INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

IN ALGERIA

Constantin Melnik

April 23, 1964

For RAND Use Only

ACCESS REQUIRES SPECIFIC APPROVAL BY AUTHOR
DO NOT QUOTE OR CITE IN EXTERNAL RAND PUBLICATIONS OR CORRESPONDENCE
PREFACE

Constantin Melnik, consultant to the Social Science Department, has been writing a study of insurgency and counterinsurgency with special attention to the Algerian rebellion as it was viewed from high quarters in the French government.

The first portion of the study to appear was the material on insurrection. This was translated by E. W. Schnitzer, and was distributed as D(L)-10671-ISA, October 15, 1962. The study now consists of three parts:

Part I -- Introduction -- The Algerian War
Part II -- Insurgency (formerly D(L)-10671-ISA)
Part III -- Counterinsurgency

The study is based on the French experience with the insurgencies of the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) and the Organisation de l'Armée Secrète (OAS) in Algeria and results from the author's participation in that experience. From January 1959 to April 1962 (during the Debré regime which, on the one hand, led the "French offensive" against the FLN and, on the other, brought to a close the negotiations with that organization while still fighting the OAS in France and Algeria), the author served as "Technical Councillor" in the Cabinet of the Prime Minister in charge of all security problems. More specifically, in charge of orientation and control of the special services and of the French police, he worked in direct cooperation with the military Cabinet of the Prime Minister and had the task of following the military operations. In this function he was associated with most politico-strategic decisions in Algeria.
However, the present study does not present a historical account of the action of France (and even less an account of personal recollections or a technical study of the methods employed). Since the author is a political scientist by profession, he has tried to formulate some generalizations derived from the experience in which he participated.

Criticism and suggestions are welcomed. Send them to C. A. H. Thomson.
CONTENTS

PREFACE ........................................... ii

PART I - INTRODUCTION - THE ALGERIAN WAR .......... 1

I. THE ORIGINS AND OUTBREAK OF THE WAR ......... 6

II. THE FLN POLITICO-MILITARY OFFENSIVE
    (1 November 1954 - May 1956) ............ 15

III. THE FRANCO-FLN CONFRONTATION
     (Mid-1956 - 15 May 1958) ........... 28
    1) The Hardening of the French ......... 28
    2) The "Battle of Algiers" .......... 31
    3) The "Battle of the Borders" ....... 34
    4) The "Battle of the Sahara" ....... 36
    5) The "Battle of the Metropole" .... 36
    6) The "International Battle" ....... 37

IV. GENERAL DE GAULLE'S OFFENSIVE
     (May 1958 - November 1960) ........ 41
    1) The Military Offensive of General
       Challe .................................. 41
    2) General de Gaulle's Political
       Offensive ................................ 52
    3) The Significance of the French
       Offensive ............................. 61
    4) The Development of European
       Activism ................................ 67

PART II - INSURGENCY ............................... 72

I. INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY .......... 73

II. INSURGENT MOTIVATIONS ........................ 76
    1) The Cause and the Platform ........ 76
    2) Negative Feelings ................ 78
    3) Positive Aspirations ............. 80
    4) Exploitation of Feelings and
       Aspirations ........................... 82

III. TYPES OF INSURGENCY .......................... 86
    1) Spontaneous and Organized
       Insurgencies .......................... 86
    2) Independent and Remote-Controlled
       Insurgencies .......................... 88
    3) "Inside" Insurgencies and "Inside
       and Outside" Insurgencies .......... 91
    4) Colonial Insurgencies .............. 93
IV. THE METHODS OF INSURGENCY .......................... 94
   1) Methods of a Spontaneous Insurgency ............... 94
   2) Methods of an Organized Insurgency ................. 98
   3) Conquest of the Population ......................... 103
   4) Para-Military Actions Against the Forces of the Established Power .... 118
   5) Use of an Outside Sanctuary ........................ 124
   6) Conclusion ........................................ 133

PART III - COUNTERINSURGENCY .......................... 135

I. DIFFICULTIES IN DEVELOPING AND APPLYING
   A STRATEGY FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY .................. 136
   1) Difficulties of Developing Strategy ................. 136
   2) Initial Problems of Execution ...................... 140
   3) Problems of Evaluation ............................. 144

II. DESTRUCTION OF THE PARA-MILITARY AND
   PARA-POLITICAL FORCES OF THE INSURGENCY .... 153
   1) Political Aspects .................................. 153
   2) Military Aspects of the Problem ................... 164
   3) The Sealed Borders ................................ 170
   4) Sectioning ("le quadrillage") ..................... 173
   5) Offensive Operations for the Destruction of Rebel Bands .... 179
   6) Non-Conventional Operations ....................... 182
   7) The Specific Problem of Cities ..................... 189
   8) Legal Problems .................................... 203
   9) Conclusion ......................................... 210

III. PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTION ON THE POPULATION .... 212
   1) Definition of the Problem .......................... 212
   2) "Classic" Methods of Psychological Action ......... 218
   3) Methods of Deterrence by Force .................... 243
   4) Offensive and "Revolutionary" Methods to Gain Popular Support .... 265

IV. THE NEUTRALIZATION OF THE OUTSIDE
    SANCTUARY ........................................... 282
   1) Definition of the Problem .......................... 282
   2) Actions Against the State Harboring the Sanctuary .... 283
   3) Actions Against the Sanctuary's Insurgent Forces .... 293
   4) Conclusion ........................................ 306
PART I

INTRODUCTION - THE ALGERIAN WAR
1 November 1954. A bus is peacefully winds its way through the Aurès mountains. Suddenly some men, neither in uniform nor armed, stop the bus and force the passengers to get out. After a brief interrogation, a burst of machine gun fire knocks down Caid Suddok and a young French teacher, Guy Monnerot. The Algerian war has just begun.

Sunday, 19 March 1962. Some helicopters fly over the blue waters of Lake Geneva to alight on the well-guarded grounds of a French resort. The members of the FLN delegation, looking like European diplomats, have arrived to sign the Evian agreements.

Between these two scenes a war occurred -- a war which for seven and a half years gave rise to spectacular and dramatic events -- fierce battles in the mountains and on the sands between "painted soldiers" of the French army and bands of fellaghas, murderous explosions of bombs in the large cities of Algeria, uprisings of the Moslem crowds leaving their wake of unatonable atrocities, European uprisings which shook the fiber of the French regime, intrigues in the halls of the UN, and French military attacks against Suez, Bizerte, or Sakhiet.

Seven and one half years which overthrew one republic and brought in a new regime in France -- which endangered the unity of France and her army to end finally in the creation of a new independent North African state that nonetheless remains tied to France by bonds of cooperation. Seven and one half years of struggle which took more than 200,000 victims (about 150,000 in the armed rebel ranks and 20,000 among the Moslem civilian population).
The analyst will be particularly interested in these events, since, faced with rebel forces which in Algeria were never to exceed 50,000 armed men at a time, * France was forced to engage a very large part of her resources.

The proximity of the theater of operations situated opposite France on the other side of the Mediterranean; the settling of a million Frenchmen who had developed Algeria for 150 years; the particularly close ties with 9,000,000 Moslems - ties evidenced by the violence of the atrocities as well as the terms of the peace; the absence of an already existing state or even a homogeneous nation in Algeria at the time of the French occupation; the economic value of the Sahara; and the strategic interest of this "southern flank of Europe" - all these factors led France to put the best of herself into this last colonial conflict in her history. Indochina was distant and foreign to France. Morocco and Tunisia were separate states (and nations) under a protectorate and the French were not solidly implanted there. Black Africa was a poor, lost, typically colonial continent. Only Algeria seemed administratively, politically, and even sentimentally like an integral part of France.

On the military level the French Army had always believed the problem was worth tackling. Stung by the Indochinese defeat and hoping to revive the victorious spirit of 1945 and erase the memory of the 1940 defeat, the Army plunged into the Algerian war body and soul. It

*The difference between the size of the rebel forces at any one time and their total losses illustrates one of the phenomena of this war - the constant renewal of bands and networks.
enjoyed the financial backing of a country which had recovered its economic health and could draw not only from members of the regular army but also from young draftees credited by all the experts with high morale.

On the political level the easy and bloodless overthrow of a regime ill suited to resolving difficult problems which had been erected by the esoteric politicians of the Fourth Republic brought to power an historical figure about whom one can think many things but whose qualities as a political maneuverer and statesman cannot easily be denied. Though General de Gaulle may consider that he came to power too late to settle the Algerian problem in exactly the way he would have liked, it is nonetheless true that his presence gave French action a new dimension and interest.

Because France had profited from her experiences in Indochina, Tunisia, and Morocco, because she was influenced by the very special character of the Algerian territory and its ties with the Metropole, and because she disposed of exceptional human and material resources, a study of her activity in Algeria can only prove extremely instructive. The Algerian war gave rise to events and allowed experiments which can and must be the object of detailed and profound analysis.

******

Before presenting the ideas and hypotheses inspired by my personal participation in this chapter of history, it is, I think, necessary to state the facts on which my reflections are based.
From the historical point of view the seven and a half years of the Algerian war may be divided into five broad periods: 1) the origins and outbreak of the rebellion; 2) the FLN political-military offensive from 1 November 1954 to mid-1956; 3) the French effort begun in mid-1956 and ending on 13 May 1956 with the violent confrontation of two adversaries and the collapse of the Fourth Republic; 4) the political-military offensive of General de Gaulle from 13 May 1958 to 4 November 1960; 5) the search for a compromise peace from 4 November 1960 to 15 March 1962.
I. THE ORIGINS AND OUTBREAK OF THE WAR

1) One of the most striking features of the Algerian rebellion is the modest beginning of this conflict which was to have such serious repercussions and consequences.

The 1st of November 1954 is only historically important because of what followed. The Algerian war actually began with a mere series of sudden outbreaks which presented no particular problem and were only executed by rather apprehensive, badly armed, and badly trained groups. Most of the action took place in the mountainous region of the Aurès where bandits were still extremely common and French force more of a symbol than a reality. Except for the ambushing of a bus in the region of Batna (by an irony of fate - and because the whole affair was badly prepared - the first European victim was a Communist teacher from the Metropole*), activity was largely restricted to harassment of military posts and rather unimportant damage to property. Though the leaders of the rebellion may have imagined they could take over army camps and prisons, their feverish wait beside a radio receiver which did not interrupt its sports and religious broadcasts proved that their initial plan was too ambitious. However, this did not prevent the Cairo radio from announcing that a "powerful elite of sons of Free Algeria had unleashed the rebellion in the name of Algerian freedom and against tyrannical French imperialism in North Africa."

*This provoked the PCF's violent repudiation of "such individual acts..."
On the political level also the 1 November insurrection had rather modest beginnings. In 1954 it was not more than nine men who decided to resort to armed insurrection, and these men were not the most high ranking members of the Nationalist movement (Ahmed Ben Bella, a former sergeant major; Krim Belkacem, a former corporal; Mostafa Ben Boulaid, a miller; Rahbat Bitat, a worker; Mohammed Boudiaf, a salaried worker; Mourad Didouche Larbi Ben M'Hidi, an actor; the pharmacist Hocine Ait Ahmed; and Mohamed Khider, a doctor and the only one among them to have reached an official position - that of Deputy from Algiers). Their only advantage was in being veteran "clandestines," accustomed to illegal activity.

In fact, these men were all former leading members of the OS (Security Organization), an organization for clandestine activity which was formed by Ait Ahmed in 1947 (and later taken over by Ben Bella) within the party of Messali Hadj, the PPA, which was later disbanded. Subjected to severe repression from the police (particularly after the hold-up of the Oran station in 1949 by Ben Bella and Khider and the discovery of the "Tebessa Plot" in 1950), the OS was more or less disbanded and the political scene dominated by such Nationalist parties as the MTLD (formed in 1948 from the disbanded PPA) and the UDMA. Most of its leaders (Krim Belkacem or Ben Boulaid, for example) had become active in the maquis in the mountainous areas. Others (like Boudiaf) were living clandestinely in Algeria. Ben Bella and Khider, after escaping from prison in Oran, had reached Cairo where, after Nasser's seizure of the power, they enjoyed the support in arms and money required to set off a rebellion.
Convinced that legal action could lead nowhere (particularly because of the rigged elections), disgusted by the deep-seated dissension between and within the Nationalist parties, admiring Nasser, Viet Minh and the violent action of Bourguiba's fellaghas in Tunisia and the urban terrorists in Morocco who were trying to restore Mohamed V to the throne, those who remained from the OS decided, against all the tenets of Algerian Nationalism, to begin action. They rounded up a few soldiers and partisans (particularly the nationalists in the Auras), divided Algeria among themselves into five "wilayas," and in July of 1954 set 1 November 1954 as "D" day of the rebellion. At that time they could only count on about 500 badly armed and trained men, 300 of whom were from the unstable regions of the Auras.

2) However, one cannot say that the quality of the insurrectional methods of the nine "historical leaders" of the FLN alone explains the success of their undertaking. The 1 November 1954 uprising took place, in fact, in a very particular Algerian and international context.

On the international level, World War II reduced Europe's prestige and paved the way for the end of colonialism. In Indochina, in part because it did not draw the implications from this fact soon enough, France had just suffered the defeat of Dien Bien Phu in May of 1954 - a defeat deeply felt by all the indigenous populations of her colonial possessions and particularly by the Algerian troops which had been involved in fighting an apparently hopeless cause. In North Africa, Arab nationalism had grown stronger since 1945, under the influence of the Arab League, with Cairo becoming, especially after the beginning
of the Nasser regime, a pole of spiritual and political attraction as well as a point of logistic support. Nationalist fermentation then reached Tunisia and Morocco. The steps taken against Bourguiba in 1952 and Sultan Mohamed V in 1953 provoked an open crisis in these two countries which saw the spread of urban terrorism and guerrilla activity in 1954.

As far as Algeria was concerned, by 1 November 1954 she already had behind her a long and impressive history of nationalist aspirations. Born between the two wars, Algerian nationalism was two-fold, the most important aspect being that expressed by a party for the revolutionary masses, determinedly Arobo-Islamic, and as such in constant conflict with the French authorities.

In 1937 Messali Hadj, under the benevolent eye of the Popular Front government, founded the PPA (Parti Populaire Algerien) which soon had many followers in the cities and in the poor agricultural regions of the Constantine area. The sudden rise of the PPA may be explained by the meeting of several currents. The impoverishment of the once rich rural areas around Constantine (most of the FLN leaders were from the country and from that particular region), as well as the poverty resulting from mass emigration to large cities, created revolutionary conditions. The campaign for a spiritual renaissance which was begun around 1930 by Sheikh Ben Badis and his religious Association of Oulemas whose slogan was "Islam is my religion, Arabic is my language, and Algeria is my country" left its mark on the younger generations. Obviously, any man who decided at this point to dedicate himself to Algeria was likely to exploit such conditions. A metal worker in Paris in 1923,
Messali Hadj underwent all the influences of his time. He knew most of the leftist political personalities in France and throughout the world, he took political and labor courses given by the French Communist Party, he was invited to Moscow by the Comintern, and for a long time he was a friend of the Fascist, Doriot, who had abandoned Communism. Arrested in October of 1937 and condemned by Vichy in 1941, deported to Dakar in 1945, imprisoned in Algeria and the Metropole, Messali Hadj spent his life going from prison to prison, but his party continued nonetheless to expand in spite of periodic repressions from the police.

After being mixed up in the bloody uprisings of Setif in 1945, the PPA remained underground until 1947 when it came forward under the name MTLD (Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties). The MTLD had five deputies in the French National Assembly, and achieved great success in the municipal elections of 1947, but was eliminated in 1948 during the elections for the Algerian Assembly, thanks to a fixed election and police arrests. The MTLD was defeated in the same manner at subsequent elections.

Deprived of a legal voice, the MTLD, still popular among the people, was then divided by internal conflict. A segment of its young members withdrew into the OS, dreaming of violence. Others (called "Centralists" and led by Lahouel) rebelled against the tyranny of Messali who, with age and hardship, had become tyrannical and too rigid in his beliefs. While the CRIUA was being formed, the MTLD was convulsed with internal struggle. The "historical leaders" had already decided to start an insurrection when in August of 1954 the split in the MTLD was confirmed by the simultaneous holding of two opposed congresses.
The second form of Algerian nationalism is of much less historical importance but must be mentioned for a better understanding of what was to follow. A bourgeois and experienced Moslem political elite came out in favor of a system which would allow the development of the personality of Algeria without a separation from France. The Federation of the Moslem Elect was formed in 1931 and took seven seats during the 1934 elections. After holding various positions vis-à-vis the most influential leader of this group, Perhat Abbas took advantage of the turmoil of war and Algeria's role in it to proclaim, in 1943, the "Manifesto of the Algerian People." Signed by all the Moslem Elect, this document demanded formation of an Algerian State after the war. Arrested and liberated, Abbas proceeded to organize the "Friends of the Manifesto and of Liberty" (AML) which formed a common front with Messali. However, all nationalist activity was stopped by the repressions which followed the uprisings of Setif in 1945. Again arrested and released in 1946, Abbas organized the UDMA party (Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto). This party, though more bourgeois than the MTLD, though absolutely opposed to violence, and counting among its members an eloquent and representative number of the Moslem elite, the UDMA was no more able to break the barrier of a rigged election than was Messali's party. However, since they were deeply involved in the political life of France and Algeria, its leaders accepted more easily than did those of the PPA-MTLD the futility of their efforts...

3) Faced with a rising tide of nationalist claims, France, however, remained passive. The assessment of
Algeria's position at that time ran as follows:

Algeria is shattered by underdevelopment, by a rapidly growing population, increasing impoverishment of the countryside, and widespread emigration to the large cities with the resulting unskilled labor. Nonetheless she maintains her archaic structure. In theory Algeria is France, but in fact she is an "Arab Kingdom" on which have been superimposed a very dynamic but selfish French population and an administration intended to serve the Europeans, while scarcely able to resolve Moslem problems. Under-manning of the Moslem administration is chronic (the "mixed commune" of Arris in the Aurès mountains where the insurrection began numbered 60,000 Moslems but only one functionary and seven gendarmes). It is entrusted to the traditional Moslem functionaries (Bachagas, Aghas, Caids) who are under the authority of a handful of Europeans. In 1947 the "Statute of Algeria" formed a hybrid system whereby the Statute of the French Department is modified by the existence of a general government and an Algerian Assembly. The opposition of the Europeans cannot, however, allow the introduction of certain anticipated reforms (suppression of the "direct administration" by appointed functionaries of "mixed communes" where Moslems are in the majority, official use of the Arab language, suffrage for Moslem women, etc.).

But let us listen to a man who cannot be accused of nationalism. In March of 1955 the new Governor General of Algeria, Jacques Soustelle, who was to become one of the fiercest partisans of French Algeria, wrote in his first official report: "The population growth of an essentially agricultural country with unfertile soil and
a difficult climate, has produced chronic unemployment, the desertion of the countryside for working class suburbs, extreme poverty and despair for a growing mass of individuals and families. While this underprivileged proletariat is increasing in number and growing daily more bitter, a small Moslem bourgeoisie, educated through contact with us, is vainly seeking a solution not only economic, but above all administrative and political. However, they cannot find this solution. The number of Moslems in the administration is still infinitesimal.

Any proposed reforms, from the Blum-Viollette project to the Algerian Statute in 1947, were systematically rejected or sabotaged. One must have the courage to admit that most of our promises have not been kept. Others have been openly violated, from 1948 until the time of the last cantonal elections for the right to vote. Hence a dual dissatisfaction: the social unrest of the masses and the political unrest of the elite. At the point where they meet, these two forms of unrest constitute a very strong explosive force."

4) This latent explosive force was already evident before the first of November 1954. The Algerian war is not only the product of the sterility of the claims made within a legal framework, but also of the premature explosion of May 1945.

At that time of uprisings, atrocities caused 120 European dead in the region of Setif. At the outset, there was no more than a series of demonstrations launched by the PPA on 1 May for Labor Day. 8 May was the occasion of the Allied victory. The violence of the crowds and the reaction of the police soon created the atmosphere of a
virtual holy war. Under the orders of the harsh General Duval, French forces swept down upon the country. Although the first estimate of the number of Moslem victims was about 1,500, a governmental investigation commission later spoke of some 15,000 dead — many of whom were lost during punitive expeditions organized by the European population.

For almost ten years after that Algeria was to remain calm, but the violence of those feelings which broke out in the spontaneous uprisings and repressions of May 1945 were to mark the future.
II. THE FLN POLITICO-MILITARY OFFENSIVE

(1 November 1954 - May 1956)

During the first phase of the war beginning with 1 November 1954 the insurgency had the initiative on military and political levels. Up to the middle of 1956, France, for her part, showed the same equanimity as before the armed revolt's outbreak.

1) On the military level, the insurgency spreads throughout Algerian territory.* Apart from the uprising in the Constantinois district, the FLN offensive takes the form primarily of setting up a maquis in rural and mountain areas. The large cities -- particularly Algiers and its periphery -- remain calm.

At the start the Aurès mountains (when the Algerian territory was broken up Wilaya I became the responsibility of the dynamic Ben Boulaid) is the launching point of the insurgency. Under the leadership of the young Chibani (Ben Boulaid was captured in February 1955) the rebels are able, in February, to capture six French paratroopers, to assassinate an important official, and to encourage desertions among Moslem soldiers. After difficult combat with French paratroopers, they are able, in the spring of 1955, to spread out from their initial base in the Aurès but are severely battered and beset with internal differences characteristic of the tribes of that region. But at this time the other wilayas went into action.

In the spring of 1955, Wilaya II (North Constantinois) substitutes itself for Wilaya I for violent operations. Benefitting from natural advantages (notably the Collo cork tree forests) and a people traditionally nationalistic,

*See Fig. 1 for boundaries of wilayas, rebel concentrations, etc.
led by such a born leader as Zighour, a blacksmith, Wilaya II rapidly became famous. The bloody skirmish of Jemmapes, the encirclement of the town of El-Milia made a landmark of May 1955 and necessitated the intervention of paratroopers. It is in August 1955, however, when Zighour launched an operation -- on orders from Cairo -- which remains unique in the annals of the Algerian war. On August 20th -- as on the day of the Oued-Zem massacres in Morocco on the anniversary of the deposition of the Sultan Mohamed V -- 800 fellaghas won over and organized the Moslem population of 39 towns (such important centers as Constantine and Philippeville) or villages. Nearly a hundred Europeans are savagely massacred (particularly in the small villages) by a crazed mob convinced of an imminent landing...from Egypt. The result of this "widespread" revolt is nil. The uprising is immediately quelled by the army (the assailants leave nearly 1,000 dead on the battlefield) but the psychological repercussions are intense. The Constantine area will remain an important trouble center. In March 1956, of the 2,600 extortions recorded, three-fourths are in Wilaya II (Zighour himself is killed in combat in September 1956 and replaced by Lakdar Bentobal).

Nevertheless, the more subtle and less spectacular methods of Wilaya III (Kabylia) more significantly mark the Algerian war. In these wild, uneven mountain ranges without a single town, extremely poor but inhabited by a stubborn population with a curious history -- the core of emigration towards the metropole -- the former corporal Krim Belkacem applied the theoretical plans elaborated by the nine "historic leaders." Assisted by an employee of
the mayoralty, Ramdane Abbane, former member of the OS who later became the FLN brain, and by gifted leaders (the former sergeant Ouamrane, the former SS Moham'di Said), Krim set up an effective politico-military organization which served as a model for the insurgency. While avoiding serious skirmishes with French troops, Wilaya II not only trained actual ALN military units (National Liberation Army) but more notably set up an OPA (Politico-Administrative Organization) -- the actual FLN administration which progressively substituted itself for French administration, which was in any case sparse.*

Kabylia thus became the focal point of the insurgency and Krim extended his authority beyond his wilaya. After the arrest of Rabah Bitat in Algiers, the military adjutant of Krim, Ouamrane, took over the command of the Wilaya IV (Algerois district) where in the spring of 1956 insecurity spreads to the Mitidja plain, up to the gates of Algiers. Krim Belkacem himself often visited Algiers where he participated in 1956 in the organization of an "Autonomous Zone" (ZAA - Autonomous Zone of Algeria) geared to enlist the capital in the war. At his side, Ramdane Abbane defined insurrectional political strategy and tactics and was responsible for most successes in this domain.

The predominance of Kabylians is not checked by the birth of Wilaya V (Oranie).** Since the area around Oran was fairly prosperous and traditionally calm, guerrilla

---

* For details on the politico-military set-up and the analysis on methods of control on the population put into operation, please see chapter on "Insurgency."

** Wilaya VI (Sahara) will become active only in 1957 but will never play a role comparable to the other wilayatas.
warfare developed, in the beginning, only in the mountains bordering Morocco and this only after Mohamed V returned to the throne in September 1955. Benefitting from these circumstances, Boussouf was able to launch that same month an audacious commando raid against the "holy city" of Tlemcem and successfully sabotage in a spectacular way the railroad linking it to Oujda in Morocco. However, if Boussouf was able in 1956 to organize a force of 2,000 well-trained men on the Algerian-Moroccan frontier (which attacked many farmers in Oranie in the spring of 1956), the insurgency strictly speaking spread only very slowly from the mountain ranges. A region such as Mostaganem will begin to move only in 1957.

2) **On the political level**, the insurgency establishes its organization and doctrine. Its offensive in this respect permits it, under the initiative of Abbane, to impress itself on the population as the only force of liberation, to eliminate its opponents and to win over the undecided.

It was in February 1955, in Cairo, that the insurgency gave birth to the FLN (Front Liberation National) and defined -- very briefly -- its political objectives (national independence, internal reorganization, continuation of the struggle by every means). The MTLD itself was dissolved in November 1954 by the French authorities, but the greater part of its members and organization -- especially as a result of repression -- joined the insurgency. Messali Hadj, however, refused to make this overture and regrouped, at the end of 1954, the remaining elements faithful to him within the MNA (National Algerian Movement).
The first FLN action consists therefore in eliminating this rival. Important purges in the wilayas (notably in Kabylia) successfully limited MNA influence to southern Algeria -- the only place in Algeria where they were able to set up their own maquis, both quite disorganized and divided. On the other hand, the MNA remained powerful in the cities among Moslem workers (more interested in union type activities than in the struggle for independence) and in Algeria itself -- a former MTLD stronghold. In January 1956, the FLN decides on an offensive in the capital; thanks to a dynamic doctrine, to the climate derived from maquis successes, and the use of well-organized shock groups as a means of pressure, the FLN obtains control of the city's nationalist circles.

Concomitantly, the second FLN action consists in rallying to its cause the most outstanding nationalist personalities and especially UDMA bourgeois elites. By a subtle campaign mixing persuasion and violence, Abbane obliged, in December 1955, all elected UDMA officials to take positions against Mr. Soustelle's reforms and to resign from their elected posts. Despite the reactions, Abbane maintained the pressure (during the month of January alone, 120 Moslem personalities favorable to France were assassinated). In April 1956, Ferhat Abbas and his brother-in-law Ahmed Francis arrive in Cairo and join the FLN. Apart from the MNA "enemy brother," no Algerian nationalist remains who will not be obliged -- whatever their own views -- to commit themselves to the insurgency or even to obey its orders. Everywhere the OPA manages to substitute itself for French administration.
There remains the problem of the Algerian Communist Party (PCA) -- not very serious because of its predominantly European structure and its ties with the FCP, and its support of anti-colonialist demands of non-Communist inspiration. Abbane will therefore have little difficulty in refusing integration with the PCA, as a party, in the FLN. In the spring of 1956 -- in order to negotiate as equals with the FLN -- the Communists decide upon autonomous armed action. They create shock groups in Algiers (and engage in making bombs) as well as a "red maquis" near Orleansville on Wilaya IV territory (with the help of the deserters Guerrab and Maillot and a former member of the Spanish International Brigades, Laban). But the Communist maquis -- highly localized and not enjoying any support from the population -- was decimated almost as soon as it was created. The only thing the PCA could do was to put its resources -- without anything in return -- completely at the disposal of the FLN, which did not hesitate for a moment to sacrifice them in the most dangerous missions.

Masters of the political situation, known to world opinion, at the head of an effective maquis and of growing urban political organization, the internal heads of the insurgency -- and above all the Kabyles led by Krim Belkacem and Abbane -- decided to take maximum advantage of their favorable situation by convoking the first Congress of their movement in Algeria itself.

Held in the valley of Soummam, in August of 1956 in Kabylie, the Congress of Soummam marked the high point of the rise of the FLN on Algerian territory. It set forth, in the celebrated "Soummam platform," the goals of the
insurgency. It adopted as a guide for its organization the principle of collegial direction by creating the CNRA (Conseil National de la Révolution Algérienne, or National Council of the Algerian Revolution) with an executive organ entitled CCE (Comité de Coordination et d'Exécution, or Coordinating and Executive Committee) and composed of the wilaya chiefs Krim, Zighour, Ben M'Hidi, d'Abbane and the syndicalist Aïssat Idir. At the same time, the Congress gave the endorsement of the FLN to the syndicalist organization (UGTA -- Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens, or General Union of Algerian Labor) that Abbane had just launched, and to the UCEMA (Union Générale des Étudiants Musulmans Algériens, or General Union of Algerian Moslem Students). Finally, the leaders who met at the Congress decided to intensify maquis activities according to the Kabyle pattern, and above all, to seek a trial of force with France in the city of Algiers.

On the political level, the Congress of Soummam not only marked the predominance of the Kabyle clan, but also the victory of the leaders within Algeria over those outside. Those outside (who were not represented because of a disagreement subtly provoked by Abbane) were reduced to the simple mission of liaison, furthermore limited by the "parachutage" of various personalities on Cairo. Ben Bella and the Cairo leaders lost any hold on effective power; the Congress even ordered that the CEE must in future meet on Algerian territory.

3) The international situation looked as favorable for the insurgency as did the situation within Algeria.

If 1955 was the year of Bandung, it was marked also in North Africa by the evacuation of English forces from
the Suez Canal in June, and by the commencement of the process which brought the two states bordering Algeria -- Morocco and Tunis -- complete independence at the start of 1956. In Tunis, the Franco-Tunisian conventions governing internal autonomy were signed in May of 1955 (Bourguiba returned to Tunis on the first of June). In Morocco, after a long period of terrorism, Sultan Mohamed V returned to his throne in October of 1955. Moreover, from the time they received their independence, these two states took positions favorable to the FLN both in public declarations, and in providing logistical support.

Also, from 1955 on, the Algerian problem spread outside the borders of the Maghreb. In September, under the pressure of the Afro-Asian countries and the Arab League, the United Nations put it on its agenda, forcing France to leave the debates in the General Assembly and face its vote.

4) The French reaction did not, however, seem to measure up, during this initial phase of the war, to the threat encountered.

-- On the military level, French forces stationed in Algeria on the first of November 1954 were no larger than 50,000 men, who in addition were totally untrained and unsuitable for guerrilla combat. Reinforcements came only in "little packages," permitting increases in effectives to 80,000 men in February of 1955; 100,000 in May after a first call-up of reservists; 120,000 after the August uprisings in Constantinois (and the ensuing call-up of another batch of reservists). It was not until April 1956 that the military buildup plus a third call-up of reservists made possible the force of 400,000 men necessary to
put sufficiently intensive "sectioning" (le quadrillage) into effect on Algerian territory.

Certainly, the parachutist units returned from Indochina were thrown into the Aurès from November 1954 on, and from the Spring of 1955 in North Constantinois. Severe blows were dealt to the guerrilla bands (so that practically all the forces of Wilaya I were encircled at Djeur in September 1955) but the shortages of men and appropriate equipment (in March 1956, there were only 90 helicopters in Algeria), a sluggish style of action inherited from Indochina and stemming from the excessive employment of heavy materiel, the absence of "sectioning" necessary to sustain and exploit the French operations, -- all these seriously limited the effectiveness of "rakings" (ratissages). Guerrilla bands were able to survive by hiding or by escaping through gaps in the French forces. Many mountainous massifs remained practically inviolate. Guerrilla forces extended their activities, as we have seen. Up to 31 March 1956, nearly 13,000 extortions had been committed.

On the political level, the situation was hardly more favorable, and the French response unfolded but slowly. (Three governments held office during that period: that of the left radical Mendès-France, up to February 1955; that of the right radical Edgar Faure, up to December 1955; and that of the Socialist Guy Mollet, from January 1956 to February 1957.) Not until January 1955 did a politician (Jacques Soustelle) replace the "classic prefect" Léonard in the Government General. And it was not until March that the state of emergency was declared in Algeria. As to fundamental reforms, Jacques Soustelle concentrated on establishing in fact the "integration" of the Moslem
population with the metropolitan population, but he did not have sufficient powers for more than timid measures for economic and social development in Algeria.

At bottom, the official thesis proclaimed by Mendès-France after the events of November 1, 1954 -- "Algeria is France" -- was unchanged. On taking power in January 1956, the Socialist Guy Mollet tried to create a new atmosphere. In his speech of investiture before the National Assembly he spoke of respect for the "Algerian personality" and guaranteed the holding of free elections by constituency ("au college unique") after the end of violence. In February, he issued a solemn appeal for a cease-fire and authorized, in April, the necessary contacts to bring it about. (Several secret meetings had taken place between members of the FLN and Socialist politicians: between Khider and Gorse in April at Cairo; in July, with Pierre Commin in Belgrade; at Rome in September, etc.)

In reality, Guy Mollet's "new look" was sure to be blocked. From the beginning of February, his efforts ran counter to one of the factors that played then and for the future a critical role in the Algerian war: the resistance of the European population to any solution based on compromise with the FLN. Guy Mollet's change in tone before the National Assembly coincided with the nomination in Algiers, as representative of France with status of Minister, of General Catroux, an old friend of General de Gaulle, known for his moderation and his capability for resolving diplomatically the most difficult situations. (In August of 1955, Catroux was sent to Madagascar to work out with the exiled Sultan of Morocco the terms for his return to the throne: he therefore seemed particularly well qualified
to bring the Algerian insurgency to a peaceful conclusion.)

However, both the declarations of the President of the Council and the personality of the Minister-Resident directly provoked unrest in Algiers among the European population, accustomed to be the boss, and extremely apprehensive on account of the uprisings of Sétif and Constantine. A Committee of Alliance (Comité d'entente) was formed in Algiers around the Associations of Veterans. Formal protests "in the period of calm" were issued on the occasion of the arrival in Algiers, on February 6, 1956, of the new President of the Council. But the crowd broke loose; a human wave broke the barriers. Amid shouts and missiles of all kinds (it was the season for tomatoes in Algeria) Guy Mollet discovered the strength of the opposition of the Europeans to his policy. General Catroux resigned his mission. If Guy Mollet made it a point of honor to keep open his famous triptych (negotiations, cease-fire, elections), this was no more than a chip floating on a tidal wave.

Robert Lacoste replaced General Catroux. His socialism was more empirical than doctrinal, more authoritarian than liberal. It seemed designed above all to satisfy the little people, the petty bureaucrats and the Army. The major effort of the French war started. In April 1956, the French forces rose to 400,000 men, and the new minister gave them a mission of "pacification" -- that is to say, the combination of military operations with "psychological action"; the establishment of human contacts and the participation of the Army in all efforts looking towards the economic and social betterment of the Moslem position. In March 1956, the law granting special powers
to the Government provided the necessary legal basis for conducting the war. The administration of Algeria was reorganized; new reforms were promulgated (notably dealing with improvement of the Moslems' position and in the field of agriculture); the mixed communes were dissolved along with all the political assemblies. "Sectioning" was not just military (General Salan took command in December), but became political and administrative.

The two adversaries -- France and the FLN -- having chosen divergent paths, and possessing necessary means of action, were thenceforth ready for their confrontation.
III. THE FRANCO-FLN CONFRONTATION
(Mid-1956 - 15 May 1958)

In the second phase of the war the FLN and France came together in an intense and cruel combat. Fighting moved from the maquis toward the capital of Algeria ("the Battle of Algiers") and toward the country's borders ("Battle of the Borders"). It even went beyond France and Algeria to break out spectacularly in other places (ship searching, the Suez and Sakhiet affairs), almost bringing the Algerian conflict to the point of an international conflict. The intensity of the struggle and the impasse which it reached result in the collapse of the Fourth Republic on 13 May 1958.

1) The Hardening of the French

The steps taken by France begin to bear fruit after the second half of 1956.

On the military level the arrival of sufficient manpower allowed a progressive "sectioning off" ("quadrillage") and made it possible to elaborate tactical methods allowing more successful attacks on rebel bands.

The harvests of the summer of 1956 were reaped and the safety of the roads reestablished. At the beginning of 1957 the FLN was able, however, to launch a "Spring offensive" in Orania and in the Constantine region (the attack of the Oran-Reillizane train in January, the ambush near Collo in May, causing 35 dead among the French forces, and the assassinations of isolated Europeans) but it was unable to renew the offensive in the fall. The number of FLN extortions which reached 4,000 in January of 1957 dropped to 1,500 in December.
However, no decisive results were achieved. On the French side the quality of the troops improved very gradually, but equipment remained too heavy, certain units (armor, artillery, engineers, etc.) were unsuited to partisan warfare and the number of combat troops was proportionately too small a part of all the effectives. Since it was not possible to form organic reserve troops under these conditions, the FLN bands remained powerful mainly in the mountainous areas and the border regions, and became even more so, thanks to arms and men arriving from the Tunisian and Moroccan "sanctuaries."

Nonetheless, the continued expansion of the FLN since 1954 was slowed and finally halted. In spite of the fact that after 1957 the FLN fully enjoyed facilities offered by Tunisia, it was henceforth on the defensive and could not undertake the conquest and control of a part of the territory which would have been a logical phase in the evolution of this type of situation and which the FLN had dreamed of accomplishing, either in the Constantine area or around the holy city of Tlemcen.

On the international level several actions also proved that the French were taking a firmer stand during and after the second half of 1956.

On 16 October 1956, with the searching of the yacht Athos (loaded with war material in Alexandria by Egyptian soldiers), the French Navy began a series of ship searches. The Yugoslavian cargo ship Slovenija was also searched in January of 1958. On 22 October 1956, Ben Bella and the leaders of the FLN delegation outside Algeria (Khider, Air Ahmed, and Boudiaf) were arrested, thanks to the forced re-routing of the plane carrying them to Morocco. Lastly,
in November of 1956, France took part in the Suez expedition with the hope of dealing a decisive blow to the Nasser government, which at that time seemed the symbol of Arab aid to the Algerian rebellion.

But, here again, none of these operations, however dramatic, brought definitive results. The supply of arms continued (notably with Egyptian surplus) and the very act of ship searching paid a tribute to FLN power. The arrest of the FLN leaders stunned the Algerian people, but France did not know what to do with them. Ben Bella became the imprisoned symbol of the rebellion. As for the Suez expedition, it undoubtedly showed - as the current phrase went - that "France dares...," but it also showed that she retreats. Transforming his military reversals into political successes, Nasser was henceforth the living proof for the Moslems that French military power was no longer invincible. The simplest people believed that France had been defeated by the Arabs; the most sophisticated learned that the use of military strength is limited in the modern world.

On the political level, on the other hand, no new initiative could change the meaning of the French effort. The Guy Mollet triptych remained as inoperative as the Robert Lacoste reforms. Two governments followed Guy Mollet's: the government of the radical Maurice Bourges-Maunoury (from June to September 1957) and that of Felix Gaillard (from November 1957 to May 1958). Both rested their campaign on a proposed "loi-cadre" for Algeria, a curious plan for setting up complex territorial and federative organizations. This law (which provoked the fall of the Bourges government and was only enacted in
January of 1958) did not interest the majority of the Moslem population and gave rise to lively criticism from both Nationalists and Europeans.

In fact, at this point a political solution of the Algerian problem had never seemed more remote. In an essay written in May of 1957, Raymond Aron anticipated with rare clarity the final outcome of the conflict but also pointed out its fundamentally "tragic" character: "Fate is drawing all men, the clear-sighted and the blind, fanatics and moderates, to the same catastrophic end."*

And just when the FLN underground ceased to spread, the confrontation of the two adversaries assumed new and particularly dramatic forms.

2) The "Battle of Algiers"

At the height of its power, at the Congress of Soummam, the FLN decided to launch the "Battle of Algiers." The exact reasons for this decision are not known. Were they a desire to crown the success of the maquis, to attract international attention, to compete with the PCA? Whatever the reasons, the CEE set itself up in Algiers, the ZAA was directed by Ben Khedda, and a "bomb network" was entrusted to his military assistant, the dynamic former football player, Yacef Saadi.

Blind terrorism then overran the city. Until 1956 the capital had remained calm. However, during the spring of that year the FLN had taken over the control of the Casbah, heartlessly eliminating former members of the PPA.

who had joined the MNA as well as the police informers, and forcing the "underworld" to join sides with them by violence. After the agreements made with the PCA, the FLN commanded the services of technicians who were able to fabricate (and eventually to emplace) the bombs.

An initial vicious circle began on 30 September 1956, when bombs exploded in very crowded bars ("Milk Bar," 1 dead, 30 wounded; "La Cafeteria," 2 dead, 16 wounded). On 5 October buses were attacked (9 dead and 16 wounded, all Moslems, in the bus from Algiers to Tablat; and 1 dead and 8 wounded in the waiting room in Rivet). After a month of calm the explosions began again, in November, with the atrocities reaching their height at the beginning of 1957 (5 dead and 34 wounded by the explosion of bombs in three cafes of the rue Michelet on Sunday, 26 January; 10 dead and 36 wounded by one explosion on 10 February in the Algiers stadium). In the meantime one of the most representative colonialists, Amédée Frager, was assassinated on 26 December 1956 in the streets of Algiers, and a general strike was launched to coincide with the UN session in January of 1957.

After the spectacular counter-offensive of the 10th Paratrooper Division, a second battle of Algiers began on 3 June 1957, when three bombs exploded at streetcar stops, causing 5 dead and 92 wounded. On Sunday, 10 June 1957, an attack was made at the Casino of the Cornice, causing 11 dead and 35 wounded. Lastly, after the resulting counter-attack by Colonel Godard's paratroopers, the FLN threw its last reserves into a desperate show of force on Sunday, 27 July. By this time, however, the French surveillance network was so effective that the nine men

*These are described in the section on "Counter-Insurgency."
carrying bombs either got rid of their fatal burden or ... blew up with it.

The French repression was concentrated on stopping the FLN offensive. Confronted with the murderous attacks of January 1957 and the order for a general strike, the civilian authority delegated its powers for the maintenance of order to General Massu. The 10th Paratrooper Division was sent to reinforce the 9th Regiment of Zouaves previously posted in the Casbah. In June of 1957 the Sureté Nationale was entrusted to Colonel Godard.

Paratrooper methods,* based on obtaining information by any means and the ultra-rapid exploitation of the information, were often the object of bitter controversy, but the results were impressive. Three weeks after the investment of the city (five days after the attack at the stadium), 87 bombs were taken from the principal FLN depot on 15 February 1957, and after the arrests, the ZAA was obliged to begin a long period of reorganization. The CEE was then obliged to flee the city...and Algeria. As for the "insurrectional strike," it was stopped in three days. Even though Yacef Saadi did succeed in escaping arrest and reconstructing his bomb network, it was really in operation for only one week, from 3 to 10 June. On 26 June, 16 days after the attack at the Casino, the head of the network was arrested with 33 bombs. The offensive launched in July by the FLN failed. On 6 August the last 24 bombs of the ZAA were seized and on 24 September Yacef Saadi was arrested and his assistant Ali-La-Point killed on 7 October.

Though the complete destruction of the FLN machine in the capital and the precipitous flight of the CEE may

*These are described in the section on "Counter-Insurgency."
be interpreted as signs of defeat, the rebellion nevertheless achieved solid results. The ZAA troops never exceeded 1,500 men and its bombing networks, 150. However, this handful of men controlled a Moslem population of 400,000 (collecting about 100 million francs a month) and pushed 300,000 Europeans to extremes of desperation. After these 1956-1957 events, the city of Algiers became a furnace where anything was possible. In a certain sense the 13 May 1958 outbreak was a direct result of these events, as were all the ensuing European attempts to oppose any changes favorable to the aspirations of the Moslem population.* The Moslem population was literally so shocked by the repression of the Battle of Algiers that it kept out of the conflict for almost three years. But the manifestations -- which were almost spontaneous -- from December 1960 on, proved that the fire lighted in 1956 and apparently extinguished in 1957, had continued to burn and spread under the ashes.

3) The "Battle of the Borders"

The prevention of any possible spreading of the maquis and the difficulties encountered by the maquis within Algeria forced the ALN to seek a renewal of its strength outside of Algiers.

In 1957 Tunisia became the external sanctuary of the rebellion. While Cairo's influence was eclipsed owing to the Suez affair and the capture of Ben Bella, the need for bringing effective support to the maquis of the Constantine and Kabylie areas made Tunisia of prime

*During the Battle of Algiers, European terrorism on which the OAS will later be based broke out.
importance. It is here also that the heads of the CEE took refuge after their flight from Algiers.

Two hundred thousand Algerian refugees supplied, in fact, the required human reservoir, which was further strengthened by recruits raised in Algeria and transported across the border.

The agreements signed, after February 1957, between Ouamrane and Bourguiba allowed arms obtained by the rebellion to be stocked in Tunisia, as well as the training and instruction of regular units. "The eastern base," organized on Tunisian territory, provided the logistic support for the Algerian underground. During one week of February 1957, 5,000 men were able to pass in small groups into Algeria. Traffic in arms was not less heavy. During May 1957, 1,200 arms, many of them heavy arms, were brought into Algerian territory from Tunisia. The resulting border fights cost the FLN about 700 deaths a week.

In the face of the intensity of this threat the French government ordered, in the Spring of 1957, maximum acceleration in the setting up of defenses on two borders which was decided upon in 1956, with particular concentration on the Tunisian border, since the help of Morocco, though earlier than that of Tunisia and constant, was much less.

In the Fall of 1957 the Tunisian defenses were 80 per cent completed. Conceived more as a warning system than as an absolutely impenetrable barrier, improved and strengthened in relation to FLN technical progress, these defenses became the scene of furious battles. While arms poured into Tunisia (17,000 guns, 380 machine guns, 30 mortars in the last three months of 1957), the fighting
became increasingly intense at the beginning of 1958. In February the FLN left at the Tunisian border some 635 prisoners, 52 machine guns, 28 automatic rifles, 268 submachine guns, and 885 rifles.

However, though the battle was still raging (after it reached its peak at the beginning of 1958 there were recurrences until 1960), the initial FLN objective of equipping the maquis with men and arms could no longer be realized.

4) The "Battle of the Sahara"

Unable to launch in 1957, on Algerian territory, the anticipated military campaigns, the FLN tried to operate from the Sahara.

At first the FLN tried to break up the MNA bands, which, under FLN pressure, had retreated toward Southern Algeria. But after a wild massacre of the inhabitants of the Messaliste village of Melouza, in May of 1957 (300 victims), the MNA "General" Bellounis reached an agreement with the French forces.

In the fall of 1957 the FLN bands began attacks on the French forces. However, after murderous ambushes, French paratroopers scattered the rebels who could not find on the sands of the desert, with its sparse population, the conditions necessary to sustain guerrilla warfare.

5) The "Battle of the Metropole"

The FLN battle of the Metropole was less spectacular. In spite of MNA rivalry, the FLN succeeded in imposing its authority (thanks to its OPA) on some 400,000 Moslems working in France.
Shock groups (and later the OS - Organisation Speciale) were ripe to launch terrorism. In the heart of Paris, on 26 May 1957, after the final for the French football cup, Ali Chekkal, former vice-President of the Algerian Assembly was killed while standing beside the President of the French Republic.

6) The "International Battle"

While the tightening up on the part of the French made impossible the spread of the maquis on Algerian territory, at the same time attempts to supply them from Tunisia or to bring the war to Algiers, the Sahara, or the Metropole, either ended in military failure or did not produce any appreciable results. However, though the two adversaries may have reached an impasse on land, this was not the case with the FLN where the influence of its activity on public opinion, especially international opinion, was concerned.

The bombs of Algiers, the attacks in Paris, the border fights, brought the war in Algeria into the limelight. French public and international opinion could not ignore the fact that there was such a conflict. In France itself the violence of the confrontation, the nature of the methods used on both sides, stirred up passions. While the extreme right condemned terrorism and denounced the government's inability to fight it, the extreme left demanded negotiation and the abandonment of such primitive methods of fighting. The French élite was henceforth as divided on the subject of the war in Algeria as they were over the Dreyfus case, and a segment of public opinion wanted to bring the French war effort to an end.
Similarly, these same events loudened the echo of the positions taken by the FLN within international tribunals. The first battle of Algiers, and in particular the order for an "insurrectional strike" in February of 1957, coincided with the UN session. Though the Assembly rejected the Afro-Asian move for the right to self-determination and immediate negotiations in favor of a move of conciliation, the habit of seeing the UN regularly consider the Algerian problem was established.

The motion passed on 10 December 1957 was sufficiently vague to satisfy everyone, but the reference to the Tunisian-Moroccan "good offices" (merely, it is true, for the pursuit of a cease-fire) constituted a step toward that "internationalization" of the conflict in which the FLN placed heavy hopes from that time forward. The Maghrebine Conference of Tangiers and the Inter-African Conference of Accra in April 1958 constituted new diplomatic victories for the FLN.

The political direction of the FLN took skillful advantage of this new situation. The arrest of Ben Bella, the flight of the CEE and its installation in Tunis (where it benefitted from the wise council of a specialist like Bourguiba), the failure of the military and terrorist offensives in Algeria, and the enlargement of the possibilities for diplomatic action necessarily brought about redirection of effort.

While those who represented the rebellion within Algeria were skilled leaders of the rebel bands, Amirouche for example, the rebellion outside of Algeria became less military and more political. Little by little the influence of Abbane decreased (he was assassinated in May of
1958) and the rebellion was apparently united around political figures like Ferhat Abbas. Even the armed forces outside of Algeria were under the orders of men like "Colonel" Boumediener whose political knowledge surpassed their military abilities.

The organization itself was transformed. Real administrations were formed and grew. The diplomatic missions grew and spread. Of course, the situation in Algeria was such that the effective influence of the direction of operations from Tunis decreased. Nonetheless, the possibilities for international action increased.

However, what most strikingly weakened the position of France in the eyes of the world were the military operations of the "Battle of the Borders." Various border incidents, in the fall of 1957, (French operations in September against bands retreating into Tunisia, machine gunning from Tunisia of French planes flying over the border) had already strained relations between France and Tunisia. In 1958 the crisis came to a head after the French, on 7 February, bombed the Tunisian village of Sakheit-Sidi-Youssef, from which on several occasions fire had been opened on French aircraft.

The crisis then assumed international proportions and the intervention of the Security Council was only avoided through the Anglo-American offer of "good offices." If these progressively bogged down, it was, however, the good will of the Gaillard government which directly caused its overthrow by the National Assembly on 15 April 1958. The way lay open for 13 May.

On 13 May 1958 a European demonstration was organized in Algiers on the occasion of the presentation of the new
President of the Council, Pierre Pflimlin, to the National Assembly. The execution by the FLN of three French prisoners, the "liberal" reputation of Pierre Pflimlin, the constant government instability -- the ministerial crisis had gone on for almost a month -- the way the "good offices" were working out -- all these factors created an explosive atmosphere. Accustomed since February of 1956 to demonstrating its anguish and passions in the street; aroused by the Battle of Algiers, border combats, and foreign interference; sustained by Gaullist and extreme right opposition which affirmed the Fourth Republic's inability to defend Algeria; excited by agitators; -- the European masses went wild. The demonstration became an uprising and the uprising a revolution.

After these unleashed masses seized the General Government, the Army, influenced by the same forces as the European population, took command in order to demand in Paris a government of "Public Safety." Algeria was in a state of delirium. "Committees for Public Safety" multiplied. Demonstrations continued. Not only did the FLN attempt no offensive action (probably because of the fear inspired in the Moslems by this extreme European reaction backed by the Army), but the Moslem population participated en masse in the grandiose demonstrations of "fraternization" organized by the Army. Algeria seemed to have taken a new direction.

From Algeria the delirium spread to the Metropole. Corsica was occupied by paratroopers. The invasion of the Metropole was actively prepared. Unable to cope with the situation, the Fourth Republic delivered itself into the hands of General de Gaulle.
IV. GENERAL DE GAULLE'S OFFENSIVE
(May 1958 - November 1960)

After the 13 May Revolution and General de Gaulle's return to power, France could go on the offensive. Blessed with a solid and stable government, led by a man of character enjoying the total backing of the metropolitan population for solving the Algerian problem, France was able to exploit the shock value of 13 May in Algeria.

1958 saw a military and political offensive in the grand style. It reached its height in 1959, but began to decline in 1960. At this point early signs of a second rebellion appeared: that of the European population of Algeria.

1) The Military Offensive of General Challe
   a) The military offensive launched in Algeria by General de Gaulle was rendered easier - even possible - by the events of the preceding years.

   On the one hand the French army benefited from its experience before 13 May 1958. To a certain extent the "Challe Plan" was the logical continuation of the activity of the preceding commands, and that of General Salan in particular.

   On the other hand the events of 13 May literally galvanized the Algerian Army. The role played by the Army in the Coup d'État; the return to power of a leader of General de Gaulle's stature, precisely because of the Army's role; the presence in Paris of a stable political power, organizing, favoring, and supporting vigorous military operations; the euphoria which followed 13 May where the future of "French Algeria" was concerned --
concerned -- all these factors created an extraordinary enthusiasm which General Challe (appointed to replace General Salan in December of 1958) knew how to exploit admirably. Until the end of 1959 the Army did not share the doubts and hesitations of the Europeans in Algeria. It plunged headlong into renewed operational tasks.

b) The "Challe Plan" is above all known for its great offensive operations intended to dislodge the rebel bands from the mountainous zones where they found refuge. Thanks to the "general reserves" that it constituted and to tactical methods stemming from previous experiments, * the new commander-in-chief attacked those regions where operations had come to an impasse.

In February and March of 1959, Operation "Couronne" successfully cleaned out the mountains of the Ourarsenis and the Tlemcen in Orania. Wilaya V lost half its strength (2,420 rebels were left unable to fight, among them 44 leaders; 1,000 members of the OPA were neutralized; 1,133 weapons were recovered; numerous places of refuge, supply depots, and hiding places were wiped out).

From 18 April to 15 June Operation "Courroie" mauled the bands in the region of Algiers (Wilaya IV) to the point where 1,095 uniformed fellaghias gave themselves up

---

*See page 29. The "general reserves" created by General Challe included, on 31 December 1960, two paratrooper divisions (10th and 25th DP including 5 regiments of paratroopers each, one cavalry regiment and an artillery section), one Foreign Legion Division (1Ind DI including three Legion regiments and one artillery group); two regiments of Algerian sharpshooters and 13 commandos. Their total force included 51 battalions. The sectioning off took up 209 battalions, the border defenses 47 battalions, and the cities 3 battalions.
to the French forces. From 8 to 19 July Operation "Etincelle" disrupted the nets which, by way of the crests of the mountains of Hodna (Wilaya I) connected the mountains of the Aurès and Kabylie. After 22 July the French used helicopters ("Jumelles") to assault the practically inviolate territory of the Kabylie (Wilaya III). In September of 1959, Operation "Pierres Precieuses" attacked the mountains of the North Constantine area, while "Turquoise," "Emeraude," and "Rubis" cleaned out the refuges of Wilaya III.

Lastly, in March of 1959, Operation "Matraque" returned to the Ouarsenis; and after General Challe departed, his successor General Crépin lead operations "Prometheus 1 and 2" in the Atlas Mountains.

c) In spite of all the gains of these operations, the French military offensive could not be reduced to these alone. The system of pacification resulting from the experience of preceding years and put into practice by General Challe and his team constitutes a whole of which none of the other parts should be overlooked.

"Sectioning off" (le quadrillage) was invigorated notably by appointing dynamic heads of sectors. General Challe's directives specified that sectioning off must be undertaken in a firmly offensive spirit - that is to say the troops must be ready both to attack with their own means the OPA and the rebel bands (notably, if necessary in the particularly subverted zones, after an initial cleaning out by the general reserves) and also to lead action in depth which would influence the population.

This action in rural areas aimed essentially at putting the villages into a state of self-defense, with
recourse, if necessary, to the technique of regrouping. In the Dahra, for example, almost 80 villages (including 40,000 people) were organized on 1 August 1959 into a system of self-defense with fortified villages, an alarm system, and the stationing of 30 Moslem Harkas at approximately five kilometer intervals. Thus the strictly military sectioning off was extended while troops were freed for the general reserves.

Use of Moslems was systematically encouraged both in self-defense groups and within the various support units (Harkas, GMS, Maghzens) of the regular army. By the end of 1959, 175,000 Moslems were serving in the French forces: 60,000 in the regular army, 60,000 in the Harkas, 20,000 in the self-defense groups, 20,000 in the Maghzens, and 5,000 in the GMS (Mobile Security Groups).

Specialized units of a new type were used to aid and complete the activity both as intervention forces and as sector troops. The "Fighter Commandos," who were nomads and led the life of the rebel, had to prevent the reconstitution of his bands in the zones which were cleaned out. The "Operational Detachments for Protection" (DOP) made up of officers from the Special Services and police forces were responsible for dispersing the OPA.

In order to allow profound psychological action on the Moslem masses, the Army took part in the administration of the local population (notably through the officers of the Special Administrative Sections and the Urban Administrative Sections: SAS and SAU) and also contributed to their social, scholarly, and medical improvement (120,000 children were taught by the Army, 920 military doctors furnished free medical care, etc.). A Fifth Bureau was
also responsible for propaganda and psychological operations.

Lastly, under the impulse of an organization attached to the commander-in-chief (BEL - Bureau d'Etudes et Liaisons), special operations were run against the rebellion. The most famous and effective were those which succeeded in making the "Wilaya" believe they were the victims of French "penetration." Bloody purges and imaginary plots thus destroyed Wilayas III and IV in 1959.

d) Even though the destruction of the rebel bands by means of vast offensive operations and the simultaneous pursuit of pacification (by offensive sectioning off and self-defense) constituted the two outstanding aspects of French military offensive, action was also directed toward making the borders impenetrable. This was begun before 13 May and was continued and increased. The border barriers were completely finished, and the alarm and defense systems were improved (a second barrier was set up near the Tunisian border).

In November-December 1959, the FLN tried a strong offensive against the border blocks in order to relieve the Wilayas in Algeria which were being defeated by the offensive operations of the Challe Plan (95-100 per cent of the "Katibas" which had tried to cross the border in the first months of the year were destroyed). Out of 1,200 men, 950 turned back before the first block and only 10 crossed the second block. All the others were defeated. In spite of the strict orders of the FLN Commander, attempts made at the beginning of 1960 had no greater success. Losses were such that the FLN, by the second half of 1960, gave up any action except harassment. Only 40 men and 40 guns got through into Algeria during that
period. Moreover, the search, in April 1959, of the Czech cargo ship Lidice carrying 12,000 guns and 2,000 machine guns (supposedly en route to the Moroccan Army) confirmed the effectiveness of the French maritime blockade.

e) The positive results of the French military offensive were impressive. The rebel armed forces within Algeria which numbered more than 40,000 in 1956 dropped to about 10,000 by the end of 1959. The number of weapons which surpassed 20,000 at the beginning of 1958 was less than half that by the end of 1960. Four wilaya leaders were killed: Amirouche of Wilaya III in April 1959 and his successor Mira in November of 1959; Si Haoues of Wilaya IV in April 1959 and Lofti of Wilaya V in March 1960. The head of Wilaya IV, Si M'Hamed, disappeared either in the fights or purges. His successor, Si Salah, took part at the beginning of 1960 in the diplomatic talks for the surrender of his wilaya (these discussions - which are distinguished by the fact that they took place in a secret meeting in Paris with General de Gaulle in June - were not concluded and Si Salah was eliminated by his military assistant, Si Mohamed, who was himself killed in battle in 1961).

Under French pressure the rebel bands were forced to remain on the defensive and to break up. They could no longer exist as organized units capable of engaging in military style operations.

f) However, the "rebel presence" did not disappear. It is typical that the number of extortions (see graph no. 2) which decreased regularly did not follow as sharp a curve as that of the decrease in weapons in Algeria (see graph no. 3). This is because the rebel
forces, obliged to break up and "demilitarize" to a certain extent, gathered together in small groups which roamed through the inhabited areas and even through the big cities. Banditry and individual terrorism replaced the ambushes or large-scale terrorism of the "Battle of Algiers." In populated rural areas (particularly in the plain of Mitidja around Algiers) individual Europeans were assassinated and crops burned. In the cities grenades (or small bombs) were thrown at passers-by and Europeans killed at random. Several terrorist outbursts bloodied Algeria further.

Though the FLN may have been completely powerless to prevent mass Moslem participation in the October 1958 referendum, it nonetheless was able to upset the municipal elections of April 1959. Numerous Moslem candidates were kidnapped or assassinated. In twenty places the electors were kidnapped. A bomb and a grenade even exploded in Algiers - something which had not occurred since 1957.

After an attack on the crops, terrorism began again in October of 1959 and continued until the end of the year. For example, between 19 and 26 December the following incidents occurred: the assassination of a functionary from Ponts-et-Chausees; a grenade thrown into a cafe in Miliana; in the Mitidja the occupants of a civilian vehicle wounded by machine gun fire; a European woman killed in her automobile and four Moslems had their throats cut; near Manceau a farmer killed, and a European woman killed near Tipaza, etc... Christmas was marked by the explosion of a bomb on the rue d'Isly in Algiers.

The year 1960 witnessed a particularly horrible wave of terrorism, especially after the break in the negotiations
at Melun and the resulting increase in hostilities between the two adversaries. In addition to a series of assassinations of isolated Europeans and the massacre of pro-French Moslems, a uniformed commando opened fire on the bathers of the vast beach of Chenoua near Algiers, causing thirteen deaths.

Though the FLN could no longer indulge in a show of strength, in military style operations, or the relentless terrorism of the Battle of Algiers, through harassment and easily executed attacks on individuals, it was nonetheless still able to cause profound psychological repercussions and to maintain a climate of insecurity. The feeling that the war was continuing thus reduced the effect of the French military offensive on the Moslem populations in cities and heavily populated areas. As for the Europeans, they had quickly relapsed into that state of over-excitement and panic which terrorism produced in them and which was one of the causes of the 1960 uprisings.

The second possibility for action still open to the FLN in face of the French military offensive lay in the use of its OPA which grew up in Algiers, Oran, and Constantine. Thanks to coercion and propaganda, it was able to extend its hold over the Moslem masses in the large cities. The political administration of the FLN even managed to survive (or revive) in the zones subjected to the important operations of the Challe Plan. In regions where the FLN was able to influence the population profoundly (like the Kabylie), operations under the Challe Plan did succeed in destroying the military infrastructure of the rebellion (though with more difficulty and less
success when the rebels, who had learned their lesson from the first operations which took them by surprise, began to split up into small groups before the launching of the operation), but they could not succeed in wiping out the political infrastructure. The survival and development of the OPA explains moreover the ease with which small groups and individuals were able to engage in terrorism.

Similarly, the FLN extended its activities to France itself where 400,000 Moslems furnished a maneuvering ground and the French authorities were not in a position to fight the same kind of war as in Algeria.

In September of 1958 concerted attacks were made on the economic potential of the Metropole (depots and gasoline refineries were burned). But police repression and the hostile reactions of the French public opinion dissuaded the FLN from resorting again to this substitute for the vigorous attacks which were then out of the question in Algeria. While the OPA continued to develop more than ever in Algeria, shock groups indulged in individual acts of terrorism. Such groups tried to assassinate Minister Soustelle, Senator Benhabyles (who was the possible representative of a "Third Moslem Force"), the integrationist deputy, Robert Abdessalam, etc. Later the FLN systematically attacked the police. Thus the impression of war which terrorism had always maintained in Algeria was also maintained in the Metropole, at little cost but in spectacular fashion.

However, the problem which most preoccupied the Government was still the political hold of the OPA on the Moslem population of Algeria.
Immediate causes for this phenomenon may certainly be found. In the first place, the civil administration had difficulty in adapting to fighting conditions. For example, owing to lack of initiative and funds, certain centers for regroupment of the population were left in destitution which could only favor the spread of insurrectional propaganda. Moreover, the law was unable to find an effective manner of penalizing infractions which appeared to be only political. In the second place, General Challe insisted, and rightly so, on the all-important factor of time. Thus he himself prolonged Operation "Jumelles" in the Kabylie area which had long been subjected almost exclusively to rebel law and installed some of his general reserve troops there for more than four months.

Nonetheless, this phenomenon of the OPA was more political than military. Deprived of most of its military infrastructure, the rebellion still retained its power of seduction thanks notably to its foreign "government" which possessed an army (militarily useless but politically impressive) and gained international successes. Therefore, if a military offensive, undeniably successful from a technical point of view, could not alone produce decisive psychological results, the political offensive led by General de Gaulle must be examined.

2) General de Gaulle's Political Offensive
   a) Upon taking power, General de Gaulle had less freedom of movement on the political level than on the military level.

   If, after taking part in the Coup d'État, the Army was to be satisfied with the operational task assigned to
it, the Army had to be separated first from politics. This was done by the order of October 1958 that military leaders withdraw from the "Committees for Public Safety," by the replacement of General Salan, etc. Also, de Gaulle had to follow a course which would not be immediately contrary to the Army's position on French Algeria and integration. Initial prudence was necessary since the European population, intoxicated by the events of the month of May, was expecting from General de Gaulle a policy essentially favorable to its interests.

On the Moslem side the situation was no longer clear. Granted that the Moslem population, like the European population, had been literally shocked by the events of May and the impression of strength emanating from a leader of the stature of de Gaulle and the most hardened elements of the Army, the Moslems were nevertheless expecting miracles from the man who gave the speech in Brazzaville and who, since his return to power, had undertaken to renew relations between France and her African possessions. (The building of the "Community" in September of 1958 led to the proclamation of the possibility of independence with cooperation in December of 1959 and the granting of independence to most French speaking African states during 1960).

Even opinions among the FLN leaders from abroad were tossing about between respect for the prestige of General de Gaulle* and ignorance of his intentions (certain leaders attributed to him extreme liberalism; others saw

*The FLN meetings held in French and marked throughout by respect for the General were at that time something to be savored!
him as the prisoner of the Army's "ultras"), between the military difficulties arising from the French offensive and a desire not to give up a fight which was not, however, very dangerous -- in Tunis.

b) Empiricism and prudence thus characterized General de Gaulle's offensive. During the days following 13 May and during his trip to Algeria the General used vague formulae to satisfy the Europeans from Algeria (in the manner of the famous phrase, "I have understood you" which was delivered to the crowds congregated in the Forum of Algiers), but he did not say the word "integration," nor insist on a "French Algeria." He said nothing, in fact, which was likely to go clearly against Moslem nationalist aspirations.

However, though General de Gaulle carefully avoided the use of "slogans and boasts" (generally he considers that such formulae excite passions and do not change realities), he did utter, from the time of his first trip to Algeria, some prudent hints to indicate the broad lines he would later follow -- i.e., "the open road is the road of renovation" (4 June 1958). There is also the road of fraternity which must make the Moslems "totally French." The necessary evolution can only be a "French work," accomplished by "legal means" (5 June 1958) and "within a French framework" (29 August 1958), but the "conditions for the future of Algeria - France wishes to establish them with the Algerians themselves" (27 June 1958). Lastly, the FLN combat is "courageous," but must end in a "reconciliation" (4 June 1958). "Why hate? It is a question of cooperating."
While making these statements, General de Gaulle was also taking steps to bring about that transformation of Algeria which he intended to promote in spite of the continuation of the war.

On the political level General de Gaulle wished that "an Algerian political elite should reveal itself freely... and that the political vacuum which opened the way to rebellion be filled." Integrated constituencies ("college unique") and women's suffrage went into effect in July of 1958. On 9 October 1958 instructions were given and publicized to the effect that all political groups should freely express their views (excluding those individuals held on penal charges) so that a genuine electoral competition should occur. Numerous elections took place.

First of all, and in spite of the FLN's orders to abstain from voting, the Moslems participated in great numbers in the national referendum of September 1958 pertaining to the official birth of the Fifth Republic and its institutions. Secondly, a program of elections at several levels was devised: elections to the French National Assembly in November of 1958, municipal elections in March of 1959, senatorial elections in May, 1959, cantonal elections in May 1960, plus elections to the various professional chambers, etc.

On the economic and social level the launching of the Constantine Plan by General de Gaulle himself ("It is a question of profoundly transforming this country which is so alive and so courageous but so difficult and suffering"), helped to promote rapid economic development. At the same time such measures as the emancipation of Moslem women, the appointment of Moslems to public positions,
and broader opportunity for professional training, looked toward the reform of Moslem society and the improvement of living conditions. Paul Delouvrier, a noted economist, was appointed Delegate General for Algeria in December of 1959 and was placed in charge of all civil powers, while General Challe exercised military powers.

Lastly, where running of the war was concerned, steps were taken to reduce the emotional impact of the struggle. A Committee to Safeguard Individual Rights was formed on 13 August 1958. Public instructions were given to the command to ensure that repressive operations would use only legitimate methods. Lastly, pardons and liberations were carried out in several cases. (As for Ben Bella and his companions, they were transferred first to a fortified enclosure and then to a guarded residence.)

Thus was the ground laid for General de Gaulle to launch his solemn appeal for the "Peace of the Brave" on 23 October 1958, which was addressed equally to the fighters within Algeria and to the FLN leaders outside Algeria, indicating that the former could contact the command and the latter the French embassies abroad.

This appeal was periodically renewed (notably during the message to the nation on 30 January 1959, the press conference of 25 March, the speech on self-determination of 16 September 1959). On 14 June 1960 de Gaulle gave it particular urgency by declaring to the leaders of the rebellion (the Si Salah affair had just proved that the offer for the "peace of the brave" attracted certain of the leaders within Algeria) that he was "waiting for them in Paris to conclude with them an honorable end to the continued fighting, to settle the peace, and to safeguard the position of the fighters."
Since the military offensive had borne fruit, and the effort to transform Algeria had been undertaken but the offer of the "peace of the brave" had not produced any results, General de Gaulle decided in September of 1959 to relaunch his political attack. In a radio-televised speech he set forth his views on the future of Algeria. On the one hand he proclaimed with particular solemnity the right of the Algerian people to self-determination. On the other hand he indicated the broad lines along which self-determination could be put into effect. The condition was that peace be re-established either through negotiation with the FLN or through conclusive victory on the part of the French forces. The second condition was that a period of peace (a maximum of four years) should follow, after which the vote on the future of Algeria (with three possibilities - Frenchification, complete independence, or association with France) could be cast under conditions of total freedom. The FLN would take part in the political life thus created on an equal footing with all other Algerian political factions.

Under this plan General de Gaulle refused to grant the FLN special rights. He specified clearly that he did not want, under any circumstances, to recognize before the vote for self-determination the leaders of the rebellion as representatives of the Algerian people. He therefore refused on the one hand to negotiate with the FLN on any level other than that of the military terms of the cease-fire (or to "grant them the privilege of negotiating with them on the future of Algeria, which would have thus baptized them as the Algerian government") and on the other hand to consider them, after the cease-fire, as
anything more than one of the political factions of the Algerian nation ("The men who constitute the political organization of the uprising...will have, like all others - no more, no less - the voice and the position granted them by their rights as citizens.").

This 16 September 1959 plan played a very large role in the outcome of the Algerian affair. The FLN accepted the principle but refused the conditions imposed by General de Gaulle. They attempted to negotiate about the political future of Algeria and to profit from de facto recognition as the official and sole representative of the Algerian people. Until November 1960, General de Gaulle would not modify his stand and the conflict remained at a standstill, with each adversary trying to make the other yield. However, in the last phase of the conflict, both protagonists gave ground.

The failure of the first attempts at negotiation in Melun in June of 1960 can only be explained by this disagreement in the interpretation of de Gaulle's proposals. The exploratory delegation sent by the FLN to France after the renewal of the offer for negotiation made by the General in his 14 June 1960 speech indicated that its mission was to organize political talks. The French delegates were under strict orders from General de Gaulle only to discuss the military organization of the cease-fire...Therefore, this first and brief meeting could have no immediate results or later consequences.

While sticking to the broad outlines of his 16 September 1959 plan (and continuing the military offensive as well as an attempt at a political-economic transformation of Algeria), the General continued in his many
speeches during trips or visits outside of Paris, to fill in the picture of his vision of the future Algeria.

De Gaulle renewed his opposition to political conversations with the FLN as long as "the knives have not been left in the vestry"; he opposed the "hoax of independence" ("it is poverty, unemployment, catastrophe"); and proclaimed that the necessary evolution would occur "within a French framework" and would protect the ties between France and Algeria. But, at the same time, the General specified that "Algeria will be Algerian"; that it would be associated with France but would have "its own institutions, governments, justice, assemblies" (9 July 1960). At last, in his 4 November 1960 Press Conference, the General painted a complete picture of "Algerian" Algeria, "liberated...with its own government, institutions, laws," but still "tied to France through economics, technology, schools, defense." Leading the way to negotiation, he even pronounced the magic words "Algerian Republic."

While evoking this increasingly liberal vision of the Algeria of tomorrow, General de Gaulle was at the same time attempting to prove that it could be built without the FLN. Hence the establishment in July 1960 of the "Commissions of the Elect" whose purpose was to advise the Government on reforms to be effected (and in the forthcoming referendum, from November 1960 on, the provision for the possibility - before the vote for self-determination - of setting up provisional executive and advisory bodies).

c) At this point General de Gaulle's plan of action seemed clear. On the one hand, by his military
offensive, he was trying to destroy the armed potential of the rebellion. On the other hand, he was aiming through a political offensive to render continuation of the rebellion unnecessary. (This point was particularly emphasized by de Gaulle when, after presenting on 16 September 1959 his plan for self-determination, he asked, "What then can be the meaning of the rebellion?")

Obviously these political-military pressure tactics bore more heavily on the active combatants of the rebellion than on the Moslem population. De Gaulle was trying above all to attack the maquis fighters with the "peace of the brave" in 1958. He was trying to put pressure on the FLN leaders outside of Algeria through his proclamation of the right to self-determination and through his picture of an "Algerian Algeria." Never did de Gaulle address the Moslem masses directly, though dialogue with the people is one of his usual methods of action. ("Together we are going to build the fraternal Algeria of tomorrow" could have its place in an anthology of Gaullist phrases...but he did not ever say it.)

Of course General de Gaulle did launch a program for the transformation of the political, economic, and social life of Algeria which aimed at satisfying the aspirations of the Moslem people, but his main concern was nonetheless with re-integration of the rebels into the renovated Franco-Algerian Community. Psychological action on the population was thus carried out, but more as a complement of action directed against the rebellion than as an end
in itself.*

3) The Significance of the French Offensive

The success of the French offensive is undeniable. On the military level the insurgency was noticeably regressing. On the political level, the Moslem population as well as the fighters within Algeria and the FLN leaders abroad were strongly impressed by the liberal promises of General de Gaulle.

However, these victories brought no conclusive results. The rebel fighters within Algeria did not lay down their arms, the FLN did not accept the terms laid down by de Gaulle, and the Moslem population simply waited. The arrival in Paris of Si Salah and the leaders of Wilaya IV, and the arrival in Melun of an FLN delegation momentarily seemed to indicate a possible thaw, but in the end all of de Gaulle's efforts were in vain.

a) Though the FLN was less intransigent toward the French government under de Gaulle than it was under the Fourth Republic, the FLN still refused to accept

---

*This direction of the major effort against the rebellion is what differentiates de Gaulle's offensive from classic counterinsurgency action which is usually directed toward the population itself. In addition to the many other factors which limited the effects of de Gaulle's offensive, it can be argued that this conception, which certainly played a role, produced only partial results. Since the FLN did not surrender, de Gaulle was obliged to negotiate with them. As for psychological action on the population, it could not be completely effective because it was not the primary objective and also because the rebellion benefited from the de facto recognition de Gaulle gave it. Therefore the Moslems, though recognizing the benefits of de Gaulle's action, could legitimately wait to take sides with him until his efforts with the FLN were successful.
"unconditional surrender." While accepting the right to self-determination, the FLN wanted to discuss the "guarantees." Though stating that it was ready to order the cease-fire, the FLN proclaimed its need to know the "political terms."

Their reason for such a position is obvious. Rather than give in to General de Gaulle and re-enter political life in Algeria under conditions established by him and after a delay which would risk decreasing their importance, the rebel leaders outside Algeria did not want to barter away their means of political and military action except for tangible and immediate advantages.

It seems that in spite of the French offensive, the FLN leaders still held important trumps. Thanks to their refuge in Tunisia the FLN had a military and political machine in being. Of course it could no longer use its military machine in Algeria or even equip the maquis. But conditions in Tunisia and Morocco allowed the FLN to form two armies in these countries (armies of 25,000 and 15,000 men). The aid of the Arab countries and the Soviet bloc even permitted arming these forces in a modern fashion, which was moreover completely out of keeping with their actual needs.

On the political level de Gaulle's offensive lead the FLN to set up in Tunis, after 19 September 1958 and under the presidency of Ferhat Abbas, a "provisional government of the Algerian Republic" (CPRA), which increased even more the possibilities for international action. Recognized and supported by the Arab and Afro-Asiatic countries (and notably by Communist China), the CPRA also had on its side those western nations favoring
decolonization. On 13 December 1958 in the U.N., the Afro-Asian motion proclaiming the right of the Algerian people to independence and recommending the opening of negotiations between the GPRA and France failed of adoption by only one vote.

In 1959 and 1960 the international position of the GPRA was strengthened. After the triumphant welcome of an FLN delegate to Peking in December of 1958, Ferhat Abbas himself was royally welcomed in Moscow and Peking in September of 1960. And it was only because of General de Gaulle's liberal stand on the question of self-determination and an Algerian Algeria that France could prevent the U.N. from endorsing the FLN's arguments and demands (notably in December of 1960, the organization of a referendum for self-determination under the control of the United Nations).

While making progress in the international arena, the FLN was also improving its position in French public opinion. Goaded by the spectacle of weak and sketchy attempts at contact, an important segment of the left criticized the slowness of these attempts and made increasingly insistent demands for a negotiated solution. In February of 1960 the police discovered a network for the support of the FLN which was inspired by the philosopher Francis Jeanson. In September of 1960 important intellectuals signed a manifesto proclaiming the right of the French soldier to "insubordination." Though such "tumult" upset de Gaulle only slightly, the FLN nonetheless thought it had solid allies.

Lastly, in Algeria proper, the FLN was not entirely stripped of means of action. Its bands were exterminated
but terrorism allowed them to maintain a climate of war. Moreover the international victories, the favorable opinion of the French left, and the existence of a liberating army in Tunisia and Morocco were easily exploited to show that "rebellion continues" in spite of heavy losses and the generous proposals of General de Gaulle. The OPA took admirable advantage of the circumstances to extend its influence, particularly in large cities where the French forces had great difficulty in combating it.

b) The fighters of the maquis within Algeria bore the entire weight of the French offensive and therefore showed the most exhaustion. Though a few bands continued to rally (notably the "dissident" band of Ali Khabibi, in the Souk-Ahras region, at the beginning of 1959) and the number of prisoners increased noticeably, it was only at the beginning of 1960 that an event of sweeping significance occurred: the negotiations between the heads of Wilaya IV (Si Salah and his two political and military deputies, Si Lahcen and Si Mohamed) and the French authorities.

Though the enterprise seemed to be drawing to a successful conclusion (in June 1960 the rebel leaders were received in secret in Paris, by General de Gaulle himself, and they tried hard to make an arrangement concerning Wilayas III and V), it floundered nonetheless just as the goal was imminent. Si Mohamed changed his mind, got rid of his two accomplices, and swore allegiance to the GPRA.

The circumstances of this spectacular "missed chance" have given and will continue to give rise to many interpretations, but it proves above all that the effects of
de Gaulle's offensive, though stronger on the fighters in the maquis than on the GPRA, did not in the end produce any positive results. *

* Though General Challe's interpretation that General de Gaulle deliberately sabotaged the negotiations with Si Salah does not bear up under examination, (General Challe himself dropped it during his trial), the theory that General de Gaulle committed a tactical error when he asked the GPRA to come to Paris for negotiations in his 14 June speech is more valid. By throwing out such an offer, in fact, the General could cause the leaders within Algeria, with whom he had begun diplomatic talks, to reflect on the advantages of a "separate peace." In fact, it seems almost certain that the 14 June 1960 speech was more intended by de Gaulle as a reminder of the general basis of his strategy (a permanent offer to negotiate on the cease-fire with the FLN) than as a specific tactical move (to such an extent that he was surprised by the GPRA's acceptance as well as by Si Mohamed's reaction).

However, there may have been other factors: 1) by wishing to avoid indiscretions or sabotage, General de Gaulle had not allowed the use of an intelligence organization to "protect" the operation (such an organization could have detected the hesitations of Si Mohamed and taken the necessary steps); 2) the concrete advantages offered by the General were rather slight and at the level of "have confidence in me and you will have an important place in the Algeria of tomorrow"; 3) in any case, the hesitations which were encountered (the desire of the rebel leaders to speak only to General de Gaulle, the hesitations of Si Salah and Si Lahcen, the turnabout of Si Mohamed) proved the difficulties of an undertaking which in any case may not have snowballed to include the other wilayas.

Nonetheless, on a purely operational level this episode certainly gives food for thought, and one may conclude 1) that General de Gaulle has difficulty in mounting a concrete tactical operation, 2) that he is more inclined to rely, as a means of acting upon reality, on the effect of historical-political formulae which have a general application, 3) that he does not always foresee the tactical effects of these formulae, 4) that the main objective of his offensive was not very clearly defined,
c) As for the Moslem population, it can be placed in the category of those who just waited and in the General's own words, caused him to "waste his time in Algeria."

Neither the effort to transform Algeria through the Constantine Plan with its associated social reforms, nor the attempt to create a real political life through frequent elections ended in creating a factor which might have influenced the relationship of the conflicting forces. Of course, the promise made by General de Gaulle that Algeria would henceforth be "totally French" raised the spirit of the people; but the economic expansion, great as it was, could not noticeably raise the standard of living and completely remedy from one day to the next such social ills as unemployment and poverty. Participation of the voters in the September 1958 referendum which established the Fifth Republic may have set a record (almost 98 per cent) in spite of the FLN's orders to abstain, but this victory was not renewed. Participation in the cantonal or municipal elections reached only about 50 to 60 per cent, but could not create a current similar to that made by the vote taken after the shock of 13 May where it was a question of saying "yes" to General de Gaulle even when the Moslems did not know whether he

*(continued) though the external leadership of the FLN seems to have been the most important target, 5) in order to defeat the FLN leaders the General relied more on the statement of certain truths and the consequences of a general military offensive or an effort at economic-political transformation of Algeria than on tactical steps like the rallying of the wilayas or the destruction of the outside sanctuary.
intended to maintain French authority or envisaged a more liberal future for Algeria.

As for the élite thus revealed, they never constituted a force - even potentially - on which it would have been possible to lean. Some of them remained inseparably tied to the Army and the Colons in the purest "Colonial Algeria" style which was denounced by the General. Most of them, however, preferred to support secretly an FLN whose chances seemed considerable and which always retained the capability of punishing any too serious engagement with the French. The conditions for the creation of that "great party for Algerian progress" evoked by de Gaulle in his 10 November 1959 press conference were never made clear.

The proclamation of the right to self-determination, the description of an "Algerian" Algeria produced the greatest effects, but while they heightened de Gaulle's prestige and popularity, they did not destroy the power of the FLN. Though trusting de Gaulle to build a new Algeria, the Moslem masses, especially in the nationalist bastions of the Constantine Region and in the large cities where they escaped the control of the Army, did not really understand the nature of the disagreement between de Gaulle and the FLN. In December of 1950 General de Gaulle's trip to Algeria was marked by resounding and candid cries of "Vive de Gaulle, Vive le FLN."

4) The Development of European Activism

The unfolding of General de Gaulle's political offensive produced, however, the opposite effect on the European population. Little by little the Europeans from Algeria broke away from de Gaulle and then openly opposed him in an increasingly rebellious atmosphere.
After General de Gaulle's return to power, the Europeans accused him of not becoming more openly the champion of French Algeria and of integration. But the prudent vagueness of General de Gaulle's position, the euphoria which followed the 13th of May, the unshakeable optimism of the Army in its operational tasks, did not allow the European masses - which were from the outset rather erratic and unstable, divided into groups almost paranoid in their extremism and sharply divided among themselves - to go beyond the stage of hesitancies and regrets.

On the other hand, the 16 September 1959 proclamation of the right to self-determination created more explosive conditions. The Europeans openly began to consider themselves betrayed, and the groups which had organized the 13th of May (the Veterans of the Pilot Arnould, the French National Front of the cabaret owner Ortiz, student associations sponsored by Lagailarde and Susini, the "Popular Movement of 13 May" organized by Doctor Martel) not only became virulent again, but also enjoyed renewed popularity and a kind of unity. The Army itself began to question whether it made sense to go on fighting, since it felt that de Gaulle's liberalism both strengthened the FLN and prevented the Army from acting effectively on the Moslem population. However, for a certain period General Challe succeeded in calming these qualms of conscience by ordering the Army to choose, from the three possible solutions set forth by General de Gaulle, "Frenchification," -- which did not clarify the minds of sophisticated Moslems who thought (with reason) that de Gaulle favored "association."
A chance event then set fire to the powder keg. General Massu expressed his doubts about de Gaulle's policies to a German journalist (who hastened to print them), and it was therefore necessary to recall the victor of the "Battle of Algiers." As always, in Algiers the truth is distorted by rumors. Massu was said to be the victim of a "provocation" from the Élysée Palace, and it was rumored that the Committee of Algerian Affairs was meeting on 22 January to discuss the "abandonment of Algeria." Tension was rising, as the terrorist campaign unleashed by the FLN in the region of Algiers was in full career. Street demonstrations were organized on 24 January 1960 for the recall of General Massu. The demonstrations turned into riots, and by the end of the evening, while the gendarmes were trying to break up the crowds, a burst of rifle fire caused 22 dead and 147 wounded (14 dead and 123 wounded from the side of the established order).

The 13th of May did not recur, but two rioting groups (directed by Lagaillarde and Ortiz) remained for a week in fortified strong points. Great pressure on the Army (and a solemn appeal from General de Gaulle) were required to break down these "barricades."

A period of relative calm then began in Algiers. The 24 January 1960 drama proved to the Europeans the impossibility of causing a revolution or even influencing those in power in Paris. This impression was strengthened by the replacement of General Challe and most of the officers who had not shown sufficient strength in controlling the demonstration. For a while the European population tried to act through legal means. After the 14 June speech a single organization, the "French Algeria
Front" (FAF) replaced the various activist groups which were for the most part disbanded after 24 January.

In spite of massive adhesions of Europeans in Algeria and support from the Metropole (the regrouping of personalities favoring French Algeria within the "Committee of Vincennes," the formation of a "National Front of French Algeria," the FNAF, in Paris, the striking stand taken by General Salan who went into exile in Spain where Ortiz had already taken refuge and where Lagaillarde was to flee at the time of the trials of the barricades), the FAF was no more able to make its voice heard by General de Gaulle than the General was impressed by the "two enemy camps - that of sterile immobility and that of cheap desertion." When de Gaulle took the path of a negotiated solution with the FLN, the European population of Algeria turned back to their former demons.

In the meantime the 24 January 1960 barricades continued to make their effects felt. With the replacement of General Challe by the classic General Crepin (and later by General Gambiez and General Ailleret) the Army, already morally weakened by the affair of the barricades, lost some of its fighting spirit. The FLN hoped that the slowdown of the military offensive and the weakening of de Gaulle's position in Algeria and the Metropole would cause him to compromise, especially since the difficulties created for the General by the Europeans and the Army made more doubtful the advantages to be drawn from a pure and simple rallying to his position. As for the Moslem masses, throughout they put their faith in General de Gaulle, but the split among the Europeans diminished European prestige, heightened the attractions of the nationalist cause,
or brightened the charms of simply waiting.

By the end of 1960 the French offensive had lost much of its steam.
PART II

INSURGENCY
I. INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

The Front de libération nationale (FLN) claims to have learned from the Viet Minh that the principal asset on which an insurgency can count is the "stupidity" and the "ignorance" of the enemy.*

1) In fact, if the necessity to know the enemy, his aims and methods, and to fight the same type of war he is carrying on are almost self-evident factors, their practical application in the field of counterinsurgency often seems very difficult.

a) At the outset, an organized insurgency always has the initiative. It chooses the moment most favorable for starting insurgent activities.

b) Since recourse to insurgent methods stems partly from the impossibility of attaining certain aspirations in legal and peaceful ways, the first reaction of the established power can only be repressive. However, the organizers of an insurgency, fully aware of this probable reaction of the established power, count on this very reaction to reach their objectives.

c) Therefore, if the insurgency quite naturally achieves a fusion between the politico-psychological aspects of its action and its insurgent methods, the established power encounters much greater difficulties in achieving a synthesis of the different aspects (political, psychological, military, and police) of its action.

*For declarations to that effect of leaders of the Algerian insurrection, see Mandouze: La révolution algérienne par les textes. Masspero, Paris, (date).
Political factors (such as initial rejection of certain aspirations which make the launching of the insurgency possible), emotional factors (hatred for the rebel, and therefore for those who support him, indignation over his atrocities, fear of being overthrown or killed by him), technical factors (use of the police and of the army which - in a pre-insurgent environment - are prepared mostly for repressive operations or routine military action), all these factors obscure the judgment and paralyze counterinsurgent action, sometimes long after the beginning of operations.

d) Since insurgent (and counterinsurgent) operations bear fruit only slowly, the established order becomes aware only gradually of its errors and of the success of the enemy.

e) Thus, it is very rare for the established power to be immediately aware of the seriousness of the threat posed against it at the moment an organized insurgency is launched. As a rule, a strong reaction occurs only after the insurgency has already achieved important results.

And still more time is needed to organize a reaction truly suited to rebel action, as long as the political, emotional, and technical factors mentioned before obscure the judgment and paralyze the counter-action.

2) A thorough knowledge of the insurgency (of its causes, objectives, and methods) appears therefore to be the first stage in a counter-move fully adapted to the types of action which it employs.
3) Moreover, this knowledge is the more indispensable as the similarities observed in past insurgencies regarding strategic objectives (winning over of the population), methods (combined use of violence and politico-psychological approach), and techniques (guerrilla warfare in rural districts, terror in urban zones, policing and indoctrinating the population), disguise the profound differences in all insurgent situations, and therefore also between the forms which the counterinsurgent action must take.
II. INSURGENT MOTIVATIONS

1. THE CAUSE AND THE PLATFORM

The first task in assessing a given insurgency is a precise determination of its causes and motivations.

1) Most frequently, one of the main motivations of the insurgent leaders is political ambition and the subsequent wish to assume and exercise power. Of course, other motivations among "fighting activists" are ambition and a taste for adventure and loot.

But both leaders and combatants also believe - most of them with sincerity and ardor - in a cause which justifies as well as necessitates their action. To a French officer puzzled by the fact that General de Gaulle had offered a "peace of the brave" to the FLN fellaghias, who to him were but "bandits," de Gaulle replied: "Possibly all Algerian bandits are fellahs, but, I am sure that not all fellahs are bandits."

2) Moreover, this very cause serves the insurgency as a political and psychological platform.* The appeal which this cause has for the population constitutes one of the basic and most effective weapons of the insurgent leaders in their conquest of the population.

3) One may even say that any insurgent action which is not based on a cause capable of winning over the population (either because the leaders totally lack ideologico-political inspiration, or because they support a cause

*The term "platform" was used by the FLN. This is the title given to the Charter of the insurgency which was issued by the "Soummam Congress" in August 1956.
which - in content or presentation - goes against the aspirations of the masses, or because the mass of population displays complete or very strong indifference) is bound to fail. Its failure is brought about by classical army and police operations. *

a) Most operations launched by special services or by alien groups against other countries seem to have failed, partly for these reasons, particularly when these operations met with regimes controlling strong military and police forces and also practicing indoctrination and strict policing of the population.

b) An interesting example of this can be found in a country where two insurgent movements opposed to each other are engaged in subversive actions and advocate the same objectives.

Such was the case in Algeria in the open and very bloody fight between the FLN and the Movement National Algérien (MNA). The FLN crushed the MNA, undoubtedly because it was militarily stronger, but also, and chiefly, because, in the eyes of the people, it seemed better qualified to defend the cause at stake. The prestige of the leader of the MNA, Messali Hadj, spiritual father of Algerian nationalism, could not compensate for the bad impression made by his advanced age, the shortcomings of his organization, and for the fact that his use of violence started after that of the FLN.

The defeat of Mihailovich by Tito can also be explained by the lesser politico-psychological appeal

*The terms "rebellion" and "counter rebellion" can be applied to this type of situation.
of his platform as well as by a very inferior technique of indoctrinating and policing the population.

c) It is therefore the strength of appeal contained in the cause and in the insurrectional platform which must be carefully examined from the double viewpoint of content and presentation by the insurgent force.

4) The motives which the leaders of the insurrection invoke in justification of their actions and in securing the support of the population appeal to:

a) fairly simple feelings rooted in elementary but basic aspirations of the people.

Thus, the doctrine of the FLN was practically limited to (1) "independence," (2) "unity and sovereignty of the Algerian People," (3) "democratic and social revolution."

The OAS, on the other hand, used the theme of "Preservation of French Algeria," which expressed the profound wish of the French population of Algeria to keep all its privileges intact.

b) A double set of feelings, some negative, some positive.

2. NEGATIVE FEELINGS

The influence of the insurgent group and the success of its action are greatly furthered by the existence of a profound negative sentiment against the established system and power.

a) hatred of the Nazi occupiers is the reason for the success of the resistance movements in occupied Europe.
b) hatred of the whites is one of the characteristics of colonial type insurgencies. In Indochina, where racist feeling was stronger than in Algeria, France met with far more difficult problems. In Algeria, it is not so much the white man as such, nor the Frenchman in general, who stirred up negative reactions, but the French colon. Rebellious feelings against the colonial system were chiefly focused on him (and not on the people of Metropolitan France).

c) the feeling that the established power is unjust seems, indeed, to play a decisive role in the negative feelings underlying an insurrection.

In Algeria, the feeling of political injustice seems to have played a more important role than racial hatred. "Colonial oppression" was fought because it aimed at maintaining forever the dominant position of the European colons. The feeling of injustice stemmed from the fact that Ben Bella, despite his rather remarkable military record, was only an adjutant in the Army; that Krim Belkacem had been denied a job as constable, which, instead, was given to a creature of the Administration; that Abbane, the political head of the movement, could only hope for a secretarial position in a town-hall. This feeling of injustice seems to have served the FLN propaganda better than a feeling of social and economic injustice derived from the fact that the richest lands were in the hands of the French colons.

In the cities, the FLN certainly found support among the slum-dwellers, but its strongest support came from the middle-class in the Casbah and from the new housing developments around Algiers.
d) it is possible, however, that in underdeveloped countries, worse off than Algeria, rebellious feelings against the established power may be aroused by a feeling of economic injustice.

e) in contrast, the Organization de l'Armée Sécrète (OAS) was markedly out of favor, because the wish to preserve the existing privileges clashed with the feeling of rebellion which underlies any insurrectional action. The rebellion aimed at long-range and unobtainable goals (such as at General de Gaulle and "power in Paris"). The best way to express it was participation in street demonstrations against these goals (a typical example is furnished by the riots of December 1960, incited by General de Gaulle's trip to Algeria). Hatred for the Arab (considered a FLN rebel) and of the "liberal" Frenchman (considered a traitor) led to numerous individual attempts against the lives of people (or to sabotage aimed at leaving only "scorched earth" for the FLN). But such attempts could not promote any serious politico-strategic objectives.

3. **POSITIVE ASPIRATIONS**

The negative feeling toward the established order must be embodied in a positive aspiration.

a) In the case of FLN nationalism, the rebellion against colonial oppression (and, incidentally, the hatred for the colon) clashed with the aim of independence. The accomplishment of independence appeared as the solution of all individual and societal problems.

- on the one hand, independence was seen as offering to everyone a possibility of obtaining political
promotion and a higher standard of living (the latter wish seems to have been less pronounced in Algeria than the former. For instance, the FLN program for land distribution was one of the least effective propaganda subjects).

- on the other hand, independence appeared as the only means of fulfilling the collective hopes of a society imbued with nationalism (hence FLN propaganda) on the theme of "struggle of the Algerian people," etc.)

- actually, such a mixture of individual and collective hopes, embodied in a kind of ideological panacea, and combined with rebellious feelings against the established power and order, seems to provide a solid and efficient platform for insurrections.

b) If the positive hope, exploited by the insurgent leaders, is to appear as a constructive goal, this goal must be realizable.

Typically enough, the nationalistic claims which originated before World War II found an outlet in insurgencies only after the war. Undoubtedly, the war sensitized the native masses, introduced the use of violence and weakened the prestige of the European powers, but it also gave the impression that the historic hour of independence had arrived and that postwar conditions made it politically feasible.

The quick collapse of the OAS after the ceasefire with the FLN can be ascribed in part to the impression on the part of the European population that the preservation of French Algeria was a dream rather than a reality. The fear of opposing a system which henceforth was to be in Moslem hands, and the possibility of gaining complete safety by leaving for France have also played their role,
but chiefly it was that the cause which would have justified and motivated an eventual fight appeared unrealizable from the political point of view.

4. EXPLOITATION OF FEELINGS AND ASPIRATIONS

To exploit to the fullest the importance of negative feelings of the population and to intensify the persuasive power of positive aspirations are the foremost propagandistic tasks of the insurgent leaders.

a) The propaganda techniques are fully known.

They comprise:

- definition of an action-idea expressed in a key word which crystallizes the total of positive aspirations and negative feelings. The words "independence" and "French Algeria" served as battle cries for the FLN and the OAS.

- search for the simplest possible propaganda themes (such as, "national war of liberation," "struggle against French colonialism," "rise of the people," "unity of the Algerian people," "indivisibility of the Algerian territory," "social and democratic revolution," etc.). A French author* marvels at the "intellectual poverty" of the FLN doctrine (the "manifesto" drawn up on November 1, 1954, at the time of the start of the insurrection, covers only one page; the "Soummam platform" has but a few pages). But it seems, on the contrary, that the very simplicity of the themes, the ease with which the people can absorb them, their emotional rather than intellectual content,

---

constitute the psychological trump-cards of an insurrection.

- endless repetition of these themes; etc.

b) The emotional impact of the slogans, the way they express both negative feelings and positive aspirations, undeniably plays a role in the success of the insurrection. The motto of the insurgent group (or party) is important in this respect.

Thus, the motto FLN ("Front de libération nationale") seems almost perfect because of its simplicity and banality. The "Front" suggests an idea of unity, strength and fighting spirit. "Libération nationale" is an almost perfect expression (cf. its use by Soviet theorists) which sums up the positive aspirations (the Algerian nation exists and must be free) and the negative feelings (the Algerian nation must be liberated) in a formula of aggressiveness.

The name MNA ("Mouvement National Algérien") did not possess comparable persuasive power because it lacked shock expressions with regard to positive aspirations and negative feelings.

Another nationalist movement which started toward the end of the war in defense of independence and cooperation was not any happier in the choice of its motto. The FAAD ("Front Algérien d'Action Démocratique"), trying to apply methods from the "totalitarian" actions of the FLN, and seeking to satisfy the aspirations in favor of political and social rebirth, missed not only the plain aspirations for independence but also the negative feeling against the existing system.
Both the MNA and the FAAD fully realized the loss they suffered because their programs failed to embody the concept of "national liberation." Both tried not only to establish maquis units, but they also called these "Army of National Liberation" (thereby attempting to deprive the FLN of the prestige which its ALN gave it).

As for the OAS ("Organisation de l'Armée Secrète"), its name expressed no specific objective but only a means (with a persuasion factor contained in the ideas of violence and secrecy), but later on it took over an organization which succeeded in carrying with it a large part of the European population, namely, the FAF ("Front pour l'Algérie Française"), before it was dissolved for that very reason.

c) The final condition for the success of insurgent propaganda rests with effective integration of propaganda with politico-military action.*

In the area of psychological and strategic action the success of the FLN is due to the fact that it proved its ability to carry on effectively a war of national liberation. Thus, the victories of the ALN illustrate the theme of "national liberation" which inspired them.

In the area of psychological tactics, indoctrination of the people goes hand in hand with organization and policing. By policing the population, and by forcing it often to rally at its side, the FLN made the people susceptible to its propaganda (and vice-versa).

---

*Cf. pp. below.
In other words, propaganda, for the FLN, was not a means \textit{per se}, but part and parcel of the twofold propaganda action - policing and indoctrination.

By contrast, the OAS was never able (or never wished) to achieve such an integration. Its propaganda activities were practically independent. They were therefore much less effective.
III. TYPES OF INSURGENCY

If we agree that an insurgency holds a chance for success only if it has the support of the people's aspirations, then it is important, in designing appropriate counter-action, to determine quickly under what conditions an insurgent movement arises and develops.

1. SPONTANEOUS AND ORGANIZED INSURGENCIES

1) A first distinction can be made between spontaneous and organized insurgencies. Thus, in occupied Europe, the rebellious feelings against the occupier were strong enough for insurgent action to rise almost spontaneously from small isolated units or even from individuals. Only after that did organized resistance take shape.

- On the one hand, it was intensified, helped (and unified) by the allies who only had to play on the negative sentiments of the population.

- On the other hand, (especially in Eastern Europe where aspirations for political change existed) organized groups tried (and often successfully) to channel this deep-seated revolt against the occupier toward an aspiration for political, economic, and social renewal. These groups, engaging in "double insurgency" (against the Germans and against the former regime), tried out modern insurgent methods which combined - in contradiction to Allied resistance movements - the use of violence with psychological warfare in the pursuit of their second objective.

2) The second type of insurgency exists in a situation where a limited group of individuals decides to
organize a nationwide insurgency in order to overthrow the established regime.

A typical case is found in the manner in which the nine "historic leaders" of the Algerian rebellion, after having created a very small para-military organization (OS - "Organization Spéciale"), decided to launch an insurgent movement on November 1, 1954, in the mountains of Aurès. The belief that the cause of independence could secure the support of the population and that it could not be advanced through the legal channels by which the nationalist Algerian parties were stymied (the PPA of Messali Hadj and the UDMA of Ferhat Abbas) played a vital part in this decision.

In other cases, the insurgent group may have at its disposal either a large fighting group (the Viet Minh employing the anti-Japanese Maquis) or even a political party (Néo-Destour in Tunisia).

3) The OAS presents a mixed type partaking more of the first than of the second category.

In fact, the hope of the European masses to see their privileges preserved in "French Algeria" led to several sporadic, semi-spontaneous, and semi-insurgent uprisings long before the creation of the OAS (riots against Guy Mollet on February 16, 1956; the revolution of May 13; the barricades of January 24, 1960). This insurgent climate induced General Challe to attempt his coup d'état on April 22, 1961. The OAS as an organization arose only after the failure of these short insurgent thrusts. After the collapse of Challe's putsch, General Salan and Colonels Godard and Garde decided to create a special terror organization in furtherance of the aspirations which had incited these various upheavals.
2. INDEPENDENT AND REMOTE-CONTROLLED INSURGENCIES

Another distinction can be made between autonomous and remote-controlled insurgencies, the latter including mainly those inspired, provoked, and supported by international communism.

a) Communist insurgencies make full use of the negative feeling of hatred or revolt and the positive aspiration toward greater justice and well-being which can be found underlying any insurgency. Moreover, they seem especially expert in intensifying and exploiting these feelings and aspirations. Their approach consists in demonstrating that communism is the only and the most effective method of achieving the desired aims.

b) A common error is to label every insurgency communist. Since communism appears to the counter-insurgents as the embodiment of evil, it is a temptation for the more ardent among them to find a simple reason for their fight by labeling it anti-communist. Since international communism rarely fails to give support in some form or another to the insurgencies which threaten the Western world, numerous "proofs" of collusion can be brought forth to confirm this assertion.

For instance, a small part of the French Army always held that the FLN was communist-inspired. The trips of FLN leaders to China and Moscow, the provision of Soviet bloc arms for the rebels, and the use of communist propaganda techniques supported this opinion. In fact, the FLN leaders were (and are) not influenced
by communism in any manner whatever, * even though they were impressed by some of its achievements (like Ben Khedda in China) and eager to obtain its help (said Ben Bella: "I'd sign up with the devil himself if need be").

c) However, a precise evaluation of the relationships between an autonomous insurgency and international communism seems the more necessary since the

*FLN opposition to communism derives from the pan-Arabic and Islamic ideology of some of its leaders (Ben Bella). It also derives from French socialist doctrines held by men like Boudiaf and Dahlab, and also from the basically traditionalist reactions of a Krim Belkacem. The hatred of the PCA (Parti Communiste Algérien), whose elite consisted of communist colons, who had joined the insurgency belatedly, and the disappointment over the coolness of the PCF also explain this opposition. It should be noted that both the PCA and the PCF committedgrave tactical errors vis-à-vis the FLN in underestimating the depth of rebellious feelings against "French domination," and in insisting in "Western" terms on the positive benefits of the communist system.

The PCA tried to recoup from its errors by placing itself completely at the disposal of the FLN (after having initially condemned the "individualistic romanticism" of the "historic leaders," and after having attempted to create a purely communist maquis in Oran - an attempt which was soon neutralized by the French forces, because it did not have any popular support). The PCA then supplied the weapons for the "Battle of Algiers," manufacturing bombs and placing them in the European quarters. Despite the practical breaking up of the PCA through the pitiless oppression carried on by the tenth police division (execution of Audin and Lancelot, interrogation of Alleg as reported in his book "La Question"), it never regained favor with the FLN, which sent it on a suicidal mission without giving it the least recognition for it. As to the PCF, (because of the reactions of the French people, the PCF mostly led a campaign for peace), it never gave the FLN help equivalent to that of certain extremely leftist French groups ("Janson network," "Manifesto in favor of non-surrender," etc.).
prolongation of hostilities and the intensification of armed strife may attract any insurgency to communism.

In itself, the prolongation of hostilities intensifies the negative feelings of the combatants and the leaders while strengthening the position of individuals who are more eager for war and all kinds of adventure than for a sensible policy.

Besides, it permits communism to do the following:

1) step up its aid (in the last phase of the Algerian conflict, the bulk of weapons came from the Soviet bloc, chiefly from Czechoslovakia, but also from the USSR); 2) act as adviser (Ferhat Abbas and Francis had long conferences in 1961 in Moscow with Khrushchev and Kosygin who pointed out to them at great length the advantages of international neutralism and advised them never to negotiate with France on any basis other than full recognition of their independence; Ben Khedda was instructed in Peking on the methods of agrarian collectivization and the technical aspects of the organization of a "socialist state"); and 3) adjust its methods of mass penetration (after their failure with the PAC, the communists concentrated their effort on the penetration and indoctrination of Algerian syndicalism among workers and students.)

Both UGTA (Union générale des travailleurs algériens) and UGEMA (Union générale des étudiants musulmans algériens) were honeycombed with communist agents; trips, scholarships, vacations, etc. behind the iron
In such a situation, where the insurgents are being systematically accused of being communist, but in fact are not, accompanied by a state of actual isolation, serious consequences may ensue. Such accusations may push into the arms of communism people who are not yet communists.

3. "INSIDE" INSURGENCIES AND "INSIDE AND OUTSIDE"

INSURGENCIES

The third distinction concerns "strictly inside insurgencies" and "insurgencies with outside support." This distinction does not necessarily duplicate the second one.

a) For instance, in Malaya, the communist insurgency did not benefit from truly effective outside support.

*In answer to a question raised by Alexander George and Leon Courré, I wish to point out that from the body of information possessed by the French information services it appears that Chinese support was second in importance to Soviet support, which itself lagged behind Maghrebian and Arab support. The only power which directly encouraged the launching of the rebellion was Egypt (through Ben Bella). As far as we know, Chinese support was chiefly a diplomatic and moral kind (visits to Peking). The Soviet Union and its satellites: 1) furnished weapons (China supplied food); 2) trained saboteurs of the OS in Czechoslovakia (in 1959); 3) and urged trade unions to send food supplies and gifts, and set up scholarships, etc.

The fear that China might outbid the USSR and supply more effective aid became a reality only when FLN leaders brought back certain promises from China. However, these never materialized.
b) But the FLN insurrection drew most of its success from the outside support it managed to secure. Taking advantage of Maghrebian and Arab solidarity, and of the appeal of the cause of independence, the FLN managed to set up a chain of outside support, often backing its requests for "fraternal" aid with threats and blackmail:

- logistic support from Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, Egypt, and Iraq.*
- moral and financial support from the Arab League.**
- diplomatic support of the Soviet and Afro-Asiatic blocs.
- moral support from part of the French Left; networks which specialized in propaganda and active support of FLN members in Metropolitan France.

* Tunisia allowed the FLN: 1) to station 15,000 troops near the French frontier, 2) to install its agencies at Tunis (the FLN ministries employed 2,000 persons), 3) to convoy weapons from Libya, Egypt, and Iraq, and to unload them at Tunis.

Morocco allowed 10,000 men to be stationed near the French border. It also acted as intermediary in the purchase of weapons (the arms shipped on the Czech freighter "Lidice," which was searched in March 1959, were intended for the Moroccan Armed Forces).

Libya allowed the transport of weapons through its territory, while Iraq and Egypt sold military surpluses to the FLN.

** However, the main source of FLN funds was the compulsory "collection" among the Moslem populations of France and Algeria.
c) Among the communist-inspired insurgencies which profited from effective outside support are the Viet Minh (after 1949), the Viet-Cong, etc. International communism furnishes moral, financial, and ideological support to every communist insurgency. Whether an insurgency gets logistical support also depends on a key geographical circumstance -- the existence of a communist neighbor state.

d) In contradistinction, the OAS presents a type of insurgency which is almost completely autonomous and isolated. The facilities granted to individuals in Spain (or Italy) were not enough to pose a true problem for France. There again the determining factor was this: The OAS had little power of persuasion.

4. COLONIAL INSURGENCIES

A final distinction is this: the insurgents either belong to the same race as the established power they are fighting, or they do not. The colonial type of insurgency is completely different from the classical type.

Obviously, colonial insurgencies present great difficulties because feelings of rebellion and positive aspirations are usually very strong. Thus the FLN created for France many more problems than did the OAS.
IV. THE METHODS OF INSURGENCY

1. METHODS OF A SPONTANEOUS INSURGENCY

Practices and methods vary according to the types of insurgency. Spontaneous ones (chiefly based on the negative feelings of hatred and rebellion), in general express themselves in fairly simple ways.

1) Riots and Mass Demonstrations

Negative feelings are so strong that they set the masses into motion.*

a) But the reasons and the aims behind the upheaval are quite unclear. Most of the time the reason invoked does not account for the seriousness of the demonstration, nor does the importance of the rioting match the goal to be attained.

Thus, the riots of the European population of May 13, 1958 in Algiers were set off by the "liberal" declarations of the candidate for the presidency of the Council and also by the execution of three prisoners of the FLN. The riots of January 24, 1960 followed the dismissal of General Massu (very popular in Algiers). The riot of November 7, 1960 came after General de Gaulle's trip to Algeria. All these events furnished a "spark" which set off a fire, but other much more explosive events did not have the same effect (the executions of other French prisoners, the arrival of the FLN delegation at Melun and Evian, the announcement of the cease-fire

*In this case one should speak of "revolt" rather than insurgency.
with the FLN, etc.). In those three cases, the aim of the masses, in the beginning, was just to make a noise. But then the masses decided to march on the government buildings ("Everyone to the G.G.!") - General Government - was the rallying cry). In the end, the masses wanted to occupy them.

It should be noted that in such cases, neither the officials responsible for the maintenance of order nor the organizers of the demonstration are able, for the moment, to foresee the scope of the demonstration or of the riot. During the street riots of February 8, 1962 in Paris, a communist leader, having lost control of his troops, philosophically consoled a police commissioner with these words: "With this kind of thing, one only knows how it starts but never how it ends."

b) The situation is slightly different in an organized group which consciously tries

(1) to intensify an uprising (through ringleaders who shout objectives to the masses);
(2) to make it irreversible (armed groups opening fire on the police - a technique used by the FLN whereby the people, often women and children, were surrounded by armed fellahs. This technique, as used by the activist leader Ortiz on January 24, 1960, served to transform an uprising into a riot);
(3) to channel it toward a tactical objective (this objective being communicated to the mass by the ring-leaders);
(4) and to exploit the results of the riots for the attainment of political objectives (game of the Gaullists on May 13 who believed that any serious crisis in Algiers would restore General de Gaulle to power).
But even in this case, the organized group is rarely in a position to foresee the actual consequences of the success which it has obtained, as this very success is contingent on the unpredictable reactions of the masses as well as on the counteraction taken by the police force.

c) Usually the final outcome of such riots (either spontaneous or semi-organized) is quite simple: 1) either they are crushed by force immediately (December 7, 1950), or after some delay (January 24, 1960); or 2) they are victorious, if the established order is neutralized by the rioters in the capital, or if it is paralyzed by the implications of repression (May 13, 1958).

d) It should be noted that spontaneous riots, even when crushed, are often the forerunners of an organized insurgency. Thus the riots of Sétif in 1945 can be considered the cause of the decision of the FLN leaders to establish an organization capable of launching insurrectional action in the future.* One might say, the "Bloody Vespers" of Hanoi were organized by Ho Chi Minh in order to provide a basis for his insurgency.

As a matter of fact, the crushing of an uprising by force has two consequences: 1) the rebellious feelings underlying the revolt are intensified by the violence of the repression; 2) the street riot approach appears dangerous for the participants and not sufficiently effective and safe for the leaders.

2) Guerrilla and Terror Operations

a) The range of objectives is fairly simple:

---

feelings of hatred are expressed in attacks on enemy soldiers or civilians and their military installations.

In the case of the OAS, the basis of its terrorism was the assassination of Moslems by uncontrolled groups or, often, by individuals, whereas the official doctrine of the movement favored fraternal relations between Moslems and Algerians within French Algeria.

b) A group which tries to channel insurgency then meets with great difficulties:

(1) in imposing the selection of objectives which can serve the strategic and tactical aims it seeks; and

(2) in preventing spontaneous murders from obstructing attainment of these objectives. Thus, murders of Moslems committed by the OAS in a welfare center and in a hospital horrified public opinion in France, while General Salan was making all possible propaganda efforts to demonstrate that his movement was morally unassailable. Likewise, the attack by the OAS in March 1962, at Bab-el-Oued, on a regular army patrol was contrary to instruction #29 of Salan, which said that "the OAS offensive" against the Évian Agreements must be directed only against specialized forces employed in repression (such as policemen and CRS) and never against regular army contingents. This mistake dealt a most severe blow to the OAS, because it made it possible for the Government to order the siege of Bab-el-Oued by the Army which - before the patrol incident - hesitated to be openly engaged.

Sometimes it even happens that the insurgent group which tries to exploit a spontaneous insurgency is obliged to modify its objectives in order to adjust them
to the natural expression of the negative feelings in the population. Thus, Colonel Godard took the credit (and more) for the murder of Moslems in the European cities because he saw there an effective means of separating the European quarters (controlled by the OAS) from the Moslem quarters (controlled by the FLN). However, the very idea of "partition" was contrary to all official OAS doctrine on French Algeria "from Dunkirk to Tamanrasset." Of course, the resort to partition could have been caused by tactical necessity (it was, however, never sanctioned by the political leadership of the OAS), but it also stems from the inability of the OAS to prevent the assassination of Moslems in European cities.

c) To the extent to which an organized insurgency makes use of negative feelings, the murders committed in the name of such feelings are not detrimental to it. Thus, the murder of Europeans by Moslems, even when not ordered by the FLN, played into its hands. But, when negotiations were going on between the FLN and France, certain murders undermined its position at the Évian Conference.

2. METHODS OF AN ORGANIZED INSURGENCY

1) As a rule, the use of elaborate and systematic methods is found only in organized insurgencies.

To the extent the insurgent leadership has at the start only weak military and political means, and insofar as its motivations are rational rather than visceral, it employs methods already tested and adapts them to the conditions peculiar to the situation concerned.
2) The goal of the group is to overthrow (or to force the surrender of) the established power. The means used is recourse to violence since so-called legal methods seem ineffective.

a) The insurgents' use of violence, in general, has two characteristics:

(1) The leaders of the insurgency strive to win the total population over to their cause. Therein lies a necessary condition for their success. As a result, they compensate for their numerical weakness and broaden their courses of action against the established order. Furthermore, they create the conditions for replacing a defeated established power with a politico-social structure in accordance with their wishes.

To this end, the insurrectional group places much weight on its propaganda and indoctrination. But, as we have seen, valid propaganda must be bolstered by firm politico-military action while the indoctrination of the people goes hand in hand with its policing and its organization into a combat force.

(2) The insurgent leaders engage in paramilitary operations against the established power. Since, at the outset, the armed forces of the insurgency are much weaker than those of the established power, the insurgents usually compensate for this weakness by the use of guerrilla techniques and street terror. The decisive test of military strength usually takes place only after significant successes have been gained in winning over the population. The numerical inferiority of the insurgents makes them place great importance on the "psychological" factor. For instance, guerrilla (or
terror) operations against the established order, which are based on surprise attacks on enemy forces numerically inferior to the insurgents immediately engaged, are directed more toward demoralization than toward destruction of the enemy's military potential or toward the occupation of strategic targets. Operations are usually selected in terms of their psychological impact upon the population: they try to give the impression that the insurrection is omnipresent and all-powerful. According to the OAS motto: "The OAS strikes when and where it chooses."

One of the traits of para-military operations is the importance that is placed on psychological exploitation. The insurgency, in its propaganda, maximizes its "successes." (At the time of their trial, the OAS leaders Salan and Jouhaud were not clear as to which operations they had actually ordered and which were only claimed by the OAS.)*

A common procedure consists in trying to transform an actual defeat into a mythical victory. A typical example is "the conquest of the city of Bône" by the FLN. In 1959, FLN units from neighboring hills attempted to enter the city. They were stopped and

* The PCF in France employs a similar technique. While the most important demonstrations never have drawn more than 20,000 people at most, Humanité speaks regularly of a popular movement of 200,000 people. Since ordinary observers are unable to determine the exact size of a demonstration and retain only the impression of a big crowd, the police estimates are not taken seriously and even the most reliable political commentators are satisfied with the average of the two numbers, which in the above-mentioned case amounts to over five times the true number of demonstrators.
neutralized after a short and violent fight with automatic weapons in the suburbs. This merely local incident was presented by the FLN (and this was believed by a rather sizable part of the Moslem population outside of Bône) as an occupation of the city, transitory but almost complete.

b) The pursuit of the two objectives (conquest of the population and para-military operations) is therefore closely linked.

The para-military factor is part of any para-political operation: the conquest of the population is made possible through insurgent military "victories."

Therefore, non-FLN movements like the MNA and the FAAD insist on their own "army of liberation" in the maquis.

Likewise, the para-political factor inspires para-military operations: in the initial phase, the insurgents do not try to attain strategic objectives but merely to impress the population (and to demoralize the enemy) while keeping alive.

c) However, the two composites "propaganda - indoctrination" and "para-military action - violence" may (and mostly have to) be separated organizationally for the sake of action.

- Thus the FLN in Algeria had an army (ALN) on the military side and an OPA (Organization politico-administrative) on the political side. Similarly, a very strong OPA (Fédération de France) in France controlled and indoctrinated the 400,000 Moslems living there. When the FLN decided to launch para-military action in France (against the police, political personages, or economic targets), it created an OS (Organization spéciale). This distinction had become necessary because of the
specialization needed for that type of operation and because of the isolation needed for the protection of its agents.

In fact, the separation is more theoretical than actual.

First of all, it does not take place until the insurgency is quite advanced. In the beginning (and at variance with what happened in France), the small insurgent groups hit at anything and engage mostly in para-military action (whether or not this has a psychological impact). Thus, "the decision of the nine" to launch the Algerian insurgency included also the decision to divide Algeria among some of these leaders. Each one was directed "to make the most" of his district. The progress of their respective operations depended on each one's dynamism and on the local conditions encountered. The emphasis was placed on para-military operations and one could witness in Algiers "politicians" like Ben Khedda and Dahlab setting up bombing networks that mixed gangsters with fanatical young girls and communists. At that time, the question of having an OPA or a government had not yet arisen. Only after achieving successes in the country and in the cities did the FLN, on the one hand, create its government outside and its OPA inside, and, on the other hand, focus on the organization of its armed forces (formation of semi-regular units, elimination or absorption of uncontrolled individuals and groups) and their leadership. (The original leaders by now had either been killed or were devoting themselves to the political leadership of the war. Men appeared at the head of the maquis who, like Amirouche, were gang leaders trained exclusively for war.)
Secondly, even when "the military" and "the civilians" have been separated, provision for military-political interaction is made within the organization of the movement. For instance, in the guerrilla zones, a wilaya leader usually has a political assistant in charge of influencing the population and a military assistant in charge of directing the operations. In the cities (or in France) where the OPA is the dominating element, the local leader has the whiphand over the OS.

Thirdly, even with a perfect organization (which rarely happens in an insurgency under military and police pressure and whose organization has to adjust to men and circumstances) there may be duplication. Thus, in France, the OS was standing by in readiness while the "armed groups," assigned the task of "disciplining" the Moslem masses, attacked the police.

3. CONQUEST OF THE POPULATION

We have already seen that the population can be won over only when it manifests both positive aspirations and negative feelings. But - in contradistinction to spontaneous insurgencies - these feelings do not lead to active operations against the established order. The goal of the insurgent leaders should therefore be to shake the masses out of their apathy and to align them with the leaders.

a) In order to get rid of this apathy, the insurgent group aims its efforts in several directions which include both indoctrination and violence.

- First of all, the insurgents try to demonstrate by propaganda that the insurgency is sacred.
justified and indispensable, first because of the loftiness of the cause to be defended, and secondly because the positive aspirations of the masses cannot be fulfilled by any means other than violence, since the established order has a "reactionary" attitude.

The insurgents must also show that this sacred and indispensable insurgency is feasible.

The violence against the established order at the beginning of any insurgency is not without a purpose. These acts of violence, which constitute a declaration of war against the established order, are meant to show to the masses that the existing order can be defied with impunity and that it does not have (or no longer has) to be feared or worshipped.

Hence the atrocities which very often characterize the first killings of an insurgency. In Algeria, soldiers killed in ambushes were often savagely mutilated. The same savagery is found in local actions when the insurgents want to show that their action will not be stopped by enemy victories. (Here is a typical instance: an officer of a very popular paratrooper regiment which had been assigned to an enemy sector, was kidnapped, tortured, and emasculated.) Only when the insurgency can regularly mount para-conventional operations are prisoners treated more humanely.

In every way, the insurgent group, through its "military successes" (magnified by its propaganda) tries to demonstrate that the negative feelings can henceforth be expressed.

- An insurgency must not only be sacred and feasible; it must also be necessary. To this end, the
insurgents employ violent methods of persuasion. The punishment for not siding with them is very severe. It results in the destruction of possessions (houses burnt, vineyards cut down, heavy fines), the mutilation of people (severe beatings, cutting off noses, etc.), and, above all, in physical liquidation. The brutality of these methods, it is claimed, is justified because of the sacred nature of the insurrection. The insurgents strongly emphasize that their terror acts are just and not arbitrary. A very clear relationship is established between the punishment and the causes which have necessitated it. Parodies of "justice" (the FLN had "Justice Committees" in its OPA) and public "confessions" are used whenever possible. In other cases, "death-sentences" announced beforehand to the victims, and signs posted after the execution explain the reasons for the "sentence."

The insurgents not only use violence: they also deliberately increase progressively the degree of involvement required. At the beginning, the people are asked to give the insurgents kinds of collateral aid (fund raising, food collection) that do not strongly conflict with their convictions or their desire to live in peace. The disproportion between the extreme severity of the punishment and the small risk run vis-à-vis the established power, and the insignificance of the sacrifice asked for, explains the effectiveness of this method of pressure.

In most cases, only after this stage are people asked to serve as liaison and housing agents, as bearers to combatants, etc. There again the risk and the bother incurred are less than the penalty. After that,
one can become a collector for or a member of the OPA. The forced enrollment into the maquis ranks or into the "armed groups" of the urban OPA takes place only in the final stage. In these latter cases, where individuals act on their own, a progression can be observed in the nature of the assignments. In the initial situation people, if arrested, make this kind of confession: "I was given a gun, a photograph, and an address, and I was told: Go kill so and so ... Even if you are caught by the French they won't do you much harm, whereas we shall kill you if you don't do it."

Beside this individual type of coercion, there are collective methods of coercion, which aim to "condition" the whole of the people. When the insurgency possesses a sufficient control group, it tries to establish its authority over the whole population and to involve it - always by progressive steps - against the established order. In this respect, taking up collections appears as an almost ideal starting point. While solving the financial problems of the insurgents and aligning the people with the rebel movement (without having them run actual risks), it provides the leaders with a starting point through a census and control action. Other methods include the trade union strike (easy to enforce through violence), the general strike, the boycott of certain products (at the beginning, the FLN compelled the Moslems not to smoke or drink alcohol), and the display of seditious flags and emblems. When the masses have become convinced that the insurgent leadership is powerful, and are duly impressed by the acts imposed on them, then, and then only, are people drawn into operations like street
demonstrations - which entail for them risks that are equal to or greater than the punishments inflicted by the insurgents.

- Sometimes, in a later phase of development, the insurgency tries to win groups or important individuals over to its side, either because the insurgents need leaders or because they want to impress the population, or both. A notification sent to all medical students that they must join the rebellion amounts to a mere expedient. The crossing over to the insurgency of all the Algerian football players in French teams furnishes an example of a psychological operation. (The players were not incorporated in the army and the "National Algerian" team thus formed never played.) The adherence of Ferhat Abbas (and of other moderate nationalist leaders) is a mixed example.

In these cases, the insurgency concentrates its efforts on isolated individuals. In the case of Ferhat Abbas (who later became the President of the GPRA), persuasion and intimidation were combined, and both were personally supervised by Abbane - the brain of the FLN. The intimidation phase included: 1) a murder attempt against Abbas (fumbled on purpose) to show him what the operational possibilities of the FLN were, and 2) the assassination of his nephew who was deeply involved on the French side. Let us note, however, that, for men of that type (or the Algerian football players) a physical threat alone is not sufficient. It is used only as a clincher once the insurgency has proved that it is popular and that it pays off.
But with less important individuals, a less complex method, employing violence only, can be used. Thus, the FLN, on the eve of its 56/57 battle, won all the Algiers gangsters to its side through the assassination of the "chief" of the local pick-pockets* who claimed to be a-political. Progression exists, therefore, not only in the types of involvement required but also in the selection of the social groups on which the insurgents exact pressure.

- An insurgency must pay off. Hence the efforts of the insurgents to demonstrate by means of spectacular military feats and by propaganda that they are on the road to victory. Hence the interpretation of any concession made by the established power as an indication of its final defeat and as an achievement of the armed rebellion.

In such circumstances, to join the insurgency must appear as the only rational approach, the only way of defending one's personal interests. Now "the wheel turns" and the "tide" becomes irresistible. Everyone jumps on the bandwagon. The hesitant and even the servants of the established power begin to shift.

b) Conversely, the insurgent group, in its endeavors to conquer the masses, eagerly points out that siding with the established order is not only immoral and shameful but also impossible and irrational.

While propaganda aims at arousing hatred for "traitors" to the cause, the elimination of "collaborators with the enemy" becomes an essential goal of insurgent terror: 1) to prove to the population that the rebellion

*He got his training in Chicago!
is in command and that the established order need no longer be obeyed, 2) to deter the people from siding with the established order.

A first target is the low-ranking official of the established order who does not derive large benefits from his position nor act from strong ideological belief. He is usually eliminated under the most atrocious conditions (mutilation, torture, etc.) which are often believed to increase the psychological impact both of the deterrence and of the vilification of the established order.

The elimination of high-ranking officials is less systematic. It is more difficult to achieve, it has less deterrent impact (the population does not identify with them and they are more deeply "involved" than the low-ranking employees), and it is desirable especially at the moment when the insurrection wants to demonstrate its omnipotence.

The elimination of political figures, won to the cause of the established power, constitutes the second target. Inasmuch as France attempted to create a non-FLN political power in Algeria, the FLN counteracted this effort by terror. There again, the "little ones" are attacked before the "big ones." The assassination of obscure candidates during an electoral campaign, in order to discourage further candidacies, is a typical example of this method. The murder of important personalities is especially important when they represent a symbol or a threat on account of the influence they exert.

The people who collaborate with the enemy constitute a third target: informers (for obvious security
reasons), or interpreters, "responsible for apartment buildings or districts" (when the French army established control techniques).

Finally, the insurgency can try to prevent the population as a whole from carrying out certain orders of the government. The order to boycott the Algerian elections is a good example. As a matter of fact, these defensive actions never paid off and were markedly less successful than the mass offensive actions (which we shall examine below), partly because of the counter-measures that could be taken, but often because it seemed difficult to make effective use of violence. If the established power succeeds in winning - through pressure - active participation of the masses, the insurgents will find it difficult to impress a number of people large enough to sway the masses, or to determine which ones opted for the established order because they were deeply and sincerely committed to it. The pressure applied by the insurgents can therefore only be massive and blind, which results in alienating people.

Here we find again an important aspect of the use of violence by the insurgents. If the use of terror must appear justified by the loftiness of the cause it serves, it is also necessary that terror appear selective and just. The punishment must therefore be deserved and never arbitrary.

    c) Thirdly, the insurgency must demonstrate that it alone defends the cause at stake, and that it alone can bring about its success.

    Hence the systematic elimination of any oppositional insurgent group. The most bloody means were
used by the FLN against the "brother-enemy," MNA. In such a case, terror may be employed on a massive scale, such as the destruction of the Messalit village of Melouza (300 dead, village burnt down) by the FLN in 1958. The aim of this operation was to prove that large-scale support for the MNA was impossible.

Hence the elimination of any insurgent group which does not fully recognize the authority of the FLN, and the "purges" of cadres of wilaya combatants in the interior (more than 2,000 men killed by Amrouche in 1959 in the Wilaya No. 3 of Kabylia).

d) The conquest of the population usually has three phases: 1) compulsory support for the rebel troops, 2) control of the population through an insurgents' administration, 3) active involvement of the population in the insurrection.

- The results thus obtained vary. Generally speaking, the military involvement of the whole population is possible only after an almost complete occupation by the military insurgent forces.

However, the experience both of the FLN and the OAS proves that in certain areas, usually densely populated, insurgents can establish political and administrative control without military occupation. We will now examine this particular type of action.

Towards the end of the war, the FLN had imprisoned the population in the large cities (and even in heavily populated rural districts) within the tight "net" of its OPA. The OPA, although it did not systematically attack the French military forces, concentrated its indoctrination and its acts of violence on the Moslem population along the lines described above.
An interesting example is furnished by the Moslem population of Paris because of both the accuracy of the figures obtained in the course of arrests and the a-political nature of this population wishing to live quietly in France on the fringes of the war. The FLN succeeded in establishing effective political-administrative control over three-fifths of this group which numbered 200,000 people and was concentrated in certain zones of the Paris area (especially in the suburbs of Paris) by forcing a clandestine parallel administration upon it. On the horizontal plane, a tax system, courts of justice, a health service, and a welfare service worked effectively. On the vertical plane, a very strict hierarchy encased the population (through cells, kasnas, zones, super-zones, wilayas, Fédération de France). But, just the same, the FLN admitted that, out of this population of 200,000 people, it could not count on more than 500 men to launch active operations against the French forces and that the number of combatants did not exceed 5,000.

While the results regarding the active involvement of the people against the established order are obvious when almost total occupation permits the insurgents to recruit on a massive scale, the advantages derived from an OPA type of political control without occupation of terrain are more complex and subtle.

True, the effectiveness of such measures is certain. For instance: 1) in metropolitan France the monthly sum collected by the FLN amounted to 400 million old francs; 2) in Algeria, the discipline of the Moslems in the face of OAS provocations can be explained to a certain extent by the effectiveness of OPA control. But their real impact remains to be analyzed.
From the para-military point of view, situations such as these provide an ideal environment for the armed commandos which gain support and shelter.

A typical example in Algeria was furnished by the OPA controlled plains which gave logistic support to the rebel groups hidden in the neighboring mountains. In the cities, where the OAS - thanks to the feelings of the European population - almost spontaneously achieved results similar to those of the FLN in the European districts, it could manipulate its armed commandos with the greatest of ease.

But a para-military involvement of the whole population seems more difficult to achieve. The FLN never attempted it. The OAS did, but then it experienced its greatest defeat. Thus the "Salan Plan" outlined first a "commando phase," then the involvement of the people "as an army" and finally the involvement of the population "like a human tide."* But these two last phases never materialized; the timid and imperfect attempts that were made immediately collapsed in the face of loyal French forces. Thus, the siege of Bab-el-Oued by the army met with no sizable military reaction on the part of the "surrounded and controlled" population, thereby turning the OAS "offensive" into a defeat.

In fact, this type of action seems better suited to spontaneous insurrections (e.g., the Warsaw Ghetto uprising, or the Paris insurrection during the last war) than to organized insurgencies. With a population worked up to white heat, it proves a decisive test of strength, a true "double the ante or quit" type of

*Instruction No. 29 by Salan on the OAS "offensive."
action (where the insurgency loses everything if the counterstroke is adequate, or where it wins power). Since one of the main characteristics of an organized insurgency is to run a minimal risk, it is unlikely - as the FLN case illustrates - to resort to the involvement of the total population, unless it is sure of dealing the coup de grâce to a rotten power.*

The FLN tried to prevent important paramilitary operations in the areas where it was in full control. Thereby it avoided a violent counteraction which would have blocked its control effort and jeopardized the security provided by these areas (sanctuary, supplies, etc.).

But the insurrection has an effective political weapon at its disposal with regard to control over the people.

First, thanks to this method, the FLN exerted full control over the social benefits derived from some French organizations. For instance, a Moslem could get on the rolls of a civilian "welfare organization" in Algiers or Paris only if he had been chosen by the FLN because of his sympathy with the insurrection and his obedience toward the movement, which practically amounted to robbing France of the benefits of her social program.

* The mistake of the OAS leaders whose strategic plan was so glaringly faulty is truly astonishing. One of the main reasons for it seems to be that General Salan and the colonels employed principles derived from the Viet Minh and ascribed to them magical powers without realizing that they could not be applied to the actual situation in Algeria. An analysis of the "strategic perversions" of the OAS would make an interesting study...inasmuch as men who had unquestionable knowledge and experience of the war were involved.
Secondly, the FLN threw the masses it controlled into street demonstrations against the established order. But while street demonstrations were a common expression of European rebellious sentiment long before the OAS, the FLN - acting as an organized insurgency - was able to make use of them only toward the end of the war and under very specific circumstances. The FLN needed not only a strong grip on the people, as well as an excuse to set them in motion (the demonstration day protesting partition in Algeria of July 5, the demonstrations against the curfew in Paris in November 1961), but, above all, such demonstrations had to appear clearly as para-political means of pressure and never as para-military demonstrations.

The last case falls into the category already analyzed where a repressive action is triggered which - if successful - may lead to a temporary defeat. But, when theoretically pacific masses are thrown against the established order - at a time when it has not yet been decided (for material, political or psychological reasons) to use violent methods of repression - the established order is forced to permit a public demonstration of insurgent political power. A number of such demonstrations impress public opinion, undermine the established order, and, one success leading to another, increase the prestige of the organizing group as well as the likely number of demonstrators. The number of demonstrators (and the discrediting of the established order) then begins to snow-ball.*

*Such a technique was employed by the French Communist Party after the end of the Second World War and toward the end of the Algerian war, and by right-wing groups in Algeria.
In truth, this kind of operation seems best suited to sub-insurgent situations; for example, one in which a group or a nation intends to undermine and to overthrow an established power without making use of violent insurrectional methods, and the established order does not want or cannot employ para-military methods of repression. The FLN found itself in this peculiar situation only after the opening of the negotiations with France, at a time when war seemed to swing toward peace. Then was the time for the FLN to show the "strength" of its popular support and to prove that France could hardly use violence on a large scale. Typically enough, the FLN made a point of warning the French government that it was taking all necessary steps to have the planned demonstrations come off in an orderly fashion.

Any mistake made in evaluating the nature of the situation (and therefore of the probable reaction of the police forces) may entail grave consequences. Thus, the OAS engaged in a peaceful demonstration, in an atmosphere of war, when it attempted to put an end to the siege of its Bab-el-Oued stronghold by a street demonstration. But the military operations going on at that time made a violent reaction of the troops unavoidable (40 killed when the troops opened fire in the Rue d'Isly).

---

and in Paris before May 13. The danger in this chain of events is clear: from one manifestation to the next, the discrediting of the established order increases, and a final demonstration can assume the aspect of an insurgency (cf. May 13). Thus the established order must apply enough violence during a demonstration to deter the masses from participating in the next one, without provoking an insurrection.
And this helped to prove to the population (by the easy siege of the Bab-el-Oued sanctuary and the firing at the demonstrators) that henceforth this insurgency could not possibly succeed. These were the events which put a final stop to the victories of the OAS, which, from that very moment, began to fall apart (the arrests of Salan and Jouhaud followed almost immediately). Typically, street demonstrations did not play a role in the fight against the German occupation in Europe. *

To carry out its action, the insurgent group needs the following elements to mount a successful demonstration:

1. a powerful control force,
2. negative feelings in the population (in November 1961, the Moslem population in Paris was irritated by the curfew orders - which had become necessary because of terror actions against the police force), and
3. the use of terror.

In November 1961, after the whole population had been ordered to demonstrate, armed groups of the OPA carefully combed the Algerian slum areas with their night sticks, looking for recalcitrants.

*Here, too, it remains to be cleared up how the leaders of the OAS made such a bad mistake.

**A typical instance of a "vicious circle." Police-men are killed. Their colleagues react brutally against all Moslems. The OPA launches a movement for the assassination of policemen to "avenge the masses." The police order a curfew and provocative discriminatory measures. Then the OPA launches a demonstration.
- In conclusion, while the effectiveness of such methods of control and involvement is assured on the para-political level, but militarily useful only as a supporting element, it must be noted that their use was possible for the FLN only: 1) in an advanced phase of the insurgency when it had proved to be feasible and to pay off, 2) under circumstances in which its politico-military "successes" were sufficient in other sectors. Thus, for instance, the OPA victories in Algiers happened only after the battle of Algiers, and against the background of success of FLN political strategy (at a point, however, when the para-military power of the insurrection was in fact quite weakened).

4. PARA-MILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST THE FORCES OF THE ESTABLISHED POWER

The common characteristics of insurgent para-military operations can be considered from the standpoint of objectives and of means. With regard to the objectives, para-military operations against the established power aim at 1) introducing the use of violence, 2) demoralizing the established power, 3) impressing the masses. With regard to the means employed, para-military operations are undertaken under conditions of numerical inferiority in men and weapons.

In the beginning, at least, the insurgents are not interested in military conquest or in occupying or holding territory. Their offensives are therefore not intended to occupy strategic positions, but to deal the enemy blows that will lower his morale and impress the masses. Therefore, they rely on their mobility, on
surprise, and on the amount of information they can secure from the population, so that they can attack isolated enemies from a position of strength. Ambush and attack on isolated posts constitute the two most common types of offensive action. When attacked by numerically superior forces, the insurgents usually shun a fight. They prefer giving up their position and falling back to jeopardizing their fighting strength.

The insurgents, however, usually try to combine surprise attacks with efforts to establish their military presence in certain defined areas. The establishment of "sanctuaries" is important from the military point of view (it permits recruiting, training and recuperation); also from a political point of view (it allows work in depth on the population and solidifies the impression of the insurgents' military power.) In the selection of these zones, the terrain plays an important part. Terrain (mountains, jungle, swamps) is ideal when it can be defended with the least possible cost, and when it provides opportunities for withdrawal and easily available hiding places when it can no longer be defended.

Algeria's mountain terrain fulfilled these requirements perfectly. The Aurès massif, the mountains of Kabylia, the Collo peninsula - together with less important mountain ranges - became the main base of the insurgency. The goal of the FLN was to deny these areas to French troops except at the cost of heavy losses and the deployment of considerable strength. When the French forces chanced that risk, the rebels tried to survive by withdrawing, by dispersal, and by hiding in ways that would enable them to reappear at the next favorable
opportunity. The fact that even considerable enemy forces did not succeed in wiping them out was then used to prove to the population the invulnerability of the insurgents. As a matter of fact, OPA control over the population proceeded successfully in areas which had been militarily pacified. After the departure of the operational French troops, the insurgent groups reappeared in the glory of having survived, and - before disappearing again into the mountains - they appointed political agents in charge of applying the persuasion techniques described above. Thus, a para-military sanctuary was succeeded by a para-political sanctuary in which the insurgents enjoyed great freedom of action.

In the cities, the insurgents may wish to set up terror groups to carry out para-military operations.

One of the objectives of these groups may be the establishment of blind terror. In this area, the disproportion between numerical weakness and importance of the results obtained is most striking. During the battle of Algiers in 1956-57, some 150 terrorists terrorized a whole city and impressed (and demoralized) French public opinion. A home-made bomb, placed by two men on the terrace of an Algiers cafe, provoked intense passionate reactions throughout the city, and made the headlines in Metropolitan newspapers.

Blind terror, however, seems to be difficult to employ. In Algiers it was possible because of the existence of a compact European population considered hostile and irreducible. It would have been impossible for the FLN to use such methods with a population it wanted to win over to its side. This is why the FLN never made use of blind
terror in France. The reaction to the murders of September 1958 (attack on economic targets) showed that public opinion in France, horrified by the bombs in Algiers, might become infuriated and irrevocably hostile to the FLN if it committed such acts in France.

The OAS, in turn, employed with considerable success blind terror against Moslem populations, from indiscriminate murders of any Moslem passer-by in a European district, to bombs, booby-trapped cars, and mortar-firing. But, although the OAS developed the most elaborate techniques of blind terror, the results were less impressive from the psychological point of view, because high technical ability in the perpetrators went hand in hand with the wish not to expose themselves. Since the Moslem city was tightly closed and self-contained, the OAS terrorists did not dare venture into it. This threat was therefore peripheral, and much less impressive than attacks carried into the center of a city where the inhabitants feel at home and secure. However, the OAS tried to use blind terror as a trigger causing a chain reaction: the mortar firing from one of the European terraces onto the "Government Square" which was filled with Moslems (25 killed), the attempted assassinations on the Algiers piers (booby-trapped car at the time of gate-opening, plus firing of automatic weapons after the explosion, result: 100 killed), the exploding of a tank truck filled with gasoline driving on a steep road toward the Moslem districts: 60 dead). All these actions gave the impression that the OAS could not be defeated but also incited the Moslem masses (the FLN control forces barely prevented this from happening) to hurl themselves against the
European districts (which would have resulted in a regular battle and the probable siding of the French army with the Europeans).

It is interesting to ask why the OAS did not make use of blind terror in France. (The exploding of six plastic bombs in the checkrooms of Paris stations and the placement of a booby-trapped car in front of the meeting hall of the pro-Communist Peace Movement are the only demonstrations of this type, probably launched by uncontrolled elements.) I, for one, have always thought that this very threat was not only the most difficult to counter, but also the most dangerous. While it undermined the authority of the Government, by arousing passionate anti-OAS reactions (thereby providing a favorable ground for the PC) it also encouraged anarchy in France. Be that as it may, the OAS never used this technique, either because it rejected certain means of action, or because of the unforeseeable consequences of the anarchy thus created, or for lack of competent and fanatical personnel.*

A second way of employing para-military groups in cities consists in the destruction of economic targets. The FLN made use of this method once in 1959 and successfully attacked oil factories in France. The OAS used this method systematically: destruction of Moslem shops in the

*It should be pointed out that Western countries never employed blind terror either - in contradistinction to Communist countries which openly support insurgencies. However, 1) it is relatively easy to achieve through specialized commandos, 2) its political and psychological possibilities seem considerable - even if used only as a blackmailing technique.
European district (in order to make partition a fact and to impress the Moslems), destruction of schools, hospitals, income-tax offices, oil wells, etc. There again, the use of this technique is psychologically difficult for insurgents of the classical type. The FLN gave it up for fear of antagonizing the French people in France. The OAS did not move on from the destruction of shops to attacks on economic targets before its battle was lost. However, the result was important enough to make the FLN accept the idea of negotiating with a supposedly invincible enemy.

The destruction of military targets in a city meets only with technical difficulties. The FLN never really overcame them. Despite making a favorable psychological impression on the population, the attacks on military posts or protected installations within the city meet with many more obstacles than they do in the country: concentration, surprise, and withdrawal pose complex problems. Although the OAS made harassing attacks on police barracks, it achieved spectacular victories only against the "parallel police force" by taking advantage of their lack of experience and of their isolation, and by using elaborate techniques (such as the destruction of two PC by rockets or plastic bomb parcels).

The destruction of installations selected for their vulnerability and their political value seems more profitable, as long as the established order has not yet taken protective measures befitting the "psychological value" of sensitive areas. Thus the OAS was successful in destroying television transmission towers. But once a good method of protection is established, the insurgents are limited to marginal psychological objectives if they
do not want to risk the destruction of their networks.

The use of the population as masses in appropriate para-military operations is the third means of insurgent action.

In Algeria, neither the FLN nor the OAS reached the point where the masses could be organized into military units and thrown into regular operations, because this stage presupposes the military occupation of terrain. (The Viet-Minh reached that stage only after the Chinese Communists had arrived at the border in 1959.)

5. USE OF AN OUTSIDE SANCTUARY

One of the essential features of the FLN rebellion was the possibility of using Tunisia and Morocco as "rear-bases" for the insurrection. In Tunisia, the FLN possessed 1) an army of 15,000 men (10,000 in Morocco), 2) its "Government" and its departments.

At the beginning the Tunisian base was considered only a mere extension of Algerian operations. Soon, however, the "sanctuaries" of the Aurès massif and of Kabylia became quite unsafe as a military base because of French military operations. In the opinion of the insurgent leaders, an installation on foreign territory would provide training and rest areas, deployment and withdrawal areas while also facilitating the shipment of weapons. On the political level, however, rebel leadership had to be exercised principally from inside Algeria (this was one of the imperative decrees decided upon at the Soummam Congress held in the interior of Algeria in August 1959), while a few people conducted the liaison operations of the rebellion from the outside.
This plan had to be modified mostly because of the pressure of circumstances. The French army erected barriers on the borders, thereby making all attempts to cross over very difficult and costly. Also, the ongoing operations made it very dangerous for the insurgent leaders to stay in Algeria itself: their leading organ (CCE - Committee for External Coordination) had to go abroad.

Only at that time did the FLN fully realize all the political and psychological advantages of a sanctuary outside and turned it into one of its principal assets.

On the military level, the army outside was built up, trained, and organized in regular units.

But the important point is that it never engaged in military operations in Algeria. In the few cases in which large rebel forces tried to break through the barrier, French forces almost completely destroyed them. The rebel leaders then had to face the fact that such attempts: 1) demoralized their troops, 2) lowered the morale of the Algerian population because they proved the impossibility of insurgent combat in Algeria, 3) and strengthened the morale of the French army and of French public opinion. Therefore, none of the psychological benefits expected from a military operation were attained. Quite the contrary.

It seems that, for this very reason, the FLN never attempted a massive break through the barrier, even though the French defenses made a break-through in strength possible. A simultaneous break-through at several points of the barrier (which was nothing more than an electrified fence to alert the intercept troops) by a sizable number
of troops would have allowed them to penetrate into Algerian territory. By scattering, a portion of the troops could have joined the maquis and brought them the weapons they needed so much. However, the bulk of FLN troops would then have been forced to fight against the French forces and would certainly have been greatly weakened. The maquis would have been strengthened only at the price of heavy losses and especially of the impression of defeat. The French commanders, however, feared this eventuality since they would then have to employ sizable forces and to abandon their other positions (a general uprising might then have taken place in the cities), without really preventing a strengthening (and in some cases a true revitalization) of the maquis.

Be it as it may, the FLN decision illustrates clearly the insurgents' technique which consists in avoiding pitched battle when it cannot be turned fully to their advantage and in placing the highest importance on the psychological impact of military operations. From this point of view, the presence of an army in Tunisia and Morocco - even if militarily important - fully satisfied the FLN.

The infiltration of small groups was possible, who indoctrinated the people and the fighters inside Algeria. Above all, the presence of an army organized into regular units, in uniform, well armed, marching, and engaged in basic training, represented a propaganda asset with the population. The FLN outside had thus become the symbol of the Algerian revolution, the embodiment of the possibility to carry on the fight against France and of FLN "power."
The harassing of French forces at the borders (especially with 105 mm. guns), and the French counter-thrusts, although void of any military significance, gave the impression of war. In this connection, it was typical that the signing of the Evian Agreements was preceded by an intensification of the artillery fire because the FLN wanted to show thereby that it was on equal footing with France and did not yield because of military weakness.

Similar considerations seem to account for the accumulation of weapon stockpiles outside of Algeria. While the FLN could bring arms into Algeria only in dribbles, it, nevertheless, did not lose an opportunity to acquire medium and heavy weapons. Assuredly, a portion of these weapons were used to equip the border troops, but there remains, nevertheless, a discrepancy between the weapons used and those stockpiled. This influx of arms represented both a power symbol and support by foreign countries. France herself often added significance to this symbol when she openly stopped the ships that carried these weapons.

On the political level, Tunis gradually became the nerve center of the insurrection. The hasty departure of the CEE members from Algiers in the face of French successes in the battle of Algiers, the creation of the PGRA (Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne) in response to General de Gaulle's assumption of office and the resulting shock suffered by the Moslem masses, the necessity to unite the supreme command set up by the Soummam Congress (CNRA), transferred and strengthened a leadership group outside Algeria which, according to the 1956 charter, was never to leave the city.
By the end of the war, the GPRA was not a mere committee in exile, but the animating spirit of a whole group of departments with 2,000 employees, covering all the activities of a nation (finances, defense, armament, information, social services, etc.).

In fact, the authority of the GPRA organization extended effectively only to its own departments. For instance, whereas the Minister of the Army headed a general staff (stationed in Chardimaou in Tunisia) over which, incidentally, he exercised only a rather theoretical control, his authority was almost non-existent when it came to the wilayas within Algeria, which, trying to survive, sought means of meeting conditions of the moment, while feeling abandoned (if not betrayed) by the organization outside. Likewise, the "Minister of the Interior" exercised only very minimal control over the urban OPA and the Federation of France. This became quite evident when the Moslem demonstrations in Algiers of December 1960 caught the GPRA completely off guard. (Not until the time of the negotiations with France did the GPRA recover its hold on the OPA.) As to the Minister for Social Affairs, his already shaky authority over the UGTA union did not extend beyond the frontiers. Practically speaking, the authority of the GPRA Ministers was limited to the individual prestige of personalities like Krim Belkacem (former head of Wilaya 3), Boussouf (former head of Wilaya 6), Bentobal, etc. Besides, this prestige was more apparent than real, and the men mentioned exploited it mostly in their relations with colleagues who had joined the rebellion later than they did, and
with French and foreign journalists.*

But whatever the weakness of the real control, and the mythical nature of individual fame, the fact remains that the existence of a seemingly official organization, adorned with titles and personalities, which takes advantage of any hostile action by integrating it in a so-called "war plan" and by seemingly conducting the operations, constituted a weapon whose importance must not be underestimated.

Certainly, this phenomenon of disparity between actual control and the appearance of power is to be found in the leadership of any insurgency where the requirements of operating clandestinely prevents genuine command, whereas the nature of the acts committed gives an impression of omnipotence. (Thus General Salan and the colonels enjoyed a quasi-mythological reputation which had nothing to do with actual control of the organization.) But when the leading group happens to be in an outside sanctuary, 1) the apparent power of its leadership increases, thanks to the easy use of propaganda, and 2) the outside leaders are not only invulnerable but barely sensitive to the counter-effects of armed clashes on the battlefield. For instance, whereas in June 1960 the Algerian wilayas were close to surrender (as the arrival in Paris of the Wilaya 4 leaders for the so-called Si Salah case proves), the GPRAl on its part was still ready for an all-out war to be fought by others. Even though it also hid an inner malaise behind its bellicose announcements, it was able to reverse the current in the collapsing wilayas.

*Recent events in Algeria demonstrate the independence of the wilayas and the artificial nature of some of the reputations for popularity among the insurgent leaders.
If the propaganda was the principal weapon of the leaders of what General de Gaulle called "the outside organization of the rebellion," one must admit that they knew how to make singularly effective use of it. They were helped in this respect by the French university training of some of their leaders (and the support of a fraction of the French intelligentsia), also by a certain phraseology borrowed from communism, and, principally, by the Arab liking for debate and palaver. But here again, in order to bear fruit, the ground had to be prepared by the appeal which the cause of independence presented to world public opinion (and a fraction of French public opinion), and by the Arab and Maghreb feelings of solidarity, etc. In this area, technique and talent - no matter how good - are no substitute for a solid ideology, contrary to the firm beliefs of some French counterinsurgents. The OAS learned this from experience despite the fact that it counted in its ranks some of the greatest French experts on "psychological action."

On the organizational level, the FLN had a Ministry of Information, but as is true of all success in this area, propaganda considerations directly guided the activities of all the ministries and departments. The Information Ministry acted rather as spokesman and publisher of brochures and newspapers, while the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the Army, the Interior, etc. made propaganda aimed in the same direction. **

* One could almost say that therein lies the only contribution communism made to the Algerian insurrection!

** Hence the false aspect of unity and earnestness presented by the GPRFA and the revolution itself. This facade was to receive hard blows when they returned to Algeria.
The main success of the FLN propaganda directed from the outside sanctuary concerned the exterior world and its public opinion. One of the main causes of FLN success can be ascribed to its "diplomacy." In fact, the FLN "diplomats" with their "representatives," their "offices," their "missions" (titled according to the official attitude of the country to which they were assigned) were above all propagandists and missionaries. Indoctrinated from the outside sanctuary, enjoying large financial means, they were more important for the FLN cause than some Katibas or even wilayas. The influence of men like Yazid in the United States (who later became Information Minister), or Chanderlé (formerly a French reporter) in New York and at the United Nations, or Mostefai in Rabat was equal to that of Amrouche.

At first, the role of these "diplomats" consisted of conducting "public relations" for the insurrection, justifying it, maximizing its successes, convincing people of its viability. Then they tried to obtain maximum support for the FLN cause with two conditions attached: not to become deeply involved in any of the world quarrels (cf. non-intervention either in the Nasser-Bourguiba conflict, or in the intrigues of the Arab League, or the African battles, or the Afro-Asian plots, not to mention the East-West cold war); and also not to arouse the opposition of the host country where they were installed by asking too vehemently for what could not be granted, or by obviously overplaying their hand. Any support or sympathy was exploited for domestic propaganda. For instance, the presence of Moslem students with scholarships in American universities was interpreted as support on the part of the
United States, * and an invitation to go to China was made to appear as aid by the whole nation of China although the CPRA had no illusions about the actual weight of these "supporters."

The annual discussion of the Algerian problem by the United Nations provided the FLN opportunities for great diplomatic successes. The UN debates (and other less tangible organizations like the Arab League or the African Peoples' Congress) were used to show that the FLN cause enjoyed the support of the whole world, which condemned France's policy, and to prove the inevitable triumph of the FLN. The disproportion between these attitudes and the actual situation on the battlefield tended to belittle French military successes. In fact, the UN sessions not only provided the FLN with propaganda weapons, but also hurt the international position of France.

One might ask, then, to what extent these "diplomatic" activities of the FLN would have been possible without an outside sanctuary. We believe that it would not have been possible, at least not to the same extent. An insurgency shut up in a given territory can certainly stir up interest in the world (cf. Castro) and it may also have liaison agents outside, but the establishment of actual posts on the outside and pronouncement of a real doctrine render possible a central leadership, important agencies, and minds free from the vicissitudes of the battle, not to mention the prestige derived from the existence of a "Provisional Government."

*A rather innocuous letter written by an American minister was found on the body of an important rebel leader who used it to strengthen the morale of his troops.
6. CONCLUSION

To sum up, an insurgency has two major assets: flexibility and its intuitive character.

**Flexibility:** On the one hand the insurgent plays on several keyboards - political, military, and psychological. On the other hand, he can easily shift the aim as well as the nature of his efforts. In doing this he follows the line of least resistance and easily adjusts to circumstances and to counterinsurgent action.

Thus the FLN, in 1954, started with isolated guerrilla actions in the mountains of Aurès - the traditional gangster territory. After that, in 1955-56, it extended and organized guerrilla operations in mountainous and secessionist Kabylia and in the nationalistic Constantine area. In the face of the French counterstroke, the FLN launched the "battle of Algiers" and primed a political operation in the Oran area. After the defeat of Algiers, it concentrated its efforts on the organization of rear bases in Tunisia (and in Morocco) and on the transfer into Algeria of strong armed bands. After the closing of the borders and the action against the strong bands, the FLN reduced the size of its units and put the emphasis on "outside political action." Following the military offensive of General de Gaulle, the FLN practically gave up large-scale offensive operations. While intensifying its international activities, it launched again terror in cities (but avoided making it appear a test of strength, as in the battle of Algiers) and focused its efforts on controlling and indoctrinating the people, in the cities as well as in the zones "pacified" by the French army.
As General de Gaulle remarked: "Kick them out through the door and they will come back through the window."

**Intuitive nature:** Flexibility, adjustment to circumstances (type of land, state of mind of the people, reactions of the official police), integration of the para-military and para-political action, and politico-psychological aspects come naturally to the insurgents. To them it is not a technique that has to be learned and assimilated, but rather a natural state of mind, which derives, it would seem, from the requirements for survival under difficult circumstances, and from defending a just and attainable cause.
PART III

COUNTERINSURGENCY
1. DIFFICULTIES IN DEVELOPING AND APPLYING A STRATEGY FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY

While the rebel gives the impression of moving easily in his surroundings (this is the implication of Ho Chi Minh's famous slogan "fish in water") the counterinsurgent, on the other hand, seems to experience serious difficulties.

The counterinsurgent certainly enjoys (at least from the start) numerical superiority in men as well as means. But at the same time, he usually cannot adapt immediately both to specific conditions and the adversary's methods. Indeed, Goliath can crush David only by committing overwhelming numbers of troops. His task is easier if David makes the error (in the case of spontaneous insurrections especially) of provoking a decisive show of force without sufficient resources. Even in this instance, David often rises from the ashes. More frequently the counterinsurgent resembles an old boxer, huge but awkward, who becomes the toy of a small and youthful judo artist. His hammer blows miss their mark or if they do not, his smaller adversary turns their force against him.

Although history includes many counterinsurgent failures (Europe under German occupation, Indochina), there have been successes (Malaya, the Philippines), which were achieved after numerous trials and errors and long-lasting hostilities.

1. Difficulties of Developing Strategy

On a strictly analytical level, the problem can seem simple.

(1) Once the enemy is known, the elaboration of
a suitable political and military strategy should not, in theory, present insurmountable difficulties.

- Since the enemy considers the use of violence is possible, useful and fruitful, and wishes to prove it, the established power must prove that all attempts to rebel have no chance to succeed because, on one hand, of the unwavering determination of the established power and, on the other hand, the effectiveness of its weapons.

- Since the enemy considers that recourse to insurgency is justified and indispensable to its cause and wishes to prove it, the established power must prove that insurgency is unjustified and futile since the ideals sustaining the cause can be achieved peacefully in a legal framework.

(2) Nevertheless, in order for these two factors to operate, several conditions must be met.

(a) In order to make the insurgency seem impossible the established power must 1) be as determined as the rebels, 2) be prepared to endure all the consequences, and 3) possess the necessary military and political means. In this domain, neither wiles nor half measures suffice. In Indochina, for example, it is obvious that neither the administration nor the French people had any intention of making an important military effort against the Viet Minh (notably by sending draftees or even mobilization), nor were perhaps capable of fighting Communist China through an intermediary (the fact that this effort was never made proves the absence of real determination). Since a downright retreat would not have been accepted by either public opinion or the administration, a skeleton force was condemned to fight until defeat proved the futility of such a war.
In Algeria, however, the French government was both willing and able to carry out a concerted military effort. Geographical proximity, the presence of a million native Frenchmen as well as the organization of Algeria into French departments created a favorable climate for necessary military organization in funds and in personnel (as shown by the draft and the calling up of reserves). Nevertheless, as the years went by, French public opinion became more reserved (a trend exploited by the Communist party and the extreme left) and France's scope for international action shrank markedly. Towards the end of 1960, General de Gaulle (six years after the start of the war and two and a half years after his own return to power) decided that the French military effort could not be prolonged without serious damage to the country's unity, and to its national and international prestige. The desire to end the war was becoming a serious impediment to French freedom of action.

(b) In order to make the insurrection futile the authorities 1) must keep open the possibility of changing the status quo existing before the insurrection; and 2) must possess the political means to impose and to realize necessary reform.

Again, these conditions are hard to bring about once confronted with a problem of insurgency. 1) By definition the authorities have been unable to satisfy certain positive aspirations and to placate certain negative reactions (hence the insurgency) either because they failed to understand the situation, or because such reforms alienated precisely those groups supporting the authorities, and the adoption of reforms could deprive the authorities of support or even encourage fresh insurgency for other reasons.
2) The initial development of an insurgency clouds one's judgment. (To underestimate the rebel because of his insignificant numbers ("a handful of bandits"), or because of the hate directed towards them ("assassins," "terrorists," "torturers," "communists," "fascists," etc.) is widespread.)

3) The continuation of hostilities makes it more difficult to do anything remedial that would appear to be recanting or yielding to the adversary while the forces involved reinforce their opposition to spectacular reforms.

Thus the establishment of the Bao-Dai government in Indochina, after several years of war, was considered an ultimate concession by France although it did not satisfy any of the people's aspirations. In Algeria, on the other hand, certain governments of the Fourth Republic were ready to apply a new policy (here again the first attempt took place 16 months after the onset of the insurrection) but had to cope either with violence by Europeans (e.g. the outbreak of 6 February 1956 which forced Guy Mollet to retreat) or even with a revolution (13 May 1958 proceeding from the liberal leanings attributed to the new Président du Conseil, Pierre Pflimlin). It was only when General de Gaulle came to power that a government capable of developing and of imposing its views was created (but faced with very definite problems which partly paralyzed its program of reform).

(c) The problems encountered by the authorities dealing with counterinsurgency in both elaborating and imposing an appropriate strategy, explains the role of strong personalities in such a situation.

As long as France was governed by weak and unstable teams of men, it was impossible to handle effectively the
Indochinese and Algerian wars. The coming to power of General de Gaulle (stemming, in fact, from this ineptness of the Fourth Republic) made possible a new approach to the problem. A strong personality can inspire national unity, not concerning political and strategic goals (these are always open for discussion) but concerning his personal prestige and dynamic temperament.

It was also possible for a strong leader to bring into play, outside of the theater of operations itself, necessary government actions not wholly compatible with the normal legal freedoms: (control over freedom of the press, freedom of speech beyond certain bounds, etc.).

In the case of colonial wars, however, strong national discipline and a distant theater of operations can permit the situation to be handled without recourse to exceptional solutions and personalities. These would nevertheless be necessary in the theater itself.

2. Initial Problems of Execution

The two "war goals" (to make the insurrection both impossible and futile) can be pursued either separately or simultaneously.

(1) Exclusive pursuit of the second goal (to make the insurrection futile) by a policy aiming to satisfy the population's aspirations will not contain a fully developed rebellion. In fact, this single emphasis could clearly play into the hands of a forceful and popular insurgency since it does not reduce the rebels' military power and, furthermore, the rebels can easily convince the population that the insurgency and its activities forced the government to offer reform.
As such, the political approach is rarely used by itself, but it is frequently demanded by elements of public opinion, thus handicapping the efforts of the authorities. So it was in France that a section of the left demanded that independence, pure and simple, be granted the FLN. One of the problems of counterinsurgency indeed remains the difficulty in obtaining national unity behind the goals pursued and the methods employed inasmuch as, bearing on politics, they may be subject to discussion.

Nevertheless, it is evident that political reforms still constitute the best means of obviating insurgency. Such reforms can be brought into play during the initial stages of an organized insurgency, before the insurgents have become militarily powerful or have won support from the population (as was somewhat the case with Bourguiba, who "cut the grass from under the feet" of his adversary Salah Ben Youssef). The rebels then must choose between abandoning their effort or continuing it without much hope of being able to mobilize sufficient sentiment to support it.

(2) Exclusive pursuit of the first goal (to make the insurgency impossible) is more common either because of confidence in physical might, or failure to understand the yearning for change on the part of the population, or because of the impossibility of satisfying these yearnings (fear of arousing another social group, or financial problems). Assuming that even Nazi Germany had not believed blindly in force, nor held the aspirations of other peoples in contempt, the fact remains Germany could not leave the occupied countries (and thus pacify the negative feelings of the Europeans), nor even attempt to provide economic
and social relief during occupation because of continuing war.

Actually, to the extent the tenets of a program of counterinsurgency are still vague, and the counterattack improvised more in relation to given conditions than faithful to a clearly defined political and strategic idea, recourse to force most often does not take into consideration factors which should be self-explanatory.

Offensively, to make an insurgency impossible consists of destroying the rebel networks and the rebel bands, and defensively, of preventing rebel outbreaks. This is the task of the armed forces which already must wrestle with many technical problems. The achievement of this goal, however, implies adjustments of military technique alone only so long as the bands or networks are still cut off from the population.

The problem becomes very seriously complicated, however, when negative feelings or positive aspirations break out spontaneously and especially when these feelings and aspirations have been used by an organized insurgency to control the population. To the extent the rebels attach importance to their influence on the population, it is then a matter 1) defensively, of discouraging the population from following the insurgency, and 2) offensively, of winning over the population to the side of the established power.

Now in case it is decided (or necessary) to use force and only force without being able to make the insurgency appear futile and unjustified, it is necessary: 1) to intensify proof of the impossibility of recourse to insurgency, 2) to deter the population by using violence solely for its psychological value, and 3) to attempt to
win over the population contrary to its own aspirations again by playing on violence alone.

The execution of this principle thus becomes extremely complex and its effectiveness often limited in time. The example of the German army in occupied Europe demonstrates to what degree a purely conventional conception of the "neutralization of partisans and terrorists" led to technical difficulties despite the quality of the combat units, sparked dreadful violence and definitely alienated the population.

(3) The combined pursuit of the two "war goals" (to make the insurrection both impossible and futile) constitutes, meanwhile, the most effective method for fighting an insurrection. All examples of successful counter-insurgency (Malaya, the Philippines and, in part, Algeria) exhibited these factors: 1) a resolute fight against the rebels with all this implies in political determination and energy on the part of the authorities and a rational military and police action, 2) political, economic and social reform geared to satisfy a number of the population's aspirations. (The established power demonstrates the insurrection is impossible, since it cannot survive militarily; it is unnecessary because the regime itself will satisfy the needs of the people.)

Even in Hungary, the Soviets seem to have used both these means of action, though, it is true, more consecutively than simultaneously. After very violent reprisals demonstrating the futility of the insurgency, a more liberal economic (let alone political) program attempted to appease the feeling of the population.*

*In point of fact, I wonder whether the Soviets are the only ones who have effectively considered both problems of insurgency and counterinsurgency within each particular viewpoint.
3. Problems of Evaluation

Even if the established power has both the determination and the capability to apply a political and strategic plan of action and, towards this end, to destroy the rebel bands and network while discouraging (and winning over) the population, one is forced to admit very great problems are involved.

(1) As in any war, it is not the intentions but the results that count. However, during an insurgency the case is rare where it is possible to evaluate successes and setbacks clearly and conclusively. The counterinsurgent, therefore, experiences great difficulty - in a fluid situation where gains and setbacks follow one another - in comparing the effectiveness of its methods against those of the rebels. These difficulties promote discussion within the public and even among the authorities. While closeted strategists criticize every operation, the school of hard realities - so useful in time of war to develop an effective command - does not exist to force the authorities to move from the stage of purely verbal intentions to the execution of forceful action.

Even the evaluation of military successes against rebel bands is in itself quite difficult. The number of rebels killed (often swollen by civilians counted among the dead rebels) is less important than the number of military weapons seized, the number of prisoners and especially of recruits. But what matters particularly is the number of rebels still in operation (a more difficult number to obtain) and the number of outbreaks possible. Concerning the last question, the number itself is less significant than the indications of military capability
implied by an outbreak (it is easier to saw unguarded telephone poles than to plan an ambush) and the psychological impact of a successful outbreak. (In statistics, all the dead are alike but this is not valid for an insurgency.)

But the problem is even greater when evaluating attitudes of the population. The best indications are the number of native soldiers on the side of the established power, the extent of desertions, and especially the quality and quantity of information obtained. But here again, although these indications are clear to specialists but of a more instinctive than scientific nature, they are not generally convincing even within the government and the military hierarchy.*

(2) Not only difficult to evaluate, the results are equally difficult to obtain for technical reasons.

- On the para-military level the forces of law and order meet many obstacles in achieving purely military goals.

In the offensive phase of their mission (destroying rebel bands), because rebels hide out in vast and rough territory, military operations necessitate reliable information, quick execution and troops well hardened in battle. In the towns, a handful of terrorists briefed on the rules of clandestine operations are like needles in a haystack. The OPA itself was difficult to separate from the regular population.

In the defensive phase (preventing enemy outbreaks), the problem stems from the number of objectives from which

---

*The construction of an index having scientific value would be greatly useful.
the enemy is able to choose because of their mobility and especially because of the primary importance given to psychological considerations (political effects of the outbreaks) over strategic considerations.

- On the para-political level, the following are, first of all, necessary: 1) to define correctly the aspirations of the population which are pertinent and capable of being satisfied; 2) to satisfy these. Although these two objectives may seem simple on paper, examples go to prove the mistakes possible in interpreting the desires of the population (especially when, for political reasons, it is impossible to satisfy their main aspiration) and the difficulty in rapidly translating a determination into a reality. Here once again, the results themselves count, not just words and good intentions.

In the second place, it is necessary to eliminate the negative feelings on which the insurgency is based. However, the use of force and violence runs the risk of increasing these same negative feelings. An entire technique of violence must be elaborated and yet is not being taught in Western war colleges.

(3) Now we have come to one of the essential problems of carrying out counterinsurgency. Whereas the rebel network almost instinctively integrates the para-military and the para-political aspects of its activity, the counter-insurgent does not generally evince the same aptitude.

For the counterinsurgent as well as the rebel the essential problem is to combine the pursuit of military operations with the enlistment of the population, to use both force and psychological action (in the broadest sense).
On the level of military operations, the counter-insurgent is forced not only to adopt appropriate anti-guerrilla and anti-terrorist techniques but also to attach particular importance to the psychological repercussions of his acts on the population. For example, in the defensive aspect of his mission, a troop which entrenches itself behind fortifications and barbed wire gives the impression the insurgency is powerful and dreaded (while the troop cannot prevent its outbreaks because it is immobilized). If, as usual, an offensive strategy is the best means of defense, one must not forget that often the resort to military force brings meager results and, while not preventing a reappearance of the rebels, can cause disastrous psychological effects on the population. The population is definitely impressed in the beginning by the number of troops but if the rebels should reappear, they are likely to be glorified as supermen who not only required the commitment of so many soldiers but also managed to escape them. In addition, conventional troops are rarely prepared for such considerations.

On the level of psychological action on the population, military operations must not only destroy both the military strength and the psychological halo of rebel bands but must in addition discourage the population from joining them and force the population into following the established power.

Concerning the defensive aspect (deterrence), the problem is relatively simple as long as the insurgents are cut off from the population. Military successes demonstrate the impossibility of the insurrection but even then the sanctions and the chastisement of those defeated are
necessary to drive this idea home. But if it is a matter of deterring a population already involved with the rebels, counterinsurgents must regulate and balance the use of violence so that the explosion of negative feelings does not become uncontrollable with positive achievements -- the satisfaction of the population's positive aspirations, plus protection against pressures from the insurrection. Nevertheless, regular armed forces often have a tendency either to lose interest in problems not directly related to purely military technique ("that's the politicians' job") or to administer force according to over-simplified and uniform rules. (Certain forms of reprisals - the execution of hostages for example - or individual reprisals against persons abetting the insurrection, are closer to the logic of the machinery of the military than to the pursuit of lasting psychological effects.)

Concerning the offensive aspect, the enlistment of the population on the side of the established power is related to the ability of that power to prove, by its determination and military success, it cannot only win but also satisfy certain of the population's vital aspirations. But civil administrations in democratic countries, customarily responsible for para-political projects, have a tendency to work in the abstract. They initiate economic and social projects, or provide services and facilities with no concern for the effect produced on the population. If one is not careful, the counterinsurgents' political and social programs then produce no visible psychological effect and can even be used to the rebels' advantage.

(4) In short, while the rebels' means of action are essentially light and flexible, the counterinsurgents
themselves are handicapped by clumsy equipment and organization (military and civilian); by their slow and painful adjustment to particular circumstances, and by excessive specialization.

While the apparatus of the insurgency is in essence solely oriented to the realization of its goal, the administrative and military machinery of the counter-insurgents most often follows normal routine, failing to adjust its operations to the achievement of the war's goals. These are therefore not only difficult to define but even more difficult to attain.

(5) All these difficulties explain why the counter-insurgents must use personnel of the highest caliber both in the field and at the highest government level. Whether military or civilian, it is necessary to have open-minded leaders, capable of grasping the particular nature of the war they must wage and of devising appropriate methods. In order to carry out appropriate measures, considerable vitality is necessary: for breaking routine, stimulating changes, eliminating inefficiency and especially for directing all minds and activities towards one goal.

I do not believe a single insurgency has been won without such architects (the Philippines and Malaya illustrate this point perfectly) and, under them, a team of key subordinates they carefully selected. In Algeria the best results were obtained under the personal stimulus of General de Gaulle, Prime Minister Michel Debré,* of a

*General de Gaulle personally made the most significant decisions (after discussion with Michel Debré, Louis Joxé, Minister of Algerian Affairs, or the Commander in Chief and Delegate General), and presided at least once a month over a
military personage such as Commander in Chief Maurice Challe or, to a lesser degree, of a civilian leader such as Delegate General Paul Delouvrier. General Challe not only knew how to set up a General Staff but also how to choose effective heads of key units or sector chiefs.

The importance of a leader was illustrated with the departure of Challe, for the generals who succeeded him (Crépin, Gambiez, Ailleret) never achieved the same results. Even though they correctly implemented the military ideas he had elaborated (notably the "Plan Challe"), it was not done with the same spirit, nor the same vitality, nor the same rapport with his subordinates. And under Challe, the departures of General Massu of the Armed Forces of Algiers, of Colonel Godard of the Protective Services and of numerous chiefs of sectors, all constituted irreparable losses. Similarly, the replacement of Delouvrier by the highly traditional prefect, Jean Morin, robbed the civil administration of much of its spirit.

If the role of a leader in a counterinsurgency is crucial, there exists no known criterion to define the type of personality or proficiency necessary. When Challe, an Air Force officer and member of the General Staff, was nominated, he seemed much less qualified militarily than his predecessor, General Salan, who had a more impressive military background (gained notably during service with

* (continued) "Committee of Algerian Affairs." Michel Debré presided weekly over a regular "war committee" and his civilian and military staff were organized to follow all that occurred in Algeria 24 hours a day.
Marshal de Lattre) and very sound experience from Indochina. However, Challe's successes very definitely surpassed those of Salan. Likewise, Delouvrier, an economist fresh from the Economic Coal and Steel Community, seemed less competent than his successor, Jean Morin, who held one of the highest positions in the French administration (top prefect in the difficult region of Toulouse). Here again, the results obtained by Morin cannot be compared in the least with those of Delouvrier. The same observation can be made of lower echelons where officers with brilliant reputations were not as effective as officers with less brilliant records. In essence (and by way of an evaluation), one could say that in order to succeed in a counterinsurgency, * spirit is more necessary than reason, a taste for adventure more than for office work, human rapport more than a respect for traditional hierarchies, a sense of improvisation more than theoretical knowledge, love of action more than a liking for administration.

If the authorities find it difficult to choose the most effective types of man, the most gifted leaders just as frequently create the greatest worries. In Algeria, almost all the "prima donnas" of the war proved to be very difficult to handle. More seriously, they were not always willing to implement a political and strategic plan formulated in Paris. If a man with the temperament of an adventurer or one of a "group leader" achieves exceptional results in his sector (this was the case of famous Colonel Bigeard who was able to transform completely

* Here again, a scientific analysis of the qualities necessary to hold a command would be welcome.
the subverted sector of Saida) it is frightening to see him lead this sector into local achievements often admirably adapted to circumstances but not concurrent with the master plan. Another serious factor: Some of the best leaders in Algeria did not hesitate to turn their arms against the established authority when they considered their views were not being taken into account (i.e., General Challe on 22 April 1961, Colonel Godard in the OAS, etc.). If General Crépin or General Gambiez were not as effective as General Challe, they at least presented less of a security risk. It is clear that precisely those capacities which explain Challe's success in anti-insurgency operations also pushed him into an impasse, while the limitations of General Crépin or General Gambiez in this kind of war guaranteed their loyalty. So it is that because of a given situation, faults can become qualities and qualities be transformed into faults.

*Innumerable examples may be given. Two typical cases: 1) General Challe, while admirably pursuing the plan for destroying the insurgents, judged that the positive aspirations of the Moslem population would only be satisfied through the solution called "integration" with metropolitan France, whereas General de Gaulle, for his part, desired to bring about a solution through "independence in an association" with France; 2) Regarding the sectors, Colonel Bigeard had hoped for the enlistment of the population by recruited fellaghias. But the latter by their hate of the FLN they had renounced, by personal temperament, created all the conditions for a dictatorship as unconditionally nationalistic and bloody as that of the FLN. This was directly opposite to the situation in other sectors where a moderate nationalism or (in Oursenis of the bachega Boualem) traditional and patriarchal ideas were encouraged. If precautions had not been taken, Algeria would virtually have become a mosaic of different patterns.
II. DESTRUCTION OF THE PARA-MILITARY AND PARA-POLITICAL FORCES OF THE INSURGENCY

1. Political Aspects

The destruction of para-military forces follows certain characteristics which stem from the very nature of the use of these forces by the enemy. The failure to understand these characteristics, and the conduct of operations according to conventional procedure and point of view, is at the root of many of the counterinsurgents' setbacks.

(1) The destruction of rebel forces is not an end in itself. It is only a part of a political and military master plan.

a) On the strategic level: If military operations aim to prove recourse to rebellion is impossible, it is best that political operations should concurrently prove insurrection futile. If confronted with particularly deep-seated positive aspirations and negative feelings on the part of the population, a demonstration that armed rebellion is impossible runs the risk of producing only limited effects. On the one hand the armed insurgency can flare up again after a moment of calm. On the other hand, the insurgency will be all the more drawn out and difficult to quell because it is continuously incensed by the people's hate and frustration.

b) On the tactical level, the destruction of rebel forces must go hand in hand with psychological action on the population in order that long-lasting results may be obtained and in order to facilitate and
simplify the task of the counterinsurgent.*

(2) The destruction of rebel forces is not only a military objective. Indeed, it is a question of preventing their outbreaks defensively, and of annihilating them offensively. But it is also necessary to deprive them of an essential political trump: By the simultaneous destruction of the OPA type of para-political forces and the para-military forces, one of the means of psychological action on the population is taken away: coercion by means of terror.

The military and police successes of the counterinsurgents thus play a role of deterrence by their very existence and without any other means of pressure on the population. To join the rebel forces becomes very dangerous and to fight is unrewarding. Moreover, under counterinsurgent protection, the population can choose not to join the rebels.

In short, by substituting the "normal order" for "insurrectional order" conditions are created which should allow the population to be won over to the established power to the extent it is always rewarding to be on the strongest side.

(3) Several practical consequences follow from these considerations:

a) In order to achieve desired political and psychological effects, military and police operations should aim above all to be effective.

---

*See Chapter III, Psychological Action on the Population.
- Consequently, the only decisive results will stem from an offensive - on every level of counterinsurgency. The mobility of the rebels, their knowledge of the terrain, plus support among the population always gives them the advantage in ambushes of mobile units and in surprise attacks on fixed points. As the rebels above all seek psychological effects, it is difficult to predict their choice of objectives. Any successful operation on their part enhances their morale and their ascendancy over the population.

A defense system of fixed points cannot prevent enemy outbreaks of a para-military nature. Even more, such a deployment would not prevent the insurgents from exercising their ascendancy over the population between these fixed points. The mobilization of the population and the concentration of rebel forces might precipitate the defeat of these points - as this often occurred in Indochina.

If, however, a military post is necessary to occupy certain strategic points, to protect inhabited areas, or to manifest the regime's forces, this in no way should be considered sufficient. Only offensive operations are able to destroy rebel organizations.

For these same reasons, the operations should aim at the destruction of the entire enemy forces. Offensive operations can only be considered terminated when there remain no organized rebel groups able to fight. The necessary time must be assigned to obtaining this objective without ever determining arbitrarily a fixed time for the duration of these operations. If it is necessary to call off a specific operation, it should be launched again at a later date. Thus, in Algeria, the "Plan Challe"
called for the cleaning out of zones where the rebels were strongest, by strategic reserves. However, the number of reserves was too small to permit clearing up all zones simultaneously. They had to handle them consecutively. Because the commitment of the entire reserve in a specific zone would have given the rebels free movement in other zones and would have given the impression that the insurgency was sufficiently strong to require a long and important mobilization of the French forces in a limited area, General Challe planned to use his "steam roller" the necessary number of times to obtain complete destruction. The duration of each operation itself was never determined a priori. It was decided to terminate the operation only after substantial successes had been obtained.

The need for total success and total effectiveness was witnessed in Algeria also in relation to the problem of sealing the Tunisian and Moroccan frontiers.

- The aim of destroying all the enemy forces should not only include all the combat forces, (guerrilla forces in the countryside, terrorist networks in the towns), but also the entire political and administrative machinery.

The destruction of armed bands cannot prevent the insurgency's ascendancy over the population by means of its political framework and its action groups. In Algeria, it was established that the operations of the "Plan Challe" were followed by intensified action by the OPA in the zones purged by the army. Moreover, the destruction of political organizations is all the more imperative as it facilitates the annihilation of groups and networks since it helps isolate them from the population.
Unfortunately, the armed forces of the counterinsurgents very often do not understand adequately the need for destroying the political and administrative machinery of the insurrection. Overconcentrating on conventional operations, the counterinsurgents fail to realize that the enemy they are annihilating crops up again in other forms. In addition, it has been ascertained that the destruction of the OPA posed more different problems - and in some ways much more difficult ones - than the annihilation of armed bands (or even, to a lesser degree, of terrorist networks). Whereas mobility is the essential factor in the fight against these bands, the fight against the OPA itself can only be waged by means of emplaced troops. Troops must be stationed not in military outposts but in the very heart of the population. In short, these are more police and para-political methods than military. Regular conventional troops are not, therefore, always well prepared either in technique or in spirit.

- In fact, the potential effect of efforts to demonstrate the insurgency must fail depends on the frame of mind of the population to be convinced. The more the population evinces strong emotions (negative or positive), the more it has been subjected to the psychological action of the insurgency, the more harsh the demonstration should be.

When a population, on the contrary, evinces only weak emotions and aspirations or is doubtful over the insurrection's chances, even limited success can produce favorable effects and may even snowball the morale both of the population and of the troops engaged (i.e. the quelling of colonial insurrections in the 19th and
beginning 20th centuries or the peasant uprisings in pre-Revolutionary Europe). Likewise, to the extent the European population regarded the OAS to be more a fairytale than a fighting machine with real chances of success, the occupation of the Bab-el-Oued sanctuary sufficed to initiate the insurgency's collapse. But, in this particular operation, the OAS commando units were neither destroyed nor challenged to a fight.

It is also possible that the counterinsurgents' success produces substantial effects less by total destruction than by symbolic value. This is true in the case of captured or killed rebel leaders with reputations as supermen whose troops have not been necessarily decimated. In this instance, the population can be swayed because the naturalization of such leaders appears to mean a total counterinsurgency success. Thus the arrest of General Salan and General Jouhaud contributed to the collapse of the OAS while the contribution of these nominal leaders to the actual striking power of the OAS was only relative.

On the other hand, the death of renowned FLN leaders such as Amrouche (chief of Wilaya III) did not produce a long-lasting effect so long as it was not accompanied by the destruction of their organization.

b) To the extent political and psychological effects are desired, a skillful psychological program must highlight the importance of counterinsurgency successes.

It is not only a matter of obtaining "results" but of making them known both to the population and to those doing the fighting. Photographs of the dead leaders, tracts specifying the extent of the losses suffered, should be distributed.
But, as always, propaganda should not debase or substitute itself for reality. Here again, propaganda must be founded on unquestionable successes and must be circumspect. To declare or imply the complete annihilation of rebels when this has not yet been accomplished plays into the hands of the rebels: a successful outbreak, even a minor one, will suffice to give the impression the rebels are invulnerable (and encourage doubt over the truthfulness of the declared successes).*

c) The enhancement of the psychological effects of military successes must deal as well with the problem of the fate meted out to men captured in combat.

- Beyond a doubt the strongest effect on the population is obtained when intervening troops do not take any prisoners. The danger and the impossibility of the insurrection is made specific by death - the only fate awaiting armed rebels (to enhance this effect even more, it is frequently decided not to authorize the civilian population to bury its dead when this would not endanger public health). However, although a policy of deterrence is useful, certain drawbacks would arise if the enemy, having no means of escape, sees a fight to the death as the only possible course.

The execution of prisoners is thus strictly rejected for moral reasons as well as for ones of effectiveness. It seems best to adopt a method of combat which allows a minimum of quarter (which is, after all, very normal in guerrilla fighting with its violent encounters and the

*It is typical that enemy outbreaks always follow "results of victory" too strongly emphasized.
indispensability of specialized elite troops. A chance is left open for those who wish to stop the struggle and conditions are created which enable certain individuals (even whole units) - faced with counterinsurgent pressure - to come over and join the forces of law and order.

- The enlistment of prisoners and surrendered former enemy troops constitutes, in fact, the best solution. Insurgency is proved possible and the more rewarding choice is to be on the side of the counterinsurgent forces. On the technical level, this produces battle-hardened troops, experienced in guerrilla warfare, aware of the adversary's secrets.

In Algeria such surrenders and changes of loyalty were almost wholly confined to units and leaders known for their toughness in battle. The main motive of such adversaries was not political. Such troops wanted to pursue an adventurous life and to fight on the winning side ("they want weapons and shoes," the experts would say) with better chances of survival and perhaps ultimately, political advancement. Hate of the FLN was less a fundamental reason than a consequence.

Certain French units succeeded in training entire commando units of former rebels (for example, the famous "Georges commando" of Colonel Bigeard). The main difficulty consisted in convincing the first few individuals to change sides. Afterwards, example and the bonds of companionship came into play.

- The lot reserved for unyielding captured rebel leaders presents a problem. It does not seem politic to send men with legendary reputations (even locally) to camps or prisons where their glory will follow them, and
who will rapidly come to represent a symbol of the continuing revolution. In addition, the organization of prisons and camps in a somewhat liberal regime allows convinced individuals to continue fighting - if only by the training and the indoctrination of their fellow prisoners or through propaganda towards the outside world (with the help of lawyers and visitors) without even considering the possibilities for escape. In this way, the capture of Ben Bella and his companions in 1956 (by intercepting their plane flying from Tunis to Rabat) in the end prejudiced French interests.

- However, if the execution of certain unyielding rebel leaders seems feasible in the heat of combat and far from the public eye, it is not the same thing in the case of arrests in towns of persons with primary political responsibilities.

The killing in cold blood of individuals not fighting at the moment of their arrest is repugnant to moral principles. Moreover, public opinion would quickly interpret this as murder. The population itself may thus acquire reasons for more negative feelings towards the established power: martyrs have always been useful to revolutions. In reality, we will see below that the legal problems entailed in fighting the OPA are very difficult to solve.

d) If military results are to produce favorable psychological effects on the population, care must be taken that troop action should not lessen (or reduce to nothing) those effects.

We shall later examine in detail the means used to control and conquer the population.* It should be noted

*See Chapter III.
here that the destruction of the rebel machinery must
avoid the release and development of negative feelings
which are latent in the population during every insur-
gency and which run the risk of being magnified if force
alone is used.

- Since the objective is to cut the rebels off
from the population, recourse to violence must be limited
only to persons actively engaged in the insurgency. Just
as the rebels want their terrorism to appear just and
selective, the population must know it has nothing to
fear from counterinsurgent forces which use violence only
against those who have taken up arms.

The troops, therefore, must be well disciplined. No
abuses can be tolerated.

If control operations (roadblocks, interrogations,
etc.) and house-searches must be carried out, it must be
done with propriety.

Collective reprisals must be rejected unless directed
against the collective activity of a whole section of the
population.

Support for the insurgency must not be punished when
it is exacted by force and when it is of minor importance
(contributions of money, food, shelter, etc.). Counter-
insurgency operations aim precisely at freeing the popu-
lation from such coercion.

- The destruction of the rebel organizations
should not be done in such a way as to promote the popu-
lation's identification with them or to augment negative
feelings towards the counterinsurgents.
The execution of prisoners is to be proscribed for an additional reason. Systematic public executions carried out in order perhaps to serve as an example, on the contrary create martyrs and inspire more hate than fear. These can only be used within the framework of a judicious policy of collective reprisals or when it concerns individuals who have terrorized the population itself.

Public trials can cause equally disastrous effects, especially in the case of rebel chiefs exercising political functions or members of the OPA with no blood directly on their hands. Only an anonymous killer whose political beliefs seem secondary to the number of murders committed can be sentenced and executed with impunity. An important political leader, an official who has never himself killed, will dramatize his personal convictions and will use his own trial as a theater for propaganda and justification for his cause. His ideal will eclipse his acts, if it does not even justify them.

In order to exploit the situation, the FLN had organized a "battery of lawyers" specialized in staging political trials (and playing a secondary role as liaison). The fact that these lawyers were important FLN officials (Mr. Ben Abdallah had the rank of "colonel," Mr. Oussedik was cousin to a minister of the GPRMA and member of the Council of the French Federation) did not injure their standing because of the prestige attached in France to the lawyer's profession.

For their part, the French authorities never took the risk of trying Ben Bella or any of the important FLN political chiefs. To have tried them would have meant in effect
condemning not so much their acts as those aspirations they would have put forward. Ben Bella thus became a rather cumbersome hostage. The resulting impression of weakness (which could be compensated by military and political action in other areas) seemed less serious than by condemnation making him into a martyr. On the OAS side, the example of General Salan, who was not, however, sentenced to death by an extraordinary military tribunal, proves the state's difficulty in coping with a defense based solely on ideological and political motivation.

The leader responsible for the blind terrorism in the city of Algiers, Yacef Saadi, was tried and sentenced since he himself had ordered violence. Even in this case it was considered best not to execute him (although he was not pardoned). On the OAS side, the same thing happened to the deputy assistant to General Salan, General Jouhaud, who was condemned to death but who was neither executed nor pardoned for a long time. However, at the same time, Saadi or Salan's subordinates could be sentenced to death as their killings thrust their political motives into the background.

Once again, the repression of political officials caused greater difficulties than the annihilation of the insurgency's para-military elements.

2. Military Aspects of the Problem

The immediate and long-range objectives assigned to the task of destroying rebel forces having now been defined, what are the military procedures which better facilitate their realization?
(1) From 1959 on, very positive results on the military level were attained in Algeria.

If in 1956 the enemy order of battle included some 50,000 men in Algeria, at the time of negotiations with the FLN it comprised only some 5,000 to 10,000 men. The number of weapons on Algerian territory fell from 21,000 in 1958 to less than 8,000 in 1961.

- Considering the constant renewal of the maquis, enemy losses during this period amounted to more than 150,000 persons.

- In 1958 enemy bands were fully developed at company strength (and nearing that of a battalion). Later they were forced to break up, usually into groups of 10 to 15 men.

- Under these conditions, no important offensive operation could be planned without the risk of suicide. (Quantitatively, the number of incidents fell from 2,500 in 1957 to 1,000 in 1960.) The enemy was forced onto the defensive and restricted to outbreaks of limited importance.

- The enemy forces stationed in Tunisia and Morocco (25,000 and 15,000 men respectively) were neutralized militarily. If in 1958 whole companies regularly crossed the frontiers, in 1962 only an intermittent trickling of a few individuals was observed.

- The internal military situation was such that:

* Documents seized and the interrogation of prisoners emphasized the scarcity of weapons, munitions, provisions and clothing; the constant pressures of the army and police; conflicts and internal purges; the suspicion and hesitancy of the population, etc.
1) All the political leaders had sought refuge abroad,
2) the head of one of the most important wilayas (Si Salah of Wilaya IV of the Algerois) had gone to Paris in June 1962 to ask General de Gaulle the conditions for enlisting in the government's service.

(2) If these results are impressive, their cost should not be forgotten.

- These results were obtained during close to two years of operations (mainly in 1959 and in 1960 - the year 1961 saw a certain slackening due to the opening of negotiations with the FLN, the putsch of April 1961, etc.). They benefited from the trial and error and experimentation carried out from November 1954 (start of the insurrection) to January 1959, when the de Gaulle offensive against the FLN actually started following his arrival in power in May 1958. (It was in 1955 that parachutist regiments came home from Indochina set foot in Algeria, in 1956 when recruits were sent there, and in 1958 when the construction of barriers along the frontiers became effective.)

- These results called for a considerable number of men. The French army in Algeria comprised around 400,000 men and included about 200,000 Moslems in its ranks or in support as local militias, or a total strength approximately a hundred times that of the rebel forces.*

---

*In actuality, a simple comparison with the armed rebel forces cannot suffice. On one hand, one should consider the surface area under control (340,000 km² in Algeria, 2,000,000 in the Sahara) and the size of the population (9 million Moslems). On the other hand, the total manpower was not engaged in active operations: the need of troops for manning fixed positions and for supply functions, plus the poor quality of certain units, reduced French effective operational strength to around 80,000 men.
Concerning methods, all modern methods were put into effect: the use of military engineering for the construction of electric barriers, a fleet of helicopters, light planes, a reserve of trucks, ultra-modern means of communication, light artillery, air and naval means of surveillance. The nature of the war, however, made tanks, heavy artillery and bombers useless (except in small doses at the frontiers).

In short, as far as men are concerned, the Algerian war was waged by the finest of the French army: an impulsive and dynamic Commander-in-Chief such as General Challe; experienced general officers at the head of the armed forces such as Generals Massu and Olié; exceptional fighters at the head of regiments (or sectors) such as Colonel Jeampierre (one of the best officers in the French army, killed in combat in 1959), Colonel Bigeard, Colonel Chateau-Jobert, etc. ... a constellation of captains and non-commissioned officers trained during the fiercest Indochinese fighting; the Foreign Legion regiments* and parachutist regiments filled with almost a mystical belief in force and efficiency, eager to erase the memory of defeat in Indochina.

(3) In order to adapt to general conditions of counterinsurgency operations and to their specific

*For example, during four months of operations in 1959, the first REP (First Foreign Regiment of Parachutists) which was considered the "spearhead of the French shock troops" (disbanded on 22 April 1961), had eliminated 1,500 rebels, seized 1,200 arms including 100 automatic weapons. They suffered, out of a total of 900 men, 100 dead and 300 wounded.
application to Algeria, the French army was obliged to convert its structure (organization and command) as much as its doctrine.

- The daily recourse to strictly conventional methods (maintenance of garrisons and fixed points without preventing rebel outbreaks; extensive operations planned in advance and producing meager results) was abandoned for a style of warfare geared to the nature of the enemy.

- In regard to organization, the disposition of French troops was characterized by the combined quest for flexibility and solidity, mobility and permanent stationing. The cornerstone concept of troop disposition was the division of the Algerian territory into military sectors (based on the civilian "arrondissement" and generally entrusted to a superior officer of the rank of colonel) manned by their own troops (sector troops) and, in the most subverted zones, wielding unified civilian-military command. In this way, Algeria was equipped with a solid military structure. This structure remained nonetheless very flexible because each chief of sector could adapt his action to local conditions and because the garrisoning of troops in the sector went hand in hand with the existence of shock troops (troupes d'intervention). These were very flexible, continually on the move and responsible for special missions to destroy rebel groups.

- The commanders of this troop disposition combined the knowledge of local conditions with the broad views necessary to the conducting of war. The primary unit in the sectors was part of a hierarchy founded on the division of Algeria, under the authority of one commander-in-chief, into three army corps each one
including three key regions of Algeria (Constantinois, Algérois, Oranie). Each army corps was in itself divided by zone or region (based on the department). The shock troops were linked to these command areas with the commander-in-chief controlling the strategic reserves.

- In relation to doctrine, this disposition permitted attacks on the two essential means of action of the rebels.

In the first place, the basing of sector troops (sectioning, i.e.: "quadrillage") served mainly to sever the rebels from the population and to prevent the former's influence on the population. These garrisons deprived the rebel of the milieu necessary for his survival and progress while restricting his liberty of movement. On the offensive level, sectioning allowed counterinsurgency forces themselves to win over the population.

In the second place, the mobility of the troops of intervention made possible the annihilation of rebel groups cut off from their supporting milieu and driven back to their zones of refuge. The mobility of the rebels and their knowledge of terrain were countered by the mobility of the troops of intervention (thanks to the use of modern means of transportation and communication), their special training and large numbers.

- The ruling idea consists of "fixing" the rebel on all levels in order to destroy him. On the tactical level, this fixing is obtained by a foolproof plug (le bouclage). On the strategic level, it is sought by tightening of the frontiers which block the entry and exit of the rebels in the territory, and by the process of sectioning which excludes both their melting into the
population and, lastly, their access to inhabited areas.

3. The Sealed Borders
   (1) Well-sealed borders are essential for the counter-insurgents. Tight border control:
       - prevents rebel forces from being reinforced by fresh troops having benefited from undisturbed military training and political indoctrination;
       - prevents provisioning of existing forces with weapons and ammunition;
       - prevents the para-military rebel forces from seeking refuge in a territory out of reach either to escape from pursuers or to benefit from rest, first aid and training. Thus the rebels are limited to territory where they can be destroyed.
   (2) In Algeria, closing the frontiers was all the more imperative because the FLN had been able to set up two important armies in the bordering countries (25,000 and 15,000 men in Tunisia and Morocco) and the Indochinese precedent had proven the near impossibility of fighting an insurrection benefiting from an open frontier with any supporting country.
   (3) In the event, this problem was resolved in a more than satisfactory way from a strictly military point of view: if in 1957 strong bands (composed of several companies each) ventured into Algeria and made heavy fighting necessary to contain them, no massive border crossing took place following the construction of barriers. Several attempts to cross cost much bloodshed for the rebels (95 per cent of a Katiba was destroyed at Morsett in February 1959, 100 per cent at Bambetta on 1 March 1959,
etc.) and gave such an impression of defeat to the Moslem population and to the exterior FLN army that the FLN command abandoned the idea, limiting border crossings to the "trickling" of small groups of individuals. During the second half of 1960, only 40 men and 40 rifles were able to enter Algeria.

(4) The system achieved such results owing less to conventional techniques (a system of fortifications would have been too costly in men and equipment and in the last analysis of little effect against the infiltration of small groups) than to adaptation to the enemy's actions.

The French "barrier" operated first as an obstacle (mines, barbed wire, continuous lighting, patrols between fixed points, etc.) and secondly as an alarm system (the barrier being electrified and equipped with radar) allowing mobile troops stationed farther back to enter into action. Border crossing was thus possible but it was immediately detected and an organized group had no chance of escaping troops specialized in the annihilation of armed bands.

Indeed, such a barrier could not have prevented (or even seriously impeded) a forced entry by the entire enemy corps. However, this seemed both highly unlikely (from the point of view of the insurrection, the FLN saw no advantage in risking the annihilation of its total battle corps outside of Algeria in a test which would have had decisive psychological consequences), and not very dangerous, since the superiority of the French forces in men and equipment assured their advantage in an open battle.

The very nature of the barrier, however, was perfectly adapted to the more probable and most dangerous nature of
an enemy threat: the possibility of continually renewing the maquis by the infiltration of armed bands into Algeria. Moreover, the very simplicity of the system allowed it to be extended over long distances (320 km. for the eastern barrier) and on any type of terrain (even wooded and hilly). However, 40,000 men were necessary to guard the Tunisian barrier (and 2,500 to maintain it).

(5) If the construction of the barrier made possible the military neutralization of the FLN forces in both Tunisia and Morocco and the localization of the existing maquis in Algeria, one is forced to admit that this military success did not solve all the problems arising from an outside sanctuary.

Indeed, French propaganda could and did successfully insist on "the barrier that kills" but the presence of an "army of liberation" near the frontier constituted a symbol of an ever fighting revolution.*

A defensive measure -- even if perfectly successful -- could not in effect produce decisive results. These last can only be expected from an offensive resulting in the destruction of the enemy.

(6) A last but important aspect of closed frontiers consists in the repression of arms traffic supporting the insurgency.

- The French navy controlled Algerian waters very closely for this purpose. However, the control of traffic in territorial waters was not enough for complete

---

*From this point of view, the slogan "the barrier that kills" was a useful tactic to discourage an enemy, but was pointless as a strategy. It confirmed the existence of an army which France was obliged to take into account.
control, so long as arms could be unloaded in the bordering countries and brought to the aid of the insurrection.

Without going into detail, it is necessary to note:
1) that the number of arms captured by the navy was greater than those captured in combat in Algeria itself,
2) that the action of the Special Services was decisive in providing intelligence and in disorganizing illicit trade,
3) that the disorganization of arms traffic for the FLN in Western Europe was immediately followed by arms shipments from the satellite countries. However, after several successful interceptions of these shipments, it was Russia herself who assured their transport toward the end of the war.

- The Police and Customs services controlled the railways and roads leading into Algeria. (The controls set up were so effective that the FLN was obliged to pass arms in "small packages" hidden in railway cars or trucks, or in desert convoys coming from the Sahara to the south, where the borders were less well guarded.)

- Lastly, aerial surveillance of Algerian territory was carried out in spite of the fact that the FLN never had planes at its disposal even on the more remote bases of Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya.

4. Sectioning ("le quadrillage")

When the rebel forces are restricted in this manner to a given territory, sectioning ("le quadrillage") tends to isolate them from the rest of the population and push them back into uninhabited areas.

(1) The sectioning which was carried out in Algeria by the French forces had the following characteristics:
- The installations were not considered permanent or even primarily military in function.
- Certain positions were held because of their military interest and in order to restrict the freedom of movement of the rebels. Ideally, however, most of the troops must be based among the population itself and therefore do not so much ensure the defense of positions of military or economic interest, as they provide protection for the population.
- Garrison troops must, of course, be prepared to repel enemy attack, but their principal mission is offensive and involves the discovery and destruction of the rebels in those areas where they are stationed.

(2) Sectioning goes hand in hand with the presence of mobile troops. Such troops assigned to a given sector must be prepared to provide support at points under rebel attack and, at the same time, to run limited offensive operations between the fortified posts or in this or that populated area.

Regional mobile troops, belonging to the Army Corps or to the strategic reserves of the Commander-in-Chief, are used for more far-reaching offensive operations.

(3) This type of sectioning possesses the advantage of extreme flexibility. The chief of each sector is able to adapt his activity to local conditions and to the specific nature of enemy activity in his sector (or in any part of his sector).

(a) In a heavily subverted zone (with strong rebel bands enjoying the underlying support of the population), the use of the conventional technique of maintaining fixed fortified positions may be the appropriate measure.
These posts do not necessarily prevent the rebels from operating between them and acting on the population, but their existence does restrict the enemy's freedom of movement. Above all, it prevents the rebellion from completely taking over an entire region. The necessity for circulating between the posts obliges the counterinsurgency forces to hold open the major axes, and to make their presence felt.

Such as it is, however, this provision can only be considered an act of temporary consolidation preceding a more thorough cleaning out operation. Costly from the outset because of the possibilities of ambush and harassment, it can lead to disaster, as in the case of Indochina, if the rebellion gains enough strength to wipe out the posts one by one.

(b) Within zones that are only moderately subverted, sectioning can take the form of basing troops not at fortified posts but within inhabited centers. In such a case the troops are in the open and not stationed behind barbed wire. Their mission is to
- destroy the local Politico-Administrative Organization [OPA];
- prevent rebel groups from attacking the inhabited center;
- prevent rebel infiltration for terrorizing, resting, or seeking supplies.

If to this end a control system is required outside the inhabited center (to prevent entry of suspects and the removal of food and other supplies), and ambushes must be set up at all points of access, the support organization operating within the inhabited center must be
simultaneously dismantled. Once again, encirclement from the outside must be combined with a cleaning out from within.

The two main trump cards of the counterinsurgency forces are their intimate knowledge of the population (the census represents the most classic method of distinguishing stable from fluctuating rebel elements) and the confidence they inspire. The constant presence of counterinsurgent forces, their participation in the life of an inhabited center, the effectiveness of their defense and control system, their success in operations against armed bands, as well as the absence of any form of extortion—all these factors help to win the collaboration of the population.

As in the case of the insurgency, the support of the population must be enlisted gradually. The classic technique at the beginning is to obtain a minimum of collaboration from the population which would not cause them to run any real risk. For example, a series of private and confidential interrogations of a large number of individuals usually results in information on members of the local OPA. Low-level members who have been arrested are released in exchange for the names of more important individuals, etc.

On the whole, the vital problem of intelligence in such situations depends, in part, on the general atmosphere created by the counterinsurgency forces and also on intelligence. Complete protection must be offered to informers. In Algeria, elements specialized in intelligence gathering (the Operational Detachments for Protection—DOP, which was under the authority of and formed by the
Special Services) provided the necessary competence, as they systematically penetrated the rebel networks.

(c) When a zone has been more or less pacified, participation on the part of the population can take the more active form of self-protection.

In the early stages volunteers are authorized to take part in the defense of an inhabited center (at first through minor tasks and with simple weapons).

In the final phase, however, these volunteers must be prepared to defend a given point and the surrounding area. The troops of that sector will only act as a mobile shock force, if necessary.

In the entire process two mistakes must be avoided. First there is the mistake of giving arms and responsibility to a population which is not sufficiently won over to the side of the counterinsurgency forces. Indigenous participation must be brought about progressively and be whole-hearted enough to prevent the volunteers or the rest of the population from succumbing to pressure from the rebels to redeem themselves by once again switching sides. The second error is that of refusing protection and arms to a population which is seriously involved on the side of the counterinsurgency. Such a population becomes a choice target for the rebels, who, by destroying it, can convince others not to follow the same example.

(d) However, there are cases where it is not possible to bring about this evolution. Self-protection by the population may encounter too many obstacles, when the terrain is too rugged, the population too dense, or the inhabitants are too strongly aligned with the rebellion.
In this case, rebel bands cannot be isolated, either through basing of troops or self-protection. Recourse must be had to the technique of regrouping. The population is regrouped into flat areas, for example, where it is possible to ensure protection and control.

Regrouping (involving during the Algerian war a million people) can be carried out either in a population who are in the self-protection phase (in which case it would be done primarily for military reasons), or with one basically on the side of the rebellion.

In the latter case, however, the regrouping operation usually increases the feeling of hostility toward the established power. Therefore, particular care must be taken to dismantle the OPA, which takes advantage of the situation to increase its activity, and also to put into effect the techniques of psychological action on the population. But in spite of intense effort in both these directions, regrouping is at best only a lesser evil. It permits isolation and even facilitates annihilation of the rebel forces, but at the same time it creates zones which, though pacified from a military point of view, are nonetheless politically unstable. This technique should only be used in cases of absolute necessity and only if followed by a persistent effort to mollify the feelings of the people.*

(4) After a sector (or region) has been placed under a defensive sectioning, it is usual to take the next steps by concentrating the principal offensive effort on a carefully chosen zone (usually one of the least subverted).

*See Chapter III.
Depending on the success obtained within the chosen zone, the pacification effort can then be extended and gradually spread through bordering zones.

Simultaneously, while the rebel bands are thus being cut off from the population (and pushed back to their zones of refuge), offensive operations may be launched against them by mobile troops.

5. Offensive Operations for the Destruction of Rebel Bands

   (1) The success of offensive operations depends essentially on the conditions under which they are carried out.

   The object is to drive the rebel forces into a net and wipe them out. However, when one considers the extreme mobility of the rebels, their intimate knowledge of the territory, and the information they have concerning the movements of the counterinsurgency forces, it becomes obvious that offensive operations present great technical difficulties.

   The counterinsurgency plans must be kept secret. Encircling must be done discreetly and thoroughly enough to present a solid, impenetrable barrier (which means a large number of troops must be used). The troops in charge of the cleaning out must be well enough trained operationally to uncover and wipe out rebels, often in hand-to-hand combat. Lastly, the whole apparatus must be extremely mobile in order to adapt to any situation.
The necessary mobility, flexibility, and effectiveness were achieved through recourse to special troops (Legion and Parachutist), the systematic use of helicopters (for transport of units responsible for encircling and cleaning out), constant radio communication (enabling each participant to follow the progress of the operation) and aerial surveillance, as well as rapid exploitation of information obtained from prisoners and inhabitants, quick paced combat aiming toward the destruction of the encircled elements before nightfall, and the installation of command posts in the combat zone. The enemy was localized through systematic scouring of the territory ("le ratiissage") with particular attention to unusual terrain that might provide the enemy with a valuable position, through aerial surveillance, intelligence gathering, and information furnished by prisoners, etc. In other cases the same thing was accomplished by whole units acting as "nomads." They remained under cover during the day and advanced only at night, setting up ambushes and thus detecting anything unusual.

Because they did not follow a rigid system, because they were constantly on the move and motivated by a spirit of competition, the mobile forces, with the help

*The Legion and Parachutist regiments excelled in adapting their resources to the situation. In May of 1959, Colonel Ducasse, who had by chance run into some unusually well-armed rebels, immediately modified the operation which had been planned in such a way that he was able to surround the band. In this way, Colonels Amirouche and Si Haoues (leaders of Wilayas III and VI) were killed on their way to a meeting of the GPRA in Tunis.
of considerable technical support and often at the cost of heavy losses, succeeded in becoming virtual "beast of the hunt" with impressive results.

(2) One of the essential characteristics of the "Challe Plan" lay in the creation of a mobile force (about three divisions) which could systematically undertake large-scale offensive operations.

These reserves, under the "Challe Plan", attacked the rebel zones of refuge, where the sector troops were restricted to a defensive sectioning and limited offensive operations might be ineffective or too dangerous. In 1959 the following operations, running from east to west, were carried out: Operation "Couronne" (in the region of Oran, from February-March 1959); Operation "Courrois" (in the region of Algiers, from April-June 1959); Operation "Étincelle" (in the Hodna mountains, in July 1959); Operation "Jumelles" (in the rugged mountains of the Kabylie range, the center of the rebellion, from July 1959 on); Operation "Pierres Precieuses" (in the mountains of the Constantine region and the Collo Peninsula, October 1959).

In operations of this kind sector troops made wide and deep encirclements. Legion and Paratrooper regiments were then injected into the resulting net. The entire operation was entrusted to the local command (of the sector or region).

Here again, plans for the operation were not drawn up a priori, but sought the maximum effectiveness, taking into account the nature of the enemy.

*See page (II).
For example, whereas Operation "Etincelle" was a lightning operation (three weeks) in the Hodna mountains, Operation "Jumelles" stretched out over a period of more than eight months. This region of the Kabylie had, in fact, been placed under control by the rebellion. After a preliminary cleaning up, it was decided to commit mobile forces to it for as long as necessary. While some of the regiments were carrying out limited offensive operations, others were stationed among the population. However, the density of the population, the ruggedness of the terrain, and the strong rebel hold over the area required systematic regrouping.

6. Non-Conventional Operations

Because the counterinsurgency forces had to adapt to the methods and objectives of the rebellion, their military missions and operations eventually took on a particular character distinct from those of conventional, classic operations and missions. Specialized counter-insurgency operations strive for mobility and surprise when they are directed against small, mobile bands familiar with the terrain. Similarly, in static missions, the psychological action of the rebels necessitates the basing of troops among the population, if the inhabitants are to be known, protected, and controlled.

However, one can go even further. At this point many theoreticians claim, on the one hand, that unconventional operations are the most fruitful, and on the other, that if the enemy is to be defeated, his own methods should be used as much as possible - not only for winning over the
population, but also where military methods are concerned. Many such unconventional experiments were tried out in Indochina and Algeria. Some were admittedly very effective; others ended in almost total failure. From all these attempts the conclusion may be drawn that the unconventional character of the operation or the use of the special techniques of insurgency are less necessary for success than flexible adaptation, with no particular system (conventional or unconventional), to the nature of the adversary and to whatever circumstances and conditions may exist at any given moment.

(1) The search for mobility and surprise, and adaptation to enemy methods of combat led to the creation and intensive use, highly successful in Algeria, of "Fighter Commandos" ("Commandos de chasse").

Divided into groups of 60 to 80 men (sometimes including Fellagha) who could operate in small numbers - teams of up to four men - the commandos were trained to live the life of guerrillas. Nomadic, they moved about especially at night, often following the trail of rebel bands or setting up ambushes. They relied completely on surprise to wipe out rebel bands or pin them down while awaiting the arrival of the mobile forces. Thanks to their continuous movement, they also served as a form of reassurance to the population which became aware of a constant and effective military presence.

Actually, the use of these commandos depends very much on the strength of the rebel forces as opposed to that of the established power. In Indochina, in very

*See Chapter III.
subverted areas, the commandos were certainly able to achieve some success and create a climate of insecurity among the Viet Minh, but, at the same time, they became more vulnerable to ambushes and sudden attacks. In Algeria, on the other hand, in zones which were well sectioned or where mobile forces were operating, they obtained results so remarkable that the command accelerated their organization and training. General Challe, in particular, used them systematically as the last phase in his offensive operations. Once the general reserve units had departed, he ordered the commandos to remain behind and prevent the formation of new rebel bands.

The state of mind of the population also plays a role. Systematic hostility (and therefore informing to the rebellion) hinders the commandos, whereas simple neutrality allows them to amplify the impression of power they create through their constant presence and their impressive "hunting scenes."

(2) Even further from any conventional idea is the formula of a counterinsurgent maquis.

In Indochina application of this formula was highly conclusive, but in Algeria the experiment ended in failure. (This is exactly the reverse of what happened with the "fighter commandos" and proves that any formula is less effective in itself than in relation to the circumstances to which it is applied.) In Indochina the maquis was successful because of the anti-Viet Minh feelings of

---

*Over a period of two years, 50,000 anti-Viet Minh underground fighters were organized and equipped in the highlands of Tonkin and Laos which were controlled by the Viet Minh."
the population in the High Plateaux. But it was only formed as a last resort and because there was no way, under such a heavy Viet Minh occupation, of channeling the negative sentiments of the population into a formula of self-defense. In Algeria, however, wherever a pro-French and anti-FLN feeling existed, the territorial hold of the FLN was so weak that this feeling was better utilized to support the self-defense system or even militias (harkis of Bachaga Boualem, Si Cherif, etc.) which were capable of wiping out the guerrilla bands alone or with the help of French forces.

Therefore, an anti-FLN maquis could only be organized on an ideological basis similar to that of the rebellion but exploited in a different direction. Two experiments were made.

The first experiment was the artificial creation of a "maquis-counter-maquis" ("Force K," from the code name of its leader Kobus, organized in 1958), which was similar in every way to the FLN except for one important and precise point: militant anti-Communism. However, "Force K" not only failed to develop but was rather quickly neutralized from within by the FLN. It was too artificial in character and too open to enemy penetration. Furthermore, it is very difficult to implant underground forces in zones which are already held by other guerrillas. The newcomer is obviously at a disadvantage with respect to the original occupant, which tends to prove that the facilities that a maquis might be expected to enjoy are not inexhaustible.

The second experiment was somewhat more interesting, as it involved the support of already existing underground
fighters who were inspired by rebel ideology but opposed to the FLN. In 1957 this support operation was entrusted to the MNA leader, Bellounis, and his forces from the region south of Algiers (after the FLN massacre of the MNA village Malouza). Here again, complete success was not feasible. The very fact that a rebel chief asks for support from the established power proves that he is in an inferior position. An attempt to rectify the situation through support, no matter how discreet, from representatives of the established order demoralizes the guerrillas and diminishes their prestige among the population. Already losing ground in this way, the dissident group can hardly solve the problems involved in fighting an original occupant. On the other hand, this same difficulty facilitates defensive activity against the orthodox rebels. Bellounis, though certainly not able to extend his influence, could successfully prevent the FLN from taking over his territories since he no longer had to fight on two fronts, and had received arms. (These territories remained, almost to the end of the hostilities, forbidden to the FLN.) However, the very success of this formula constitutes a danger for the counterinsurgent. As soon as the dissident band is capable of action, it is inevitable that the ideal of rebellion will influence its actions. Bellounis increased his extortions to the point where he damaged French interests and had to be eliminated - which was easy enough to do because of the control the French forces had over him.

This dilemma (ineffectiveness or insurgency) proper to a maquis based on a para-insurrectional ideal only disappears when the rebellion is spreading and the
counterinsurgents must take every opportunity and the dissidents must fight for survival. As soon as pressure from the rebellion is relaxed, however, the dissident underground quickly becomes uncontrollable and must be eliminated. It has been affirmed that such a situation does not necessarily condemn this formula, as it is always easier to eliminate controlled dissidents than to destroy rebel bands. This argument would have more validity if the para-insurrectional maquis were more likely to win decisive victories over its enemy brothers. But the experience of the MNA underground (and the Indochinese religious sects) tends to prove that they are only able to run defensive, delaying operations, which limits their value except in cases of very heavy insurrectional pressure.

(3) Similar experiments involving urban movements (OPA and shock groups) confirm the above conclusions.

- All organizations artificially created in the name of the insurgent ideal were doomed to total failure (attempts at penetration of the MNA in Algerian cities, organization of the FAAD which supported the idea of independence in a future association with France, etc.).

- On the other hand, in cities in the Metropole where the MNA had heavily penetrated, it was likely, thanks to secret police protection, to deal noticeable blows to the FLN. But this particular movement could only fight a defensive battle on the one hand - which was lost in the long run - and on the other it kept as fierce a watch over the Moslems as did the FLN. (The latter drawback was lessened, however, by the fact that the MNA was not inclined to attack French property and
persons, especially in metropolitan France where the Moslems were segregated.)

(4) Another, more effective, way of taking advantage of the rivalries and opposition which often exist within rebel movements is to increase them directly, from within the rebel organization, without giving official support to any of the dissident factions.

The best example of an effective activity which exploits the situation in the most thorough and flexible manner is the operation known as "bleuite." With this operation the French Special Services magnified the dissidence within Wilaya III by directing, through persons identified with the Wilaya, fabricated "proofs" of collaboration with the French services on the part of this or that leader or well-known fighter. The results exceeded all hopes. Confronted with these "proofs," the leader of the Wilaya, Amrouche (known for his suspicious and cruel nature), began an extensive purge which was carried out with such violence that the fabricated information from the French services snow-balled, and inhuman tortures resulted in denunciations and unbelievable confessions. Wilaya III was profoundly shattered and "spy-itis" reached such a point in the undergound that after the capture of "Major" Azzedine, a GPRA minister was even accused of treason.

Thus, the ability to adapt, imagination, and quick reactions are the greatest assets of counterinsurgents in non-conventional operations.

*During the "Battle of Algiers," FLN renegades were dressed in blue dungarees (in French "bleu-de-cauffe"); thence: "bleuite," action of making something blue.
7. The Specific Problem of Cities

The combined use of dynamic sectioning and offensive operations bears fruit especially in populated rural areas. The French experience in Algeria proves that it is possible both to undertake the destruction of guerrilla bands and prepare the villages for fortified self-protection, after breaking up the local OPA. The results thus obtained can have lasting effects.

On the other hand, if the entire population has already been seriously subverted, the policy of regrouping, while solving the military problems, provides fertile ground for the activity of rebel political organizations. However, the consequences of this lesser evil are reduced to the extent that the regrouped populations are scattered throughout regions which are removed from the center of attention of public opinion. Under such conditions the repercussions of the activity of rebel political organizations in the centers of regroupment cannot be widely felt.

In large, densely populated cities this is not the case. The presence of numerous journalists and spectators allows those political organizations, which succeed in penetrating a city and becoming active there, to provoke para-political movements and even attempts at uprising which may assume great proportions. Also, we have seen that the para-military organizations of the rebellion had at their disposal that weapon of the poor, which has explosive repercussions in large cities, terrorism. Therefore, it is the specific case of counterinsurgency activity in large cities which we must now examine.

(1) In the face of a dynamic rebellion the regular police forces (with their small numbers and their routine methods) appear to be helpless.
Though normally well informed police forces may succeed in learning both the organization and intentions of the leading rebel group in the phase which precedes the triggering off of the rebellion, they soon lose their sources of information.

Compartmentalization within the networks and other rules of secrecy, recruitment from a special milieu, and the heavy risks involved soon render ineffective the classic indicators used by the police. The interrogation methods of the criminal police (respectful of the law and based on proof of individual guilt) are ill suited to fanatics who do not hesitate to admit their own responsibility, but refuse to denounce their leaders and accomplices. As for the uniformed police, they are quickly cut off from the population and often upset by a situation which more closely resembles war than their daily routine.

Buried in their posts, cut off from their sources of information, and overwhelmed by the number of cases to be handled, the police as a body soon become blind and helpless. Against both FLN and OAS terrorism new solutions had to be found in the large cities of Algeria.

Once again the basis for these techniques lies in a combination of sectioning and offensive operations.

(2) Sectioning is an essential element but alone could not be decisive. It makes possible widespread and detailed control operations, which seriously hinder the freedom of movement and maneuvers of the terrorist commandos. The presence of troops makes a strong impression on the inhabitants and prevents, or nips in the bud, street demonstrations or para-military insurrections. The decision to station armed forces within Algiers
(instead of massing them at the outskirts of the city in order to avoid an eventual putsch) was enough to kill OAS domination in the city. Though the OAS prided itself on controlling the capital, the entry of the troops dealt such a blow to OAS prestige that its members were provoked into what proved for them a fatal demonstration of force at Bab-el-Oued.

However, sectioning in large cities presents more difficulties than in rural areas. In the first place, contact with a hostile city and execution of control missions soon exhaust the troops. Reduced in number they soon lose both striking power and their high morale. It is not unusual to see troops in the city taken by surprise in a well carried out insurgent operation (on 22 April 1961, the 1st REP of General Challe easily defeated 6,000 men stationed in the city) or gradually succumbing to the feelings of the population and even taking the population's side in a demonstration of strength. Therefore, in the large cities in Algeria sectioning was preferably entrusted to specially trained forces which were half-way between the army and the police ("gendarmes," CRS).

In the second place, it is very difficult in a large city to render sectioning offensive. Personal contact with the inhabitant, and the control of his activities (with the resulting detection of insurgents) is not so easy as in populated rural areas where the population is less dense and more stable. In the city, participation on the part of the population, which is more subject to conflicting sentiments, cannot take the simple form of self-protection.
In Algeria an initial remedy to these difficulties was provided through specialized activity of certain units. For example, the entire responsibility for control of the Moslem Casbah in Algiers was entrusted to the 9th Regiment of Zouaves. Through patience and sufficient numbers they succeeded in acquiring, house by house, inhabitant by inhabitant, an intimate and profound knowledge of this quarter which is so difficult to penetrate that in 1956-1957 it was still the inner sanctuary of the FLN rebellion. Unfortunately, this long-range task immobilizes countless troops and is more difficult and less effective in extended and overpopulated agglomerations. (The very nature of the Casbah, embedded as it is within the European city, explains its utilization by the FLN as well as the success of the 9th Zouave Regiment.) But, above all, whatever the success may be in obtaining knowledge of the population and the dismantling of rebel political organizations, unlike the country, it is not possible to come upon a solution as simple as self-protection. In cities, more than elsewhere, the attitude of the masses depends not only on local success in putting down the rebellion but also on the general political situation.

The second remedy to the defensive character of sectioning in large cities was therefore sought in an elaboration of the technique of structuring ("structuration") of the population which will be studied in detail in the next chapter.

Nonetheless, sectioning constitutes an indispensable basis for those offensive operations which alone can make possible the destruction of the para-military and para-political organizations of the rebellion.
(3) **Offensive Operations:** In Algeria, in a milieu and in situations which rendered the regular police completely ineffective, offensive operations proved successful against the para-military organizations of both the FLN and the OAS. In 1957, the bomb network of the FLN was entirely destroyed, and in 1962 the principal OAS leaders were arrested, as well as a large number of their commandos.

a) In both cases success was obtained in the following manner:

1) Through the formation of an autonomous special force (the 10th Paratrooper Division in the Battle of Algiers against the FLN; "mission C," sent from the Metropole to combat the OAS).

2) Through providing sufficient military manpower to carry out the necessary encircling and searches.

3) Through intensive use of methods of information gathering which derived more from techniques of counter-espionage than those used by the criminal police.

b) In working against a terrorist organization, the collection of intelligence is, in fact, of prime importance, since information very soon ceases to come from the political or urban police. If sectioning again makes intelligence gathering possible, it is nonetheless only from the lower levels of the rebellion. The paramilitary networks and the leaders remain protected by compartmentalization and by their clandestine nature. They can be penetrated by classic methods of counter-espionage (agent penetration, surveillances, etc.), but
the care required for such methods caused delay and the results are always incomplete. For example, if a terrorist network resorts to blind terrorism, it is necessary to act with great rapidity and obtain definitive results. There is no time to re-establish networks patiently and with flexibility. It must be done quickly and forcefully.

Of course, it is easy enough to obtain a guiding threat - as soon as the networks become active some of their members will inevitably fall into the hands of the authorities, either as a result of control operations (barricades, patrols, strict searches), or as a result of indications (examined according to classical criminal police methods) found at the scene of a criminal attempt.*

But, when several individuals have been arrested, there is however the problem of getting them to lead the counterinsurgent forces to their accomplices and leaders, either through denunciation or future collaboration with the counterinsurgents. Such a result can only be achieved by application of methods of pressure other than the classic methods used by the criminal police, without regard to normal laws governing individual freedom, or even to respect for human dignity. In fact, normal criminal police interrogation takes little account of the element of time, and also attempts primarily to obtain

*At the time of the Battle of Algiers, the first arrests were made by the 3rd RCP of Colonel Bigeard during the cleaning out of an Algiers slum. After the explosion at the Algiers stadium, a piece of jacket in which the bomb had been wrapped was discovered. The jacket led to the dry cleaner, the dry cleaner to the customer, etc.
an individual confession of guilt. However, the rebels, no matter how un fanatic, see no reason not to make such a confession. It is on the essential point - the organiza-
tion of the network to which they belong - that they remain absolutely silent. The promise of no punishment or even of financial gain for "coming clean," which is already contrary to classic methods, was systematically used on members of the OAS (and in fact made possible such sensational arrests as those of the head of the "Delta Commandos," Lieutenant Degueldrel, or the head of the organization, General Salan). But such forms of pressure are only truly effective in individual cases, and especially in an atmosphere where a feeling prevails that the rebellion is losing. As long as the rebellion seems to stand a reasonable chance of success (and even more so when it actually appears to be winning), escape from punishment or monetary bribes from the counter- insurgent forces seem ridiculous to the captured rebels, who, should they accept to get out of trouble, immediately cover themselves vis-à-vis the rebellion. In the early stages of the fight against the OAS, such methods pro-
duced scant results (and many disappointments, such as the assassination of Major Poste, head of Military Secu-
ritv in Algiers, by a double agent), and were only fruitful after Bab-el-Oued was taken.

Unfortunately, experience proves that the use of torture is the most effective method of obtaining in a minimum of time the information required to neutralize a terrorist network. The direct results which are not negligible (immediate communication of the necessary information) are increased by the indirect results of a
psychological nature. The fact that they will almost certainly confess and a desire to escape what will precede confession act as powerful psychological forces on the arrestees and often end in spontaneous denunciations or collaboration with the established order.

   c) Whatever the moral judgment of such methods may be, the extreme effectiveness of those offensive operations which resort to them is undeniable. It even surpasses that of offensive operations against guerrilla bands. Thus, within about nine months, the Battle of Algiers saw the absolutely total destruction of those FLN networks specialized in blind terrorism and of the entire

*Several arguments have been presented (notably by the chaplain of the paratroopers, Reverend Father Delarue) to justify recourse to such methods which are contrary to laws of morality and civilization: 1) the use of torture makes it possible to save human lives through neutralization of networks which are sowing death, often among innocent victims (the incident of the stadium in Algiers, for example, caused 10 deaths, among them 4 women and children, and 36 were seriously injured); 2) the information must be obtained very quickly so the network can be neutralized; 3) a terrorist is carrying out a highly atrocious act of war, since he attacks the innocent; 4) that act of war involves only a minimum of risk to the one committing it (much less than to a normal fighter) if the secrecy of the terrorists is not penetrated; 6) the search for effectiveness restricts the use of torture and eliminates sadism. Systematic torture of all suspects would inevitably increase the negative feelings of the population. The population must understand that torture is only the result of serious acts of insurrection. Sadistic torture would waste time and destroy the psychological effects on the guilty. They must realize that they are being subjected, without hate, to a "formality" which is a result of their actions and can be avoided or stopped whenever they so choose.
FLN political-administrative organization in the city of Algiers. Only three years later could the FLN begin to act again either politically or through terrorism, which even then was carried out on a voluntarily reduced scale.

However, the difficulties and inconveniences of such operations must not be overlooked. Not only is considerable support required (a division of paratroopers in the case of the Battle of Algiers); the troops must also possess rather exceptional qualities: great cohesion, considerable dynamism, good officers, and a highly developed talent for adaptation. The fight against the OAS was particularly difficult for the French government because units with these qualities could not be used since they were favorable to the rebellion. What was achieved against the OAS with the aid of regular soldiers or police militias does not bear the slightest comparison with what was done against the FLN by the paratrooper regiments used in the Battle of Algiers.

Secondly, troops thus engaged are subjected to strong moral pressure. Constant activity in a hostile urban area, the latent and diffused nature of the danger, billeting and life in the city, as well as recourse to methods which the soldiers judge repugnant* result either in a certain apathy (such was the case of the gendarmes used against the OAS), or in an often dangerous over-excitement. The troops engaged in the battle of Algiers acted as if they were looking for a solution to their

*The Battle of Algiers marked the Legion and Paratrooper officers in this way. The use of torture was not without moral conflicts which were publicly expressed at the time of the trials of members of the OAS.
dilemmas in victory at any price. A Legion officer explained this as a virtual "flight forward." "We are not able to retreat. If we are the victors, we will not be accused of being torturers."

In the third place such methods cannot be used without shocking the population itself, the effect of the shock being greater in cities than in rural areas. Certainly, at first glance, the experience with the FLN and the OAS proves that such a shock convinces the population not to attempt hostile acts against the established power. However, one may ask if, in the long run, the negative feelings thus repressed are not reasserted to the benefit of the rebellion. It is characteristic that the calm in Algiers after the Battle of the Casbah was followed three years later by a brutal explosion of pro-nationalist feeling in the city and its suburbs. The FLN, moreover, profited admirably from this situation to emplace its OPA and channel the feelings of the masses into street demonstrations which were para-political in nature. When plans were drawn up to begin the "Battle of Paris" in order to make the Moslems there throw off FLN domination, General de Gaulle sent back the proposal with the remark: "No, ultimately too dangerous."

The fourth difficulty stems from the possible reactions to such methods on the part of public opinion, which is accustomed to liberal ideas and the exploitation of this fact that can be made by the rebellion. Although the fight against the guerrillas takes place in zones badly covered by modern communication methods (moreover press representatives are easily kept away from these zones), and, at the same time, allusion to accompanying
"atrocities" seems an almost normal consequence of an almost conventional form of warfare, the fight against terrorist networks is completely different. It takes place in broad daylight and in large cities which are the nerve center of modern information. It is also more difficult to understand. While certain people delicately hide their faces, others cannot and do not wish to allow the pursuit of effectiveness to end by defiling the safeguard of human dignity. The more terrorist danger decreases, the more cries of indignation are voiced against the methods used. For example, the "campaign against torture" was at its height in France in 1959-1960, that is two years after the end of the Battle of Algiers and at a time when General de Gaulle had formally forbidden (after his return to power in May of 1958) the use of torture. It is obvious how much benefit the rebellion can derive from such a situation. The actual trials of some of its members were described in great detail which was often exaggerated and twisted in newspaper articles, and even in books.* In the courtroom both lawyers and accused utilized this material to the utmost, to such an extent in fact that the FLN gave its arrested militants instructions to complain of maltreatment and torture in any case. Under an essentially liberal regime which takes into account national and international public opinion, the impact of such campaigns is certain. Though the forces representing the established order consider themselves misunderstood, deserted

*See Henri Alleg, "La Question;" "Le martyr de Djamila Bouchechka;" "La Gangrene;" etc.
(or even betrayed), the established government attempts to "prepare for the storm" by outlawing the use of those methods which have caused the problem, once the terrorist danger has passed, and by reinforcing the legal rights of the individual. This, in turn, increases the uneasiness of the official forces and complicates their task. It is in the realm of the fight against terrorist networks and the urban OPA that the contradictions between legal processes of the law and the actions of the counter-insurgent forces seem the most difficult to resolve.

The final problem lies in the difficulty of applying such methods against the political organizations of the rebellion. If repressive measures are provoked by demonstrations of terrorism, their development leads ipso facto to the neutralization of the entire enemy apparatus, since the troops once launched do not make a distinction between the different branches of the enemy machine, even when they are strictly divided. For example, the Battle of Algiers destroyed not only the bomb networks, but the OPA in the region of Algiers as well, which forced the CEE to flee Algeria. But the situation seems very different when it becomes a question of coldly neutralizing a rebel organization which has carefully restricted itself to political-administrative activities. Here the rigorous methods of draconian offensive operations scarcely seem justified, either to the leaders of an established order in the somewhat democratic aspirations or to its troops. Furthermore, recourse to such methods against leaders who are mainly political serves to increase the negative sentiments of the population. In this case, violence does not appear to be provoked by other
acts of violence and the established power acquires the reputation of a regime of political terror. On the other hand, recourse to less brutal methods (and notably to the sweeter techniques of counter-espionage) produces definite but only partial results. In Metropolitan France, for example, the DST (Direction du Surveillance du Territoire) succeeded in neutralizing most of the FLN political leaders on the zone and wilaya levels. But below this level the organization remained more or less intact (through lack of units trained in counter-espionage), and at the same time the leaders were replaced immediately after their arrest.

(4) **Prison Camps**

Since it is not possible to acquire a complete knowledge of the enemy organization (and still less irrefutable legal proof of the guilt of every member), the usual temptation for the counterinsurgent forces lies in the resort to imprisonment by simple administrative decision (without trial) of suspect individuals. Here again, such a step proves quite efficacious at the moment. A large number of rebel leaders are thus neutralized, and even if some innocent individuals are deprived of their freedom, the population is deterred from participating in any act which might appear suspect to the forces of the established government. This places the rebel organizations in a difficult situation.

But the disadvantages are very soon apparent. In the first place, large-scale imprisonment operations are only effective for a limited period. After about six months the rebel organization fills the gaps and again takes over the population. Another operation then becomes
necessary (to use an expression of the technicians: "The grass must be mowed regularly"). Care must be taken to avoid over-crowding the prison camps which makes it difficult to provide sufficient space, food, and guards.* In the second place, under a regime which is not totalitarian, prison camp conditions do not break the spirit of the individual, and strong men can take advantage of the leisure time and forced contacts with others to resume, clandestinely, their political activity. The French camps became actual "training schools," both for the FLN and the OAS. Time spent in such camps only served to strengthen the political convictions of the prisoners (and in certain cases, even gave them convictions, if they had been imprisoned by mistake), and often increased their morale and their skill as agitators.**

*An effort was made to have the French camps as comfortable as possible, with recreation, health services, good food, etc. A continued increase in the number of prisoners and in the number of camps would have resulted in heavy expenses in both money and guards. It was therefore decided to limit the number of FLN prisoners to about 10,000 in Algeria and 5,000 in Metropolitan France. But one can well imagine what would have happened under a totalitarian regime - forced labor, insufficient food, extermination, etc.

**Similar effects were noted on the French officers who were held in the "re-education" camps of the Viet-Minh. The survivors returned absolutely fanatically anti-Communist and desirous of a triumphant revenge and a chance to experiment on others with the methods of psychological action which had been used on them.
Under such conditions, administrative imprisonment is a very temporary remedy. This was particularly true for the French, where the number of prisoners was limited in the camps and the principles of individual freedom were respected, where political considerations resulted in periodic liberations after examination of the files by the commission for the verification of imprisonments, in collective decisions to pardon, or even in the release of minor suspects in order that more dangerous individuals might be interned. A policy of systematic imprisonment therefore acts only as an oxygen tank unless more and more individuals are arrested, and they are neutralized as completely as possible (through imprisonment for the entire period of the rebellion under very harsh conditions within the camps). These conditions are difficult to fulfill under a liberal and democratic regime.

8. Legal Problems

The organization of justice poses the greatest difficulties for an established power with democratic traditions, especially in the cities and with respect to the politico-administrative leaders of the rebellion.

(1) In the countryside, the fate of men who are caught with arms presents a relatively slight problem.

We have seen that in anti-guerrilla warfare the number of prisoners is rather limited because of the small numbers of the maquis, the fierceness of combat, and the possibility of incorporating captives within the forces of the established order. Imprisonment in camps until the end of the rebellion is therefore highly feasible. The drawbacks are fewer, since the military
and political leaders, as well as any determined fighters, are usually killed in combat.

As for the counterinsurgency forces, they are not too seriously hampered in their operations by a rigorous respect for the judicial rules. Of course, in Algeria because of a desire to follow correct legal procedure, the troops were sometimes accompanied by military police who were responsible for establishing the legal character of the deaths caused. But such a procedure made little difference. In fact, even under such conditions, the command is usually free to resort to violence when necessary, while preventing extortion.

The problem becomes more complex when members of the OPA from villages, and especially from large cities, are captured. Here the freedom of action of the command is already more restricted than in open country, and since the captives are not taken armed or in para-military formation, they must automatically be handed over to the law.

(2) The difficulties resulting from recourse to legal procedures are many, if the established power has democratic traditions and legislation, and a strong judiciary.

In the first place, legal procedure is codified to respect individual liberty. The decisive role is given to judges who are accustomed to handling cases which are not too complex and who, today, are by training increasingly interested in the psychological-sociological motives of the criminal. Experience has proved that the appearance of a terrorist defendant before a traditional sort of judge immediately put an end to any possible
exploitation of the case - even in those cases where the police services did not resort to brutality. Furthermore, since the period during which the police can detain a suspect is limited to 24 hours in France, interrogations were practically useless.

Secondly, the sentence passed was often likely to be ridiculous. In time of peace certain offenses are not severely punished. For example, in France it is not a serious offense to possess arms (notably because of "trophies" brought back by soldiers after a war). This means that if the police could not prove anything more than possession of a weapon, the suspect could not legally be sentenced to more than a few months in prison. The number of cases to be handled and the necessity for intervention as a preventive rather than a repressive force make it extremely difficult to provide solid and confirmed proof of guilt, which the law has a right to demand. (This is another justification of imprisonment by simple administrative decision.) Even if proof of a crime severely punishable by existing law can be established, the judges may show leniency when the defense reveals primarily political motives. The search for individual motives, respect for political ideologies, as well as a desire to remain uninvolved in burning conflicts (notably in France because of the memory of successive purges) - these are the reasons most frequently given to explain the failure of the French judiciary to deal satisfactorily with the FLN and the OAS - a failure particularly difficult to remedy, as the judiciary is traditionally independent and democratic.
While the verdict may often be against the best interests of the counterinsurgents, the trials, on the other hand, frequently serve the rebel cause, when the rebels know how to put to use, for propaganda and publicity purposes, the opportunities for expression open to the accused under a democratic regime.

In the third place, even if the outcome of the trial is satisfactory, the possibilities of appeal, reversal or quashing of the decision (cassation), or pardon, those golden rules of democracy, often delay execution of the sentence. When the periods of investigation, trial, judicial review, and pardon have finally ended, a great deal of time has elapsed between the crime and its punishment. The execution of a terrorist, let us say one year after the crime, can no longer have the exemplary value it would have immediately after the fact. The delay may be interpreted by the population as a sign of weakness on the part of the established power, and, furthermore, a belated execution, at a moment when the criminal act has lost its emotional impact, is likely to seem an unjustified act of violence.

Finally, in a case where the sentence involves imprisonment, the problem of regular prisons is similar to that of internment camps. Overcrowding, inadequate guarding - conditions which are already serious in themselves - also encourage political activity on the part of the prisoners.

(3) The consequences of an overly rigorous application of the principles protecting individual freedom in a modern democracy appear, therefore, twofold.
- The forces of order are hindered in their effort to destroy the rebel organization, principally the politico-administrative organizations and the urban terrorist networks. Not only is their effectiveness reduced, but their morale is damaged by the impression that they are not being supported. What is more, a feeling of revolt may spring up against a society whose most respectable elements do not help, and even hinder, the activity of its fighters.

In fact, the procedures of the law may even happen to work against the forces of order themselves. This is a remote possibility during anti-guerrilla operations which may become more likely during anti-terrorist operations in the large cities. Of course, the established power may give "carte blanche" to those charged with suppressing rebellion (i.e., during the "Battle of Algiers"), but an independent and rigorous system of justice may, at the same time, attempt to shed light on the results of the repressive methods used. Thus the "Battle of Algiers," like any vigorous anti-terrorist operation, was followed by judicial investigations of murder, arbitrary detention, and maltreatment, etc. None of these cases was brought to any conclusion, but the very fact of their existence disturbed the Army (which was surprised to be investigated for carrying out orders) and furnished material for campaigns against atrocities.

- The rebellion is the main beneficiary of the eventual shortcomings of an overly democratic system of justice. Neutralization of rebel para-military and para-political organizations is not only a goal in itself, but should also be a way of demonstrating to the population
the impossibility of illegal or violent action against the established power. However, if members of terrorist and political organizations are judged very slowly and given ridiculously light sentences, after trials which tend to glorify their actions, the rebellion will not only be relatively unharmed materially, but even provided with undeniable psychological weapons by the very power it is combating. A cautious and lenient sentence diminishes the effect of the shock produced by an arrest and tends to prove that rebellion is possible in spite of the activity of the forces representing the established power, because that power is either impotent or divided. Still more, clemency can be construed as proof of the justness of the rebel cause. Is it not the nobility of those ideals the rebels are defending which renders the law hesitant and incapable of totally rigorous action?

(4) Without falling into the error of totalitarian systems (all-powerful repressive forces, with a judiciary conditioned to rapid and harsh sentences and no possibility of real trial), various attempts which will not prove fatal to individual freedom can be made, even by a democratic regime, to adapt the workings of the law to the needs of the counterinsurgency.

France has sought the solution to this problem in four main directions:

- Extension of the period during which suspects may be retained by the police to 10 or 15 days, on condition

---

*It was often necessary, as much in the case of the OAS as the FLN, to imprison by administrative decision, individuals who had been acquitted or others who were released after serving their legal sentence.
that this extension be granted by judicial authorities and
effected under their control.

- Heavier penalties for certain crimes and offenses,
if they were committed in an attempt to undermine "State
Security" - that is, with the purpose of overthrowing the
established power.

- The creation of specialized tribunals for dealing
with such crimes and offenses. All crimes and offenses
of the FLN were therefore judged by military tribunals
normally qualified to judge acts endangering the national
defense. However, the sympathy of military circles toward
the OAS (and the indulgence of the civil tribunal toward
the accused from the 24 January 1960 barricades, who were
almost all acquitted and therefore free to participate in
the April 1961 putsch) necessitated setting up special
tribunals like the High Military Tribunal (which, nonethe-
less, did not sentence General Salan to death), the Military
Court, etc. Just recently, under the Pompidou government,
the Assembly voted in favor of a Court of State Security.

However, all these tribunals respected the idea of
examination by judges, public trial, and the possibilities
of review and pardon. Though in certain cases sentences
were passed quickly and the police services were not
particularly hindered, the results were not entirely
satisfactory. Surprising verdicts were rendered (life
imprisonment for General Salan, head of the OAS, and for
the FLN assassin of the Vice-President of the Algerian
Assembly, Ali Chekkal, etc.). But the government did not
feel it could go any further in judicial repression with-
out definitively violating democratic principles. At the
very height of the breakdown of authority in Algiers and
Oran because of the OAS (about 100 dead every day), General de Gaulle opposed expeditious court-martial, which seemed, however, the best solution to the problem of almost total anarchy which existed in the two major cities of Algeria.

Such are the heavy burdens of democracy which, if threatened by rebellion, has at its disposal far fewer means of defense than does a totalitarian regime.

9. Conclusion

(1) Rural areas: Once the territory has been thoroughly surrounded and solidly sectioned, offensive operations run by a large number of well-equipped, well-trained, and well-commanded troops are able to wipe out the para-military rebel bands.

Similarly, in populated rural areas offensive sectioning can destroy the political-administrative structure of the rebellion.

Confronted with a moderately subverted population, a combination of sectioning and offensive operations can allow the establishment of a system of self-protection in the villages. Free of rebel terror and shaken by proof of the impossibility of armed rebellion, the rural populations can, as long as they are without negative feelings or positive aspirations, ensure their own protection in favor of the established power.

A more thoroughly subverted population can be regrouped and in this way neutralized from a military standpoint. But this solution, whose results are only temporary, implies constant military surveillance and recourse to more elaborate techniques of psychological action on the population.
(2) In cities which have been subverted by the rebellion the problem is more complex. Once an effective sectioning has been carried out by numerous troops, offensive operations led by trained forces can wipe out the terrorist networks, but only with the help of unduly harsh methods and an atmosphere suggesting the defeat of the rebellion.

The use of such methods, which are always distressing to civilized men and little understood by public opinion, becomes even more difficult when directed against the politico-administrative organizations of the rebellion which have not instigated a demonstration of terrorist force against the established order.

In any case, if the population has been heavily subverted, the success of offensive operations and the results of military sectioning (more limited in cities than in rural areas) are not enough to bring about a sufficiently lasting improvement in the situation. Here again psychological action on the population may prove indispensable.

(3) Under these conditions, destruction of the para-military and para-political organizations of the rebellion can have only partial and temporary results.

It is therefore necessary to consider how success can and must be facilitated, consolidated, and exploited through psychological action on the population.
III. PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTION ON THE POPULATION

1. Definition of the Problem

(1) With the population entirely and profoundly on the side of the established power, one could consider the problem of insurgency almost solved. Under such conditions the counterinsurgent forces benefit from the information required to localize armed rebel bands and identify the members of their political organizations. Terrorism and secrecy remain the only tactical weapons of the insurgents, who have no opportunity to carry out their political strategy. The established power does not lack men, either for its armed forces or its political and administrative services. And, as long as it has the necessary will, that power will run both offensive operations in order to destroy rebel bands and networks as well as any political operations which are necessary to consolidate the support of the population.

France had the chance to enjoy such conditions against the OAS in the Metropole. Whereas the governments of the IVth Republic had relatively weak support from the Metropolitan population, General de Gaulle had firm support from the masses. As a result the OAS could never exercise the slightest influence over the Metropolitan population. Its networks (made up, moreover, of individuals on the fringe of society) could thus be rapidly dismantled. Most of its terrorist acts were
followed by the arrest of their perpetrators.* The only difficulties encountered by the police began once the conspirators began to live in a closed circuit and applied rules of secrecy.

Similarly, in the Metropole there was only one not very serious attempt to create a maquis. In Algeria itself the hostility (or neutrality) of the Moslem population made it impossible for the OAS to form a maquis. In spite of General Salan's orders, all such attempts ended in failure, the most striking of which was the failure of Colonel Gardes himself. This had the most far-reaching consequences for the OAS, since it demonstrated in a startling manner to the OAS and to the European population the impossibility of this form of action. Leader of an important commando unit made up of the strongest OAS military elements and former head of the 5th Bureau (Psychological Action), Colonel Gardes tried, as part of the Salan offensive against a cease-fire with the FLN, to win over the traditionalist tribes of

*A typical example of the difference made by popular support occurred in the murder in France of a member of the Algerian Communist Party, Locussol. The OAS entrusted this mission to an assassin sent especially from Algeria, where at that time a dozen murders went unpunished daily. The Algerian murderer learned, at his expense, to what extent popular support, which would allow him and others like him an easy escape in Algiers, helped the police in the Metropole. Some witnesses gave an exact description; others indicated the direction he had taken. Train station employees identified him and specified the direction of his ticket, etc. He was arrested six hours after the crime. In Algiers investigators working on similar cases were confronted with absolute silence from both the population and the local police itself.
one of the most spirited Moslem defenders of a French Algeria, Bachaga Boualem. However, since Boualem refused to enter into conflict with the official French forces, the commandos had to withdraw. The Moslems then betrayed them to the official forces, and even in certain cases surrounded and held them until the arrival of the loyal French forces.

However, such favorable conditions only characterize an unsuccessful uprising.* In a spontaneous or organized insurgency of any vigor the ratio of psychological force is, by definition, unfavorable to the counterinsurgent, since rebellion was only made possible by the existence of deep feelings of dissatisfaction among the people. For the directing rebel group it becomes then a question of amplifying and channeling toward action an already existing current which the counterinsurgent must, on the other hand, counteract and reverse.

On a tactical level, the psychological action of the counterinsurgent forces, to be successful, must facilitate the destruction of rebel bands, networks, and OPAs by isolating them.

On the strategic level, the reversal of popular feeling will help stop the progress of the insurgency and alone can ensure a genuine and durable consolidation of the successes obtained in the destruction of the para-military and para-political forces of the rebellion. Otherwise,

---

*If an uprising occurs under such conditions, the established power does not have to take into account the attitude of the population and can put an end to clandestine organizations by methods which are almost conventional.
efforts to destroy these forces will take the distressing form of a modern cask of the Danaides. *

(2) Using these observations as a base, most French theoreticians of "subversive warfare" or "revolutionary warfare" attached the greatest importance to the "conquest of the population." ** Intrigued by the seductive idea of the necessity of waging the same type of war against the enemy that he is waging against you, impressed by the Viet-Minh hold over the population in Indo-china, and building upon Ho-Chi-Minh's phrase about "the fish in the water," they concluded that the counterinsurgent should attach prime importance to the psychological conquest of the population. And these theoreticians consistently claimed that to achieve this conquest, the counterinsurgents must steal the enemy's methods and, like him, make "psychological action" an essential part of their strategy.

Since certain French groups looked on the "conquest" of the population and "psychological action" as the indispensable panacea for all ills (solving every problem if well utilized and bringing disaster if not used), it is essential to make an attempt at theoretical clarification of this realm of action.

---

*Mythical daughters of Danaus who killed their husbands and were condemned in Hek to pour water forever into bottomless barrels.

**Partly because of this ideology they condemned the actions of General de Gaulle in Algeria, who in their eyes was guilty of neglecting this factor, and they almost all bet on the OAS, expecting grand results from the "conquest" of the European population.
In fact, it is easier to proclaim the necessity for a "conquest of the population" than to carry it out. And to say that one is going to "conquer" the population does not mean it can be accomplished. The term "conquest" has more emotional impact than analytical value, since it transposes onto the psycho-sociological level the idea of military, territorial conquest. But worse, it seems to imply that this most delicate of realms involving the attachment of a population to the power which governs it - the quintessence of political art - is amenable to military technique.

Without doubt, emphasis placed on "conquest of the population" distinguishes this form of counterinsurgent activity from that which does not take the feelings and attitudes of the population into account at all, or if it does, only with the intention of dealing with it through simple recourse to force. In French terminology "pacification" operations are therefore opposed both to "conventional" and "repressive" operations (in fact, inadequate results from the first often end in recourse to the second). However, with the evolution of both insurgent and counterinsurgent methods in the modern world, it hardly seems likely that strictly conventional or repressive measures can be successful in the second half of the twentieth century against rebellions which enjoy popular support. The need to take into account the population is not only an idea of the theoreticians of "revolutionary warfare." From now on this need must surely be part of the task faced by all counterinsurgents.

It is, however, much less certain that the methods which characterize insurgency are necessarily applicable
or profitable in such a situation. In the counterinsurgent's answer to the insurgent it appears impossible to overlook the profound factors which characterize an insurgency. Psychological action on the population, the psychological repercussions on that population of the military or political measures taken, as well as flexible and rapid adaptation to situations are therefore major preoccupations of both rebel and counterinsurgent. Yet, imitation down to the last detail of the organization and methods of the insurgents would not automatically ensure victory to the counterinsurgents. It is necessary to know how to adapt to the general conditions of the moment and to specific situations as well, and to know the methods and goals of the adversary in order to defeat him. Nonetheless, restriction to a servile copying of everything he has done is not particularly recommended. On the contrary, victory belongs to the side which best knows how to use a creative imagination and to make the most of any given situation.

(3) To conclude, doctrines on the "conquest of the population" may be broken down into two aspects as follows:

- The first aspect contains an obvious fact: It is indispensable for the counterinsurgents to act psychologically on the population, and, in order to ensure their control of the masses, they must take into account the strategic-political plan being carried out by the rebels.

- The second aspect of the doctrines of "revolutionary warfare" must be considered with certain reservations. Carrying their reasoning to its logical conclusion, some French theoreticians go so far as to claim that psychological action on the population is alone important, that the destruction of the rebel para-military
forces is only secondary since it is influenced by the effectiveness of the measures taken to conquer the masses, that the results obtained may be as decisive as they are rapid (the population can be won over to the established power quickly enough to affect the outcome of the battles being fought) and that the only effective methods are those used by the rebellion itself. (The basic techniques are those of indoctrination and organization of the population.)

Personally, such views seem to me more theoretical than practical. Engaged in hard daily combat, the counterinsurgent forces cannot wait for the problematic effects of psychological action on the population. Furthermore, this action is not restricted to the use of methods of organization and indoctrination, and the effectiveness of these methods alone is not always as great as predicted in the manuals.

But rather than get involved in a theoretical discussion of the subject, it seems preferable to review all possible forms of psychological action on the population. And rather than advocate (or attack) one of them, it is better to examine the theoretical basis as well as the practical effectiveness of all such forms of action which were applied in Algeria.

2. "Classic" Methods of Psychological Action

In many instances the counterinsurgents acted on the population just as Moliere's Monsieur Jourdain made prose - that is unwittingly - "sans le savoir."

To simplify as much as possible, one may say that the psychological action of the counterinsurgents on the population means, in this case, taking the opposite course,
more by intuition than by theory, from the rebel plan for "conquest of the population" put into effect by the insurrection. While the rebel makes every effort to get the people to follow his cause, the counterinsurgent, on the defensive level, makes every effort to deter the population from doing so, and on the offensive level he tries to win the population over to the side of the established power. To this end, if the rebellion is trying to make help to its cause obligatory, feasible, rewarding, useful, or sacred - or make it appear so - counterinsurgency attempts, on the contrary, to show that the rebellion is optional, impossible, and useless.

In doing this the established power resorts to methods which may be termed "classic," as opposed to the "revolutionary" methods of indoctrination and organization. The theoreticians of "revolutionary warfare" claim to have a rigorous program of elaborate techniques which will bring about a quick and sure solution to the problems of insurgency. But the methods we shall first study are more empirical and intuitive, without "scientific" pretension or any claim to be able to work quick miracles.

(1) **Making the rebellion optional.** The first step the counterinsurgent can and must take is to neutralize the methods of pressure used by the rebels on the population.

We know the insurgents use various methods of pressure and coercion in order to make obligatory participation on the part of the population. The counterinsurgents must attempt, by restoring security, to make such participation optional. In order to do this they can either ensure the protection of the population (defensive aspect) or (offensive aspect) destroy the para-military organizations of the
rebellion, whether they are armed bands (in the country-
side) or shock groups (in cities).

The following observations about this form of action
may be made:

- Its execution stems essentially from the military
  or police victories which the counterinsurgent forces are
  capable of winning and not from any "psychological" tech-
  niques. In this realm half measures are not sufficient.
  Protection must be complete or it produces no effect. No
  propaganda can take the place of this harsh reality. What
  is more, premature propaganda on security can incite the
  insurgents to prove, in a fiendish manner, that this
  security is not guaranteed.

- As always, serious results cannot be counted upon
  except from an offensive, and only then if it is totally
  successful. Against fluid and mobile forces it is prac-
  tically impossible to ensure the protection of the popula-
  tion solely through defensive measures, which, though
definitely indispensable, must be combined with effective
  offensive operations.

- The psychological factor must not be neglected,
  however. The presence of troops (particularly when they
  are stationed among the population) plays an essential,
  reassuring role. The population must be convinced that
  the presence of the armed forces (and their attempt to
  destroy rebel bands and networks) will be effective for a
  long time. "How long will you stay here? As long as you
  are here, it's all right." These are the questions and
  affirmations most frequently heard by the troops from the
  population among which they are posted. Under such condi-
  tions the troops engaged in quadrillage must not be removed
before security has been completely restored, or unless effective measures for self-protection (and immediate support in case of attack) have been taken.

- In addition to this almost technical factor, there is another essential factor of a political nature which will be mentioned frequently throughout this chapter. The population must be convinced that the established power will not relax its effort and will not yield to the rebellion. Too many recent examples (Indochina, Morocco, Tunisia) had made the Algerian population particularly sensitive on this point. They were completely aware of the fate reserved by the rebellion for populations which had put too much faith in an army that was forced to retreat. Protection must therefore not be momentary but seem of unlimited duration. Promises from the local officers must be backed up by tangible signs of a determined and successful anti-insurgent effort. The protection of the population depends on the general political line of the established power, and, since gratuitous affirmations in this sphere are ill-tolerated, on the determination and success of its activity.

Even at best, protection of the population will not really bear fruit unless the population (or a segment of the population) harbors relatively slight feelings of dissatisfaction and obeys rebel orders only by constraint and force. Such a population may even resent the pressures to which it is subjected by the rebellion. By offering the people a chance to live in peace, the counterinsurgency forces can win them over. Skillful propaganda on peace and regained freedom or on atrocities committed by rebels can produce results when reinforced by a noticeable
increase in security. In addition, the counterinsurgent armed forces must not be guilty of extortion and must also make popular participation in current military operations optional. On the other hand, maintenance of a limited amount of rebel pressure can play a stimulating role and facilitate setting up the machinery of self-protection. In such a case the rebellion will be held responsible for any damage or liability.

- It must be pointed out, however, that such favorable conditions are rather rare. (As in Algeria, they usually exist in certain rural areas where the inhabitants are attached to a rather routine way of life and have not been touched by the great currents of thought which are agitating the mass of the population.) It therefore becomes necessary to elaborate in further detail the counterinsurgent's possible answer to the rebel plan of attack.

(2) **Render the rebellion impossible and unrewarding.**

The second course which the counterinsurgents may follow lies in attacking those arguments through which the rebellion is trying to attract and win over the population.

Just as the rebellion aims to prove that armed struggle against the established power is feasible, the counterinsurgents must prove the contrary. The execution of this mission goes hand in hand with the neutralization of rebel methods of pressure. It depends on the counterinsurgent armed forces and their ability to score complete military (and police) victories.

Again, it is essential that the military effort does not appear sporadic. The population must be convinced that this effort stems from an unshakeable political will.
In fact, a demonstration of the impossibility of insurrection would be far less effective if military success in the territory seemed questionable because of a weak and irresolute attitude on the part of the political power. The rebellion would find its powers of persuasion partially restored, if it could argue that the military effort of the established power would not continue indefinitely (in which case it would suffice to "hold out" and "wait for the storm to pass") or that the political power is ready to give in, in spite of its military victories.

From the moment General de Gaulle made it publicly known that he wanted to settle the Algerian problem as soon as possible (from November 1960 on), he certainly increased his pressure over the GPRA but at the same time decreased the deterrent effect of French military success. The pursuit of secret negotiations with the rebellion under the IVth Republic and the renewal of private or public diplomatic talks from May 1960 on produced the same results.

The most striking example is the Wilaya IV affair, because it affected the armed rebel bands themselves rather than the population. Faced with extensive French military success, at the beginning of 1960 the leaders of this Wilaya began negotiations with Paris with a view toward their surrender. The matter had gone so far that the leaders even came to Paris in June of 1960 in order to meet General de Gaulle. Then, on 14 June, de Gaulle gave a televised speech which was interpreted as an offer for negotiation with the leaders from Tunis. While the GPRA decided to send a delegation to France for talks at
Melun, the Wilaya IV went back on its original intentions and broke contact.*

The rebellion must seem unrewarding as well as impossible. If counterinsurgent military effort is crowned with success, and if the political will to put down the rebellion seems strong and unshakeable, it will not appear particularly advantageous to join sides with the rebellion. Only those for whom rebellion seems politically justifiable and even morally essential will do so.

(3) **Render the rebellion useless.** In the end the counterinsurgent will be forced to bend his efforts toward neutralizing the deep-seated motives underlying the insurgency. He will be responsible for convincing the population that insurgency is politically useless.

a) **Satisfaction of the aspirations of the population.** This particular effort, which involves cutting the ground out from under the rebellion or stealing its

---

*In fact, this was less an error of strategy than of tactics. 1) General de Gaulle did not think his speech would be interpreted by Tunis as a specific opening. He was only presenting liberal arguments on the futility of combat, which were intended in part for the leaders of Wilaya IV. 2) Since he had reserved for himself the exclusive handling of the negotiations with Wilaya IV, General de Gaulle gave great importance to the political factor but neglected to take the security precautions usual in such circumstances. He made every effort to convince the political leaders of the Wilaya (Si Salah and Si Lahcen), but nothing was done to win over (or at least neutralize) the military leader, Si Mohamed, a fanatic and narrow-minded killer who alone controlled the military strength of the Wilaya. It was Si Mohamed who caused the negotiations to fail by having his two accomplices executed.
power of seduction, is especially difficult to carry out. Had it been done in time the rebellion would never have occurred nor developed. In order to carry out such a task, the established power must understand the nature and importance of the threat against it (and not become hypnotized by hatred or underestimate the rebellion). It must define exactly the nature of the popular feelings of dissatisfaction and reform itself sufficiently to grant what it has always refused. However, though the formula "What do they want? Give it to them" sums up the situation neatly, its application presupposes a large dose of lucidity, maturity, and authority.

Even if we suppose the established power has all the necessary qualities, this does not necessarily mean it is able to grant what the population wants and what the rebellion is demanding in its name. Neither the Germans nor the Soviets could give occupied Europe or Hungary of 1956 what their populations so intensely desired - the departure of the foreign occupier.

Even if a government is unable to give everything of what is demanded or desired, it may find itself at least able to give something. For example, in colonial insurgencies, though the former ruling power can grant independence to the colonized country, it can scarcely be expected to withdraw most of its goods and citizens.

More generally, we may also point out that what is conceded does not have the savor of something won through hard struggle. For this reason concessions on the part of the established power will always seem somewhat suspect in the eyes of the population. With its aura of moral purity, the rebellion will always be in a position to set a higher price.
The difficulty in reducing popular feelings of satisfaction will be better appreciated through an analysis of the negative and positive components of these feelings.

In the first place, negative sentiments are by nature hard to change. Therefore the problem involves trying to satisfy positive aspirations which, if not satisfied, provoke negative feelings. But this action must be timely. Once negative feelings have crystallized into an irrational and passionate hatred, it may become almost impossible to stifle them. Thus in the colonial countries, where a prolonged absence of desired reforms ended in unconditional hatred of the colonizer, it was practically impossible to reverse any negative sentiments. Only after a long time and a steady policy of increasing the satisfaction of positive aspirations can there be a slight amelioration.

In the second place, the satisfaction of positive aspirations is rendered difficult by their vague and oversimplified character. It has often been said that by nature the people do not know what they want. It will therefore be up to the political leaders of a counter-insurgency to distinguish among all the confused popular aspirations those which, if satisfied, will most attach the population to them. But it should be considered that progressive and imperfect achievements are often more disappointing than the vivid and simplified demands on which the rebellion plays. Lastly, there is no example of an important successful reform which did not interfere with the interests of at least a fraction of the population. Dissatisfaction and disillusionment can therefore persist for a rather long time.
On the other hand, the unformed character of the popular aspirations may serve the counterinsurgent. Their reform policy can be elaborated with a certain freedom. It is not necessary to heed all the claims of the rebellion. Two attitudes are possible:

b) **Satisfaction of political aspirations.** Firstly, the counterinsurgents may steal, to their advantage, the platform of the rebellion, or at least ensure the realization of those popular aspirations which can be satisfied without giving in to the rebellion.

This is what General de Gaulle tried to do in the policy he defined between September 1959 and November 1960. As head of the French state, he guaranteed the Algerians the right to govern themselves in his 16 September 1959 speech on self-determination, and by successive hints he indicated that the resulting Algeria would be "Algerian" and would enjoy the attributes of independence. However, during this entire phase, General de Gaulle refused to grant immediate independence to the FLN itself, through direct negotiation with him. Under this concept, if the FLN accepted de Gaulle's plan, it would be only one political party among others and would also accept the timetable and waiting periods proposed by France. (The vote on self-determination was to come up only after a period of pacification following the cessation of hostilities.)

In fact, the whole problem is not to satisfy the claims of the rebellion but prove to the population that its aspirations can be attained otherwise than through armed combat behind an insurgent group. Though General de Gaulle did not succeed in completely cutting off the
FLN from the Moslem population of Algeria, at least he was able to build up and maintain considerable prestige among that population. This veritable worship of de Gaulle, with the added psychological effects of French military success, contributed to decreasing the FLN hold over the population, without being able to reduce it to nothing. However, when combined with parallel destruction of rebel para-military organizations, these factors made possible negotiations for a compromise of peace. We may assume that had the FLN not been subjected to this combined military and political pressure, negotiations would never have been possible, barring complete capitulation on the part of France. Any negotiation with a rebellion is at best dangerous and its outcome problematical; it is only conceivable from a position of strength.

*This partial failure of General de Gaulle may be explained by the fact that it was impossible for him to act upon a powerful negative feeling in Algeria - the hatred of the Moslems for the local European population. Moreover, the action of the French army in favor of "integration," which contradicted the policy of the Chief of State, divided French power. The initiatives of the army and the permanent state of rebellion against General de Gaulle's policy on the part of the Europeans also gave the impression that generous as his policy might be, it could not be applied on the spot. Also, the concessions made by General de Gaulle to national sentiment were exploited by the FLN as a rebel victory and recognition of the legitimacy of the rebellion. To the limitations in psychological effects of de Gaulle's policy on the Moslem population were added, as we know, limitations in military success which stemmed essentially from the impossibility of destroying the rebel army in Tunisia and Morocco and the difficulties in dismantling the OPA.
c) Substitutes. The second course of action the established power may follow with respect to popular aspirations involves satisfying aspirations other than those defended by the rebellion and which are even more strongly felt by the population.

The ideological substitute: The policy of substitution will usually be practiced when the established power considers itself unable to satisfy the aspirations of the masses without capitulating. Thus the Governor General of Algeria from 1956-1957, Jacques Soustelle, came to the conclusion that while France could not grant the country its independence, certain fundamental aspirations of the Moslem population could be satisfied just as well if not better by "integration." Soustelle considered that the desire for greater political and social justice, for true equality with French citizens (and in particular with the local European population), for greater economic well-being and an improved social program could be fulfilled simply by application of the judicial statute making Algeria one of the departments of France. While maintaining French sovereignty over Algeria, Soustelle wanted to give the Moslem inhabitants the advantages of French citizens. He called this rather fanciful program* "integration"

*Even if we suppose that "integration" could possibly have had the effects on the Moslem population which were anticipated by its defenders, it has in no way been proved that it could - even and above all in the long run - have been brought about. To give nine million Moslems (with an extremely rapid rate of population growth) the advantages of French citizens would have meant an upheaval not only in Algeria but in France itself. It was not possible to make Algeria into a region which could even be compared to the poorest region of the Metropole, or to absorb the (continued)
(i.e., into the French community) which the French Army took up as its battle slogan from that moment on (and almost until the end of negotiations with the FLN). Theoreticians of "revolutionary warfare" believe, in fact, that they had in the concept of integration the driving idea which would make possible the defeat of the insurrection on its own ground and through its own methods. In their minds the mystique of integration was to sweep away the mystique of independence and win the Moslem population over to the side of France against the FLN.

The economic-social substitute: Without going so far as to wish to substitute their ideal for the ideal of the rebellion, the counterinsurgents can try to attract the population by stressing efforts to realize aspirations pertaining to economic and social well-being. Use of this technique is especially common, since those aspirations exist among most people and their satisfaction in poor or under-developed countries where insurgency generally breeds may appear easy. In fact, the rebels themselves do not neglect the exploitation of these aspirations, but they subordinate their satisfaction to the triumph of the rebellion and of their political ideals. For the counterinsurgents it is a question of reversing this order of things and making the economic-social aspirations come before the political aspirations, in order to substitute the former for the latter. It is

*(continued) unskilled labor which would have overflowed into Metropolitan France. The "Frenchification of Algeria" would have ended in an "Algerianization of France," which the Metropole would not have accepted easily and which might have been disastrous for the future of the country.
usually estimated that a population living under normal economic conditions loses much of its fighting spirit and prefers to concentrate on raising (and enjoying) its standard of living.

For this reason, one of the first political acts carried out by General de Gaulle after his return to power was the launching, in October of 1958, of the "Constantine Plan," which outlined broadly a policy of economic and social development in Algeria through heavy investment. In 1961 annual gross investment in Algeria reached four billion New Francs. At that time four hundred industrial enterprises of the Metropole took advantage of the facilities offered for opening branches in Algeria—which meant a total investment of one billion New Francs and the creation of 28,000 jobs. Industrial production showed a yearly increase of 10 per cent and the employment rate increased by 6 per cent. Two years after the initiation of the Constantine Plan, one hundred thousand new jobs had been created. Foreign trade in Algeria had more than doubled since 1954, when the rebellion began. More than 50,000 houses a year were built (as opposed to 12,000 in 1954). Schooling exceeded one million (as opposed to 45,000 children in 1954 and 650,000 in 1958). Social advantages were increased (from 1958-1960 the number of wage earners with social security benefits went from 260,000 to 350,000 in agriculture and from 460,000 to 600,000 in industry), etc.

Although in the case of Algeria, satisfaction of economic aspirations was the complement of a policy for satisfaction of political aspirations, it is conceivable that economic satisfaction alone would serve as a
substitute for satisfaction of political aspirations. In Hungary, without withdrawing completely from the country, the Soviets did begin a policy of raising the standard of living, after putting down the rebellion, which was, moreover, combined with a slight political liberalization of the regime.

d) Difficulties and limitations in the satisfaction of popular aspirations. Though, as we have seen, the counterinsurgents have good possibilities of acting upon the latent or actual aspirations of the population, nonetheless, no matter what their grasp of the situation and their will to reform, they encounter difficulties inherent in any attempt to convince the population of the uselessness of rebellion. The negative sentiments of the masses are difficult to change, and the simple themes elaborated by the rebellion are all the more seductive in that they involve above all promises for the future and can as a result wear the iridescent hue of demagogic mirages. "Tomorrow we will eat for nothing" suggests more or less the atmosphere of most revolutions and insurgencies.

The established power moves on the harsh ground of realities. It must prove itself doubly effective, since in the past it was unable to satisfy the aspirations of all the population, as evidenced by the fact that rebellion broke out.

- If the established power chooses to substitute economic and social amelioration for political gratification, its impact on the population will be subject to limitations which stem from the very nature of this form of action.
In the first place, economic development and improvement in the standard of living are slow. A long period must pass before economic measures begin to show results and especially before they take the form of consecutive improvements in the standard of living. Therefore, the population will not immediately enjoy substantial advantages.

Secondly, economic development often goes hand in hand with upheavals in the social order which undermine the immediate interests of a more or less important fraction of the population. For instance, steps to modernize Algerian agriculture only increased the exodus from the countryside to the large cities where a poverty stricken population was already a prime target for the Político-Administrative Organization of the FLN. Therefore, a program for economic modernization can increase the discontent of at least a part of the population.

Thirdly, a program for economic development, even for immediate aid, which has been planned according to modern theoretical concepts, is often misunderstood by under-developed populations who do not appreciate its benefits. In Algeria, for example, the construction of modern housing brought only slight immediate satisfaction to a population which was more attached to the old tribal forms of life than to modern comfort.

In the fourth place, progressive improvement in the standard of living may be considered natural and inevitable, so that credit will not be given to the established power. In such situations only a very profound change in general living conditions - a long-range accomplishment - could modify the fundamental political attitudes of the population.
To conclude, we know that a rebellion with an effective political organization can succeed in exercising actual control over the most popular social benefits provided by an a-political administration, allowing such benefits to go only to those inhabitants who are devoted to the rebel cause.

In the realm of the satisfaction of popular political aspirations, a different danger threatens the counter-insurgent. Realization of certain aspirations can cause disappointment, since the population does not see that the political reforms produce immediate results. In Algeria, for example, the solemn proclamation of the right to self-determination and the various steps taken to awaken the Algerian people to political life and prepare them for voting (women's suffrage, free elections for the general and municipal councils) had very slight repercussions.

On the other hand, by realizing the aspirations contained in the rebellion's demands, the established power can give the impression of giving in and in this way furnish proof of the legitimacy of rebellion. The various political initiatives of General de Gaulle were interpreted by the Moslems as demonstrations of his desire for reconciliation with the enemy FLN. (This impression was, it is true, strongly reinforced in Algeria by the violent criticism and accusations made by the army and the European population.) Only by the affirmation of an unshakeable will to fight against the rebellion, and more especially by the manifestation of this will through concrete victories over the rebellion, can the government avoid this pitfall.
- From the Algerian experience, it would seem that the best way of increasing the effect of measures intended to satisfy popular aspirations is to attempt to "personalize" these measures as much as possible.

A long experience of colonization in North Africa (led notably by officers in charge of "indigenous affairs") had already shown the French Army that in the tribe (and in particular among Arabs, Berbers, or Kabyles) the personality of the "Chief" plays an exceptionally important role. Hence the concentration of important administrative functions among specialized officers who were familiar with the indigenous inhabitants, their customs and their language, and were willing to undertake operations extrinsic to the classic career in arms. The extension of the war in Algeria ended in a systematic application of the conclusions drawn from these experiments through the formation of an officer corps called "SAS" (Special Administrative Sections) in rural areas and "SAU" (Urban Administrative Sections) in cities. Under this system each officer in charge of an "SAS" or an "SAU" either carried out civil administrative functions directly (in the case of the "SAS") or acted as an intermediary between the various administrative units and the inhabitants (in the case of the "SAU").

The ascendancy of these officers over the population soon became rather exceptional - and this without the use of force. The rule of the SAS was that these officers should never participate in military or police operations and would circulate in uniform but unarmed. Of course, the information (moreover very valuable) which the SAS obtained was exploited, but officially the only role of
the officer was to appeal to the military authorities on behalf of the population. The ascendancy of these men can be explained by their unrivaled devotion, their thorough knowledge of indigenous customs, and also to a great extent by the particular form taken by their attempts to satisfy the aspirations of the population.

In fact, their actions corresponded exactly as much to the immediate needs as well as to the customs of the inhabitants. Familiar with the problems of the people he was administrating, the SAS officer, usually with military support from his sector, had a road constructed here, an irrigation system there, etc. Very often the inhabitants themselves came to seek his help in obtaining a loan, building or enlarging a house (in rural areas) or in finding work, housing or help in the cities. Under such conditions the work of the SAS immediately bore fruit clearly apparent to the population. These gains did not come from the workings of incomprehensible forces (which were soon considered normal) or from an impersonal administration which dispersed its benefits automatically to everyone, but instead from a specific man embodying and personifying the established power. As one of these officers explained to me one day: "If tomorrow the government gives each inhabitant of my village a new house, either he will not occupy it or he will decide it is his due. On the other hand, if, with a few soldiers, I help a peasant to rebuild a roof, he will be very grateful to me and through me to France which I represent."

In principle, the SAS officer was not obliged to take a political stand or exercise any pressure on the population. Through his presence and his activity alone was he to serve the interests of France.
It must be said that the success of the SAS resulted in part from the rather backward character of a large percentage of the Moslem population (in this respect the SAS produced greater results than the SAU), and also from the peculiarities of the Arab world (notably the cult of the Chief). However, be this as it may, this fascinating experiment indicates the direction which counterinsurgent activity must take when it is a question of deterring the population through satisfaction of its aspirations.

The administration (civilian or military) must lose the impersonal character of a modern state as much as possible. The representatives of the established power must have their own personality as well as human qualities. The closest possible relationship must be formed between them and those they are administrating.

Therefore, combined with the setting up of vast programs for industrial, agricultural, or social modernization, economic and social activity must take the form of help for the inhabitants which is personalized to the utmost by the helper and adapted to the immediate needs of the receiver.

Unfortunately, it is to be feared that when it is most threatened by a rapidly developing rebellion, the established power will succeed only with great difficulty in recruiting sufficient numbers of men with the necessary training and taste for such a task. More effective in the short run than vigorous economic and political programs, such activity encounters difficulties in recruitment just at that moment when the fate of the conflicting forces seems to hang in the balance.
Though the experience of the SAS officers was completely favorable, this was not the case with the role played by the armed forces in social reform. The French Army participated on a large scale in the attempt to modernize Algeria economically and socially. 120,000 children were sent to school, 900 doctors from the conscripted forces served in the free medical assistance services, 400 shipyards furnished work for 22,000 men, etc.

This participation by the Army in concrete achievements which would benefit the population presented, in the eyes of those who favored "pacification" methods, numerous advantages. General Challe considered that the Army was proving the integration it preached to be more than just a vain word. His successor, General Crépin, considerably lessened this participation on the part of the Army because, like General de Gaulle, he thought it would force the Army to take a political stand and distract it from operations for the destruction of rebel bands.

In fact, the consequences of the economic-social activity entrusted to the Army depend on the context in which such activity is carried out. If it is only an instrument for the execution of methods of "revolutionary warfare," it is not so much the concrete achievements which count as the attempts at political indoctrination and organization of which they are a part. Moreover, it is certain that an attempt at political organization based entirely on social reform which is led by the Army alone has little chance of serious success.
However, if the activity of the Army is examined from a less ambitious point of view, it does present a certain interest. On the one hand it increases the means of the established power for carrying out some of the projects which directly affect the standard of living of the inhabitants. On the other hand it shows that repression by the armed forces is restricted to the rebels and is not aimed at the population for whom they feel only concern. At the same time the Army is in a position to prevent any social advantages which have been granted the population from being used by the rebellion and restricted to individuals who favor the rebellion. Even more important, the Army can regulate its attitude and actions according to the degree of popular participation in the rebellion. While in certain heavily subverted zones it can use violence on the population, it can also offer social reform and benefits as a reward for loyalty on the part of the population. Finally, the Army often serves as a valuable intermediary between the masses - especially the under-developed and primitive masses - and the established power. On the strength of its own prestige, and more easily than the civilian administration, it can "personalize" to the maximum both the faces of those who are locally in power and the advantages which they are likely to offer those under their administration.

However, the Army's intervention in social problems may appear more suspect to the population than the intervention of the civilian authorities. By appearing to exercise pressure over the inhabitants, the Army may seem to represent somewhat the same "totalitarian" philosophy which inspires the methods of "revolutionary warfare."
During periods of grave danger such drawbacks become unimportant in the face of the speed, directness and practicality of action which the military apparatus can provide. But, when there is less pressure from the rebellion, it seems preferable to resort to the slower action of civilian administrations.

In any case, we do not believe that the economic-social activity of the Army is as original or as effective as the Commander in Chief General Challe claimed. Actually its originality and value are most effective only when part of a broader plan to gain a total commitment from the population.

As indispensable as it may be, this attempt to neutralize the deep-rooted causes of the feelings of dissatisfaction which feed the rebellion is no wonder drug. To quiet the population's negative feelings and satisfy their positive aspirations is very difficult and doing both is a very long-range task. Especially effective in preventing rebellions, this form of activity will not bring immediate relief to the counterinsurgent forces.

(4) Conclusion. By rendering participation in the rebellion optional through protection of the population, by proving to the masses through spectacular military victories that armed struggle is impossible, by demonstrating through success and an unshakeable will that the rebellion is not and never will be rewarding, and by eliminating the negative feelings and satisfying the positive aspirations of the inhabitants in order to make them understand that rebellion is useless, the counterinsurgents can put into practice numerous methods of psychological action on the population and thwart those which are being used by the rebellion.
In addition to their empirical and non-theoretical nature, most of these "classic" methods of psychological action on the population have three characteristics:

In the first place, these methods do not subject the population to any direct material or even psychological pressure. The established power undertakes the creation of new conditions (re-establishment of security, promotion of political, economic, and social reform), and it is these new conditions which must indicate to the population where its interests lie. If there is an attempt at persuasion, it is in a way direct and objective. It appeals to the common sense of the people and to the well understood notions of what their interests are. Psychological action on the population is therefore based on methods which may be called democratic to the extent that democracy is compatible with a state of war.

Secondly, such methods of persuasion are by nature only very gradually productive. The reversal of the feelings of the population constitutes a long-range task.

Thirdly, these methods are more defensive than offensive; the latter can only begin with a massive and intense commitment on the part of the population to the established power, against the rebellion. By showing the impossibility of rebellion, the established power deters the population from joining rebel ranks, but, on an offensive level, it is restricted to obtaining the population's acceptance of its existence. By wishing to persuade the population that rebellion is useless, the established power already goes further and aims at obtaining the deep loyalty of the masses. But even under the most favorable conditions, the desired adhesion stems
more from the spontaneous defense of a way of life than from a body and soul commitment against a conflicting ideology. Certainly, the counterinsurgents can legitimately count on an increase in the number of volunteers who will serve in their civil administration and in the ranks of their armed forces (200,000 Moslems served thus in the French Army in Algeria). They can count on an improvement in the quality of the fighting of these volunteers and on increasing popular cooperation with the forces or order, etc. But in the fight against the rebellion the established power cannot reasonably count on a true mobilization of the population against the rebellion, on any fanaticism on the part of its indigenous troops, or on an emotional commitment on the part of the civilian population.

Only psychological action which makes it possible for the population to refuse to join or help the rebellion can end in armed support (and sometimes emotional support) from the entire population. Self-protection is, in fact, the natural outcome of the classic methods of protection of the population. But here the participation of the population has an essentially local character. It is limited to a fraction of the population, and even then presents only a defensive character. Self-protection is one thing; offensive neutralization of the rebels is another.

By working gradually and using only indirect persuasion in the democratic style, which results more in the population's acceptance of or adhesion to the established power than to a general mobilization against the rebellion, the "classic" methods of psychological action
on the population are certainly indispensable in preventing the extension of insurgency (or its recurrence), but they cannot immediately change the balance of the existing forces.

For this reason the counterinsurgents may have to resort to more immediately effective methods. There are two possible courses: the first, essentially defensive, involves using violence against the population itself to attempt to deter its members from joining the rebellion; the second, essentially offensive, strives toward subjecting the population to intense political indoctrination and strict political organization in order to win it over to the side of the established power. In both cases, the population is henceforth subjected to direct pressure. The counter-insurgents no longer wait for the new conditions which they are creating through their military and political efforts. To influence the population they work on it directly, kneading and conditioning it. Here the methods of indirect persuasion give way to methods which are basically more totalitarian.

3. Methods of Deterrence by Force

Until now the population has been considered only as a kind of "no-man's land," whose conquest by the rebellion must be slowed and stopped in an initial phase and whose loyalty must, in the second phase, be gained. However, from now on it will be treated as a potential or actual enemy which must be neutralized by force and as quickly as possible.

There are two forms of defensive activity which may be undertaken against a hostile population. The first
involves convincing the population through violence that it should not join the rebellion. The second entails organizational measures which render difficult and may even prevent the population's participation in rebel activities.

1) Deterrence by Violence

a) The Problem: The use of violence to deter the population from joining the rebellion is certainly the most brutal method there is. However, this does not mean it will necessarily be effective. History is filled with examples of fallen regimes which used violence as their only form of control over the population. To be more precise the difficulties encountered by Hitler's Germany in occupied Europe (and notably in Soviet Russia) show to perfection the possible limitations of this form of control.

One of the mistakes made by the advocates of violence seems to stem less from an analysis of the effects of violence than from an almost mystical belief in its inherent power to resolve the situation. Recourse to violence is then had, not for tactical or strategic reasons but for emotional and ideological reasons.*

Although an analysis of recourse to violence is somewhat beyond the scope of this study, it may be useful insofar as it relates to what we have already discussed.

*For example, in another realm, the OAS leaders seem to have lived by a belief in the inherent virtues of violence through terrorism without realizing that recourse to such a weapon (and the chaos which followed) only increased the desire of the French and Algerian leaders to arrive at a negotiated settlement of the Algerian question. Thus OAS violence, far from delaying Algerian independence, only speeded it up.
The basic assumption is that deterrence by violence instills sufficient fear into the population to prevent its members from joining the rebellion. The counter-insurgent hopes that a sufficiently terrorized population will not dare to express its feelings of dissatisfaction or yield to the appeals, orders and pressures of the rebellion. The slightest manifestations of insubordination to the established power are forbidden under threat of severe and eventually widespread punishment.

But this form of control means a desire to prevent any manifestation of hostility to the established power without acting on the possible causes for such hostility. Through recourse to collective violence the counter-insurgents want to repress through force the expression of hostile feelings without trying to uproot them.

What is more, through their activity the counter-insurgents are stimulating those feelings which nourish the rebellion. First of all, by bringing violence to bear on the population they are assuming ipso facto that the population has been won over, virtually or actually, by the rebellion. If this is automatically the case in the forms of insurgency which we have termed "spontaneous" (and which, as such, can only be repressed by force at the moment of the rebel explosion), it is not always true in what we termed "organized insurgency." When violence is used in the latter case on a population which has not yet entirely swung over to the side of the leading rebel group, the counterinsurgents risk bringing to the surface a reality which was only latent. In occupied France, for example, collective reprisals against the population which was on the whole neutral only succeeded in pushing its
members to identify with the Resistance of which they were at first scarcely aware.

In the second place, the use of violence on the population automatically inspires a feeling of hatred in the masses for those who are practicing it. Terrorism can certainly prevent active expression of negative feelings, but once repressed these feelings become increasingly powerful and their outburst is to be feared.

b) Conditions for the use of violence on the population: Under these conditions the effects of violence as a form of psychological action depend on several factors:

- The intensity of the violence plays an important role. In fact, since violence must repress not only initial negative feelings, but also those which it incites, a continuous and rapid progression (in a sense more geometrical than arithmetic) must be expected wherever strong negative feelings come into play. The growing intensity of the hostility will be in proportion to the initial negative feelings, the character of the race, and the feeling that insurgency is historically possible. In any case, the time seems to have passed when "punitive expeditions," under the very special conditions of European colonization, were enough to break primitive peoples. But the progression of violence necessary to terrorize a population effectively cannot be absolutely continuous or it would end only with the total destruction of the population, and there does come a time when resistance subsides and discouragement and passivity take over. However, under present conditions such a point can only be reached after an increasingly long period of violence. When
experts in this form of psychological action attempt to keep the population down through a "few examples," they must understand that far from achieving final success, they are simply adding fuel to the fire.

Confronted with this logical development of the use of violence, the counterinsurgent must be prepared both morally and materially to increase relentlessly the application of violence, if he does not wish to be swept away by the forces which he has helped to unleash.

The form which violence will take is therefore extremely important. The most common error is to measure the intensity of the violence by the atrocity of certain acts, whereas such acts often have only a very limited deterrent value.

For example, in 1944, the extermination by the SS of all the inhabitants of Oradour-sur-Glane (with such horrible refinements as the burning of a church filled with women and children) could only strengthen hatred of the Germans throughout the rest of France, while the fear they inspired was not in the least heightened by an act which did not seem applicable on a large scale by virtue of its very horror. A spectacularly atrocious act exacerbates feelings of hatred. If it is isolated, it does not give the population an impression of relentless danger; if it is too massive or too systematic, it can provoke revolt through despair.

What, in fact, does produce a deterrent effect is essentially the feeling that when the displeasure of the established power is incurred, the entire population (or enough of it so that everyone feels threatened) runs considerable risk. Therefore the intensity of the violence
must be more quantitative than qualitative. The penalties need not be spectacular. The fear they inspire comes more from an impression that anyone can be taken off at any moment by a relentless mechanism than from horror scenes which often result in revolt and despair. A certain mystery surrounding the eventual fate of those picked up by the machine may be preferable to the certainty of an act of horror.

On the other hand, contrary to the methods used for deterring the population by showing the impossibility of rebellion (methods which involve just penalties applied only to rebel fighters), deterrence by violence should not be too individualized. If the population knows that only certain groups of individuals are attacked, those who are not among them will be quickly reassured and may even identify with the "martyrs" and wish to avenge them. A collective repression that strikes even the innocent and those guilty of minor offenses will be more effective, since everyone will have a stronger desire to escape his turn. However, there must be a logical connection between insurgent behavior and the reactions of the established power. Otherwise the possibility of a reaction of desperation increases. The population must also have a chance to avoid punishment by submitting to the orders of the established power.

While acts of brutality can be accomplished by a handful of brutal henchmen, the practice of diffused and massive violence presupposes a particular moral attitude on the part of the leaders and even more a complex material and logistic organization as well as men to carry out orders who are both fanatic and disciplined. Large-
scale, methodical violence is in the long run as difficult to carry out - if not more difficult - than most counter-insurgent activity. Hitler's Germany, no matter how well equipped from this point of view, was never able to bring sufficiently effective violence to bear on the population of occupied Europe, notably because of the burdens imposed by such operations which were essentially military.

Through lack of adequate means or through a perverted love of violence for the sake of violence the counter-insurgents tend therefore to abandon themselves to isolated atrocities that have but limited effect. Practices like the annihilation of a few inhabited points or the torture and assassination of a few individuals seem more calculated to satisfy the sadistic instincts of those committing the violence than to allow the realization of a plan for deterrence. They are only useful when they involve, in very specific cases, those who are known to be guilty and in this way show a population which is otherwise subjected to little pressure, the terrible fate reserved to the rebellion and its followers. Applied systematically as a means of pressure over the entire population, such acts produce slight results. As for the execution of hostages after terrorist attacks - a frequent practice under the German command - this seems above all to aim at sustaining the morale of troops subjected to terrorism. The execution of individuals, who are usually chosen for their ties with the rebellion, does not in any way terrorize the population itself, but it does provoke sympathy for the victim and hatred for the murderer.

During periods of tension, widespread use of such measures as opening fire on any suspect movements, a
policy of collective arrests and even deportation to unknown destinations seems to produce more substantial momentary results.

Thus, when extremely critical situations in Algeria and France imposed recourse to collective methods of violence, it was not necessary, in order to achieve tangible results, to resort to execution and systematic destruction. Confronted with OAS anarchy in Algiers and Oran, the investment of these towns (and of their activist bastions) by the army had a beneficial effect. Simply to open fire on any suspect facade caused almost no victims and stopped harassing fire on the troops from the terraces more effectively than any executions of the inhabitants of the buildings from where firing occurred could have done. During a wave of FLN terrorism (Battle of Algiers or the destruction of numerous economic objectives in September of 1958 in Metropolitan France) a policy of massive (and moreover, temporary) arrests helped neutralize the networks. Lastly, in the case of street uprisings in Algeria (European and Moslem), the rapid and rather brutal dispersion of the demonstrators with police charges, gas, arrests (and only as a last resort, shooting) produced a definite deterrent effect. It seems that the Soviets, during the revolution in Budapest, used the same methods, though they operated, it is true, on a very different scale and degree of brutality.

An example taken from street demonstrations - a collective phenomenon of insurgency which once unleashed can only be controlled through deterrence by violence - illustrates the ineffectiveness of a spectacular but isolated act of violence as opposed to a diffused,
collective violence made up of acts of limited brutality. On 24 January 1960 shooting at the European masses did not in any way encourage them to break up. On the contrary, it transformed a demonstration into an uprising, which began the week of insurgent difficulties called the "barricades." This result may be partially explained by the impression of the crowds that they enjoyed the complicity of at least a part of both the command and the troops (notably the paratrooper regiments) and also by the presence of dynamic insurgent groups (which, by opening fire on the gendarmes provoked answering shots and then exploited the indignation of the masses).

However, a technical analysis of the errors of the services for maintenance of public order revealed the fact that the order for dispersion, which was indispensable or the crowd would, as on 13 May 1958, have attacked the public buildings, was not given until 1800 hours, to mixed troops (paratroopers and gendarmes) and therefore could only be ineffective or end in a certain amount of shooting by the gendarmes - which at that point proved inadequate for controlling an over-excited crowd.

As a result, during subsequent demonstrations in Algiers the order was given to start breaking up the demonstrations from the beginning (usually during the early hours of the morning). Blows with sticks and clubs, the arrest of a large number of demonstrators (who were then sorted out and often taken outside the town in trucks and left by the side of the road) created from the outset a mechanism which could subject any person wishing to join the demonstration to actual - though in the end not too serious - unpleasantness. On
the other hand, abstention from demonstrating (and especially staying at home) automatically allowed one to escape such risks. Tear gas and above all shooting were only to be used as a last resort made necessary by the course of the demonstration. Under these conditions the European demonstrations in Algiers were never again as serious as the 13 May 1958 or 24 January 1960 demonstrations. Shooting never again caused an act of revolt. It never again seemed, when and if it was necessary, as much like an isolated atrocity as an unfortunate and predictable consequence of the unleashing of violence. Cries of "the troops are firing" caused the demonstration to break up in specific spots and also more generally.

The example of street demonstrations also reveals the rapid rise of the intensity of violence and the necessity for the established power to be able to keep pace with it. The simple push gives way to use of the club, then to tear gas, and finally to shooting. In the last case, shooting in the air can end in actual shooting with a few victims, or even heavy losses, in the masses. For this reason the counterinsurgents must have troops and supplies at their disposal (as well as adequate reserves)* and be generally both materially and morally prepared to stand up under the most brutal contingencies. It was through insufficient will on the top levels and insufficient troops able to open fire that the 13 May and

*Even in Paris the police relied, for handling large demonstrations, on: 1) the municipal police; 2) special "intervention companies"; 3) CRS companies and gendarmes; 4) even armored squadrons.
24 January demonstrations became uprisings. Hence the rule which entails (the progression of violence being almost unavoidable) both thwarting the demonstration in each of its stages and using in the first stages only the mildest forms of violence. In this way the final total of violence can be limited. If the troops in Algiers had opened fire during the early hours of the morning, by nightfall they might have been faced with an actual revolution.

The choice of the right moment for applying violence is therefore important. Since violence applied against the population has serious drawbacks, notably the increase in negative feelings which it causes, it is preferable to use it only deliberately and consciously, with no moral considerations. To the extent that the use of violence intended to persuade the members of a population not to commit certain acts, at the same time drives them to do so, it would seem preferable to use such methods only when the population has actually been subverted by the rebellion. The profound preventative value of the application of violence against the population seems to me, in fact, limited, and a premature application only risks heightening the intensity of the violence which will eventually be necessary.

Also, there is definitely such a thing as growing accustomed to violence. In order to economize his forces, the counterinsurgent would therefore be wise not only to use violence carefully but also to limit its duration. Since it is psychological effects which are primarily sought, it should be remembered that violence will leave a much stronger memory if it has not become a habit. In
fact, the desire not to see the return of a painful period will even act as a more effective deterrent than fear of seeing the established power go on to a more brutal phase (in which case the population may hope that it will eventually win out because the established power may lack the will or the means to continue). Finally, the negative feelings provoked by the use of violence will be attenuated if it is not a permanent state. Periods of violence followed by periods of calm seem, therefore, to be more rewarding and less costly than continued violence.

This choice of the right moment for applying violence or letting up on it, this constant adaptation to the frame of mind of the population is, however, difficult to put into practice. (Premature intervention may unnecessarily strengthen negative feelings and delayed intervention give rise to feelings of impunity, or vice versa, a premature release of violence may be interpreted as a sign of weakness and capitulation while too late, it may provoke feelings of revolt.) Correct timing depends more often on a subjective evaluation than on a scientific analysis.*

*Personally, I was strongly opposed to the measures, moreover minor, of intimidation which were taken against the European population of Algiers after the failure of the April 1961 putsch which was strictly military in origin and execution. It seemed both useless and dangerous to me to subject the population to measures of coercion such as a curfew, searches, internment, etc. In my opinion the effort at that time should have been centered around finding the responsible military leaders through penetration methods. On the other hand, toward the end of the same year, I considered that the surrounding of Algiers by the troops, the neutralization of the "sanctuary" of Bab-el-Qued, the re-establishment of order through harsh methods which would affect the population's freedom of movement (continued)
The intuition of the civilian or military leaders plays a decisive role, even if their use of violence follows a rational plan and is not the result of emotional considerations.

- Violence combined with other forms of action:

Lastly, the manner in which the methods of deterrence through violence are combined with other forms of counter-insurgent action very much determines the effectiveness of these methods.

1) In fact, in the case of "organized" insurrection, recourse to violence on the population may happen to be used as a substitute for other forms of action. This is partly because the counterinsurgents do not succeed in destroying the para-military and para-political forces of the insurrection and attack the population instead. This may be a normal psychological reflex, but its immediate results are almost null. On the contrary, retaliation against the population incites the rebels to increase their provocations in order to profit from the negative sentiments which are stimulated by such repression. In a beginning phase the use of violence on a neuter and passive population therefore serves the insurgency rather than the counterinsurgency. Only after the established power has been able to practice such harsh violence that

*(continued)* should be carried out as soon as possible, since it was so obvious that the populations of the large cities were escaping the control of the legal authorities in favor of the OAS. General de Gaulle only authorized the practice of the measures which were outlined by the cabinet of the Prime Minister after the cease-fire with the FLN in the spring of 1962. In fact, he considered that such harsh measures could only be applied as a last resort.
any negative feelings are repressed, will the population, for reasons of security, withdraw from and thus isolate the rebellion.

Though reprisals against the population often answer a psychological need of the counterinsurgent forces, they rarely become part of a coherent and effective strategic-political plan. On the contrary the desire for retaliation often drives the counterinsurgent forces to forms of reprisal (such as the execution of hostages) which have a very limited deterrent effect both on the population and the rebels. This decrease in effectiveness is doubly serious when at the same time the established power proves incapable of showing the population the impossibility of armed rebellion through uncontestable military victories. Faced with accumulated negative feelings and an unshaken insurgency, the only way open to the counterinsurgents is to increase the intensity of the coercive measures which have already been taken.

However, if the impossibility of insurrection has been demonstrated by considerable military success, the application of violence on a subverted population can, for a limited period, increase the deterrent value of the military demonstration. As in the case of the repression of a spontaneous rebellion, the rigor of the established power then seems a logical consequence of the insurgent acts which were committed. If the established power does not make the mistake of resorting to a permanent reign of terror, the population may wish to avoid the recurrences of such dramatic situations, and the insurgents in this case no longer have a favorable terrain within which to work. Most repressions effected under such conditions by
the French Army in North Africa (notably the repression of the Setif uprisings in 1945) were followed by a period of calm. It must be anticipated, however, that the calm will have durable but limited results. The passage of time wipes out the memory of sufferings endured and the repressed negative feelings may again rise to the surface.

2) Secondly, the psychological effects of recourse to violence also vary according to whether the established power is prepared to carry out a policy for the satisfaction of popular aspirations.

If the established power is incapable of doing this (either because it does not have the resources or because it follows the cult of force) no compensation is given to the population for the trials it has endured and nothing is done to try to decrease its negative feelings. This means that the use of violence should become more intensive, extensive, and prolonged, since it can only seem like pure and simple oppression even to a moderately sophisticated population. It is possible, for example, that even after the destruction of Soviet armies, Hitler's Germany should have imposed an increasingly bloody tyranny in occupied Russia.

On the other hand, when the established power is able to satisfy certain positive aspirations it can, if clever, succeed in decreasing to a certain extent the negative feelings with which it must cope and which it has amplified through its repressive measures. When violence has already been used, it is even likely that any concrete achievements of the established power on behalf of its citizens, in order to have an appreciable psychological effect, need be less extensive and perfect than if deterrence is sought.
without violence. In fact, in contrast to past rigors, the new action of the established power will be all the more appreciated, especially if it knows how to give a human touch. In this case the new orientation of the established power cannot be interpreted as a sign of weakness. Also, the trials endured by the population can make any improvements seem more precious, no matter how incomplete and imperfect.

While the negative feelings provoked by the repression are being attenuated in this way, there also appears an increased appreciation of reforms undertaken and the contrast with the past accentuates the desire not to see that past recur. "The stick and the carrot..." is an old adage, used moreover by the Soviets, who, unlike the Nazis, do not seem to believe that violence solves everything and do not hesitate to combine deterrence by violence with other forms of action on the population, such as satisfaction of aspirations and, in addition, techniques of organization and indoctrination.

(2) **Control through Organization of the Population**

Since any activity directed toward persuasion of the population only produces slow and partially deterrent effects and deterrence by violence requires many men while producing only temporary and slightly preventative results, the counterinsurgents can try to prevent the population from following and obeying the rebellion by confining it within the framework of a well-structured organization which makes freedom for such action difficult or impossible.

a) **Attempts at structuralization in Algeria:**

After the "Battle of Algiers" which saw the destruction of
both the terrorist networks and the OPA of the FLN (and was therefore a striking demonstration of the impossibility of rebellion in the capital of Algeria), and the application of minor forms of violence (round-ups, arrests, curfew, and other controls), it was felt that control of the Moslem population obtained in this way should be consolidated to become lasting.

At this point those in charge of security used methods termed "structuralization" (structuration) on a large scale. The city was broken down into inhabited units (both buildings and blocks of buildings). A census of the population revealed the composition of each unit. A responsible Moslem who had shown tangible evidence of willingness to cooperate with the French forces was assigned to every unit. He was responsible for (1) keeping the census up-to-date and keeping track of the arrival and departure of any individual and (2) signaling any suspect activity or movement to the authorities.

This method so bemused the theoreticians of "revolutionary warfare" that one of their members, Colonel Trinquier (former commander of a paratrooper regiment and an active organizer of the 13 May 1958 revolution who resigned from the army in 1960) considers it as one of the essential weapons of counterinsurgency in his book entitled Modern Warfare.* In an attempt to systematize the process, Colonel Trinquier recommends widespread use of individual identity cards which, thanks to simple numerical symbols, allow a quick identification of the dwelling unit of any individual.

The French General Staff had a more subtle vision of the effectiveness of such forms of structuralization. If the city of Algiers remained calm until 1960, one cannot say to what extent this was due to the structuralization which was carried out or to the effects of the 1956-57 repression. Actually, however real the effects of structuralization may have been in the 1958-59 period, it alone could not prevent the reorganization of the OPA and the increased political awareness and participation of the urban mass which was made possible by the political success of the FLN insurrection.

b) **Advantages and inconveniences of structuralization**: Structuralization in itself is useful only for defense and protection. It does not really attack the problem of insurgency.

It does undeniably help the security services to a great extent, since thanks to the census they are immediately informed of any suspect elements by those in charge of the buildings and districts. Also, it certainly hinders the activity of the insurgents and makes popular participation on their side more difficult.

But structuralization alone cannot destroy the rebel organizations. Moreover, the difficulties produced can be easily surmounted by an insurgency with adequate means. The men in charge of the "units" become prime targets for insurgent armed groups. Their physical elimination is facilitated by the negative feelings they provoke amidst the population under their authority. Their assassination not only helps to reduce the effectiveness of structuralization, but points out to the population both the possibility of challenging the authorities as well as the small
rewards from joining their side. A few spectacular examples can impress the survivors. In order to escape a brutal fate, the men in charge of the "units" will tend -- if they are not too fanatic -- to moderate their zeal, to close their eyes, even to act as accomplices.

In the same way, the census can be upset by the printing of false identity cards, the complicity of terrorized authorities, etc. Absolutely strict control will require the counterinsurgents to put more and more specialized manpower into action.*

In the second place, structuralization alone does not counteract any single means of action employed by the insurgency to conquer the population. Certainly this makes it more difficult for the insurgents to demonstrate their strength and to apply their means of coercion on the population but it does not completely prevent this. In addition, it has no effect on the population's feelings and aspirations -- feelings which it does not seek either to eliminate or repress.

This procedure in any case contains nothing really new. In a more amateur manner, it has always been used in rural regions by all dictatorial or authoritarian regimes who entrust the administration of rural communities not to elected councils but to representatives chosen for their loyalty to the ruling power. Even in Algeria, as in all North Africa, the maintenance of the system of "caids" and tribal authorities also constituted a form

*For instance, in respect to the OAS, the proliferation of false papers in Algeria was such that barriers were only effective with radio liaison with a central file, which was destroyed by OAS commandos several times.
(more developed certainly) of structuralization. Now, such forms of political and social organization perhaps delayed the manifestation of negative feelings and political aspirations but never prevented them. They were able to hinder their expression in open insurrections but never to prevent them.

A fortiori, even an elaborate structuralization, when applied to a population already under the sway of insurrecti
cional ideals and organization, can, by itself, contribute to containing the masses. It is obviously too late to deter them from joining the insurgency. The establishment by the Germans of "STAROST" in occupied USSR solved no fundamental problem in the Russian villages.

c) The combination of structuralization with other forms of action: The final impact of structuralization thus depends on other measures coupled with it in order to produce an effect as much on the insurgency as on the population to be controlled.

- In the first place, structuralization must be protected against the insurgency's para-military organizations. It can only bear fruit if these groups or armed bands have been seriously incapacitated. In Algeria, the tribal order was able to play its traditional role only in the zones cleared of FLN military presence. In Algiers itself, structuralization became possible with the dismantling of the FLN networks after the "Battle of Algiers."

- In the second place, the effects of structuralization depend essentially on the actions undertaken to shape the sentiments of the people.
1) On the defensive level, structuralization seems a natural complement to the measures of violence destined to stem expression of unwanted feelings. On the one hand, it naturally leads to the use of violence. Setting up structural constraints necessitates coercive methods to inspire respect. Sanctions against suspects and offenders must, therefore, be arranged beforehand and applied automatically to all suspects reported by those in charge. On the other hand, through measures applied against suspects and offenders, the ruling power deters the population from engaging in possible insurgent activities. Moreover, the adoption of rules for obligatory census creates a particularly adequate base for the many checks and inspections which bring the weight of the counter-insurgents to bear on the population. Sanctions against insubordinates spreads violence evenly among the population since their number is great and it is not limited to a particular category of citizens. The extension of the network of informers (and even the approximate worth of the intelligence they furnish) also helps spread the points where violence is applied and increases the frequency of intervention by the forces of order.

In a climate of deterrence by force structuralization provides a practical basis for applying violence over a broad area, and in a manner that appears rational. Such endemic violence cannot have the same deterrent effects as massive "punch-like" operations but can fill in -- and prolong -- the intervals between them.

2) On the offensive level, structuralization offers a technical control procedure feasible within the framework of a plan to win over the population on the side
of the established power. Indeed such a plan must rest on new political and administrative structures, but structur-
alization then completely changes meaning. It is secondary in relation to the plan itself of which it is only a means. Its object is thus primarily political rather than for military or police purposes. As such, structuralization is then less artificial, less formal. The constraint imposed on the population is less direct and automatic.

In extreme cases, structuralization leads to political organization by one political party as in totalitarian regimes.

In hybrid cases, structuralization can take a form similar to self-defense. But here again, there is a profound difference with structuralization strictly speaking: the new structures of self-defense are less imposed on the population than accepted or desired by the people. The effect of this structuralization in any case is minimal as we know how this type of organization is only possible if the population is little sensitive or even resistant to the ideals of the insurgents. It is then a matter -- as in Algeria -- of adapting traditional structures (with the predominant social role of the tribe, the chief, the village, etc.) of a somewhat archaic society, in a situation of insurgency.

d) Conclusion. The French theorists of structuralization made a basic error in attaching too great importance to a technical procedure -- possibly useful but essentially conservative. On the one hand, these theorists exaggerated the successes obtained in rural areas of Algeria without realizing that these successes took place because the ideals of the insurgency had little
appeal for the traditionalist population. On the other hand, blinded by totalitarian successes, they wished to rationalize organizational techniques without perceiving to what extent these stem from political messianism.

In the Algerian villages, the attempts at structuralization without political support created an empty framework, quickly splintered by the insurgents. In rural, traditionalist territory, they were reduced to a small fraction of the population. As such, these efforts provided only "a second wind" (ballon d'oxygène), not the solution of the problem. How true it is that the structures are significant only because of the participation -- forced or spontaneous -- of the population to which they are applied.

In short, if it is evident that in case such popular support exists, the insurgency becomes only a matter of technical police measures (which can include "structuralization" in case of grave danger), it is now necessary to complete our analysis while asking whether support can be rapidly and completely won, as the theorists of "revolutionary war" believe.

4. Offensive and "Revolutionary" Methods to Gain Popular Support

The offensive method in winning over the population constitutes the second field of action aiming to overcome in the short run any limitations in the immediate effectiveness of classical means of action on the population. As in the case of methods of deterrence by violence, the entire population itself becomes the direct, top priority target of the counterinsurgents who do not hesitate to use most brutal means for this task.
But the counterinsurgents not only want to get the population to accept their rule and refrain from insurrectional activity, they also want to win the population deeply and in massive numbers on their side. Impressed by the offensive "conquest" of the population by the Viet-Minh, the French theorists of "revolutionary war" came to assert that the only way to defeat an insurgent was to steal his methods and turn them against him. In their eyes the massive use of indoctrination and political organization should produce not only a simple following or acceptance of the established power, but also a general mobilization of the entire population against the insurrection -- reducing in this way the destruction of rebel para-military and para-political forces to simple operations to maintain order.

(1) Commitment Through Indoctrination

(a) General Principles

Proceeding from the concept that one fights well only for a cause, an ideal, or even for a belief, and that it is the existence of such a cause or such an ideal which explains the success of an insurgency, it is, in effect, tempting to say that the first task of the counterinsurgents consists precisely in outlining a cause and an ideal as dynamic as those of the insurgency, or even more so.

According to this notion, the insurgency not only challenges the established power but also the ideal it upholds. If the counterinsurgency becomes the incarnation of Good, the insurgency itself is Evil and must be crushed accordingly.
By proceeding in this way, the established power (according to this theory) gives the population not only a motive for rejecting a futile insurgency but also a reason for lining up with the government and actively fighting a thenceforth ill-fated insurgency that has betrayed the people's cause. Furthermore, in becoming the apostle of an ideal, the ruling power manifests a resolute determination both to reform itself and to combat the insurgency. Thus the ruling power can abolish the demoralizing effects of its hesitancies and of the lurking thought that the authorities will give in. Those hesitating can simply swing over to its side.

It is then only a question, in order to give this ideal importance, of making use of the insurgency's methods: definition of a central idea, choice of a key word and creation of simple slogans, constant repetition of these slogans, etc. The population must thus be submitted to an unceasing and intense indoctrination stressing the sacred nature of the counterinsurgency's ideal, exposing the turpitude of the insurrection, demonstrating the advantages the realization of this ideal would bring to the people, and emphasizing the necessity -- in order to defend this ideal and to obtain these advantages -- to commit oneself completely for the established power and against the insurrection.

- Similar ideas led French theorists to make "integration" their battle horse. This central idea, summed up by a key word, seemed apt to win over the population by satisfying the aspirations of the Moslem masses for more political and social justice and greater economic well-being. Simultaneously the FLN was pictured as sold
out to foreigners and a prisoner of international communism -- therefore hostile to Algerian interests and profaning Moslem traditions. A new branch of the Army -- the 5th Bureau of "psychological action" -- was responsible for the wide-spread propagation of these viewpoints under the initiatives and guidance of the civil authority.

(b) Limitations of Indoctrination

In actuality, such concepts, very attractive on the purely theoretical level, run up against serious difficulties in practice.

- The essential difficulty stems from the somewhat artificial character the creation of an "ideal" risks acquiring under such condition.

In the first place, the conditions under which the counterinsurgents decide to operate play all the greater a role since the established power has a big handicap to surmount: the appearance, the survival and the development of the insurgency is precise proof of its own inability to satisfy the aspirations of the population. It is then necessary to offer the masses sufficient reason to believe that the ruling power -- formerly inept or reluctant to change their lot -- is hereafter infused with a new and sincere determination, and is capable of translating it into action.

The result of internal revolutions (even of profound changes) can be beneficial in this respect. It is certain, for example, that in Algeria the shock of the revolution of 13 May 1958 was very great: the Moslem population was convinced that "things would change." If instances of "fraternalization" between Moslems and Europeans multiplied, and if FLN violence ceased almost completely, these trends
arose not only because of army pressure (providing trucks to transport the crowds) or because of GPRA delaying tactics (a result of the effect produced by the shock), but also because of the deep feeling that after such a blow, everything would be unsettled. Cries from the Moslems of "Algérie Française," or "integration" were not simply shouted on orders but because they expressed both hope for change and the intense emotional atmosphere of equality with the French during these "historic days." Later the same techniques to make the Moslems turn out and demonstrate did not produce comparable results. Techniques of psychological action and constraint are less important than the profound feelings of the population.

In the second place, the relationship between the ideal presented and the real aspirations of the population takes on considerable importance. In other words, does the counterinsurgent ideal aim to satisfy the aspirations exploited by the insurgency or is it only a substitute for satisfying them? One can surmise that as a result of an important upheaval (even of a real revolution) the established power could steal the insurgency's appeal by fighting for an ideal which satisfies the aspirations supporting the insurrection. A program of national reform can satisfy nationalist aspirations for political justice and social well-being which support a communist insurrection.

This was not the case in Algeria where the ideal of integration seemed to be only a substitute for the ideal of independence exploited by the FLN. Now, if it is possible that a substitute for deep-lying aspirations can win acceptance for the authority of the ruling power
(especially if the latter had known how to demonstrate the impossibility of the insurgency and deterred the population through violence from joining it) it is less certain it can evoke a really sincere commitment from the population. Certainly, the supporters of integration will always say that this solution was never fully tested (because of the civil administration's and especially General de Gaulle's reservations) but the poor results obtained even on an incomplete scale are there to indicate the limitations of a prefabricated ideal.

- The second problem stems from the persistent difficulty in transforming an ideal into concrete achievements. In this domain, however, methods of indoctrination can help the counterinsurgents where no such possibility existed when relying solely on their achievements -- even magnified by skillful propaganda -- to convince the population of the insurrection's futility. If the techniques of indoctrination are unable to make certain aspirations immediately disappear and to replace them by others, they can make otherwise imperfect achievements appear satisfying. Nevertheless, the insurgency always had the advantage of never having to place itself on the level of hard facts and is able to limit itself to attractive promises, since it is not yet in power.

Difficulties will also certainly arise from the beneficiaries of the old established order as it was not through sheer indolence and ignorance that the established power limited itself to inaction. Thus, in Algeria, effective measures toward integration clashed immediately with attitude of the European population, to whom this new doctrine was only a facade designed to hoodwink
the Arabs, but not intended to modify the status quo in any way. Nor was the metropole enthusiastic about the idea of seeing nine million new Frenchmen born with full privileges. Under these conditions, the Moslems could realize that integration was only a word for a program the "oppressors" had no intention of executing.

- In the third place, it is difficult to see how the negative feelings of the population can be eliminated by the simple birth of an ideal. The existence of the Communist ideal, the intense use of indoctrination and political organization did not circumvent the Hungarian revolt. To a lesser degree, the Nazi "new order" was so little enticing that its eventual attractions were eclipsed by the hatred of the occupant. There again an actual internal revolution at the heart of the established power seemed necessary for the disappearance of negative feelings among the people.

In Algeria, the integration ideal clashed with the reservations held by the European colonist. The ground was not completely unfavorable since the metropolitan Frenchman inspired less negative feelings than the local "pied noir." However, the limited effect in time of the 13 May "fraternal" revolution was due less to the fact it was not exploited for integration by de Gaulle, than to the quite predominant role played by the European colony. Its daily attitude, its riots against de Gaulle not only proved nothing could change but also continually encouraged Moslem hesitancies and revolts.

From this point of view, the barricades of 24 January 1960 had a definite effect: The European riots crystallized Moslem hostility. It is equally characteristic that
the first important Moslem street demonstration since the battle of Algiers occurred in December 1960, in response to European demonstrations against General de Gaulle. Indeed, the liberal declarations of the chief of state on Algeria's future had already rung the death knell of integration; but it remains equally true that the conditions for this Moslem explosion prove to what point the masses' negative feelings were intensified by the existence of a European population willing to accept integration as a myth, but desiring to continue enjoying its privileges. It has indeed been proved that this was a spontaneous revolt and surprised the FLN as much as the French authorities.*

In short, if the effectiveness of indoctrination depends on the nature of the ideal propounded to the population (adaption of its content to popular aspirations) and on the conditions under which it is undertaken (sincerity, concomitance with concrete achievements), it depends as well on the nature of the political tool which carries it out. He who says indoctrination also means a political organization.

(2) Commitment Through Political Organization

(a) General Principles

As opposed to news and propaganda which can be carried out by organizations outside the general public, indoctrination must be implemented by a political organization encompassing the population. Only such an

---

*The Europeans, of course, asserted that the revolt had been organized by the Gaullist regime. This is just not so.
organization can penetrate the population deeply enough to obtain, by influencing its daily behavior, a commitment in support of a cause. Only a similar organization can channel this commitment towards real and fruitful activity. In totalitarian regimes this role is completely absorbed by the single political party - both the means and the "transforming agent" in the work of indoctrination.

(b) **Limitations of Political Organization**

Now, the work of an agency for political organization in established totalitarian regimes, or its use in certain types of organized insurgencies cannot be necessarily transposed into a counterinsurgent situation. The creation of such a tool presupposes that an important section of the population believes as much in the victory of the established power as in the justice of its cause. We return then to the quality of the ideal put forward by the counterinsurgents and to the power of enticement it can exert over the population. It is typical that the exponents of integration never succeeded in creating a political movement capable of organizing the population (nor even of crusading for their ideology).

The mere creation of a political movement or the recruitment of considerable numbers for it cannot in any case be considered sufficient. If the ideal which the movement serves does not correspond with the aspirations of the population, if it does not exert a certain power of attraction over it, this movement will not be able to produce a viable organization adequate to its tasks. Its role will rapidly become purely defensive. Although it can allow the extension of the intelligence network, increase the possibilities of the use of violence (and
even rapidly become a means of violence (as the armed
militias of the European neo-Nazi parties proved) or even
courage a defensive structuralization, it will not
obtain the population's commitment to offensive measures.
Likewise, the French army, obliged finally to carry
out political organization and indoctrination of the Moslem
population through its own means, achieved in the end only
modest results. Caught within the sectioning system, the
Moslem population was deterred -- until December 1960 --
from actively demonstrating in favor of the insurgency.
Before this deployment of force, the greater part of the
masses adopted an attitude of watchful waiting. But the
deterrent aspect of the counterinsurrectional military
mission never took an offensive character.
It is true that almost 200,000 Moslems served in the
French army and could be used effectively in operational
missions against the FLN. But these men (draftees, harkis,
mokhaznis, GMS, etc.) in no way represented a massive
movement of the population -- except such as Bachaga
Boualem's that arose in some highly traditionalist areas.
In this particular case, a commitment did not follow from
indoctrination and political organization, but, on the one
hand, from the liking for a tribal form of life and, on
the other, from genuine successes in campaigns against FLN
bands.
Certainly, the self-protection method corresponded
also to a form of collective commitment but this commit-
ment had a purely defensive character limited to rural
communities. Here again, self-protection stems directly
from military successes and was only possible in agricul-
tural and traditionalist regions.
Generally speaking, the restriction of French successes to rural populations would seem to indicate the failure of indoctrination and political organization -- except in the particular case of the 13 May fraternal demonstration. In this case, the political organization carried out by the Army, the intense indoctrination in favor of integration and the revolutionary movement mobilized great crowds in the large cities despite their nationalist sentiment. But we have seen that the shock produced by the 13th of May led the Moslems to believe -- at least for a brief time -- in the possibility that the new regime emerging from the Revolution could engender and apply an entirely new policy. Furthermore, the May events took place against a background of violence. The battle of Algiers and its excesses lay only two years in the past. The insubordination of the army (General Massu himself, victor of the battle of Algiers, headed the revolutionary movement) and the mood of the Europeans made the Moslems fear the worst if orders received were disobeyed. Under these conditions, to go down in the streets, to participate in the general festivities, to shout "Algérie Francaise" and to brandish flags seemed to be a minor and temporary commitment -- in order to avoid a greater risk.

(3) **Commitment Through Violence**

(a) **General Principles**

The application of large-scale violence on the population is (equally with persuasion) at the basis of any effort towards commitment as prove the examples of Hitler's Germany and Soviet Russia.
But in this context, violence does not aim to deter the population from insurgency solely by terrorization. Violence particularly tends to force the individual to commit himself on the side of the established power or be destroyed by it. Under these conditions, violence is no longer an autonomous means of action but an instrument -- necessary but incomplete -- of indoctrination and political organization. And the successes obtained in these two domains alone assure that the use of violence on the population will be offensive in style.

It is only if the population is convinced that violence is being used in the service of an acceptable ideal that such force will not provoke negative feelings and will make them perform positive acts. The use of violence in itself never obtained the commitment of the people of the occupied countries to the Nazi cause. The differences in effectiveness between the commitment of the population, let us say, of the USSR and its satellites does not spring in the least from a lesser use of violence (on the contrary) but to the level of acceptance of the Communist ideal by the population.

(b) Minor Forms of Commitment

It is nonetheless true that if counter-insurgents can expect violence to provide both a deep and widespread commitment only to the extent they have been able (and have known how) to build a popular cause, they are able to apply violence in certain particular circumstances for purposes other than pure deterrence. But the results obtained will be limited.

In this way the French army was able to frustrate all FLN orders urging abstention from the different elections.
organized in Algeria (September 1958 referendum, municipal elections, cantonal elections, etc.). Electoral participation was then obtained by methods of minor coercion (transportation in army trucks, more or less forced loading in these trucks, stamping of electoral cards -- the abstainer knowing full well that during later police control operations an unstamped card would make him look suspet). If the FLN always got the worst of such tests of strength this was because the measures used were sufficient to allow the Moslem population to tell the FLN it had only acted under duress, and also because the act of voting did not seem to the population to be a commitment with serious consequences. Voting -- flattering and diverting -- corresponded to a sufficiently strong aspiration to justify a trip (and even the depositing of a ballot pleasing to French authorities) but such action was a far cry from militant acceptance of the French point of view.

Here again, the use of violence (even moderate) is only secondary as compared to the population's state of mind.

(4) In conclusion: The commitment of the population by the combined techniques of indoctrination, political organization and violence seems to be more a method of totalitarian regimes to implant and consolidate its power than a combat procedure against insurgency.

Certainly, similar methods when used by insurgents (such as the Viet-Minh) or by an established power are definitely effective but they do not constitute, despite what the French theorists concluded from the Indochinese experience, the essence of an insurgency or a counter-
insurgency. The FLN insurrection made appreciable gains without using systematically, as did the Viet-Minh, these totalitarian techniques. The same is true of the counter-insurgent success obtained in Malaya and the Philippines. The use of these methods by the Communist regimes in satellite countries reinforces their stability but does not prevent the outbreak of insurgency. The events of Budapest show, moreover, that the regime had to use classical techniques (military quelling of the insurrection, application of violence to the entire population followed by partial satisfaction of its economic aspirations) to buttress methods said to be revolutionary.

It would be incorrect to pretend that the techniques of indoctrination and political organization are absolutely indispensable in the struggle against an insurgency. Far from being indispensable, resort to the techniques has been very haphazard, as shown by the French experience in Algeria, unless used to serve a cause already benefiting from some support among the population.

In any case their use is dangerous for the maintenance of a democracy. I am convinced for myself that if after the 13th of May Revolution General de Gaulle had followed the adjurations of the partisans of "revolutionary war," the French regime itself would have felt the consequences. The inevitable limitation on such methods in Algeria would have been attributed to "defeatism of the intelligentsia," to excessive respect for procedures protecting individual liberties and in the end to the absence of "psychological mobilization" of the metropolitan population. Moreover, it is not a coincidence if, after denouncing all these evils, the champions of "revolutionary
war" came to attempt riots and joined the OAS. Without being able to say the OAS was inspired by fascism, it is evident that its eventual success would certainly have entailed extreme totalitarianism.

The "conquest of the population" is therefore as difficult to achieve as it is easy to declare its necessity. No specific techniques, no miracle solutions matter more than the simple rules of common sense: The masses will join the established power only when it has shown that it is destroying the insurgency on one hand, and is satisfying the aspirations of the population, on the other. Only the hard facts of reality are important: A brilliant military operation is valid only when it ends with the complete destruction of the insurgent forces and organizations; a political, economic or social program only if it truly satisfies the real needs of individuals.

In Algeria, no one program, no one technique was able either to modify the division of the Moslem population into three groups (according to the usual evaluations, around 20 per cent were for the insurrection, 20 per cent for the maintenance of French order, and 60 per cent undecided) or to alter the fact that the undecided in the end were favorably inclined towards the nationalist cause. Certainly, French military successes (dynamic sectioning and offensive operations), the program of self-defense, and the action of the SAS allowed maintaining an important "no-man's land" between the FLN and France as well as drawing the maximum from pro-French feeling in certain rural regions and from the interest of certain individuals. But neither the Constantine Plan, nor extension of elections and voting, nor psychological action in favor of
"integration," nor structuralization and political organization by the Army helped swing the undecided into the French political camp.

In contrast, General de Gaulle's promises first concerning self-determination and then "Algerian Algeria" favorably impressed all minds as they corresponded with a profound national aspiration. They did not, however, lead to an active union on the level advocated by the French chief of state in September 1958 through the exercise of self-determination (end of combat, a cooling-off period, restriction of the FLN to the position of one political party among others) as the constructive part of this plan was never put into effect. On the one hand, in spite of all the successes gained against para-military bands and terrorist networks the FLN could neither be totally destroyed nor obliged to accept the procedure of General de Gaulle (particularly because of the existence of an inviolate outside sanctuary and a strong OPA in the cities). On the other hand, the General's plan seemed difficult to achieve because of the opposition of the European population and of the army.

The FLN therefore maintained as great an attraction for the population as did General de Gaulle's promises. As neither of the two adversaries could either triumph on the military level or win over completely the population to their cause, they were compelled to accept a compromise peace.

One may think, however, that if General de Gaulle had not been obliged to cope with the latent rebellion of the Europeans and especially if he had had enough time, he would have had enough aces up his sleeve -- thanks to
the aforementioned techniques -- to embark upon the construction of Algerian Algeria without the FLN. The choice of a compromise by General de Gaulle is, in effect, most of all explained by his desire, from the end of 1960 on, to end the war as quickly as possible. In effect, the chief of state came to the conclusion at this time that the continuation of hostilities ran the risk of endangering French unity as well as his personal prestige and of very seriously restricting the international role of France and her regime.

Time is ultimately the counterinsurgent's principal ally. All that he is able to undertake necessitates a period of time to succeed.
IV. THE NEUTRALIZATION OF THE OUTSIDE SANCTUARY

1. Definition of the Problem

The existence of an outside sanctuary available to the insurgency creates one of the most serious problems of all for the counterinsurgents.

(1) We have already seen that France was able to apply a defensive solution to the military aspects of this problem. Thanks to the imperviousness of the frontiers, the insurgent bands could neither take refuge on foreign territory nor receive reinforcements and arms. The FLN army in Tunisia and Morocco was militarily "frozen."

It is all the more important to note that such an achievement, remarkable in itself, was not adequate. The outside sanctuary remained a symbol of the possibility of continuing the armed struggle despite defeat of bands within the country and its own inability to wage military operations. On the political level, the sanctuary became a pole of attraction for the Moslem population ("the FLN mecca") and the nerve center of insurrectional propaganda.

(2) Such a state of affairs shows perfectly the limitations of purely defensive measures and successes for counterinsurgency.

The problem then arises (and has arisen) of offensive measures capable of destroying an outside sanctuary. If on a theoretical level one may assert that decisive results can only, as always, be gained by means of an offensive, how can this be achieved against military forces and political organizations stationed in a foreign country?
Assuredly, in passing to an offensive, the counter-insurgents are not only grappling with their natural and internal enemy but must direct their attack on the foreign power which shelters him. A part of the problem therefore shifts from questions of counterinsurgency to those of relations of force and law between foreign countries. Other variables then appear which are related to the respective power positions of the established power and the country accessory to the insurgency, to the effect and motivation of the aid, actual or potential, provided to the insurgents and, finally, to the political and moral positions of each party on the international scene, etc. Cases can thus vary to extremes: The total aid given the Viet-Minh war effort by the Communist Chinese empire did not create the same problem as little Tunisia's simple and somewhat restricted loan of her territory to the FLN.

One of two directions can be chosen: The first consists in concentrating effort directly on the accessory country, the second in attacking only the insurgent forces and organizations stationed on its territory -- it being understood that this form of action necessarily infringes on its sovereignty, even if only in a somewhat indirect manner.

2. Actions Against the State Harboring the Sanctuary

   (1) Diplomatic Pressures

   The pressures exerted on the state harboring the insurrection pertain more to the relations between states than to the subject of this study.

   It should be expected, however, that purely diplomatic pressures will be ineffective unless it is a question
of terminating provision of facilities to an insurgency by a friendly and allied country (which is not strictly speaking the case of an outside sanctuary).

Thus France succeeded in limiting the facilities from which the FLN and OAS could benefit in the countries of Western Europe. But even in these favorable instances, France did not always wholly succeed. Pressures coming even from a friendly country can, indeed, run counter either to foreign policy considerations, desirous of preserving influence in zones where the insurrection is developing, or to expression of opinion favorable to the insurgency. For example, the existence in America of an "Arab" policy (or in Spain and even in Switzerland) restricted the effects of French steps towards closing off aid from these quarters. Likewise, a tradition of political liberalism acted against French measures in America, Switzerland, Belgium and even West Germany. (However, these countries did not accept OAS agents on their territory while Spain, Italy and even West Germany felt somewhat kindly towards them.) Finally, it can happen that the legal systems of very liberal regimes offer no protections against agents of an insurgency (especially when they possess, as in the FLN case, false diplomatic papers): This was the case, for example, in Belgium and West Germany.

The limited effect of diplomatic pressures designed to terminate restricted facilities extended by friendly countries shows how weak such measures are in a country which chooses to extend substantial aid to an insurgency. Thus no diplomatic measure could force Morocco or Tunisia to chase the FLN from their territory. On the other hand,
it is possible -- if the country accessory to the insurrection is not completely and unalterably hostile to the country fighting against it -- that such pressures are not entirely devoid of effect. Thus Morocco and Tunisia did not wish to sever all relations with France (who provided them with financial and technical help). French diplomatic steps helped prevent FLN aid from becoming absolutely complete and forced the governments of Tunis and Rabat to respect certain formalities. A de facto modus vivendi was thus obtained.

However, in order to be fruitful diplomatic pressures must be energetic, reiterated, and based on precise facts. It is only through continuous and well-founded pressure (hence the importance of intelligence services) that some results can be obtained without overly exasperating the countries concerned. Thus the Debré government achieved results the IVth Republic had been unable to obtain since it vigorously protested against every instance of collusion or support to the FLN. But, in the end these continuous interventions diminished France's international good name.

(2) Measures of Retaliation

To enhance the effectiveness of diplomatic measures, the state fighting an insurrection can take (or threaten to take) retaliatory measures.

The problem then consists in creating (or threatening to create) a situation where the accessory state suffers inconveniences greater than the advantages gained by support of the insurgency. Thus the implied threat that France could no longer oppose the anti-French activity of the Spanish republicans exiled on its territory resulted
in the internment of the OAS leaders residing in Spain. Similarly, the spread of political crimes encouraged by the FLN presence in Belgium or West Germany (particularly set off by the settling of differences between the MNA and the FLN) lead these countries to take security measures against persons creating such political disorders. The arrest of Tunisian citizens in France on the pretext of aid to the FLN permitted obtaining agreement from the Tunisians that they would no longer deliver pro-French Algerians over to the FLN.

However, here again, retaliation (or threats of retaliation) runs the risk of being less effective vis-à-vis the country providing the sanctuary. The reasons why it chose to help the insurrection do not permit it, in effect, to yield to the country fighting the insurgency. It is evident that France -- especially by cutting off the delivery of money and technicians -- could cause Tunisia as well as Morocco serious economic difficulties, outweighing any advantages possibly to be gained from providing aid to the FLN. However, the problem was not expressed in economic but in almost passionate emotional terms. Because of their internal political situation, their ideology and state of public opinion, and because of the role they wished to play in the Arab world, Tunisia and Morocco felt obliged to support the cause of their "Algerian brothers" despite the cost. Of course, these countries tried their utmost to limit expense, but any overt pressure on them, any public retaliation would have run counter the prescribed goals. Support of the FLN was a political and psychological necessity. Bringing discussion into the open, or arousing emotions by an
ultimatum or an overt retaliatory measure could only end in failure.

In similar cases, however, the veiled threat of retaliation was preferable to a specific threat and even more so than to retaliation itself. Being secret, it does not unleash the passions which are at the basis of aid to the insurrection. Veiled and theoretical, it does not reveal, as would response to a concrete event, that retaliation is eventually ineffective. In this way fear -- encouraged by France -- of losing advantages which he enjoyed lead Bourguiba to refuse the FLN all that it demanded.

(3) Clandestine Operations

- For these same reasons, clandestine operations are more effective than overt retaliation. If a state discovers the counterinsurgent state can cause it serious damage in ways that do not affect public opinion in the accessory state, since the public does not know from whence comes the blow, or if the accessory state cannot provide proof of foreign interference, it may prefer to end such retortions by softening its position. It has free rein because its public opinion is not involved; hence, it is more difficult to stop the adversary's action by national or international public reaction.

Thus if the destruction by the French air force in 1958 of the Tunisian village of Sakhiet-Sidi-Youssef created difficulties for France, this was not so in the case of the completely clandestine bombing of Tunisian military installations available to the FLN. Similarly, the pitched battles provoked at the end of 1959 by the French services between clandestine commandos composed of
pro-French Moslems and AIN units, created such insecurity in the frontier zones that the Tunisian government was obliged to place serious restrictions on FLN freedom of movement.

Clandestine operations of this order are nevertheless very difficult to organize (especially because of the need to observe absolute secrecy and of not leaving any compromising evidence on the terrain) and their range is therefore necessarily limited.

- In the framework of clandestine operations it may seem interesting theoretically to exact "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth" from the state supporting the insurgency by fomenting subversive activity against it on its own territory. But here again, an enticing idea is not always feasible. Its execution depends on the actual situation in the supporting country and the existence there of an insurgent group capable of exploiting the population's positive aspirations or negative feelings.

In Tunisia, for example, the only insurgent situation which could have been exploited was the pro-Nasser and the ultra-Arab Salah-ban-Youssef opposition. Now the success of such movement would have pushed Tunisia towards a total commitment in favor of the FLN, and its strength could have incited Bourguiba to fight against this tendency by the classical method of outbidding the opposition -- an equally unfavorable solution to French interests.*

*For my part, I favored support of Salah-ben-Youssef -- on condition however of being able to ensure the support of certain extremist FLN elements for his movement. The goal was less to overthrow Bourguiba -- an impossible objective -- than to increase differences between the FLN and himself.
In Morocco, on the other hand, it was possible to offer support to the Berber tribes, traditionally hostile to the Sultan's central authority. But since such a movement could not become very wide-spread (except in the Southern Sahara where particular tribal disorders caused Rabat serious trouble), it was not in a position to provide the necessary means of pressure on Hassan II who possessed a much better trump in the threat to increase further his country's aid to the FLN.

In fact, in Tunisia as much as Morocco, aid to the FLN ("Arab brothers" fighting against the common enemy of "French domination") gratified a deep-lying aspiration of populations that had just recently won their independence. It was thus almost impossible successfully to launch insurgent movements running counter to such an aspiration. Nor was this absolutely necessary as -- despite appearances -- the Tunis and Rabat governments constituted to some extent a counterbalance to this popular feeling, as long as Bourguiba and Hassan II also were worried over certain "leftist" FLN revolutionary elements and the competition that a total success of this movement would entail in the struggle for the leadership of North Africa.

In actual fact one may ask -- excluding even this borderline case where aid to the insurrection was more imposed on the heads of state then wanted by them -- to what extent the counterinsurgentsever have the capability of provoking an insurrection in the state harboring an outside sanctuary. One may think that such a state, firstly, engages in such an adventure only when once assured of its own strength and especially, secondly,
when this strength is actually increased by the aid extended the insurrection. Either this aid is gratuitous—or it reflects a desire to defend and make successful a cause which is held in common with the country in question and the insurgency it harbors. Now the taste of victory, of territorial and ideological expansion has always exercised a great sway over the masses, sufficient at times to serve as a substitute for their other aspirations.

It is thus possible to believe that the counterinsurgent power will be capable of infecting the enemy with insurgency only when the counterinsurgent has almost quelled the rebellion on its own soil. It is only after a reversal of the relations of ideological forces that the counter-offensive would be feasible. That is to say that the outside sanctuary can be neutralized by means of an insurgency transported to the accessory state only such neutralization no longer presents a vital and immediate necessity.

- It seems therefore preferable to orient clandestine operations towards the realization of operations not aiming to conquer its population but simply to cause this state serious difficulties by virtue of a simple warning or retaliation. Various violent actions (varying from an attack on individual objectives to the broad destruction of military and economic objectives) can thus be entrusted to specialized groups among the most fanatical elements of the counterinsurgency forces.

However, such operations — difficult to organize — can only have a limited effect on states deeply committed to abetting the insurgency. As long as they are applied on a small scale, they can only result in a reduction of
the aid extended and not in its disappearance. On the other hand, if they are able to shake the foundations of the accessory state's security -- and this may be the consequence either of a very widespread wave of violence or especially of blind terrorism -- this automatically emotionalizes the problem. And this is prejudicial, we have seen, to the counterinsurgent cause. Unfortunately, faced with the emotions of public opinion it is likely that the accessory state will not be able to yield on aid to the insurrection. It is evident that the French services were capable of spreading blind terrorism at any time through Tunisia and Morocco. But it is clear nonetheless that such action would immediately have triggered popular reprisals against French persons and property in those countries, and even more, would have pushed their regimes towards xenophobia and pro-FLN extremism. Unfortunately, whatever the extent of anarchy provoked in the country, such a course of action, once initiated, could only grow in importance.

In conclusion, therefore, most means of direct pressure the counterinsurgent authorities can consider using against a state providing outside sanctuary will produce limited results. Such measures are only of moderate effect against a friendly country extending slight help to the insurgents and are almost ineffective -- mere pinpricks -- against a state entirely committed to this aid. They can restrict the aid extended only within certain very broad limits -- in the case of states such as Tunisia and Morocco that are providing considerable aid without being completely committed.
(4) Neutralization of the Accessory State

The problem therefore arises as to the neutralization, pure and simple, of the accessory state.

The Bizerte affair in 1961 proved that the French army was technically capable of conquering Tunisia in less than a week. However, the Suez affair (which many French officers had considered the key to the Algerian problem by neutralizing Nasser's aid to the FLN and in boosting the prestige of the French North African forces) brought out the difficulty or the near impossibility of gaining full success by similar operations in a modern world.

Without entering into the domain of power relations between countries one must note, strictly on the level of counterinsurgency, that while the territorial conquest of the country providing the sanctuary will perhaps solve the problem, it incurs the definite risk of encouraging the appearance of a new insurgency on the conquered territory. This insurgency can, in certain cases, benefit from the support of other bordering countries.

Thus the conquest of Tunisia, technically possible but difficult because of the world situation, would probably have added a Tunisian insurgency to the Algerian one. Both these insurgencies would have been able to count, in turn, on the support of Libya and Egypt.

Again strictly on the level of effective counterinsurgency, total destruction of the country accessory to the insurrection (or partial destruction following quick and temporary occupation) would provide the most satisfactory solution. Without coping with complex territorial occupation procedure, the counterinsurgent would demonstrate --
while destroying the outside sanctuary -- the disastrous fate reserved for states aiding the insurrection. However, such punitive expeditions or military parades of force do not seem adapted to modern world conditions.

If the occupation or the destruction of the accessory state does not seem possible, the threat to carry this out can be somewhat effective. However, open blackmail threatening war, conquest or destruction incurs the risk of provoking internal mobilization, on one hand, against any capitulation and, on the other hand, intensive international complications. If France had given Bourguiba an ultimatum, he foreseeably could not have permitted himself the luxury of losing face by yielding but would have appealed to international public opinion.

If open blackmail has therefore all the same inconveniences as direct action, this is not true for indirect and veiled threats. Because Bourguiba knew a certain part of the French army ardently wanted to "sleep in his bed," he attempted to maintain aid to the FLN within certain bounds. It then falls to the special services to see that all deception operations indicate that the counterinsurgent power has in mind and is preparing a military invasion in the event of increased aid to the insurgency. But such procedures can be put into operation only periodically (notably to end any increased aid to the insurgency) and can only result in containment, not neutralization.

3. Actions Against the Sanctuary's Insurgent Forces

Direct action on the insurgent forces operating from abroad involves the same requirement for substantial and decisive results: total, absolute neutralization.
(1) Harassment

Certainly, the counterinsurgents can resort to a less radical series of methods but those constitute, in the final analysis, types of harassment whose tactical utility is certain but which cannot modify strategic power relations in the slightest. From a military point of view, the harassment of the outside sanctuary only constitutes "pinpricks."

a) Counteraction

The first type of counterinsurgent action is open counterattack with available means of action and no thought of secrecy, against specific attacks directed from the sanctuary. Thus the shooting from Tunisian soil of French reconnaissance planes surveying the frontier in 1958 led to the destruction of the Tunisian village of Sakkiet-Sidi-Youssef by the air force. Similarly, after the ALN set up a battery of artillery to harass the barrier and its guards, General Crépin decided to authorize the neutralization of the enemy pieces by artillery fire. Finally, in border actions near the barrier or in areas of the Southern Sahara where there was none, troops sent to pursue an insurgent band were sometimes authorized to continue their chase across the frontier through the exercise of "the right of hot pursuit."

Similar actions have an unquestionable tactical utility. Nevertheless, as soon as important military results are involved, both the significance of the event and the clamor it provokes forces the accessory state to protest vigorously. Then counterattacks of any size against insurgent forces are openly conducted by classical counterinsurgency forces; they become actions against the
state providing the sanctuary. They therefore give rise to all the complications we have reviewed without producing decisive military results.

On the other hand, counterattacks limited to routine operations can very well be fitted into the context of war. Thus the artillery duel between the ALN and the French army was finally accepted by Tunisia as a normal but limited consequence of its aid to the insurgent.

Counterattacks also act against the counterinsurgent power on the psychological level. They reaffirm the military presence and activity of the insurrectional forces. Since they cannot be kept from public notice, they reinforce the psychological advantages the insurrection derives from the existence of an outside sanctuary: the illusion that the insurgents dispose of important fighting troops.

b) Clandestine Operations

Such considerations pushed certain theorists (notably General Challe) to undertake the harassment of an outside sanctuary only by clandestine military methods. Various missions can then be assigned to specialized clandestine forces:

- The creation of a climate of insecurity behind enemy lines (mining, ambushes, harassment of camps, etc.);

- The creation of incidents between the insurgents and the state harboring the sanctuary (harassment -- from locations close to insurgent camps -- of the state's military forces, or of the civilian population; extortions by units disguised in the insurgents' uniform, etc.);

- The destruction of military objectives (through clandestine operations or surprise attacks against
military installations, especially against those participating in frontier harassment);

- The destruction of political targets (elimination of insurgent chiefs, destruction of their installations);

- If such forms of action do not have the psychological and diplomatic inconveniences of conventional counterattacks, their effectiveness is nonetheless equally limited. Certainly, at the cost of much effort and ingenuity, a climate of insecurity can be created within the sanctuary but its continued functioning cannot be prevented. The greatest effect will be felt by the state harboring the sanctuary (when not completely committed to the struggle) without acquiring, however, a decisive character.

On the other hand, once the first surprise effects are over, the destruction of political and military targets rapidly becomes very difficult. If in this phase the counterinsurgents want to take interesting military objectives by surprise, the protective and security measures taken by the insurgents will force the commitment of relatively large numbers of men and the risk of considerable losses. Now prisoners and bodies left on the terrain always lift the veil of secrecy. Past a certain stage, destructive clandestine operations leave as many traces as conventional operations and therefore present the same impediments.

(2) The Destruction of the Sanctuary

To the extent conventional counterattacks and clandestine operations either produce only limited effects or, if more important, provoke international complications, it is logical to consider the problem of purely and simply neutralizing the outside sanctuary.
a) In the first place, we know that in counter-insurgency matters purely defensive measures (such as impenetrable frontiers) or limited offensives (such as harassment) cannot produce decisive results. This can only be obtained by an offensive aiming at the total destruction of all insurgent military and political organizations. Since the neutralization of the whole of the adversary's means of action is necessary, it is normal to say that this goal must be pursued as much in the interior as the exterior of the territory.

Now, in the second place, one can expect that the international complications which are the inescapable price of any far-reaching operation against the outside sanctuary will not be proportionally greater in the case of total destruction than in that of a limited action. On the one hand it may be possible to reduce their scope. In limiting the operation to the insurgent forces and their installations, the counterinsurgent state can diminish its violation of the sovereignty of the state harboring the insurrection while maintaining justification for its course of action. By striking with great rapidity (and by keeping preparations absolutely secret), it can take public opinion off balance and end the sanctuary's intervention before an international reaction has had time to develop. In contrast -- so long as the threshold is not overstepped where an operation risks provoking a world crisis -- diplomatic complications grow less quickly than the degree of violence employed. For example, the destruction of the ALN forces in Tunisia would not have caused many more difficulties than the bombing of Sakhiet. It is probable that it would have caused complications
analogous to those created by the conquest of Bizerte without provoking major tension comparable to the Suez operation.

b) Since the ALN was concentrated on the frontier, many military experts (and particularly General Challe) showed that France was able to conduct a lightning operation, making a devastating entry and exit and obtaining the total destruction of units unskilled in modern warfare. According to these plans, limited intervention to FLN armed forces and great speed should reduce both the possibility of a reaction from Bourguiba as well as interference from other big powers. France would have been justified in attacking the armed forces of an internal rebellion. Once the operation was finished, she could wait contentedly for the chorus of international reproach to calm down naturally.

I do not know for my part the underlying reasons which prevented adopting these projects. Certainly it is not a very easy decision to take and can make the advocates of classical diplomacy shudder. The Suez affair had also left bad memories and no major aggression -- as was later the case when Bourguiba decided on the blockade and the attack on the French base -- could provide either an imperative necessity or definite and immediate justification for such an operation.

It is also pertinent to ask how such an action, had it been carried out, could have influenced the outcome of the struggle.

- A strike operation would certainly have reduced the ALN military potential to nothing. But we know that the problem is not essentially military. Part of the ALN
potential in men would have inevitably escaped the dragnet. There were enough Algerian refugees present in Tunisia to permit a certain amount of recruiting. The political leadership of the insurrection, the GPRA, its ministers and bureaus stationed in Tunis would have remained completely intact if the operation had been strictly limited to units stationed along the frontier. In short, faced with a violent anti-French reaction in the Arab world, aid from Tunisia and from other brother countries would undeniably have increased. Fear of an additional French operation would be attenuated by the intensity of popular feeling and the restriction of the operation only to FLN forces and installations.

If, therefore, Tunisia had not been deterred from continuing to offer its aid to the insurrection, if the insurrection had not been decapitated, if a certain human reserve held out permitting new units to regroup, the ALN could have -- over a relatively long period of course -- risen once more from its ashes. It is obvious that its military effectiveness would have been greatly reduced but because the problem is not military, a semblance of combat capacity could have been recreated through intensive propaganda.

Now the propaganda effect of this "renaissance" would have been reinforced by the spectacular nature of the French strike operation. Invulnerable in the Tunisian sanctuary and upheld by Arab solidarity, the GPRA would have had a chance to transform their defeat into victory by their survival and by the revival of even a few of their forces.
France would then have been left with the choice of either carrying the war to Tunisia* (occupation of this territory would encourage a new insurgency, a lightning destruction would be scarcely feasible from the international point of view) or of renewing its military clean-up (as in the "Challe Plan" for liquidating the wilayas). Yet the repetition of a similar operation seems difficult. A recurrence would not only provoke stronger international reactions but worse, would appear to public opinion as an admission of powerlessness. To repeat such a spectacular intervention several times would admit inability to settle the problem. Despite the opinion of the French command, one may believe that a strike operation against the sanctuary's military forces would not have had a decisive character inside Algeria.

Even if the destruction of the sanctuary is a necessary condition, one may still ask whether it is adequate. In other words, at what moment during the counterinsurgency effort should this neutralization take place? As a prelude to the counterinsurgency offensive or at its conclusion? I would tend to think that an action aiming to neutralize the outside sanctuary should, in order to have a decisive effect, intervene at the moment when the established authority had already overturned the situation to its advantage on all the insurgency's internal fronts. I do not think in fact that the existence of an outside sanctuary can be considered -- as many counterinsurgents do -- as the source

*"Or...to China" as General de Gaulle said one day in mentioning the offensive posture of the French military towards external aid to the FLN.
of the insurgent evil. The sanctuary is only an instrument -- of considerable importance certainly -- of a situation whose underlying causes in particular must be sought elsewhere: in the population’s frame of mind and in the opportunities for para-military forces to engage in extortions and demonstrations. If the sanctuary is destroyed without seriously preparing for the destruction of insurgent bands, networks and its OPA as well as changing the population’s frame of mind, the deep-lying reasons for the insurgency will continue to exercise their influence. If the established power is not capable of attacking successfully the very basis of the insurgency within, its external offensive -- which cannot be an end in itself and must be evaluated in respect to its psychological repercussions -- will only serve to demonstrate the incapability of the established power to conduct an offensive against the insurgents within its territory.

If the offensive against the sanctuary constitutes one of the most spectacular operations there is, and if it is not possible to repeat this several times, then it can only be launched as an ultimate weapon when results would be decisive. From this point of view, the destruction of the sanctuary should appear as the culmination of counter-insurgency initiated through other means. *

* I believe that his rule applies, in counter-insurrectional matters, to the execution of all sensational, out-of-the-ordinary methods. For instance, the capture of General Salan when the OAS was strongest -- even if it had been possible -- would have changed nothing in essence but would have rather profited the OAS in proving it was so strong that it could continue after the loss of its leader and despite the spectacular success of the French government. (continued)
Such was the situation in Algeria from a military point of view during 1960. The bands, decimated by the offensive operations of the "Challe Plan" and energetic sectioning, forced to split up or to go on the defensive, starved for arms and food, riddled with discouragement and spying in their midst, found themselves -- as the Si Salah affair proves -- on the verge of surrender. One might think that lightning operations against the sanctuary would then have struck a decisive blow to the FLN military potential.

On the other hand, it is not clear that this blow would have been possible from a political viewpoint. French military success did not appreciably affect the FLN's hold on the population or its watchful waiting tactics. The Constantine Plan, economic and social measures aiming to satisfy certain aspirations of the population, elections aiming to encourage its political life, had not produced any results. The ideal of integration had not progressed. The liberal declarations of General de Gaulle dazzled the population but could not -- because they were both theoretical and far in the future -- lead to a concrete commitment of the population to his program. Unfortunately, it is likely that in such a situation where the population's frame of mind has not actually been reversed, a neutralization of the FLN external

*(continued) However, such an arrest within the context of a collapse did hasten the downfall. Similarly, the recent kidnapping of Colonel Argoud in Germany contributed to the breakup of morale among the few OAS émigrés. Executed any earlier, such an action would have provoked a succession of reprisals which would have made the operation appear useless.
military potential would have had no more effect than the dismantlement (considerably advanced) of its internal military potential -- especially since the political direction of the insurrection would have remained completely intact.

Although decisive as to military potential, the destruction of the outside sanctuary would not have been decisive in respect to the FLN's political potential inside as well as outside Algeria. The total destruction of all the insurrection's possibilities of action -- which must be the fundamental principle of the counterinsurgents -- could not be obtained. As such an operation is difficult to renew and engenders international complications, it is possible to believe that the undecisive aspect of this solution led General de Gaulle to put it aside.

In order for the operation to produce decisive results, it would have been necessary, in fact, to decimate the political management of the insurgency (located in Tunis and not on the frontier) while preventing the future revival of its troops -- which brings us back to the solution -- hardly practical -- of the neutralization of the state accessory to the insurrection. Or a solution could come about if the lightning destructive operations really changed the population's frame of mind -- in which case, deprived both of their external military forces and of the people's support, the leaders of the insurgency would transform themselves into venomous but powerless émigrés.

Although the OAS never possessed an outside sanctuary, strictly speaking, the story of its finish presents some interest in illustrating this point. If
one considers only the metropolitan OAS, Algeria might be considered its outside sanctuary. The political leadership of the movement was located there, most of its troops were recruited there, and accomplices were found there to ensure real immunity. As long as the "Algerian sanctuary" existed, even the metropolitan OAS presented some danger (although diminished) to the French government -- despite the fact the metropolitan population was fiercely unfavorable in its regard.

On the other hand, as soon as Algeria came under FLN control and the OAS was completely driven out, the OAS practically ceased to exist as a subversive threat even in the metropole. Certainly, an assassination attempt was made against General de Gaulle in August 1962, but this sole outbreak of the former insurgency was more revenge for revenge's sake than an act with subversive intent. And yet a great number of OAS leaders remained at liberty (notably the formidable colonels) and most of their commandos and deserters from the Legion had been able to leave Algeria with their arms and considerable funds procured through holdups. Nor is it possible to state that hate for General de Gaulle had abated in military and para-military circles (on the contrary!) or that the abandonment of Algeria had not been violently resented by extreme right circles (and by one million Frenchmen forced to exile themselves from Algeria). While some believed the metropolitan OAS was, under these conditions, going to expand, it actually evaporated. In other words, the metropolitan OAS could not be deprived at the same time of both the people's support in the metropole and of its "Algerian sanctuary," and survive.
- Certainly, by engaging in the inconsequential game of rewriting history, one may say that the destruction of the Tunisian sanctuary in addition to the success in dismantling FLN bands could have created a shock which could not help but affect the Moslem population.

Before the breakdown of the maquis (signalled particularly by the request for surrender by the Wilaya IV leaders) General de Gaulle could have accelerated the trend by destroying the sanctuaries. After such a shock, the chief of state could have launched -- other than verbally -- his construction of an "Algerian Algeria" corresponding to the aspirations of the population but excluding the FLN.

Several reasons can explain why such action was neither undertaken nor envisaged. In the first place, it seems that General de Gaulle thought that his military success inside Algeria and the adherence of the Moslem population to his views on the future of Algeria were sufficient to make the external FLN yield (the speech of 14 June 1960 -- whose appeals for a ceasefire provoked the botched interview of Melun -- came several days after his meeting with Si Salah). Rather than destroy the military potential of the outside sanctuary, the chief of state preferred to neutralize its political potential through surrender. In the second place, even if this error of judgment had not been made (underestimation of the extent to which the FLN had retained its political prestige vis-à-vis the population), General de Gaulle would not have been able, at this time, to initiate the construction of an Algerian Algeria -- notably because of opposition to a liberal policy by the French army and the European population.
The destruction of the FLN sanctuary, rather than serving as a basis for a policy gratifying the only aspirations which could have satisfied the Moslem population, would have strengthened the advocates of integration of the status quo as on the 13th of May. One is forced to assert once again that, in an unpropitious context, the destruction of simply the military potential of the outside sanctuary would only have been "something for nothing."

4. Conclusion

The problems created by the existence of an outside sanctuary indeed can be handled within the framework of counterinsurgency theory.

- Defensive measures, however perfect, cannot suffice. An impervious barrier did not solve the problem of the FLN sanctuary outside of Algeria.

- If offensive measures are indispensable, they amount only to harassment with limited results as long as they do not aim at the total destruction of the sanctuary.

- In a domain where appearances are as important as reality and where actions must be weighed in relation to their psychological repercussions, neutralization must cover the entire potential of the sanctuary, military as well as political, present and future.

- Destruction of the sanctuary, although necessary, is not sufficient. It will bear fruit only if it encompasses a successful offensive against the internal military potential of the insurgency and a significant change of the population's frame of mind.