

D No.: 1980/ARPA/AGILE

Assigned to: _____

Prospective RM: YES NO

Project No.: 9811

Contract No.: _____

Task Order No.: _____

RAND DOCUMENT

REVOLUTIONARY JUDO

Working Notes on Vietnam No. 10

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January 1970

DECLASSIFIED OCT 28 2005
Authority: EO 12958, as amended
Chief, Declass Br, Dir. & Rec. WHS

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06-11-0006

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PREFACE

This draft is one part of an analytic exploration of the role of politics and political strategy in insurgent conflict. Other parts will deal with "counter-judo," with other factors influencing or influenced by political attitudes, with the politics of internal alliances, the relations of lost government and its external support, and with the political premises underlying alternative approaches to "pacification."

The relatively apolitical analysis and prescriptions in the forthcoming Rebellion and Authority by Wolf and Leites and in the writings of Sir Robert Thompson and Dennis Duncanson will, as here, serve as a point of departure and contrast for the approach to be developed in these essays. Other papers will present more coherently their alternate point of view, which is criticized in passing here.

This is a preliminary draft, offered definitely in hopes of comments and examples (or counterexamples). Later versions will rely more on illustrative material, including cases other than insurgencies, such as civil rights, anti-war and student protest, and non-violent resistance campaigns, in which judo has played a crucial role.

REVOLUTIONARY JUDO

Let R, A, P, denote three parties to a revolutionary conflict: Rebels, Authority, Public.* An early phase of many such conflicts has these characteristics:

R wants to destroy A; but isn't strong enough. It must borrow strength: where? From P. But P doesn't want to give it, at a "price" R can afford; given reluctance in P, R's limited arms and manpower aren't enough to coax or coerce all the help it needs. And outside support, if any, is too small.

P must be induced, somehow, to help much more. If R is to succeed, P's attitudes and preferences must change: toward willingness to give R the assistance and resources it needs for growth, not necessarily "free," but at a cost -- in cadre effort, in propaganda, in rewards and punishment--- that R can meet. But just as direct coercion is costly -- beyond R's present means, on an adequate scale -- changing P's attitudes, too, takes energy, takes manpower and resources, takes time: perhaps a decade or a generation, if R must do all the work. To show results faster, R must still get help: from where, now? A.

A?

It is A that has the assets, and the "reach," to change mass attitudes more quickly; it is A, only, who can touch the lives of enough people deeply enough to "change their hearts and minds" in a few months or years. It is A, not R, that has radios to broadcast edicts, propaganda, threats, and promises; a large budget to distribute; multitudes of representatives -- officials, soldiers, and police --

* This follows the usage invented by Wolf and Leites in Rebellion and Authority, R-462. The symbols R, A, and P will often be used, for convenience, as if the groups referred to were individuals; actually, of course, each has a structure of subgroups as well as being a collection of varying individuals; all of which is highly relevant to a more detailed analysis. "R" refers to full-time, or at any rate, active and "disciplined" members of the rebel organization, "A" corresponding to members of the government and its armed forces, "P" to all other members of the population.

to transport them; masses of troops and police, heavy firepower, prisons, with which to threaten and punish; and services to withhold. All these, depending how they are used (and what they actually do) can change attitudes, lots of them, quickly.

There is the situation. With new attitudes in P -- then, with P providing more help for R, and less for A, for given inducement and effort by each -- R could grow from its small beginnings, press A increasingly, perhaps win. If A used its strength in ways that moved P's attitudes, it might get the job done, so R could destroy A; otherwise, R may have no chance. What hope does that hold out for R?

Enough, it often turns out. Time and again, A's do just that.

Sometimes, R brings this about deliberately: knowingly harnesses A's energies to its own ends, manipulates A's actions to work on P in a way disastrous to A. In other cases, all it takes is for R to exist, posing a threat. Sometimes not even that: A presses policies to this effect without any initial stimulus from R, which benefits (and which then, often, acts to encourage the process further).

In achieving crucial -- unintended -- "cooperation" from A, many insurgent forces have thus relied vitally upon a strategy that can be called "revolutionary judo"* in which, exploiting a stronger opponent's political responses to various feints, threats, and provocations, his own strength and momentum are used to unbalance and overthrow him.

"Counterrevolutionary judo" (discussed elsewhere) is also possible; e.g., certain aspects of Viet Cong behavior after 1964, though little exploited by the Saigon Government, may have attenuated the effects of revolutionary judo before and after that date. However, since A is by the nature of the situation initially far stronger than R, it is less

*"Judo (ju-jitsu) ...a Japanese system of wrestling in which the strength and weight of an opponent are used against him by means of anatomical knowledge and the principle of leverage." (Webster's New World Dictionary); "self-defense without weapons in using an opponent's strength and weight to disable or injure him." (Webster's Collegiate Dictionary.)

likely to be driven to an awareness of the potential of judo tactics or to acquiring skill in exploiting them, having no need of such methods to achieve its basic viability. For R, at an early stage, successful judo may be essential to its very survival on a significant scale, as well as to growth.

It is by no means only communists who use judo effectively, but an appreciation of the underlying premises of the approach comes very naturally to communist insurgents. As Vu Van Thai points out,^{*} those influenced by Marxism view war, politics, and negotiations as processes, taking time; with stages, a natural evolution, with contingencies to be exploited or deflected or recovered from in their course. Policy-making in conflict is not, for communists, ever seen as a one-shot decision on a single program which is played out to the end. In particular, the process is expected -- indeed designed -- to produce changes within both parties. It is necessary, then, that the conflict take enough time to operate on the opponents. The communist expectation is that neither side will be "the same" after a period of conflict. Their aim with respect to the opponent is not merely to counter his means, but to change him, and his relationship to his supporters; and to change one's own situation, and the organization of one's sources of support and relation to them, in large part using the stimulus and energy supplied by the opponent's actions. In short, their aim is to use conflict, in order, ultimately, to win it.

COMMUNIST JUDO IN SOUTH VIETNAM, 1954-64

By 1956-57, after harsh "land reform" in the North and Diem's consolidation in the South, strong sympathy and support for the communists in South Vietnam was probably limited to a small minority.^{**} However, the very existence of communist organization as a threat (1954-58) and

* In discussion; and see RM-5997-ARPA.

** In contrast to putative majority sympathy for the Viet Minh leadership -- as leaders of the liberation struggle against the French -- in Tonkin in 1947-54 (and even in South Vietnam in 1954-55, after Geneva).

the onset and growth of violent pressure (1959-64), added to the challenge of non-communist opposition to the Government, served as catalyst to a dynamic process, weakening and limiting the capabilities of the GVN (Government of Vietnam) and progressively denying it the cooperation of both organized and unorganized elements of the population, while increasing cooperation, during this period at least, for the Viet Cong. GVN actions (with U.S. support) provided most of the energy in this process, and were probably crucial to the timing of the onset, the rate of growth, the scale achieved by 1963 and the effectiveness of active VC guerilla insurgency.

The threat specifically from the communists provided immediate stimulus for GVN responses that had highly counterproductive aspects for the GVN strategically: alienating both rural and urban masses from the GVN, generating recruits, information and cooperation for the VC, and making VC pressures on the peasants more acceptable and effective (even without, necessarily, inducing positive sympathy for the VC).

The following list indicates some of these "communist successes," i.e., GVN practices serving communist interests, and induced in part by the communists:

1. GVN "anti-communist" arrests (especially 1956-60) and threat of arrest: a process of "self-fulfilling accusations," driving former Viet Minh and others accused back into the jungles and the organization.
2. ARVN deployment in the countryside and entry into villages, bringing looting, brutality, arrogance: a major issue of resentment against the GVN.
3. Use of ARVN and RF/PF to protect the return of landlords and to collect rents: causing resentment (especially where the Viet Minh or Viet Cong had previously abolished rents or "given" ownership to tenants), emphasizing a class basis of the conflict, and making VC bonds and taxes acceptable.
4. GVN artillery fire on hamlets (and rough handling of ensuing, often NLF-organized, "protest demonstrations").

5. Corvee labor schemes and resettlement (agrovilles, strategic hamlets) 1958-63, without regard for harvesting schedules, villagers' desires or needs, and without promised or adequate compensation.
6. GVN draft: creating resentment, producing draft dodgers as VC recruits, and creating acceptance of VC "draft."
7. "Resource control" on roads and bridges by poorly trained and paid police, resulting mainly in an irritating burden of corrupt "taxation."

At the same time, the pressure of the insurgency strengthened certain inherent political and administrative tendencies of the Diem regime and its successors -- trends which also owed important stimulus to the challenge of non-communist opposition to the GVN -- that likewise had major counterproductive aspects, limiting and weakening the capabilities of the regime in trying to assure its continued control by a narrow faction:

1. The development of an autocratic (but inefficient) police state.
2. Refusal to broaden participation in the government, either at national or local levels: excluding and alienating most elites, denying the regime administrative talent and leadership.
3. Refusal to draw on ex-members of the anti-French resistance movement.
4. Reliance instead upon administrative and military elements associated with the colonial or puppet regime, with their limitations, weaknesses and onus.
5. Refusal, under Diem, to conciliate the Sects, after their armed challenge had been reduced.
6. Reliance upon, but suspicion of, Army support; hence, measures to assure loyalty, rather than competence, among Army commanders; frequent shifts in command, and refusal to delegate operational control; and unwillingness to press ARVN to reform itself or to take casualties.

7. Over-reliance upon, and "unfair" rewards to, Catholic and Northern refugee elements loyal to the ruling family.
8. Increasing centralization of control among most-trusted elements, family and friends.
9. Unwillingness to tolerate, conciliate, or negotiate with any organized structures (e.g., Sects, parties, unions), especially in an opposition role: hence, great vulnerability to a major organized or mass protest, like the Buddhist Struggles of 1963 and 1966, in the absence of organizational allies or support.
10. Militarization and emphasis upon loyalty (with little delegation of power and frequent shifts) of provincial administration and police: at great cost in competence and rapport with the public.
11. Preoccupation of the regime with the threats to its maintenance in office -- not only from communists but from non-communists, ARVN, or U.S. -- at the cost of attention to reform or positive long-run goals or programs.
12. Reliance upon the United States, at the cost of supporting communist "puppet" charges, and in fact (after 1965), at the cost of inability to influence the United States toward discriminate use of firepower. (Thus, along with (6) above, inability of the GVN to protect the population not only from the VC but -- more importantly, for the masses -- from ARVN or the United States). (Note: This was drafted before the recent example of President Thieu's deprecation of the My Lai massacre.)

THE IMPACT OF JUDO IN VIETNAM

The impact of all the developments in Vietnam described above can be seen in a variety of ways:

- (a) Denying the GVN willing cooperation from both the organized and unorganized population -- information freely given, volunteers for the Army and militia, adherence of dedicated activists -- and increasing

it for the communists.

(b) Reducing the dedication, morale, enthusiasm of both civil and military elements of the regime, and their sense of acting with the sympathy and serving the interests of the mass of the population: hence, worsening discipline and effectiveness and encouraging misbehavior, desertion and corruption.

(c) Reducing the effectiveness (e.g., in finding the enemy, or willingness to operate at night, pursue contact, or take casualties) of military operations. Likewise for civil administration: e.g., by lowering the levels of experience, competence, rapport with the local population, discipline, initiative, delegated power and honesty.

(d) Stimulating organized non-communist opposition to the regime at various times distracting, provoking, destroying or paralyzing the GVN.

(e) Losing, by the spectacle of repression, ineffectiveness, instability, and lack of public support, the sympathy and willingness to support the effort of the U.S. domestic public.

The first three effects above (a-c) are reflected in reduced effectiveness of given policies and operations; and in increases in the cost, in psychological and political as well as in financial, manpower, and casualty terms, of achieving given objectives; hence, with given resources, in reducing the feasible scale of operations and their overall impact.

The fourth category of effects (d) must be seen as affecting not only the cost but the physical obtainability of success. The very threat of active non-communist opposition (e.g., the Caravellists' manifesto in early 1960) added to the initial pressures of the communists insurgency in encouraging preoccupation of the regime with threats to its stability and strengthening all of the counter-productive responses listed earlier. When these led to actual outbreaks against the regime -- the Thi coup of 1960, Buddhist Struggles of 1963 and 1966, ARVN overthrow of Diem in 1963, student/Buddhist/Catholic riots in 1964-65, FULRO Montagnard uprising 1964, the various ARVN coups of 1964 on -- efforts

against the communists were limited, reduced, or broke down completely; the administrative structure was temporarily paralyzed and personnel were completely shifted; and in-between-times, the expectation of such instability had a generally paralyzing effect. This factor alone -- the impact of actual or anticipated non-communist opposition -- has been enough virtually to nullify, periodically, all progress against the communists. (Yet it has rarely been addressed as a specific problem by the U.S. Government except in the form of unfulfilled hopes that increased military and economic aid and improved military effectiveness would serve to lessen non-communist opposition to the regime.)

Meanwhile, the efforts of successive regimes to divide, disorganize, paralyze and repress non-communist opposition groups were successful enough (most competitors to the tightly-organized, clandestine communists being considerably more vulnerable to police suppression and to corruption) to reduce or eliminate these as rivals to the communists, or alternative foci of nationalist support. This assured the VC that if the GVN should collapse, they would be the main beneficiaries; and in the meantime, that they would provide the only leadership for those moved to active, violent opposition to the regime. This aspect of judo -- relying on or stimulating A to destroy alternative Rs -- has been crucial to communist leadership of rebel forces in Indochina at a number of stages even prior to 1954, including: (a) French destruction of the VNQDD after the Yen Bay revolt in 1930;* the disarming of the French by the Japanese, March 9, 1945 (in part stimulated by guerrilla sabotage encouraged by the French);** arrest by French or Chinese authorities of various rivals denounced by the communists.*** In continuing this process from 1954 to the present,

* John T. McAlister, Jr., Vietnam, The Origins of Revolution, (Princeton, 1969): "But with the sudden elimination of the VNQDD by the reprisals of the colonial authorities, serious competition to the communists ceased to exist..." (p. 93).

** Ibid., pp. 112-113.

*** "When Ho Chi Minh arrived in Canton in June, 1925 as an agent for the Comintern... his first task was to cause the arrest of Phan Boi Chau, the living symbol of the traditionalist protest against French

Diem and his successors have excluded from power most of those Vietnamese (including non-communist former members of the Viet Minh, and Buddhist and union leadership) with the talent, experience, credentials or following to have provided the GVN with a mass base or to have understood and countered effectively NLF strategy.

As for (e), the effect of GVN repression and evident unpopularity upon sympathy in the U.S., this once was a crucial factor in the destruction of a GVN administration stronger than any of its successors. It could happen again.

Since the fall of Diem, just as before, the appearance of purposiveness in GVN/US behavior in the "pursuit" of communist ends has been so marked and consistent as to have led one observer, Richard Critchfield, to believe that Prime Minister Ky and other Northern junta members were acting under the discipline of Le Duan, Secretary-General of the Communist Party in North Vietnam.* This hypothesis provides an excellent fit to the data of observed behavior, even though it is almost surely wrong; Critchfield does not seem to notice that the data would be equally consistent with the hypotheses that Diem, or General Westmoreland, were disciplined communists.

Such paradoxes are neither infrequent nor accidental. They are the rule and essence of insurgencies using judo. The point is that R, if it is to win, must often be able to count on producing or benefiting by just such "counter-productive" behavior by A as will fit this conspiratorial hypothesis of deliberate sabotage of A's own cause.

rule." (Ibid, p. 83) When groups formerly allied with Chau formed the Tan Viet party, the founders of the Indochinese Communist Party in 1930 "succeeded in having the Tan Viet leaders arrested and in assuming control over their provincial organization." (Ibid, p. 87)

*The Long Charade (New York, 1968).

JUDO AS A CHOICE

To use resources to the ends of judo is a choice by R, among alternative tactics. R starts with a certain, small amount of arms, money, supplies, information, cadre, raw recruits; how shall it allocate or invest these so as to get more?

R can:

- (1) use cadre (and perhaps money) to persuade P to give supplies, money, information, recruits;
- (2) use weapons and recruits to threaten P, to the same effect;
- (3) use recruits and weapons to overrun A's outposts, ambush A's patrols, to get more weapons;
- (4) with money and threats, buy weapons from A's outlying troops (or even, in larger lots, from A's armories);
- (5) use recruits to raid or mortar A's outposts, inducing A to shell adjacent parts of P at night and run "sweeps" by day, accompanied by chicken-stealing, brutality, mass arrests, drafting, and rent-collection, so that later promises, threats, and propaganda by R's cadres will meet with greater response from P;
- (6) use cadre efforts to induce, by propaganda or threats, members of P to put themselves in minor opposition to A -- by demonstrating, destroying (or surrendering) ID cards, avoiding the draft, performing labor for R -- counting on A to respond over-harshly and "unjustly," with the same effect as in (5).

The first two of these promise little return while R's resources are still small and P is not yet sharply alienated from A. The last two are, of course, instances of judo. The third and fourth are forms of what Dennis Duncanson has termed "symbiotic insurgency," "the principle of getting control of part of the Government's own resources." *

* Dennis J. Duncanson, Government and Revolution in Vietnam (London, 1968), p. 295. Under his heading of "symbiosis," Duncanson gives many examples of what is here analyzed as "judo," without making necessary distinctions and, I would say, without giving either proper explication or adequate importance to the latter phenomena. These same defects apply to corresponding discussions in Wolf and Leites, op. cit., and in Tanham and Duncanson, "Some Dilemmas in Counterinsurgency," Foreign

These last two approaches have important similarities; like judo, symbiosis involves methods by which a weaker party "borrows strength" from a stronger adversary, so that escalation of the fighting by the Government increases the strength of the revolution.* Thus, if the Government disperses weapons more widely to militia or hamlet defenses, many of these may be sold or lost to the rebels; if it distributes fertilizer and credit to gain peasants' sympathies, villagers may use increased income to pay higher "taxes" to (or "buy protection from") the rebels; in both cases, symbiotically strengthening the rebels without any change -- or even despite change favorable to A -- in P's political attitudes toward the Government (P's assets having been increased). But while symbiosis may not involve P at all -- e.g., where R directly acquires A's weapons -- or may depend on improvement in P's lot, judo relies on actions by A that serve to antagonize P. (These last may be actions intended to win peasants' hearts -- e.g., development projects that increase rural income disparities, graft, and jealousies -- or that are meant to cut down on symbiosis: e.g., "resource control" programs, strategic hamlets.)

Without deprecating the importance of "symbiosis" as narrowly defined -- i.e., relating to processes in which, in contrast to judo, attitudinal changes in P need not figure -- we will not explore this concept here or its differences from judo. These differences can have, however, considerable significance for counterinsurgent policy. A government that is over-concerned with the dilemma posed by symbiosis -- "whatever improvements are made in social services, or however much out-right bounty is distributed, it will be seen that the insurgents are

Affairs, October 1969, pp. 113-122. All of these emphasize R's ability to "leech off...by purchase, theft, or capture" increments of supplies belonging to or provided by A (Tanham and Duncanson, p. 120), which is clearly describable as "symbiotic" in a narrow sense. Analytically, and even in practice, this is distinguishable from judo processes in which acts of A change P's disposition or patterns of decisions on trading or giving up its own given assets and services to either A or R, in favor of R.

* Duncanson, op. cit., p. 296.

also benefited"* -- is likely not to trust the rural population, whether with arms, increased income, more self-government, or reduced central intervention. Such a government is likely to be specially vulnerable to judo tactics, such as (5) or (6) above, that lead to changes in attitudes and response-patterns in P.

A AS BLIND SLAVE

Che Guevara and Regis Debray maintained that active rebellion could create the support it needed. This is, typically, true only if A can be harnessed to the process appropriately by revolutionary judo. That possibility is often among the true "preconditions for revolution." If A won't "cooperate," if (as in Bolivia) it suppresses any tendencies to alienate the population under R's stimulus, R's efforts alone cannot rouse P to take enough risks. This is especially so for R's terror tactics alone (as with the OAS in Algeria) which neither in themselves give R legitimacy nor undermine A's: on the contrary. If these are to have a useful effect, it must probably be, in the first instance, on A's own behavior. A must show promise as a victim of judo.

A contrary theory of the timing of the renewal of terrorism and insurgency in South Vietnam (1958-59), presented in official USG White Papers, is that Diem's success in consolidation and development had made him a threat to be countered by Hanoi. But the interpretation favored by many non-Communist Vietnamese, as well as by the NLF, is that Diem encouraged (and necessitated) such measures by demonstrating, over 1956-59, his tendencies to repel even potential support and to alienate the uncommitted by indiscriminate repression, even without, but especially with provocation. Thus, he had shown, by his "willingness to respond appropriately " from the point of view of the VC, vulnerability to judo tactics. The final unveiling, officially, of the NLF came just one month after the abortive Thi coup of November 1960 had confirmed conclusively both widespread disaffection and Diem's unawareness and intransigence in dealing with it.

* Tanham and Duncanson, op. cit., p. 121.

To say that revolutionary judo has been at work is to say, among other things, that the responses of P to the actions, the declarations, the threats and promises of R and A are no longer what they were; that P now shows a pattern of response more favorable to the interests of R; and that this change (reflecting changes in P's attitudes, perceptions and evaluations of the contending parties and their relation to P) has been brought about largely by actions of A (typically, stimulated by actions of R). It is to say that, for these reasons, A's own performance has caused R to become larger, more effective and challenging, more dedicated, less vulnerable, by making elements in P more receptive than before to appeals and pressures by R (even before any growth in size and coercive resources in R), more aware of congruences between their own interests and desires and those of R (particularly as these involved the destruction of A's rule), and vice versa with respect to A.

Obviously, such results of A's behavior conflict with A's self-interest. For judo to work, it is essential that A not foresee (or at least, not act upon foreknowledge of) such outcomes as the consequence of its actions and reactions. A must act "blindly," be "stupid," "clumsy," unlearning in these matters, ignorant of linkages. A must be unaware: of political "side-effects," of the ability of an organized and alert R to exploit them, of recurrent, ominous patterns in stimuli to which it is responding routinely or ad hoc.

Anthony Russo has suggested^{*} (for South Vietnam) that R "operates on the urban social system in such a way that it generates, dynamically, inputs for R as R needs them; it shakes the black box of the society and gets recruits out." But this proposition might well be modified: R mainly relies upon, or induces, A to operate on the social system to this effect. To achieve this, R must understand^{**} better than A -- or at least, manage better to exploit -- the dynamics of the social

* In discussion.

** Or somehow act as if it understands, perhaps by simple imitation of revolutionary models elsewhere (examples ignored by A). See the propagation among student rebels of effective judo tactics against college administrations in the United States, 1968-69, a "domino" effect, resulting from great and growing disparity between R's and A's in knowledge of the process, self-awareness, and willingness to learn from the examples of others.

system, including that part of the system that serves, supports, and constitutes A. R must understand that system in a very realistic and complex manner, foreseeing, so as to utilize, not just gross aspects of its mechanism, but local peculiarities (in Vietnam, the peculiar properties of the "43 province wars"), and properties that simple models of the social system (relied on by A) neglect as mere "side-effects," "frictions," "leakages," and long-run indirect linkages.

R may be helped by a better theory than A of A's own propensities, its likely responses to a revolutionary situation and to the stimuli R provides, and their impact on the conflict. R may be better aware than A of the actions A's representatives are actually carrying out, and the ways these actions and representatives are perceived and judged by P. Such conditions, it turns out, are frequently met (R being, by background and/or the enforced conditions of rural insurgency, "closer" to P than is the urban-based leadership of A, and better placed to perceive the actual field operations of A's forces and officials and their impact on P).

Nevertheless, the overall effect of a successful judo campaign is paradoxical, ironic, puzzling: both to A, and to an observer, who not only sees the weak frustrating or defeating the strong, but, if he looks closer, sees A apparently cooperating, suicidally, to this effect. The bizarre, off-key aspect may be conveyed by a mechanical analogy, from the field of cybernetics, which deals with communication and control in "purposive," self-regulating "servo-systems."


"'Control' is a special kind of relation between two machines or parts of machines, such that one part regulates the operation of the other. The master gives the orders and the slave (servus) does the work. The essential point is that the source of energy is dissociated from the source of instructions.... Mechanical control is a relationship which brings to mind the story of the lame man leading the blind. One of the partners can see and decide what should be done, but has scarcely any strength, while the other has strength but lacks information."*

* G. T. Guilband, What is Cybernetics? (New York, 1959), pp. 11-12. Guilband's text actually refers to "the story of the blind man leading the lame," which I take to be a mistake, though it brings to mind the story of alliance relationships in Vietnam, SEATO, and NATO.

An observer of such a system might not be able to comprehend the content of the control signals, or foresee the goal/equilibrium toward which the system tended; but he could infer its nature as a control system and distinguish the roles of the components by the disparities in critical energy-flows. "The control signal requires only a very small amount of power, often quite negligible, but this negligible amount is vital, as with yeast or a catalyst."^{*}


R, using judo, acts as a controller in a servo-system in which A and P are the main sources of energy. An observer could well interpret the low-energy "input" from R to A -- e.g., assassinations of officials, attacks on small outposts, demonstrations, sniper fire from a village at a helicopter -- as "signals" or "commands" that cause large-energy responses from A operating on P (e.g., in the latter case, an air strike on the village), which, in turn, cause significant flows of support from P to R, while increasing P's resistance (the price, timeliness and competence of P's compliance) to A's demands. Both of these effects of A's actions "serve the purpose" of assuring R's survival and growth.

The basic dynamics of judo can be shown by the following circuit diagram, where the width of the arrows indicates the size of the energy-flow, the sign indicates a supportive (+) or destructive/repressive/antagonizing (-) act, and the numbers show sequence of effects:




* Ibid, p. 13.

The corresponding flow-chart for "symbiosis" may be similar, except for a positive rather than negative flow from A to P:



By contrast, although Wolf and Leites, in their text, give examples of symbiosis, their Figure 1* showing a flow-chart for the support system of insurgency amounts to the following:



In other words, as noted in the preface, their abstract analysis ignores the possibility of a link from A to P -- positive or negative, corresponding to symbiosis or judo -- so that A is "wired in" as a vital part of the process sustaining the viability and growth of R. Support for R from P is shown solely as a result of transactions between R and P, acts of coercion, persuasion or exchange initiated by R. A appears only as a target of R's "outputs", not as a means for acting on P, conditioning P to be more forthcoming in interaction with R. This omission (which commonly models appropriately A's understanding of the conflict process) leads directly to distorted or crucially incomplete interpretations of the process and to misdirected policies for A.

*Op. cit., p. 38

JUDO AND THE COSTS OF COUNTERREVOLUTION

R's ability to recruit dedicated members is one of the key factors to benefit from successful judo. Thus in China, as K. C. Yeh recounts, four years of recruiting activities for the Chinese Communist Party prior to 1925 had brought increases in membership which "were relatively small compared to the period after 1925. The acceleration after the Fourth Congress in 1925 was partly the result of the Party's intensified effort and partly the outcome of the wave of nationalism generated by the May Thirtieth Incident."^{*}

This incident, and its effects, illustrates all the elements of revolutionary judo. "On May 30, 1925, the police in the British concession in Shanghai fired on a group of demonstrators protesting against the killing of a Chinese textile worker by the Japanese. Scores of persons were wounded or killed. The incident turned into a national movement against the Japanese and the British."

"When the May Thirtieth Incident occurred, the unions displayed unprecedented strength and unity in their struggle against the Western powers. Mass demonstrations and strikes spread from Shanghai to numerous other major cities in China. Although the strikes ended in a defeat, the political impact was great. The incident provided a powerful impetus to the revolutionary movement and demonstrated to the CCP leaders the importance of nationalism and how it could be exploited to help the cause of communism."

In particular, the May Thirtieth Incident "was particularly significant in bringing about the phenomenal growth in 1925-26. In less than a year, total membership increased thirty-fold"^{**}; from 1,000 in May, 1925, to 30,000 in July, 1926 (the Party having started in July, 1921 with 57 members).

Actions by A that dramatise, adversely, the goals and "character" of A -- in particular, its "distance" from and lack of concern for P --

* K. C. Yeh, RM-6077_ARPA, "The Communist Revolutionary Strategy and the Land Problem, 1921-1927," p. 19.

**Ibid., p. 21.

affect not only the flows of recruits to R and P, but the outflows, in the form of desertions and defections. Moreover, they affect the morale, the sense of purpose, pride, dedication, elan, of the actual members of both sides, in ways that affect the competence, discipline, and coherence and thus the effectiveness of the opposing organizations. To the same effect, they influence the kinds of recruits -- in terms of dedication, patriotism, leadership ability -- accessible to each side. All these effects, of course, work in opposite directions for R and A, all -- if revolutionary judo is working -- to the detriment of A.

However, the key importance of attitudes -- hence, of judo that stimulates "counterproductive" acts by A -- is not just with respect to the voluntary, active support of those "fully committed" on either side, i.e., the inputs that come free to one opponent or the other; either from the members of their organizations or from helpful elements of P. Such contributions are not the major part of the inputs for either side. As Wolf and Leites emphasize throughout Rebellion and Authority: most help comes at a price. But what is the price?^{*} How adequate and effective is the help available for given Government resources? What are the annual and total costs to A, and to its external support (X_A), of avoiding defeat, showing progress, approaching success?

The prices, quality of support, and thus, total costs for adequate support for each side -- not just the scale of uncoerced and unrecompensed "volunteer" services provided -- are crucially influenced by

* This is the question -- underemphasized by Wolf and Leites -- that determines the importance of political attitudes and changes in attitudes: perceptions of opponents, social goals and values, loyalties, hostilities, identifications, alienation. Wolf and Leites deprecate both the importance of attitudes and the possibility of short-run tactically-induced changes in them (as in the May Thirtieth Incident); hence, their analysis omits or neglects most of the real phenomena discussed here under the heading of "judo," which are addressed to such change. Moreover, analytically, while their discussion is path-breaking (and has strongly influenced my own) in its use in this context of such concepts as the price of inputs, their presuppositions lead them to underrate what seem to me the crucial phenomena (occasionally mentioned by them) of changes in "prices" based upon changes in preferences and attitudes.

policies and actions of each side that affect attitudes and loyalties.

It is not only the attitudes of those who are strongly committed to one side or the other that matter to the costs of revolution and counterrevolution; nor is it the sole or even main target of political strategy to shift individuals from one committed camp to the other, or between just three categories: these two plus the "uncommitted." Just as a dichotomy -- "for us or against us" -- is an inadequate breakdown of political attitudes for understanding the politics of revolution, the familiar three-way split above is almost as misleading as a basis for appreciating the true potential or requirements of political action. It is the whole spectrum of political attitudes, sympathies, perceptions, aversions -- and not a one-dimensional array, at that -- that counts toward the costs and the effectiveness of operations on both sides, and which may be potentially influenceable. This definitely includes the whole range of attitudes within the "uncommitted" mass, that part of the population that is not willing to incur high incremental risks for either side. And it means that differences of even a few degrees in the temperature of the water, though they may not quickly affect the survival of the insurgent fish, can matter a great deal to the costs of pursuing them: and thus, ultimately, to the outcome.

This applies even to the recruiting processes mentioned above. Even "volunteers" do not truly come free; recruiting effort is still needed. (Note Yeh's reference above to the role, in increasing Party membership after the Fourth Congress in 1925, of "the Party's intensified effort" as well as to the nationalist attitudes intensified by the May Thirtieth Incident.) What depends partly on attitudes -- and this can be affected by A -- is the number of recruits, and their quality, that a given effort by R's cadres brings in.*

R's aim in changing attitudes is not only to lower the price to R of its inputs of men, supplies, labor, and information, but to raise

*"I can call spirits from the vasty deep."

"Why, so can I, and so can any man. But do they come when you do call for them?" Henry IV, Part I.

the price to A of its needed inputs. This effect on costs is typically not a mere side-effect, an "additional burden" to A and to X_A , its external source of support; in many insurgencies it is absolutely central to the strategy, and the success, of the rebels in producing, first, a stalemate, and ultimately desertion of the cause and concessions by X_A and/or A.

How, after all, are insurgents to win?

They may hope to grow large enough ultimately to destroy the physical capability of the regime to oppose them (as in China). They may hope the regime will split apart, and give them an opening (as in South Vietnam, November, 1963); or that it will lose the support of its own instruments and the public so completely that it becomes a shell and collapses (Batista in Cuba). Yet when the opponent is a major colonial power, or when large-scale external support is available to the Government, none of these outcomes looks immediately feasible.

More specifically, suppose A has either:

- (1) a. some hard-core support: say 10-20%; and/or
- b. a large proportion -- 30-60% -- of the population not firmly against the Government, and
- c. significant external support (these characteristics probably held for the Diem Government in 1957);

or simply (2) very strong external resources (e.g., A is a colonial power); or else (3) a very strong coercive apparatus.

In these cases, A cannot quickly be:

- a. deposed (by revolutionary forces);
- b. split, dissolved;
- c. defeated totally in military terms;
- d. deprived of a geographic (urban) base;
- e. deprived totally of coercive capability.

In fact, in physical terms, an A with these assets may remain stronger than R in military, administrative, and base capabilities til the end, or near the end; and R may, from the beginning, face this prospect.

What is possible in these cases, as a path to victory -- in part, because it increases the likelihood of each of the other developments

above -- is to raise the price to the opponents of maintaining the effort and of achieving an adequate measure of success. R must aim to increase the costs of governing for A (psychological and political costs, as well as material, both for A and X_A), aiming to raise them higher than the local Government's ability, or the external supporter's willingness, to pay.

This goes considerably beyond simply presenting A with a stalemate, with an inability totally to eliminate the rebel organization. Henry Kissinger's recent dictum, "The guerrilla wins if he does not lose,"* is an untrustworthy base for rebel hopes if it is taken literally, divorced from the question of the costs to A of continuing the conflict. Various guerrilla factions in Burma have, over the past twenty years, not lost; neither have they won. If the costs of a stalemate are low enough, and the stakes high enough, authorities can live with an "unpacified" region for a very long time, as the French did with respect to the northern border areas in Indochina, or the British with frontier regions in India.

In general, the prospects of victory of a guerrilla force that can maintain a prolonged stalemate depend on (a) the costs to authority of continuing to stalemate and contain them, and (b) the significance of the "space" they occupy, considering this not only in terms of terrain but population, resources, the attention consumed of publics locally and abroad and of the government, and the specific threats they pose.

To say even that a moderately-costly stalemate favors R is to imply that the sources of A's support are more likely than R's to be discouraged by a failure to win (or even, perhaps, too slow a process of attrition of the opponent). This may be; yet it would seem to hold mainly where A's main support is external (as in a colonial struggle, or South Vietnam). For a stalemate or "slow win" (or "slow loss") is likely to be much more comfortable for A than for R, in

* Foreign Affairs, Jan. 1969, p. 214. This premise does not seem to underly policy in the Nixon Administration, which sometimes seems to have reverted to the belief of Kissinger's predecessor in office, W. W. Rostow: "the guerrilla loses if he does not win."

terms of day-to-day living. The costs of a stalemate can seem "too high" for the supporters of authority only when the advantages of A's governing the country (instead of R) seem less than vital to them: which will apply mainly for a colonial power, or for X_A (or for a very lightfooted leadership: e.g., Batista). Against more determined opposition -- as in Vietnam, 1946-70 -- R must do more than just stay alive; R must ensure that the costs of keeping it from winning loom large and irreducible for A and X_A , the higher the better.

In certain circumstances, the underlying attitudes of P may be already an adequate base for this strategy: very likely as the result of earlier judo involving the same or even a different opponent. Thus, P's attitudes toward the French in Tonkin by 1953, or in Algeria in 1961, were such as to assure high costs for French efforts without further stimulus. But if strong antipathy to A (or sympathy for R) is limited to a small minority, then attitudes must change, if the effort is to be made costly to A. And if, as is probably also the case, R's resources and personnel for coercion and persuasion are small, then R must induce, or rely upon, the Government, with its far greater reach and resources, to do most of the work of alienating the masses and organized groups. The insurgents must hope and plan for the Government to act in such a way as to increase the price and total costs to itself of acquiring popular collaboration, of carrying out operations effectively, and of denying popular collaboration to the insurgents. Likewise, the Government and its allies, with their greater access and visibility to the outside world, must do the main work of alienating foreign opinion, especially in the home public of the supplying power; so that in the light of high costs, ambivalent attitudes, and low prospects of "victory," external support will be limited, then withdrawn.

This was the path to victory for the insurgents in the First Indochina War, Algeria, Palestine, Cyprus; and it was an essential precursor to victory to India, Yugoslavia, and China (in the anti-Japanese campaign). It was aborted or countered in Malaya and the

Philippines. It had led, by 1964, to near-victory in South Vietnam, and provided the basis for costly stalemate even against U.S. forces in 1966-68.

