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*Post-Mobilization
Training of Army
Reserve Component
Combat Units*

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ARROYO CENTER

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SUMMARY

The United States has responded to recent changes in the international political scene by beginning to substantially reduce military forces. As forces are reduced, questions arise about their structure, particularly the balance between reserve and active forces. The situation is complicated because the Army must be ready to respond in the future to a variety of uncertain contingencies, which may require that combat forces deploy overseas on short notice.

Active forces can respond to such needs but are expensive; reserve forces are more economical but tend to be less ready and hence would take more time to deploy. Vigorous debate has ensued about the share of the future Army force structure that should be accorded to each type of force. That debate frequently centers on the responsiveness of the reserve forces and most frequently on the time required to train reserve combat elements before deployment.

PURPOSE AND APPROACH

This report estimates how long it takes Reserve Component combat forces to prepare for deployment to a wartime theater. For its data, it draws on four main sources of information:

- Information on the train-up process of the three National Guard round-out brigades that were activated for service in Operation Desert Shield/Storm;
- Analyses and projections of Reserve Component training times made by the Department of the Army Inspector General;
- Training plans followed by Active Component units during peacetime to sustain readiness; and

- An extensive series of interviews with both Active and Reserve Component personnel and observations of the 1992 summer Annual Training cycle for National Guard brigades.

POST-MOBILIZATION ACTIVITIES REQUIRED

Combining information from these sources, we defined a minimum set of activities that a Reserve Component combat unit would have to complete following mobilization. We identified 12 specific activities in four general categories, as shown in Table S.1.

In defining these activities, we made several assumptions about the status of the units and their peacetime training and maintenance activities. For example, we assumed that units were fully resourced (at Authorized Level of Organization 1) and had at least 90 percent of

Table S.1
Necessary Post-Mobilization Activities

Mobilization Activities	
1.	Mobilize, move from home station to mobilization station
2.	Move from mobilization station to collective training site
3.	Prepare for overseas movement and individual training
Crew/Platoon Training	
4.	Maintenance, gunnery preparation, Conduct of Fire Trainer, crew gunnery skills test
5.	Gunnery Tables IV–VIII ^a
6.	Gunnery Tables XI–XII
7.	Squad drills, platoon lanes, situational training exercises
Training While Task Organized	
8.	Company team lanes and situational training exercises
9.	Company/battalion combined arms live fire exercises
10.	Battalion task force operations
11.	Brigade and battalion task force operations
Training Recovery and Preparation to Move	
12.	Maintenance, recovery, and preparation for loading

^aGunnery Tables IV through VIII are sets of engagements and targets for tank and Bradley Fighting Vehicle crews. Tables XI and XII are engagements for platoons (groups of four vehicles).

their personnel. Thus, no additional activity or time has been included to bring a unit up to full strength, to train personnel for military occupational specialty (MOS) qualification, or to fill out its equipment set for deployment. More important, we assumed that the peacetime training program for the units' leadership has allowed them to complete their preparation in parallel with and in conjunction with gunnery and field maneuver training in the post-mobilization phase.

Gunnery Tables IV through VIII are sets of engagements and targets for tank and Bradley Fighting Vehicle crews. Tables XI and XII are engagements for platoons (groups of four vehicles).

ESTIMATING THE TIME REQUIRED

Once we identified the activities required, we then developed estimates of the time to complete them. We reviewed our data sources to determine how long Army units have typically taken in the past to train for the identified tasks, deriving average times when we had information from multiple units. Not surprisingly, the sources provided a range of times. For example, units plan 21 to 29 days for a brigade to execute Gunnery Tables IV through VIII. These figures provided a basis for our estimates.

Again, we had to make several assumptions about the post-mobilization training process. Specifically, we assumed that:

- Sufficient training support would be available to the unit (normally from an Active Component unit).
- Both gunnery and collective training would take place at one location.
- Units would have to travel from their mobilization station to the collective training site.
- Some simultaneous training would occur, particularly for the higher-level leadership.
- Unit-level maintenance could be sustained as an integral part of the training time allotted.

Given the data and these assumptions, we framed three scenarios for post-mobilization training, which we labeled optimistic, intermediate, and pessimistic. Each scenario reflects a different level of possible success of current Army initiatives to improve the peacetime training of the Reserve Components, ranging from meeting all expectations (the optimistic scenario) to failing in many of them (the pessimistic case). Each case also assumes an increasingly detrimental effect from skill atrophy and personnel turbulence. Table S.2 shows our estimates for the three cases.

Table S.2
Post-Mobilization Time Estimates
for Three Cases

Case	Days Required
Optimistic	79
Intermediate	104
Pessimistic	128

Two caveats must be borne in mind when considering these estimates. First, the estimates assume that the leadership can complete its command and control training in parallel with troop training. Should the leadership training extend beyond the predicted period or require the participation of the lower echelons to complete it or verify its success, a longer time would be required. Second, the estimates assume adequate training support from the Active Component. Should that support be unavailable for whatever reason, again the process would require more time.