and lack of willingness; still others from disagreements among various stakeholders over objectives and approaches. Among the factors correlated with success in overcoming these challenges were consistency of funding and implementation, shared security interests, and matching objectives with the partner nation’s ability to absorb and sustain capabilities.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR937

Career Development for the Department of Defense Security Cooperation Workforce

M. Wade Markel, Jefferson P. Marquis, Peter Schirmer, Sean Robson, Lisa Saum-Manning, Katherine Hastings, Katharina Ley Best, Christina Panis, Alyssa Ramos, and Barbara Bicksler

RR-1846-OSD (2018)

Security cooperation’s importance, scale, and complexity have grown substantially in recent years, but efforts to develop and manage DoD security cooperation workforce have lagged behind. This study informs the development of career models for the security cooperation workforce by assessing requirements for security cooperation competencies and experience, identifying potential job families, and recommending measures to improve workforce management over the long term. The study identified 21 security cooperation competencies, including five core competencies that appear in most security cooperation jobs: security cooperation strategy, security cooperation analysis, cultural awareness/international affairs, security assistance case management, and global perspective. The study identified four potential job families within the security cooperation workforce: international affairs, security assistance implementation management, international training management, and financial management. The study team also explored the amount of experience that might be required of incumbents. It might be feasible to require several years of security cooperation experience for advancement to senior positions within the civilian workforce, but the analysis could not determine how much experience would be necessary. With regard to the military workforce, it would be feasible to require only limited amounts of prior security cooperation experience, and then only for senior positions. DoD should focus on improving the quality of management information describing the workforce, refine the proposed competency framework, and impose at most limited requirements for prior security cooperation experience until better data allow systematic correlation of prior experience and performance.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR1846
Assessing the U.S. Air Force Unified Engagement Building Partnerships Seminars
Jennifer D. P. Moroney and Jeffrey Engstrom
DB-605-AF (2011)

The U.S. Air Force’s Building Partnerships Seminars support Unified Engagement, a biannual war game. During these seminars, countries that do not formally participate in the larger wargame engage in tabletop exercises, providing inputs for supporting exercise scenarios. RAND assessed two of these seminars to identify ways to enhance the program. The recommendations that emerged were a need for authoritative documentation, such as an Air Force instruction; measurable objectives for each seminar to aid assessment; identification and involvement of other potential stakeholders at the outset of planning; development of after-action reports; and follow-up mechanisms, such as post-event interviews and participant surveys. This briefing also demonstrates the use of RAND’s security cooperation assessment framework.

Find the full document at www.rand.org/t/DB605

Pacific Engagement: Forging Tighter Connections Between Tactical Security Cooperation Activities and U.S. Strategic Goals in the Asia-Pacific Region
Stephen Watts, Christopher M. Schnaubelt, Sean Mann, Angela O’Mahony, and Michael Schwille
RR-1920-A (2018)

Security cooperation events should forge strong relationships with U.S. partners, help develop partners’ military capabilities and ability to operate with U.S. forces, and facilitate access to foreign countries in the event of a contingency. This report examines U.S. Army security cooperation processes in the Pacific Command area of responsibility to forge stronger links between strategic and tactical levels in the planning and execution of security cooperation activities. Researchers developed a framework to link tactical- and operational-level security cooperation activities with strategic goals and found ways to identify information requirements for units executing security cooperation activities and improve evaluations. Researchers found that planning for security cooperation events could be improved by providing additional clarity in the orders process and strengthened knowledge management to aid tactical planners. Security cooperation evaluations at the strategic level could be improved through better specifications of the linkages between security cooperation events and expected outcomes and at the tactical level through process improvements in the conduct and dissemination of after-action reports.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR1920
Lessons from U.S. Allies in Security Cooperation with Third Countries: The Cases of Australia, France, and the United Kingdom
Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Celeste Gventer, Stephanie Pezard, and Laurence Smallman
TR-972-AF (2011)

Like the U.S. Air Force, many U.S. allies work with partner countries on security matters, sometimes even with the same partners, but on a smaller scale. But how, where, and why do these allies engage the same countries? Would working together in particular areas be worthwhile or viable and can specific lessons be learned from their experiences, for example, in the areas of planning, resourcing and assessments? This report explores these questions by examining both the positive aspects and the challenges of the security cooperation approaches of three U.S. allies, Australia, France, and the United Kingdom. These three capable allies are experienced in working with civilian counterparts and benefit from higher-level departmental guidance. They generally do so with relatively small budgets, leading them to learn to economize, pool resources, and take advantage of joint and interagency planning. These strategies can inform current U.S. thinking on security cooperation. They also suggest venues for further collaboration between allies, particularly in the three key areas of staff talks, exercises, and training followed by exercises.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/TR972

Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and Beyond: Challenges and Best Practices from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Colombia
Austin Long, Todd C. Helmus, S. Rebecca Zimmerman, Christopher M. Schnaubelt, and Peter Chalk
RR-713-OSD (2015)

Building the capacity of Afghan special operations forces is a key goal of the United States and its coalition partners. In February and March of 2013, RAND analysts conducted extensive battlefield circulations in Afghanistan and visited multiple training sites for Afghan special operations forces. The mentors at these sites hailed from a variety of International Security Assistance Force contributing nations, including the United States, Lithuania, Romania, Australia, Norway, and the United Kingdom. This report summarizes key partnering practices across these international partners and presents findings from special operations forces partnership case studies in Iraq and Colombia. The goal is to identify best practices for special operations forces partnership that can benefit the development of the Afghan special operations capability. These best practices also have broader applicability for special operations partnerships beyond Afghanistan.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR713


RR-1201/1-SOJTF-A (2017)

This report presents findings from an examination of six historical case studies in which the mission of special operations forces in each of the six countries transitioned over time to include some level of inclusion in the U.S. embassy’s Security Cooperation Office. The authors provide background and context for SOF missions in Iraq, Jordan, Pakistan, the Philippines, Uganda, and Yemen and explain the interactions and relationships between special operations forces organizations and personnel in the U.S. country team in each embassy. Drawing on existing literature and extensive interviews with mission stakeholders, the authors characterize how U.S. special operations forces transitions in each of these nations have affected special operations forces’ ability to conduct ongoing missions, and they derive best practices for special operations forces when transitioning to a Security Cooperation Office in general and for NATO Special Operations Component Command–Afghanistan/Special Operations Joint Task Force–Afghanistan to transition to a Security Cooperation Office in particular.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR1201z1


Terrence K. Kelly, Nora Bensahel, and Olga Oliker

MG-1066-A (2011)

Security force assistance is a central pillar of the counterinsurgency campaign being waged by U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. The outcome of the campaign hinges, in large measure, on the effectiveness of the assistance given to the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, and other security forces, assistance that the International Security Force must provide while fighting the insurgents. Yet senior U.S. military and civilian officials have posed many questions about the effectiveness of security force assistance in Afghanistan, and no empirically rigorous assessments exist to help answer these questions. This monograph analyzes security force assistance efforts in Afghanistan over time and documents U.S. and international approaches to building the Afghan National Security Forces from 2001 to 2009. Finally, it provides observations and recommendations that emerged from extensive fieldwork in Afghanistan in 2009 and their implications for the U.S. Army.

Find the full document at www.rand.org/t/MG1066
Lessons Learned from the Afghan Mission Network: Developing a Coalition Contingency Network
Chad C. Serena, Isaac R. Porche III, Joel B. Predd, Jan Osburg, and Brad Lossing
RR-302-A (2014)
Recent and likely future U.S. military operations depend on coalitions of foreign military and nonmilitary partners, and a coalition mission network is necessary to support those operations. The Afghan Mission Network is the primary network for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, allowing the United States and its coalition partners to share information and data across a common Secret system. Many view the Afghan Mission Network as a successful enabler of coalition information sharing. It is thus critical that the Army understand the principal lessons of the development of this network as it plans to develop future coalition contingency networks. To this end, the Army Chief Information Officer/G-6 asked RAND Arroyo Center to provide an independent review and assessment of the operational and technical history of the Afghan Mission Network and to identify lessons learned for future coalition networks. The history of the Afghan Mission Network provides an example of how to develop information systems to support operational missions, but perhaps more important, it also yields tactical, operational, and policy-relevant lessons that can inform future efforts to create contingency networks that are both effective across the range of military operations and useful to a host of military and nonmilitary partners. This report presents findings drawn from interviews with key Afghan Mission Network developers and maintainers and the documentation they produced during the network’s development.
Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR302

Advising the Command: Best Practices from the Special Operations Advisory Experience in Afghanistan
Todd C. Helmus
RR-949-OSD (2015)
This report identifies best practices in operational-level advising from the special operations advisory mission in Afghanistan. The report also identifies recommendations that are intended to help address key challenges in operational-level partnering. Findings are drawn from an analysis of the Special Operations Advisory Groups, which are part of the NATO Special Operations Component Command–Afghanistan/ Special Operations Joint Task Force–Afghanistan. Special Operations Advisory Groups advise headquarter elements of the Afghan Special Security Forces.
Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR949
Lessons from Department of Defense Disaster Relief Efforts in the Asia-Pacific Region
Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Stephanie Pezard, Laurel E. Miller, Jeffrey Engstrom, and Abby Doll
RR-146-OSD (2013)

DoD has long been able to play a major role in international humanitarian assistance and disaster response because of its unique capabilities, manpower, and forward-deployed resources. The Asia-Pacific region is of particular importance to the United States because it bears the brunt of more than half of the world's natural disasters and is home to numerous key U.S. allies. In an effort to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations in the future, this report analyzes recent operations in Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Japan, and identifies lessons that have emerged in the areas of (1) interagency coordination, (2) communication with the affected country, (3) coordination with other state and non-state actors, (4) prospects for U.S. security cooperation and building partner capacity for humanitarian assistance and disaster response, and (5) prospects for the increased involvement of regional organizations in humanitarian assistance and disaster response. This report also identifies complementary capabilities and comparative advantages that exist around the region, presents options for leveraging these capabilities to deal with future disasters, and assesses various crisis management mechanisms involving allies and partners that can be applied to other contingencies.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR146

Linda Robinson, Patrick B. Johnston, and Gillian S. Oak
RR-1236-OSD (2016)

This report examines the 14-year experience of U.S. special operations forces in the Philippines from 2001 through 2014. The objective of this case history is to document and evaluate the activities and effects of special operations capabilities employed to address terrorist threats in Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines through (1) training and equipping Philippine security forces, (2) providing operational advice and assistance, and (3) conducting civil–military and information operations. The report evaluates the development, execution, and adaptation of the U.S. effort to enable the Philippine government to counter transnational terrorist groups.

An average of 500 to 600 U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps special operations units were employed continuously under the command of a joint special operations task force. They provided training, advice, and assistance during combat operations to both Philippine special operations units and selected air, ground, and naval conventional units; conducted civil–military and information operations on Basilan, in
the Sulu archipelago, and elsewhere in Mindanao; provided intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, medical evacuation, and emergency care; aided planning and intelligence fusion at joint operational commands and force development at institutional headquarters; and coordinated their programs closely with the U.S. embassy country team. The authors conclude that Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines contributed to the successful degradation of transnational terrorist threats in the Philippines and the improvement of its security forces, particularly special operations units. It identifies contributing and limiting factors, which could be relevant to the planning and implementation of future such efforts.

Find the full report at www.rand.org/t/RR1236

**International Cooperation with Partner Air Forces**

Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Kim Cragin, Eric Stephen Gons, Beth Grill, John E. Peters, and Rachel M. Swanger

*MG-790-AF (2009)*

The U.S. Air Force faces a challenging environment as it devises an approach to managing security cooperation with partner countries. The important mission of countering terrorist and insurgent groups abroad requires working closely with allies and partner countries to strengthen security. Accordingly, current U.S. defense strategy emphasizes that the U.S. armed forces should prepare to do more to work “by, with, and through partners” to accomplish their missions. The U.S. Air Force could benefit from an enhanced process for identifying appropriate capabilities, as well as the ability to match these capabilities to candidate partner air forces and, where appropriate, build these capabilities into capacity through focused security cooperation. It is also important to identify other useful activities from other services and key allies to enhance capacity-building and synchronize efforts to collectively pursue U.S. objectives. Three focus areas for implementing an enhanced approach to security cooperation are detailed: increasing visibility into activities; strengthening processes for planning, evaluation, and resourcing; and creating institutions that treat security cooperation the same as other major Air Force priorities.

Find the full document at www.rand.org/t/MG790
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