USAREUR Force Structure
Adapting to a Changing World

Robert D. Howe and William D. O’Malley
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USAREUR Force Structure
Adapting to a Changing World

Robert D. Howe and William D. O’Malley

Prepared for the
United States Army

Arroyo Center
Preface

This report presents information regarding alternative force structures for the U.S. Army in Europe and suggests some modifications to the structure as it was designed near the end of Fiscal Year 1992. It further discusses reductions below the then planned level of 92,000 Army spaces, assesses alternative approaches to structuring at lower levels, and suggests a strategy for planning for reductions. The analysis on which this report is based was conducted in early Fiscal Year 1992, publication was delayed by a variety of factors, and the pace of events has made much of the discussion outdated. It is being published as a contribution to the discussion of Army force structuring in general. The work supporting this report was conducted under the Strategy and Doctrine Program of the Arroyo Center and is part of a larger project assessing potential relationships between the United States and Europe.

This report should be of interest to analysts and decisionmakers responsible for planning future U.S. involvement in Europe and for considering force structure in other theaters.

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The Arroyo Center is the U.S. Army's federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) for studies and analysis operated by RAND. The Arroyo Center provides the Army with objective, independent analytic research on major policy and organizational concerns, emphasizing mid- to long-term problems. Its research is carried out in four programs: Strategy and Doctrine; Force Development and Technology; Military Logistics; and Manpower and Training.

Army Regulation 5-21 contains basic policy for the conduct of the Arroyo Center. The Army provides continuing guidance and oversight through the Arroyo Center Policy Committee (ACPC), which is co-chaired by the Vice Chief of Staff and by the Assistant Secretary for Research, Development, and Acquisition. Arroyo Center work is performed under contract MDA903-91-C-0006.

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Summary

The changes in Europe over the past few years have dramatically modified the security environment. As NATO and other European institutions struggle to adapt to the new environment, military forces in Europe are being redesigned and significantly reduced. At the London summit in 1990, NATO announced major changes in its defense concept and in the forces raised to support that concept. At Oslo in 1991, the NATO foreign ministers issued a declaration that NATO would be receptive to requests from the CSCE for NATO forces to carry out peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the CSCE.

NATO is engaged in the process of reorganization to create the various levels of multinational forces specified by the political leadership. Central among the changes are the expansion of the Immediate Reaction Force (IRF, formerly the ACE [Allied Command Europe] Mobile Force) to include contributions from most NATO nations and the creation of the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). These two organizations are to be the keystone of the forces available to react to rapidly developing crises. The remainder of NATO forces will be in either the Main Defense Forces (MDF) or the augmentation forces. Although NATO does not specify the readiness level of these latter two categories, it appears that most countries plan to maintain them at lower levels of readiness to reflect the anticipated lengthy warning time before a major military crisis could develop.

The U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), is presently engaged in a major reduction in forces toward a 1995 planned strength of 92,000 personnel. The FY 1992 target organization of USAREUR was a corps with two heavy divisions and an armored cavalry regiment. This force is to participate with German units in two multinational corps in the MDF. USAREUR also contains units for the IRF and has dual-tasked some units for the ARRC. This force is powerful and tactically mobile. It contains, however, only one battalion of light forces designed to deploy rapidly within the theater.

USAREUR is a part of NATO, but it also serves as the ground arm of the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM). USEUCOM has geographic responsibility for all of Europe outside of the former Soviet Union and for most of Africa. If forces are needed for this area, or for where NATO forces are most likely to be needed, a significant portion of them must be capable of rapid strategic deployment. These deployable forces do not necessarily have to be a part of the USAREUR
structure in peacetime, as they can be assigned as required from elsewhere in the structure of the Army. However, the authors propose that the current planned structure of V Corps be modified somewhat to provide a better balance of in-theater forces. This proposed change would reduce one heavy division to a division (forward)—that is, a division from which only one brigade is stationed in Germany—and the personnel spaces gained from that reduction would be used to expand and formalize the lighter forces committed to the IRF and the ARRC and to expand selected combat support and combat service support forces to enhance the capability of USAREUR to deploy and perform certain missions without augmentation. Alternatively, the same personnel savings could be achieved by reducing each division by one brigade, thus keeping both headquarters in Europe for perceptual advantage.

Even though the current forces still have to be reduced to reach the planned level of 92,000, a further reduction has already been directed. Although efficiency decreases as the force gets smaller, and the authors feel that 92,000 personnel is about the right size for USAREUR, smaller alternatives were examined. Down to a level of about 60,000 personnel in USAREUR, it is possible to keep a credible and reasonably balanced combat force in Europe by withdrawing stationed forces participating in the Main Defense Force. Below 60,000 personnel, the force is difficult to balance and becomes inefficient while still demanding a considerable share of overall U.S. Army resources. Below this force level, the United States would be forced to consider whether to withdraw to a true token presence rather than continue the commitment of ground force units.
Acknowledgments

During the course of the research for this paper, the authors benefited immensely from conversations with members of the Army Staff and with various officers and civilian staff members at NATO, SHAPE, USEUCOM, and USAREUR. Many individuals contributed large amounts of time to discuss preliminary drafts of the work and to suggest alternative approaches that had potential to improve the resulting product. RAND colleague Roger Brown conducted a thorough and extremely helpful review of the draft. While we recognize and appreciate all the assistance, responsibility for any errors or omissions remains with the authors.
## Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>AADCOM</td>
<td>Army Air Defense Command&lt;br&gt;An army theater-level air defense organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACCB</td>
<td>Air Cavalry Combat Brigade&lt;br&gt;An airborne brigade with infantry and helicopters</td>
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<td>ACE</td>
<td>Allied Command Europe</td>
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<td>ACR</td>
<td>Armored Cavalry Regiment&lt;br&gt;An army organization usually assigned to a corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility&lt;br&gt;The geographic area assigned to a regional CINC</td>
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<td>ARRC</td>
<td>ACE Rapid Reaction Corps&lt;br&gt;A multinational corps being formed by NATO</td>
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<td>AUSA</td>
<td>Association of the United States Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>AVN</td>
<td>Army Aviation units</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief&lt;br&gt;The senior commander of a Unified or Specified Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>The Continental United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIV(-)</td>
<td>Division, minus&lt;br&gt;Indicates a division with less than its normal complement of subordinate units</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>Echelons Above Corps&lt;br&gt;The elements of a theater army above corps level</td>
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<tr>
<td>FA</td>
<td>Field Artillery</td>
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<td>IRF</td>
<td>Immediate Reaction Force&lt;br&gt;A NATO command with small units from all members</td>
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<td>MDF</td>
<td>Main Defense Force</td>
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<td>MI</td>
<td>Military Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>MND</td>
<td>Multinational Division&lt;br&gt;NATO units with elements from more than one country</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>ODS</td>
<td>Operation Desert Shield or Operation Desert Storm</td>
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<tr>
<td>O&amp;M</td>
<td>Operation and Maintenance&lt;br&gt;The funding that pays for normal training and support</td>
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<tr>
<td>POMCUS</td>
<td>Prepositioned Overseas Materiel Configured as Unit Sets&lt;br&gt;Equipment stored in a theater for the use of forces deploying from the United States</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Europe</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The commander of NATO military forces</td>
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<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The military headquarters for NATO</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>The United Nations</td>
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<td>USAREUR</td>
<td>United States Army, Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The headquarters that commands most, but not all, Army forces stationed in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>United States Central Command</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The U.S. command responsible for the greater Middle East</td>
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<td>USCINCEUR</td>
<td>United States Commander in Chief, Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>USEUCOM</td>
<td>United States European Command</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The U.S. command responsible for most of Europe and Africa; commanded by SACEUR</td>
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1. Introduction

Over the last three years the security environment in Europe has changed dramatically. The revolutions of 1989 brought democracy to the countries of Eastern Europe and the demise of the Warsaw Pact. These events clearly signaled the beginning of the end of the Cold War that had dominated U.S. and European politics and military force planning for the last four decades. Moreover, the possibility of a major East-West conflict in Europe’s Central Region continues to decline with the breakup of the former Soviet Union and the reduction of its armed forces.

Europe’s political and security orders are also in the process of change, with new economic, political, and security organizations emerging. The European Community and the Western European Union are increasingly active. Many, if not all, of the former members of the Warsaw Pact are trying to gain greater integration into the established Western political, economic, and military organizations. In the West, the world has witnessed the fall of the Berlin Wall, the unification of Germany, and the civil war in the former Yugoslavia. Regional confrontation and instability can no longer be clearly tied to the rivalry between Europe’s two dominant military alliances. The types of potential threats to Europe’s stability are changing—not only in their possible sources but also in character. No state or alliance has the overwhelming military capability and presence necessary to launch a surprise attack against NATO. The changes in the strategic situation and the longer warning times afforded will allow a reduced presence of active conventional forces.

The United States and its NATO allies are in the process of adapting their military structure, readiness, and doctrine to account for these changes in the security environment. The U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), is the U.S. Army component of the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and, as such, is the U.S. Army element supporting NATO, which is affected in a major way by the changes in the European environment. We will briefly review the changes taking place in NATO in response to developments in Europe and the world and assess the impact of those changes on the roles and missions of USAREUR. We will consider a number of force structure issues, concluding with our recommended structure at the 1992 ceiling and a strategy for planning the required future reductions.
2. Europe, NATO, and USAREUR

Changes in NATO

The London NATO summit in July 1990 initiated a number of changes to meet the new risk dimensions and adapt military policy and readiness to the new strategic conditions. The Alliance defined three categories of forces. These are as follows:

- **Reaction Forces.** A mixture of heavy and light but highly mobile and ready forces available at short notice for crisis management and crisis response. Current Alliance planning is placing priority on the development of multinational forces to fulfill these requirements.

- **Main Defense Forces.** These represent the majority of NATO’s defensive force structure but, because of the change in the nature of the threat and extended warning time, most countries appear to be planning to maintain these at reduced levels of readiness and availability although that remains a national decision.

- **Augmentation Forces.** Less readily available forces that can be mobilized to reinforce any region and contribute to deterrence, crisis management, and defense.

Overall, the Alliance will have lower force levels and rely largely on its reconstitution capability.

The declaration of the Oslo foreign ministers’ meeting in 1992 stated that NATO is prepared to support “peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise.” Military forces for such activities would need to be highly ready and responsive.

In addition to redefining the force structure, the London Declaration announced plans to significantly increase the multinationality of NATO forces. Figure 2.1 summarizes the planned structure of NATO forces in the 1990s.\(^1\)

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\(^1\)Note that this was as planned originally. Force structuring actions by a number of countries have resulted in the elimination of two of the multinational MDF corps.
Reaction Forces

Immediate Reaction Force

ACE Rapid Reaction Corps
  Multinational Division, Center
  Multinational Division, South
  National Divisions
  Corps Troops

Main Defense Force, Multinational Corps
  6 Corps (U.S. Participation in 3)

Augmentation Forces

Figure 2.1—NATO's New Force Structure as of 1992

In the Central Region, the Main Defense Force (MDF) is to consist entirely of multinational corps, with the Germans participating in all and the United States in two (it was originally to have been three). The Immediate Reaction Force (IRF, formerly known as the ACE [Allied Command Europe] Mobile Force) will remain multinational but at a much lower level of organization, with units of battalion size or smaller committed by most members of NATO. While it is not anticipated that the IRF would ever be committed in its entirety, commitment of any significant fraction of it would entail units from many nations operating together in a brigade-size unit.

The ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) is likewise multinational but at an intermediate level of organization. The lightest elements of the ARRC will be the multinational divisions forming in the Central Region and to be formed in the Southern Region. Additionally, the corps troops are made up of units committed by many NATO nations, including the United States. The makeup of the ARRC and of the Main Defense Force corps represents a major departure from previous NATO practice (which was multinational but primarily at the Army Group level) and appears to be without precedent in previous peacetime history.

Multinational units have operated down to the brigade level in wartime, most notably in the UN forces in Korea, but only in NATO has there been prior peacetime application of small-unit multinationality and never on a scale approaching the currently planned level.
In addition to the specifically organized forces for reaction and main defense, the remaining military resources of the NATO nations are available for augmentation as necessary. These augmentation forces would come primarily from the United States and Canada but would include some European reserve forces or active units not committed to NATO in peacetime or could involve committed forces from one region of NATO reinforcing another region.

The United States European Command

USEUCOM is a Unified Command of the United States commanded by SACEUR, in addition to his NATO position, and has an Area of Responsibility (AOR) depicted in Figure 2.2. This area, reaching from the northern cape of Norway to

![Map of Europe and Africa with various regions shaded to represent NATO Countries, Non-NATO Europe AOR, Possible add to AOR, Non-Europe AOR, and USECENTCOM AOR.](image)

Figure 2.2—USEUCOM's Area of Responsibility
the southern cape of Africa, presents planners with a broad range of physical and political environments with myriad possible requirements for missions and operational force packages.

As the ground arm of USEUCOM, USAREUR has responsibilities in the same area. In the NATO portion of the AOR, USAREUR must provide Army forces to meet the political commitments previously described. Of increasing importance, however, is the responsibility in the broader AOR, which has long been subordinated to the Central Region in force planning. In the light of the changes occurring throughout Europe, the role that USEUCOM played in ODS, and the ongoing commitments of military forces to a variety of military and humanitarian missions throughout the AOR, much greater interest and planning time are being given to possible future roles and missions that USAREUR could play in the part of the AOR outside of NATO.

**USAREUR in NATO**

Shown in Figure 2.3 are the commitments of U.S. Army forces that the United States made to NATO to reflect the political decisions described earlier. All of the forces except the brigade that would have served in the Belgian Corps\(^2\) are assigned to USAREUR. It is notable that the bulk of the commitments are to the MDF and that many of the commitments to the reaction forces are of units that also have MDF responsibilities. This is consistent with the practice of the other NATO nations and is not peculiar to USAREUR.

The list of potential roles and missions for USAREUR, as shown in Figure 2.4, has not changed as a result of recent events. What has changed is the likelihood of occurrence. The missions with traditional emphasis dominated the decisions of NATO in force structure, operational planning, and doctrinal development for 40 years. The presence of large Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces on and near the border made a mechanized invasion possible, and the danger from such an invasion led to almost a tunnel focus on deterring it or defending against it. The breakup of the Warsaw Pact and the withdrawal of the forces of the former Soviet Union have reduced the possibility of an invasion of Germany and made the other missions relatively more likely.

NATO can no longer anticipate that the conflict will come to it and that the enemy will be attacking with an armor-heavy, deeply echeloned 60- to 90-division force. Rather, it is more likely that NATO will have to rapidly move its

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\(^2\)The Belgian-led corps is no longer expected to be formed.
Main Defense Forces
- U.S. Corps with 1 Heavy Division & Armored Cavalry Regiment
- 1 Heavy Division to German Corps
- 1 CONUS-Based Brigade to Belgian Corps
- 32d AADCOM to NATO Integrated Air Defense Force
- Echelons Above Corps (EAC) Assets

Rapid Reaction Forces
- 1 Battalion to ACE Immediate Reaction Force
- FA, AVN, MI, & Signal Units to ARRC Support Troops (Dual Tasked)
- Membership on Planning Staffs
- 1 Heavy Division to ARRC (Dual Tasked)

Augmentation Forces
- POMCUS and CONUS-Based

Figure 2.3—USAREUR Commitments to NATO in 1992

forces to a conflict area and that the opposition will possess a much smaller force than that long envisioned in the classic Warsaw Pact offensive scenario.

Furthermore, given the current disarray in the east, there should be significant early warning and lead time before an offensive capability sufficient to initiate and sustain operations against NATO’s heartland could be reconstituted.

This change in the security environment in Europe has led to a major shift in emphasis in the military strategy of the United States. Throughout the Cold War, the bulk of the U.S. armed forces were either forward deployed in Europe or committed—through dual basing, prepositioning of equipment, or earmarking—to Europe. As the potential threat from the Soviet Union has declined, the U.S. armed forces have shifted deployment and emphasis from forward basing of forces committed to one theater to CONUS basing of forces available to respond to crises in any area of the world. Hence, should a major threat to security in Europe arise, the bulk of U.S. reinforcements for NATO would be CONUS-based units also tasked for response to other contingencies.

The increase in warning time and the resultant reduction in the need for highly responsive stationed forces do not mean, however, that all future military commitments can be best met by CONUS-based forces. The value of U.S. ground
forces in Europe is not measured purely in terms of their ability to respond to major military threats. There are advantages to the United States in keeping ground forces stationed in Europe even as the likelihood of large-scale conflict on the continent becomes very small. Ultimately, the presence of ground forces on the continent demonstrates to the Europeans a continued U.S. interest and involvement in European affairs. Complete withdrawal of ground forces from Europe would give the appearance of the United States withdrawing from the continent. In addition, the threats to which NATO and USEUCOM must respond in the future are likely to be relatively small but rapidly evolving crises in which there is a premium on the ability to arrive quickly with appropriately tailored forces. The presence of U.S. forces in the theater, particularly if integrated into the crisis response forces of NATO, will contribute not only to the capacity to respond quickly but to the deterrence of potential adversaries and to the ability of the Alliance, or the USEUCOM commander, to manage a crisis at appropriate levels.

A lesser but still significant advantage of forward basing of some forces in Europe is the experience in planning and training with the Europeans. This was of great value to the United States when individual European countries chose to participate in the coalition against Iraq even though NATO as an alliance did not. The common procedures worked out over many years allowed the coalition to function with a minimum of friction. Such coalitions are likely to be the norm in the future, and the opportunity for joint planning and training will be important.
Other aspects of training in and practice deployments to Europe can also be important, and U.S. forces stationed in Europe can be an important supplement to CONUS-based forces.
3. USAREUR at Planned Levels

In Fiscal Year 1992, the authorized personnel strength for U.S. Army forces in Europe in 1995 was 92,000. Of these spaces, some 8,000 were reserved for U.S. national-level purposes or committed to NATO activities above USAREUR and are not under the control of the CINC, USAREUR. With the remainder, USAREUR designed and is implementing a two-division corps with an Armored Cavalry Regiment. This structure has the advantage of putting the heavier and more difficult-to-deploy forces forward and prepares USAREUR for rapid reinforcement. However, the rate of change in Europe raises the question as to whether alternative structures might be preferred. Figure 3.1 lists criteria we consider appropriate to consider in any planning of a theater force structure.

USAREUR must be designed to reflect its most important and most likely missions. At the same time, however, USAREUR cannot be structured in a vacuum. Although Europe will no longer be the centerpiece of the future Army, USAREUR will still be a sizable element of the Army, and the overall needs of the Army must be considered in the structuring process. Assessment of the overall structure of the Army is beyond the scope of this paper and this discussion assumes that all desired capabilities will be in the structure of USAREUR. We recognize, however, that the overall needs of the Army may preclude some of these changes while retaining certain specialized capabilities in CONUS to be made available to the theater as required.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>USAREUR must have correct design for</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Likely missions</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Operational flexibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Strategic deployability</td>
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<td>• Tactical mobility</td>
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But USAREUR cannot be designed in isolation

• Alternative designs can require changes in CONUS
• USAREUR structure affects the overall Army capability

Figure 3.1—USAREUR Design Criteria
As we discussed in Section 2, U.S. Army forces in Europe serve a variety of purposes and have the potential to fulfill many missions. Not all of these purposes and missions, however, are of equal importance. Figure 3.2 suggests a priority for considering those missions. The key military benefit of stationing forces in Europe is the maintenance of the strength of the NATO Alliance, which contributes to deterrence of potential adversaries and the capacity to respond quickly if deterrence fails. The forward presence of U.S. forces provides the USCEUR with considerable flexibility in deterrent options, and the integration of those forces into NATO structures enhances the capability and credibility of NATO. A very important role, then, is participation in the NATO integrated structures at all levels. Even if reduced personnel levels were to require the withdrawal of all heavy combat forces, there would still be benefit in maintaining staffing at the various NATO headquarters and participating in activities such as the integrated air defense. This participation will improve the ability of the United States to work with Europeans on probable military activities in the future. A subsidiary benefit of forward-stationed forces in Europe is to enhance military-to-military contacts with the many non-NATO countries within the Area of Responsibility, particularly with the emerging democracies in the former Warsaw Pact countries of Eastern Europe. While not demanding a large number of personnel and not placing specific demands on the structure of USAREUR, these contacts are of increasing importance to U.S. relations with those countries and appear to be best carried out by personnel stationed on the continent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Give priority to the most important and most likely roles and missions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• NATO integrated activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Peacekeeping and peacemaking forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Rapid intervention forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Military-to-military contacts</td>
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<tr>
<th>Provide for reinforcement</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• POMCNS maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reception and onward movement</td>
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Figure 3.2—Suggested Mission Priority
Ultimately, there must be a capability to reinforce U.S. forces in Europe if deterrence fails and a major threat to NATO develops. The major element of such reinforcement would be CONUS-based crisis response forces delivered by U.S. strategic mobility assets. However, if restructuring USAREUR results, as we will later recommend, in one or more heavy divisions that are at less than full strength, the credibility of the USAREUR structure will be enhanced if the elements necessary to complete the structure of those divisions are pre-designated and their equipment stored on the continent. Hence, some level of POMCUS stocks appears to be desirable for the foreseeable future. The exact size of the POMCUS stocks will be determined as a function of the ultimate structure of USAREUR and affordability, and we will specify no level. Regardless of the ultimate level, some diversion of manpower will be required to maintain those equipment sets and to support the breakout of POMCUS if necessary. The CONUS-based units designated to deploy to those sets need not be completely dedicated to Europe and could be available for contingencies elsewhere if not required in Europe at the time of the contingency.

There are, of course, a variety of alternative approaches to the force structure of USAREUR at the target level of 92,000 personnel. In previous work,¹ RAND addressed the relationship between the missions to be assigned to USAREUR and the resulting impact on the structure of USAREUR. Figure 3.3 briefly summarizes some of the options considered in that analysis. The principal conclusion of that work was that the debate over numbers of personnel in Europe needs to be preceded by a debate over the functions and missions to be assigned to forces in Europe. Hence, as we discuss alternative structures, we will address the missions appropriate, and inappropriate, for such structures.

Obviously, one option is the heavy force structure reflected in the proposed structure of V Corps. This force would be powerful, with great tactical mobility; it was the appropriate design as long as there was a realistic threat from Soviet troops toward Western Europe. With the changes that have occurred in Europe, however, there is virtually no likelihood that V Corps will be needed near its bases in Germany, and the current USAREUR structure is limited to one battalion of light, strategically deployable forces that might be required early in a crisis such as the current one in the Balkans. The planned V Corps structure, then, does not contain in theater the mix of forces likely to be necessary to respond to crises of the future.

Current design—Heavy corps, focus on Main Defense Force
(limited light force for rapid commitment)
Light design
- Emphasize infantry/airmobile
- Concentrate heavy forces in CONUS
(lack of heavy force makes this not credible)
Compromise—Increase light but keep significant heavy component

Figure 3.3—Alternative Design Concepts

An extreme alternative would be to design USAREUR as a fundamentally light corps while transferring the heavy forces to the projection force in CONUS. It has been suggested that such a design could reduce friction with the Germans over training issues and might allow for an increase in the heavy component of the CONUS forces. While it is true that light forces are likely to cause less maneuver damage than heavier forces and that their lighter weapons would reduce noise in the vicinity of the training areas, it is not clear that such a force could be an effective alternative. It would have to be verified that it would, in fact, reduce local friction (since it would likely contain increased numbers of helicopters, which are themselves an irritant to the civilian population) while at the same time be seen by the Europeans as credible evidence of U.S. commitment. Moreover, it would place much of the Army’s light forces outside of CONUS and might not be desirable for the contingency forces. This structure thus overemphasizes European basing of U.S. light forces and reduces too far the capacity to work with European heavy forces and provide for reinforcement if necessary.

A compromise between the extremes appears to be a desirable alternative. A reduction in the number of brigades in one or both of the heavy divisions would provide spaces to enhance some elements of the force likely to be very important in the future while retaining the essentially heavy nature of the corps. Figure 3.4 shows two alternatives for the heavy (mechanized or armor) components of USAREUR, both of which constitute a reduction of those forces from the currently planned structure. The elements of USAREUR that would be expanded with the spaces saved will be discussed later.

The U.S. commitment to the NATO Main Defense Force entails providing a corps headquarters and corps troops for a U.S.–led corps with German participation
## Alternative One
- Corps headquarters and one Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR)
- One full heavy division
- One division forward with one brigade

## Alternative Two
- Corps headquarters and one ACR
- Two 2-brigade divisions

### Figure 3.4—Heavy Force Alternatives for Compromise Design

and a division to a German-led corps. Current planning to meet these obligations, as indicated above, calls for two full-strength heavy divisions and an ACR. However, nothing in the summit declaration specified the structure of the national forces to meet the obligation. The Europeans, including the Germans, are relegating the bulk of their Main Defense Force units to a mobilization status. By 1995, there will be no full-strength heavy German division to participate with the U.S. forces.

There seems to be no reason why the U.S. obligation to the German-led corps could not be met by assigning a division that is less than fully structured in keeping with the German structure. A division forward with a fully structured brigade could be stationed in Germany with the remainder of the division CONUS-based, with its equipment in POMCUS in Europe. Periodic deployment exercises of brigade size or smaller could keep the remainder of the division familiar with the environment while providing excellent training for deployments. Alternatively, both of the U.S. divisions could be reduced by one brigade, with one division designated for the German-led corps and the other for V Corps. This option has the diplomatic and military advantages of keeping both division headquarters in Europe rather than making one of them a division forward, with the command structure in CONUS.

Either structure meets our objective of reducing heavy forces to release personnel spaces that can be used for structural changes to enhance the operational flexibility of the overall USAREUR force. The choice between them lies largely in

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2 There was also a commitment to provide a brigade to a Belgian-led corps, but that commitment is to be met by a CONUS-based unit and is not considered further here.
the perceptual realm, and the second alternative might provide a more credible force in the eyes of the Europeans.

Given the considerations discussed, Figure 3.5 shows our recommended structure for USAREUR at the 92,000 level. The personnel spaces reduced from the heavy divisions are applied to elements of USAREUR committed to the reaction forces. This structure would somewhat shift the focus of U.S. forces in Europe from the Main Defense Force to the reaction forces while still retaining the capacity to field heavy forces and to expand. The expansion of the aviation brigade to an Air Cavalry Combat Brigade (ACCB) entails adding ground combat forces, which should be air-mobile, to the existing attack helicopter component of the brigade. This would enable the force to be more self-sufficient and enhance its capacity to act as part of the ARRC. The brigade could still serve as the helicopter brigade of the V Corps, should the corps deploy as an entity. The expansion of the force oriented to the Southern Region, and participation in exercises in the South, would provide increased opportunity for U.S. forces to work with the military of the southern tier of NATO, which is likely to become increasingly important in the future. Threats to the Central Region have largely evaporated, while problems in the Balkans, the Middle East, and North

| Figure 3.5—Recommended USAREUR Structure |

Main Defense Force

- Retain V Corps Headquarters and the 11th ACR
- Convert to either 1 div and 1 div (–) or 2 div (–); in either case make one division composite to command light elements also
- Formally designate CONUS-based units for the POMCUS
- Continue commitment of air defense units to NATO Integrated Air Defense Network

Reaction Forces

- Expand the 12th Aviation Brigade to a full air cavalry combat brigade and commit it to the ARRC
- Specify MI & artillery support and planning staff involvement
- Expand the 3/325th Airborne in Italy to at least a 2-battalion brigade with dual commitment to IRF and Multinational Division (MND) South
- Commit the U.S. to airlift support (USAF issue)
Africa have greatly expanded the possibility of threats to the NATO nations on the Mediterranean Sea. Ideally this expanded force would be stationed in Italy, but if fiscal and political constraints preclude that, it could function effectively with part of the brigade stationed in Germany but participating in exercises in the Southern Region. In addition, the prepositioning of a heavy brigade in Italy (Theater Reserve Unit-Army Readiness Package South (TRU-ARPS)) should be continued to enhance the capacity to provide heavy reinforcement around the volatile Mediterranean littoral.

The specific designation of CONUS-based forces to fill the reduced division structure in USAREUR would tend to offset the implication that the reduction in the stationed heavy forces indicates a reduced U.S. commitment to Europe. Continued participation in the NATO Integrated Air Defense would keep the United States involved in an important combined activity. There is serious consideration being given to shifting the focus of that defense to the south. The nations in the south are well within range of aircraft and ballistic missiles, even crude ones, from potentially hostile nations, whereas the Central Region now has a large buffer between it and any potential enemies. Even if that shift occurs, the U.S. should continue a proportionate participation.

Like any force structure, our recommended structure is a compromise between costs and benefits. On the positive side, this change would engage the United States fully and directly in the multinational reaction forces, and the participation by the United States should contribute to those forces becoming militarily effective at an earlier date than would be likely with the current focus. It also provides a force with greater deployability and flexibility, which will be key components for successfully meeting the broader potential missions and battlefield environments of the future.

We recognize that the enhancement of the reaction force elements is at a price to the heavy components of the force and that the two heavy brigades would not just leave Europe but would likely leave the Army force structure because of the lack of personnel spaces to regenerate them in CONUS. In the author's opinion, this is a reasonable price to pay, however, given the gains in participation in the other critical NATO forces.

The discussion in this section has pertained to the structure of USAREUR with 92,000 authorized U.S. Army personnel spaces in Europe. Political events in 1992, however, suggested that it would be prudent to begin to consider the impact of reductions in this authorized strength and how to accommodate those reductions. Such a reduction has now been mandated by the 1993 Defense Authorization Act.
4. Preparing for Further Reductions

Barring a major change in the world scene, it is virtually certain that the current mandated ceiling of 100,000 personnel in Europe will be implemented by or shortly after 1995. All elements of the U.S. government concerned with NATO need to respond to this reduction and have the bulk of essential planning done well in advance. This does not imply that the plans need to be public documents, but they need to exist.

Clearly, any force reductions will be taken at the expense of operational capability and flexibility of the remaining forces. Of critical importance is the recognition that, with significant reductions in Army force levels, retaining all of the currently planned force structure to meet the current political commitments to NATO would result in a very superficial and essentially hollow force structure. Such a structure would present limited opportunities for effective training, and it is not clear that it would be, or be seen to be, credible evidence of a true U.S. commitment to Europe. It could be, and appear to be, a hollow force with limited capability to do anything significant, whether in support of NATO or of broader U.S. contingency requirements. Even if USAREUR is reduced to 60,000 or so personnel, it will still represent more than 10 percent of the post-1995 Army and cannot be allowed to become ineffectual. Hence, in planning for reductions, we must withdraw units that can be removed with the least deleterious effect on the post-1995 USAREUR and U.S. Army.

In the prior work cited above\(^1\) we did a partial structuring of several alternative forces to consider which of the probable USAREUR missions each could perform and how well it would be likely to be able to perform them. The most significant of the alternatives are summarized in Figure 4.1. The “hollow” case attempted to respond to all missions by reducing the manning level of the force but retaining all current major units, including the division headquarters and all of their component brigades. However, the scale of the manpower reductions necessary to reach 60,000 personnel is such that this approach would produce a force likely to be unable to train or function effectively while still imposing a considerable cost on the Army in terms of personnel, equipment, and Operation and Maintenance (O&M) costs. Hence, in the remaining cases considered, we

\(^1\)Howe and Kleckley, op. cit.
At about 60K (USAREUR portion of 100K ceiling)

- "Hollow" force—try to keep up all missions at lower levels
- Reinforcement focused—heavy units geared for expansion
- Intervention focused—light, strategically deployable, with limited heavy forces
- Balanced force—continue broad emphasis of recommended 92K force

At about 45K (USAREUR portion of 75K ceiling)

- Reinforcement focused
- Intervention focused

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**Figure 4.1—Structure Alternatives at Reduced Force Levels**

assumed the elimination of some units performing certain missions and either the transfer of responsibility for those missions to CONUS-based units or the complete withdrawal from those missions. Depending on the focus of the case, the reduction was in heavy units or light units and, at the 45,000 level, in both.

The reinforcement-focused force was based on the terminology in the Fiscal Year (FY) 92–93 Defense Authorization Act, which contained a Sense of Congress resolution calling for a force level of 100,000 personnel, with the residual force emphasizing the capacity for rapid and large-scale reinforcement. This structure then maximized the heavy forces and expanded the manning of various headquarters to facilitate planning and preparation for expansion. Such emphasis allowed for continuing to meet requirements for the Main Defense Force Corps and preparing for reinforcement but would require a significant scaling back of commitments to the reaction forces.

The intervention-focused force took the opposite approach by eliminating all stationed heavy forces and enhancing the lighter forces designed for multinational or unilateral intervention. This would require complete, or nearly complete, withdrawal from the Main Defense Force and would likely do considerable damage to the credibility of the U.S. long-term commitment. Moreover, even at a 60,000 personnel level, it provided for more light forces than are reasonably required for full participation in the reaction forces.

The balanced force continued the commitment of a corps headquarters and part of one or more heavy divisions to the Main Defense Force while keeping the IRF and ARRC non-divisional contributions at the full strength we recommended at
92,000. This would still allow USAREUR to prepare for the most important and most likely missions while retaining a visible heavy component for credibility.

Finally, we considered USAREUR force levels below 60,000 personnel spaces. The force level of 45,000 might be the Army portion of an overall 75,000 personnel theater ceiling. At this level, tradeoffs must be made that we consider unacceptable. Figure 4.2 indicates the elements necessary for what we consider a minimum credible force.

Credibility with allies and potential enemies of the United States requires more than just having some people wearing Army uniforms in Europe. Residual forces require a real capability to accomplish likely missions. The elements listed constitute what we see as the minimum set of capabilities that would show a true U.S. commitment to Europe. First is a continued commitment to the long-standing NATO integrated headquarters and the combined communications, intelligence, and air defense activities. These represent the core of the integrative value of NATO, and the United States cannot pretend to be involved without commitment to these activities.

Of nearly equal importance is participation in the NATO reaction forces, which will be the early action arm of any NATO commitments in the future. In particular, if NATO exercises its option to provide peacekeeping forces under CSCE auspices, the forces that will be the first to deploy will be the light, highly mobile forces of the IRF and the lighter components of the ARRC. The United

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Our research indicates that a credible military commitment to NATO should include:</th>
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<tr>
<td>• U.S. elements of NATO integrated structures</td>
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<tr>
<td>— Planning staffs</td>
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<tr>
<td>— Air defense, communications, intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Participation in the reaction forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>• A heavy component with expansion capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Corps headquarters, corps troops, division forward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— POMCUS stocks and designated units</td>
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This requires about 60,000 Army personnel in USAREUR

Figure 4.2—Elements of Minimum Credible Force
States should be prepared to participate with European-based forces that can play a key operational role early.

Finally, a major element of U.S. participation in NATO is the capacity and the willingness to come to the aid of Western Europe in the event of a large-scale buildup of an enemy. While the time scale of such a buildup would be considerably more extended than was anticipated in the past, some heavy forces on the ground with built-in expansion capability represent the most credible evidence of such a commitment. For this reason, the corps headquarters and enough component elements to expand rapidly, including POMCUS stocks, are critical. Our research indicates that it is unlikely that USAREUR can retain more than the forward elements of one heavy division. However, two would be highly desirable if USAREUR can design such a structure without jeopardizing other critical elements of the force.

Note that the 60,000 spaces are specified as being in USAREUR. There are U.S. Army personnel in Europe, currently in excess of 8,000, who are not part of USAREUR. These personnel serve on high-level staffs or perform U.S. national military functions separate from the activities of USAREUR. In addition, there are many Army personnel currently involved in the retrograde of large quantities of equipment and ammunition no longer needed on the continent. Neither of these activities contributes directly to the long-term mission of USAREUR. The personnel involved in the retrograde activities should be considered as participating in a national-level activity and exempted from the overall personnel ceiling at any level until their mission is completed. Some level of the other non-USAREUR Army positions will continue to be required indefinitely, and while they must be subject to overall personnel ceilings, proper recognition of their presence, in addition to USAREUR spaces, is required when setting the Army personnel ceiling in Europe.

Determining the precise size of this minimum force requires detailed analysis, information not readily available to RAND, and resolution of a number of structure and stationing issues. However, our analysis of the force level needed to provide all three elements of the capability indicates the need for approximately 60,000 Army personnel in USAREUR. This force structure would be made up of approximately 20,000 personnel in the maneuver forces (the composition of which could differ depending on the focus), approximately 25,000 in the corps headquarters and corps troops, and about 15,000 in the echelons above corps, including the functions with theaterwide responsibility and the essential support forces. Our analysis agrees with that of other organizations
that four brigades, as we recommend, can be sustained with approximately 20,000 personnel in the maneuver forces.\textsuperscript{2} Our research indicates, however, a need for generally higher levels in the non-maneuver forces, which not only are required to support the maneuver brigades if committed but provide important capabilities in their own right. To illustrate this, consider only two recent force commitments. The bulk of the initial commitment to Operation Provide Comfort in Iraq was from the Special Forces Group. The Mobile Army Surgical Hospital currently committed to Croatia is staffed from theater- and corps-level assets. Retaining only the maneuver units and the minimum levels of support to sustain them would seriously degrade the flexibility of NATO and the theater commander to commit forces for operations short of combat.

Figure 4.3 suggests a sequencing strategy for reductions leading to the minimum credible force, assuming that the 92,000-person force was structured with a full division and a division forward and assuming that the ACR is to be retained in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>92K</th>
<th>Step 1</th>
<th>Step 2</th>
<th>Step 3</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(−10K)</td>
<td>(−20K)</td>
<td>(−30K)</td>
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Echelons Above Corps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps HQ &amp; troops</th>
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<tr>
<td>n/c \textsuperscript{a}</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Armored Cavalry Regiment</th>
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<th>Heavy division</th>
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Composite division

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<tr>
<th>Heavy brigade</th>
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<tr>
<td>Deactivate</td>
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ARRC-ACCB

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<th>Light brigade for Italy</th>
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\textsuperscript{a} n/c means no change.

\textsuperscript{b} Indicates personnel reduction but not deactivation.

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the final force structure. If the starting point were two two-brigade divisions, the strategy would differ in detail but not in principle. The key feature is that the light forces are protected during the reductions. This strategy does not constitute a recommendation as to the desired size of USAREUR. The authors feel that the planned level of 92,000 personnel, with the structure we propose, represents the best long-term USAREUR strength level. However, political and budgetary realities make it prudent to plan for further reductions. This proposed strategy will provide a logical, phased drawdown of the Army force structure in Europe while retaining the operational capability necessary to support NATO’s highest priority needs as well as to complement the Army structure based in the United States.

The three steps proposed constitute reductions approximating 10,000 personnel each in the authorized strength of USAREUR. The downward-pointing arrows for the high-level forces and the corps headquarters and troops indicate some incremental personnel reductions that reflect the reductions in subordinate troops, but no element of these two levels would be completely eliminated. With the completion of Step 3, USAREUR would be at what we consider to be the minimum structure that should be considered. Beyond this level, USAREUR would rapidly lose credibility, and it would be necessary to assess whether it would be in the best interests of the United States to withdraw all but liaison elements rather than commit very scarce resources to a force that provides little military capability and is of dubious political value.

While we consider it practical to take the reductions specified, we recognize that they are not without cost. If USAREUR were reorganized at the 92,000-person level as we recommend, it would have the capacity to deploy a heavy division outside of Germany but only with the full support of the forward brigade of the other heavy division. The first step in the reductions below 92,000-person eliminates that separate brigade. This move more or less ensures that there is no longer a fully deployable heavy division in USAREUR. The degree of deployability of the division is debatable, but Step 2 almost certainly reduces the deployable element to a brigade or less.

After Step 3, the only heavy elements in USAREUR would be the forward brigade of one heavy division and the armored cavalry regiment. While this force can still perform what we consider the most critical likely missions in Europe, it must be recognized that there is a considerable cost in terms of the heavy component of the force. One significant feature is that the combat-to-support ratio declines precipitously. Another feature is that training opportunity, and the pride and morale that go with being well trained, goes
down with the size of the force. There just would not be enough heavy combat troops present to train properly or to engage their support forces.

Figure 4.4 shows an alternative reduction strategy beginning with the same force structure at 92,000 but one in which the Armored Cavalry Regiment is deactivated as part of the reduction strategy. This approach has the advantage of being able to retain at least one heavy maneuver brigade in each of two divisions. Many consider the retention of the divisional heavy brigades more important than the presence of the ACR.

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<tr>
<th>92K</th>
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<td>(-10K)</td>
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Echelons Above Corps  
Corps HQ & troops  
Armored Cavalry Regiment  
Heavy division  
Composite division

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<td>Heavy brigade</td>
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<td>ARRC-ACCB</td>
<td>n/c</td>
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<tr>
<td>Light brigade for Italy</td>
<td>n/c</td>
<td>n/c</td>
<td>n/c</td>
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</tbody>
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\(^a\) n/c means no change.  
\(^b\) Indicates personnel reduction but not deactivation.

**Figure 4.4—Reduction Sequence Removing the ACR**
5. Conclusions

The situation in Europe is indeed changing rapidly, and it is appropriate for the United States to adapt to that change. However, there are distinct benefits to the United States that accrue from having ground forces stationed in Europe. Those benefits accrue, however, only if the ground force stationed in Europe is properly designed and assigned the proper missions.

The previously planned force level of 92,000 Army personnel in Europe was a good compromise level and, properly structured, it could meet all obligations to NATO and provide a capable, flexible force for other needs of the United States. Our analysis indicates that, if done with care, some further reductions can be taken and still allow a degree of capability and flexibility; the Army needs to prepare for the possibility that such reductions will be forced by political events. However, it is also important to recognize that a reduced force will contain a progressively higher percentage of support functions and can be, and be seen to be, "hollow." At a point not too far below the 92,000 level, USAREUR will cease to contribute to the overall capability of the U.S. Army and will instead begin to affect the capability of the CONUS-based contingency forces. Our research indicates that below a force level of approximately 60,000 USAREUR personnel, such deleterious effects begin to be seen and become more marked as the force level is further reduced. Further reductions should be approached with great care. It would be inappropriate to arbitrarily cut forces in Europe, merely to reduce the total force to a number smaller than the currently approved level.