Strategic Assessment and Development of Interorganizational Influence in the Absence of Hierarchical Authority

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The governance of civilian postsecondary education and professional development in the Department of Defense (DoD) is highly decentralized. The many educational institutions, programs, and courses of instruction offered to DoD civilians respond to influence from both within and outside DoD. Institutions within DoD are typically governed by several formal sponsors and are also influenced by boards of visitors or advisors, accrediting agencies, licensing bodies, and other governing entities that play important roles in the higher education sector outside DoD. In 1998, the DoD Office of the Chancellor for Education and Professional Development was added to the complex multiorganizational network governing civilian postsecondary educational activities as the primary advocate for academic quality and cost-effectiveness.

Unlike the formal sponsors, the Chancellor’s office was not endowed with hierarchical authority over DoD providers of education. It must therefore rely on other sources of power to achieve its mission of influencing quality and cost-effectiveness. Previous RAND research on strategic planning for the Chancellor’s office (Levy et al., 2001) considered possible roles for the office, given its mission and charter. This report extends that work by offering a systematic approach to the assessment of interorganizational influence and strategies for its development in the absence of hierarchical authority. The approach presented here draws on research from social psychology, organizational behavior, and sociology, and is designed for use by the Chancellor’s office and other similar organizations participating in the governance of education, training, and professional development (ET&D).
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Recent reports warn of the potential for a crisis in human capital in the federal civil service (see U.S. Senate, 2000, and U.S. General Accounting Office, 2001). They point to an aging workforce, a large and increasing proportion of which is eligible to retire, and convey the pervasive perception that existing federal employees do not have the skills needed to replace those who will retire. They also voice concerns that educational and professional-development opportunities are not of sufficient quality to help overcome deficiencies in workforce skill levels, stressing the need for enhanced educational opportunities to help avert a human capital crisis.

As the employer of one-fourth of civilians in the federal government (U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 2001), the Department of Defense (DoD) has an especially strong interest in tackling human resource challenges. Ensuring that DoD civilians are offered high-quality educational and professional-development opportunities is already an important element of DoD’s human resource strategy, and if the senior ranks within the DoD civilian workforce become too thin to provide effective mentoring and other informal training, formal education may become an increasingly important human resource tool. Until recently, however, oversight of educational quality for civilians in DoD was highly decentralized. In 1998, the DoD Office of the Chancellor for Education and Professional Development was established as the principal advocate for the academic quality and cost-effectiveness of civilian education and professional development.
To achieve its mission, the Chancellor’s office must influence the behavior of providers of education and professional development, yet it is constrained by a charter that grants it very limited formal authority to exercise such influence. Many organizations operate under conditions similar to those of the Chancellor’s office in that they are responsible for influencing others without the concomitant hierarchical authority that would make exerting such influence straightforward. These organizations must draw on alternative sources of power and employ other avenues of influence. The aim of the work presented here is to give the Chancellor’s office and similar organizations a clear sense of the options available to them as they pursue their missions.

Drawing on research and theories from social psychology, organizational behavior, and sociology, we present a three-stage framework for the strategic assessment and development of power and influence. The three stages are power assessment, power development, and the development of influence strategies.

An organization that attempts to exert influence benefits from a clear understanding of the power it has at its disposal. The power assessment process involves the consideration of five key factors: (1) the influencer’s objective, (2) relevant characteristics of the target organization and its members, (3) the influencer’s power bases and capabilities as an organization and as a collection of individuals, (4) features of the relationship between the influencing organization and its target, and (5) the environment in which the organizations interact. After assessing its potential power, the influencer can evaluate whether its current power bases are sufficient and the extent to which it has been capitalizing on them.

If the influencer determines that its power levels are insufficient, it can engage in power development. A successful power development process is based on careful attention to available opportunities. Some sources of power, such as the control of another organization’s funding, may be very difficult to acquire, whereas others, such as expertise, may be more accessible. A complement to the development of specific sources or bases of power is the strategic pursuit of control or influence over the allocation or use of irreplaceable and scarce resources that are valuable to target organizations. The influencing organization should be creative in considering which resources it
could attempt to control, remembering that organizations rely on a broad array of such resources, including information, prestige, technology, materials, supplies, access, personnel, social legitimacy, and publicity.

Once the influencer has either determined that its current power base is sufficient, developed new bases of power, or gained control of scarce and valuable resources, it can select influence strategies. The choice of strategies is affected by such constraints as social norms and roles, the nature of the influencer’s power base, the appropriateness of the strategy for the influence objective, the level of resistance encountered or expected, and costs of the strategy in relation to its benefits. Influencers can choose either direct or indirect influence strategies. Direct strategies are recommended when the target organization is dependent to at least some extent on the influencer. If such dependence is fairly strong, direct strategies (e.g., asking or telling the target organization to change a specific behavior) should be successful, because the target organization will hesitate to disrupt its relationship with the influencer. Alternatively, if the target organization is not dependent on the influencing organization, indirect influence strategies may be more successful. Two examples of indirect strategies are influencing system norms and influencing via a third party that, ideally, has greater power over the target organization.

The Chancellor’s office has pursued a number of strategies in support of its mission as the primary advocate for the academic quality and cost-effectiveness of education and professional development activities serving DoD civilians. Examples include personal visits to institutions, establishment of DoD quality standards, development of informational databases, coordination and hosting of an annual conference, and sponsorship of analytical support. Most of these strategies target the entire set of DoD provider institutions. In that respect, and within the limits of its existing charter, the Chancellor’s office currently benefits from moderate, but increasing, levels of power.

A recommended future strategy for the Chancellor’s office is to increase the number of interactions with and ties to other organizations that influence educational providers. Efforts to align the goals of several organizations could result in more coordinated and com-
pelling influence on providers to improve quality. In addition, the Chancellor’s office might discover an opportunity to direct its influence through a particularly powerful organization. A complementary strategy is to develop stronger ties with individual provider institutions. To do so, the Chancellor’s office must understand which bases of power and which strategies are likely to yield success with each target organization. Developing such ties will enable the Chancellor’s office to tailor its strategies to the contexts and characteristics of individual provider institutions, and thereby increase its potential for successful influence.
This research benefited from the support and guidance of Chancellor Jerome Smith, John Dill, and James Raney of the DoD Office of the Chancellor for Education and Professional Development. RAND’s Lisa Colabella, Susan Hosek, Laura Castaneda, Peter Mendel, Susan Everingham, and Laura Zakaras provided thoughtful reviews of earlier drafts.
Several recent reports have highlighted concerns about the federal civil service workforce. They point to an aging workforce, a large and increasing proportion of which is eligible to retire, and convey the pervasive perception that existing federal employees do not have the skills needed to replace those who will retire. There are also concerns that the workforce is not well equipped to handle the changing nature of work and that opportunities for education, training, and professional development (ET&D) are not of sufficient quality to help overcome deficiencies in workforce skill levels. All of these reports stress the need for strategic human resource management and enhanced educational opportunities to help avert a human capital crisis.

The Department of Defense (DoD) employs one-fourth of federal civilian employees (U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 2001), so it has an especially strong interest in tackling human resource challenges. High-quality ET&D opportunities are key means by which it can do so. DoD offers its civilian workers opportunities for ET&D both internally and through external providers. In 1997, the Office of the Secretary of Defense sponsored 20 institutions and 36 programs within DoD as well as 68 programs external to DoD (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy, 1998), serving multiple and varied customers under the broad DoD um-

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Most of the education is offered at the postsecondary level, with both nondegree programs and programs leading to associate’s, bachelor’s, master’s, and doctoral degrees. These formal educational programs may become an increasingly important human resource tool if the senior ranks within DoD become too thin to provide effective mentoring and other informal training.

Within DoD, there are formal sponsoring organizations that influence education and training through established reporting systems, the provision of resources, curriculum guidance, and policy formulation. In addition to these formal sponsors, there are entities involved in influencing ET&D for DoD civilians, including boards of visitors or advisors, accrediting agencies, licensing bodies, and—for non-DoD providers—boards of trustees and other governing entities.

In 1998, a new office was introduced into this complex network of stakeholders. The Office of the Chancellor for Education and Professional Development was established as the principal advocate for academic quality and cost-effectiveness of all DoD civilian postsecondary education and professional development activities (U.S. Department of Defense, 1999). To achieve this mission, the Chancellor’s office needs to influence providers of education and professional development to enhance quality and cost-effectiveness; however, it is constrained by a charter that grants it very limited formal authority to exercise such influence. In addition to specifying that the Chancellor’s office should review and evaluate the provider institutions, the charter states that it should work in conjunction with other DoD officials who sponsor or have cognizance over civilian education and professional development activities. Given its mission and charter, how can the Chancellor’s office best influence educational quality and cost-effectiveness?

This question is not unique to the Chancellor’s office. The main function of many entities, including professional societies, interest groups, and accrediting agencies, is to influence other organizations over which they have no direct authority. Units within organizations, such as quality-assurance departments, or creations of organiza-

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2See Gates et al. (2001) for a description of categories of customers of ET&D in DoD.

3See Levy et al. (2001) for a description of the different types of sponsors.
tions, such as advisory boards, perform similar functions. While all of these organizational types are charged with influencing others, many lack the formal hierarchical authority to command or control their targets of influence. The question of how organizations can influence one another when they are not hierarchically related is central to the understanding of organizational behavior and is of keen interest to many organizations. Even organizations that do have hierarchical authority often find that reliance on nonhierarchically based forms of influence can be a fruitful supplement or alternative (Boland and Tenkasi, 2001; Ciborra and Patriotta, 1996; DeSanctis and Gallupe, 1987).

**APPROACH**

We draw on power and influence research and theories from social psychology, organizational behavior, and sociology to gain insight into how organizations can influence others in the absence of hierarchical authority.\(^4\) *Power* is the ability to direct behavior, values, structure, policies, processes, or services, or a combination thereof (based partially on Pfeffer, 1992, and Hunt and Nevin, 1974). *Influence* is defined as the processes, actions, and behaviors through which this power is utilized and realized (based on Pfeffer, 1992). The ability to influence is dependent on the degree of power available to the influencer.

To date, studies of interorganizational power and influence have focused predominantly on the interests of the organizations being influenced, rather than on those of the influencers.\(^5\) We take the alternative perspective of organizations that have an interest in systemically assessing the sources and degree of their existing power and influence capacities and in developing new sources of power and influence strategies. Although advice for influencers is implicit in much of the current research, most of the existing literature does not explicitly describe the behavioral choices available to organizations that need to exert influence.

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\(^4\)A summary of the cited literature is included in the Appendix.

\(^5\)See, for example, Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer, 1992; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974, 1978; and Provan, 1982.
In addition, existing research tends to treat power and influence as either an individual-level or an organizational-level phenomenon. We consider both levels in concert. In exerting influence, an organization itself may have sources of power (such as its reputation) that can improve its chances for successful influence. At the same time, the people within the organization who interact with others in the target organization may be more or less skilled at influencing individuals. While it is important to understand both individual- and organizational-level variables affecting the ability to influence, it is also important to recognize that the boundaries between an organization and the individuals within it are often blurred. Staw and Sutton (1992) stress that individuals can represent organizations, individuals can influence organizations, and organizational actions may in fact be individual behavior.

Having examined current research, we propose a three-stage framework for the strategic assessment and development of power and influence, considering both the individual and the organizational level. The framework is summarized in Table 1.1 and is described in detail in the chapters that follow, using the DoD Chancellor’s office and similar organizations in higher education as examples.

Table 1.1
Power-and-Influence Assessment and Development

| Power assessment | 1. Define objective  
|                  | 2. Assess target organization and key individuals  
|                  | 3. Assess influencing organization and key individuals  
|                  | 4. Assess relationship between influencer and target  
|                  | 5. Assess environment or system  
| Power development | 1. Develop bases of power  
|                  | 2. Create dependencies through acquiring or controlling the use of key resources  
| Development of influence strategies | 1. Consider direct strategies  
|                  | 2. Consider indirect strategies  

When an organization attempts to influence other organizations, it benefits from a clear understanding of the power it has at its disposal. Such an understanding stems from consideration of five key factors: (1) the influencer's objective, (2) relevant characteristics of the target organization and its members, (3) the influencer’s power bases and capabilities as an organization and as a collection of individuals, (4) features of the relationship between the influencing organization and its target, and (5) the environment in which the organizations interact.

**DEFINE THE OBJECTIVE OF THE INFLUENCER**

The assessment process begins with an articulation of the influencer’s objective and an evaluation of the power needed to reach that objective. What is the influencer’s objective? Does the influencer want the target organization to implement a new policy or process, or eradicate existing ones? What aspects of the target is it trying to influence? Is the influencer’s goal to convince an organization to value something it currently does not, such as assessing student outcomes?

If the objective of the influencer meets one or more of the following five conditions, the influencer is more likely to achieve its objective than if the objective meets none of these conditions:1

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1This is based on the work of Greening and Gray, 1994; Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer, 1981; and Zald, 1978.
• congruence with the norms and values held throughout the surrounding environment,²
• congruence with the target organization’s values,
• consistency with the target organization’s goals,
• consistency with the values and points of view of key decision-makers within the target organization, and
• appeal for the target organization due to the objective’s contribution to either efficiency or effectiveness.

For example, if the Chancellor’s office were attempting to persuade providers to perform a cost-benefit analysis of a particular program, its objective would be easier to achieve if DoD and the individual providers believed that the cost-benefit analysis would benefit them. Although many organizational actors strive for efficiency, they may also fear losing staff or budgets as a result of an externally imposed cost-benefit analysis and therefore may resist doing it. If the provider institutions valued efficiency without fearing staff or budget cuts, it would be easier to persuade them to perform the cost-benefit analysis.

Another important consideration in this stage is to determine whether the organization exerting influence is satisfied with surface compliance or whether it requires a deeper internalization of the influence objective. For example, accrediting bodies that want colleges to develop comprehensive student assessment programs must decide whether to require such programs and monitor for compliance or, alternatively, to establish conferences and other communication vehicles to explain the benefits of student assessment, in the hope that the colleges will internalize the value of assessing students without a mandate to do so. Internalization requires that the objective is congruent with the values of the target organization and that the influencer has credibility (Kelman, 1958).

Surface compliance may be easier to achieve, but if the change is not internalized, monitoring systems must be created to ensure that the

²In the case of the Chancellor’s office, the environment would be the DoD system.
change in behavior is maintained. And, of course, a behavior cannot be monitored unless it is visible to the influencing organization (Zald, 1978). If behavior is not directly visible, the monitoring organization may ask the target organization to provide data to demonstrate compliance. Even if the influencer has the power needed to require such data reporting, it cannot guarantee the accuracy or completeness of the data. Whether the influencer directly observes compliance or determines it through data collection, the systems needed to measure compliance accurately and promptly can be quite costly. Influencers need to weigh the costs and benefits of striving to achieve internalization against those of enacting these potentially costly monitoring systems.

In considering the influence objective, it also is important to be aware of the potential for unintended consequences (Zald, 1978). A variety of unintended consequences may result if a target organization’s attention and/or resources are diverted away from other tasks. For example, if organizations are forced to spend time gathering data on performance indicators, they might have less time to devote to research on student learning.

The Chancellor’s office has taken steps to ensure that its objectives are aligned with the values and goals of the target organizations. One of the first objectives of the Chancellor’s office upon its creation was to develop DoD standards for civilian ET&D and offer them to the provider institutions for use in measuring and improving academic quality. The Chancellor’s office took steps to align the standards with the values of the provider institutions, in part by involving them in the development process. It also considered the added burden new standards might place on institutions and the effect such a burden might have on the institutions’ performance or willingness to cooperate. Although most institutions already measure their performance against other standards (e.g., accreditation standards), the move to measure institutional performance with respect to the DoD standards could prove particularly valuable to providers if the Chancellor’s office disseminated aggregate DoD standards-based information that the institutions found useful but too costly to collect on their own.
ASSESS THE TARGET

As described above, assessing the influencer’s objective necessitates an examination of the target organization. In assessing a target organization, such as an educational provider or a stakeholder of such, the main objective is to determine the likelihood that it will comply with the influencer’s objective. To gain such an understanding, the influencer must understand four key aspects of the target organization: its goals and values, its capacity to resist, its capacity to comply, and its resources. As noted above, the influencer should be familiar with the goals and values of the target organization so that it can determine whether the objective conflicts with existing goals. If the objective conflicts with an organization’s goals, that organization will have a greater incentive to resist the influence.

If the target organization wants to resist the influence, it is important to anticipate whether it will be able to resist successfully (Zald, 1978). For example, a school within a university may want to forgo a specialized accreditation process, but may be constrained by a university-wide policy that all schools be accredited. On the other hand, a local college that is not performing to the standards set by a state legislature may be considered with greater leniency if it is the only college that serves constituents in that region. Because it is serving a valuable need, the college may have greater capacity to resist external influence.

A target that does intend to comply with a request may have more or less capacity to do so (Zald, 1978). Capacity includes the will to comply along with the resources to do so effectively. Colleges often argue that they lack the resources to carry out external mandates. If there is truly no capacity to comply, either the request should be modified or additional resources provided. In addition, it may be that decisionmakers within the target organization do not have absolute control over whether to comply with the request or not. It is important to identify who does have authority, even if doing so expands the scope of the assessment beyond the target organization’s boundaries.

In determining the capacity to comply with the objective, an influencer would benefit from systematically taking stock of the resources
the target organization uses to reach its goals and determining whether the supply of the resources is stable and predictable. Information about the nature and sources of key resources allows for a consideration of viable alternatives. If the supply of resources is neither stable nor predictable, there may be an opportunity for the influencer to help reduce such uncertainties and thereby bolster its power.

In addition to thinking about the capacity of the target to resist or comply, an influencer benefits from identifying the types of power that are effective in influencing each individual target organization. Characteristics of targeted organizations make them more or less susceptible to different types of power. For example, a college that cannot control or predict the number of applications it receives may be more dependent on an organization that can provide it with information based on analyses of census or other enrollment projection data. In other words, colleges in need of enrollment projections would be susceptible to influence from organizations like state-level planning boards that are able to exert power by providing sophisticated or complex information that the college could not derive for itself. The next section includes a more detailed discussion of sources of power.

The Chancellor’s office has considered whether DoD institutions have the resources they need to comply with its performance standards measurement program. Participating in the program requires an ability to collect and report appropriate data. Some DoD institutions may need to upgrade their data collection capabilities, so the Chancellor’s office has recommended that DoD higher education institutions that have not already done so establish an adequate internal institutional research office or function (Raney, 2001). Having adequate institutional research capabilities would not only facilitate compliance with the DoD performance standards; it would also support other external and internal quality assurance efforts, such as self-studies for accreditation reviews. Despite these potential benefits, it remains to be seen whether the DoD institutions without adequate institutional research capabilities will agree that the costs of establishing them are worth the benefits.
ASSESS THE INFLUENCER’S POWER

Members of the organization exerting influence, such as the Chancellor’s office staff, must understand their individual capabilities to influence others as well as the power available to their organization in exerting influence. Power can be considered through the lens of a typology like the bases of power delineated by French and Raven (1959). Although this typology was created for the consideration of power between individuals, organizations exerting influence can benefit from it. Specifically, using the typology should prompt a broad consideration of the bases of power available to the organizational members, who might otherwise consider power more narrowly as control over financial resources. The bases of power are described here, accompanied by examples of their application to an organizational context.

- **Reward power** is based on the ability to deliver rewards contingent upon compliance. Accreditors reward institutions with accreditation status if they comply with preset standards and criteria.

- **Coercive power** is based on the ability to deliver or withhold punishments. State legislatures have threatened to withhold money from universities that do not comply with their demands.

- **Legitimate power** is based on the perception that the individual exerting influence has a legitimate right to prescribe behavior. Organizational legitimacy is often based on the legal status of an organization. For example, state legislatures often create state agencies or boards that can exercise legitimate power over colleges and universities in the state.

- **Referent power** is based on the target’s desire to emulate the individual exerting the influence. A university may have referent power over a state college if the state college aspires to become a university.

- **Expert power** is based on the influencer’s possession of superior knowledge or expertise. Because university departments have expertise in their disciplines and curricula, they can influence university administrators to hire specific candidates for faculty positions in their respective departments.
• *Informational power* is based on the power of the information itself. In its truest form, an individual could have power based solely on information that is desired by and valuable to the target, regardless of the referent or expert powers possessed by the influencer. A state planning council that collects and controls information based on analyses of census trends may have informational power over colleges that value that information for enrollment planning.

Note that it is the perception of the target organization that determines which bases of power are available to the influencer. An organization that considers itself an expert may not be perceived as such by others. Similarly, an influencer may offer a reward for compliance, but if the target does not value the offer, the reward carries no power, and the attempt to influence could fail.

It is common for organizations to draw on multiple sources of power. In the higher education sector, governing boards may have reward, coercive, legitimate, and expert power. Accreditors draw on a similar set of power sources. Their coercive power stems from their capability to punish higher education institutions by withholding accreditation status. However, this power is only viable if the target organizations desire and expect to be accredited. Some organizations opt out of the accreditation process, for example, by deciding not to obtain specialized accreditation status. Making the decision to forgo such accreditation is usually based on the reputation and prestige of the individual school. For example, several business schools are accredited by the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB), but not the Association of Collegiate Business Schools and Programs (ACBSP). While both organizations accredit schools of business, the former accredits highly selective business schools. Selective schools would have few reasons to seek accreditation from an alternative source (i.e., the ACBSP). If institutions believe their prestige outweighs that of the accreditation association, the accreditors’ coercive power base will be weak.

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3Most colleges and universities, however, strive to be accredited by one of the regional accreditation associations, because such accreditation is necessary for institutions to receive federal funding.
If drawing on either reward or coercive power, the influencer must be able to monitor and evaluate performance. Accreditors monitor educational institutions through site visits and reviews of documentation. They typically rely on preset criteria to evaluate compliance. If an influencer chooses to develop similar strategies, it should assess its capacity both to develop standards and to measure their attainment, keeping in mind that it may have to rely on data provided by the target organizations to do so. It should also determine whether it has the resources to monitor compliance both accurately and in a timely manner (Zald, 1978).

Certain types of power may be more suitable for some objectives than for others. An advisory board that wields expert power (because the board members are working in the field in which they are advising) may be better suited to advise on matters of curriculum than on salary levels. In addition to expert power, a college program’s advisory board is likely to have legitimate power over professors in the program if the professors have selected or ratified the board members. The ratification process confers legitimacy upon the board members in the eyes of the faculty.

As the organization considers its available sources of power, it can also assess the characteristics of the individuals who will be acting on its behalf. Individual influencers should both possess political skills and be willing to use them (Pfeffer, 1981, 1992). Not surprisingly, the charisma of the individual exerting the influence has been found to be an important factor in the influence process (Kudisch et al., 1995). Individuals, like organizations, can draw from different bases of power. It is important to consider how individual bases of power interact with the bases of power available to the organization. For example, if an organization’s goal is to develop its expert base of power, individual actors should develop requisite levels of expertise as well as the ability to demonstrate and apply the expertise.

When the Chancellor’s office was established, its strongest base of power was its legitimacy, garnered both through the support of the Secretary of Defense and its mission to serve as the principal advocate for the academic quality and cost-effectiveness of all DoD civilian education and professional development activities. It had limited control over rewards and punishments, and it was not yet known for having expertise in the area of assessment and
accountability. Neither was it endowed with information valued by others, although it was granted access to information on which it could later capitalize. The Chancellor’s office now reports to a new Secretary of Defense. As is the case for many organizations whose initial creators and champions move on, the Chancellor’s office must continue to develop its bases of power to ensure that its capability to influence is sufficiently robust to endure changes in administration. The development of informational and expert power will be especially important for the Chancellor’s office, because providers will likely need guidance as they strive to improve the quality and cost-effectiveness of their operations. The office’s information and expertise may also be attractive to other stakeholders within DoD, thus leading to possibilities for influencing providers indirectly through other organizations that have more power than does the Chancellor’s office.

**ASSESS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INFLUENCER AND THE TARGET**

Independent assessments of an influencer and a target organization will not necessarily address the relationship between the two. Power relationships can be defined in terms of the nature and degree of interdependence (Pfeffer, 1992), where the level of scarce and valuable resources controlled by the influencing organization determines the dependence of the target on that influencer.\(^4\) For example, colleges are dependent upon the state boards that control resource allocation.

Interdependence can be symmetric or asymmetric (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). If there is high symmetric interdependence between organizations, there is no need for power, because the organizations satisfy reciprocal needs and will therefore tend to comply with each other’s requests (Frooman, 1999). For example, some colleges have formed partnerships to create distance-learning consortiums. In

\(^4\)In the context of resource dependence theory, the term *resources* is used quite broadly, encompassing, for example, prestige, rewards, sanctions, expertise, the ability to deal with uncertainty, personnel, money, social legitimacy, technology, supplies, time, equipment, ego support, access, and publicity. The theory assumes that a resource must be scarce, valuable, and irreplaceable for it to be a viable source of power (Pfeffer, 1992).
many cases, each college in the consortium is equally dependent on the others for the consortium to be successful. Conversely, if there is low symmetric interdependence, power and influence strategies may not work (Pfeffer, 1992). In this situation, organizations operate without consideration of each other. For example, two state universities located in different states may have low symmetric interdependence, meaning that the behavior of one of the colleges does not affect the behavior of the other. These two colleges would not be able to easily influence each other. In the absence of either high or low symmetric interdependence, the relationship can be described as asymmetric, and power then becomes a factor. The balance of power will be tilted in favor of either the target organization or the influencer according to the resources controlled by each (Frooman, 1999).

The structure of the relationship between the influencer and the target can be just as important as the balance of power. In multiorganizational systems, educational institutions typically respond to multiple sources of influence, so any party that aims to affect the behavior of such institutions can influence by proxy through other organizations. This is a particularly important strategy for influencers that operate without the benefit of coercive or reward power. In such cases, the proxy organizations can be considered intermediate targets, and influencers can benefit from examining relationships with them as well. Further, consideration should be given to the nature of the relationships between intermediate targets and the ultimate target.

Assessments of organizational relationships are enhanced by assessments of the relationships among individuals within the organizations. French and Raven’s (1959) sources of power are again applicable here. Individuals in the influencing organization can benefit by evaluating their sources of power relative to their counterparts in the target organization. For example, drawing on expertise will only work if the influencing individual does indeed have greater relevant expertise than do individuals in the target organization and if the targeted individuals recognize the expertise as such. In addition, individual power can stem from close connections (Pfeffer, 1992; Zald, 1978). The frequency of interactions and the nature of the relationship between decisionmakers and those who are trying to influence the decision outcomes may be important. If individuals in the
influencing organization interact frequently with decisionmakers in the target organizations, the latter individuals may come to trust and more readily accept recommendations from the influencers. Frequency of interactions alone may not increase power capabilities, but if the nature of the frequent interactions is a positive one with benefits for the target organization’s members, the influencer may gain power.

Although the Chancellor’s office does not have control over the financial resources of provider institutions, its position in the DoD hierarchy affords it control over other relatively unique resources. It is one of only a few offices that has a system-level view of DoD civilian ET&D. Its perspective and its mandate allow it to gather and disseminate important aggregate and comparative information about the collection of institutions in the system. If the office establishes itself as the steward of valuable and scarce information, provider institutions and other stakeholders may come to depend on such information and, in turn, be more easily influenced. The Chancellor’s office could also control another potential resource. Each year, it hosts the DoD Conference on Civilian Education and Professional Development. If the conference is used as a forum for the recognition of outstanding performance, and if such recognition carries with it a measure of prestige, the providers may gradually become more amenable to recommendations made by the Chancellor’s office.

ASSESS THE ENVIRONMENT

The environment surrounding both the influencer and the target organization can be considered as the system, sector, or industry in which the two organizations interact. Assessing an environment necessitates two components, the first of which is gaining a sense of the extent of uncertainty within the environment. For example, most state-level coordinating boards determine how each public higher education institution in the state receives its budgetary allocations, whether the allocation process is predictable, and whether the level of funding is sufficient. If the process is not predictable and/or the funding is not sufficient, there will be higher levels of uncertainty within the environment, and that uncertainty, in turn, makes higher education institutions more vulnerable to influence from those who control funding sources.
The second component of an environmental assessment focuses on identifying the roles played by other organizations, including other influencers within the environment (Zald, 1978). How many other organizations are exerting influence? Are the other organizations allies or competitors with the influencer and/or the target of influence? How powerful are they? According to network theory, the greater the density in a given environment, the greater the chances for communication and norm diffusion throughout the environment (Rowley, 1997). The influencer should therefore attempt to determine the number of other influencers trying to affect the behavior of the target organizations. If other influencers are exerting similar levels and types of influence, it is less likely that the target organizations will be able to resist their attempts. The influencing organization must also understand the position of the target organization within the network of other influencers and targets. Do other organizations rely on it for resources? Does it rely on others for resources? The more centrally located the target organization—meaning the more ties it has to and the more control it has over other organizations—the more likely it is to have the ability to resist attempts to influence. For example, a prestigious university that has extensive ties to other organizations (e.g., a strong alumni network, partnerships with private industry, and research funding from the federal government) may be less susceptible to attempts to influence than an institution with fewer ties to others.

Although the Chancellor’s office cannot increase funding levels for provider organizations in DoD, it does influence funding decisions. The Chancellor’s office exerts that influence by commenting to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness on planning and budgeting documents that support DoD decisions pertaining to provider organizations. In addition, the Chancellor’s office has been studying how other influencers in the system interact with each other and with provider organizations. The Chancellor’s office is already aware that the functional sponsors of institutions (those that guide curriculum content in light of workforce requirements in an area of specialization) are able to exert considerable influence over provider organizations. The Chancellor-
lor’s office therefore works closely with these sponsors to ensure that its recommendations are aligned with other guidance provided to institutions.

SUMMARY OF DETERMINANTS OF POWER

Table 2.1 summarizes the determinants of power by listing the conditions under which compliance with the influencer’s objective is likely. While there is no formula for determining whether the influencer has sufficient power at its disposal, gaining an understanding of the conditions listed should be advantageous.

Table 2.1

Conditions Under Which Power of Influencer Is Likely to Be High

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Influence objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Objective is consistent with norms and values in the environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Objective is consistent with values of target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Objective is consistent with goals of target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Objective furthers effectiveness/efficiency of target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Objective is consistent with values/opinions of individual decisionmakers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Will to comply is high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Capacity to resist is low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Capacity to comply is high</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Influencer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Existing bases of power are appropriate for objective and target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Resources to exert influence are sufficient (e.g., to monitor compliance, provide rewards/sanctions, measure performance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Individual abilities to exert influence are sufficient</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship between influencer and target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Target depends on influencer for allocation of resources or authorization on how to use resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Individuals in influencing organization and target organization interact frequently and have close relationships</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Uncertainty is high (e.g., target organization does not control its resources)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• There are many other influencers with similar objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Prominence of target organization is low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter Three

POWER DEVELOPMENT

After assessing potential power, the influencer can evaluate whether its current power bases are sufficient and whether it has been capitalizing on them. If the influencer determines that its power levels are insufficient, it may have an interest in further developing its existing sources of power or pursuing new ones. An organization can make use of more than one approach in the process of power development. Below, we discuss considerations in the development of bases of power as well as options for controlling access to or use of existing resources.

DEVELOP BASES OF POWER

Decisions regarding whether to enhance current bases of power or to pursue new ones should be mindful of the opportunities available to the influencing organization. As noted above, organizations can often draw on more than one base of power in the attempt to influence. Does the organization have access to rewards or punishments that would be meaningful to the target organization? Was the influencing organization created by a legitimate process? Can the organization as a whole or individuals who work within it develop referent or expert power? Can the organization gather information that is valuable to the targets of influence? Answers to these questions should help in the determination of potential bases of power.

The Chancellor’s office has focused on developing its expert and informational sources of power by gathering information and honing its expertise on matters related to the quality and cost-effectiveness of postsecondary education. For example, it is creating a centralized
database of count and cost data from provider institutions. Ultimately, this information can be coupled with data on institutional performance to evaluate cost-effectiveness. The Chancellor’s office will therefore turn raw data into valuable information, which can be used as a source of power to influence providers and other DoD stakeholders.

CREATE DEPENDENCIES BY GAINING CONTROL OVER RESOURCES

A complement to the development of specific bases of power is the strategic pursuit of control over irreplaceable and scarce resources, broadly defined, that are valuable to target organizations.1 There are at least five strategies an influencer could use to gain control over such resources:

1. It could try to assume the role of providing key resources. Some state boards have gained power from their legislatures to allocate funds to the colleges and universities in their states, thus gaining control over an increasingly scarce and valuable resource (Schmidt, 2002).

2. It could provide supplemental resources to the target organization. Coordinating boards sometimes control money that can be used for incentive funding, to provide resources over and above those gained from the legislated budgetary allocation process.

3. It could find new resources to replace those currently used by the target organization. To do so, the influencer may need to convince the target organization that the new resources are more desirable. For example, if college decisionmakers subscribe to governmental services providing them with raw data on population, economic, or other trends, an influencer could take these data and personalize them for the college, thus replacing the raw data resources with a resource that is potentially more useful.

4. It could work through another organization that controls scarce and valuable resources. Some state coordinating boards have

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gained the authority to act as advisors to state legislatures during the budgeting process. The extent to which state legislators relinquish their power to these boards varies, but some boards have significant influence over funding decisions for educational institutions.

5. It could attempt to control the way in which allocated resources are used. For example, donors often stipulate uses for their contributions, thus influencing the behavior of the colleges to which they donate.

Regardless of the method chosen for gaining control over resources, the influencing organization should be creative in assessing the needs of its target organizations, remembering that resources include such varied things as information, prestige, technology, materials, supplies, access, personnel, social legitimacy, and publicity.

Provider institutions within DoD have been faced with increasing pressure to demonstrate their effectiveness and efficiency. In addition to the increased focus on accountability in the higher education sector nationally, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 authorized a new round of base closures beginning in 2005. Educational institutions located on bases on the closure list may be faced with closure, relocation, or restructuring. In anticipation of the base closure decisions, the Chancellor’s office is sponsoring an analysis of the potential effects of closing, moving, consolidating, or outsourcing educational programs on quality and cost-effectiveness. Although the objective of the Chancellor’s office in sponsoring the analysis is to elucidate the implications of base closure decisions for ET&D, such an effort will result in a rare analytic tool available to institutions that could help them articulate their individual cases if faced with externally-imposed changes. If the Chancellor’s office continues to provide tools of value to institutions, it will create a healthy dependency that will enable both itself and provider institutions to achieve their missions.
Once the influencer has either determined that its current power base is sufficient or developed new bases of power and dependencies, it can select influence strategies. For example, if the Chancellor’s office chooses to pursue expert power, how would it use that power to influence educational providers? Two strategies that are necessary, but not sufficient, in nearly all cases are (1) notifying the target organization of the influence objective (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and (2) attempting to achieve the objective at the right time (Pfeffer, 1981). Target organizations cannot respond to attempts to influence of which they are unaware, and timing is important because target organizations’ abilities to respond to such attempts vary, depending on other important but competing activities. For example, a college may be less able to comply with an attempt to influence if it recently received news that it will not be reaccredited, thus necessitating the expenditure of great resources to solve that particular problem.

The choice of other strategies is influenced by such constraints as social norms and roles, the nature of the influencer’s power base, the appropriateness of the strategy for the influence objective, the level of resistance encountered or expected, the personality of the individual being influenced, the personality of the influencer, and costs of the strategy in relation to its benefits (Yukl and Falbe, 1990; Yukl and Tracey, 1992; Yukl, Falbe, and Youn, 1993). For example, if the Chancellor’s office decided to mandate that all provider institutions adhere to performance reporting, it would need to consider the level of resistance it would likely encounter. If potential levels of resistance are high, it could use other strategies. One such
strategy, which it has already used, is to include representatives from the target organizations in discussions of valued and valid performance indicators. Including these constituents is an indirect strategy to lower their resistance to participating in the performance-reporting program.

**CONSIDER DIRECT STRATEGIES**

An organization can attempt to influence a target directly or indirectly. Direct strategies are recommended when the target organization is dependent to at least some extent on the influencer (Frooman, 1999). It is also beneficial to align direct strategies with bases of power. For example, if an influencer has information that an organization or individuals within an organization have publicly committed to a stance or course of action, an effective strategy would be to align the compliance request with the stance or course of action, because organizations and individuals tend to strive to be consistent with their commitments. Similarly, if the influencer knows that other organizations have benefited from complying with similar influence objectives (e.g., to change a structure, process, or policy), that information can be used as “social proof” that the target organization should comply with the request (Cialdini, 1984 1993). Influencers that have expert power may be able to use strategies of appealing or consulting. For example, advisory board members who are chosen for their expertise in a particular field can influence professors through consulting with them on curricula. Having reward power means that the influencer possesses the ability to provide meaningful rewards to target organizations. Accreditors reward colleges and universities with legitimacy through their accreditation process. Of course, there are countless other examples of aligning direct strategies with bases of power.

Because of the lack of dependence on the Chancellor’s office, using direct strategies to influence providers may currently be challenging. As the Chancellor’s office staff members develop strong relationships with providers, they should be able to draw on these relationships in making direct requests. Similarly, as the expertise of the office is developed, it will be able to draw on that base of power in influencing others. In the meantime, relying on direct strategies that draw on the
ability to provide proof for a course of action or a similarly strong rationale should be useful.

**CONSIDER INDIRECT STRATEGIES**

If the target organization is not dependent on the influencing organization, indirect influence strategies may be more successful (Frooman, 1999; Pfeffer, 1992). There are at least five indirect influence strategies that the influencer could use:

1. It could influence the norms of an environment. By hosting regular conferences, professional societies, such as the American Association for Higher Education, encourage participants from the higher education sector to increase and improve their student assessment efforts.

2. It could influence the values of a target organization itself, thereby indirectly influencing its behavior. By communicating frequently with key decisionmakers and providing them with information, an influencer may be able to affect key values, such as positions on affirmative action or other policy issues.

3. It could engage in agenda setting. One method of agenda setting is to gain media attention for a specific issue, such as remedial education. Media attention may then force an institution to prioritize consideration of the issue.

4. Once an issue is on the agenda, it could control information and frame issues during the decisionmaking process (Pfeffer, 1981; Weick, 1995). By influencing how organizational members make sense of the issues and related information, the influencer may be able to influence the decision itself. For example, if a college or university is trying to decide whether to seek a program accreditation that the influencer believes is important, the influencer could point out that being accredited should increase the number of student applications submitted to the college.

5. Finally, it could work through an ally as Frooman (1999) suggests. A state coordinating board may try to persuade the state legislature to align funding with compliance to the board’s objectives so that higher education institutions comply with the objectives.
The use of this final indirect strategy (i.e., working through an ally) must be evaluated carefully in the context of the relationship between the ally and the ultimate target. For example, one way to involve a third party is to provide information about an educational program to its overseer. If the overseer uses the information punitively, the relationship between the influencer and the target organization could become counterproductive. In such a case, a better indirect strategy might be to help the target improve its status with its overseer. On the other hand, a more enlightened overseer might use information in a supportive way—encouraging and rewarding improvement.

Given existing levels of power, it is likely that the Chancellor’s office will continue to rely on indirect, rather than direct, strategies. In addition to the example cited above of working with provider representatives in designing a performance-reporting system, the Chancellor’s office has taken on other indirect strategies. It uses its annual conferences to stress the importance of measurement-based, outcome-oriented assessments of quality and cost-effectiveness. By promoting data collection and quality assessment as a norm for the system, the Chancellor’s office indirectly pressures institutions to orient themselves toward such practices.

The Chancellor’s office also continues to cultivate relationships with other DoD organizations—including those that supply students to the providers—that have already established modes of influencing the educational providers. Cultivating such relationships is likely to be a productive strategy in two respects. First, formal sponsors of DoD ET&D providers can be easily identified and are typically endowed with significant reward and coercive power that could be leveraged by the Chancellor’s office. Second, by building close relationships with sponsors and other stakeholders, the Chancellor’s office could gain further legitimacy. Increasing the ties that the Chancellor’s office has to these other types of entities should therefore increase the ability of the office to influence the ultimate target organizations: ET&D providers. If this strategy is executed, stronger relationships may result if the meetings and visits between the Chancellor’s office and the sponsors of ET&D are used to display the expertise and informational power of the office to other stakeholders.
SUMMARY OF POWER-AND-INFLUENCE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES

If existing power levels are not sufficient, the influencer can develop additional bases of power and create dependencies by gaining control of resources. Whether the initial bases of power are deemed sufficient or new powers bases are developed, the influencer will need to select influence strategies. Such strategies can be either direct or indirect and will ideally flow from the influencer’s power sources. The power development process is summarized in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1
Summary of Power-and-Influence Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Develop bases of power</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consider capacity for developing reward, coercive, legitimate, expert, referent, and informational sources of power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop multiple sources of power</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gain control of resources</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consider the ability to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>take over provision of key resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provide supplemental or additional resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provide a substitute for resources currently used by target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>work in concert with another organization that controls key resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>control the use of the resources by the target</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Develop influence strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The greater the power, the more likely that direct influence strategies, such as appealing to the target, will work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For organizations with less power, indirect strategies may be more successful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>These include</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>influencing the norms of the environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>influencing the values held by the target organizations and individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agenda setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>issue framing during the decisionmaking process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>working through an ally</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
This report presents a three-stage framework of power assessment, power development, and strategy choice for organizations seeking to influence others without the benefit of formal hierarchical authority. In the power assessment stage, the influencing organization assesses its objective, characteristics of the target organization, its own characteristics, its relationship with the target, and the environment in which they interact. If existing power levels are not sufficient, the influencer can develop additional bases of power and create dependencies by gaining control of scarce and valuable resources. Once an organization has considered and developed its sources of power, it can rely on direct and indirect strategies for influencing its targets.

As noted throughout, the Chancellor’s office has pursued a number of strategies in support of its mission as the primary advocate for the academic quality and cost-effectiveness of education and professional development activities serving DoD civilians. Strategies discussed here include personal visits to institutions, the establishment of DoD quality standards, development of informational databases, coordination and hosting of an annual conference, and sponsorship of analytical support. Most of these strategies target the entire set of DoD provider institutions. In that respect, and within the limits of its existing charter, the Chancellor’s office currently benefits from moderate, but increasing, levels of informational and expert power. Over time, it can earn legitimate power through consistently good performance, and with some added creativity, it can wield some forms of reward power.
As the Chancellor’s office develops its power bases, it should make attempts to assess the perceptions of other organizations. In particular, it should gauge the degree to which other organizations in DoD value its expertise and recognize its legitimacy. It also should determine what sorts of information and rewards are valued by those it wishes to influence. For example, it could explore whether deserving institutions would value a DoD quality award accompanied by significant press coverage. Such assessments will help the office shape and target its attempts to influence appropriately.

A continued focus on global influence strategies could be enhanced by a structural analysis of the network of organizations involved in DoD civilian ET&D. The network that the Chancellor’s office joined in 1998 consists of multiple stakeholders, each with its own goals. Yet despite well-defined official roles, there is very little coordination across stakeholders to facilitate achievement of system-wide goals.1 Put differently, the stakeholders currently constitute a low-density network. Through careful study of the network of organizations and coordination with other governing bodies in DoD, the Chancellor’s office could leverage its existing power more effectively in support of its mission. Steps taken by the Chancellor and his staff to increase the number of interactions and ties with provider institutions work to increase network density. Similar efforts with respect to sponsors of institutions and other governing entities could result in more coordinated and compelling influence on provider institutions to improve quality. In addition, Chancellor’s office staff may discover that they can direct their influence through one or more of the many third parties in the current networked system.

As outlined here, a strategic assessment of power should also be conducted with respect to individual target institutions or clusters of institutions. Providers vary in their goals, their degree of interaction with the Chancellor’s office, their willingness to comply with and capacity to resist recommendations, and their prominence within the network of providers. The Chancellor’s office could therefore benefit from more systematic and detailed consideration of the power and resources at its disposal and the influence strategies that follow. It is

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1See Levy et al. (2001) and Gates et al. (2001) for discussions of stakeholders in DoD civilian ET&D.
likely that an outcome of such a process would be different strategic choices for different types of institutions, and perhaps added success.

Another outcome of systematic power assessment might be the discovery that the Chancellor’s office can benefit more from its existing resources than it does currently. For example, it might discover that some institutions are in need of expertise that it can develop and offer. Similarly, the office might find that it is in a position to provide information of use to a particular institution that was reluctant to accept past recommendations it put forward. Even more significant might be the enhancement of existing opportunities to provide input into funding decisions. All of these possibilities lie within the current mandate of the office. After assessing its existing resources and the extent to which they are being used, if the Chancellor’s office finds that it could achieve its mission much more effectively with expanded powers, it could aim to develop or acquire those powers. In extreme cases, where such a change would require an amendment to the charter, the office would be in a position to present a clear and compelling need for the proposed change.

Many organizations are responsible for influencing others without the concomitant hierarchical authority that would make exerting such influence straightforward. These organizations must draw on alternative sources of power and influence. The approach presented here is intended to help the Chancellor’s office and similar organizations gain a clear sense of the options available to them as they pursue their missions. Such organizations cannot command or control the actions of other organizations, but they can employ a panoply of strategies to influence others and align goals across organizations. The application of hierarchical authority might induce higher rates of compliance, but more moderate influence strategies have the potential to produce higher rates of mutual satisfaction and longer-range success.
We draw on research and theories from social psychology, organizational behavior, and sociology to gain insight into how organizations can influence others in the absence of hierarchical authority. This brief review focuses on six bodies of work: 1) bases of power; 2) influence strategies; 3) institutional theory; 4) resource dependence theory; 5) network analysis; and 6) theories of social control. The research and theories referenced here focus on power and influence at both the individual and the organizational level.

At the individual level, the classic work of social psychologists French and Raven (1959) provides a typology for the consideration of existing sources of social power. Bases of power cited in French and Raven’s work include reward, coercive, legitimate, referent, expert, and informational power. While this typology predominantly has been used to study power and influence between individuals, we believe it can be useful for organization-level consideration.

The strategies individuals employ in exerting influence should be congruent with the individuals’ sources of power. Many influence strategies have been both described (e.g., Cialdini, [1984] 1993) and tested for effectiveness (e.g., Yukl, Falbe, and Youn, 1993; Cialdini, [1984] 1993). Cialdini suggests a number of strategies individual influencers can use. One suggestion is that influencers provide something to the target in the hope that the target will feel obligated to reciprocate. Another strategy involves uncovering a target’s values and opinions and then seeking to influence the target through convincing him or her that the objective of the influencer is consistent with his or her values and opinions. Cialdini stresses that these strategies are
best used authentically, meaning that the influencer has the source of power needed to implement the strategy. For example, it is more effective to influence someone through reciprocation if the influencer has reward power, meaning that he or she possesses the ability to provide something valuable to the target.

At the organizational level, institutional theory and resource dependence theory are both well-established theories of power and influence in the literature on organizational behavior. Institutional theory describes how organizations conform to their environments. Conformity can occur as a result of coercion by an external body (e.g., an interest group); through mimicking of other similar organizations; or because of pressure to conform to existing norms in the environment, such as public opinion or values (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Regardless of the path to conformity, organizations are rewarded for creating rules, procedures, policies, and structures that demonstrate conformity (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1987). Rewards may consist of legitimacy, resources, and survival. Understanding institutional theory is helpful in anticipating the effects of the external environment on attempts to influence others. If the influencer’s objective is consistent with the values and behaviors found in the surrounding environment, it will be easier to exert the influence. For example, if an influencer is attempting to persuade a target organization to create an office that already exists in most organizations within that industry, the institutional pressures from the environment will facilitate the influencer’s efforts. Institutional theory goes far in describing institutional conformity, but does not include a consideration of alternative responses to attempts to influence (Oliver, 1991).

Resource dependence theory confers a more active role on organizations being influenced. It describes how organizations manage resources in their environment to reduce their dependency on others (Pfeffer, 1992; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974, 1978). In the context of resource dependence theory, power is defined as control over resources. The term resources is used quite broadly, encompassing, for example, prestige, rewards, sanctions, expertise, personnel, money, social legitimacy, technology, supplies, time, equipment, ego support, access, and publicity. The theory assumes that a resource must be scarce, valuable, and irreplaceable for it to be a viable source of power (Pfeffer, 1992). An organization in need of power could at-
tempt to control the allocation and/or the use of valuable resources (Frooman, 1999). Resource dependence theorists posit that power is defined by who controls what resources and who is dependent upon whom, with the extent of the dependence determining the degree and direction of the power (Pfeffer, 1992).

While resource dependence theory tends to describe one-on-one relationships, network theory focuses on the set of relationships among multiple actors. Attributes of the network (i.e., the set of relationships) affect access to such resources as funding and information and thus can affect one organization’s ability to influence another in the network. A premise of network theory is that patterns of relationships affect the behavior of individuals or organizations that constitute the network. Of particular interest is the work of Rowley (1997), who uses network analysis in the organizational behavior context to consider how organizations react to pressure from stakeholder organizations. He describes a world with multiple and interdependent stakeholder organizations, such as the environment within which the Chancellor’s office operates. Rowley identifies two key features of the network—density and centrality—as determinants of a target organization’s reaction. The first, density, refers to the number of organizations and how many ties they have to one another. Greater density in the network leads to more efficient communication among actors and greater diffusion of norms across the network. The combination of factors evident in a dense network makes it difficult for individual organizations to resist stakeholder influences. The second variable, centrality, is one’s position in the network relative to others, and it can vary in several ways (as defined by Brass and Burkhardt, 1993), including by: (1) degree, the number of direct ties to other actors; (2) closeness, independent access to other actors; and (3) betweenness, control over other actors. Not surprisingly, Rowley (1997) hypothesizes that the more central an entity is, the greater its ability to resist pressure from stakeholder organizations.

Zald’s (1978) and other sociologists’ work on theories of social control (e.g., Meier, 1982; Janowitz, 1975) is also relevant to interorganizational influence. Zald combines ideas and theories from sociology, economics, political science, and law to describe how individuals, organizations, groups, and institutional processes set and sanction standards of performance and operation for industries. He
concludes that there are five conditions that, if met, increase the likelihood that the industries will perform in accordance with, rather than deviate from, societal norms. These five conditions include: (1) clear societal norms with respect to the performance or operation of an industry, (2) strong surveillance capabilities by control agents, (3) strong sanctions available to control agents, (4) similarities among organizations within the industry, and (5) adequate compliance readiness and capacity of the target industry (Zald, 1978, p. 99). While these conditions overlap to a great degree with concepts found in institutional and resource dependence theory, the focus on compliance readiness and capacity is an important addition to the consideration of influence.

The research and theories described here serve as the basis for the framework we developed on power assessment and development. Organizations seeking to influence others should benefit from this framework as well as the accompanying suggestions and examples. The Chancellor's office and other similarly positioned organizations could also benefit from further examining the literature referenced here.


