During the early Reagan years, the debate over nuclear modernization and arms control by far captured the lion's share of public attention on both sides of the Atlantic. Behind the scenes, meanwhile, an equally important drama was being played out over NATO's conventional defenses. The developments in the conventional arena were less visible because they were distributed among many different and unglamorous weapon systems, none of which triggered passionate emotions. Nonetheless, they had far greater fiscal ramifications than did nuclear modernization. Whereas the entire INF program cost no more than $10 billion, NATO's five-year conventional defense budget totaled a staggering $1.35 trillion. Moreover, NATO's conventional force strength arguably mattered more for alliance security in the long haul than did the Pershing II and GLCMs. The INF program was a powerful symbol of NATO's political willpower, but the conventional forces had a larger bearing on deterrence, defense, and the strategy of flexible response.¹

Throughout the Cold War, Central Europe had seen the greatest concentration of military power anywhere in the world, but by the time Reagan entered office, it had been transformed into a bristling armed camp that staggered the imagination. Immediately to the east of the inter-German border, the Warsaw Pact deployed fully 20,000 tanks, 25,000 armored personnel carriers, 7,000 artillery tubes, 3,000 aircraft, several hundred attack helicopters, and nearly one million troops. To the West, NATO deployed roughly three-quarters as many weapons and troops. Almost daily, new weapons arrived off the production line to replace old models, producing a constant upgrading on both sides. Backing up these forces on both sides were mobilization systems capable of quickly generating thousands more troops, including large ground and air reinforcements. This especially was the case in the USSR, where a massive Soviet Army stood ominously poised, allegedly ready to be called up on short notice.

Western Europe somehow had grown inured to this situation in ways that diverted public attention from it. Because no political crises had occurred in recent years, even knowledgeable analysts dismissed the confrontation as an anachronism, and others wrote it off as a perverse product of a mindless action-

¹The analysis here of NATO conventional defense measures draws on Weinberger's posture statements, popular accounts of the time, interview material, and personal recollections.
reaction cycle. The mere presence of these hugely expensive forces, however, belied facile explanations. Europe's history in the 19th and 20th centuries suggested that large military forces were not built to keep them unused.

In the Europe of the 1980s, war was not in the offing, but this did not mean that the forces of the two blocs served no coherent purpose. The evolving character of the forces suggested conscious goals beyond competition for its own sake. Soviet spokesmen criticized NATO for preparing to attack the Warsaw Pact, but Western analysts saw the situation quite differently. To them, NATO's forces were built in accordance with professional military standards for defending territory the size of West Germany. By contrast, the Warsaw Pact's far larger forces were transparently sized, equipped, trained, and deployed for offensive purposes. As a matter of mathematics, the two blocs seemed to be pursuing very different strategies. Especially because Warsaw Pact forces were judged stronger than NATO's, the conclusion suggested itself that Soviet strategy was being driven by aggressive political and military goals. The Soviet government denied this charge, but the Reagan administration was not interested in hearing what it regarded as crass fiction.

Faced with this potentially explosive and increasingly more expensive competition, Western governments would have preferred to negotiate the problem away. With the failure of MBFR and the USSR's clear intent to remain in the forward areas, however, NATO had little choice but to maintain a competitive stance. During the Reagan era, NATO consequently sought to strengthen its conventional posture in affordable ways that shored up its military strategy and defense capability. If NATO's efforts in this area were less visible than the INF program, their impact on alliance security is also more difficult to measure with comparable precision. This is particularly so because, apart from the United States, NATO did not seek stronger conventional defenses through major spending hikes or a larger posture. Instead, emphasis was placed on achieving enhanced effectiveness in a variety of important but nebulous areas. Included were improvement programs in technology, doctrine, force structure adjustments, armaments cooperation, and combined planning. The difficulty encountered in gauging the impact of these programs, however, does not negate their positive effects on the force balance in Europe.

By any measure, the result was a stronger alliance defense posture in Central Europe, where the NATO/Warsaw Pact confrontation was most dangerous. As the Reagan-era SACEURs (Generals Bernard Rogers and John Galvin) pointed out, NATO by no means eliminated the military risks facing it. The Warsaw Pact's own substantial force improvements made this goal infeasible. Nevertheless, NATO did succeed in maintaining a competitive stance while elevating the uncertainties facing enemy military planners. Consequently, it upped the margin of deterrence and defense in ways that had an important bearing on European security affairs, including the USSR's willingness to come to terms with the West.
THE CDI

In contrast to its steady drumbeating about nuclear modernization, the Reagan administration initially approached NATO’s conventional defenses in a more low-keyed manner. Reagan recognized the importance of strengthening NATO’s conventional forces, and Weinberger had reflected this philosophy in his initial report to Congress. The administration, however, chose not to launch a visible, U.S.-sponsored, alliancewide initiative comparable to Carter’s LTDP. Indeed, in 1981 it retired the LTDP as official policy and elected instead to work behind the scenes. As the INF debate heated up and the need grew to husband its political capital, the administration became even more chary about making a public cause out of conventional defense.

The Reagan administration, nonetheless, aspired to enhance NATO’s conventional deterrent. Relying on its massive budgetary increases to elevate the American military contribution, it sought to carry out Carter’s rapid reinforcement programs and to fund an ambitious modernization of U.S. forces committed to NATO. The administration, however, was not willing to engage in a major expansion of U.S. ground and air forces. As a result, it relied on the West European allies to make up the difference in required military improvements. To achieve this goal, it elected to rely on bilateral contacts with individual allies and also to work through the established NATO force planning process, run by NATO headquarters in Brussels and SHAPE headquarters in Mons, Belgium.

From these two headquarters, the alliance engaged in a laborious effort to coordinate member-nation defense plans by trying to drive them down a common path toward a stronger combined posture. The principal documents of NATO’s planning machinery, issued biennially, were alliance “force goals” and “resource guidance.” The force goals spelled out the military contributions each ally was expected to make in order to fulfill NATO’s strategy and meet the requirements laid down by alliance military commanders. The resource guidance, in turn, identified the funding commitments and other inputs that would be needed to bring the force goals to life.

Although both documents were written by NATO staffs, they also were coordinated with member-nation defense ministries before publication. Consequently, they reflected a combination of “top-down” planning by NATO military commanders and “bottom-up” consensus formation with the various countries. This approach ensured that NATO’s plans would not be drafted in a budgetary and programmatic vacuum, but it also granted all nations considerable influence over the demands levied on them. It thereby guaranteed that the alliance could pursue only strategy and force posture ambitions which accorded with member-nation wishes. As a result, NATO’s force planning process provided a marvelous vehicle for coordinating an effective military buildup when alliance members wanted to proceed in that direction, but it also offered a powerful braking mechanism when they wanted to slow the pace down.

The Reagan administration pursued a two-phased political strategy that first encouraged the NATO staffs to endorse properly demanding force goals and re-
source guidance, and then bilaterally lobbied the various countries to carry out these instructions. Interestingly, the Reagan touch in this area was a relatively light one. Though Reagan sought to drive up U.S. spending by 7–9% annually and exerted strong pressures on the allies to support INF policy, he twisted far fewer arms in the conventional arena. When Congress began to look askance at the growing disparity between U.S. and allied spending, Weinberger, Haig, Schultz, Rogers, and other U.S. officials all privately urged the allies to do more. But Reagan himself kept his distance from the debate, never attaching the personal prestige to NATO conventional defense policy that Carter lent to the LTDP.

In early 1981, the administration did contemplate asking the allies to elevate their own spending by 5% annually in real terms, an amount that would have responded to the U.S. buildup at least in spirit. The administration, however, thought better of the idea by deciding instead to stay with the current spending target of only 3%, a leftover from Carter and the LTDP. The allies agreed with this approach and further accepted a U.S. recommendation to peg the force goals at a somewhat higher level (1% additional funding growth), thereby giving each allied defense ministry a “reasonable challenge” to aspire toward. As a result, the administration was able to tell Congress with a straight face that it had sought and received assurances of West European participation in the defense buildup. The difference between the U.S. and allied spending plans, however, remained stark, and promised to grow even larger as Reagan’s buildup proceeded.

In adopting its accommodating approach, the Reagan administration did not reflect the fondest desires of SACEUR and other NATO commanders, who would have preferred higher targets for spending and forces. Indeed, U.S. and NATO studies of the time suggested that allied spending increases of at least 5% annually, sustained for five years, were needed to achieve all necessary improvements for a confident force posture. Despite the administration’s preferences for a more vigorous response, however, two considerations led it to desist. Because so many pressures were already being placed on the allies in the nuclear arena, heavy-handed U.S. demands for conventional enhancements might have overloaded the circuits in ways leading to diminished support for the Pershing II/GLCM program. Also the allies had no intention of emulating the U.S. defense buildup irrespective of nuclear events. Indeed, most allied governments reported (correctly as events turned out) that an average of only 2% annual increases would be forthcoming. When it received this discouraging message, the administration decided to bow to political reality by focusing on the art of the possible.

Complex motives lay behind the allies’ stance, with the exact reasons varying from country to country, and from faction to faction within each nation. In general, all allied governments were opposed to elevating defense spending at a faster rate than their national economies were growing. Moreover, Western Europe in the early 1980s was sliding into a recession, which boded ill for sizable spending hikes. Some nations also did not fully share the idea of a more stalwart conventional posture for strategy reasons; in these quarters, a pre-
delicition for relying on nuclear deterrence still existed. Other nations, concerned about Reagan's maritime favoritism and congressional budget-cutting, worried that an allied buildup would pave the way to U.S. troop withdrawals. Still others felt that, with nuclear modernization under way, conventional enhancements were less necessary for deterrence and would merely rub salt in the USSR's wounds.

Of those allies that did favor a stronger NATO posture, some questioned whether the pessimistic force balance assessments emanating from Washington and Mons were technically correct. Others felt that NATO could improve its defenses by eliminating redundancy and related inefficiencies. Finally, a few nations, especially those located in less-threatened areas, fell victim to the free-rider spirit and were willing to let the United States, West Germany, and other front-line states carry the load. Taken together, all these reasons left the allies willing to steer a stable course toward gradual force improvements, but unwilling to step on the accelerator to the degree that Reagan was doing in the United States.

The five-year spending plans endorsed by the allies failed to achieve the 3% standard by a margin of only $14 billion, but fell $30 billion short of the "challenge" measures and nearly $60 billion short of the SACEUR-preferred 5% standard. Almost all of the shortfall came at the expense of new modernization programs. Still, NATO was hardly left penniless. Because of the Reagan increases, U.S. and allied defense budgets together were still growing fast enough to meet roughly 90–95% of NATO's ideal. In total, the alliance would have available a large sum of nearly $350 billion for investment, acquisition, and procurement. U.S. forces, of course, would improve far more rapidly, but even a 2% annual spending increase would permit the allies to undertake a fair number of important measures.²

Nevertheless, the allies' budgetary shortfall had important policy implications for NATO. It by no means doomed the alliance to falling far behind Warsaw Pact improvement rates; nor did it mean that a more stalwart posture was beyond the pale. But it implied that, unless other means could be found, NATO's posture would improve at a slower and more steady pace than Reagan and NATO military authorities wanted. This troublesome prospect, in turn, created powerful reasons for trying to discover ways to get more mileage out of the resources that would be available. Because no other alternative beckoned, the prescription for curing NATO's conventional defense ills thus was a combination of modest funding increases and a strong dose of enhanced coalition planning and management.

Partly because the Carter administration had been branded as too heavy-handed in pursuing the LTDP, the Reagan administration shied away from directly confronting NATO's conventional defense agenda during its first two years in office. An important exception to this pattern was the administration's efforts in early 1981 to persuade the allies to enhance their forces in ways that

²See DoD, Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense, 1990, for an assessment of allied defense spending trends. Weinberger's posture statements during the mid-1980s provide useful information on NATO's conventional defense measures.
would offset losses if U.S. forces had to be diverted to southwestern Asia. When the allies responded in a half-hearted way, however, the administration backed off and thereafter devoted its political leadership primarily to INF modernization.3

The Reagan administration, to be sure, was far from entirely inactive in the conventional arena. In NATO defense ministerial meetings, Weinberger called attention to the mounting Soviet threat and sounded a warning about the need to respond. On the programmatic front, the administration secured West Germany’s signature to the Host Nation Support agreement in early 1982. Also, it presided over the launching of NATO’s AWACS program and other air defense measures. Another innovative step was the administration’s decision to procure the British Rapier air defense system, which was to be manned by British soldiers providing low-altitude protection of U.S. air bases in the United Kingdom. Behind the scenes, meanwhile, the Reagan administration worked closely with the British and Turkish defense ministries to strengthen their forces. In the spring of 1982, it provided valuable assistance to the British in their quest to retake the Falkland Islands from Argentina. And it showed its interest in NATO planning and management by helping SHAPE install a better information system for monitoring progress toward NATO’s force goals.

Although these efforts undeniably were important, they also came across as scattered and diffuse in ways that suggested a lack of an overall policy. As 1982 gave way to 1983, consequently, the Reagan administration began to come under attack for being too inactive. Complaints began issuing from SHAPE Headquarters, and allied defense ministries were themselves beginning to wonder. Moreover, the Pentagon bureaucracy below Weinberger and his senior advisers began voicing doubts about whether the United States was showing sufficient leadership in the conventional realm. So also were members of Congress, who began complaining about both administration policy and the allies’ sluggish defense efforts. Ominously, in June 1984 Senator Nunn attached an amendment to the Military Appropriations Bill providing for the possible withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe if NATO’s conventional defense efforts did not improve. This amendment led to no actual withdrawals because the administration provided reassurances of its intentions to carry out Nunn’s larger policy wishes. It did reflect, however, mounting frustration in Congress that no longer could be ignored.

The effect of these diverse pressures was to propel the administration toward more active leadership of NATO, but initially in ways that further suggested a lack of coherent policy. During 1983, a plethora of ideas sprang forth from the Pentagon and the U.S. analytical community, all calling for NATO conventional upgrades, but in quite diverse ways. One concept, labeled “Counterair 90,” called for defense against enemy tactical ballistic missile attack, including NATO acquisition of offensive conventional missiles of its own. Another concept, dubbed “Emerging Technologies,” called for NATO to enhance its air and ground forces with highly effective munitions and guidance systems due to be-

---

3See Sherwood, Allies in Crisis.
come available shortly. A third idea declared that NATO should enhance its ground reserves and prepare the terrain along the inter-German border, and a fourth idea envisioned improved armaments cooperation. Yet a fifth idea recommended that NATO place greater emphasis on maneuver doctrine. Indeed, one academic expert boldly suggested that, in a war, NATO’s ground forces should attack into East Germany in an effort to unhinge a Warsaw Pact offensive.

Many of these ideas had merit, but they also originated at levels below Weinberger and thus lacked political sanction by the administration. Moreover, they did not add up to a coordinated program and therefore deluged NATO with a flood of recommendations pulling in very different directions. Left unclear were a number of critical issues, including how priorities were to be allocated among these concepts, how they were to work together, where the money was to come from, and who was to implement them. Consequently, the Reagan administration now found itself facing criticism of an entirely different sort. Whereas earlier it had been attacked for being too passive about NATO’s conventional defense problems, now it was accused of being too frantic and out of control.

Reacting to these charges, Weinberger set about to gather the reins of power in his hands. Assembling a senior-level Pentagon working group drawn from OSD, the JCS, and the services, Weinberger instructed this group to gather the various ideas into one tent and sort them out. The participants were to draw upon Pentagon thinking, but also to seek out the ideas of SACEUR, NATO’s civilian headquarters, allied defense ministries, and outside consultants. The goal was to develop an overall program not only to guide Pentagon force planning, but also to provide the administration a coherent policy that could be tabled in NATO’s defense councils. The effort was to prove successful and elevated NATO conventional defense issues to a position of higher status in the Reagan administration. By early 1984, the administration was now better able to assert leadership within the alliance in a focused way that could produce tangible results.

Across the Atlantic, many allied governments by now had come to welcome the prospect of more assertive U.S. leadership on conventional defense. Driven by a desire to speed West European integration, the allies were endeavoring to reinvigorate the long-moribund WEU as a security organ and otherwise to strengthen defense cooperation among themselves. For example, the West Germans and French were now engaging in regular high-level defense exchanges and were moving toward creation of a Franco-German brigade. Yet West European governments also recognized that NATO remained the West's primary security institution, and that active U.S. leadership was needed if the alliance was to continue working.

Earlier the allies had adopted a relaxed stance about conventional defense, but with the ongoing Warsaw Pact buildup now attracting greater public attention and credibility, their attitude was beginning to change. They still did not want to spend more money, but the idea of enhanced cooperation and better planning appealed to them. This particularly was the case in Bonn, where the
new Kohl government wanted warmer ties with the United States. Eager to
demonstrate its status as a good ally, it felt that a more vigorous NATO conven-
tional response to the Soviets was needed. Also, the Kohl government was
growing worried about negative trends in the United States, and wanted to act
in ways that would help reverse them. One German concern was increased
congressional grumbling about burden-sharing; the Nunn amendment was an
especially worrisome shot across the bow. A deeper worry, however, was the
emerging American attitude toward flexible response.

In mid-1982, four former senior U.S. officials had written a *Foreign Affairs*
article calling into question NATO’s plan to stave off conventional defeat by re-
sorting to nuclear escalation. Among this group, which came to be called “the
gang of four,” was Robert McNamara, who had been a principal architect of MC
14/3. Declaring that a U.S. president would be unlikely to cross the nuclear
threshold if the enemy didn’t do so first, McNamara and his partners urged
NATO to adopt a doctrine of “no first use.” That is, NATO’s strategy was to
abandon any pretense of escalating a conventional war. To shore up its deter-
rrent posture in compensation, NATO was to bolster its conventional defenses to
the point where nuclear weapons would no longer be needed to rebuff nonnu-
clear aggression.4

Because its authors were so eminent, their article attracted widespread at-
tention and triggered outright dismay in West Germany. An eminent group of
Germans immediately responded with an article of their own defending the role
of nuclear weapons in flexible response. They also, however, acknowledged the
need for stronger conventional defenses in Central Europe in order to keep the
nuclear threshold as high as possible. Their response reflected what came to be
the dominant consensus among the Kohl government. Kohl and his advisers
wanted to preserve U.S. extended deterrence as a hedge against conventional
defeat, but they also recognized that U.S. support for this position was weakening.
Accordingly, they felt, NATO now needed to bolster its conventional de-
fenses. Moreover, they also recognized that, as a practical matter, extended de-
terrence would be more likely to remain in place if the nuclear threshold was
kept high enough to mollify the Americans.

Kohl’s support enabled Bonn and Washington to agree to cooperate on
breathing greater life and coherence into NATO’s conventional defense efforts.
With Weinberger’s consent, a Pentagon team traveled to Brussels to work with
NATO, SHAPE, and German officials on an overall force improvement plan.
The document produced came to be called the “Report on Conventional De-
fense Initiatives” (CDI). Formally adopted by NATO defense ministers at their
DPC meeting in May 1985, the CDI charted NATO’s conventional plans for the
next five to ten years. Along with the CDI came a second document (MC 299)
written by NATO’s Military Committee, which was adopted the following De-

---

4See McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, and Gerard Smith, “Nuclear
Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance,” *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1982. The issues surrounding no first
use are examined in John D. Steinbruner and Leon V. Sigal (eds.), *Alliance Security: NATO and the
cember. Entitled "Conceptual Military Framework" (CMF), it looked 20 years into the future.\(^5\)

These two studies laid down planning concepts that were visionary but not revolutionary. Together, they called for sustained NATO-wide cooperation on behalf of a stronger conventional deterrent. They did not call for a dramatic upsurge in spending, but they did endorse sustained increases of moderate dimensions. Refraining from any advocacy of major change in NATO's military strategy, they called for a better capability to execute flexible response. This goal was to be achieved primarily through sound planning aimed at setting priorities and allocating resources in intelligent ways. Similar to the LTDP, the CDI report endorsed a balanced investment strategy in several different areas, with special emphasis on modernization, larger war reserve stocks, better reserve mobilization, and purchase of new technologies. The CMF report, in turn, addressed long-range military threats and missions and sought to integrate future technologies and operational concepts.

These two reports, whose recommendations were first incorporated in NATO's official force goals in spring 1985, by no means were cure-alls. They neither resolved NATO's budgetary dilemmas nor established clear priorities among competing programs. They also left untied several loose ends regarding exactly how new technologies and doctrines were to be laid atop old forces and strategies. Nevertheless, CDI and CMF also performed positive functions. By helping clear away the fog of confusion, they marked the emergence of greater consensus on NATO conventional defense ends and means. They also successfully established useful, if general, guidelines on future planning. Above all, they laid to rest criticism that NATO had no coherent conventional policy. Once they had been adopted, the alliance came away feeling it had gained a better sense of direction and purpose. As a result, the Reagan administration took another important step toward capturing the confidence of its allies.

**FORCExE IMPROVEMENT CONCEPTS**

NATO's new planning guidelines emphasized improvements in four areas: air defense, operational deep fires, enhancements in ground combat forces, and maneuver-oriented doctrine. By design, these improvements were to work together in ways stiffening the backbone of NATO's forward defense strategy in Central Europe. Because of their importance, they will be addressed here in enough detail to illuminate their contours. The stage can be set for analyzing them by first describing the tenuous military situation confronting NATO in Central Europe on the eve of the CDI and CMF.

As of the mid-1980s, NATO planners still feared that a massive 90-division Warsaw Pact attack could be launched within a month of mobilization and reinforcement. As a result, U.S. reinforcements would not yet have arrived

\(^5\)For official accounts of CDI and CMF, see NATO Facts and Figures and Weinberger's posture statements for 1985 and 1986. See also the various DoD Soviet Military Power studies of the mid-1980s.
in full strength, and NATO—temporarily with only about 45 division/ 
equivalents—would be outnumbered by nearly 2:1 in ground combat forces 
and associated firepower. Because the air balance would be about 1:1 (roughly 
4,000 aircraft apiece), the alliance would not enjoy a sufficient air 
advantage, notwithstanding its qualitative superiority, to make up for the ground disparity.

One of the great puzzles of the military balance was that NATO’s ground 
posture of 45 divisions fielded nearly as many soldiers as did the Warsaw Pact’s 
90 divisions, yet NATO found itself outgunned 2:1 in maneuver units, tanks, 
artillery and other major weapons. Many reasons accounted for the difference, 
but the primary cause was that NATO’s armies allocated far more troops (per 
division) to logistic support than did the Soviet Army. For example, each U.S. 
Army division of 16,000 soldiers received rear-area support from fully 32,000 
troops performing combat support and combat service support missions. By 
contrast, a comparably armed Soviet division of 12,000 soldiers had only about 
10,000 support troops in the rear. As a result, 48,000 soldiers were required to 
field a fully supported American division, but the Soviets needed only 22,000 
men to deploy a division with nearly an identical suite of heavy weapons. Most 
West European armies fell about half-way between these extremes, and thus 
were also left with relatively small combat forces. The result was a major difference 
in “tooth-to-tail” ratios. Whereas Warsaw Pact forces seemed all teeth 
with little tail, NATO’s armies had large tails but seemingly insufficient teeth.6

To a degree, NATO’s proportionately larger support forces provided some 
measure of assurance that the ground balance was closer than surface 
appearances suggested. These support units promised to provide help in such critical 
areas as maintenance, engineering, and ammunition resupply, thereby aiding 
NATO’s combat forces against Soviet units that seemed thinly supported in relation 
to the demands of the modern battlefield. Nonetheless, a sizable portion 
of NATO’s support posture stemmed from inefficiencies embedded in coalition 
planning. Because Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces were tightly integrated, lean 
support structures were possible: Support assets could readily be concentrated 
in areas of intense combat while safely leaving less active sectors only thinly 
supported. By contrast, NATO’s forces were still composed of separate national 
armies, a practice compelling each corps to build a large support posture for in-

6For analysis, see Edward Luttwak, “The Operational Art of War,” International Security, Vol. 5, 
“NATO Myths,” Foreign Policy, No. 46, Spring 1982, pp. 48–68; John J. Mearsheimer, “Maneuver, 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1983, Chaps. 6–7; Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for 
Defense Planning. The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1982; Joshua M. Epstein, 
Measuring Military Power: The Soviet Air Threat to Europe, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
N.J., 1984; Seymour J. Deitchman, New Technology and Military Power: General Purpose Forces for 
the 1980s and Beyond, Westview Press, Boulder, Colo., 1973; Anthony Cordesman, NATO’s Central 
Region Forces, Ianes, 1988; Jeffrey Simon, NATO-Warsaw Pact Force Mobilization, National Defense 
tense combat on the assumption that logistics aid would not be forthcoming from neighboring corps.

As a result, NATO was left with uniformly large support forces across the entire Central Region, but because major enemy attacks were expected in only a few sectors, just a portion of these assets were likely to contribute to the alliance’s cause. Moreover, some of NATO’s support assets seemed to provide sustainment rather than immediate combat power. Left unclear was whether these units could provide much help in the short and violent war that the Soviet Army planned to fight, where immediately available combat forces were at a premium, and staying power played a less important role.

The commonly recognized solution was for NATO to pursue multinational logistics planning, but national sovereignty prevented major departures toward this goal, and the practice of relying on different weapon systems further compounded the problem. Various U.S. Secretaries of Defense—including McNamara, Schlesinger, and Brown—made efforts to standardize weapons and to shift American soldiers from support to combat functions; but lacking an overall NATO response, only minor progress was made. The same pattern of frustration applied to NATO’s other national armies. Critics urged a major switch to more combat forces even in the absence of multinational integration, but NATO’s military commanders resisted with arguments that this step would leave their combat forces lacking required support. By the early 1980s, prevailing opinion held that NATO was doomed to large support structures, and therefore would continue to find itself outgunned and at risk.

NATO thus found itself still facing a serious imbalance in the early stages of the reinforcement process, which denied confidence in the ability of its forces to hold out until its full mobilization efforts could grind into gear. To be sure, NATO’s ongoing modernization efforts were helping rectify the situation, but not fast enough to suit Reagan and senior NATO military authorities. With Carter’s LTDP, the gap in combat power had slowly begun to close, and Reagan’s defense program was further accelerating U.S. improvement rates. Nevertheless, NATO’s D-Day posture continued to evidence serious structural problems that left itself vulnerable to a blitzkrieg attack, and the Soviets were acquiring a growing capability to execute a blitzkrieg.

By the mid-1980s, NATO’s posture had long since acquired a credible capacity to frustrate a crude “broad front” attack in which enemy forces would advance in linear formation along the entire inter-German border. In this event, NATO’s ground forces would be outnumbered by a uniform 2:1 ratio along the entire front. NATO’s own firepower and the classical advantages of fighting on the defense, however, worked together to give NATO a theoretical capacity to achieve favorable 2:1 exchange rates and perhaps more. In other words, NATO in this case would destroy at least two enemy tanks for every tank that it lost, thereby maintaining a constant 2:1 force ratio as the battle dragged on.\footnote{For a more complete discussion of doctrinal issues surrounding conventional defense in Central Europe, see Golden et al., NATO at Forty.}
What existed in theory, of course, did not necessarily apply in practice. Even against a broad-front attack, the prospect of being outnumbered 2:1 required the defense to fight with high skill, coordination, and coherence. Nevertheless, NATO's forces were well-equipped, supported, and trained to fight this kind of war, and their qualitative edge in ground attack missions from the air gave them added strength. As a result, the dynamics of competitive exchange rates created the prospect of a brutal attrition battle in which the two sides would batter each other into oblivion.

In the process, the Warsaw Pact probably would advance into NATO territory, but not rapidly. In all likelihood, this war would turn into a lengthy and slow-moving battle in which the outcome would hinge on which side dominated the attrition process. Here, relative sustainability entered the military equation. The Soviets, of course, were capable of drawing on additional reserves from the USSR to increase their staying power. NATO, however, would benefit from a long war by being able to draw on U.S.-based reserves and to use its better maintenance and repair capability. As a result, an attrition war seemed likely to turn into a stalemate in which the Soviet attack would advance only a short distance and then bog down in the face of major casualties inflicted by NATO. In the end, the Soviets would have suffered greatly in exchange for only modest territorial gains. Moreover, if NATO successfully dominated the attrition contest, it might eventually acquire the capacity to counterattack and regain lost ground. This grim prospect hardly provided the Soviets with an incentive to seek war.

Recognizing NATO's growing capacity to frustrate a broad-front attack, Soviet military leaders had switched doctrines in the late 1970s. Abandoning interest in broad-front tactics, they increasingly turned to a blitzkrieg strategy of breakthrough and maneuver. In this strategy, Warsaw Pact forces would concentrate at selected points and advance in successive waves of echeloned formations. Their goal would be to punch through NATO's frontal wall and advance into the rear areas. There, the battle could be fought under fluid conditions that hopefully would strip away the defense's classical advantages and enable the Warsaw Pact's numerically superior forces to predominate.

This strategy by no means was easy to execute; indeed, it was far harder to pull off than a broad-front attack. However, it held out the promise of bypassing NATO's well-armed forward defense and thereby avoiding a stalemate. During World War II, the German Wehrmacht had shown that a blitzkrieg strategy could work even under conditions of numerical parity. The Warsaw Pact's numerical superiority increased the odds that this strategy could work for the Soviets.

As Figure 19.1 illustrates, NATO's principal worry centered on what might happen if the Soviets carried out their doctrine of warfare by breakthrough and maneuver. In this event, NATO officials fretted, concentrated enemy attacks might well be able to gain decisive breakthroughs. The risk would be magnified because NATO's forward defense concept allocated most ground units to establish a linear defense along the entire inter-German border. As a result, NATO's front line was uniformly thin and few forces were left over to form
operational reserves in the rear areas, thereby weakening NATO’s capacity to contain concentrated attacks. If the Soviets did puncture NATO’s front wall, they might then be able to advance unimpeded into the rear areas. Once there, they would be relatively free to engage in classical maneuver operations aimed at ripping apart NATO’s logistics network, enveloping NATO’s combat forces, and defeating them in detail. The result, strategists feared, could be a quick unraveling of NATO’s defenses, followed by their explosive collapse and sudden defeat.

NATO military authorities were especially worried about the defense situation in the northern half of the FRG. There, the nearby location of vital industrial centers prohibited the alliance from yielding any terrain, thus propelling it into an inflexible forward defense concept. Along NATO’s front line were several dangerous corridors that could be used for attack, and to the rear was open terrain that was well-suited for high speed armored advances and swirling maneuver battles.
Guarding this area was NATO's Northern Army Group, commanded by a British marshal and fielding a hodgepodge D-Day force of 17 division/equivalents drawn in nearly equal amounts from fully five different nations. NORTHAG's frontal wall, assigned the mission of protecting the 300-kilometer front there, was composed of four different national corps sectors lined up abreast of each other in layer cake fashion. With its different weapons and tactics, this multinational array positively invited an enemy attack aimed at prying the corps apart. Because nearly all of NORTHAG's posture was committed to front-line duty, its reserves were quite small. The powerful U.S. Army's III Corps was slated to be used as a NORTHAG reserve, but not until it had been transported to Europe from the United States. This combination of a brittle front line, small reserves, and uncertain reinforcements made NORTHAG highly vulnerable.

In the event of war, NATO commanders fully expected massed Soviet columns to descend on NORTHAG, with concentrated assaults most likely to come across the Lüneburger Heide, the Helmstedt-Dortmund corridor, and the Göttingen gap. NATO's plans called for a stiff defense that would take advantage of such terrain features as the Harz Mountains, the Elbe-Seiten Canal, and the Aller, Leine, and Weser rivers. Whether NATO's forces could stop an enemy advance, however, was highly uncertain. The last line of feasible forward defense was the Weser River, which ran only about 75 kilometers west of the inter-German border. Once enemy forces had crossed the Weser River in strength, they would have gained access to open terrain, within easy striking distance of the industrial Ruhr, the Rhine River, and the lowland ports. For these reasons, military defeat in NORTHAG in all likelihood would have spelled strategic disaster for NATO.

Had the circumstances been more accommodating, NATO would have been able to concentrate its own forces in the NORTHAG area. Unfortunately, however, it also had to deploy sufficient forces to guard southern Germany, whose 450 kilometers of border created a far larger zone to defend than NORTHAG. The terrain there was more favorable for the defender than in NORTHAG, but not exclusively so. In particular, the border region provided a number of relatively narrow but still dangerous attack corridors that widened into open territory in the rear areas. Close to NORTHAG's southern boundary were the Hessen corridor, the Fulda gap, and the Meiningen gap. Further to the south were the Cheb gap, the Hof corridor, the Highway 14 approach, and a variety of narrow roads running through the Bavarian forest astride the FRG-Czechoslovakian border.

Reinforcing the military need to guard these attack corridors was West German insistence on not yielding terrain and nearby urban areas. As a result, NATO commanders had to plan on mounting a serious forward defense of southern Germany as well. The plan required construction of a linear layer-cake array similar to NORTHAG's, along with commitment of sizable NATO forces. This area, accordingly, was guarded by the Central Army Group under the command of an American general. CENTAG was assigned a D-Day force of 16 U.S. and German division/equivalents. Nearly all of these units were com-
mitted to CENTAG's four forward corps sectors, which stretched from the Harz Mountains to the Austrian border. As a result, CENTAG also had few reserves, and none that could be easily spared for reassignment to NORTHAG. Backing up CENTAG was the French Army, whose 12 small divisions equated to about six U.S.-sized divisions, but its availability was subject to a decision by the French government.

NATO thus found itself not only outnumbered 2:1 initially, but also hamstrung by operational liabilities stemming from its forward defense doctrine. Further magnifying this problem was the concave nature of the inter-German border, which gave the Soviets interior lines of communication that were shorter than NATO's exterior lines. Consequently, the Soviets were capable of swinging forces on a north-south axis far faster than NATO could move, thus enabling them to concentrate more quickly than NATO could counterconcentrate. This gave Warsaw Pact forces an added advantage in a way that, history showed, had often determined the outcome of major battles.

For all these reasons, NATO faced a daunting problem. With their large forces, the Soviets seemed capable of feinting against CENTAG while attacking with massed armored formations against NORTHAG. NATO's commanders, in turn, would be inhibited from counter-reacting by uncertainty about the enemy attack plan, by the forward defense concept, and by the need to travel longer distances. Adding to NATO's problems would be the relatively equal distribution of forces between NORTHAG and CENTAG, and the relatively few reserves assigned to each Army Group. Also, NATO commanders were worried that the sheer stress of a massive Soviet attack might induce shock among NATO's unseasoned troops and sow confusion in ways that could induce a crippling command paralysis. Even together, these liabilities did not guarantee defeat, especially if the Soviet attack was mounted with inexpert skill. But they did nothing to ease the alliance's conventional defense dilemmas, and they were the source of deep concern among NATO's commanders.

NATO had begun moving in the direction of a counter-blitzkrieg strategy as far back as the mid-1970s, and major parts of Carter's LTDP focused on this. The improvement programs launched then, however, were largely laid atop NATO's existing doctrine and therefore left unresolved structural deficiencies in their wake. By the early 1980s, a consensus was emerging in official circles to push NATO's defense plans several steps further toward an anti-blitzkrieg program.\(^8\)

Although this consensus called for visionary changes in NAC's plans, it eschewed the ideas for radical reforms that had become fashionable in some circles. The first idea that it largely turned aside was role specialization. This concept called for the West Europeans to focus more heavily on continental defense while the United States was to concentrate on maritime missions. The intent was to promote a more efficient use of NATO's scarce resources. The allies would be freed to discard expensive naval forces and thereby could field

---

larger ground and air forces that would more than compensate for any diminished U.S. contribution to continental missions. NATO gave some thought to this idea and favored adoption but in marginal ways only. A blizzard of practical considerations barred the way, and many feared that role specialization would lead to a casting aside of missions in ways that would damage NATO's strategy. In particular, U.S. officials feared that the allies would shuck off nuclear missions and not increase their ground forces, whereas the West Europeans were concerned that the United States would withdraw from the continent.

A second idea suffering a similar fate was the full-blown mobile defense. This called for NATO to abandon its forward defense concept by forming its conventional forces in the rear areas, from where they would launch sweeping counterattacks against Warsaw Pact salients. These maneuvers presumably were to enable NATO's much smaller forces to win by disrupting enemy attack, thereby using tactics that Napoleon had often employed to dispatch his opponents. The West German government, however, objected to any implied ceding of FRG territory. Moreover, many strategists questioned this concept on military grounds, and for reasons that appeared valid.

As a theoretical concept, mobile defense had attractive features that lent credibility to its advocates' claims. By providing NATO time to react and to seize the initiative, it held out the promise of eliminating the risk of being unhinged by a crippling enemy breakthrough. Nevertheless, it also had important drawbacks. In particular, adoption of a mobile defense doctrine would sacrifice NATO's ability to prepare the terrain, to establish positions, and to provide logistic support from preestablished supply lines. When Central Europe's specific circumstances were taken into account, these liabilities appeared to outweigh assets.

In the past, mobile defense had worked when highly skilled armies were fighting against less adept opponents. The situation in Central Europe, however, promised to be quite different. NATO would be compelled to fight as a multinational coalition, which called into question its ability to conduct synchronized maneuvers, and it would be facing a significantly larger opponent that allegedly was skilled in mobile operations. For both reasons, a strong frontal wall offered important advantages by allowing NATO to fight in ways that coalition defense facilitated, and by denying Soviet columns access to open terrain. In the final analysis, mobile defense sought salvation by fostering the very maneuver war that the Soviets saw as their ticket to victory, and NATO therefore chose not to buy into it.

The third idea to be rejected was "defensive defense," which was advanced by West Germany's SPD. This concept was the opposite of mobile warfare. It sought to strengthen NATO's conventional defenses in order to raise the nuclear threshold, but it also aimed to strip NATO of its own allegedly offensive capabilities, which were deemed a contributor to instability. As advocated by SPD military theoreticians, defensive defense called for NATO's forces to have far fewer of the tanks, armored fighting vehicles, and self-propelled artillery that were used for mechanized warfare. Instead, NATO's forces were largely to be
reconfigured as infantry units, and infused with a much larger number of anti-tank missiles and immobile artillery and rocket launchers. To bolster them, the terrain along the border was to be prepared with a network of trenches, mines, and concrete positions. Moreover, the German Territorial Army was to be enlarged with more reserve infantry units that would provide greater depth to the forward defense.9

Because of its willingness to prepare the terrain in ways that implied endorsement of the permanent division of Germany, this concept found serious disfavor elsewhere in the German government. Also, its plans to expand the Territorial Army counterbalanced the fiscal gains that would come from de-emphasizing expensive mobile weapons, thereby negating possible budgetary savings. Finally, NATO military authorities, remembering France’s negative experience with the Maginot Line in 1940, were strongly opposed to sacrificing the capacity for mobile operations. Defensive defense was a single-minded concept that placed all bets on a thick belt of infantry units along the inter-German border. If this belt was penetrated, NATO would be left with little ability to counter-maneuver, and therefore would be doomed to defeat.

For all these reasons, NATO remained committed to its forward defense concept and elected to pursue changes that made this plan more agile, durable, and powerful. The U.S. Army saw the need for these changes, but an especially influential voice came from the German Army. Although the Wehrmacht had been defeated in World War II by the Red Army’s overwhelming power, it acquired considerable tactical skill at frustrating Soviet blitzkrieg operations. By being able to contain Red Army breakthroughs, it was able to slip Soviet knock-out punches, and thereby compelled the Soviets to fight a long war. Drawing on this historical experience, the modern-day German Bundeswehr felt that NATO could strengthen its capacity to frustrate Soviet breakthroughs while not sacrificing the important political-military benefits of the forward defense strategy. The trick, German strategists argued, was to refashion NATO’s employment doctrine in ways that provided a more agile capability to contain localized Soviet penetrations before they had expanded beyond control.10

Whereas the Germans saw salvation in a more responsive doctrine, the Americans laid emphasis on a combination of doctrinal reform and enhanced firepower. Like the Germans, the U.S. Army was moving toward more flexible battlefield employment concepts, but it also brought forth its long-standing favoritism for more lethal weapons. Reinforcing this belief in firepower were the views of the technical community in the United States. At the time, it was asserting that a new wave of scientific achievements in highly accurate munitions and long-range targeting systems was about to appear on the scene. The new technology purportedly offered the promise of dramatic gains in the destructive capacity of modern weapons. This prospect, in turn, argued in favor of rapid-

---


ly introducing the new technology in order to bolster NATO's firepower and attrition-inflicting capabilities.

Reflecting a combination of the old and the new, the improvement concepts that NATO embraced in the mid-1980s called for both doctrinal reform and technological innovation. They were anchored on the proposition that conventional defense was a feasible goal, and that NATO could aspire to deny the Warsaw Pact high confidence of success in a blitzkrieg attack. They did not call for enlarging NATO's forces, or altering its forward defense strategy, or even changing its initial force commitment plans. Rather, they aimed to work within existing plans to improve NATO's posture in ways that made it far less susceptible to defeat by a Soviet breakthrough strategy. They aspired to achieve this objective by alleviating NATO's vulnerabilities to breakthrough, and by enhancing NATO's capabilities to frustrate it. They thus were designed with a specific operational focus in mind, and this focus held out the promise of providing far greater battlefield leverage than otherwise would have been the case.

The alliance's force improvement plans started from the premise that, as a matter of first priority, NATO required stronger air defenses. Above all, NATO needed to keep clear Western Europe's skies in order to permit its ground and air forces to operate with maximum freedom and flexibility. Beyond this, NATO needed to establish sufficient control of the airspace over battlefield and enemy territory in order to permit its own offensive air strikes to inflict maximum damage on the enemy. Because NATO's ground forces were outnumbered and in danger of being swamped early, the alliance's defense prospects hinged importantly on the ability of its powerful air forces to disrupt and delay the enemy ground offensive. Neither of these essential objectives could be accomplished without a strengthened air defense posture.

As discussed earlier, the need for an effective air defense and overall air strategy had been recognized as early as the mid-1970s. Its urgency, however, grew as the early 1980s unfolded. During these years, the Soviets had continued with their steady modernization effort aimed at deploying a more powerful and versatile air force. Advanced Flogger, Fitter, and Fencer aircraft had appeared in growing numbers, and evidence had become available that a whole new generation of aircraft, capable of rivaling NATO's best models, was now entering production. Already the Soviets possessed not only an imposing air defense force, but also an impressive capability to conduct offensive strikes against NATO's territory. More than ever before, NATO military authorities expected that a Warsaw Pact attack would begin with an offensive air blitzkrieg aimed at paralyzing allied forces. After a few days, they felt, enemy air forces would revert to an employment strategy largely aimed at erecting a protective defense umbrella over advancing Warsaw Pact ground forces. The goal of NATO's air plan was to foil this dual threat.

To enhance its air defenses over West European territory, NATO embarked on an important effort to better integrate its theaterwide air command and control network. This program included measures to strengthen the ability of NATO's two air forces in Central Europe (2 ATAF and 4 ATAF) to work together
under AAFCE's control.\textsuperscript{11} It also included steps to strengthen AAFCE's ties to French and British air defense forces. The overall goal was to develop improved command relationships, doctrines, plans, and procedures that together would help erect a protective umbrella over Western Europe.

Notwithstanding the importance of these measures, the centerpiece of NATO's air defense effort was a modernization program aimed at fielding highly capable weapon systems. This program carried forth and expanded upon the plan that had been forged under the LTDP. A major step was taken in 1982, when U.S.-built AWACS aircraft began arriving in Europe and acquired initial operational capability. The total program called for deployment of 18 AWACS and 11 Nimrod aircraft, thereby providing NATO a highly sophisticated airborne system for monitoring the air battle across Europe and coordinating defense operations at night, in bad weather, and in the face of enemy jamming. Along with AWACS was to come a steady infusion of modern U.S. and allied interceptors capable of handling multiple enemy aircraft under adverse conditions. The United States led the way with its F-15 and F-16 aircraft, but as the 1980s unfolded, allied modernization efforts were grinding into high gear as well. As of 1980, only about 10\% of allied aircraft fell into the modern category; by 1988, the number was expected to stand at about 85\%.\textsuperscript{12}

These interceptor programs were supplemented by the introduction of the U.S.-built Patriot surface-to-air missile system, which began arriving in Europe in 1984. The Patriot was distributed to U.S. forces, but West Germany and the Netherlands agreed to buy it as well. This decision was aided by an imaginative arrangement in which these nations agreed to defend U.S. air bases with European-manned Roland point defense systems in exchange for their purchase of Patriot at low cost. With its phase-array radar, the Patriot provided the capacity to engage multiple enemy aircraft under adverse conditions. Also, plans were launched to configure the Patriot with a capability to engage incoming enemy tactical ballistic missiles.

The overall goal of these modernization measures—AWACS, interceptors, and Patriot—was to leave NATO with a relatively small but highly potent air defense system. Even when completed, this system could not prevent the Warsaw Pact from launching a massed air attack in the early days. It could, however, promise to inflict very high losses on attacking aircraft, thereby ensuring that the offensive phase of the enemy's air operation would be of short duration.

NATO's air plans were not limited to passively protecting Western Europe's airspace. Indeed, the plans developed in the mid-1980s increasingly placed stock on winning the battle over enemy airspace. This objective was to be accomplished though a powerful combination of offensive attacks on enemy air bases and air-to-air engagements. The early 1980s had witnessed important strides toward developing new munitions, including stand-off missiles, that

\textsuperscript{11} "AAFCE" means Allied Air Forces, Central Europe; this headquarters commanded NATO's air assets in the Central Region.

could tear up enemy runways and destroy associated maintenance sheds and command centers. Taking advantage of this development, NATO plans called for a major air base suppression effort to be launched from D-Day onward, with enemy air interceptor bases to be destroyed first, followed by ground attack bases. In the aftermath, NATO long-range interceptors, with their sophisticated radars and multiple target systems, were to sweep over enemy territory and finish the job. Meanwhile, strikes were to be conducted against enemy ground-based missile systems and their command networks.

NATO was under no illusions that it could completely sweep the skies clean of enemy opposition or that its ambitious air superiority plans could be accomplished cheaply. It did realistically hope, however, to inflict overpowering damage on enemy air and air defense forces within the space of only a few days. NATO's operational goal was to blunt any Soviet air offensive, to render West German skies secure, and to seize at least local control of the battlefield airspace. With these objectives accomplished, it was hoped, NATO's ground forces would be free to move about, and the air forces would be able to turn their attention toward battering Soviet tank columns.

The mission of chewing up enemy tank columns from the air was the second focal point of NATO's improvement plans. Here, new technology was entering the equation to offer promise of altering what traditionally had been a negative situation. When the 1980s dawned, NATO's ground forces were steadily acquiring a lethal capacity to destroy enemy armor in the immediate vicinity of the inter-German border, but they had little ability to strike against Warsaw Pact forces held in reserve. Without a capacity to strike deeper, Western commanders feared that although NATO's forces could contain the enemy's first echelon, they would be weakened until they could not stop an assault by a fresh second echelon.

The task of softening up the second echelon had been given to NATO's air forces. They, however, were oriented to attacking soft enemy targets (e.g., command posts and air bases) and lacked both the munitions and C3I systems needed to destroy enemy armor in large numbers. The result was a serious NATO vulnerability to a second-echelon attack. Indeed, it was fear of the Warsaw Pact's armored reserves rather than front-line forces that principally accounted for the pessimistic assessments of the balance advanced by senior NATO commanders.

In the early 1980s, the American technical community appeared on the scene with assertions that this problem was now solvable. The solution, weapons scientists argued, was to be found in the acquisition of a set of sophisticated technologies then in the early stages of development. Leading the way were advances in airborne C3I systems, which promised to provide the capacity for real-time monitoring and targeting of tank columns moving behind enemy lines. Also in the development cycle were (1) quickly targetable missiles that could carry large payloads and strike with deadly accuracy at extended ranges and (2) new "smart" munitions with the capacity to acquire individual enemy armored vehicles and strike them from above.
The technical community argued in favor of combining together these technologies to form a new long-range weapon system potentially capable of quickly destroying large numbers of enemy armored vehicles. The new system was dubbed “FOFA,” for “Follow-On Forces Attack.” It was to be composed of a “JSTARS” aircraft for performing command and control, and a “TACMS” missile armed with several smart anti-armor bomblets. The TACMS missile, in turn, could be launched either from aircraft or from the U.S. Army’s MLRS launcher. The FOFA operational concept was simple but compelling: JSTARS aircraft would ferret out enemy tank columns in the rear areas and then direct withering missile fire against them. Upon arriving over the target area only minutes after launch, each missile would release multiple smart bomblets that would spread out, acquire an enemy vehicle, and strike it with deadly accuracy. If all went well, the result would be massive losses to the enemy columns, perhaps rendering them vastly weakened by the time they reached the battle area.

Propelled upward by NATO’s military needs, FOFA ascended the technical community’s ladder and passed into the policy arena, where it triggered immediate controversy. The political left in Europe branded it an instrument of NATO aggression, and this charge was echoed back in angry Soviet denunciations of FOFA. Within Western official circles, the reaction was more moderate but no less pointed. Budgetary officials were appalled at FOFA’s cost: roughly $20-50 billion for the United States, and roughly one-half this amount for the allies. Moreover, some critics argued that FOFA’s advocates were offering overly rosy estimates of its performance.

Whereas the technical community was prone to advertising FOFA as a wonder weapon that could wipe away entire enemy formations at will, critics contended that several different constraints could work together to blunt FOFA’s magical wand. To these critics, the idea that missiles could accurately be fired at long range against moving ground targets seemed far-fetched, as did the notion that smart munitions would work with great precision. Moreover, the Soviets could be relied upon to adopt countermeasures that would degrade FOFA’s performance. In sum, critics contended, FOFA might turn out to be a useful weapon system but would not transform the battlefield or alone solve NATO’s problems.

Though these cautionary notes had merit, NATO was looking for cost-effective weapons, not magic, and was willing to pay a fair price for any system that offered to fill a serious vacuum in its arsenal. Although critics attacked FOFA’s advertising brochures, most were prepared to admit that FOFA could perform at least with a modicum of efficiency that alone would help NATO’s cause. As for FOFA’s budgetary cost, all modern weapon systems were expensive: The F-16 aircraft and M-1 tank both cost comparable amounts when development, procurement, and operations were added together. With its growing military budgets, the United States seemed capable of funding FOFA’s acquisition, but the allies had little room for new endeavors. Even a U.S.-only

---

program, however, would strengthen NATO's defenses, and over a longer time
the allies could be expected to acquire FOFA as well.

For these reasons, FOFA was received well in NATO military circles, and in-
deed was celebrated as manna from heaven in some quarters. By the mid-
1980s, SACEUR General Rogers was proclaiming FOFA, and he urged both the
United States and the allies to bring it to fruition. Consequently, FOFA found its
way into CDI, CMF, and NATO Force Goals, which gave it a commanding posi-
tion for penetrating member-nation defense plans. Its full appearance in Eu-
rope, however, was still several years off, and even then FOFA alone was no sal-
vation. Additional measures were needed, and NATO’s improvement plans
were designed to bring them about.

Although FOFA promised to blunt the second-echelon threat, it did not alle-
viate the need to enhance the ability of NATO ground forces to conduct close
battle at the inter-German border. Here, NATO’s problem continued to be a
lack of sufficient maneuver units to provide adequate reserves and staying
power. The traditional estimate, holding that NATO required 50–50 divisions
to contain an attack of 90 divisions, was still regarded as valid, thereby leaving
NATO 5–10 divisions short at D-Day and for several weeks thereafter. The time-
honored solution called for an expansion of allied ground forces, but for all its
importance, this step was not in the cards.

NATO military authorities were well aware of the need for more ground
forces; both General Rogers and the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General Vessey, were clear on this point. At their instigation, CDI and CMF
both endorsed measures in this area, and NATO’s Force Goals of the mid-1980s
called upon the allies to deploy 12–18 more reserve brigades. Allied govern-
ments, however, demurred on the grounds that they could not afford the ex-
pedition. In 1984 Pentagon prodding led SHAPE to conduct a study to determine
if anything could be done. The results showed surprising allied acknowledgement
that adequate reserve manpower pools were available to field additional
formations. The allies, however, begged off by asserting that they could not af-
ford the required weapons. They did express willingness to carry out the Force
Goals if the United States would transfer equipment to them at low cost. With
Congress already upset about burden-sharing and the U.S. Army not wanting
deplete its equipment stocks, however, the Pentagon demurred. Thus died yet
another attempt to shore up NATO’s posture in this high-leverage way.14

The death of this initiative did not leave NATO bereft of options for strength-
ening its ground forces by other means. The most obvious solution was to un-
tertake peacetime preparation of the West German terrain. Although NATO
military authorities remained unenthused about a Maginot Line, they did show
interest in placing pipelines in the ground that could be quickly filled with plas-
tic explosives and then detonated to create a network of trenches which Soviet
tanks could not easily cross. Technical studies suggested that this measure
could significantly strengthen NATO’s defenses at very low cost. When Pen-

---

14 A noteworthy exception is that the Germans decided to arm 12 lightly equipped Territorial
Army Regiments with better weapons, thereby allowing them to play a combat role.
tagon officials floated a trial balloon on behalf of this idea, however, a pained outcry came from Bonn. As a result, terrain enhancement was relegated to NATO's private councils, but NATO military staffs indicated that low-visibility steps would be taken to bring this idea to life.

In addition, NATO authorities were eager to investigate whatever could be done, within affordable limits, to arm NATO's existing ground forces with a better suite of weapons. U.S. ground forces already were well-equipped and were slated to become even stronger as new systems, eventually including FOPA, were sent to Europe. The same, however, could not be said for all allied ground forces. The Belgians, Dutch, and Danes, for example, all equipped their armies with weapons that in numbers fell below the standards set by the United States and the Soviets. The Germans and British were well-armed, but even they fell short in some areas. Favoring a combination of tanks, artillery, and infantry, the Germans lacked comparable attack helicopters, anti-tank missiles, and mortars. The British, meanwhile, seemed to lack enough heavy artillery. None of these deficiencies were crippling, but they did impinge on the ability of allied armies to defend their corps sectors. The allied armies were worse off, lacking enough tanks, artillery and other weapons. Accordingly, NATO's Force Goals called on the West Europeans to improve in these areas, and subject to fiscal restraints, the allies’ response was generally positive.

Along with asking for more weapons, NATO military authorities also pushed hard for changes in NATO's ground employment doctrine. This area, consequently, became a focal point for major innovative activity in the mid-1980s. The driving ambition was to make NATO's employment doctrine less linear, less stationary, and less attrition-oriented. What NATO authorities had in mind was a new doctrine that, while still embracing forward defense, would be more flexible, adaptive, and maneuver-oriented. Above all, they endorsed greater awareness of the "operational art."

These important changes can best be understood by recalling NATO's doctrinal trends. NATO embraced forward defense and the layer cake philosophy in the 1960s, but this concept left room for much discretion in employment doctrine. Consequently, through the early 1970s, NATO commanders planned to conduct a rather fluid and mobile defense of their forward corps sectors, arraying their forces in depth, allowing the enemy to penetrate, and initiating flanking fires and maneuvers. In the mid-1970s, U.S. Army commanders saw merit in massing NATO forces very near the border and conducting an unyielding defense there. Dubbed the "active defense," their idea was to bathe the enemy in high-volume fire, thus destroying him by attrition. U.S. Army employment plans in Europe were modified to embrace this doctrine, and to varying degrees the West Europeans followed suit.

By the early 1980s, this doctrine was coming under growing attack from civilian critics, but behind the scenes an even more powerful revolution was taking place in NATO military circles. Lighting the path to reform was the U.S. Army, which had grown disenchanted with its own creation. The reason was that field experience had shown the active defense to be riddled with serious problems which became clear only upon implementation. Most important, the
active defense tended to breed the military equivalent of localitis. Under it, NATO’s individual corps tended to become the focal point of attention in ways that produced myopia to events across the entire theater. In other words, even senior military officers were now thinking in tactical (i.e., corps) rather than operational (i.e., theater) terms.

Because battles were often won or lost on the basis of larger concepts, this fractionated viewpoint carried with it serious dangers. The prospect that seven NATO corps might perform well mattered little if the eighth corps buckled in ways that allowed enemy forces to pour unimpeded into the rear areas. In this situation, NATO’s entire posture likely would go down to catastrophic defeat. Yet NATO’s fixation on the struggles of its separate corps blunted both awareness of the larger theater battle and NATO’s ability to react effectively if a major breakthrough was impending. For this reason alone, the active defense needed to be modified.

The active defense also was found to have drawbacks as a theory for conducting the corps battle. Its strength lay in its massing of combat power along the front line, but this concept also arrayed NATO’s forces in ways that prevented them from conducting powerful flanking maneuvers. Historical experience had shown that ground combat power was best maximized through a combination of fire and maneuver. Tilted too far in an extreme direction, the active defense was lots of fire and little maneuver. Moreover, this doctrine carried with it the seeds of its own destruction. By emplacing so many forces on the front line, few units were withheld as reserves. As a result, the corps was rendered less able to respond quickly and flexibly when a penetration occurred. Its primary recourse was to draw units off the front line elsewhere and redeploy them, but this repositioning threatened to take too much time. The risk was that by the time the corps had recovered its balance, an enemy penetration would already have produced an uncontrollable breakthrough.

Reacting to these problems, the U.S. Army proceeded in the early 1980s to re-vamp its doctrine in a wholesale way. In doing so, it drew inspiration from historical lessons being unearthed by German strategists, and from Patton’s approach to mobile warfare in World War II. The new doctrine, entitled “AirLand Battle,” was anchored on the proposition that combat power was driven not only by weapons effects, but also by such nebulous and yet powerful concepts as movement, tempo, and synchronization. The new doctrine continued to recognize that attrition was the final arbiter of battle, but in order to shift attrition dynamics in favorable directions, it stressed the need to achieve a better synthesis of fire and maneuver in ways that would fracture the enemy’s ability and will to resist. The changes envisioned were to be manifested in maneuver-oriented concepts for fighting both the corps and the theater battle, thereby uplifting NATO’s defense prospects across the board.16


16 See Golden et al., NATO at Forty.
Under AirLand Battle's mantle, the corps battle was to be conducted with greater agility. The front line was to be thinned out, but left with enough forces to mount stiff, if yielding, resistance. Contributing to confidence that the front line could get by with less force was the growing lethality of U.S. tank, anti-tank, and artillery fires. Meanwhile, the withdrawn forces were to be reformed as powerful corps reserves. Employing their fast-moving Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles, these reserves were to launch synchronized attacks into the flanks of enemy salients, seeking to fracture the Soviet combined arms team, thus rendering it susceptible to piecemeal destruction. If a serious penetration did develop, additional reserves were to be quickly brought to the schwerpunkt (point of main effort), thereby keeping the enemy advance under control. The ultimate result, U.S. Army officers hoped, was a corps that could do a better job of winning the attrition-maneuver battle, while also being far less susceptible to a crippling puncture of its rear boundary.

Beyond this change in corps doctrine, AirLand Battle brought a major swing toward enhanced emphasis on the operational art, or how to manage the theater fight. It called on senior commanders to view the theater as a whole and to orchestrate the individual core battles on behalf of an integrated scheme of operational-level maneuver. This scheme of maneuver was to draw heavily on NATO's emerging FOFA capability, especially as manifested in the MLRS/ATACMS system. The ground commander was to use MLRS/ATACMS, along with air-delivered FOFA strikes, to batter the Warsaw Pact's second echelon. Meanwhile, NATO's forward corps were to conduct agile maneuver-firepower battles to defeat the first echelon. In the event one or more corps fell victim to enemy concentrated attacks, reserves would quickly shift from neighboring corps and move forward from deep reserve to prevent a breakthrough. The overall result, it was hoped, would be a vigorous and agile NATO defense effort that left even a Soviet maneuver strategy confronting a frustrating stalemate.

When it was unveiled in the early 1980s, AirLand Battle went down well in NATO military quarters. SACEUR and SHAPE saw value in it, as did the British. So also did the German Bundeswehr, which had been advocating similar changes. Emerging German doctrinal concepts tended to place more emphasis on reforming corps tactical doctrine than on bold theaterwide sweeps, but this focus reflected the differing missions of the two armies rather than a deep philosophical clash. The German Army was destined to remain preoccupied with defending its three forward corps sectors. By contrast, the U.S. Army, in its growing role as NATO's operational reserve and with its planned acquisition of FOFA systems, had greater necessity and opportunity to think in theaterwide terms. On the whole, the two armies were in harmony in ways that allowed them to cooperate.

The result was that AirLand Battle quickly swept through NATO. The U.S. Army set the pace by developing broader operational plans for employing III Corps, and for using V and VII Corps units as well as later-arriving forces in a theater reserve capacity. Evidence of AirLand Battle's broader acceptance was seen in the reforms undertaken by British marshals Farnhall and Bagdall in NORTTHAG, who took steps to increase forces assigned to them as operational
reserves. Also, the French entered the act by expressing a growing willingness to use their III Corps and Force d'Action Rapide as a NORTHAG reserve. By the mid-1980s, AirLand Battle had effectively been installed as NATO's doctrine for the future.

Precisely how AirLand Battle was to manifest itself across NATO's Central Front was yet to be determined, and powerful constraints stood in the way of complete adoption in some uniform way. The demanding requirements of the forward defense concept continued to place severe limits on the number of forces that confidently could be regarded as theater reserves. Moreover, the individual corps sectors differed in ways that had uneven implications for using more flexible employment tactics. Because southern Germany provided defensible terrain and considerable depth, a more flexible U.S. Army doctrine was possible in V and VII Corps. To the north, however, the situation varied from sector to sector. The Dutch, for example, were compelled by Hamburg's nearby presence and by terrain peculiarities to defend well forward. The terrain features made greater flexibility possible in the German I and British I Corps in NORTHAG, but far less so in the Belgian and German III Corps immediately to the south. Constraints like these meant that NATO's new employment doctrine was no cure-all.17

AirLand Battle's contribution, however, needs to be judged in the context of the other improvement measures being taken by NATO. The combination of air defense enhancements, FOFA, ground force upgrades, and doctrinal changes meant that NATO had embarked down the path of significantly upgrading its conventional defenses without significantly expanding its posture or budget. This goal was to be achieved by working in several different areas to build a defense posture that could do a far better job of foiling a Soviet strategy of breakthrough and maneuver. These measures had all been launched within the short span of a few years, and considerable time would be needed to implement them. Even taken together, they were not sufficiently powerful to completely eliminate NATO's vulnerability to a Warsaw Pact attack. They did hold out the eventual prospect, however, of helping strip away the one strategy option left open to Moscow for assuring conventional preponderance in Europe. As the mid-1980s slid by, NATO's confidence in its conventional defense was growing, and the Warsaw Pact's sense of superiority was giving way to mounting doubt.

As his administration entered its second term in 1985, Reagan's impact on European security affairs was beginning to take shape. By this time, the U.S. military buildup was beginning to taper off due to diminished congressional support for increased defense spending. This development frustrated the Reagan administration, but in Europe, only recently the scene of bitter confrontation, a better future was starting to emerge. Notwithstanding lingering disputes over military strategy and burden-sharing arrangements, once-serious tensions in U.S.-West European relations were abating as a result of reestablished accord on alliance security policy. Progress was under way in the defense arena, brought about by ongoing nuclear modernization and growing support for affordable conventional force improvements. With recession giving way to sustained growth, moreover, NATO's fractious debates over economic policy were being replaced by compromise and cooperation. Because the American and West European governments had rediscovered the capacity to upgrade the common interest, the result was a renewed alliance, with its security and economic foundations under successful repair.

Against the background of growing transatlantic harmony, a momentous development was beginning to take shape in East-West relations as 1985 gave way to 1986. Led by newly appointed leader Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet government was now shifting policy gears. Replacing political confrontation and military competition came pursuit of arms control negotiations, endorsement of internal reforms, and mounting evidence of a desire to wind down the Cold War. The twin developments of growing alliance cohesion and East-West reconciliation were to gather force in Reagan's last three years, allowing him to leave office with ample cause for satisfaction about Europe's future.

THE U.S. MILITARY BUILDUP: LOSING STEAM

Under Weinberger's leadership, the U.S. military buildup continued apace through 1984, but began dissipating thereafter. Gorbachev's rise to power and the USSR's subsequent return to the bargaining table contributed to this change by reducing Western fears about Soviet intentions. More important, mounting economic problems in the United States led the U.S. Congress to slam the brakes down on Weinberger's ambitious plans. With Reagan's support, Weinberger continued submitting budgets calling for further prosecution
of the buildup. Increasingly unwilling to go along, however, the Congress not only pared away his requests for real spending growth but began imposing actual cutbacks.

The administration’s problems on Capitol Hill began in 1985, a few months after the American electorate returned Reagan to power by another landslide margin, but sent to Congress a larger democratic majority in the House of Representatives and weakened Republican control of the Senate. Not surprisingly, this schizophrenic situation soon produced an executive-legislative confrontation over domestic fiscal policy that enmeshed the defense budget in a mounting partisan debate. In February that year, Reagan submitted a defense budget calling for $314 billion in budget authority and $278 billion in outlays: increases over FY85 of about $30 billion in both categories. Calling for annual real increases averaging 6.5% over the coming five years, Reagan’s budget projected a rise in defense spending to the astronomical heights of $478 billion in authorization and $418 billion in outlays by 1990.¹

As justification, Weinberger pointed to the still-progressing Soviet military buildup. His siren call, however, no longer seemed to be anchored in international politics. By this time, the Soviet Union had become bogged down in an Afghanistan quagmire suggesting Vietnam in reverse, and it no longer seemed poised for a military strike into the Persian Gulf. With NATO now pursuing both nuclear and conventional modernization, the situation in Europe seemed more secure. So also did northeastern Asia, where the Japanese and South Koreans had become reassured of Reagan’s constancy, and the Soviet Union was no longer making diplomatic headway. Latin America remained a thorn in Washington’s side, but more for domestic American reasons that any serious threat of growing Soviet influence. Cuba and Nicaragua were still controlled by governments friendly to the Soviet Union, but U.S. fears of a communist takeover in El Salvador and other nations were subsiding.

With its international ambitions frustrated, the Kremlin itself seemed poised on the verge of an agonizing reappraisal. Gorbachev’s election to lead the Politburo in early March 1985 reinforced this impression. Gorbachev was an unknown quantity whose career as a Communist Party bureaucrat suggested continuity, but he was also a far younger man than his geriatric predecessors, which suggested a greater receptivity to innovative departures. Moreover, he was a protégé of Andropov, who had shown signs of wanting internal changes in order to stimulate the USSR’s slacking economy. What Gorbachev’s goals were was uncertain, but his early-expressed desire to resume arms control negotiations and to meet with Reagan were good signs.

If these favorable international trends helped influence Congress to slow down the U.S. defense buildup, the perilous domestic economic situation was an even stronger stimulus. By this time, the earlier recession had passed and the economy was in the midst of steady expansion with little inflation. Accompanying these optimistic signs, however, came a growing federal deficit that

was posing a serious long-term threat to the nation's economic health. The combination of Reagan's defense buildup and tax cuts had interacted with congressional reluctance to trim domestic spending to produce a mounting gap between federal tax revenues and expenditures. In the classic Keynesian sense, this gap was providing a temporary stimulus to the economy. It was also producing, however, a mounting federal deficit that eventually would depress growth by elevating interest rates and compelling the federal government to borrow heavily to finance its debt.

Higher interest rates had the advantage of attracting foreign investment and strengthening the dollar internationally, but an offsetting loss was a growing trade imbalance. Barring an unexpected upsurge in economic growth that would produce greater revenues, moreover, massive deficit financing promised to increase pressures for higher taxes that would take away private resources for investment. Perhaps most important, deficit financing threatened to weaken international and domestic confidence in the long-term health of the U.S. economy. The negative implications, in turn, were magnified by growing concerns about declining American competitiveness in the international marketplace.

Experts were divided on what these complex tradeoffs meant for federal fiscal policy, but nearly everyone agreed that greater balance had to be restored between revenues and expenditures. The Reagan administration was far from indifferent to this concern, but its preferred solution was to control domestic spending, encourage foreign investment, and rely on steady economic growth to soften the blow. By contrast, the Democratic-controlled Congress saw things quite differently. As part of its complex program for fiscal reform, it was becoming serious about putting off any further continuation of Reagan's defense buildup.

The first signs of growing congressional willingness to throw down the gauntlet came in spring 1985, when prolonged and contentious hearings were conducted on Reagan's budget. Weinberger refused to yield ground, but on May 10, the Senate approved a budget resolution freezing the FY86 budget at the previous year's level and allowing only a 3% rise in each of the next two years to cover inflation. On the same day, the House of Representatives adopted a tough budget-freezing resolution. Following a White House counterattack, the Senate in early June passed a softened resolution authorizing sufficient FY86 spending increases to cover inflation. Two weeks later, however, the House stood its ground by authorizing only a freeze at FY85 levels.²

These conflicting authorizations left the two branches facing a need to find common ground, and the summer was to witness a tough political struggle over the defense budget. In late July, a House-Senate Conference Committee agreed to a compromise budget of $302.5 billion, or about the level needed to cover expected inflation. The matter did not end there, however. The reason was that this committee did not speak for the entire House, which turned out to be dissatisfied with the compromise. Congress adjourned without having agreed on

the defense budget, and the Pentagon was compelled to enter the new fiscal year on October 1 with only a continuing resolution to tide it over.

When Congress reconvened, the debate was rejoined, with defense proponents losing ground. In mid-December, the House and Senate finally reached agreement on a lower budget of $297.4 billion, which Reagan begrudgingly signed into law. The final budget was fully $17 billion below Weinberger's original submission, and thus the cutback went far beyond the normal congressional propensity to shave only a small amount from the President's request. Whether this budget, which provided only a 4% increase over 1985, would cover inflation was left dependent on economic developments over the coming year. Regardless, the Congress had turned an important corner: Real defense spending increases were now a thing of the past.

Proponents of real increases were dealt a further blow when Reagan that December signed into law the landmark Graham-Rudman-Hollings bill. A product of mounting Congressional concern about the deficit, this bill bindingly committed the United States to a balanced federal budget by 1991. Because it compelled the federal government to pare back spending in order to eliminate the deficit, it had negative implications for any further Pentagon budget increases. Indeed, it mandated that the Defense Department absorb a representative share of forthcoming budget cuts. Graham-Rudman-Hollings was immediately challenged in federal court, where its specific provisions were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in July 1986. Some version of the bill, however, was destined to live on, thereby further tightening the noose around the Pentagon's neck.

Especially because of sentiment in favor of Graham-Rudman-Hollings, Weinberger's continuing call for budgetary growth encountered equally serious opposition when the FY87 budget was sent to Congress in early 1986. Weinberger asked for $311 billion for the coming year and charted a five-year course to a nearly $400 billion budget by 1991. By comparison with his past submissions, this budget was moderate: Its increases were enough to cover inflation for FY87 and provided for only 3% annual real growth in future years. By the time Congress was finished hacking, the FY87 budget stood at only $291.8 billion. This was fully $5.6 billion below the originally approved FY86 budget, which itself was further pared back to $281.4 billion as 1986 unfolded. With Weinberger's five-year program equally in shambles, it was now apparent that the Defense Department had entered an era of real decreases.

The next two years were more of the same. By this time, Weinberger found himself on a budgetary treadmill moving faster than he could run. Moreover, the Pentagon was enmeshed in charges of financial mismanagement, and Reagan himself by now was embroiled in the Iran-Contra scandal. Still stubbornly refusing to bow to the inevitable, Weinberger in early 1987 submitted an FY88 budget of $303.3 billion; his five-year program called for roughly 3% annual increases. The fall 1986 elections, however, had placed both the House and the Senate under Democratic control, and the new Congress tore this budget to ribbons. As the year unfolded, the FY87 budget, originally approved by Congress at $291.8 billion, was scaled back to $279.5 billion. The FY88 budget,
when finally approved, stood at $296 billion, but signs abounded that it would be slashed further and that no real increases would be forthcoming anytime in the future. Recognizing that from 1985 onward his budgets would be sliced by an annual average of 3.5% in real terms, Weinberger resigned in November 1987. His successor, Frank Carlucci, adopted a more congenial demeanor but was no more successful at persuading Congress to change its mind.³

Upon leaving the Pentagon, Weinberger expressed anger at the Congress but also pride in what had been accomplished in Reagan’s early years. Seen from his perspective, the facts bear him out. As Table 20.1 shows, the Reagan buildup provided the Pentagon fully $523.7 billion more than if no real increases had been funded from FY80-FY90. This amount was $265.9 billion more than if the United States had simply carried out the NATO standard for 3% annual real increases throughout the 1990s. Carter, of course, deserves credit for initiating the buildup. Reagan’s budgets, however, provided $224 billion beyond what Carter would have funded, assuming his call for 5% real increases was acted upon through FY85 and subjected to similar congressional cuts thereafter.

The Reagan buildup fell short of its lofty spending goals by a margin of about $730 billion. Reagan thus successfully funded only about 80% of the budgetary increases that Weinberger sought when the buildup was in full flower. The result was that the United States did not fully close the large military investment gap vis-à-vis the USSR that had accumulated during the 1970s and early 1980s. By the late 1980’s, however, the United States had pulled equal to the USSR in annual investments, and this competitive message doubtless was not lost on Gorbachev.

Largely because his spending plans were sharply curtailed, the Reagan buildup fell short of bolstering U.S. forces in all the ways called for by Weinberger’s strategy. By the decade’s end, for example, the ICBM force still had not been fully modernized, the B-2 bomber was coming under mounting attack, and the Navy had only 580 ships. Both the strategic forces and the maritime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 20.1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Comparative U.S. Defense Budget Trends: FY81–FY90</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(billions $)</strong>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuation of FY80 level (Adjusted for Inflation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual Reagan spending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reagan real increases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Carter increases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increases from NATO 3% standard</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Author’s estimate.

³See Weinberger and Carlucci posture statements for FY87–89.
posture, nevertheless, were decidedly stronger than otherwise would have been the case. The same can be said for U.S. ground and tactical air forces, which had achieved higher levels of modernization, readiness, sustainability, and overall preparedness. These improvements were to be manifested two years after Reagan left office, when war came to the Persian Gulf and U.S. forces were called upon to put their profession into practice.

RESTORATION OF TRANSATLANTIC ACCORD

Although the slackening of his defense buildup frustrated Reagan, another development was under way in the mid-1980s that had far more important and positive consequences for his security agenda: the restoration of transatlantic accord on the fundamentals of alliance policy. The conservative departures that Reagan launched in the early 1980s opened up cleavages in U.S.-West European relations as great as any experienced in the alliance’s often troubled history. What mattered most was not any single Reagan policy, but rather the combined impact of several radical steps taken at the same time. To many allied governments, Reagan’s defense buildup went too far and was propelled by questionable strategy principles that seemed at odds with West European interests. In particular, Reagan’s nuclear policies, maritime doctrines, and unilateralist globalism did not go down well in Europe. Further offending the allies was Reagan’s complete rejection of détente and his extremist positions in arms control negotiations, which damaged relations with the Soviet Union far beyond what the West Europeans thought sensible. Added to this were Reagan’s controversial economic policies, which threatened both prosperity and welfare statism in Western Europe.

Especially because allied dissatisfactions with the Reagan administration were reciprocated in equally strong terms, the dangerous situation had the potential of fracturing the alliance. Fortunately, the Soviet Union was still being led by stodgy figures whose stubborn insistence on maintaining a threatening demeanor left them unprepared to grasp the opportunity at hand for separating Western Europe from the United States. Even in the presence of blustery Soviet behavior that gave NATO’s members good reasons to surmount their widening differences, calm heads were needed to prevent the powerful negative emotions of the moment from doing permanent damage.

The meaning of the events of the mid-1980s is that the alliance backed away from the precipice and acted to reestablish harmony. Reagan’s own actions were partly responsible for this development. By persuading the West Europeans that his conservative policies had merit, Reagan was able to restore the principle of American leadership of the alliance. Equally important, Reagan by now had laid to rest fears that unilateralism might translate into American disengagement from Europe. Accompanying this reassurance came demonstrations of political competence, and from 1984 onward, a capacity to bend conservative principles in order to achieve compromises with the West Europeans that lessened their worries. In particular, Reagan showed a growing willingness to pursue improved diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, to soften the
hard edges of his military strategy, and to moderate his pursuit of contentious economic policies.

Steps toward accord also came from the West Europeans. The most important development was that Britain, West Germany, and France were now led by figures willing to deal with the United States on Reagan’s terms. All three nations remained committed to INF modernization, increasingly backed Reagan’s stance on arms control negotiations, and were funding a slow but steady conventional defense buildup. In addition, these nations took steps to embrace Reaganomics and thereby helped achieve cooperation in transatlantic economic relations. As Britain, West Germany and France pursued a better dialogue with the United States, they pulled the rest of Western Europe along with them.4

For these reasons, the Reagan administration steadily came to feel a good deal happier about the West Europeans, and the feeling was reciprocated. The effect was to help lay to rest, at least within governmental circles, mutual doubts about where the alliance was headed. Because compromise was adopted, Reagan did not get all that he had wanted from the allies, and they wound up committing to conservative policies that otherwise would not have been embraced. Nonetheless, basic demands on both sides of the Atlantic were met. As a result, Washington and the West European capitals came away broadly satisfied in ways that ensured alliance cohesion.

In the defense realm, restored harmony rested on the consensus behind INF deployments and conventional improvements, but this consensus did not mean that alliance military debates had become a thing of the past. Indeed, Reagan’s endorsement of SDI in 1983 threw the alliance into a heated dialogue about what this initiative meant for Western Europe. By no means were allied governments in agreement with Reagan that strategic defenses were sensible and affordable, and their doubts deepened when Reagan proposed to transfer SDI technology to the USSR. This gesture was designed to mollify the Kremlin, but also cast into doubt the continued utility of British and French strategic forces. The debate peaked during 1984–1985, and for a time threatened to disrupt the alliance.

By 1986, however, controversy had begun to fade. Helpfully, Reagan de-emphasized his scheme to give SDI to the Soviets, and expressed agreement on meshing SDI plans with NATO defense strategy and arms control policy. Also, closer inspection raised growing fiscal and technological doubts about strategic defense in ways suggesting that deployment of a major system was many years off. Additionally, the Congress, in acting out its budget-cutting instincts, showed particular enthusiasm for paring back Weinberger’s SDI program, thereby pushing any deployment further into the future. Meanwhile, the British expressed willingness to participate in SDI research efforts, and in 1986, Washington and Bonn signed a Memorandum of Understanding that permitted

---

German firms to participate in SDI research. Once again, both sides of the Atlantic came away reasonably satisfied.\(^5\)

With the SDI controversy now under control, Reagan created fresh controversy over a different but related issue. In late 1986, Reagan met with Gorbachev at Reykjavik for a meeting that was advertised as a technical discussion of arms control issues. After the meeting, the press reported that the two leaders had come close to agreeing to entirely eliminate offensive ballistic missiles, if not strategic bombers as well. Indeed, reports held, it was only Reagan's refusal to part with SDI that scotched the deal. Returning from Reykjavik, Reagan conveyed the impression that he was piqued for having missed the deal of a lifetime.

The idea of eliminating offensive missiles had been under discussion for some months but was regarded as a purely conceptual issue. Surprised by the seriousness of what had transpired at Reykjavik, the West European allies reacted with stunned shock. Quite apart from being miffed at not being consulted in advance, they were dumbstruck at the prospect of any dismantling of the West's nuclear missiles in ways that might leave Western Europe exposed to Soviet conventional aggression. Kohl and Thatcher beat a hasty path to Washington for clarifying discussions with Reagan, and American diplomats journeyed to allied capitals to explain Reykjavik's visions. In the end, Reagan offered satisfying assurances that no dramatic U.S.-Soviet nuclear deal was afoot, and that extended deterrence and flexible response would remain in place. The allies came away aware once again of Reagan's capacity to surprise, but also confident that the two sides of the Atlantic were in accord on strategy principles.

This trend toward transatlantic accord was enhanced by parallel developments in the economic arena. Once again, contentment came only from 1983 onward. Reagan's first two years were marked by economic debates fully as stressful as the struggles over security policy. Harmony was restored only after a painful recession had been brought under control, and after consensus was reestablished on international and domestic economic policy. Thereafter Reagan remained on good economic terms with the West Europeans, although transatlantic relations continued to be periodically affected by economic turbulence and tension over burden-sharing.

Just as Reagan's security initiatives in 1981–1982 shocked the West Europeans, his economic policies had also thrown the alliance into turmoil. During its early months, the Reagan administration was preoccupied with domestic economic issues. Consequently, it did not seem to be paying attention to international trade and monetary problems, and it did not seem to care a great deal about the impact of its domestic changes on Western Europe's economy. Moreover, Reagan's conservative policies—with their emphasis on disinflation, deregulation, and rollback of governmental programs to stimulate

private investment—clashed sharply with the Keynesian thinking that held sway in many West European quarters. Britain’s Thatcher was pursuing a conservative economic agenda for reasons of her own, but the French were still committed to central planning and reliance on federal fiscal policy to stimulate the economy. The West Germans were suspended between the French and British, and elsewhere in Western Europe government control and the welfare state mentality predominated.6

As a result, Reagan’s first economic summit with the Western industrial powers, held in Ottawa in early 1981, was a disruptive affair marred by stiff debate over economic theories for promoting growth and world trade. Moreover, tensions worsened because the United States was now plunging into a deep recession, taking Western Europe along with it. When Reagan had entered office, he inherited an astronomical 13.5% inflation rate along with 7% unemployment and a slowly growing economy. One of Reagan’s priorities was to bring down inflation, and accordingly, the Federal Reserve slammed the brakes on monetary policy by driving up interest rates. This initiative successfully wrung out inflation, but it also contributed to a sharp U.S. economic slowdown that soon began spreading overseas.

Falling import demand and rising interest rates in the United States had a repressive effect in Western Europe, where economic trends reflected America’s ups and downs. There, investments diminished, growth rates slackened, and unemployment rose. By fall 1981, unemployment stood at 10% in the United States, and in some West European countries it was hovering at a disastrous 16%. Several West European leaders complained, urging a tighter U.S. fiscal policy and a looser economic policy, but the Reagan administration refused to heed this advice. To make matters worse, Reagan declined to follow allied recommendations on exchange rate policy aimed at devaluing the dollar in relation to West European currencies. The Reagan administration, it seems, was determined to dampen inflation not only in the United States but also in Western Europe, which itself was experiencing 10% annual inflation rates. The cost of this root canal therapy was painful recession and mounting social unrest in Western Europe, a development that unnerved many allied governments but did not seem to unsettle the imperterable Reagan.

Economic matters improved only slightly by the time the next summit was held, at Versailles in June 1982. Over the previous winter, the Reagan administration had grown more cognizant of allied unrest. Although it remained adamant about not changing its conservative domestic course, it did show greater flexibility toward adopting interventionist market exchange rate policies aimed at helping out the West Europeans. The Versailles summit saw a constructive accord in this area, along with an innovative agreement to strengthen multilateral surveillance of how national policies were affecting each other. Nevertheless, American interest rates remained high and the transatlantic recession was still not receding. To compound the problem a severe debt crisis broke out in late 1982 when Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina simultaneously de-

6See Nau, The Myth of America’s Decline.
faulted on debt payments. Added on top came disruptive fights in GATT negotiations over West European agricultural policies and mounting American protectionism in trade policy.\(^7\)

Over the next two years, fortunately, the economic pendulum began swinging sharply in a far more favorable direction. Paving the way was a looser U.S. monetary policy made possible by falling inflation rates. This change, coupled with the stimulating effects of deregulation and what amounted to deficit financing by virtue of Reagan’s tax cut, helped rekindle the U.S. economy. Spurred by an investment-led recovery, U.S. economic growth surged to a spectacular 5.2% annual rate during 1983–1984. Inflation remained low at under 4% annually, unemployment dropped to about 7%, and productivity increased at steady rates. Not coincidentally, Western Europe experienced a similar trend. There, inflation dropped to about 4%, real growth rates rose to a 3–4% annual average, and unemployment fell.

The effect of this upsurge was to reduce allied anxiety about Reagan’s leadership. By this time, moreover, West European governments were showing a keener appreciation for Reagan’s conservative domestic policies. Thatcher had always been in Reagan’s camp, but the West German government, now led by the conservative Kohl, was moving there as well. Amazingly, so was the socialist Mitterand, who was now discovering the virtues of post-Keynesian economics aimed at private sector growth rather than public sector redistribution. The result was a Western alliance now increasingly united under the same economic banner, which facilitated efforts to coordinate transatlantic trade and monetary policies.

As a consequence, the next three summits—at Williamsburg in 1983, London in 1984, and Bonn in 1985—were more harmonious affairs. Some Reagan advisers were disgruntled because these meetings failed to move closer to full adoption of free-market trade policies. The meetings, however, did ratify the satisfaction of Western leaders with the economic situation in ways that undergirded their growing consensus on security policy. The last three years of the Reagan administration were to carry forth a philosophy of continued stability and consensus. With emphasis increasingly placed on regulation of existing trade relations, the impetus for further conservative reform steadily receded, and without protests from the White House. By this time, Reagan’s economic revolution had sufficiently taken root, and with the administration now leading NATO down the path of arms control agreements with the USSR, the president was content to steer a centrist course in economic policy as well.

Also affecting the West’s mounting optimism was the ambitious effort launched by Western Europe after 1985 to move further down the path of integration within the framework of a still-strong transatlantic community. Although the EEC had expanded by the mid-1980s to include 12 nations, commerce continued to be hampered by internal trade barriers that constrained economic growth. Moreover, momentum toward greater overall union was proceeding at a distressingly slow pace, with the Community’s key institu-

---

\(^7\)Nau, *The Myth of America’s Decline*. 
tions—the Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the European Parliament—still lacking significant powers. In essence, the EEC was broadening itself, but because national sovereignty still reigned supreme in most areas, it was not achieving the depth envisioned by its architects.

A major change occurred in 1985, however, when the EEC’s dominant continental members, led by West Germany and France, decided to pursue this depth. The EEC’s name was changed to “European Community” (EC), a step symbolizing a commitment to integrate in more than purely economic terms. Acting on the belief that a reduction in trade barriers could produce greater economic growth for all members, the EC adopted the Single European Act, which took effect in 1987. This act called for bold steps to achieve a single, barrierless market by 1992. Also, the policy latitude and decisionmaking flexibility of EC institutions was enlarged somewhat, including regulation of commerce and monetary relations.

Left undecided was how far the renewed drive toward federalism was to proceed, and major EC powers harbored different visions. France was a strong proponent of transferring power to EC executive agencies, and yet wanted to retain wide scope for national sovereignty. By contrast, West Germany was more inclined to transform the EC into a powerful multilateral body with greater policy scope, but wanted to emphasize the European Parliament rather than the Commission and Council of Ministers. Britain, meanwhile, was unenthusiastic about almost any loss of national sovereignty, and thus distanced itself from both France and Germany. Nonetheless, the Single European Act was an important step toward enlarging the EC’s mandate. Visionaries argued that this act propelled the EC down the road toward economic and monetary union, with a common bank and a single European currency. Looking beyond this major achievement, they further envisioned a coming political union that would produce common social, foreign, and security policies.

The creation of a single market had important implications for U.S.-West European relations, and concerns were expressed that an economic “Fortress Europe” was about to emerge, thereby denying the United States access to European markets. Continuing difficulties in reducing West European agricultural subsidies, which sharply decreased American agricultural exports to Europe, was sighted as forerunner of what might come in other areas of trade and commerce, including high technology American industries. In the long run, moreover, some Americans feared that a politically unified EC might erect its own security alliance, and thereby distance itself from the United States and NATO.

Weighing against these fears, however, was the reassurance that present German, British, and French governments emphasized harmonious relations with the United States. Although France’s attitude remained a question mark because of its long-standing campaign to reduce American influence and weaken NATO, both Bonn and London still placed high value on NATO membership and their security connection to Washington. Also important, most EC members declared that the growing economic and monetary union would be accompanied by a GATT effort to further reduce transatlantic trade barriers.
This step offered to help ensure that the 1992 project would expand, rather than contract, American business opportunities in Europe.

In any event, the U.S. and West European economies were now so tied together and interdependent that any strategic divorce would have been hard to achieve, even if deemed desirable. As of 1985, for example, U.S. direct investment in EC countries totaled $230 billion, U.S.-owned affiliates sold $412 billion of goods in EC nations, and U.S. exports to the EC amounted to $79 billion. EC penetration of the U.S. market was less substantial, but beyond doubt, the United States and the EC had become not only major trading partners but also large investors in each other's economies. Future trends, moreover, pointed to even greater trade, mutual investment, and economic interdependence in the years ahead.

Notwithstanding GATT frictions and nagging worries about potential drift in transatlantic relations, the EC's drive toward integration served the West's larger strategic purposes vis-à-vis the USSR, and complemented NATO's growing resolve in the security realm. NATO's actions were erecting a stronger defense posture, and at the same time the EC increasingly was acting as a magnet to Eastern Europe, thereby illuminating the feeble performance of communist economic management and the Soviet-controlled COMECON. On one side of the continent, Western Europe was steadily becoming more prosperous under democratic governments, capitalist economies, and affordable security requirements. On the other side, both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were rapidly sinking into an economic morass brought about by excessive defense burdens, repressive governments, and the lack of market mechanisms. The negative implications for communism's survival were obvious. For this weighty reason, the United States had cause for contentment with the EC's emergence as an economic powerhouse.

During 1985–1988, periodic disputes were to arise over trade policy, including growing U.S. protectionism, and relations with less-developed countries. Also, West European leaders grew concerned about the mounting U.S. federal deficit, and fear about a resulting economic downside especially appeared when the U.S. stock market crashed in late 1987. Nevertheless, the U.S. and West European economies continued to show stable growth, and this trend was sufficient to keep Reagan's stock high. The final economic summit at Toronto in 1988 consequently saw Reagan, due to depart in a few months, feted by his fellow leaders.

The decline of tensions over economic policy after 1983 left only the burden-sharing issue as an axis of dispute, but even here, the disagreements were not especially divisive. By 1985, Reagan's military buildup had widened the disparity between U.S. and allied spending levels. In 1980, the United States was spending about 5.0% of GDP, but by late 1985, the figure had risen to nearly 7%. By comparison, the West European allies maintained a steady commitment of about 3.5% to defense. The growing disparity provoked testy congressional remarks, but Congress helped narrow the difference by slashing Weinberger's budgets from 1985 onward. Indeed, the real cuts being imposed by Congress
indicated a DoD budget level of only about 5% by the early 1990s—still greater than the allies’, but by a far smaller amount.

Moreover, allied spending efforts were more burdensome than suggested by surface appearances, and the Reagan administration was well aware of this fact. During the 1980s, U.S. per capita income remained considerably higher than most West European incomes. Operating on the time-honored principle of a progressive income tax, the United States seemingly had a greater capacity to absorb higher defense expenditures. Also, the allies paid more in hidden areas. For example, they devoted a larger percentage of their income to security assistance than did the United States, and their smaller defense budgets were partly achieved by continuing to rely on the draft for their military manpower. The United States averted the social costs of a draft by relying on an all-volunteer force. This practice elevated U.S. defense spending, but in ways that magnified the real difference between total burdens.

A further leavening factor was the continuing West European practice of buying far more weapons from the United States than were bought in return. In particular, allied acquisition of the costly F-16 fighter, AWACS aircraft, Patriot, MLRS, and other systems helped reduce U.S. production costs and achieve a better trade and currency balance. The United States purchased some allied weapons in return, including the German 120-mm tank gun and the British Harrier aircraft, but its total acquisitions were far smaller. The stated purpose of NATO’s policy in this area was to foster a “two-way street” in weapon sales, but as a practical matter, the relationship worked in an asymmetrical way that helped offset the cost of stationing large U.S. forces in Europe.

In the mid-1980s, the United States launched a campaign to encourage international armaments cooperation in order to reduce costs, duplication, and overlap on both sides of the Atlantic. An unstated purpose, however, was to promote further allied contributions to the U.S. defense effort in ways that also would be beneficial to the West Europeans. In 1985, the U.S. Senate passed the Nunn-Roth-Warner amendment, which set aside $200 million in DoD funds for cooperative U.S.-allied programs in research, development, and testing. Following this came a second piece of supportive legislation entitled the Quayle Amendment; by 1987, the total funding contribution had grown to well over $300 million. Sensing congressional pressure on burden-sharing, several West European nations responded to these initiatives. By late 1988, 17 agreements had been signed, in which the allies picked up 80% of the cost. The effect was to somewhat ameliorate burden-sharing sensitivities among the Congress.8

In the final analysis, the United States may have had a serious burden-sharing problem with Japan (which spent only 1% of GDP on defense), but far less so with the West Europeans. What mattered far more than allied defense expenditures was whether the West Europeans were contributing sufficient forces to carry out NATO’s defense strategy. Their performance in this area was not fully satisfactory, but was sufficient to maintain a viable military balance in

Europe. What also mattered was the overall U.S.-West European economic relationship, which extended well beyond defense spending. The bottom line here was that from 1983 onward, the economies of both the United States and Western Europe showed steady growth and expanding trade. At their 1988 Toronto summit, the Western leaders expressed their satisfaction by publicly labeling the 1980s the longest period of economic growth in post-war history. This statement said a great deal about not only the burden-sharing debate, but also about the overall health of the alliance. What began in the early 1980s as a mounting crisis in transatlantic relations was now ending in restored harmony, and at the very time when a profound upheaval was about to occur in East-West relations that made harmony especially important.

THE RETURN OF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS

The growing trend to transatlantic harmony on security and economic policy from the mid-1980s onward was further enhanced by the startling developments beginning to take shape in East-West relations. During early 1984, Reagan had promised the West Europeans that, in the aftermath of the Soviet walkout from arms control negotiations, he would endeavor to shore up relations with the USSR. His gesture pleased the allies and helped further strengthen NATO's accord on security policy. With the Soviets having recently walked out of arms control negotiations in protest of the INF deployment, this gesture for the moment seemed to have little practical effect. In the following years, however, matters began to change, and dramatically so.

Gorbachev's growing efforts from 1985 onward to extend the olive branch were greeted with enthusiasm across the entire alliance. The United States and the West Europeans, nonetheless, attached somewhat different explanations to this change. To the Reagan administration, Gorbachev's demeanor was proof of its wisdom in insisting upon a firm security policy. To the Western Europeans, Gorbachev confirmed their own wisdom in keeping open communications with Moscow. In truth, both were right, for their explanations were not mutually exclusive. Regardless, both sides of the Atlantic, satisfied with their constructive roles in beefing up NATO's defenses, were prepared to move quickly. In normal circumstances, the United States might have come down on the side of greater caution and tried to keep the West Europeans in check. But Reagan, ever the big thinker, was no normal man. As the allies soon discovered, Reagan was out front once again, this time seeking not to heat up the Cold War, but rather to end it.

The diplomatic process that was to allow Reagan's security policy in Europe to end on a high note began in early 1985, when the Soviets returned to the bargaining table and Gorbachev took power in Moscow. Within three months, arms control negotiations were under way in four separate forums. The first

---

was a meeting of the 40-nation Geneva Disarmament Conference to address chemical weapons. Then the European Disarmament Conference opened its fifth session in Stockholm, followed immediately by the reconvening of MBFR talks in Vienna. The fourth negotiation was the important U.S.-Soviet Nuclear and Space talks in Geneva, which began in mid-March. By September, a fifth negotiation began, when the Third Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty opened in Geneva.10

Despite this flurry of activity, diplomats on both sides of the Iron Curtain had no reason to believe they were initiating an exchange that a few years later would transform the European security order. Indeed, few had immediate expectations for success in arms control itself, and this especially was the case for MBFR and the Geneva nuclear talks. In Vienna, the two sides were flirting with an interim step that would withdraw some Soviet and American troops, but an agreement seemed as far off as ever. In Geneva, the situation had changed little since the Soviets walked out in late 1983: The two sides were still at loggerheads over the INF zero option and deep strategic arms reductions. An accord was made all the more improbable by the USSR's growing demand for American concessions on SDI as the price for agreeing to either an INF or START treaty. Three separate sessions were held that year, but no deals seemed in the offing.

The year did produce some hopeful signs. In early April 1985, Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would unilaterally freeze SS-20 deployments in the European USSR until November, and asked the United States to reciprocate. Washington refused, but in June, Reagan announced that the United States would continue adhering to the unratified SALT II Treaty provided the USSR would eliminate its own alleged violations. In late September, Reagan and Shultz met with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to discuss recent Soviet thoughts on arms control. A week later, Gorbachev delivered a speech in Paris proposing a new Soviet negotiating package. His proposal expressed willingness to limit SS-20 deployments in the European USSR to 243 launchers and to negotiate up to 50% reductions in U.S. and Soviet long-range missiles. The INF deployment was higher than Andropov had proposed two years earlier, but Gorbachev's START proposal was the first indication of Soviet willingness to consider deep strategic nuclear cuts.

The Paris speech was a prelude to a U.S.-Soviet summit in Geneva in late October, where Reagan and Gorbachev met for the first time. The two leaders carried on a cordial dialogue, but produced no major agreements. They expressed theoretical interest in eliminating offensive ballistic missiles, but Reagan remained adamant about deploying strategic defenses, to which Gorbachev took strong exception. As in his Paris speech, Gorbachev consented to negotiate about deep cuts in strategic forces and an interim INF accord. In response, Reagan proposed an interim accord of 140 launchers apiece in Europe, proportional reductions in Soviet missiles in Asia, and global equality in INF missiles. Gorbachev, however, turned this proposal aside by expressing distaste for in-

---

10 For analysis of arms control events in these years, see IISS, Strategic Survey, 1985–86 and 1986–87, London. See also Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Farewell to Arms Control?" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 1, Fall 1986, pp. 1–20.
cluding Pershing II missiles in any interim agreement and by making no commitment to either Reagan's interim numbers or a subsequent zero option.

The meeting ended with both leaders agreeing on their need to become more involved with arms control negotiations. The summit also yielded an accord to resume commercial flights between the two countries, and to pursue increased cultural, scientific, and educational ties. Nevertheless, large differences remained between U.S. and Soviet nuclear arms control positions, leading many observers to conclude that the gap was unbridgeable. Because the meeting helped improve the political atmosphere, it was judged a tactical success, but when substance was considered, it hardly amounted to a seminal event.

Contributing to the somber assessment of U.S.-Soviet relations were troubling political events that marked the months leading up to the summit and the weeks following it. During this period, Washington and Moscow seemed as far apart as ever on global security issues, including in Afghanistan, the Middle East, and Latin America. Amidst the tension accompanying these issues, the Soviets continued to complain vociferously about SDI, the Pershing II missiles, and Reagan's overall military buildup. The United States shot back with similar charges of its own, further poisoning the well.

As the summer rolled on, the two sides entered an unproductive period of diplomatic jockeying in which each tried to embarrass the other. In late July, the Kremlin, knowing that the United States was about to conduct a series of underground nuclear tests, announced a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and called on Washington to follow suit. The White House responded with angry accusations about alleged Soviet SALT II violations. In particular, it pointed to a Soviet radar at Krasnoyarsk that suggested a budding ABM network, mobile ICBM missiles that made verification of force levels difficult, and space programs that appeared to have an anti-U.S. satellite orientation. Having painted the Soviet Union as a villain, the United States brushed aside Moscow's call for a testing moratorium and launched its testing program.

The Kremlin responded with obvious displeasure, branding the United States an aggressive and uncooperative power. Amidst this tension, Weinberger, speaking two days after the October summit, accused the Soviet Union of violating SALT II by deploying the mobile SS-25 missile. In late December, Reagan added fuel to the fire. Responding to a Gorbachev letter calling for a joint nuclear test moratorium, he asserted that a test ban was not feasible until the SS-20 problem had first been solved. He then submitted a report to Congress accusing the USSR of systematic violations of arms control agreements. Its integrity now officially called into question, the Kremlin reacted angrily, again denouncing Washington's nuclear tests and reiterating the call for a moratorium. All this hardly seemed to bode well for the future, and brought about a quick dissipation of the summit's positive atmospherics.

At the base of Washington's critical stance toward Moscow lay caution about Gorbachev's failure during 1985 to set himself apart from his predecessors. Coming across largely as an Andropov protégé, Gorbachev seemingly was pursuing no major reforms in domestic or foreign policy. His domestic agenda called for a more efficient and productive economy, including an end to corrupt
practices, but envisioned no major changes in the USSR's autocratic political system and command economy. His diplomatic agenda called for improved East-West relations, but was presented in abstract terms that lacked concrete ideas and seemed more rhetorical than sincere. Meanwhile, the Kremlin showed no signs of relaxing its military buildup or withdrawing its forces from anywhere, including Afghanistan. For all these reasons, Gorbachev seemed like old wine in a new bottle.¹¹

During early 1986, Gorbachev's behavior began to change in ways that attracted the West's attention, including Reagan's. The first indicator was a new and bold arms control proposal that seemed to depart widely from the legacy of his immediate predecessors. In mid-January, Gorbachev proposed a three-stage plan to completely eliminate all nuclear weapons from the earth by the year 2000. In the first stage (lasting 5–8 years), the two superpowers were to cease nuclear testing, cut their strategic forces by 50%, and dismantle their INF forces in Europe; meanwhile, Britain and France were to freeze their nuclear forces at current levels. In the second stage, again lasting 5–8 years, other states would begin eliminating their forces. In the final stage, reached by the year 2000, the superpowers would reduce their nuclear inventories to zero.

Gorbachev's visionary plan amounted to a leap far beyond the more moderate goals set at the Geneva summit and confronted the West with numerous diplomatic thorns. Among these, the idea of bringing British and French forces into an accord continued to be poorly received in the capitals of these two nations. Moreover, Gorbachev remained hostile to any SDI deployments, which displeased Washington. Nonetheless, his plan implied a willingness to settle first things first, thereby suggesting a genuine interest in actively pursuing arms control during the coming year. In particular, Gorbachev now seemed willing to do away with INF missiles in Europe, and this development was especially heartening to the United States.

Other actions quickly followed. On February 18, Gorbachev removed a hardline member of the Politburo and appointed a liberal, Boris Yeltsin, to replace him. Two days later, Gorbachev appeared before the UN Disarmament Conference and there broke new ground by voicing willingness to accept on-site inspection to verify a nuclear test ban. Less than a week later, he stunned the opening session of the 27th Communist Party Congress in Moscow by calling for radical economic reform and outlining a new foreign policy that envisioned far closer relations with the West. The effect was to create the impression of a leader who was interested in change.

In the following weeks, Gorbachev reinforced this impression by harping on the theme of major reform at home. His stance suggested clear awareness that the Soviet economy was in a stall pattern and possibly plummeting. Statistics released that year had shown slow industrial expansion, inadequate consumer goods, a swollen defense industry, and appalling productivity. Realizing that these negative trends had to be reversed, Gorbachev was now abandoning his

earlier quest for higher efficiency. Instead, he now began speaking of the need for "perestroika," or a major restructuring of the Soviet economic system. Equally important, he also began calling for "glasnost," or greater openness in Soviet society and politics.

Precisely what these terms meant was unclear. Indeed Gorbachev paradoxically launched his reforms by creating super-ministries to manage key sectors of the economy, a step that hardly suggested decentralization, much less free-market capitalism. Moreover, Soviet police continued to squash open dissent, thus showing that Jeffersonian democracy was not around the corner. Nonetheless, as far as the West could judge, perestroika and glasnost evidently were intended to be meaningful concepts. Gorbachev seemed willing to experiment with economic changes and was determined to clean out dead wood by purging lifeless functionaries. His call for greater openness focused on sharing information but also included a willingness to tolerate controlled debate. Gorbachev had no intention of undermining Communist Party control or abandoning the USSR's centrally planned economy. His announced goal was to create an economically robust socialism. His reforms, however, seemed pointed toward a less repressive and dictatorial nation, which piqued the West's curiosity.12

As the West knew, weakened totalitarianism created the prospect of a less hostile attitude toward democracy, and doubly so because the USSR now badly needed economic help from its capitalist rivals. Confirming western hopes in this area, Gorbachev's unfolding foreign policy rhetoric steadily downplayed both the NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation in Europe and U.S.-Soviet rivalry around the globe. Gorbachev was now talking of cooperating with the United States, and arms control negotiations received special emphasis. As for Europe, he was now speaking of "our common European house," thus implying a growing harmony of views and visions with the West Europeans.

Skeptics responded by worrying that Gorbachev was using arms control and economic reform to revamp Soviet military power, and that he was subtly trying to ease the United States out of Europe. Gorbachev's pleas for improved East-West relations, however, seemed more sincere than what had come from the Kremlin before. This became clear to Americans and West Europeans who journeyed to Moscow, where they discovered not only an earnest Gorbachev but also a more honest dialogue with Soviet officialdom.

The West's response to this new kind of Soviet political leader was to test the waters in a cautious but forthcoming way. Tempted by the prospect of a diplomatic breakthrough but chary because of many dashed hopes in the past, Western governments called on Gorbachev to prove his sincerity, and pointed to the arms control arena as a good place to start. As 1986 unfolded, Gorbachev responded by rolling out a revised arms control agenda that guaranteed no agreements, but did suggest a growing willingness to deal on Western terms.

---

The action began in late February, when Reagan sent Gorbachev a letter that downplayed the disarmament goals outlined in his January proposal and instead drew focus on prospects for more limited accords. Reagan welcomed Gorbachev's January 15 proposal to dismantle INF missiles from Europe, but also called for a global elimination of all INF missiles within three years. Thus, the Soviets were to be allowed no SS-20s in Asia, nor was the United States to keep any Pershing II and GLCM missiles in the United States. Reagan also emphasized the importance of cutting strategic forces by 50%. Although he expressed theoretical interest in eventually eliminating nuclear weapons, he said that the first priority must be to redress the nuclear and conventional balance in Europe.

When Gorbachev offered no immediate response, the action shifted to other arenas, where events remained unencouraging. In early March, the USSR announced an extension of its nuclear test moratorium unless the United States continued to test. The United States responded by proposing verification measures that would lead to ratification of the still-unsigned Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions treaties, but the USSR rejected this offer. Instead, Gorbachev offered to meet Reagan to negotiate a nuclear test ban, but the United States demurred. When the United States conducted another test in early April, Gorbachev announced the end of its moratorium. The Chernobyl nuclear accident occurred in late April and led Gorbachev to renew the moratorium, but the United States continued to balk at a test ban.

Impatient with Moscow's unresponsive attitude about SALT violations, Washington began threatening to break SALT II's sublimits. At the time, cruise missiles were being added to B-52 bombers, and the momentum of this program promised to carry the United States over the SALT II limit late in the year. The Reagan administration voiced no intention of scaling back this program, thus bringing the informal SALT II framework into question. Added to top came a spate of nasty exchanges in which Washington accused the USSR of having spies at the United Nations, while Moscow responded by protesting the presence of U.S. naval forces in the Black Sea and Reagan's mid-April bombing of Libya.

In late April, Gorbachev strode into this deteriorating situation to switch attention back to the arms control arena, where he apparently did have plans to achieve improved relations. In his initial response to Reagan's February letter, Gorbachev said nothing about nuclear negotiations, but did offer a proposal answering Reagan's demand to rectify the conventional imbalance in Europe. Speaking to the East German Communist Party on April 18, Gorbachev proposed to widen the scope of conventional force negotiations to include the area stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals. A short while later NATO signaled back its interest. In response, Gorbachev's proposal was repeated in early June, when the Warsaw Pact issued its "Budapest call" endorsing the Atlantic-Urals concept.

Beyond question, this dramatic gesture was an indication of the kind of sincerity the West was looking for. It promised to broaden the stalled MBFR negotiations in ways that strongly appealed to NATO's concerns over the conven-
tional balance. In particular, it opened to negotiation the large conventional forces in the western USSR, thereby creating the prospect of a genuinely stabilizing agreement if the Kremlin proved amenable to asymmetric reductions. A stabilizing conventional agreement, in turn, promised to enhance NATO’s flexibility for negotiating about nuclear arms.

Following this, Gorbachev moved in the nuclear arena in ways that similarly gave rise to Western hopes. On June 11, his negotiators at Geneva laid down a new proposal which offered a 30% cut in strategic forces in exchange for U.S. commitment to continue the ABM Treaty for 15–20 years. For this period, the United States was to confine SDI testing to the laboratory. The U.S. response came in a Reagan letter to Gorbachev in late July, which offered the INF zero option, a staged 50% cut in strategic forces, and compliance with the ABM Treaty for at least 7-1/2 years. In the interim, the two sides were to negotiate about SDI in a manner designed to seek a stable balance composed of deployed strategic defenses and eliminated offensive missiles.

This exchange still left the two sides far apart, especially on the continued duration of the ABM Treaty. Whereas the Soviets clearly wanted to keep the treaty in force, thereby blocking any SDI deployments, Reagan was offering a treaty extension only until SDI was ready for deployment. Nevertheless, the exchange marked a turning point. It did so by bringing the two sides close enough to provide a basis for negotiation about a comprehensive INF, START, and SDI deal that might be acceptable to the United States and its allies.

In particular, the Soviet Union was now expressing both (1) a willingness to compromise on SDI in order to gain a nuclear accord and (2) a still-existing acceptance of deep strategic arms cuts. As for INF, Gorbachev signaled greater flexibility here as well. He expressed willingness to sign an interim accord allowing for 100 missiles in Europe, followed by complete elimination there. British and French forces, he said, would be no obstacle. Although he did not commit himself to a global zero option, he did suggest that Soviet missiles in Asia could be reduced in response to Reagan’s wishes.

Together, these positions suggested that Gorbachev indeed was serious about reaching an arms control agreement, and the West responded by unequivocally changing its assessment of the Soviet leader. What thus far had been a feeling-out period now gave way to a far more serious diplomatic dialogue, one aimed not at posturing for appearance’s sake but rather at achieving genuineaccords. Leading the way was Reagan, a longstanding anti-communist but also a pragmatist who, because of his own experience as an innovator, seemed to have an affinity for Gorbachev and his agenda.

The following months were to see a flurry of activity as the two sides began moving closer to a nuclear agreement. The sixth round of the Geneva talks, launched in September, provided a further articulation of the two sides’ positions. The U.S. START position now envisioned reductions to 1250 ballistic missiles and 350 heavy bombers, with a limit of 3300 ICBM warheads, 5500 ICBM/SLBM warheads, and 2000 air-launched cruise missiles. Soviet missile throw-weight was to be cut in half, heavy ICBMs were to carry only one-half of allowable warheads, MIRV loadings were limited to six warheads per missile,
new ICBMs were banned, and mobile ICBMs were banned unless verification of their numbers could be ensured. The U.S. INF stance also had important new wrinkles. The interim accord remained at 100 missiles in Europe and 200 globally, but a provision was added for collateral constraints on shorter-range INF missiles, i.e., Soviet SS-12s and SS-23s. Regarding SDI, the July formula for a seven-year ABM Treaty extension was repeated.

The Soviet position provided areas of accord and continuing disagreement with the United States. It was similar, but not identical, in its call for a combined total of 1600 ballistic missiles and bombers, 8000 nuclear warheads, and an interim INF accord of 100 missiles. It did not, however, offer similar cutbacks in ICBM forces; where the U.S. position allowed for only 3300 ICBM warheads, the Soviet proposal authorized 4800 warheads. Nothing was said about throw-weight or limits on heavy ICBMs, but the Soviet position called for a ban on sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) on surface ships and submarines, an area where U.S. deployments were under way. The Soviet INF position continued to embrace an interim agreement but was less firm on Asian limits and an ultimate zero option. Once again, the Soviets called for a 15-year extension of the ABM Treaty, nowhere near Reagan's stance.

These positions provided the framework for the Reykjavik meeting, noted earlier, that was held on October 11–12. Reagan evidently arrived expecting a general exchange on INF, but when Gorbachev appeared with an obvious intent to deal on more comprehensive terms, the discussions quickly became far more serious. During the first day, the two sides made significant progress toward narrowing the remaining differences. The reason largely was Soviet concessions on INF and START. Regarding INF, Gorbachev proposed to bypass an interim accord in favor of complete elimination in Europe, a global limit of 100 missiles, and reductions in shorter-range missiles. Concerning START, Gorbachev moved much closer to the U.S. position on total launchers and warheads, heavy ICBMs, bomber counting rules, and SLCMs. The effect was to bring an INF agreement within easy reach and to make a START accord a realistic goal for 1987.13

Continuing to bar the way, however, was the thorny matter of SDI and the ABM Treaty. During the second day, the two leaders agreed on a treaty duration of ten years but were unable to find common ground on allowable research and development in the interim. Equally important, the idea of completely eliminating offensive nuclear weapons entered the discussion to create an additional impasse. Evidently Reagan proposed a phased ten-year arrangement in which ballistic missiles would be entirely dismantled, leaving the two sides with bombers and free to deploy SDI defenses. Displeased at the prospect of a U.S.-dominated world of bombers and defenses, Gorbachev countered with an even more visionary plan to abolish everything, including missiles, bombers.

and defenses. When Reagan continued clinging to SDI, the discussion deteriorated into vague abstractions about the nature of stability. The meeting ended there, with the first day's progress obscured by frustration at the second day's failure to forge a grand deal.

Reagan returned to Washington to cope with his alarmed allies, and over the next few weeks American and Soviet negotiators worked to refocus dialogue on more limited and achievable goals. Once again, however, SDI and the ABM Treaty stood in the way, thereby transforming an otherwise reachable INF-START accord on deep offensive cuts into an unbridgeable impasse over the fundamentals of mutual deterrence and stability. Also, Reykjavik's frustrations combined with mounting tensions over spy scandals to poison the atmosphere. Furthermore, the Iran-Contra scandal exploded in Washington, bogging down the White House in domestic turmoil and diverting its attention from negotiations.

The trends were not entirely adverse, however. In early December, NATO finally answered the Budapest call of the previous June by agreeing to open new talks on conventional force reductions from the Atlantic to the Urals. The sterile MBFR exercise thus seemed about to be replaced by a more promising negotiation. Nevertheless, U.S.-Soviet relations were taking a negative turn elsewhere. In late November, the United States had announced that, fed up by the lack of progress over SALT compliance, it was breaking SALT II's limits by deploying more cruise-missile-equipped bombers than authorized. In turn, the Soviet Union, proclaiming anger at continued U.S. nuclear testing, announced in late December that it would end its testing moratorium. On this note, 1986 came to an unhappy end.

The year 1987 dawned with uncertainty over what lay ahead. On the bright side, the CSCE Review Conference opened with a spate of Soviet proposals on human rights, cultural exchanges, and confidence-building measures. Also, NATO and Warsaw Pact delegates met in Vienna to set terms for the new conventional negotiations. This progress was obscured, however, by U.S.-Soviet failure to resolve their differences over nuclear testing. Shortly after the United States conducted its first test of the year, the Soviets resumed testing for the first time in 18 months. To an important degree, this negative development signified that East-West relations now stood at a crossroads. Much depended on the Geneva nuclear negotiations, but although diplomats had returned to work in early January, the impasse over SDI remained.

At this critical juncture, once again Gorbachev transformed the situation. Evidently concluding that his continued insistence on an SDI accord would bar any further progress, Gorbachev on February 18 stunned Washington by proposing to separate INF negotiations from the START/SDI talks. Gorbachev now appeared willing to bow even further to the West's negotiating stance on INF force levels. Gorbachev's reasons for taking this dramatic step, which reversed his earlier emphasis on a comprehensive settlement, were unclear, but doubtless well thought-out. Apparently Gorbachev reasoned that his larger political agenda, international and domestic, could not withstand another year of stalemated U.S.-Soviet relations. Moreover, by this time large numbers of
Pershing IIs and GLCMs, a bête noire in Moscow, were already deployed in Europe. The only practical way to remove them was for the USSR to agree to Washington’s interpretation of the zero option.

Delighted by this turn of events, Reagan readily agreed to pursue a separate INF Treaty that would be crafted on his own terms. Reagan’s response to Gorbachev’s volte-face touched off ten months of intense negotiations that ultimately produced a signed INF Treaty at the Washington summit in December 1987. This treaty proved to be even more comprehensive than the zero option had envisioned. It eliminated not only all LRINF missiles in Europe, but also those in Asia and the United States. Additionally, it swept away all shorter-range (SRINF) missiles on both sides, i.e., missiles with ranges between 500-1000 kilometers. The result was a “double zero” treaty, something that neither leader had envisioned when the process began.

The drive to sign an INF Treaty began in early March, when the INF talks reconvened to take up Gorbachev’s offer and the United States tabled a new negotiating proposal. As this session unfolded, it became apparent that the West intended to expand three demands tabled at Reykjavik. With the prospect of an actual treaty looming on the horizon, U.S. negotiators were now pressing for an intrusive verification regime to ensure compliance. Second, the United States raised questions about allowing a global limit of 100 LRINF missiles after these systems had been removed from Europe. Finally, the United States, reacting to the wishes of its West European allies, now sought deeper reductions in SRINF systems than had been contemplated earlier.

The Soviets responded to U.S. pressures on SRINF by immediately calling for a separate negotiating forum to handle these systems. On April 15, however, Gorbachev changed course by proposing that both sides reduce their SRINF systems to zero. In effect, Gorbachev was offering to give up several hundred SS-12/SS-23 launchers and missiles, and in exchange he demanded only that West Germany sacrifice 72 old Pershing IA missiles under its control. These missiles already were approaching obsolescence, but they had important symbolic value to the German government and NATO military authorities, both of which were coming to fear an alliance slide toward denuclearization. As a result, NATO balked and responded by stepping up its demands for the complete elimination of Soviet LRINF missiles in Asia.

On July 23, Gorbachev responded by declaring his willingness to dismantle all LRINF missiles in both Europe and Asia, but only if the Pershing IA’s were included in the deal. Citing the Warsaw Pact conventional threat, Kohl resisted this demand, saying it would be acceptable only if the USSR was rendered incapable of invading German territory. In an effort to end the controversy, the United States tabled a counterproposal in which the Pershing IA’s would be retained but not modernized, thereby condemning them to eventual retirement from obsolescence. Also, the United States softened somewhat its verification demands and stretched out the timetable for implementing the treaty. This offer, however, failed to mollify the Soviets, who argued that notwithstanding their own largesse, the treaty was being blocked by Western arguments that violated the zero-option principle.
Faced with the logic of this position and backed against the wall by Soviet unwillingness to yield further, NATO found itself plunged into a tough internal debate. Over the next three weeks, considerable pressure was brought against the West German government, not least by the United States. Finally, on August 23 Kohl relented. Even this concession failed to satisfy the Soviets, who now pressed for the withdrawal of U.S.-owned Pershing IA warheads from Europe and the destruction of all similar missiles and warheads on American soil. Reagan, smelling a treaty that would bolster his political stock at home and abroad, responded in a positive fashion. After further haggling, a satisfactory double-zero agreement finally was reached, and in mid-September, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to hold a summit in late December to sign the INF Treaty.

The following weeks saw intense negotiations on the verification issue in which all parties proved hesitant about accepting full on-site inspections. An agreement eventually was crafted calling for principal reliance on national technical means, but also allowing for continuous monitoring of production facilities. Also, a specific number of short-notice inspections were to be held at agreed locations over a 13-year period.

The double-zero treaty that was signed at the Washington summit on 8–10 December, amidst considerable fanfare, promised to disband by 1991 two entire categories of nuclear weapons that had threatened Europe’s security for years. For LRINF systems, the Soviet Union was obligated to destroy about 600 launchers and 900 missiles, whereas the United States was to dismantle about 300 launchers and 700 missiles. For SRINF systems, the Soviets yielded over 200 launchers and 900 missiles in exchange for West Germany’s 72 Pershing IA’s. In total, the USSR was to destroy over twice as many missiles and three times as many warheads as the United States (see Table 20.2).

Both sides came away from the Washington summit pleased with the outcome and looking forward to greater things in 1988. For Gorbachev, the agreement dramatically improved his standing in Western capitals and did away with especially threatening NATO missiles without undermining the USSR’s deterrent posture. Also, it enhanced his political standing in Moscow, validated his

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Launchers</th>
<th>Missiles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S./NATO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRINF</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRINF</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-20 LRINF</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other LRINF</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>910</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
foreign policy toward the West, and gave him greater latitude for pursuing reform at home. Hard-line conservatives doubtless were left grumbling, but the tide was clearly going against them.

Within Western circles, critics charged that NATO had gone too far toward paring back its own nuclear flexibility. Nonetheless, the Reagan administration voiced satisfaction with the treaty, as did West European governments. For them, the INF Treaty marked the end of a long and troubled journey, one that ended happily by validating NATO’s long-standing commitment to the zero option. For the price of NATO’s LRINF/SRINF missiles, the INF Treaty removed not only the entire SS-20 force but also a whole set of other Soviet missiles along with it. Western governments, notwithstanding some dissent from professional military circles, judged this exchange to be an advantageous one.14 Equally important, the INF Treaty seemed a harbinger of other arms control agreements to come, including deals on strategic nuclear and conventional forces. Beyond this, it raised the possibility that, with Gorbachev at the helm in Moscow, a much broader political settlement might be in the offing.15

Consequently, 1988 dawned with a great deal of hope in Western capitals, and although the highest expectations were not realized, Reagan’s final year in office produced major additional progress on East-West relations. Progress did not come in the form of a treaty on strategic forces. Rather, it was registered in the realm of conventional force negotiations, where indications grew that Gorbachev was willing to engage in sizable cutbacks which would strip away a great deal of the Warsaw Pact’s offensive potential. More important, progress was made in East-West political relations in ways indicating a fundamental relaxation of tensions in Europe.

When 1988 got under way, many observers felt that Washington and Moscow would quickly follow-up their INF Treaty with a similar agreement on strategic offensive and defensive forces. Hoping this would be the case, Reagan tried to goad the negotiations along, and Gorbachev evidently pushed for the same goal from Moscow. The still-existing differences between the two sides, however, proved too stubborn for ready solution. Disagreements over strategic defenses, SLCMs, ALCMs, mobile ICBMs, and verification bogged down the negotiations in a time-consuming morass of technicalities. Diplomats in Geneva succeeded in agreeing on major parts of a START draft treaty, but it soon became apparent that actual signing would have to await a new presidential administration.

Fading hopes in this area were balanced by growing optimism for conventional negotiations. On March 9, the moribund MBFR talks were replaced by an entirely new negotiation entitled “Conventional Forces in Europe” (CFE). Convened in Vienna, CFE was a product of nearly two years of preparation, including internal reviews by NATO and discussions with Warsaw Pact officials about CFE’s mandate. The negotiation was chartered with the establishment of a


15For a critique of the INF Treaty, see Jeffrey Record et al., The INF Treaty: Pro and Con, The Hudson Institute, Indianapolis, Indiana, 1988.
stable and more secure balance of forces at lower levels. In particular, it was mandated to eliminate the capability to launch surprise attacks and to initiate large-scale offensive actions. The area to be covered included the entire Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU) region, thus taking in not only Central Europe, but also the northern and southern flanks, and the western USSR as well.

The replacement of MBFR with CFE was not itself grounds for optimism, but what encouraged Western negotiators was the stance adopted by Soviet diplomats and military officers. At the opening session, the West tabled a negotiating position that was committed to deep cuts and heavily one-sided. Calling for reductions to parity, the West proposed an ATTU limit of 20,000 tanks, 28,000 armored troop carriers, and 16,500 artillery pieces for each side. These limits required the Warsaw Pact to dismantle about 60% of its conventional weapons in the ATTU region, including nearly 32,000 tanks and 27,000 artillery tubes. In exchange, NATO was required to disband only about 10% of its weapons, including only about 2,000 tanks and 1,000 artillery pieces. Subzones and national limitations, in turn, were to guarantee at least a proportionate withdrawal of Soviet military forces from the forward areas. In the end, the once-powerful Soviet Army in Eastern Europe would be reduced to a shell of its former self, far below the levels needed to attack NATO without massive reinforcement from the USSR. Moreover, Soviet forces in the western USSR would themselves be reduced so that they alone could not provide the sizable reinforcements needed to support a theaterwide Warsaw Pact offensive.

The West’s position set aside traditional notions of negotiability in exchange for a wholehearted commitment to achieving true stability. The West’s argument was that a 6:1 asymmetrical drawdown was needed to achieve parity while also leaving sufficient forces for NATO to carry out its defense strategy. In earlier years, this stance would have elicited guffaws from Soviet representatives followed by stalemate; indeed, the USSR probably would have accused the West of insincerity and stormed out of the talks. To the astonishment of observers, however, Soviet officials accepted NATO’s position as a serious basis for negotiation. Although they tabled somewhat different data and reduction concepts, they indicated that an asymmetric agreement might be signed once the technicalities were mastered and differences narrowed. This stance suggested new thinking in Moscow that might produce a major change in the European conventional balance, one yielding far greater stability than once imagined.

A forthcoming Soviet attitude was also evidenced at a second and complementary negotiation that began at this time. On March 9, the second 35-state Conference on CSBM opened in Vienna, with a mandate to build on agreements reached in the 1986 Stockholm CDE document. That document had identified 83 military activities required for monitoring under the CDE’s CSBM regime. The new negotiation was chartered to achieve a more detailed exchange of military information on both sides, to encourage adoption of defensive doctrines, and to lower the threshold for military activities requiring observation. Once again, the Soviets tabled positions that differed from the West’s in scope and ambitiousness, but their attitude was forthcoming and conciliatory.
Along with this stance in the CFE and CSBM negotiations, Soviet officials were now singing a very different tune about the nature of the European force balance. Earlier Soviet spokesmen had adopted a self-righteous stance, assigning defensive intent to themselves and blaming NATO for harboring aggressive designs. Although they continued to criticize NATO, their denunciations were now far less harsh and suspicious. Moreover, they were also beginning to acknowledge the extent to which an offensive strategy underlay Warsaw Pact forces. Leading the pack were Gorbachev and his senior advisers, who openly called for major changes in the Soviet Army with the goal of stripping away offensive power and leaving behind a purely defensive force. Accompanying this growing emphasis on defensive intent, orders came from Moscow instructing Soviet commanders no longer to plan to counterattack into West German territory even if NATO first attacked the Warsaw Pact. The guiding concept was to be a counterthrust that would stop at the inter-German border.\(^\text{16}\)

None of these developments guaranteed that the long-standing NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation at the inter-German border was likely to end any time soon. Nor did they imply that the Soviet Army was about to leave Eastern Europe, or that offensive doctrines were truly being discarded from Soviet thinking. Gorbachev’s policy called for the Warsaw Pact to continue in existence as a defensive military alliance and for large Soviet forces to remain in the forward areas. It also called for mobile forces and doctrines that easily could be used for offensive operations notwithstanding their defensive veneer. Many seasoned observers felt that the Kremlin’s expressed interest in an asymmetric CFE agreement was a propaganda ploy. Their expectation was for a prolonged and difficult CFE negotiation that might well end in a frustrating stalemate.

The winds of change, however, were blowing, and a far more open and constructive dialogue was getting under way. Accompanying this dialogue came Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and a slackening of meddlesome activity elsewhere in the Third World. Outweighing all this were the strong reformist impulses now coming from Moscow. Gorbachev was talking about wholesale changes not only in the Soviet economy but in the political system as well. Word began coming out that major experiments in free enterprise were under consideration, and that power was to be transferred from the Communist Party to state institutions. Additionally, prominent Soviet officials were now talking about creating a nation of laws to replace the arbitrary exercise of power. These changes did not mean that democracy and capitalism were about to be adopted, but they did suggest that totalitarianism was on the way out.

The positive changes under way in the USSR especially gained public attention in the West when Reagan visited Moscow for his final summit with Gorbachev in late May. The summit achieved no new arms control accords, but what it produced in symbolism was important in itself. With the Western press celebrating “Moscow Spring,” Reagan openly approved of Gorbachev’s reform efforts and made clear that, if they continued, a far better era of East-West rela-

\(^{16}\)The Warsaw Pact’s switch in doctrines, which was openly admitted by Soviet and East European military officers, increasingly became a focal point of the East-West dialogue on doctrines that began around this time.
tions lay ahead. Skeptics continued to doubt how much reform Gorbachev was capable of, and calls for prudence emanated from Western capitals. Reagan endorsed the need for caution, but his demeanor suggested a belief that the Cold War was all but over.

REAGAN'S LEGACY

Speaking at the Toronto economic summit's closing ceremony, Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney warmly praised Reagan. He proclaimed that Reagan's "leadership has been strong, his accomplishments most substantial, and his place in history secure." Although his remarks were a rhetorical flourish, they reflected more than the afterglow of the Moscow summit and a natural mellowing as the Reagan era neared its end. They also reflected broad satisfaction among NATO's leaders with the state of the alliance and East-West relations.17

This contentment was not limited to Reagan's alliance partners, for he himself had reason to feel comfortable about his presidency at the time of the Toronto summit. He continued to face domestic criticism about the Iran-Contra scandal and the economy, but not to fatal effect. With the Cold War coming to an end, his international leadership was being praised across the country, and the Democratic Party seemed incapable of mounting a powerful challenge to overturn his conservative legacy. As a result, his anointed successor, Vice President George Bush, seemingly stood a good chance to win the upcoming 1988 election. When Bush parlayed this opportunity into a November victory over Democratic challenger Michael Dukakis, Reagan had even more cause to savor the fruits of victory. He departed the White House in early 1989 as the first president since Eisenhower to serve out a full two terms. Moreover, he left with his reputation intact.

A final verdict on Reagan's presidency can come only after sufficient time has elapsed to permit a historical appraisal. Whether Reagan's conservative goals best served the national interest will be debated for many years, but future historians are unlikely to question that he was successful at carrying out the agenda that he set for himself. In the domestic arena, Reagan shifted national policy and politics in the conservative directions that he favored. As was his intention, he left behind a sea change in fiscal and economic policy that seemed immune to reversal anytime soon. He also called into question the welfare state and shifted emphasis toward the private sector. Notwithstanding these departures, Reagan managed to lead the Republican Party in seizing the vital centrist high ground. The reason was that major segments of the Democratic Party drifted leftward during his tenure, a trend that Reagan played upon. Although Reagan failed to drive the Democrats off Capitol Hill, Bush's decisive victory

showed that Reagan had further solidified Republican control of the White House. For this reason alone, his political visions seemed likely to continue affecting American politics for years to come.

The same record of successfully achieved goals applies to his international policies, only more so. By early 1989 Reagan had largely carried out his pledge to forge a stronger U.S. defense posture, and he had bequeathed a prosperous NATO alliance united under the banner of his own principles. To the astonishment of his detractors, his stubborn stance on arms control was now paying off, and his improbable quest for a new theory of mutual nuclear deterrence also seemed to be taking hold. Beyond this, Reagan not only had stood up to communism, but Soviet power was receding and the Kremlin was now seeking to end the Cold War on terms favorable to the West. Even in the eyes of his critics, this record of accomplished goals will be hard to dismiss, and it seems likely to stand up under history's scrutinizing eye.

Reagan will continue being criticized for policies that were too inspired by ideology and thus lacked balance, coherence, and programmatic content. Critics also will continue giving Reagan low grades for questionable domestic priorities, for his large budgetary deficit, and for an allegedly wasteful and poorly planned defense buildup. Because of these questions about his priorities, a key issue will be whether he could have accomplished his foreign policy goals at less fiscal and political cost. His critics probably will contend that Reagan paid too high a price for favorable security outcomes that would have been his in any event. His admirers likely will counter by arguing that although the costs of the Reagan strategy might have been high, his achievements—especially in compelling the Soviet Union to cry uncle—were staggering.18

Regardless of where the truth lies, Reagan's international accomplishments, for all their power, undeniably crystallized in his second term. Throughout his first term, Reagan relentlessly pursued an ambitious conservative agenda that seemed to pile one controversial departure upon another. These years, to be sure, saw important accomplishments, including the U.S. military buildup and NATO decisions to undertake nuclear and conventional modernization. Nonetheless, Reagan's agenda often overloaded the alliance in ways that left NATO strained by disruptive debates over many aspects of security affairs and economic policy. It was only by mid-1984 that the alliance's fractious policy debates had begun to heal, and even then the consensus was shaky, and East-West relations were poor. Had his administration been voted out of office in the election that fall, Reagan's foreign policy legacy consequently would have been far less impressive.

Reagan overcame these problems during his second term in part because his policies ultimately were persuasive to the West European allies and influenced the Soviets to come to terms. In particular, Western industrial recovery from 1983 onward helped quell allied angst about his economic policies, and INF modernization seems to have turned the key in the security arena. Also SDI, for

all its initial controversy, eventually helped jar the Soviets into pursuing arms control. Nevertheless, Reagan's success also resulted from paying closer attention to allied views from 1983 onward, and from 1985 onward holding out the olive branch to the Soviet Union. Reagan deserves credit for wisely shifting gears in ways that established a more mature policy balance and a tactful diplomacy, but these were changes that his critics had been urging on him.

An important issue will be whether Reagan's cascading accomplishments in Europe during his later years were a product of his own initiatives or, instead, favorable circumstances. In relations with Western Europe, Reagan's policies played a constructive role by promoting transatlantic industrial recovery and growing NATO solidarity, and they also had an impact on allied internal politics. The West European nations, nevertheless, moved in responsive directions for reasons that went beyond Reagan's hammering on conservative themes. They themselves were led by able statesmen who were sympathetic to Reagan's visions. Reagan especially benefited from Thatcher's continuing presence in Britain, Mitterand's forthcoming stance in France, and Kohl's elevation to power in West Germany. Without their cooperation, Reagan doubtless would have been less successful.

Similarly, Reagan's success at bringing about improved relations with the USSR owed partly to his policies and partly to circumstances. Reagan's military buildup, success at restoring alliance cohesion, and uncompromising arms control stance undoubtedly contributed to the Kremlin's willingness to come to terms, but this was largely because the Soviet Union already had spent itself into the poorhouse. Whether the Reagan administration fully grasped that the USSR was tottering on the brink of bankruptcy is unclear. To the extent it did not, its coup de grace was administered unwittingly.

Fortunate timing also came to Reagan's aid. Just at the moment when Reagan's defense buildup was losing steam and his tough-minded security policies were being challenged, Gorbachev rode to the rescue with an offer of arms control agreements and global reconciliation. Had Andropov or Chernenko lived, Reagan's record almost certainly would have been far less stellar. Eventually the Soviet Union would have been compelled to pursue internal reform and external accommodation, but not right then.

In dealing with the West Europeans and the Soviets, Reagan clearly knew the path that he wanted to take and refused to be diverted from the journey. Whether he had any early inclination that he would travel as far as he did, or a fixed roadmap for getting there, is another matter; this especially is true for relations with the USSR, but it also applies to alliance relations. As a consequence, Reagan's leadership will be credited as visionary and strong, but not clairvoyant or always of maestro quality. To an unmeasurable yet important degree, history might well conclude, Reagan succeeded partly because he had the luck of the Irish.

Because good luck itself is often created by sound policy goals and unrelenting effort, what counts most in statecraft is results. Through a combination of design and good fortune, he left office after eight years with NATO militarily and
politically stronger, and the USSR in retreat. The bottom line thus is that Rea-
gan brought good results, and by the bundle.

Indeed, Reagan wrote his own script. Early in his tenure, he remarked that
the presidency was similar to acting in a play. The trick, he said, was to make
the first act an eye-catcher, to survive the down moments of the second act, and
then to close with a flourish. The overall goal was to send the audience home
satisfied, feeling that it had gotten its money’s worth. As Reagan left office, his
admirers gave him high marks on this score. History probably will do likewise,
for although Reagan’s specific policies will remain controversial, his presidency
undeniably was an era of gripping political drama.
To set the stage for an analysis of the political revolution that swept over Europe after Reagan departed, the following takes stock of Europe's military balance in early 1989. Reagan had presided over the final eight years of grueling military competition that went back to the mid-1960s, when the Soviet Union launched its concerted military buildup. For a time, the USSR seemed on the way to unquestioned military supremacy in Europe, but then NATO began to respond, and with growing momentum as the 1970s ended. Inheriting these initial efforts in 1981, Reagan led the alliance in bringing them to fruition. For the USSR, early 1989 marked an unhappy end to the competition in ways that influenced how the Cold War was to end a few months later.

Appearances to the contrary, the NATO-Warsaw Pact competition during the 1970s and 1980s was not a mindless rivalry. Both sides were intent on using their force improvements not only to underscore their military doctrines, but also to bolster their capacity to shape the terms for political settlement and accommodation in Europe. In a narrow sense, the Soviet Union won this competition because it added more military power to its side of the ledger than did NATO. The alliance's goal, however, was not to match the Soviets' bomb for bomb. Instead, it aspired merely to strengthen its forces to the extent needed to maintain deterrence, to preserve a balance of power, and to keep viable its defensive military strategy. Behind this security shield, it endeavored to continue pursuing the sustained economic growth that had brought prosperity, internal stability, and cohesion during the 1950s and 1960s. It thus judged success by a quite different yardstick.

Because NATO's strategic policy established a satisfactory balance between security and economic health, it proved to be far superior to the one-sided and ultimately self-defeating policy pursued by the Kremlin. Although the military balance was still tenuous as of early 1989, the alliance had weathered the Soviet challenge and achieved most of its military objectives. In doing so, NATO effectively negated the Kremlin's expensive quest for supremacy that left nothing to show in terms of enhanced Soviet influence. Moscow's unfulfilled military ambitions, in turn, were purchased at the price of deteriorating economic conditions that by 1989 had reached the crisis point throughout the Warsaw Pact. For these reasons, Moscow's long-pursued strategic policy in Europe ended in colossal failure. Recognition of this catastrophe played a role in driv-
ing the expanded arms control agenda set by Gorbachev as he confronted the
incoming Bush administration. Beyond this, it helped undermine the legiti-
macy of communist rule in both Eastern Europe and the USSR in ways that, to
almost everyone's surprise, soon made arms control a secondary issue.

THE NUCLEAR BALANCE

Precisely what motives lay behind the USSR's massive and unrelenting arms
buildup from 1965 onward remained a bone of contention in the West through-
out the Cold War's final two decades. When the Soviet buildup began, many
observers saw it as a reaction to American nuclear superiority. As its dimen-
sions became clear in the late 1970s, however, the buildup became hard to ex-
plain purely in terms of deterrence. Larger ambitions became obvious when
Soviet strategic nuclear, theater nuclear, and conventional initiatives were
added together. Debate remained, nonetheless, over exactly what form of mili-
tary dominance the Soviet Union was seeking. Some argued that the USSR was
striving for conventional dominance in Europe under a mantle of nuclear par-
ty, whereas others asserted that the Soviets were trying to add nuclear
supremacy to the equation as well. Throughout the period, the Soviet govern-
ment, constantly proclaiming solely defensive intent, remained unclear on this
critical issue.

Whatever the case, measures to improve the USSR's strategic nuclear forces
remained an important feature of the buildup. As of 1965, the Soviet Union still
had a paltry force of only about 500 ICBMs and SLBMs and some 165 strategic
bombers, which put it far behind the U.S. posture of 1300 ballistic missiles and
1000 bombers. Within five years, its posture stood at 1150 ballistic missiles, and
by the mid-1970s the posture had leveled off at fully 2350 ICBMs and SLBMs.
The deployment of modern missiles with large throw-weights and MIRVed
warheads, which started about this time, produced a further major increase in
nuclear power. By the late 1980s, consequently, the Soviet posture of nearly
1400 ICBMs, 950 SLBMs, and 150 bombers boasted over 4700 megatons and
10,000 nuclear warheads (see Table 21.1).

Because American force levels remained fairly constant during these years,
the USSR achieved numerical equality with the United States in the early to
middle 1970s, and thereafter pulled ahead by about 20% in total launchers and
50% in megatonnage. Since the United States proliferated MIRVs throughout
its ICBMs/SLBMs and continued to deploy a larger bomber force than the USSR
did, however, it retained about a 15–20% edge in total warheads. As a result, the
Soviets never did gain a clear-cut numerical superiority, if that was their goal.
Although the forces on both sides changed a great deal through modernization,
the superpower nuclear balance remained one of overall parity and essential
equivalence. In Europe, this state of affairs had a quieting effect on the NATO
allies and tended to quell fears that extended deterrence was eroding.

Throughout these years, a key question was whether the USSR would gain a
meaningful operational advantage over the United States. In particular, Ameri-
can planners constantly worried that the USSR would acquire a disarming first-
Table 21.1
Trends in the Strategic Nuclear Balance*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBMs</td>
<td>1014</td>
<td>1054</td>
<td>1054</td>
<td>1053</td>
<td>1043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLBMs</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total launchers</td>
<td>2262</td>
<td>2214</td>
<td>2160</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>2055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total warheads</td>
<td>7800</td>
<td>8700</td>
<td>12000</td>
<td>12000</td>
<td>13000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total megatons</td>
<td>3500</td>
<td>3200</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>2700</td>
<td>3200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBMs</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1425</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>1398</td>
<td>1386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLBMs</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total launchers</td>
<td>1660</td>
<td>2120</td>
<td>2560</td>
<td>2508</td>
<td>2488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total warheads</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>5900</td>
<td>9700</td>
<td>11500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total megatons</td>
<td>2200</td>
<td>3100</td>
<td>4900</td>
<td>4800</td>
<td>4700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Author’s estimates. Data taken from multiple sources, including Secretary of Defense annual reports and Soviet Military Power.

Some range of variation in warhead levels exists for all of these estimates, largely due to different counting rules for bomber and SLBM warheads. Warhead levels should be taken as approximate.

strike capability, or a capacity to dominate the United States somewhere along the escalation ladder. Partly because these fears motivated the Pentagon to take compensatory actions, however, the Soviets wound up falling far short of this capability as well.

In the West, the public debate focused largely on the survivability of the U.S. ICBM force. Although the deployment of hardened silos, MIRVed warheads, and the M-X Peacekeeper helped calm concern, the failure to find a mobile basing mode remained a source of frustration throughout the 1980s. By the time the Reagan administration ended, it was urging Congress to deploy 100 M-X missiles in a mobile rail-garrison mode and to terminate the program to procure a small single-warhead mobile missile. Congress, however, remained reluctant to go along with either recommendation and left the administration no alternative but to continue emplacing Peacekeeper in hardened Minuteman silos pending a final choice between the two basing modes. Whether this step would produce a usable ICBM force was uncertain. Some analysts continued to worry about a disarming attack, but others were expressing growing doubts about the USSR’s targeting proficiency. To the extent that a swift disarming attack was more theory than reality, the ICBM force remained a potent leg of the triad.

Even if the ICBM force had become vulnerable, important steps were taken to ensure that the other two legs of the triad could survive a first-strike attack and retaliate effectively. During the 1970s, deployment of the SLBM Poseidon missile, with over ten MIRVed warheads apiece, and B-52 upgrades bolstered the submarine and bomber forces. Driven by Reagan’s buildup, the 1980s saw a
plethora of modernizing initiatives for these forces, and especially for the submarine force. By early 1989, fully eight Trident submarines, each equipped with MIRVed warheads, were available to complement the 28 Poseidon submarines remaining in the fleet. Additional Tridents were under construction, and the powerful D-5 SLBM with a hard-target kill capability was scheduled to be operational soon. The effect was to provide a highly survivable and versatile SLBM force that could perform most ICBM functions.

Meanwhile, the bomber force was undergoing similar upgrades. By 1989, some 234 B-52s, 48 FB-111s, and 90 new B-1s were in service. Already, nearly 160 B-52s had been equipped with the ALCM, with ALCMs on order for another 36 bombers. Efforts were being made to overcome nagging problems experienced with the B-1, and plans were being drawn eventually to equip this bomber with ALCMs. Moreover, the first of 132 B-2 stealth bombers was scheduled for delivery in the early 1990s. The result was to guarantee the continued availability of a powerful bomber force that could escape Soviet ICBM attack and punch through enemy air defenses with a combination of stand-off cruise missiles and penetrating bombers.1

Beyond doubt, the improvements of the 1980s produced a more formidable posture that alleviated doubts about whether the United States could carry out its strategy in a nuclear war (see Table 21.2). Table 21.3 shows the magnitude of these improvements by illustratively displaying the U.S. forces that could be expected to survive an enemy attack and be available to deliver a retaliatory blow.

Table 21.2
U.S./Soviet Strategic Nuclear Forces:*
1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>USSR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ICBMs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minuteman II</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>SS-11/13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minuteman III</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>SS-17/19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeper</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>SS-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SS-24/25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLBMs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poseidon</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>SSN-5/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trident</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>SSN-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SSN-17/18/20/23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-52 G/H</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>Bear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-1B</td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FB-111A</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Derived from DoD publications.

1See DoD posture statements issued by Carlucci and his successor, Dick Cheney, for FY89-FY91.
Table 21.3
Trends in U.S. Strategic Nuclear Survivable Forces*
(Illustrative)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Before Modernization (Late 1970s)</th>
<th>Partly Modernized (Middle to Late 1980s)</th>
<th>Fully Modernized (Mid-1990s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Day-to-Day Alert</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Megatons</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>1025</td>
<td>1650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total warheads</td>
<td>3050</td>
<td>4560</td>
<td>5320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warheads available for military targets</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>3300</td>
<td>4100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prompt and lethal hard-target warheads</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully generated alert</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Megatons</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>1900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total warheads</td>
<td>4075</td>
<td>5400</td>
<td>6100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warheads available for military targets</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>4200</td>
<td>4900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prompt and lethal hard-target warheads</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Author's estimates.

Had the late-1970s U.S. posture not been modernized, it would have been capable of striking back against enemy urban/industrial areas (a mission requiring about 400 megatons), but only 800-1900 warheads would have been left over to attack military targets. This amount would have fallen well below targeting requirements; moreover, the United States would have had almost no capacity to destroy hardened enemy targets in a time-urgent manner. As a result, the United States would have been left with a relatively inflexible deterrent that failed to match Soviet forces in war-fighting and escalatory capacities.

The modernization effort launched by Carter, and then recrafted and accelerated by Reagan, changed this troublesome picture. By the middle to late 1980s, this program had been only partly completed, but warhead totals for countermilitary missions had already increased by 2-4 times over the unmodernized posture. Dominating this increase were deployment of Trident submarines, the ALCM for B-52s, and the B-1 bomber. The United States still lacked a prompt capability to efficiently destroy hardened targets, but the deployment of the Trident D-5 missile and a mobile-basing platform for the M-X Peacekeeper was expected to alter this situation within a few years. As Table 21.3 shows, the fully modernized posture of the mid-1990s was expected to be capable of delivering fully 2600 hard-target killers, while also covering a large set of soft military targets. In other words, the posture was planned to be able to perform the entire spectrum of nuclear war-fighting missions in a robust manner that matched anything the Soviets could muster.

Fulfillment of Reagan's plans to deploy a hard-target capability was left dependent on Bush's success in acquiring a mobile Peacekeeper and the Trident D-5 missile. Continued congressional opposition to the Peacekeeper left the
first half of this program uncertain. Nonetheless, the improvement programs already implemented had made the triad capable of absorbing a surprise blow and retaliating powerfully to destroy not only urban areas but a host of military targets as well. The effect was to underscore nuclear deterrence and to ensure that the United States possessed the strategic forces needed to carry out its nuclear commitments to NATO. If the USSR had been aspiring to nuclear supremacy, it was now stopped well short of this goal.

As of early 1989, most observers were prepared to declare the nuclear balance a stable situation, but Reagan’s departure left a host of unanswered questions about exactly how “stability” was to be defined. With the START talks now seriously moving toward a treaty, the two sides had officially embraced cuts of 25–50%. Their willingness to reduce this far reflected a judgment that older systems could be retired in favor of a smaller number of modern weapons, and that some capabilities, including the USSR’s heavy SS-18 ICBMs, were genuinely destabilizing. Still unsettled, however, was the issue of how large their nuclear forces should be in the event the Cold War was settled politically. The passing of overt rivalry between the two nations implied that additional forces could be cut; indeed, Gorbachev and Reagan had openly talked about getting rid of strategic forces entirely. Yet, this extreme step seemed far away, and partly because other nations had nuclear arms. Moreover, the need to retain a diverse posture for survivability and to preserve a flexible targeting capability also called for still-sizeable forces. Left to be resolved was the troublesome issue of how many.

An equally troublesome issue was the matter of strategic defenses. Despite the White House’s continued lobbying for SDI, Reagan’s last two years saw growing doubts about whether a major space-based missile defense network could be deployed anytime soon. Formidable technical questions remained to be answered about whether lasers, particle beams, or conventional warheads launched from satellites could destroy a large number of enemy missiles in the short time that would be available. Moreover, rotational dynamics dictated that a space-based system circling the entire globe would have to be deployed. The sheer cost of launching and operating a fully adequate system continued to seem astronomical, well beyond the declining defense budgets of both nations.

Additionally, academic studies of the offensive-defense interaction suggested that, even if the United States and the USSR agreed to deploy defenses as a stabilizing measure, the process of doing so could temporarily cause serious instabilities. In particular, a problem would arise if Side A deployed defenses somewhat faster than Side B; the situation would worsen if major reductions already had been made in Side B’s offensive forces. In this event, Side A would gain a capacity to launch a surprise attack and then use space-based interceptor satellites to destroy Side B’s surviving missiles; this created a highly unstable situation. Analysis suggested that stability was not an achievable goal, but it would require a carefully staged process of offensive drawdowns and defensive deployments. Also required was a shift in force postures away from ICBMs and toward SLBMs and bombers, which were less vulnerable to space-
based defenses. This requirement alone threw cold water on any hope for a quick transition to a defense-dominated world.

Nevertheless, SDI was far from dead either as a U.S. military program or as a potential contributor to stability. The option remained to deploy a limited and less sophisticated system, possibly based on the ground, that could destroy a small number of incoming missiles. This capability would not ensure against a massive enemy attack, but it would promise to defend against accidental launches and limited strikes. The incoming Bush administration expressed interest in this idea, but most versions required Soviet willingness to modify the ABM Treaty to permit deployments beyond the limited number authorized. Even a limited SDI system thus remained hostage to the nuclear negotiations, which in turn promised to be affected by overall U.S.-Soviet political relations.²

Whereas the failure to sign a START Treaty had left the strategic postures on both sides untouched, by early 1989 the INF Treaty was making itself felt in Europe. Already Soviet LR/SRINF missiles had been reduced from 1700 to 900 launchers, and the American missiles (108 Pershing IIs and 304 GLCMs) were also on their way out. The dangerous nuclear confrontation that had threatened the continent since the mid-1950s thus was winding down. Nevertheless, Europe still remained host to sizable nuclear forces. The Soviet Union continued to deploy many of its 570 medium bombers and 450 Fencer strike aircraft within range of Western Europe, and its ICBMs remained capable of striking targets there. Also, an unknown number of Soviet tactical delivery systems and warheads remained in the forward areas. For its part, NATO continued to deploy 150 U.S. F-111 aircraft, 160 U.K./French SLBMs, and 36 French land-based missiles and bombers. Added to this posture was a large number of nuclear-capable tactical aircraft and artillery pieces; even after the Montebello decision, NATO’s nuclear inventory remained at fully 4,000 warheads.

To many, these postures seemed an outworn legacy of a rapidly evaporating Cold War, and calls were coming from across Western Europe for deep cuts in tactical systems as well. Indeed, some advocates were demanding a third zero, and this idea went down well in West European liberal circles. For its part, NATO was examining the idea of a follow-on negotiation aimed at short-range systems, but it was opposed to any unilateral NATO triple zero. During the period when the INF Treaty’s double zero was being debated, outgoing SACEUR General Rogers had complained angrily that NATO was going too far toward sacrificing its nuclear options. His replacement, General Galvin, adopted a lower profile, but SHAPE Headquarters remained deeply concerned about the growing anti-nuclear sentiment that was sweeping over Germany and Western Europe. To SHAPE, a core problem was that NATO’s conventional posture still

²In 1989, the incoming Bush administration increasingly talked in terms of a phased SDI deployment that would begin with a limited capability and grow larger over the years. Also, the new administration began portraying SDI as a defender not only against Soviet missiles but also emerging threats from lesser powers. Still favoring an ultimate U.S.-Soviet transition to a defense-dominated relationship, the administration sought significant funding for SDI, but continued to encounter congressional resistance.
remained vulnerable; especially until this situation was rectified, NATO would require nuclear forces to provide for flexible response.\(^3\)

To counteract the anti-nuclear drift in Europe, NATO began focusing on plans to scale back its nuclear artillery inventory through negotiations but to keep a sizable posture of tactical air bombs and delivery aircraft. In particular, a nuclear air posture was deemed necessary to preserve coupling of the United States to Western Europe. As a device to underscore this continued commitment, NATO officials were also crafting a plan to deploy a modernized air-delivered nuclear cruise missile whose short range would meet INF Treaty guidelines. The difficult task of bringing these plans to fruition fell into the lap of the incoming Bush administration.

The situation, nevertheless, was far more tranquil and manageable than what Reagan had confronted in 1981. In the interim, the Soviet Union had lost the battles for nuclear supremacy in Europe and the United States. The thankless job facing Gorbachev was to enlarge upon the INF Treaty by completing a comprehensive nuclear arms control settlement with the United States that allowed the USSR to escape with its dignity intact. Whether the West was prepared to cooperate remained to be seen, but for all their seriousness, the decisions confronting Bush and his alliance partners were a far cry from what the Cold War had witnessed in earlier days.

THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE

If the Kremlin had not won the nuclear arms race, at least this failure alone did not bankrupt the USSR. The same cannot be said for the Soviet Union’s vastly more expensive quest for conventional supremacy in Europe, which also ended in failure. Once again, the USSR did not fail because its military efforts lacked vigor. Rather, it failed because NATO, in its own quest for security, unintentionally performed an act of political jujitsu that left the Warsaw Pact collapsing under the weight of its own military strength.

Reacting to the Soviet buildup, NATO’s nations steadily increased their defense efforts as the 1970s and 1980s dragged on. Rather than accept the situation and throttle back, the Soviet Union kept its foot on the military gas pedal, pouring 10-15% of GNP into defense each year and steadily increasing its own military spending. During the 1970s and 1980s, as a result, the USSR apparently spent over $4 trillion (in FY91 dollars) on military preparations, or about $1.5–2 trillion more than needed for a purely defensive posture. This diversion alone was a serious loss to the Soviet economy, and by virtue of taking away badly needed investment capital, caused huge sacrifices in reduced growth of the nondefense sector. Overall, the Soviet Union spent 15–20% fewer rubles on the civilian sector than otherwise would have been the case—a crippling amount for an economy struggling to enter the modern age. The result was the emergence of a bristling Soviet defense industry amidst a larger economy that was

---

\(^3\) These sentiments are reflected in a study published by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1989 Joint Military Net Assessment, GPO, Washington, D.C., 1989.
doing little to increase consumer goods or enhance industrial productivity in nondefense enterprises.\textsuperscript{4}

By the end of this period, the Soviet Union and its allies had a gleaming conventional force posture that, for all its showcase qualities, still was not transparently capable of overpowering NATO. Meanwhile, the domestic scene showed a poor standard of living across the USSR and Eastern Europe; not only was it far below the West, but also well below what otherwise could have prevailed. In essence, the Soviet Union was still a Third-World country, with cities reminiscent of decaying Western urban areas in the 1930s, pre-industrial rural areas, a paucity of consumer goods, a weak infrastructure, and few amenities of modern life. Moreover, the Soviet people themselves had lost the zeal for industrial mobilization and hard work that they showed in the 1930s. Eastern Europe was not much better off. Because the Soviet government’s own misplaced priorities and incentive-stifling command economy were heavily responsible for this disastrous situation, the rebellion against communism that came in 1990–1991 is not shocking.

As Figure 21.1 shows, Soviet/Warsaw Pact ground forces in Central Europe grew significantly stronger between the late 1960s and late 1980s. Driving this upward surge was a combination of modernization and internal expansion by adding more weapons to existing units. Soviet forces were the primary beneficiary—their military strength grew by fully 250%. In later years, however, East European forces also were beefed up. As a result, the overall combat power of Warsaw Pact ground forces more than doubled during this period. Meanwhile, modernization increased the combat power of Soviet/Warsaw Pact air forces by about 50–75%. Together, the Warsaw Pact’s combined ground and air strength increased by a factor of two during these 20 years.

What is impressive about this buildup was its sustained and relentless nature. No huge gains were experienced in any single year. The rate of increase was greatest in the early 1970s, when internal expansion was peaking, and leveled off somewhat in the late 1980s. The range of variation, nevertheless, was not very great. During peak years, the rate for ground forces pulsed upward but only to 5%, and in slow years, it dropped down but to no lower than 1–2% annually. The norm was a steady 3–4% increase experienced annually for over two full decades. A steady upward pattern also prevailed for Soviet/Warsaw Pact air forces, which received new models at about the same rate.

This slow and steady rise was a product of Soviet industrial policy, but it also reflected the unchanging commitment of Soviet leaders. In most nations, military buildups most often last a few years and then peter out as fervor diminishes; this, at least, is the American pattern. But not so for the Soviet Union. True to its reputation for grim determination and disregard for criticism, the Soviet government patiently plodded on, relentlessly pursuing its goal of a powerful force posture capable of major offensive action.

\textsuperscript{4}Author’s estimates are based on published DoD data on Soviet military expenditures.
By early 1989, the Soviet government undeniably had attained this goal. Soviet tank and motorized rifle divisions were now equipped with an awesome inventory averaging 300 tanks, 400 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, and 145 artillery tubes. Backing up each division were additional artillery units that roughly doubled the Soviet Army's indirect fire assets. Moreover, Soviet hardware was of uniformly high quality. The Army's T-80 tanks, BMP fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery, attack helicopters, and anti-tank missiles were reputed to be among the world's best and a clear rival to U.S. equipment. The quality of these weapons, and above all their sheer numbers, made the Soviet Army a formidable fighting force.⁵

The Soviet Air Force also by now was well-equipped with new model aircraft, including Fulcrum, Fencer, Flogger, Fitter, Foxbat, and Frogfoot. In many respects, the Soviet Air Force was coming to resemble the U.S. Air Force, with its complex mixture of air defense fighters, multimission fighter-bombers, specialized attack aircraft, and sophisticated reconnaissance assets. Experts still doubted that it could fight with the skill and versatility of NATO air forces, but its primary mission was to keep NATO air power off the Soviet Army's back, and it appeared amply endowed to pursue this mission.

⁵See DoD, Soviet Military Power studies, 1987–90.
What counted in the military balance, however, was not absolute power but instead relative strength. For all its impressive assets, the Soviet military machine was capable of exercising suzerainty in Europe only to the extent that it clearly could overpower NATO's defensive posture. Unfortunately for the Soviet Union, the picture in the late 1980s remained as clouded as ever. During the preceding two decades, NATO had been driven by its defensive imperatives to appreciably bolster its own posture. As a result, it was able to frustrate the USSR's ambitions.

NATO's improvements were not adequate to match the USSR's growing military power in absolute terms, or even to achieve a fully satisfactory balance for the West. But NATO's efforts were sufficient to shore up the balance, so that Soviet capability to overrun West Germany in the event of war was always in doubt. This uncertainty had huge strategic meaning, and not only because it left NATO deeply concerned. In essence, it helped prevent the Kremlin from translating its growing military strength into political influence in Europe.

Figure 21.2 tells the tale from a historical perspective. It measures how the Warsaw Pact/NATO ratio of mobilizable ground combat weapons changed in Central Europe, relative to the standards set by NATO's defensive strategy. As it suggests, NATO made major progress during the 1950s in reducing the military disparity in Central Europe, but by the late 1950s, its forces were still seriously deficient for any strategy calling for more than a short pause before escalating. The continuing German rearmament and the U.S. buildup of the early 1960s, however, brought the balance within range of a serious conventional defense strategy. It was this achievement that made NATO's adoption of MC 14/3 possible.

![Figure 21.2—Trends in the NATO/Warsaw Pact Ground Balance in Central Europe](image-url)
The Soviet buildup intervened here temporarily to push the balance back in an unfavorable direction for NATO. Contributing to the deterioration from 1965–1972 were the U.S. involvement in Vietnam and slackening allied defense efforts. By the early 1970s, consequently, NATO's conventional defense doctrine was being called into question. The onset of AD-70, however, helped NATO pick up pace; the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and reorientation toward Western Europe played a particularly important role. By the late 1970s, the alliance was once again competing coequally. Indeed, the LTDP aimed to improve the balance at least somewhat. Reagan's arrival in 1981 further stimulated NATO defense programs, with the U.S. modernization effort leading the way. As a result, during the 1980s NATO seemingly improved its standing to a modest but important degree (see Table 21.4). Far more important, NATO's actions were strong enough to prevent what otherwise would have been an alarming deterioration in the Central European force balance, which might have fractured NATO's unity and allowed the Soviet Union to pick up the pieces.

Notwithstanding the fluctuations that occurred, what stands out is the extent to which the force balance remained stable from the mid-1970s onward. A great deal of defense activity took place, and in absolute terms, Soviet improvement programs were roughly twice as comprehensive as the alliance's. Nevertheless, the alliance was required to perform only half as well as the Soviets in order to prevent the D-Day balance from rising above the 2:1 mark. NATO succeeded in achieving this modest goal, thereby producing a stand-off that saw neither side benefit from the competition.

For its part, the alliance fell short of building a confident posture—an important goal of all NATO-wide force improvement efforts. By the late 1980s, NATO still faced a serious risk of being overpowered if war occurred before full Western mobilization was complete. Generals Rogers and Galvin both highlighted this risk, and apart from an optimistic minority, few observers were inclined to quarrel with their assessment. The fact that NATO remained nervous, however,

Table 21.4
Warsaw Pact/NATO Force Balance in Central Europe: Late 1980s
(M+15/30)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Warsaw Pact</th>
<th>NATO</th>
<th>WP:N Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Division/equivalents</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>2.0:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>29,400</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>2.3:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>22,300</td>
<td>8,100</td>
<td>2.8:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Static scores (NADEs)**</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1.9:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat manpower</td>
<td>1,350,000</td>
<td>850,000</td>
<td>1.6:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total manpower</td>
<td>2,100,000</td>
<td>1,575,000</td>
<td>1.3:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical combat aircraft***</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>1.2:1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Author's estimate.
**NATO Armored Division/Equivalents.
***Assumes diversion of 400–500 U.S. aircraft to Southwest Asia, which otherwise would bring the air balance close to numerical parity.
did not mean that the Soviets were entitled to any measure of confidence in their own offensive prospects. Indeed, the Soviets continued to face uncertainties that were no less profound than had been the case two decades and trillions of rubles earlier.6

Back in the mid-1960s, planners on both sides had been well aware that the Warsaw Pact’s early 2:1 advantage was no guarantee of success, especially if NATO’s defenses did not buckle quickly and the alliance was thus given opportunity to mobilize. The magnitude of the Soviet buildup after 1965 suggests a concerted effort to elevate further the Warsaw Pact’s early numerical advantage, thereby compelling NATO to abandon hope for conventional defense. The alliance, however, chose to cling to flexible response and therefore decided to take up the cudgel. The result of the NATO-Warsaw Pact competitive interactions was to maintain the original 2:1 ratio while deploying well-armed and powerful force postures on both sides.

Despite its continued superiority in armor and artillery—the driving factor behind its 2:1 lead in static scores—the Warsaw Pact’s edge in other important categories continued to be far less impressive. As a result, the Soviets probably wound up facing somewhat greater risks and uncertainties than before. As always, their prospects continued to hinge on being able quickly to punch through NATO’s forward defenses, and their improvement measures clearly were aimed at acquiring the capacity to conduct a breakthrough-seeking blitzkrieg attack. NATO, however, managed to increase the depth of its defenses through U.S. rapid reinforcement programs, and the impending deployment of POFA systems offered the promise of a better capability to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy. As a result, the Soviets faced a growing risk that their forces might be consumed by NATO’s lethal firepower before they could chew through its robust defenses. Soviet doctrinal writings of the late 1980s, which voiced strident calls for new approaches to war-fighting, were a clear indicator that this risk had not gone unnoticed in Moscow.

As of the late 1980s, military theoreticians on both sides were debating the prospects for new technology and doctrines, and the outcome was not yet in sight. Nevertheless, one conclusion seemed fairly clear: About all the USSR achieved for its expensive efforts during 1965–1988 was to perpetuate the military status quo. To be sure, NATO experienced the same frustrating result, but at far less relative fiscal burden and amidst political circumstances that permitted Western nations to attend to their domestic agendas. As of early 1989, deterrence remained in effect, the Western alliance was still united, the prospect of war had grown increasingly remote, and Soviet influence was waning. For all these reasons, the winner in this standoff was obvious, and so was the loser.

---

If the Soviets failed to make any headway in Central Europe, they experienced reversals elsewhere in the global military balance, and especially at sea. Reagan's maritime buildup was prosecuted to the point of infusing the U.S. Navy with new ships, weapons, and doctrines oriented to seizing control of the world's oceans early in a major war. The Soviet Navy continued to possess large fleets in the northern waters, the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Pacific. These fleets, however, were no match for the U.S. Navy on the high seas. Indeed, many observers felt that in a war, the U.S. Navy would go on the offensive early and probably would succeed in crippling Soviet maritime forces.

Finally, the U.S. program to develop a powerful force for intervening in the Persian Gulf had come a long way since the early 1980s. Indeed, the West European nations were now showing a growing willingness to work with the Americans in the gulf. In particular, the United States and several allied nations joined together in 1987 to escort Western shipping through the gulf's waters during a tense period of the Iran-Iraq war. This cooperation, coupled with the receptive attitude shown by moderate Arab powers, suggested that if the Soviets ever had been interested in a gulf adventure, the time had long since passed.

Indeed, the time had long since passed for the entire Soviet military buildup. The strategic nuclear balance had stabilized far short of Soviet superiority, and the United States was in the throes of a major modernization program that promised not only to upgrade its offensive forces but also eventually to deploy defenses. In Europe, Soviet nuclear missiles were being dismantled and the Warsaw Pact's vaunted conventional forces were no closer to unquestioned dominance than two decades earlier. Elsewhere around the globe, Western military forces continued to hold the Soviet Union in check, and the USSR's military assistance programs to Third World allies had become a financially draining albatross. Together, these developments left the USSR with hollow strategic rewards in one hand, and an empty bank account in the other.
Within a year of Reagan’s departure, the Cold War was brought to a climactic end by a revolutionary upheaval in Eastern Europe that shattered communist rule there. By late 1990, new governments were in power proclaiming democracy, capitalism, and a desire to join the Western community. Equally amazing, Germany had been reunified, the Warsaw Pact was rapidly dissolving, and Moscow had agreed to withdraw all of its troops from Eastern Europe. These changes swept away the old bipolar structure and introduced a new security order that, many hoped, would be far more stable than in the past. Only nine months later, communism collapsed in the USSR as well, and the Soviet state was disestablished. Following the failed coup d'état in August 1991, the West’s former nemesis was sent spinning toward internal fragmentation amidst calls for democracy, free enterprise, Baltic independence, and a new Commonwealth of Independent States.

Meanwhile, NATO went through an agonizing reappraisal of its own, but one that led to renewed life. The withering of Soviet power initially led to calls for NATO to dissolve as well, but with Europe’s future uncertain, sober minds rejected this proposition. As of mid-1990, NATO was proclaiming its intention to stay in business by transforming itself into a less military and more political alliance. By late 1991, the alliance had gone a bold step further. It was now assigning itself the new mission of being a primary security institution for all of Europe, a stance that called for growing cooperation with former Warsaw Pact nations. For an alliance that started out as a desperate attempt to contain communist expansionism, this new vision was a profound metamorphosis. Above all, it was a powerful statement that NATO not only had succeeded but also had sunk roots deep into Europe’s soil.

COLLAPSE OF COMMUNIST RULE IN EASTERN EUROPE

Surveying the European scene from the Kremlin in late 1988, Gorbachev clearly concluded that the time had arrived for the USSR to cut bait by pursuing nuclear and conventional arms control accords that would permit sizable drawdowns in Soviet forces. Continuing to pursue the Nuclear and Space Talks, he also began attaching increased importance to the new CFE talks, and his
aides began calling for naval talks as well. Simultaneously, he announced measures to scale back the USSR's military posture and to cut military spending. He furthermore stepped up his criticisms of authoritarian rule and centralized economic planning, and urged the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to take steps toward creating more flexible institutions. As he pursued these measures, Gorbachev evidently had no intention of wholly withdrawing Soviet forces from the forward areas or unraveling the Warsaw Pact. The process of change that he lit, however, was to have precisely this effect.1

The dramatic sequence of events that ended the Cold War began in June 1988, a month after Gorbachev's summit with Reagan in Moscow. At that juncture, a special Communist Party Congress approved Gorbachev's design for sweeping political reforms in the Soviet Union. Officially rejecting continued totalitarianism, the Congress promised a shift of power away from the party and toward the government as well as creation of an entirely new legal system to make the USSR a nation of laws. As a sign of where he intended to lead the country, Gorbachev declared that Communist Party members should be required to win democratic election to government posts.

Following a summer of heated debate and mounting public unrest over deteriorating economic conditions, Gorbachev in late September called for special meetings of both the CPSU Central Committee and the Supreme Soviet, the country's parliamentary body. At the Central Committee session, Gorbachev purged the Politburo, installing four loyalists to give him a solid voting majority, and announced that the party bureaucracy would be cut by one-half. The session of the Supreme Soviet, which lasted until early December, was even more momentous for it launched the USSR down the path of major political change designed to strengthen state institutions.

Brushing aside the incumbent, aging Andrei Gromyko, Gorbachev assumed the Presidency of the USSR, thereby symbolizing his determination to downplay the party's role. With Gorbachev at the helm, the Supreme Soviet crafted a program of legislative reform that created a tricameral government structure. Ultimate authority was to reside in a Congress of People's Deputies, to be composed of 2250 representatives drawn from the nation's republics and chief interest groups. Representing the Congress when not in session was to be a newly constituted Supreme Soviet, composed of 450 members, that would meet semi-annually to wield real legislative power over national policy. Handling executive functions was to be a President who would be elected by the Congress and could serve no more than two five-year terms. The President was to direct a Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and a Council of Ministers, small bodies that would help him translate legislative decisions into executive action.

The key to democratic reform lay in the Congress of Deputies. In past years, Soviet legislators had won office by first gaining party nomination and then winning sham elections that lacked democratic content. Under the new laws, members of the Congress were to be elected by true popular ballot. Although other political parties were still not allowed to participate, the national elections

were to be secret and democratic. The goal of these changes, Gorbachev proclaimed, was to "open a new chapter in Soviet statehood on the basis of democratization and popular self-government."

That same month, Gorbachev dropped another bombshell. Speaking at the United Nations, he stunned the world by announcing unilateral Soviet defense cuts, including the pullback of some forces from Eastern Europe. His plan called for withdrawal of six of the USSR's 26 divisions there, including 5,000 tanks, specialized assault formations, and 50,000 personnel from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Additionally 5,000 tanks, along with several hundred artillery tubes and combat aircraft, were to be removed from Soviet forces elsewhere in the Western USSR, and a total of 500,000 personnel were to be dropped from the active posture. East European forces were to be pared back about 10%, including disbandment of three combat divisions. Although Gorbachev characterized this step as a gesture toward stability in Europe and a downpayment on a CFE agreement, it also clearly reflected his strong preference for reduced defense spending as a device to solve his budgetary dilemmas.2

Three months later, Gorbachev got his first taste of democracy at work, when national elections were held to determine the composition of the Congress of People's Deputies. The elections subjected a number of senior party officials to humiliating defeat and sent a number of reformers to office. In particular, Boris Yeltsin, who had been expelled from the Politburo for his liberal views and was emerging as a rival to Gorbachev, garnered 87% of the votes in Moscow. In May, the freshly elected Congress voted Gorbachev into the presidency, thereby legitimating his rule. As he assumed office, Gorbachev found himself facing a divided legislature, composed partly of die-hard communists but also seeded with influential factions that were willing to travel far and fast toward reform.

These changes aided Gorbachev's cause in the Soviet Union, but they were to complicate his ability to maintain control in Eastern Europe. In taking his bold steps, Gorbachev's stated intention was to preserve communist rule and to maintain the Warsaw Pact as a living security alliance. His calls for democratization and demilitarization, however, touched deep emotional chords in Eastern Europe. During the fall of 1988, signs of growing ferment already had been appearing not only in Poland but also in the normally quiet Baltic states, where surface tranquility concealed deep-seated anger at Soviet repression. In the aftermath of Gorbachev's reforms, this ferment began spreading elsewhere and growing in intensity. Within a few months, it reached a crescendo across Eastern Europe, bringing sweeping changes far beyond Gorbachev's visions.

Although dissatisfaction with Soviet-sponsored communism had existed almost from the day Stalin took over Eastern Europe, Gorbachev's reforms gave it a hitherto unsanctioned opportunity to express itself. By Jeffersonian standards, Gorbachev's changes in the Soviet Union were modest; they still left the CPSU as the only political party there and clearly concentrated power in the

---

hands of the president. Nonetheless, even these modest steps pulled the rug out from under the traditionalist regimes in Eastern Europe, most of which had shown few innovative instincts. Gorbachev now found himself prodding these regimes to emulate his reforms, and although some hesitantly complied, their overall sluggish response called into question their legitimacy even in Moscow's eyes, to say nothing of their own people's.

Moreover, Gorbachev's democratizing reforms and his downplaying of defense preparedness sent a clear message about his distaste for using military force as an instrument of repression. Gorbachev had proved willing to use police intervention, in the face of public outcry, to quell domestic unrest in the Soviet Union. Also, as of early 1989 he had still not officially retracted the hated Brezhnev Doctrine, which allowed the USSR to invade its Warsaw Pact allies whenever dissent threatened communist control. Nevertheless, the misadventure in Afghanistan had squashed Gorbachev's enthusiasm for foreign adventures. Soviet troops were due to be entirely out of that country by spring 1989, leaving behind a trail of dead Russian soldiers that Gorbachev did not want to recreate in Eastern Europe.

Motivated by awareness that reform could hardly be instituted with the sword, Gorbachev maintained that Soviet tanks would not again roll in Eastern Europe. His partial troop withdrawal and his participation in the deep-cut-seeking CFE talks lent further credence to his position. His stance told the regimes there that they would have to survive by their own devices, preferably at the ballot box. Beyond this, it more momentously told East European dissidents that their freedom of maneuver was far broader than at any time in the past.

In effect, Gorbachev had partially opened the floodgates while allowing himself no recourse to closing them again. Sensing this, reformist groups seized the moment to push the gates wide and march through. They were successful in ways that far exceeded their own imaginations, to saying nothing of Gorbachev's designs. As 1989 unfolded, communism in Eastern Europe was subjected to a staggering succession of defeats that left it on death's edge by late fall. At year's end, the roll call showed collapsed communist rule in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and even East Germany: the heart of the Warsaw Pact.

Poland's unraveling began in 1988. Earlier in the year, the government had tried to implement market reforms in the heavily subsidized state-run economy, but the result was massive inflation and food shortages. In May unrest broke out, and Solidarity under Lech Walesa reappeared after six years of repression. With the ensuing strikes, the government underwent a wholesale turnover, and the new leadership—still under Jaruzelski—approved large pay increases to workers. After a second round of strikes, Jaruzelski decided to enter into a dialogue with Solidarity aimed at co-opting the union's support while withholding legal recognition. Because times had changed since 1982, this step was to prove fatal.

In February 1989, Jaruzelski's government opened roundtable talks with Solidarity and the Catholic Church. By early March, an agreement was reached
for political reforms that included Solidarity participation in June elections. April saw an accord that legalized Solidarity and created a two-chamber parliament in which the upper house would be freely elected and 35% of the lower house would be reserved for opposition delegates. In May came official recognition of the Catholic Church. Then in June came the long-awaited national elections. Solidarity triumphantly swept all 161 independent seats in the lower house and 99 of 100 seats in the upper house. The Communist Party, meanwhile, was subjected to a humiliating defeat in which only five of its candidates won outright election. The party remained in control of another 294 seats in the lower house, but none of the party’s unopposed candidates garnered the 50% vote approval needed to take these seats.

This embarrassing situation led to a debate over the future government. As part of a compromise agreement in late July, the new parliament elected Jaruzelski as president, but compelled him to resign his post as head of the Communist Party. Jaruzelski issued a call for Solidarity to join a communists-led coalition government or to accept his own candidate for prime minister. In early August, Jaruzelski appointed Czeslaw Kiszczak as prime minister, but within two weeks, the government resigned after losing parliamentary support.

This defeat left the beleaguered Jaruzelski no choice but to abandon communist rule. On July 24, Solidarity member Tadeusz Mazowiecki was elected prime minister by the parliament and became Poland’s first non-communist leader since World War II. On September 12, the parliament approved a Solidarity-led cabinet under Mazowiecki, effectively relegating the Communist Party to minority status. Signifying what was to come, the new government promptly embarked on an effort to gain economic assistance from the West. Meanwhile, the Communist Party was left to contemplate its declining fortunes. In January 1990, it renamed itself the Social Democratic Party of the Polish Republic, but this face-lift did little to reestablish it as a serious contender for power.

Communism suffered a similar fate in Hungary. In May 1988, reformer Karoly Grosz had taken over leadership of Hungary’s Communist Party and begun pursuing changes in the political system. In mid-January 1989, the parliament authorized a multiparty system, and the party relinquished its constitutional right to play a leading role in Hungarian politics. Opposition groups promptly began organizing into formal parties, and the communist leadership found itself on the defensive. Its problems worsened when a special commission endorsed the 1956 uprising as a popular rebellion and criticized Hungary’s participation in the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. Mounting public dissent led to a September agreement to adopt a new constitution and to hold national elections the following spring. Faced with the growing likelihood of defeat, the Communist Party dissolved in October and a new “Hungarian Socialist Party” was established. Two weeks later, Hungary rechristened itself in non-ideological terms as the “Republic of Hungary.”

Communism’s downfall in Czechoslovakia came late in the year, and happened abruptly. Prior to November, the country continued to be led by the reactionary Jakes government, which opposed all thoughts of reform. In mid-
November, protests broke out, and when the government responded with police brutality, the protests turned into mass demonstrations as a Civic Forum opposition group was formed. Within a week, Communist Party leaders had resigned, but when the new leadership proposed only minor changes that would leave the party in command, a nationwide strike broke out. Days later, the party capitulated by allowing non-communists into the government and calling for democratic reforms. In mid-December, a new government was announced with a communist prime minister, but with the opposition holding the majority of cabinet seats. Gustav Husak resigned as president, a resurrected Alexander Dubcek became head of the National Assembly, and dissident Vaclav Havel was elected president. With these dramatic changes, Czechoslovakia’s “velvet revolution” was complete.

Fall 1989 saw the virus of anti-communist revolution spread to the Balkans as well. Beset by economic troubles, Yugoslavia steadily deteriorated along ethnic lines, pitting pro-communist Serbia against Slovenia and Croatia, both reformist and independence-minded regions. Bulgaria underwent a palace coup that ousted arch-conservative Todor Zhivkov and elevated reformist leaders to power. Although their stated goal was to preserve a one-party socialist state, these leaders were compelled by growing opposition to agree to free elections in 1990. Even tiny Albania, a stronghold of communist control, began slowly moving toward reforms aimed at preserving a one-party system. The most striking change came in Romania, where the dictator Ceausescu was toppled by a violent revolution and executed on Christmas Day. The new government, calling itself the National Salvation Front (NSF), abolished the Communist Party’s leading role and called for free elections the following spring. When the NSF’s character quickly came under attack, however, Romania’s future seemed unsettled.

For all their power, these changes across Eastern Europe failed to rival in strategic importance what transpired in East Germany. Through mid-1989, the reactionary Honecker government had disavowed reform. In August, the upheaval began when East German citizens began appearing at West German embassies in Budapest and Prague asking for asylum. By late August, some 60,000 refugees had traveled across Czechoslovakia to Hungary. When the Hungarian border was opened in September, the refugee flow soared, and the Honecker government was compelled to allow these citizens to complete their journey to West Germany.

These dramatic changes clearly indicated an impending revolution in the GDR. The only way to avoid another catastrophe for communism was for the Soviet Army to intervene, and the Honecker government apparently was willing to take this violent step. By this time, however, Gorbachev had formally disavowed the Brezhnev Doctrine and was unwilling to step in. He had first made his nonintervention stance clear at a speech to the Council of Europe in July, when he made no direct reference to the Brezhnev Doctrine but did say that any interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states was “inadmissible.” At the time, his remarks seemed directed at Hungary and Czechoslovakia, but when the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers officially abandoned the Brezhnev
Doctrine in late October, it was clear that nonintervention applied to East Germany as well.

Gorbachev's decision left communist rule hanging by a thread that was about to be cut. In early October, demonstrations broke out in East Germany, led by the opposition group New Forum. The government bowed to this discontent by agreeing to begin a dialogue with the population, a step that led to Honecker's ouster a week later. Successor Egon Krenz agreed to discussions with New Forum, and in November his government lifted travel restrictions to the West and opened the Berlin Wall. Internal opposition did not diminish, however, and the communist leadership soon found itself under sharp attack for corruption and failed policies. At year's end, Krenz was ousted and the new caretaker government led by non-communist Manfred Gerlach was calling for free elections the following spring.

The prospect of free elections seemingly promised to subject communism in the GDR to the same fate suffered in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. By this juncture, however, larger international events were gaining momentum in ways that made the timetable of communism's demise a secondary issue. The entire East German state was about to be erased from the map, bringing changes in 1990 that would transform Central Europe's geography and security order.

GERMAN UNIFICATION: TOWARD A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ORDER

From the Cold War's earliest days, the FRG had maintained that the two Germanies eventually should be reunited, but ever since the days of Ostpolitik and détente, it had downplayed this goal by relegating it to the distant future. The unfolding East German drama during autumn 1989, however, was rapidly telescoping the future into the present. With thousands of East German citizens now emigrating to West Germany, the GDR collapsing into political-economic chaos, and demonstrators in East Berlin openly calling for unification, Bonn found itself under mounting pressure to publicly state its position.3

Because the two Germanies shared a common heritage, the justification for two separate states had rested on their differing ideologies. With communism in the GDR giving way, this justification was rapidly passing into history. Yet, there remained many reasons for caution about creating a single German nation. Not least important was the attitude of the Soviet Union, which did not relish the thought of resurgent German power in Central Europe. For the last 40 years, Moscow had placed great stock in a separate and socialist East Germany. To the extent Moscow allowed for unification, it insisted that Germany could become a single nation only if it withdrew from NATO. The NATO alliance had always voiced pro-forma support for unification, but its traditional hostility to

3 For analyses of German unification issues, see Christoph Bertram, "The German Question," and Ronald D. Asmus, "A United Germany," both in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 2. Spring 1990, pp. 45-62 and 63-76, respectively.
any security arrangement that would create a neutral Germany had not diminished. As a result, the security dimension alone made unification a hot potato. Also, doubts existed in West Germany about the wisdom of this step. Possible reluctance by many East Germans was one consideration, and Bonn officials were aware that the budgetary cost of rebuilding East Germany's depleted economy would be huge.

Even so, unification was an idea whose time had come. Speaking on November 29, Chancellor Kohl opened what was rapidly to become a Europe-wide debate by outlining a ten-point plan for achieving unification. Judged in relation to what came later, his plan was of decidedly moderate character. Arguing against any head-long rush, Kohl proposed a three-stage process that would begin with FRG economic assistance to the GDR, transition into a vague confederation, and ultimately end with a single nation. His speech focused on the near-term modalities of economic assistance, and attached no timetable for achieving the final stage. Apart from saying that Berlin would be part of the new state, Kohl revealed no specifics about how Germany would fit into the European security order. With great understatement, he merely noted that reunification raised security issues that would have to be worked out.4

For all its sober tones, Kohl's speech touched off a firestorm of controversy. The next day, Gorbachev released a critical statement saying that a single German state could not be a member of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. A week later, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze formally rejected unification. The East German government, still under Krenz, announced its interest in economic cooperation but rejected unification with the claim that a majority of GDR citizens wanted a separate socialist state. The Polish government expressed worry that a unified Germany might seek to redraw the Polish-German border to the east of the Oder-Neisse Line, and other East European nations voiced nervousness about future German ambitions. For their part, Bonn's allies acknowledged their long-standing support for unification, but expressed concern about Germany's continued membership in NATO and relations with the USSR. Britain's Thatcher particularly was a nay-sayer, urging a 5–10 year process that would give Europe plenty of time to absorb the change. She further called for Germany to remain in NATO and for U.S. troops to remain on the continent.

Within a week, the United States entered the debate. Addressing a hastily called NATO summit, President Bush laid down basic principles of Western policy for guiding the unification process. Endorsing German unification as a time-honored NATO goal, he said that self-determination in Europe must be pursued without prejudice to the outcome. Unification, he further stressed, should occur in the context of German membership in NATO and the EC, and with due regard to allied legal rights in Berlin. Unification was also to be accomplished in a peaceful, gradual, and step-by-step process aimed at preserving European stability. In particular, there were to be no changes to the borders of Poland and other East European nations. Promising to keep U.S. forces in

Europe as long as they were wanted by the NATO allies, he concluded by saying that an end to the unnatural division of Germany and Europe must proceed in accordance with freedom and national independence.

Speaking in Berlin a week later, Secretary of State Baker voiced similar themes but went beyond them to lay out a larger vision. Praising NATO, West Germany, Gorbachev, and the East Europeans all in one breath, he boldly called for the creation of an entirely new European security architecture to replace the old bipolar order. The new architecture, he said, was to be anchored on overcoming the division not only of Germany but also Europe as a whole. A new Europe whole and free, he asserted, must meet the legitimate interests of both Germany and its neighbors, including the USSR. Endorsing unification, Baker also urged Western policy to continue pursuing cooperative relations with the USSR while promoting freedom, democracy, and self-determination in Eastern Europe. To help speed the process of creating a new architecture, he called for stepped-up CFE negotiations that would quickly lead to radically decreased conventional forces in Europe.5

Stressing that the United States would remain a European power, Baker cautioned that the new architecture must reflect American security interests. In particular, he said, while transforming itself NATO must continue to be a viable alliance, one with a broader range of security missions than common defense. He also called for the United States to establish closer relations with the EC, which was encouraged to play a leading role in building cooperation with Eastern Europe.

In this landmark speech, Baker transformed what had been a narrowly focused debate over German unification into a larger and more far-sighted dialogue on the European security order. In effect, he promised American support for unification, but established limits on the consequences that would flow from it. In particular, NATO was to remain alive with Germany still a member, and the United States was to continue playing a leading role in European affairs. Baker’s speech, moreover, was far from purely protective. By portraying unification as one element of a far larger process of constructive change, he helped take the sting out of an embarrassing setback for the USSR. Beyond this, he offered the Soviet Union and East European nations a powerful incentive to cooperate in the understanding that their larger interests would be respected and even upgraded.

While setting decided boundaries for change, the Bush/Baker speeches had a helpful impact. They sent strong assurances that the United States would play a leading, visionary, and balanced role in shaping unification and its larger ramifications. Also, they told the Germans how they could proceed with allied support and gave all European nations, including the USSR, reason to hope that unification could lead to a durable security order for themselves. As a consequence, West European hostility to unification began to fade, but for the moment, the Soviet Union remained a different story.

Throughout 1989, the United States had been working with the Soviet government to encourage a constructive response to the tumultuous changes sweeping over Europe. The effort played an important role in bolstering Gorbachev’s international stature and persuading him that the United States and its allies would not exploit the situation to damage legitimate Soviet interests. In early December, Bush and Gorbachev held a successful summit off Malta that helped set the course for arms control negotiations over the coming year. In all this, Gorbachev had been accommodating, indeed supportive of democratizing reforms in Eastern Europe. For domestic reasons, however, German unification was an idea that stretched his willingness and ability to cooperate almost to the breaking point.

Events soon intervened to compel Gorbachev to cross even this Rubicon. To the Kremlin’s mounting dismay, communist rule in the GDR had collapsed so completely by early January 1990 that rapid unification was almost a forgone conclusion; the only real issue was the larger security arrangements that Baker had dwelt upon. During January’s first two weeks, the USSR continued to oppose any early unification. As the month wore on, however, Gorbachev began softening his position by saying that history would have to decide the outcome. As January drew to a close, this chapter of history evidently had come to a far speedier conclusion than he had hoped only days earlier. Speaking on January 31, Gorbachev shocked Europe by switching positions to accept German unification as a near-term inevitability.

Having given up trying to preserve the GDR, Gorbachev drew a new line of retreat—the larger security arrangements that were to accompany unification. Evidently feeling that he still held some diplomatic high cards, he embarked on an agenda aimed at fashioning a unified Germany that would be left neutral and relatively weak in Central Europe. His rear-guard effort set the terms of debate in Europe for the next six months, but in the end, proved no more successful than his forlorn effort to prop up the GDR.

Calling for a carefully managed process so as “not to undermine world peace,” Gorbachev laid down three conditions for unification: preservation of European stability and enhancement of security, concurrence of Germany’s neighbors, and involvement of the four powers whose rights over Berlin were affected. In themselves, these terms were hardly controversial. The real sticking point, however, came when Gorbachev’s aides interpreted these guidelines to mean that a united Germany would have to withdraw from NATO. The price for unification thus was to be a neutrality that would remove Germany’s anchor from NATO and bring about a vastly revised alliance less capable of projecting its presence into Central Europe.8

Gorbachev’s argument was that a unified Germany in NATO would pose a grave military threat to the USSR that could be contained only by stripping away the U.S. nuclear guarantees that underpinned Germany’s ability to act aggressively. Presumably a Germany lacking American nuclear reassurances

would be far less likely to pursue militarist and revanchist policies to the east. Beyond this, the Kremlin insisted that Soviet military withdrawal and the Warsaw Pact's dissolution negated the need for NATO to remain in existence at all. In its view, the proper quid pro quo for ending the Cold War was to be the dismantling of NATO, with a European-wide collective security pact to be substituted in its place. But if NATO was to survive, the Kremlin maintained, it would have to do so without Germany.

Gorbachev's stance did not go down well in Western circles for several reasons. Aware that NATO had a moderating effect on Germany by assuring its security, Western officials felt that a neutral Germany without ties to its partners would produce greater instability in Central Europe, not less. Indeed, many felt that the USSR's legitimate interests would be far better served by keeping Germany in NATO. Additionally, a truncated alliance offered the unwelcome promise of depriving the United States, Britain, and France of their influence in Central Europe. Finally, Western officials rejected Gorbachev's assertion that he was merely trying to protect the USSR from Germany. Rather, they felt, Gorbachev was trying to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat by rendering Central Europe vulnerable to the Kremlin's control even after Soviet forces had withdrawn.

For all these reasons, Gorbachev's demand was rebuffed by Bonn. Speaking for Kohl and the entire NATO alliance that same day, Foreign Minister Genscher unequivocally ruled out neutrality, saying that a unified Germany would remain in both NATO and the EC. By adopting this uncompromising stance, his statement carried an additional landmark message that had huge implications for the future. Because the former GDR would join NATO, he implied, Soviet troops would have to depart East Germany entirely.

Genscher did extend an olive branch to both the USSR and East European nations that responded to Gorbachev's larger security principles. He pledged that unification would pose no dangers to Soviet security interests, and he indicated that there would be no expansion of NATO territory farther eastward. Moreover, he said that Soviet troops could remain in eastern Germany for a transitional period, and that after withdrawal, NATO troops would not move into the former GDR. Thus the USSR was being offered a face-saving accord in which NATO's security umbrella would not be extended into what would soon be a diplomatic neutral zone between unified Germany and the Soviet Union.

Notwithstanding these accommodating gestures, Genscher's terms were tough and consequently not warmly received in Moscow. What especially seemed to stick in the Kremlin's craw was the prospect that Soviet troops were to be expelled from Germany. Coupled with the changes taking place elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the result was to be a radically transformed security structure in Central Europe that would sweep away the entire edifice that the USSR had maintained for the past four decades. Looming on the horizon was the

---

distasteful prospect of a unified Germany remaining in NATO, a dismantled Warsaw Pact, and a Central Europe bereft of Soviet forces.

Two key questions seemed likely to dominate Gorbachev's calculus. Would the Soviet Union see enough advantages in Baker's larger vision to accept Genscher's terms? And was Soviet influence declining so rapidly that Moscow had little choice but to agree? For the moment, Gorbachev maintained the line against continued German membership in NATO. Significantly, however, he also agreed to enter into "2+4" negotiations involving the two Germanies and the four Berlin powers that were to address how unification would unfold. This agreement suggested recognition that the Kremlin was not going to get what it wanted, and that the only viable course was to use its remaining bargaining chips to make the best of a bad situation.

Initial procedural meetings for the 2+4 talks were to begin in mid-March. In the weeks leading up to these talks, important political developments took place across Europe that further weakened the Soviet position. Leading the way was the rapidly evolving political situation in East Germany. In January, an agreement had been reached to hold free elections there in late March. As a result, political parties began forming which strongly resembled the CDU/CSU and SPD parties in West Germany. When open campaigning got under way, many observers felt that the Communist Party would do well or, at a minimum, the Socialist SPD would capture voter loyalties. When the elections were held on March 19, however, the CDU/CSU coalition stormed to victory, capturing 47% of the popular vote and a majority of 189 parliamentary seats. The SPD won only 21% and 87 seats, while the communists came in a dismal last with 16% and only 65 seats. On April 2, CDU member Lothar de Maiziere was sworn in as prime minister. With this astounding result, East Germany had made its preferences felt.

The Soviet position received another blow from an unanticipated source when Warsaw Pact foreign ministers met in Prague the day before the East German election. At the meeting, the Soviets argued strongly against German membership in NATO, but Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland astonishingly rebuffed the formerly all-powerful Kremlin by rejecting German neutrality. Their preference was to keep Germany in NATO, and possibly to seek later creation of an all-European security structure to replace both alliances. A critical vote against German neutrality was made by Poland. Earlier in the year, Kohl had made some ambiguous remarks about future German-Polish relations that suggested possible German interest in realigned borders and reparations for post-World War II changes. On March 8, however, the Bundestag accounted for this mistake by passing a resolution that guaranteed Poland's borders and renounced reparations. The same day, a 2+4 procedural meeting agreed to allow Poland to participate in sessions about its borders. Mollified, the Poles spoke out against German neutrality at the Warsaw Pact meeting, and their position played a large role in rejecting the Soviet demand.

Further undercutting the Kremlin was a strong endorsement for unification made by the EC in late April. Speaking at an EC meeting in Dublin, Kohl pledged to remain in NATO, disavowed any interest in a Fourth Reich, and
characterized German unity and European unity as being two sides of the same coin. He further said that Germany would seek no special EC financial aid in funding the costly rebuilding of East Germany after unification. His remarks went down well; Mitterand pronounced himself satisfied, and while Thatcher continued to grumble about the EC's vision, she supported unification. The meeting ended with a ringing endorsement for Kohl's plans.

Notwithstanding these negative developments, the Soviets remained publicly insistent that Germany must leave NATO, but behind the scenes their resolve was beginning to weaken. On May 6, the first substantive session of the 2+4 talks was held in Berlin, where Shevardnadze again opposed German membership in NATO. Although he criticized NATO as an aggressive bloc, his stance was not obstructionist. To many, his behavior suggested not an unmovable agenda, but rather a desire to use the issue as a device to extract Western concessions on CFE, START, and the timing of Soviet troop withdrawals. The meeting ended with no agreements, but Western negotiators came away feeling that the Soviets would eventually yield.

Further indicators of growing Soviet flexibility came in early June when NATO's foreign ministers met at Turnberry, Scotland. There, Baker and Genscher reported on recent talks with Shevardnadze. Both reported that the Soviet foreign minister seemed to be coming around to the view that NATO was the USSR's best hope for keeping Germany in check. Especially because Shevardnadze was expressing a desire to find a solution, the two voiced guarded optimism that the Soviet position would soon change.8

That same week, the Warsaw Pact met in a session that further undercut any hope that Gorbachev could hold out much longer. The result of the meeting was a communiqué calling for the Warsaw Pact to transform itself into a democratic grouping of sovereign states. The communiqué endorsed cooperation with NATO leading to creation of a pan-European security structure; it also set up a commission to consider how the Warsaw Pact could be radically transformed in the months ahead. Behind the scenes, a good deal of debate evidently took place about whether the Warsaw Pact should remain in existence at all, with Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia apparently all voicing doubts. Although these nations refrained from final actions, the meeting ended with recognition that the Warsaw Pact integrated military command probably would be phased out at the next meeting in November. The demise of the entire alliance, many observers felt, would follow shortly thereafter.

As if this was not enough, the meeting marked official approval of impending Soviet troop withdrawals from Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Soviet forces had begun pulling out of Hungary in March and were slated to be gone by mid-1991. The schedule for Czechoslovakia, agreed upon the previous February, called for complete departure by late 1991. Both governments were now exerting pressure on the Soviets to leave earlier if possible, and the best excuse that the Soviet government could lamely muster was that the complicated logistics of withdrawal made a faster response difficult. Moreover, even the Poles were

now clamoring for the Soviets to withdraw. The result was to undercut any plausible rationale for Soviet troops to remain in Germany. Indeed, the Warsaw Pact’s dissolution and Soviet withdrawal from elsewhere in Eastern Europe meant that any Soviet units remaining in Germany would be cut off from the USSR, thereby transforming them from occupiers into hostages.

The second session of the 2+4 talks was held on June 22, and although it produced no agreement, it did show signs of further Soviet softening. In the following days, bilateral talks between the Germans and the Soviets produced the outlines of a workable deal. By mutual agreement, the Soviets would withdraw completely over several years and consent to Germany remaining in NATO. In exchange, Germany would cut its military forces, refrain from basing NATO forces in eastern Germany, and provide the USSR a large infusion of financial support. Reporting to NATO in early July, German officials indicated that Gorbachev had all but agreed to this arrangement.

Sensing that Gorbachev needed some reassuring gesture from the West, NATO responded at its July 5–6 summit in London. There, NATO’s leaders issued a landmark communiqué proclaiming that the USSR was no longer an adversary. Their statement further promised a new and nonthreatening military strategy that would be appropriate for the coming post-Cold War era, and announced both a deemphasis on nuclear weapons and sizable cuts in conventional forces. Beyond this, the communiqué promised to transform NATO into a more political alliance that would aspire to build a cooperative European security order anchored on peaceful relations with the Soviet Union. It offered a beefing up of the CSCE and rapid progress on arms control negotiations, all aimed at assuring the Soviets of Western intentions.\(^9\)

The London Declaration also contained statements expressing NATO’s resolve to remain militarily vigilant, but nonetheless it seemed to satisfy Gorbachev. Shortly thereafter, Gorbachev expressed his belief that NATO no longer was an anti-Soviet alliance, thereby undermining his earlier argument that Germany could not remain associated with it. A week later, he took the final step. Besieged by mounting troubles at home and apparently satisfied that he had gotten the best possible bargain, Gorbachev on July 15 relented to German unification within NATO. His decision triggered a frenzied period of diplomatic activity aimed at capitalizing on the moment. Conducted at blinding speed, the effort produced dazzling results. By year’s end, a comprehensive set of agreements had been signed that transformed the face of Europe.

First to come was the Two-plus-Four Treaty, which was signed on September 12 in Moscow. The treaty terminated allied four-power rights over Berlin on October 1, restored German sovereignty over the long-divided city, and authorized German unification on October 3. It also called for allied troops to remain in Berlin until Soviet forces entirely had been withdrawn from Germany. This momentous development was scheduled to take place by late 1994. In return, unified Germany agreed to reduce its active military forces to 370,000, 25% be-

---

low West Germany’s current posture and nearly 50% under FRG-GDR levels combined. Germany further agreed to exercise substantial restraint on troop deployments in eastern Germany during the period Soviet forces were still present there and even after they had departed.

Although the exact details were unclear, the core concept was that defensive forces would be allowed to increase after 1994, but forces suggesting offensive missions would be completely disallowed. Accordingly, Germany was authorized to deploy some active and reserve units in the eastern area, but nuclear warheads were forbidden. And although Germany could hold limited NATO training exercises in its eastern lands, any permanent stationing of non-German NATO forces was prohibited.

Two days later, on September 14, Germany and the USSR initialed a 20-year Treaty of Friendship, with final signing ceremonies to take place in early November. This treaty was intended to lay the basis for a new political and economic relationship between the two countries. The treaty specified that neither side would use force against the other, and that both would honor without reservation the borders of all European states. It further stated that if one party were attacked, the other party would refrain from assisting the aggressor and would work through the United Nations and other collective security organizations to end the conflict.

The treaty specified that its provisions did not interfere with Germany’s obligations to NATO. Moreover, the treaty was not to come into effect until a similar nonaggression agreement had been signed between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. A final and important provision was that Germany agreed to provide substantial economic assistance to the Soviet Union. In total, Germany consented to provide fully $7.6 billion to cover the cost of Soviet withdrawal, including $600 million in farm products and machinery. In no small way, Germany thus opened its bulging wallet to buy the departure of Soviet troops from its soil. Along with the German-Soviet Treaty of Friendship came a German-Polish treaty guaranteeing their mutual frontiers, thereby removing a final barrier to unification.

With these security arrangements in place, the two Germanies quickly moved toward unification. Amid a touching midnight ceremony in Berlin, complete with a Beethoven symphony, a stirring flag-raising, and spectacular fireworks, unification took place on October 3. Triumphantly presiding over the festivities was Chancellor Helmut Kohl, with Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt at his side. Kohl and his CDU colleagues had more than one reason to be happy. Notwithstanding the massive cost of rehabilitating the eastern area, unification practically guaranteed they would be in power for some time to come. National elections were scheduled for December 2. When they occurred, Kohl won a decisive victory and thereby became the first chancellor of a united Germany.

In the wake of the security accords came agreement on a treaty to reduce conventional forces in Europe. The origins of this important development went back to January 1990. At the CFE talks in Vienna, chief Soviet negotiator Oleg Grinevsky had indicated that the USSR was prepared to move on a treaty for deep cuts, thereby promising to sweep away 17 years of frustrated negotiations.
In his State of the Union speech on January 31, President Bush signaled back with a proposal to supplement CFE’s armaments strictures by placing a man-power ceiling of 225,000 troops on U.S. and Soviet forces in Central Europe. The United States was to be allowed an additional 30,000 troops elsewhere in Europe, primarily in the southern region. In a mid-February meeting in Ottawa to discuss a U.S.-sponsored “open skies” proposal, the Soviets accepted Bush’s démarche, thus opening the door to a CFE Treaty later that year if the German question could be resolved.

Movement toward a CFE Treaty was accelerated by other arms control developments over the following months, especially in the START arena. Meeting at Camp David in early June, Bush and Gorbachev agreed to establish the basic provisions of a strategic arms treaty by the time of their next meeting. Their accord called for a complex set of nuclear reductions that amounted roughly to an overall 30% decrease. The two leaders also reached agreement to reduce their chemical arms stockpiles by 80%. Later in the summer NATO proclaimed the Cold War over, and Germany agreed not only to establish force limits but to continue renouncing nuclear and chemical weapons. With these developments helping clear the path, Baker and Shevardnadze in early October announced that agreement on the main points for a CFE treaty had been reached.

The CFE Treaty, a highly advantageous accord from NATO’s view, was signed in late November. Aimed at preserving defensive capability while eliminating offensive power, its complex provisions totaled 110 pages of detail. The treaty established force limits on Soviet forward deployments that had been overtaken by larger European political developments. The treaty was meaningful, however, in another respect. It established ATTU-wide limits for each alliance of 20,000 tanks, 20,000 artillery pieces, 30,000 armored combat vehicles, 6,800 aircraft, and 2,000 helicopters. Moreover, it specified that the forces of any one country were limited to two-thirds of the total. These and related provisions mandated the Soviet Union to reduce its total armaments in Eastern Europe and the western USSR by fully 50%. As a result, thousands of tanks and other weapons would have to be removed from the ATTU zone and presumably destroyed. By contrast, NATO’s forces were left comparatively untouched. Required to reduce by less than 10% in most categories, NATO’s forces would remain amply large for their still-important defensive missions.

The CFE Treaty, as experts pointed out, did not drive a stake through the heart of Soviet conventional power. The Soviets were left with sufficient equipment allowances to form 40–60 divisions in the western USSR. This force would still be capable of concentrating together for offensive, as well as defensive, purposes. Moreover, evidence soon became available that the Soviet military was racing to beat the treaty’s clock by redeploying 17,000 tanks, 26,000 armored combat vehicles, and 34,000 artillery tubes east of the Urals. In theory, these weapons would be exempted from destruction, which was to be employed only on excess systems in place the day the treaty took effect. When an angered Baker inquired about this worrisome development, an embarrassed Shevardnadze denied any malevolent intent and insisted that most of the weapons would be left to rot in open areas. Nonetheless, the Soviet military’s
behavior suggested that still-powerful Soviet forces east of the Urals could not be entirely discounted from the European power balance.

Even so, the CFE Treaty had important stabilizing implications. Above all, it meant that the USSR would no longer be capable of rapidly mobilizing a powerful 100-division army for a wide-reaching offensive adventure. Moreover, the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact’s integrated military command in November and the evident intention of East European nations to do away with the entire alliance meant that East European forces no longer counted on the threat side of the ledger. The complete withdrawal of Soviet forces from the forward areas meant that the threat of a surprise attack in Central Europe would soon be entirely dead. The CFE Treaty implied that, even over a lengthy period, the Soviet Union no longer could mobilize the kind of force needed to conduct powerful offensives simultaneously in central, northern, and southern Europe. To the extent that the USSR would still pose a conventional threat after CFE, that threat would take the form of a limited “single axis” attack that could be mounted only after weeks or months of preparation.

The CFE Treaty was signed at a CSCE conference in Paris that also produced a second important document with larger political implications. Declaring an end to confrontation and division in Europe, the “Charter of Paris” boldly envisioned an era of democracy, peace, and unity ahead. On the negative side, it failed to specify how the new and worrisome threats to instability were to be handled. Although it established an embryonic CSCE secretariat and conflict-prevention center, it provided little tangible confidence that CSCE could grow into the major security organization that its backers envisioned. Also, the Charter of Paris was disturbingly silent on how the United States was to continue playing a constructive role in Europe. Largely due to French opposition, the conference rejected a German-sponsored declaration highlighting the need for continued American involvement. This declaration was left to be adopted at a lower-profile meeting the following week in Rome. Nevertheless, the Charter of Paris offered a symbolic contribution to the common vision of cooperation and community-building ahead. At a minimum, it brought an uplifting end to what had been a historic two years.

COLLAPSE OF COMMUNISM IN THE SOVIET UNION

If the events of 1989 and 1990 were astounding, they were matched and even overshadowed by what happened in 1991, which saw communism’s dance of death play out its final act in the USSR itself. Setting the stage was a dramatic and prolonged crisis within the USSR that called into question not only communist rule but also the continued existence of the Soviet Union as a nation-state. Alarmed by their loss of power and control, the old guard finally reacted in August 1991 by staging a feeble coup d’État against Gorbachev that was quickly crushed by reformist forces. Days later, a restored but weakened Gorbachev closed down Communist Party headquarters in Moscow and took steps to completely ban the party from participation in Soviet political life. Immediately thereafter, he presided over an extraordinary parliamentary session that
officially disestablished the Soviet Union and created a new "Union of Sovereign States" in its place. This entity, in turn, soon gave way to a confederated "Commonwealth of Independent States" that set the former Soviet Union's consistent republics on the path to divorce.

This incredible development had its origins in spring 1990, when within seven stunning weeks the three Baltic states all proclaimed their sovereignty. Estonia's declaration was relatively mild, calling for gradual secession and thus falling short of an outright proclamation of independence. Lithuania and Latvia, now under the control of nationalist-minded reformists, showed no respect for even this nicety. Gorbachev responded by sending troops into Lithuania and by proclaiming the Latvian and Estonian declarations invalid. Behind his mailed fist, however, was a weak political stance. Stating that the Baltic states could possibly have their independence in due course, Gorbachev insisted that they must first observe Soviet laws governing secession. The laws that he was passing made secession a difficult endeavor, but even so, his willingness to acknowledge secession as a theoretical option betrayed the erosion of central control in Moscow.

Angered by Gorbachev's heavy-handed intrusion into Lithuania and sensing that his power was fleeting, several other Soviet republics followed the Baltic example in one way or another. By early August, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Armenia, and Tajikistan had all proclaimed sovereignty over their internal affairs, although not necessarily their intent to fully withdraw from the USSR. Most astonishing, the giant Russian republic had asserted its own sovereignty, notwithstanding the fact that Moscow was its own seat of government. Russia's recalcitrant behavior began in late May, when Boris Yeltsin, now an outspoken critic of communism and Gorbachev, was elected chairman of the Russian Republic's Supreme Soviet, defeating conservative opponents for this important position. Two weeks after the election, he led a parliamentary vote to assert his republic's sovereignty over its internal affairs. Three weeks later, he stormed out of the Communist Party's 28th Congress, resigning from the party and promising to form a rival democratic organization.

Faced with this chaos, a desperate Gorbachev claimed that he needed temporary emergency powers not only to control the situation but also to speed the process of reform within the USSR. By summer's end, he had won authority from parliament to rule by decree for the next 18 months. He had also been granted power to create a market economy and to negotiate a new all-union treaty that would preserve central authority while granting internal sovereignty to the 15 Soviet republics. The key issue was whether Gorbachev would use these powers to push radical reforms or instead to maintain as much of the old system as possible.

By late fall, the results were beginning to take shape, and they hardly looked encouraging for democratic reform. Gorbachev was able to produce a new draft treaty that seemed likely to keep at least 12 republics (the Baltics dissenting) in some form of new union with diminished central powers. His handling of the economy, however, was less innovative. Across the nation, a serious economic recession was in progress, with production falling, distribution problems
occurring in the agricultural sector, consumer goods lacking, and the money
supply growing far too fast. The economic reforms that Gorbachev instituted
for dealing with this situation fell far short of dramatic. In mid-September, he
had introduced a visionary 500-day plan that called for sweeping changes to-
ward a market economy. The institutional barriers to major change, nonethe-
less, remained powerful. The lack of a banking system, modern commercial
law, marketing and distribution networks, and many other factors argued
against any rapid turnover to a full-fledged market economy. Citing these in-
hibitions, parliamentary conservatives rebuffed the 500-day plan and, with
Gorbachev's acquiescence, forced adoption of a watered-down version preserv-
ing many features of the traditional command economy.

The political pendulum seemed to be swinging back toward central authority
and communist control. The recent headlong rush to political reform had co-
incided with recession, thereby subjecting democracy to the charge that it was
responsible for the economic collapse. Conservatives took advantage of the sit-
uation to assert their positions, and reformers suddenly seemed on the defen-
sive. Contributing to their problems was the fact that reformers were still a mi-
nority fighting deeply entrenched interests. Although the Supreme Soviet in
early October 1990 had decreed a multiparty political system, communists re-
mained in key government and economic posts across the country. This was
ture even in the Russian republic, where Yeltsin's immediate entourage held the
top positions but tradition-minded bureaucrats continued to dominate lower
levels. The problem was even more severe in the outlying republics, where in-
terest in local sovereignty often stemmed from a desire to keep communism in
power rather than to create democracy.

Most worrisome to reformers, Gorbachev himself seemed to be so shaken by
the mounting chaos that he was losing enthusiasm for perestroika and glasnost.
His willingness to backpedal on economic reform was a concern, but more
troubling was his growing flirtation with political reactionaries. Some months
before, he had been talking in terms of forming a center-left coalition for radical
reform. Now, he was openly pandering to the Communist Party, the Army, the
KGB, and government apparatchik in what was apparently an effort to restore
order on the basis of conservative principles. Reformers were disappearing
from his inner circle, to be replaced by old thinkers and even outright oppo-
nents of democracy. This development led an alarmed Shevardnadze to resign
from the government in protest of what he claimed was a coming reimposition
of communist dictatorship, one that presumably would be led by Gorbachev
himself.

The events of 1991, however, were to prove otherwise. Precisely what moti-
vated Communist Party conservatives to launch their August coup d'état is un-
certain, but the USSR's continuing downward internal spiral obviously played
an important role. By mid-1991, the economy had fallen deeper into recession,
and Gorbachev was losing popular support to the rebel Yeltsin. With revolt in
the republics gaining momentum, strikes had broken out in several areas in
protest of low wages, declining living conditions, and central leadership. In
mid-June, Yeltsin won a landslide victory in popular elections to become Rus-
sia's first president, and immediately began beating the war drums for radical reform, including steps to abolish Communist Party cells in Russian factories. Faced with these developments, angered Kremlin conservatives evidently concluded that Gorbachev's reforms had gotten out of hand.

In addition, the USSR's once preeminent international position was suffering one dispiriting defeat after another. Not only had Germany been unified within NATO, but the past 12 months had seen the Warsaw Pact's integrated military command dissolve amid signs that the entire alliance would soon be extinguished. The only remaining issue was whether the liberated East European nations would succeed in their transparent flirtations with the EC and NATO. Another reversal for the conservatives came when Gorbachev cooperated with the Western campaign to liberate Kuwait from the control of Iraq, a former close Soviet ally. The U.S.-led coalition's crushing military victory in early 1991 not only sent Saddam Hussein's government reeling but also exposed Soviet doctrine and weapon systems as below Western standards—a deeply humiliating setback for the Soviet military.

These reversals left the Soviet Union's fate increasingly in the hands of its former NATO adversaries. Although the Western nations all voiced rhetorical support for Gorbachev's reforms, they proved reluctant to provide the massive economic aid needed for the USSR to make the difficult transition to democracy and free enterprise. During the summer, Gorbachev attended the Western economic summit and met with President Bush, but came away with few promises for immediate aid even though the Soviet Union was tottering on the brink of political chaos and economic collapse. This failure signaled that Gorbachev's one remaining card—international support—had fallen under the table, and he was no longer an asset to the conservatives.

Evidently the final straw was the negotiations over the new all-union treaty. What started out as an effort to provide enhanced status for the republics was now being driven by a steady stream of concessions that weakened party control and central governmental authority. By mid-summer it was becoming clear that the new union would be composed of a Western-style parliamentary democracy led by a weak president, presiding over headstrong republics that had little intention of taking orders from Moscow. Where this fragmented structure would leave the Communist Party and the USSR's authoritarian governmental organs was eminently clear.

Whatever their motives, the conservatives took advantage of a vacationing Gorbachev to strike the night before the all-union treaty was to be signed into law. For a brief period, Vice President Gennadi Yanayev and his henchmen seemed in control, but their coup quickly collapsed when Yeltsin-led reformers put up stiff resistance and the Soviet military refused to cooperate. Within a few days the coup leaders were in jail and a shaken Gorbachev was back in Moscow, this time beholden to a triumphant Yeltsin. Acceding to Yeltsin's demands, Gorbachev, as mentioned above, banished the Communist Party pending an investigation into its role in the coup and purged the government of senior communist leaders.
Accompanying this collapse of communist authority came a vehement assertion of sovereignty by the republics, led by Yeltsin's Russia, which swept away any thought of adopting the previously agreed-upon treaty. Mounting protests against Moscow suggested that many republics were now committed to virtually complete independence in ways that called into question whether even a loosely confederated nation would survive. Indeed, civil war pitting republics against each other seemed a growing possibility. Regathering his energy, Gorbachev stepped into the breach in an effort to preserve a union that at least would allow for inter-republic commercial ties and would maintain military power and security functions under central control. He was able to convince an emergency session of the People's Congress to endorse negotiations on a new treaty reflecting this vision before the Congress voted itself out of existence. Whether he would succeed in rebuilding a new union on the ashes of the old system, however, seemed at best an uncertain proposition.

If these earth-shaking developments left a great deal unsettled about the Soviet Union's future, they seemingly did resolve the burning issue of whether communism would continue to be a leading political force in the nation. Prior to the aborted coup, the Communist Party still held a preeminent if deteriorating role in Soviet government and politics. After the coup, it found itself locked out of its own offices, its leaders under angry public attack, and its symbols being destroyed across the entire country. If communism's rise to power in 1917 had been accomplished with breathtaking speed, its fall from grace in 1991 had been even more abrupt, and equally portentous.

The final coup de grace came just before year's end. Ignoring Gorbachev entirely, Russia's Yeltsin, Ukraine's Kravchuk, and several other republic leaders met at Minsk. Rejecting Gorbachev's concept of a Union of Sovereign States, they agreed to forge a "Commonwealth of Independent States," a new entity with Minsk as its capital, and with vastly weaker central powers than Gorbachev was envisioning. Completely absent was any mention of communism. Indeed, these leaders, all ex-communists and several of previously conservative disposition, proclaimed themselves nationalists and democrats.

Precisely what was meant by a "commonwealth" was left undefined, and became even more unclear in the aftermath. Apparently Yeltsin envisioned an enduring if loose economic and political union under Russian leadership, with a common foreign policy and defense establishment. Even this modest vision was not shared by all his counterparts. Kravchuk, for example, seemed to regard the commonwealth as a temporary way station on the road to complete separation, with the Ukraine eventually emerging as a fully independent nation holding scant ties to Russia. All the participants seemed to agree on one basic point: The Soviet Union was dead not only in appearance, but also in reality.

In the following days, Gorbachev made a lame attempt to restore a centralized union, arguing that the Minsk meeting had been unconstitutional. But his power was long gone, and with Yeltsin presiding over the humiliating transition, Gorbachev soon resigned and entered civilian life. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet state officially went out of existence, courtesy of a poorly attended meeting of a nearly defunct parliament. On Christmas Day, the hammer and
sickle flag, which had flown over the Kremlin for 70 years, was hauled down. In its place was raised the old Russian tricolor, which now stared down warily over a city with a turbulent history and equally troubled prospects for the future. Exactly what Lenin had to say is uncertain, for the door to his tomb, normally kept open, had been locked.
Lessons of the Past, Policies for the Future
An old axiom holds that anyone who ignores the mistakes of history is doomed to repeat them. If this axiom is true, it might also be said that, by learning history's positive lessons, we can apply them to the future. The West's decision to refashion NATO to play an active role in Europe's uncertain future makes the need to absorb the Cold War's lessons all the more urgent. Because the years ahead will be different from the past, the Cold War provides no policy blueprint, but it does offer a basic insight. It shows that the Western democracies can accomplish great things when they set their minds to the task. Difficult problems and great dangers are not overcome easily, or without painful costs, but they can be surmounted. As the Western alliance showed during the Cold War, the prescription for success is to show sustained commitment to a worthy purpose.

REASONS FOR THE WEST'S VICTORY

Victory in the Cold War was not predestined by communism's faults or democracy's superior moral virtues. The West won this tough contest because it forged a sound grand strategy at the outset and then pursued this strategy for 40 long years. The core goals of this strategy were containment and deterrence, Western solidarity and prosperity, and the gradual weakening of communism in Europe. Created to serve these goals, the alliance brought together the powers of its many members, and thereby magnified these powers far beyond what could have been achieved had an alliance not been formed. Serving as an instrument for applying these powers, NATO functioned as a primary vehicle by which coherent policies and programs were developed and carried out through coalition mechanisms. The art of practicing coalition warfare in peacetime was not easily mastered, but NATO's members learned this art well enough to prevail over a strong totalitarian opponent. As a result, the Western democracies survived a dangerous threat and gained a victory that came late, but was total.

The alliance achieved its goals because it put together a long sequence of wise policy decisions as the Cold War unfolded, and because it worked hard to implement these decisions, with considerable success. The alliance performed best at times of crisis, slackened but remained quietly effective during periods of relaxation, and slumped into ineffectiveness only when unclear goals created internal division over priorities. Crises allowed NATO to elevate itself onto new
policy plateaus, relaxed times permitted implementation at a moderate but steady pace, and periods of ineffectiveness were brief and never fatal. The result was a performance that ebbed and flowed in response to the Cold War’s dynamics, but overall, proved adequate to the task. Indeed, the remarkable story here is not that a Western alliance was formed, but that for 40 years this alliance overcame periodic bouts of fatigue and indecision to show great staying power. To a degree, NATO won the Cold War because it outlasted the Warsaw Pact.

NATO showed its greatest effectiveness in what arguably was its most important and difficult endeavor: building a powerful military and security coalition that had to undergo constant renewal as one phase of the Cold War gave way to another. Rebounding from a slow start in the late 1940s, NATO employed the crisis-marked early 1950s to establish its foundations. These landmark years saw NATO secure American military commitment to Western Europe, create an integrated command, rearm West Germany, forge an enduring transatlantic bargain, and build a powerful nuclear deterrent. Following a drop-off in the late 1950s, the debate-laden 1960s witnessed a conventional buildup and adoption of a better-balanced military strategy and security policy that faced both inward and outward. Working together, flexible response and the Harmel doctrine provided the vital ingredients of internal consensus and external coherence for managing a new but still dangerous stage of the Cold War.

The ambiguous 1970s saw NATO achieve partial success with détente, slump into temporary stagnation, and then rally to restore partnership and embark on the path of staying competitive with the Soviet military buildup. The confrontational 1980s saw the alliance push down on the defense accelerator in ways that ended the USSR’s quest for military supremacy in Europe. Following NATO’s defense buildup and the USSR’s capitulation came success at negotiating German unification, Soviet military withdrawal, and the end of the Cold War on terms that left the alliance intact, with a new mission for the future. All of these positive steps were taken only after stiff internal debates and partisan infighting, but the point is: They were taken. As they were implemented, they built on each other with a cascading effect that, in the end, transformed potential defeat into overwhelming victory.

NATO’s performance was far from perfect, but what matters is that the alliance outperformed the Soviet bloc by a wide margin. At the outset the Cold War was a close contest with NATO a distinct underdog, but as Western coalition-building gathered momentum, the advantage shifted, and the conflict ended in a rout. Throughout the contest, the Warsaw Pact remained a potent military threat, but NATO build a deterrent shield backed by strong defenses, behind which it far outpaced communism in political and economic terms. With communism lying prostrate at the finish, the alliance emerged alive, with its defenses intact, its democratic institutions flourishing, and its economy depleted by heavy military expenditures but still healthy. Unless NATO’s security efforts can somehow be dismissed as irrelevant to this outcome, history will be hard pressed to reject the conclusion that NATO, for all its blemishes, was an
effective alliance. The bottom line is that the Western alliance came from behind to win the Cold War against a formidable opponent.

Because fear could have produced paralysis and defeatism, the Soviet menace alone does not account for NATO’s successful performance. The communist threat was a major reason for NATO’s formation, but afterwards, internal alliance dynamics played a determining role that grew in importance as time passed by and worry over invasion receded. NATO held together and worked effectively because, despite periodic departures and setbacks, collective security and alliance partnership served the vital interests of members on both sides of the Atlantic. NATO’s effectiveness, however, was not guaranteed by this fact alone, nor was it achieved easily. It came about because NATO’s members labored hard to make the alliance work, overcoming major problems along the way. Subordinating themselves to the common good, they embraced multilateral cooperation, committed major resources, and supported the emergence of NATO’s institutions as bodies capable of making and implementing fateful decisions. It was these activities that breathed enduring life into the alliance and made possible NATO’s success.

This commitment, abnormal by historical standards, was an outgrowth of a farsighted calculus applied in each of NATO’s capitals. Alliance partnership required NATO’s members to accept sacrifices in lost sovereignty, entangling obligations, expensive ventures, and discomforting policy compromises. Outweighing these costs, however, came major benefits in both the short term and the long term. Providing a vehicle that allowed the vulnerable West European states to band together under the protection of the United States, the alliance enabled each nation to pursue an ambitious policy agenda far beyond what otherwise could have been contemplated. By creating collective defenses, the alliance brought each nation security from the communist threat, and promises of benign conduct from other NATO members, some of which had once been untrustworthy rivals. Along with these security benefits came participation in a collaborative world economy that helped foster prosperity for NATO’s members. Also important, the alliance helped nurture the democratic values and institutions of its members. At the time NATO was created, these benefits were judged as far exceeding the costs of participation, and this calculus remained unaltered as the years passed by. Although the communist menace receded at times, NATO’s successful track record and uncertainty about the future helped alleviate concerns about the costs of membership. Over the years, awareness of NATO’s benefits grew to the point where the alliance came to be regarded as a public good whose worth was taken for granted.

NATO’s successful performance was also a product of the strong leadership shown by the United States. Because the Cold War began with a communist superpower threatening a large number of small West European nations with a recent history of bitter wars among themselves, NATO would not have been formed, let alone performed effectively, in the absence of the American commitment. Although other nations were involved, it was the U.S. decision to become involved in European security affairs that led to NATO’s creation, and permitted the alliance to grow afterwards. In decisive ways, the United States
set the policy agenda, mobilized the alliance behind visionary goals, and committed the resources that made feasible many ambitious undertakings.

Because no other members possessed comparable power, none could have played this role, nor could any subcoalition have served as a substitute. Had the alliance lacked strong American leadership, it would have fallen victim to the inability of many smaller nations to form a common front, and it would have been left vulnerable to Soviet divide and conquer tactics. Recognizing this reality from the onset, most West European nations welcomed American leadership: France was the only nation that mounted an enduring challenge to it. These nations sometimes grew irritated at Washington’s clumsy diplomacy and distanced themselves from specific American endeavors, but they agreed with the strategic goals pursued by the United States. Also, they recognized that the huge resource contributions made by the United States entitled it to substantial influence. Moreover, they were hardly powerless, and although their own less weighty military contributions may have diminished their influence, their roles offered the advantage of enabling them to devote greater resources to economic development. Satisfied with the alliance’s goals and internal distribution of power, they preferred a strong U.S. presence to the alternative of having to fend for themselves.

The American presence was especially manifested in the defense arena. U.S. nuclear commitments were the backbone of deterrence, and American conventional forces played a major role in the strategy of flexible response. Moreover, all of NATO’s military buildup efforts were a product of American visions and political leadership, expressed in sufficiently compelling terms to persuade the West European allies to join the cause. Had the United States not led, and had it not provided large forces, a stable military balance would not have been maintained, and the Cold War’s outcome might well have been different.

A century from now, historians might look back with perplexity on the vigor and constancy of the American commitment. After all, the United States had been an isolationist nation, and its interests in Europe were derivative, not elemental. The United States, moreover, was compelled to pay for about one-half of the alliance’s heavy defense expenditures: a disproportional amount that inflicted damage on America’s economic health. Perhaps a naive faith in international involvement and military power animated American policy for the Cold War’s first two decades, but the disastrous Vietnam War swept away this innocence, leaving behind widespread skepticism about involvements not anchored on clear goals and compelling logic. If the United States entered Europe unaware, it remained there long after sober realization had come to dominate its foreign policy.

Explanations can be found from a variety of reasons. Anti-communist ideology played a role, but a more fundamental reason, forged during the previous two world wars, was the belief that a hostile superpower could not be allowed to dominate the European landmass. Moreover, the failure of Britain’s appeasement tactics in the 1930s led to the belief that a strong military commitment aimed at preventing war was far cheaper and safer than trying to intervene after war had broken out. Also, the nuclear balance came to play a large role. Be-
cause a European war could grow into an intercontinental exchange, American forces were needed in Europe to help dampen crises before they escalated. To an important degree, nuclear realities gave the American government no choice but to accept an entangling involvement that was the only reliable way to safeguard the physical survival of the United States. For the United States, collective defense had drawbacks, but it had the advantage of not stopping on Europe’s shores.

Other calculations also entered into American strategy in Europe. Because the United States was embroiled in a global rivalry with the Soviet Union, a strong democratic alliance in Europe weakened the worldwide appeal of communism, and helped enhance American global influence. Moreover, NATO made Western Europe secure, thus allowing the United States to pursue involvements elsewhere with confidence that the USSR could not commit aggression there while American backs were turned. Finally, commitment to NATO helped create support in Western Europe for a world economy anchored on the dollar and free-trade capitalism, thereby serving the cause of American prosperity. The United States made expensive military commitments to Western Europe, but in the wake, American businesses were allowed to invest heavily, and in time, West European exports and investments flowed into the United States. Like security, economics was also a two-way street, from which the United States benefited.

Because these reasons led all Cold War presidents to make NATO a centerpiece of their foreign policies, no one administration can claim predominant credit for U.S. leadership in Europe, nor did any single policy departure dominate the American performance there. Rather, leadership was manifested through the constancy exhibited by nine successive presidencies, and was anchored on the bipartisan consensus toward Europe that endured, with only some flagging, throughout the Cold War. All administrations experienced successes in Europe, and all experienced failures. What mattered is that, when they left office, they passed the NATO commitment along, to a successor willing to pick up the banner and lead in its own way. As a result, American leadership of the alliance often changed policy colors, and sometimes was controversial, but in underlying character, it was consistently strong and clear.

Bipartisan constancy stemmed from an understanding of Europe’s importance, but it also grew out of domestic American politics. When the Cold War began, the Democratic Party embraced a stance of pro-Atlanticist internationalism, but the Republican Party was isolationist and Pacific-oriented. Eisenhower, however, anchored the Republican Party on the centrist East Coast establishment, and refashioned his Party’s foreign policy along Atlanticist lines. Democrats Kennedy and Johnson were both pro-Atlanticist, and the Republican Nixon and Ford Administrations carried forth this centrist tradition. Although the Vietnam War pulled the Democratic Party leftward in the early 1970s, its isolationist sentiments were directed against Third World involvements and zealous anti-communism, rather than Europe. As a result, Carter pursued pro-NATO policies with his Party’s support. Reagan entered office as a conservative Republican with unilateralist leanings, but his confrontational
stance toward the Soviet Union drew him into collaboration with the West Europeans.

During the Cold War’s last two decades, the American political system was weakened by eroding presidential strength, by the breakdown of party discipline, and by divided government that left the Republicans commanding the White House and the Democrats in control of the Congress. These trends, however, were never translated into rejection of the NATO commitment. Although some congressmen chafed at the disproportional military burdens carried by the United States, the only serious assault on the U.S. presence in Europe was launched in the early 1970s. After it was rebuffed, rising Cold War tensions produced a reassessment of congressional support for NATO, thereby allowing subsequent presidential administrations to pursue their instincts in Europe.

The great strength of U.S. policy in Europe was its pursuit of a unified alliance capable of resisting communist expansion. This stance led it wisely to insist on a sound defense strategy backed by American military strength, and to pursue a forthcoming diplomacy toward the USSR aimed at preventing war. In carrying out this approach, moreover, it normally was responsive to its two closest partners, Great Britain and West Germany, in ways that allowed American leadership to energize the alliance. The principal weakness of American policy was a propensity to unpredictable behavior and a sometimes appalling insensitivity to allied concerns. Washington’s zig-zag behavior rattled London and unnerved Bonn, often compelling both governments to repudiate policies they had previously endorsed out of fealty to the United States. More damaging, the United States did not perform well in handling France, thereby contributing to France’s decision to detach itself from the integrated command.

These strengths and weaknesses were reflected in different ways by the successive presidential administrations of the Cold War. Truman was late in sensing the military danger in Europe, but once he became aware, he authorized the policies that led to NATO’s creation. Eisenhower presided over building NATO into a full military coalition anchored on nuclear power, but he encountered troubles in dealing with British and French colonial policy, and he left office with NATO’s conventional posture weak and defense strategy in tatters. Kennedy provoked a debate that strained relations, but he guided the alliance through two dangerous crises, reformed American military strategy, and launched strategy reform in NATO. Johnson became entangled in an unwinnable war in southeastern Asia that damaged the American foreign policy consensus. However, he guided NATO into adoption of a new military strategy anchored on forward defense and flexible response, and a new security policy anchored on negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Nixon reoriented U.S. defense policy on Europe and pursued a balanced mix of détente and defense, but provoked a fractious debate over economic relationships, and brought about the Watergate crisis that weakened presidential leadership in foreign policy. Ford may have been slow in disentangling from détente’s worst features, but he helped refashion transatlantic partnership and defense awareness. Carter was unwilling to launch a worldwide defense buildup and behaved in a fashion that brought disrespect on his presidency.
From the outset, however, he led NATO toward major defense improvements, and at the end, he moved to enlarge the U.S. military budget and defend southwestern Asia. Reagan chose to confront communism head-on, launched a huge U.S. military buildup, and acted to invigorate the West's defenses and economic policies, but he also damaged NATO's cohesion. Recovering, he restored alliance solidarity, and then began the process of ending the Cold War. When Bush led the alliance in securing German unification and Soviet withdrawal, he thus stood on the shoulders of many presidents, all of whom made mistakes but contributed to America's legacy of strong leadership.

If the United States was NATO's dominant power, it could not have led the alliance in absence of the strong roles played by its principal partners, Great Britain and West Germany. Like the United States, Great Britain's policy toward NATO benefited from bipartisan constancy shown by the Conservative and Labour Parties. In retrospect, Great Britain probably made its most enduring contribution at the Cold War's onset, when its diplomacy had a major impact on securing American involvement and creating NATO. Thereafter, Great Britain acted as a loyal American ally, and played a leading role in NATO's military command structure. Saddled with a declining economy, it wisely disengaged from global involvements and focused on Europe, where it joined the EEC in a manner designed to preserve its national identity and the transatlantic connection. Great Britain contributed to NATO's defense strategy with its strategic nuclear forces and powerful navy. On the continent, the British Army of the Rhine stood guard over one of the most dangerous attack corridors into West Germany, thereby helping ensure deterrence. When the Cold War ended, Great Britain played a constructive role in refashioning NATO and calling for an enduring American presence in Europe. All told, this is an impressive legacy.

The Federal Republic of Germany rose from the ashes of destruction in World War II to become a strong democracy, an engine of Western economic prosperity, and one of NATO's most reliable partners. The FRG's strategic concept was laid down by Konrad Adenauer, who rejected neutralism in favor of being a good ally making contributions to containment and deterrence. During the Cold War's first two decades, the conservative CDU/FDP alliance dominated West German politics, and steered in a centrist pro-NATO direction. Midway, the liberal SPD ruled for fourteen years, but notwithstanding its pursuit of Ostpolitik and détente, it maintained West Germany's presence in NATO and close partnership with the United States. Over the Cold War's last decade, the SPD drifted leftward toward neutralism, but it fell from power and was replaced by the conservative Kohl government, which was strongly pro-NATO and pro-United States.

The alliance seldom gave public recognition to the FRG's military contribution, but this contribution was immense. Simply stated, it was the emergence of the West German Army and Air Force that allowed NATO to build a viable conventional defense in Central Europe, and thereby to maintain a military balance of power that helped checkmate the USSR's quest for supremacy. The FRG's reward was the forward defense concept, but West German military strength served American interests by providing the wherewithal for rejecting
massive retaliation and pursuing flexible response. As the Cold War ended, the FRG continued to pursue a constructive policy anchored on membership in NATO, a leading role in the EC, and support for an enduring American presence in Europe. When the opportunity for unification came, outside observers may have been surprised by the degree to which NATO's members supported the FRG's aspirations. But in retrospect, this support was no surprise: For political, economic and military reasons, the FRG earned it.

France's role in NATO reflected the complicated motives behind de Gaulle's policy. From the outset, the alliance's greatest failure in the Cold War was its inability to find a satisfactory role for France. This failure owed partly to short-sighted American and British policies, and to West Germany's rise, but it also was an outgrowth of France's own weak identity, fractious internal politics, and deep social cleavages. The weakness of Gaullism was that it detached France from NATO's integrated command, and led France to pursue an anti-American stance that was unhealthy for France's own security, to say nothing about Western Europe's safety. Gaullism's strength was that it allowed France to recover self-respect and permitted this nation to find an internally satisfying equilibrium with the United States and NATO. After de Gaulle departed, NATO's members grew more comfortable with France's independent stance, and Paris quietly drew closer to NATO and the United States.

During the Cold War's last decade, France continued to seek influence through a foreign policy aimed at bolstering the EC and the CSCE, but it supported NATO's growing resolve more than is commonly appreciated. It often remained a thorn in Washington's side, but its military forces underscored nuclear deterrence and provided valuable reserves for alliance defense strategy. As important, France favored a policy of standing up to the Soviet Union, backed NATO nuclear modernization, and supported German unification in the alliance. As the Cold War came to an end, France seemed more preoccupied with pushing EC integration and the CSCE than with preserving NATO and an enduring U.S. role in Europe, but its complex diplomacy recognized the need to keep NATO alive and U.S. forces present in Europe. French historians may well give their nation high marks for France's behavior. Although American historians might be less enthusiastic, even they probably will grant that, on the whole, France contributed to the West's victory in the Cold War.

Although beyond the scope of this inquiry, the roles played by NATO's other members also deserve mention here. In Central Europe, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark all were pro-alliance participants in NATO's policies and programs. Despite accusations of embracing free-rider tactics and occasional departures into neutralism, these nations adhered to centrist policies, and often served as voices of moderation that tempered frictions among NATO's dominant partners. Moreover, these nations contributed about 20% of NATO's conventional defenses and played important roles in alliance defense strategy. In particular, Dutch and Belgian forces guarded otherwise vulnerable attack corridors in northern Germany, and thereby helped make possible forward defense. In northern Europe, Norway anchored the alliance's defense posture, and in southern Europe, Italy guarded its own Po Valley and contributed to alliance air
and naval defenses in the Mediterranean. Portugal and Spain helped maintain NATO's air and maritime defenses in the eastern Atlantic. In the eastern Mediterranean, Greece and Turkey often seemed detached from the alliance and spent considerable energy quarreling with each other, but they provided important forces for NATO's military strategy on the southern flank.

Notwithstanding the roles played by these nations, it was the leadership provided by the United States, Great Britain, and West Germany that made NATO an effective alliance. What translated this cooperation into concerted action was the NATO institutional structure, which provided a forum for high-level policymaking and executive agencies for program implementation. Throughout the Cold War, NATO operated on the basis of democratic principles that emphasized consensus formation, thereby promoting searching dialogue. But NATO also distributed influence according to degree of national resource contributions, thereby helping overcome the risk of paralysis. Influence alone, however, was not allowed to rule in untrammeled fashion. NATO's planning mechanisms helped install technical analysis as an important arbiter of competing policy alternatives, thereby avoiding the pitfalls of arbitrary choices that reflected partisan interests. The result was a democratic alliance in which open debate, careful deliberation, and decisive choice were all possible.

In retrospect, NATO proved especially effective at fashioning political bargains that preserved its internal unity. Sometimes the alliance was able to resolve its policy dilemmas by finding solutions that upgraded the common interest in a fashion that required few sacrifices by any nation. But when conflicting objectives could not be meshed, NATO aimed for policy compromises that protected the most critical goals of each nation, and necessitated sacrifices on only matters of secondary importance. This ideal was not always achieved, but it was approximated in a number of cases that proved critical to NATO's survival. Good examples are the 1954 transatlantic bargain, the military strategy of flexible response and forward defense, the Harmel doctrine of defense and détente, and the decision in the 1980s to pursue nuclear modernization and arms control negotiations. By fashioning policy choices that faced inward to preserve consensus, NATO strengthened its ability to face outward with strength and solidarity.

Although internal unity was a dominant theme, NATO also was able to achieve a high degree of outward-facing policy coherence that enhanced its effectiveness in managing the Cold War. This coherence was achieved because NATO's institutions had a disciplining effect by imposing a sense of the common good, technical criteria for policy choice, and attention to programmatic detail. Equally important, NATO's members often may have disagreed on specific priorities, but they shared common strategic goals in ways that allowed them to pursue balanced policies and integrated programs.

During peacetime, NATO often acted with a slowness that dismayed critics, but when it acted, it did so powerfully, with the weight of the entire alliance. Moreover, its peacetime actions stemmed from planning that typically was well conceived. NATO's defense policy suffered from a lack of adequate resources, but apart from redundancy and duplication, the resources made available were
well used. The alliance not only fashioned a sound defense strategy, but employed its executive agencies to build a military posture that, despite many problems, was aligned with this strategy and capable of carrying it out to a greater degree than commonly appreciated. NATO's defense posture had its skeptics, but the Soviet Union never lost its respect for alliance military power and this respect is what counted.

Observers worried about NATO's ability to act at times of crisis, but when crises actually occurred in Central Europe, the alliance acquitted itself well. Above all, NATO rearmed West Germany, stood firm on Berlin, and withstood Soviet blandishments to undertake many force modernization decisions. NATO's performance on the southern flank was less stellar, and until the Persian Gulf War, the alliance failed to handle crises beyond NATO's borders. For all their importance, however, these failures were never fatal. Central Europe was the focal point of the Cold War, and there, NATO earned high marks.

The alliance's success in Central Europe was a product of sound overall policy and strategy, but NATO's integrated command also played a major role. By fostering defense plans and combined force operations, it established effective mechanisms for crisis response and wartime defense. In Central Europe, a powerful military posture was built, one capable of deterrence and strong defense. This is one important reason why, despite a dangerous political confrontation and ever-mounting military competition, war never broke out. Raw fear of a nuclear holocaust was a powerful restraint, but fear alone had not prevented destructive wars in the past, and Korea and Vietnam both showed that conventional war without escalation was possible in the nuclear age. The fact that a holocaust was avoided in Central Europe is alone strong testimony to NATO's effective performance.

LINGERING CONTROVERSIES AND RESOLVED DEBATES

NATO's successful performance notwithstanding, the Cold War has left behind a legacy of controversies that will fuel debate for many years. In particular, NATO was far from a perfect alliance. All four decades saw cases in which NATO departed from the principles of coalition planning and sound security policy. At times, the United States behaved in a disruptive fashion driven by internal politics, national predilections, and failure to anticipate the impact of controversial policy departures on allied sensitivities. As often, the West European nations behaved with similar shortsightedness, embracing flawed priorities, free-rider tactics, neutralism, and their own agendas. In the end, the alliance's shortcomings were not fatal, but history may well conclude that the West survived the Cold War with its unity and security intact partly because the gods were on its side.

Though NATO's strategic policy was well conceived, victory in the Cold War was won at a huge budgetary cost that brought painful sacrifices. The United States and the West Europeans proved capable of waging the Cold War without ruining their economies, but they paid for their defense strength with reduced domestic investments. The negative consequences are a matter of dispute, but
by the late 1980s, many experts were concluding that the United States was entering into long-term decline caused by slow productivity growth and diminishing competitiveness. The stubborn recession of the early 1990s suggested the onset of structural weaknesses, including an aging infrastructure, questionable management, and a lack of flexible working class skills. Fewer doubts were raised about the economies of Western Europe, but even there, rumbling social discord suggested that all was not well.

The question will be asked whether the West still would have won the Cold War had it scaled back on defense expenditures along the way, thereby allowing for greater economic investments. In all likelihood, the answer will be clouded with many uncertainties. Arguably communism might still have come tumbling down had the alliance’s defense efforts been less strong. Nonetheless, NATO’s growing resolve evidently did play a role in causing Gorbachev to come to terms, thereby giving rise to the explosion of pent-up dissent that destroyed communism. For this reason, it is hard to escape the conclusion that, although communism ruined itself through unhealthy values and flawed policies, NATO’s defense efforts hastened the process of collapse.

At three stages of the Cold War, moreover, the alliance went through periods of military restraint driven by fiscal imperatives, and emerged with its security weakened. In the late 1940s, an attempt was made to create a political alliance lacking organized defenses. In the 1950s, NATO pursued fiscal restraint by embracing a nuclear strategy. In the 1970s, the alliance employed détente as a rationale for defense scalebacks. In all cases, the result was a deteriorating force balance that made necessary wrenching buildups in later years. Perhaps the enduring lesson is that greater fiscal continuity would have been best.

Indeed, NATO’s fiscal stringency resulted in serious risks throughout the Cold War because a fully adequate conventional defense posture was never erected. Unwilling to pursue coalition planning and military strength beyond certain limits, NATO gambled its security on the proposition that deterrence could be achieved by denying the USSR confidence in its own supremacy. In the end, this gamble paid off, but along the way, NATO was compelled to rely on nuclear weapons to a greater degree than decreed by safety and sanity. Here again the gods were on NATO’s side, but whether this gamble will stand up well in history is another matter.

A related controversy will be whether military and economic burdens were distributed fairly within the alliance. The Cold War began with the United States carrying a heavy share of the military load in order to allow West European economies time to recover. By the 1970s, this recovery was complete, but even thereafter, the United States continued to spend 5–7% of GNP on defense, whereas the West Europeans, only about 3.0–3.5%. This wide gap provoked mounting congressional anger, but when the technicalities were considered, the difference narrowed. Moreover, global military strength helped buy the United States a privileged position in the world economy that endured many years, and eroded only when American business began losing its competitive edge. The United States thus was far from exploited in some grossly unfair way, but both Western Europe and Japan did act to prolong their own insulated sta-
tus long after they had acquired the capacity to carry a greater share of the burden. Because Japan was spending only 1–2% of GNP on national security and pursuing strong protectionist policies, it was subject to special inquiry, but the EC's self-serving Common Agricultural Policy stubbornly resisted change in the GATT negotiations. When the Cold War ended, a host of economic squabbles rose to the surface—over trade policy and protectionist measures—that introduced growing strains into the alliance. Because this issue will remain on the contemporary agenda, disputes over Cold War burden sharing seem destined to linger on, without definitive conclusions.

Another controversy will be whether the NATO alliance could have done more to reduce Cold War tensions by placing greater emphasis on negotiations with the Soviet bloc. This question will be answerable only when Soviet archives are opened, and maybe not even then. The dramatic ending of the Cold War, however, has introduced a fresh perspective that should help resolve this controversy. If the West often suffered from self-doubts along the way, the rebellions that ended communist rule in long-oppressed Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have lent a new meaning to the Cold War, and to the West's conduct.

Because Stalin's demeanor was so threatening, Western negotiatory policy through 1956 was animated by conservative principles inspired by fear that agreements might unravel NATO's internal unity and security. Support for West Germany played a major role in this calculus in ways that hamstrung Western flexibility. After 1956, Soviet diplomacy showed signs of softening, but even so, the Kremlin's stance on Berlin and Germany was far from forthcoming. After the Cuban Missile Crisis the Soviet Union began pursuing a limited détente, but it also launched a major military buildup driven by a supremacy-oriented offensive strategy in Europe, and it showed stubborn resistance to any overall settlement that respected the West's interests. At this juncture, moreover, communism showed no signs of grave internal weaknesses. Political negotiations therefore seemed likely to produce agreements that would weaken the FRG's sovereignty and NATO's unity without expelling the USSR from Eastern Europe or ending communist rule there. Because this exchange could have had disastrous consequences, the West's conservatism remained anchored on principles more valid than narrow-minded defensiveness.

In the early 1970s, the two sides pursued détente, and this exchange produced valuable agreements that lessened tensions by ruling out ABM deployments and by ratifying the territorial status quo in Central Europe. Détente also set in motion growing Western contacts with Eastern Europe that held promise of slowly eroding communism there. Hope that communism would collapse, however, was correctly relegated to the distant future, and negotiations failed to resolve a core problem: the military confrontation in Central Europe. After that, negotiations focused on nuclear arms control, but with the USSR refusing to scale back its conventional force presence in the forward areas, the West was unenthused about marginal nuclear accords that did little to enhance real security and threatened to mislead public opinion. The USSR's growing assertiveness was responsible for the downturn thereafter. By the early 1980s,
dé­tente and arms control negotiations had all but collapsed, but the fault did not lie with the West. Perhaps the West could have been more forthcoming in some areas: its performance in SALT negotiations and economic trade with the East will remain subjects of special debate. Whether it should have offered fair better terms on the overall European security order, however, is another matter. More was involved than placating a Soviet paranoia that translated into oppressive control in Eastern Europe and bullying behavior toward the West. First and foremost, NATO's governments were responsible for protecting their own security, and the Eastern bloc's rigid adherence to totalitarian values provided little basis for confidence that risk-taking gestures would be reciprocated. Major arms control agreements and better security arrangements, moreover, were speedily reached when Gorbachev decided to seek true political accommodation with the West. This development says a great deal about the real cause of the enduring Cold War confrontation in Europe.

Although questions can be raised about whether Western diplomacy sometimes was too hard-edged, equally pointed questions can be asked about whether the West, in its desire to avoid war with the Soviet bloc, failed to do enough to relieve oppression in Eastern Europe. After all, the West stood by and merely protested as Soviet tanks crushed rebellions in East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. To some, the West's performance in the Cold War will suggest an inflexible diplomacy toward the Soviet Union, but to others, the record will imply a too cynical readiness to accept totalitarianism as long as terrain vital to Western geopolitical interests was not violated. The real issue therefore is whether the West struck a proper balance between firmness and flexibility, not whether it was too unresponsive to the Kremlin.

In the final analysis, it is not the West's behavior that stands criticism, but that of the Soviet Union. It was the USSR that started the Cold War and then fueled it for 40 years, thereby inflicting great damage on a European continent already devastated by two brutal world wars. Stalin committed the colossal mistake of showing gross disrespect for legitimate Western interests, and Khrushchev did little to rectify matters. By the late 1960s fear of nuclear war seemed to be edging the two sides closer to a diplomatic settlement, but then the USSR committed a second colossal blunder by launching its threatening military buildup and misbehaving in areas outside Europe. In both cases, Western governments responded firmly, but their actions were driven by defensive motives, and were aimed at striking the proper policy balance needed to manage a difficult situation. Both times, the Soviet Union rejected opportunities for a genuine settlement that acknowledged Western interests. By provoking and then prolonging the Cold War, Soviet communism cut itself off from the economic miracle occurring in the West, and thereby sealed its own destruction. Its fate was harsh, but not unearned.

In summary, the Cold War's climactic outcome has finally put to rest the long-simmering debate about whether the West should have ended the conflict far earlier by accommodating the USSR's self-serving agenda in Europe. Rejecting the temptation to settle on these terms, the alliance never wavered from the
belief that communism was an illegitimate value system, and that further Soviet expansion was unacceptable. Perhaps the West at times was too inflexible, but had it embraced accommodationist solutions, communism might still be a dominant force in Europe. The events of 1989–1991 showed that containment and deterrence, for all their flaws, were wise policies. By sticking to its democratic values and erecting a defense alliance, the West gained a great victory for democracy that perhaps can be parlayed into enduring peace in Europe. Regardless of what the future holds, NATO's successful waging of the Cold War will go down in history as a remarkable achievement. Its memory will be with us a long time: A century from now, it will linger still.
Bringing this book to a close, the final two chapters examine the future of NATO and Europe. The shattering events of 1990–1991 swept away the communist threat that for 40 years had been an important rationale for NATO’s existence. To the outside observer, these events might have seemed enough to bring about NATO’s demise as well. Because NATO proved to be erected on stronger foundations than the communist threat, however, it emerged from the episode intact and with an internal consensus on new missions for the future. Even so, both NATO and Europe found themselves facing worrisome uncertainties about the new era. This chapter examines the efforts to reform NATO that were carried out in 1989–1991 amidst rising optimism about Europe’s future. It then discusses the mounting pessimism that swept over the continent during early 1992 and the implications for NATO’s role in post-Cold War European security affairs. Chapter 25 analyzes how the United States can best handle the challenges and opportunities ahead.

INITIAL DEBATE OVER NATO’S FUTURE: 1989–1990

The process by which NATO started redefining itself began in May 1989, when President Bush’s first alliance summit took place on NATO’s 40th birthday. With the East European upheaval still several months away, the alliance was focused on how arms control negotiations should be approached, and how NATO’s forces were to be adjusted in response to the fading Soviet military threat. The meeting was dominated by nuclear issues, pitting West Germany against the United States and Britain. With the INF Treaty now being implemented and CFE negotiations showing signs of agreement in the near future, Kohl’s government favored deep reductions in NATO’s remaining short-range nuclear missiles in Europe. Fearing that Bonn might be driven by domestic pressures to endorse a complete elimination of these missiles, Washington and London wanted Kohl’s agreement to modernize NATO’s short-range Lance missiles.

The meeting was a tense affair, but ended with a compromise that left both sides satisfied. The complex agreement began with an accord to pursue accelerated CFE talks that hopefully would produce a treaty by 1990 and completed
drawdowns by 1993. With the Warsaw Pact conventional threat cut by 50% and
NATO thereby left better able to defend itself, negotiations would then begin on
reducing short-range nuclear missiles in Europe. These negotiations, however,
were to address only deep reductions, and not a “third zero” that would leave
NATO completely bereft of nuclear weapons on the continent. The issue of
what nuclear weapons would remain was left unsettled, but the presumption
was that NATO’s posture would need to be sufficiently powerful to perform the
dererence and defense missions of the mid-1990s. As a signal of their intent,
NATO’s leaders agreed that the United States would immediately begin develop-
ing a Follow-on to Lance (FOTL) missile. A deployment decision on FOTL,
however, was to be delayed until 1992: after the next scheduled German elec-
tions but before nuclear negotiations would commence.¹

As a result, the United States and Britain got what they wanted, including an
acceptable negotiating agenda along with reassurances of a continuing NATO
nuclear posture. Kohl also came away happy, having gained alliancwide
commitment to deep cuts of nuclear systems that could be used on German
territory along with relief from making any controversial modernization deci-
sion anytime soon. At a deeper political level, the accord marked an important
breakthrough that boded well for NATO’s future unity. Representing NATO’s
first attempt to address the emerging challenges of the post-Cold War era, it
suggested that the alliance partners were prepared to continue practicing the
coalition diplomacy that had worked so well over the past four decades.

Coalition diplomacy was put to a far more severe test over the coming year,
during which East European communism and the Warsaw Pact collapsed. As
this event unfolded, powerful arguments were marshaled against NATO’s con-
tinued existence as a collective defense alliance. A leading voice calling for
NATO’s dismemberment was the Soviet Union, but by this time, the USSR’s
bargaining leverage was fading so rapidly that Western diplomats were ready to
dismiss the Kremlin’s demands with a casual shrug. Less easily dismissed were
mounting calls from within the West itself—including elite opinion in some
quarters—for a weakened if not dismantled alliance.²

One argument for eliminating NATO asserted that the alliance was no longer
needed now that the threat of Warsaw Pact attack was fading. Citing the high
political and budgetary costs of collective defense planning, proponents of this
view were prepared to retain NATO as a loose political alliance, but wanted to
abolish its integrated command and large military forces. Their vision was for
the kind of alliance that existed in 1949, before NATO’s militarization took
place. A second argument was that NATO’s continued existence as a military
alliance would be destabilizing by posing a potential threat to the USSR from
across the neutral East European buffer zone that would divide the two sides.
This argument called for NATO to be replaced by a beefed-up CSCE that
presumably would offer adequate assurances to the USSR and NATO’s members.

²For additional analysis, see Richard L. Kugler, NATO’s Future Role in Europe: Toward a More
Political Alliance in a Stable “1.5 Bloc” System, RAND, R-3923-FF, May 1990.
A third argument acknowledged that Western Europe needed tangible security guarantees, but called for the transatlantic connection to be severed. It called for the West Europeans to form a security pillar of their own under the WEU/EC flag, thereby allowing the United States to withdraw from military involvement in Europe.

Although these arguments were based on differing assessments of Europe’s security requirements, they reached similarly negative conclusions about NATO’s future. As a result, they possessed the surface appeal that made them hard to dismiss short of careful argumentation. Their effect was to cast NATO into a searching debate about its raison d’être that lasted from 1989 to mid-1990. Despite the arguments of those who hoped for something different, the outcome was not the alliance’s demise. Rather, NATO emerged with a new rationale for the post-Cold War era, one that called for important internal changes but nonetheless carried forth an integrated military command.

Of the complex reasons that lay behind the emerging consensus to retain NATO, a simple but profound one was the goal of continuing to build the transatlantic community. When NATO had started out, it was commonly regarded as a military bloc for containing communism, but as time passed, it acquired a larger purpose. In powerful ways, it tied the United States to Europe and brought together the West European nations in a forum of mutual cooperation. As a result, NATO helped put an end to two principal causes of instability during the early 20th century: American isolationism and fractious West European nationalism. As time passed by, moreover, NATO provided the security framework that allowed formation of the European Community and a prosperous transatlantic economic relationship. By the late 1980s, the result was a Western community united by common values, visions, and expectations. In no small way, this positive development was owed to NATO’s existence.

Critics argued that the roots of community had now been planted deeply enough to permit NATO’s removal, but alliance governments felt otherwise. Wariness about any wholesale renationalization of defense planning figured prominently in this calculus. A core reason was fear that, absent a close military partnership, otherwise manageable political and economic disagreements might grow and become destructive. This concern applied to U.S.-West European relations, but it also applied to relations among the West European nations. As a practical matter, NATO’s national economies had become so entangled that the members could not afford the risk of parting company on security policy. Because of their growing commercial ties over the past four decades, they were now dependent on each other’s prosperity and good will, and vulnerable to each other’s downturns and malevolent actions. The goal of maintaining a healthy economic community—within Western Europe and across the Atlantic—made continued security cooperation all the more essential, even in the absence of an external threat.

Another reason for maintaining NATO was that alliance members were far from convinced that Europe’s security problems had permanently gone away, and they were unenthused about relying on the CSCE and EC in the absence of NATO. The old bipolar standoff at the inter-German border was fast disappear-
ing, but this change alone did not mean that stability would come in its wake. During 1989–1990, the Soviet Union still existed under communist rule, and it seemed likely to remain a formidable power even after being pushed behind its borders. If the USSR chose to return to an expansionist foreign policy, it could still pose a serious military threat to its neighbors. Moreover, a more multipolar order seemed to lie ahead, and throughout history, multipolar systems were shown to have unstable fault lines of their own. For these reasons, Western governments felt that NATO should be retained to preserve a military balance of power in Europe and thereby encourage stable political relations.

To NATO, an essential feature of a balance of power was credible military guarantees that reassured all alliance members of their security in the years ahead. Chief among those nations needing assurance was Germany, which would remain exposed to Soviet military power even after Soviet troops had withdrawn. Lacking nuclear weapons, Germany still required extended deterrence coverage from the United States; lacking a large army, it alone could not defend its borders against major nonnuclear aggression, including the possibility of a quick Soviet thrust across Poland. If the United States and NATO no longer provided these assurances, Germany could be left with no choice but to pursue an independent course. Because no nation—including Germany—wanted German militarization, NATO had little choice but to remain in existence.

Furthermore, NATO had little alternative but to retain a balanced military strategy and force posture, even at a burdensome cost to its members. The receding of the Warsaw Pact threat meant that NATO could relax its defenses and reduce its budgetary expenses, but it still needed nuclear and conventional forces to meet the requirements ahead. Figuring into this calculus was not only Central Europe, but also the stressful Southern Region, and the always-turbulent Middle East and Persian Gulf. The exact size of NATO's future military requirements was uncertain, but one thing seemed clear: In the complex era ahead, NATO could not afford to increase its reliance on nuclear weapons. The situation called for NATO to raise the nuclear threshold as high as possible, and this called for a flexible military strategy and sufficient conventional forces for confidence in all foreseeable contingencies.

Faced with these requirements, the West Europeans had no desire to truncate NATO in ways that would lead the United States to depart Europe. Nor did the United States want to leave, and it continued to regard NATO as an effective mechanism for achieving its goals and carrying out its commitments. For these reasons, the alliance's members came to the conclusion that NATO should be retained as a collective defense organization even though the Cold War was ending. True, the costs of an entangling alliance promised to remain high, but so did the continuing benefits. The issue facing alliance members therefore was not whether to dismantle NATO. Instead, it was one of determining how NATO should be altered to meet the demands of the post-Cold War era.

NATO provided its initial answer to this burning issue at the London Summit in mid-1990. In their “London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance” issued on July 6, NATO’s leaders acknowledged that the USSR was no longer an adversary, but they also made clear their belief that the alliance had a constructive role to play in the era ahead. Arguing that the future was uncertain, they declared that NATO would continue to provide military protection of member borders, but NATO also would expand its mission to promote security and stability across Europe. To this end, the London Declaration called on NATO to undergo a major transformation by becoming a more political alliance with an increasingly activist diplomacy toward the east.

Accompanying this bold diplomatic charter came guidelines on how NATO’s defense policy would also change. Proclaiming that NATO would remain a defensive alliance, the London Declaration asserted that, consistent with arms control agreements and enduring requirements, NATO’s nuclear and conventional forces would be reduced to the lowest and most stable levels possible. Further, the London Declaration called on NATO promptly to develop a new military strategy reflecting the changed environment in Europe. A key feature of the new strategy was to be revision of flexible response. While NATO intended to preserve the option to escalate if necessary, the new strategy was to make nuclear forces “truly weapons of last resort.” Additionally, the new strategy was to replace “forward defense” with “forward presence.” By this was meant a conventional posture less primed to wage war at a moment’s notice, but still capable of responding to the threats and challenges ahead.

The London Declaration spelled out additional features of NATO’s new defense posture. It asserted that NATO would field smaller and restructured active forces that would be highly versatile in order to provide maximum flexibility in responding to crises. These forces were to rely heavily on multinational corps made up of units from two or more nations; also, their previous high tempo of exercises and peacetime operations was to drop to a lower and less provocative level. Backing up these forces was to be a capacity to build up larger reserve forces “if and when they might be needed.” The combination of smaller multinational forces and still-large reserves was intended to provide a proper mix that would provide a menu of options for responding in a calibrated manner.

Although the London Declaration laid down new strategy concepts, many details were left unsettled, and over the following months, NATO’s staffs began sketching in these details. One important development was the extent to which the multinational formation idea was to be applied across virtually NATO’s entire active posture in Central Europe. By Fall 1990, SHAPE Headquarters was announcing that a “Rapid Reaction Corps” would be formed, composed of forces drawn from several allied nations and led by a British commander. Additionally, five or six other multinational corps were to be created, normally

---

made up of two divisions from one nation and one division from another. By design, the effect was to firmly embed Germany’s forces in NATO formations but also to commit other nations in ways that guaranteed a coalition response if Germany was attacked. Moreover, nearly all the Central Region powers were given command of at least one multinational corps, thus providing them an important incentive to maintain a sizable military contribution to NATO. Significantly, the United States was given command of a corps, thus creating a rationale for a large American military presence in Europe.4

Along with this shift in force structure came growing indications of changes in NATO’s employment doctrine. In particular, the era of linear defense at the old inter-German border was destined to end after Soviet forces had departed by 1995. NATO unveiled no formal doctrine, but the situation seemingly called for a more flexible mobile defense conducted eastward in defense of unified Germany’s new eastern borders.5 As official pronouncements suggested, defense of Turkey also began gaining added importance in response to perceived threats from the USSR and radical Arab powers to the south. The need to shore up Turkey’s defenses demanded from NATO an improved capacity to shift forces from Central Europe to the south.

Indeed, NATO’s entire Southern Region seemed likely to rise in importance. Whereas NATO’s defense plans there had focused on rebuffing Soviet efforts to seize the Mediterranean, the new threat seemed likely to emanate from North Africa and the Middle East. In the years ahead, many experts felt, anti-Western Libya, Syria, Iraq, and other nations seemed capable of acquiring the aircraft and missiles needed to attack Western shipping and even to bombard NATO nations nearby. Deterrence and defense against this threat required, at a minimum, improved NATO air defenses along the southern littoral.

An important issue left unresolved was whether NATO should prepare to conduct “out of area” military operations in locations well beyond its borders. In past years, NATO’s plans had focused on direct physical threats to member borders; the mandate to respond to these threats stemmed from the collective defense provisions of Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty. For meeting situations in remote areas, NATO traditionally had relied on individual members to cooperate together in ad hoc fashion under the looser and more permissive Article 4. This practice had an uneven history, but the narrow bonds of coalition partnership placed formal commitments beyond the scope of alliance consensual politics. For the most part, NATO’s members preferred to retain this informal approach, but with threats to NATO’s distant interests likely to grow, the feasibility of continuing to rely on ad hoc actions seemed uncertain.

Any thought that NATO could ignore out-of-area operations was given a rude shock in August 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait. Within days, the United States was assembling a coalition response and calling on the West European nations


to participate. Britain, France, and Italy sent forces to the Persian Gulf. Germany demurred, but NATO acted as an institution to send forces (including some German air units) to help protect Turkey. Also important, the West European nations made their bases and infrastructure available to aid the massive deployment of U.S. forces to the Persian Gulf. This support was instrumental in the successful effort to promptly build a defense posture that discouraged a follow-on Iraqi advance into Saudi Arabia.

The crisis ended favorably in early 1991, when coalition forces mounted a massive air campaign against Iraq and then roared to victory with a lightning ground assault that out-flanked Iraq’s already-battered army. The Desert Storm victory was a direct by-product of the efforts NATO had made over the past years to prepare for conventional war in Central Europe. Because of this experience, NATO’s nations had learned how to conduct combined operations and wage coalition war. Moreover, the weapons, tactics, and doctrines developed in Central Europe proved highly applicable to mobile desert war in the Persian Gulf. Drawing on their experience in Central Europe, U.S. and allied air forces quickly suppressed Iraqi air defenses and then employed precision weapons to inflict major damage not only on Iraq’s industrial infrastructure, but also on Iraqi army forces, command systems, and logistic support. The Desert Storm ground campaign then drew on NATO doctrine by employing a combination of firepower, operational maneuver, shock action, and deception to unravel Iraq’s seemingly powerful echeloned ground defense. In the absence of the NATO experience, the victory would not have been so total and achieved at so little cost.

Notwithstanding the positive outcome, the experience called attention to the West’s growing need to prepare for operations like Desert Shield/Storm in the future. In this crisis, the coalition partners had the benefit of time: nearly six months to build their forces. Moreover, they faced an incompetent opponent in Saddam Hussein, who made nearly every military mistake in the books. Future crises in the Middle East/Persian Gulf, many felt, might not be so accommodating. The critical issue was whether the West could afford an informal ad hoc approach that allowed only for a clumsy and slowly mounted response in the early stages of any “out-of-area” crisis.

After the Persian Gulf crisis had settled down and Western troops began withdrawing, the alliance returned to carrying out the London Summit mandate to design an updated military strategy. The effort was conducted over a period of months that saw new and threatening problems appear on the scene. Yugoslavia crumbled into bitter civil war, democracy got off to a shaky start elsewhere in Eastern Europe, violence erupted in the USSR, and the United States and France fell into a quarrel over West European defense efforts outside NATO. Most important, the chilling coup d’état occurred in Moscow: an event which ended happily but served as a reminder that democracy was not yet

---

firmly implanted there. Together, these developments illustrated that Europe had not yet left behind its security troubles.

NATO's planning efforts came to a conclusion in November 1991, when alliance leaders met at Rome for another summit. There, NATO's leaders adopted a new strategic concept to replace MC 14/3.7 The new concept largely blessed the ideas articulated in London. It did, however, lay greater stress on crisis management, a departure whose importance was underscored by continuing troubles with Saddam Hussein and by the bloody mess in Yugoslavia. Additionally, NATO's leaders endorsed a major drawdown, but not complete elimination, of NATO's tactical nuclear inventory in Europe. This step reflected President Bush's announcement in August of major steps to reduce U.S. nuclear readiness and force levels, an effort that was intended to encourage Russia and its Commonwealth partners to follow suit.

The Rome Summit also endorsed a recent decision by Germany and France to form a joint corps of their own that could operate either under WEU/EC or NATO auspices. This decision was important because it reflected emerging efforts to harmonize plans for NATO and the WEU/EC. With growing interest since the late 1980s, the EC had been pursuing the goal of eventual political union and security collaboration. During 1991, its commitment to this goal had grown stronger in response to the turmoil in Eastern Europe and the desire to firmly tie Germany to the West. The Franco/German decision to expand the joint brigade to a corps-sized unit was intended to add momentum to the goal of creating a European defense identity. Lurking in the shadows were longer-range thoughts about creating military and diplomatic staffs for coordinating security plans across the entire WEU/EC, an idea that had briefly appeared in the 1950s and now was being resurrected.

The West European nations stated that their goal was not to replace NATO with a WEU/EC defense alliance, but rather to fashion a partnership with NATO on behalf of stability in Europe. Precisely how this partnership was to be achieved was left undefined, and some observers voiced concern that the effort would weaken the alliance. NATO military authorities especially wondered how combined planning was to be achieved with forces responding to two different command structures. The United States felt nervous about any future WEU/EC capacity to respond to crises in ways that could trigger NATO's involvement and thereby affect American interests. Weighing against the idea of truly independent WEU/EC ambitions were equally powerful concerns among American and West European diplomats not to provoke a U.S. withdrawal from Europe. Concluding that a balanced relationship should be developed, the United States and the West European nations endorsed the idea of carefully preparing a WEU/EC pillar that would complement NATO, not undercut it. Meeting at Maastricht a few weeks later, EC and WEU members reaffirmed the Rome Agreement about the European defense identity and its close relationship with NATO. The Maastricht Accord charted a path to economic and monetary

---

union, but suggested that political union, including joint security planning, would be built more slowly.

An important issue addressed at Rome was the future U.S. military presence in Europe. President Bush forcefully asked the West Europeans to make clear their wishes regarding the U.S. presence. The Germans indicated their desire for a more influential role in NATO, and France’s Mitterand expressed skepticism about whether U.S. forces would remain for long. All allied nations, nonetheless, were firm in their desire for large U.S. forces to remain, and for continued American leadership of the alliance. In response, Bush reaffirmed a U.S. plan, unveiled some weeks before, to keep 150,000 troops in Europe, including an Army Corps and three Air Force fighter wings. The allies welcomed this plan. Whether this plan would survive budget cuts and congressional scrutiny seemed uncertain, but the prevailing judgment was that a sizable U.S. presence would remain, and that U.S. reinforcements would still be available in event of a crisis.

The Rome Summit also marked the adoption of U.S. and allied force plans for the future. In general, NATO’s nations announced plans to reduce their conventional forces by about 25%, and to transfer additional units to less ready (and less expensive) reserve status. Having adopted a “regional strategy” to guide its worldwide defense policy, the United States set forth a plan to maintain an active “Base Force” of 12 Army divisions, 3 Marine divisions, 15 Air Force fighter wings, 12 carrier battle groups, and 450 naval combatants. Backing up these units were to be reserves of 6 Army divisions, 1 Marine division, and 11 air wings. Whereas the United States had planned to be capable of waging a global conflict during the Cold War, the Base Force was designed to support a less-ambitious concept of fighting two concurrent regional contingencies. Most observers concluded that the Defense Department was focused on possible wars in the Persian Gulf and Korea, but press accounts revealed the intent to remain capable of waging a major regional war in Europe.6

West European plans were less clear, but the available data suggested that the Central European allies planned to retain a total of about 9 active divisions, 19 reserve divisions, 1,725 combat aircraft, and 100 naval combatants. Although sizable active air and naval forces were retained, this plan amounted to a major shift toward ground reserves; during the Cold War, the force mix had been 27 active and 7 reserve divisions. The greatest downshift came in the German Army, which planned to reduce from 12 active divisions to the equivalent of only 2–3 divisions. British ground forces were also cut significantly, but the reductions were less severe for France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Denmark.9

---


The effect was to leave NATO's posture in Central Europe with still-large air defense forces, but only about 11 active ground divisions (counting U.S. and French units): down from 32 divisions in the Cold War. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the withdrawal of the Soviet Army, however, made this small posture a safe bet in the eyes of NATO officials. The alliance would still retain enough forces to conduct military training, and to respond to situations likely to arise on short notice: terrorism, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and limited applications of force for political effect. In the improbable event of a major war, sufficient warning time was deemed available to mobilize 30 active and reserve divisions, and this posture could be increased to 40 divisions and 2500 combat aircraft with the arrival of reinforcements from the United States. Judged by traditional standards, this mobilizable posture seemed large enough to give NATO confident defenses in Central Europe, and a similar situation prevailed in the Northern and Southern Regions.

Provided Western parliaments refrained from further major reductions, NATO's military prospects for the post-Cold War era thus looked reasonably good. The Rome Summit, however, was marked by misgivings over whether already-shaky parliamentary support would hold now that the Soviet Union was disappearing and the vaunted Red Army was headed for tough times. The Summit mood was especially apprehensive because both the American and West European economies were headed toward recession, and further defense cuts offered a way to solve growing budgetary problems. In the United States, the Congress already was chipping away at the Bush administration's military budget, and similar reactions were expected across Western Europe as well. Prospects therefore seemed to hinge on whether Western parliaments, no longer confronted by readily fingered military adversaries, would be willing to maintain still-large forces as a safeguard against a future downturn whose origins and nature were unpredictable.

The Rome Summit proposed no new thoughts for dealing with the Middle East and Persian Gulf, but the participants did unveil an important strategy departure for dealing with Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the former Soviet Union. Increasingly, they declared, NATO would become militarily involved in these regions. The purpose, they said, was not to extend NATO's security umbrella, but instead to encourage stability and partnership with the nations to the east, including Russia and the Commonwealth. The Rome Declaration announced creation of a North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), to which East European nations and the Commonwealth partners would be invited for the purpose of promoting a joint dialogue. Apart from implying that NATO's involvement would begin modestly and grow slowly in such areas as military assistance and doctrinal discussions, the Rome Declaration left unclear exactly what were to be NATO's long-term aspirations. But the geographic direction NATO was to travel was unambiguous. Albeit uncertainly and with some misgivings, NATO was pointed outward, to a destiny that only time would reveal.
DOWNTURN IN 1992

Because of satisfaction over the Gulf victory, the downfall of the Soviet Union, and the Rome Summit, the year 1991 ended on a note of considerable optimism for the future. The early months of 1992, however, saw a sharp downturn that dissipated this optimism and left behind mounting concern about both NATO and Europe. One cause for worry was that NATO began developing internal fissures and the EC encountered obstacles on the road to carrying out the Maastricht Treaty. A more serious development came from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, where signs of rapidly deepening chaos were apparent. Together, the combination of eroding alliance unity and growing eastern instability raised the prospect that, if events deteriorate too far, Europe's future might be less rosy than was commonly assumed in late 1991. In important but subtle ways, these developments also illuminated the need to fulfill the Rome Summit's vision of keeping NATO alive as a vibrant institution capable of contributing to enduring peace in Europe.

The most visible manifestation of NATO's internal troubles was a series of nasty spats between the United States and France. In mid-1991, the two nations had quarreled publicly over whether the new Rapid Reaction Corps would operate under NATO (favored by Washington) or the European Community (endorsed by Paris). The United States won the debate, and France responded by advocating that the new Franco-German corps operate outside the NATO integrated command. Germany restrained France and won agreement that the corps would be available for both WEU and NATO use, but the preferences of the French government were apparent to Washington.10

Angry at Paris, the United States in September refused to support a Mitterand initiative to hold a conference of Western nuclear powers to develop policies for ensuring control of the Kremlin's nuclear arsenal. At the Rome Summit, Mitterand retaliated not only by questioning whether U.S. forces would remain in Europe, but also by refusing to sign a U.S.-sponsored joint declaration in favor of open trade and free markets. Following the Soviet Union's collapse, France criticized the United States for failing to offer enough economic aid to the fledgling Commonwealth. When Washington responded by calling a conference aimed at coordinating Western aid policies, Paris accused the Bush administration of trying to steal the initiative away from Western Europe, and then criticized Bush for a sluggish response to the Yugoslavia civil war. Washington shot back by denouncing the French government for stalling the GATT negotiations.11

By spring 1992, Paris was accusing Washington of an arrogant and patronizing attitude aimed at perpetuating its dominance in Europe. Paris also complained about Washington's allegedly peremptory and unilateralist handling of relations with Russia and the Commonwealth. In response, Washington was


accusing France of trying to undermine NATO, drive the United States out of Europe, and create rival trading blocs. Rubbing salt in the wound, U.S. officials charged that French diplomacy was being driven by Mitterand’s shaky internal position and by France’s inability to find a prestigious role in the new European security order.

The dispute took on added intensity when West European powers announced further steps toward greater military independence. In addition to formalizing plans for the controversial Franco-German corps, the WEU announced that it intended to create a separate, larger defense force that would include this corps plus units from Britain, the Netherlands, and other nations. The British and German governments took pains to emphasize that this step was intended to complement NATO, not weaken it, and was not meant to drive the United States out of Europe. The French government voiced rhetorical support for this stance, but its tone implied a different and less accommodating agenda. Alarmed by French insinuations, senior U.S. officials protested strongly and called attention to France’s allegedly destructive and self-serving agenda. Further contributing to the standoff was the failure of the GATT negotiations to achieve agreement on reducing protectionist barriers in time for the G-7 Summit in July. Although France was far from the only cause, U.S. officials stressed France’s long-standing efforts to insulate its agricultural sector from the world market. In this poisonous atmosphere, by mid-1992 talk was surfacing in both capitals that the two nations were headed toward open rivalry.12

The alliance’s problems, however, ran deeper than tensions between these chronic squabblers. Although West European governments continued to voice rhetorical support for NATO in early 1992, they also showed signs of turning inward in self-absorption with the great drama unfolding in the EC. With the EC’s future now Western Europe’s chief concern, policy toward the United States and NATO began taking a back seat. Although this stance was a natural byproduct of preoccupation with the tumultuous debates that accompanied the Maastricht Treaty, it also reflected a deep-seated and growing ambivalence toward the United States and NATO that emerged in the months following the Rome Summit.

This ambivalence was a product of several factors playing upon each other. With the collapse of the Soviet Union greatly decreasing Western Europe’s security dependence on the United States, progress toward EC integration created the alluring prospect that Western Europe might soon be able to act with far greater self-identity, assertiveness, and power. Accompanying this sense of impending liberation came, for some, release of long pent-up frustrations over their subordinate status to the United States. This emotional reaction, in turn, was accentuated by Washington’s obvious hesitancy to assert itself on emerging European issues (e.g., Yugoslavia), thereby suggesting that the United States was turning inward and detaching itself from involvement in Europe’s affairs. Added on top came awareness, amplified by stalled GATT negotiations and the

---

unproductive G-7 summit in Munich, that economic relations seemed to be moving toward outright competition between rival trading blocs.

The result was to create sharp divisions within Western Europe on handling future relations with the United States. One faction, led by the British, the Dutch, and conservative Germans, still argued in favor of preserving a strong relationship anchored on mutually beneficial security and economic ties. At the other extreme was a faction led by the French, Belgians, Italians, and other Europeans whose desire for a preeminent European identity translated into an arms-length relationship toward NATO and a marginalized U.S. role in Europe. In the middle were a large number torn between these competing instincts and waiting for the United States to show its colors.

With Britain anchored in the American camp and France most intent on a diminished U.S. role, the balance of power rested in the hands of the German government, which seemed uncertain of its priorities. At his Camp David meeting with President Bush, Kohl spoke warmly about U.S.-German relations and stressed NATO's importance, but at the same time, his government was pursuing close relations with France and fast progress by the EC. German policy thus had become all things to all men. Within that nation, the SPD and the FDP were expressing sentiments more neutralist than Kohl's CDU, and domestic opinion was moving away from continued dependence on the United States. With the Foreign Ministry devoted to EC causes, the Ministry of Defense remained Washington's principal ally in Bonn, but with military affairs diminishing in importance, its own influence was shrinking.

Elsewhere in Europe, the principal supporters of EC integration were the same individuals who were least enthused about maintaining close ties to the United States. With the tide moving steadily in favor of the EC, the proponents of diminished partnership with the United States began gaining the upper hand. Washington, moreover, found itself in the unenviable position of having its efforts to preserve a satisfactory role in Europe often portrayed as a sinister effort to derail the EC and leave an internally divided Europe dependent on the United States. Regardless of their distortions and exaggerations, these charges further eroded the American position in Europe.

Weighing against any total rejection of the United States and NATO was recognition that American power plays an essential stabilizing role in Europe, and that without its presence, Europe might fall victim to post-Cold War upheavals. Nonetheless, some argued, this stabilizing role could be performed by an influential U.S. presence and by an alliance retired to the backwater role of only providing insurance against unlikely military threats. In this vision, Europe's daily security problems, including preparations for the limited wars most likely to be fought, would be handled by France, Germany, and the WEU/EC. The United States and NATO would be confined to the status of a military gorilla, one to be kept caged in normal times, and let out only when extreme danger stalks.

This attitude by no means characterized all West European thinking, but sober foreign policy calculations failed to offset the strong emotions at work. Because the EC was offering a palliative that grew stronger daily, many West Eu-
uropeans were discounting the risk of any plunge into darker historical times. For them, the impulse to flex their muscles by demonstrating independence from the United States and NATO dominated other motives, and their siren call was being heard. Like a giant iceberg moving slowly but with powerful momentum, Western Europe began drifting away from the United States.

This development may have unnerved many Americans who cared about NATO, but a vocal minority were eager to offer good riddance. To them, anger about mounting economic competition and unfair West European burden-sharing practices mattered far more than fear of losing a still-valuable alliance. Further contributing to this view was lingering disgruntlement over an allegedly weak allied role in the Persian Gulf War. Also contributing was annoyance at French schemes for leaving the United States responsible for bailing out Western Europe in a big war but unable to influence the peacetime policies and crisis actions that might bring about this war. For these critics, their preferred solution was disengagement from Europe and adoption of an isolationist "America-first" policy. As was the case in Europe, raw emotions, not cool logic, were driving the calculus, but in human affairs, emotions often count more than logic. As a result, the deterioration in alliance cohesion was being caused by forces well beyond Europe's drift away from the United States. To a degree, the United States was drifting away from Europe.13

Any attempt to forecast how far and how fast the alliance might decay, if events are not controlled, is rendered uncertain by factors too complex to be cited here. What can be said is that the centrifugal trends now under way are being driven not only by deep emotions, but also by cold calculations and powerful political-economic forces not easily reversed. These trends are now eating at NATO's unity, but as long as NATO remains a viable institution, it helps serve as a bulwark against these trends inflicting far greater damage than need be the case. In the absence of NATO and its integrative functions, the drift toward transatlantic tension almost certainly would be far faster and greater than otherwise will be the case.

Because degree matters, any complete collapse of the alliance is far from inevitable. Both Western Europe and the United States continue to have important incentives to collaborate, and their Cold War experience has taught them the valuable lesson that partnership, for all its sacrifices, can bring huge rewards. For these reasons, the principal risk for the years immediately ahead is not that NATO will be abolished, but that it might steadily lose its effectiveness as a result of mounting transatlantic frictions. Even this downside is far from preordained, and the experiences of 1989–1991 suggest that NATO's members are capable of redefining the alliance to meet changing circumstances. What matters is the willingness of NATO's nations to confront their problems and fashion solutions based on the principles of mutual respect and compromise. As in years past, NATO's members will get out of their alliance exactly what they are willing to put into it.

If NATO's prospects were left uncertain by the events of early 1992, the EC's march to ever-growing unity and power was also slowed. Shortly after the Maastricht Treaty was adopted by EC leaders, it was sent down the path of gaining ratification from national parliaments or public elections. Stunningly, Danish voters rejected the Treaty by a narrow margin, thereby causing many nations to reexamine popular support for the idea of EC unity. Mitterand shortly thereafter decided that the Treaty would have to be subjected to a national vote rather than be ratified by parliament. The British government wavered between the ballot box and parliamentary ratification, but parliament itself was no sure bet. Even with Prime Minister Major offering greater support for a confederal EC than did Thatcher, Great Britain still remained lukewarm to the idea of losing its sovereignty, its hallowed traditions, and the pound to an allegedly sterile and self-serving European bureaucracy in Brussels.

The German government decided to seek parliamentary ratification, but even in Bonn, where pro-EC sentiment traditionally had been strong, doubts began to surface. Whereas Britain's reservations were based partly on sentiment, Germany's hesitancies were anchored on teutonic practicality. With the European economy struggling to shake off recession and inflation, the idea of abandoning the strong Deutschmark to a less stable European currency began looking like a dubious proposition to flint-eyed German bankers. Another concern was whether rapid progress toward EC integration would allow Germany to complete the costly task of rebuilding the eastern states. Still a third concern was whether the act of tying down Germany in the EC would allow Bonn to play the more assertive and independent role deemed necessary by the precarious situation in Eastern Europe.

Emerging differences with France also led to stock-taking in Bonn. Whereas France wanted a European Community led by the EC executive bureaucracy, Germany preferred a more federal structure anchored on parliamentary authority. Whereas France wanted to deepen the EC before enlarging by admitting new members, Germany wanted to deepen and enlarge at the same time. Whereas France wanted policies that fostered economic growth and preserved agricultural subsidies, Germany wanted to prevent inflation and reduce protectionism. Whereas France wanted to delay recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, Germany wanted prompt recognition, and did so on its own, ignoring French complaints. Underlying these policy disputes were unstated but profound differences over fundamental EC visions. France originally saw the EC as a vehicle for enhancing its own influence and tightly bonding Germany to Western Europe. Germany welcomed community-building, but ever since unification, Bonn's actions were making clear that the EC would be dominated by Germany, and France might be relegated to the role of junior partner.

With Bonn developing reservations, and splits emerging between France and Germany, other EC members began voicing doubts about how far integration should be pushed, and how fast. Stiff debates arose over internal EC policy, but an equal imperceptible was the thorny matter of new membership. A consensus had emerged on admitting the wealthy nations of Switzerland, Austria, Finland, and Sweden in the coming years, but there was as yet no consensus on
when such poor nations as Poland and Hungary should be welcomed into the fold. Poor partners threatened to skew EC economic priorities, and even short of their admission, the act of creating a larger community of prosperous members promised to make more difficult the task of forming strong community institutions. Yet, the prospect of a small community focused on itself hardly seemed to square with the idea of building a unified Europe, much less an enduring transatlantic alliance.

It remains to be seen how these forces will play out. Over the years, the EC has encountered periodic troubles, but it always has recovered and moved forward, often in a halting fashion but with relentless energy. In time, the current barriers to deepening and enlargement might be overcome. The sacrifice of one of these goals, however, might be temporarily unavoidable. In this event, enlargement probably will be embraced at the expense of deepening, thus producing a broader but more diffuse community. Economic and monetary union might be achieved, but member nations would be left free to pursue their own foreign policies, and cooperation in security affairs and military planning probably would not develop very far. In the extreme case, this type of community might revert to being little more than a glorified customs union, thereby leaving Germany, Britain, and France to play their more traditional security roles in a multipolar setting not unlike that of the late 1800s.

NATO's future cohesion enters the equation here, and in ways that are contradictory to surface impressions. A cursory analysis of Western Europe's dynamics suggests that a dismantling of NATO would propel the EC members further and faster down the road to creating their own security pillar. Closer inspection, however, reveals a more complex calculus. The West European nations were able to build the EC because the already-existing NATO alliance provided them a stable security foundation. Their current piecemeal efforts to beef up the WEU are anchored on the assumption that NATO will continue providing this foundation, thereby rendering unnecessary any bell-mell and major expansion of the WEU that might overload Western Europe's political circuits.

If NATO and U.S. military power were suddenly to be removed in today's environment, the West Europeans might find the resulting barriers to security collaboration had become far bigger than now, and too big for a large number of small nations to overcome on their own. In particular, they might be hard pressed to establish satisfactory nuclear deterrence mechanisms, conventional force levels, and integrated command arrangements. In this event, their efforts to quickly erect a security pillar might fail, and possibly in ways that could seriously damage further prospects for EC political and economic unity. To the extent this is the case, prospects for continued West European integration in the foreseeable future might well depend upon whether NATO remains intact.

The problems faced by NATO and the EC as of mid-1992 paled by comparison with those confronting the East European nations. Poland found itself with a fledgling democratic government hampered by political gridlock created by a multiplicity of parties all lacking governing strength. Meanwhile, Poland's economy continued plummeting in free-fall collapse, victimized by a lack of
productive assets and by radical reforms that thus far had failed to trigger capitalist renewal. Czechoslovakia found its very existence about to end, brought about by irreconcilable conflicts between the Czech and Slovak regions. Of the northern tier nations, only Hungary was well-off in political and economic terms, but privatization of its economy had only begun. Across the entire region, the ability of democracy to take hold by no means was assured.

Prospects were even more bleak in the Balkan region, which seemed destined to recreate the historical patterns that helped destabilize Europe 80 years ago. While Bulgaria and Romania continued on their ponderous marches out of communism, Romania found itself on the threshold of a messy involvement in Moldova’s complex ethnic politics that could bring it into trouble with Russia. What formerly was Yugoslavia had descended into vicious civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where Serbia pursued ethnic cleansing and Croatia sought greater influence. Despite vigorous diplomatic efforts and economic sanctions, the UN, CSCE, NATO, and the WEU/EC seemed unable to stop the fighting with anything less than full-scale military intervention. Their hesitancy to intervene, in turn, suggested that Serbian aggression might set an unhealthy precedent, or even serve as a model for the future.

By far the greatest threat to Europe’s stability was the worrisome drama unfolding in the former Soviet Union, where events also took a downward course in early 1992. In Russia, Yeltsin’s government survived the winter and emerged still on the path of radical reform, but found itself facing continued economic decline, growing popular discontent, and a conservative backlash. Russia’s great experiment in democracy and free-market capitalism by no means had ended, but hopes for a quick and easy transition were rapidly evaporating, and many observers were beginning to contemplate the prospect of failure. In all likelihood, some predicted, another year of sluggish privatization, declining economic productivity, rampant inflation, and rising unemployment would doom Yeltsin and his democratic colleagues. Precisely where economic failure would leave Russia was impossible to say, but many feared for the worst: either the emergence of a fascistic authoritarian regime with hostile attitudes to the West, or a descent into social collapse and civil war.

Meanwhile, mounting friction between Russia and Ukraine was itself a sufficiently serious threat to ensure that the Commonwealth was failing to plant deep roots in the soil of the former Soviet Union. Throughout early 1992, Russia and Ukraine engaged in a serious tug of war over control of the Crimean fleet and other military hardware on Ukrainian soil. After prolonged negotiations involving the United States, Ukraine agreed to transfer all tactical nuclear weapons on its soil to Russia, and to dismantle all ICBMs within a few years. Moreover, Russia and Ukraine seemingly had reached an agreement to jointly control conventional weapons in Ukraine for a period of three years, thereby allowing for a cooling off period and further negotiations. Even so, the two nations still seemed at loggerheads over many issues, including the Crimean region and the status of Russians living on Ukrainian soil. The prospect of a Russian-Ukrainian confrontation remained a serious worry, and even short of that, ongoing ethnic fighting in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Moldova, and elsewhere
suggested that the Commonwealth will remain a violent and highly unstable land.

The future of Russia and the Commonwealth defies prediction, but what can be said is that the outcome will have an important bearing on Europe's future and NATO's role. If democratic reforms succeed, prospects for enduring peace will be enhanced. To the extent the Commonwealth plunges into chaos, Europe's prospects will suffer, and doubly so if reform in Russia fails and that nation emerges as anything other than a benign democracy. In this event, the West might find itself facing the dark prospect of a clash over control of Eastern Europe between a German-led EC and an angry, vengeful Russia that blames the loss of its empire on Western duplicity. Only time will tell, but until the outcome is clear beyond doubt, the need to retain NATO as outlined at the Rome Summit will be all the stronger.

Equally important, NATO's continuing health may well have an impact on whether reform succeeds in these nations, and for reasons that go well beyond any threat of coercive deterrence if those nations return to bad ways. This certainly will be the case in Eastern Europe, where many nations want to join NATO not only for security protection but also to help encourage their commitment to democracy. Similarly, NATO serves as a democratic beacon to Russia and other Commonwealth nations, offering them moral support for their political reforms, encouragement to demilitarize, and potential assistance if threatened by internal revolt or outside aggression. For this reason, Yeltsin's 1991 request to eventually join NATO was not a hollow ploy, but rather a sober reflection of the fact that his reformist agenda depends heavily upon whether Russia is admitted into the Western community of nations, including NATO.
The complex trends at work in Europe today suggest that the end of the Cold War still offers the opportunity to build an enduring peace, but this vision will not be realized simply because it is desirable. It is a vision to be achieved, not an established fact or a predestined outcome of the changes rapidly sweeping over Europe. Bringing this vision to life will require insightful understanding, sound policies by many nations, favorable circumstances, and good fortune. These attributes will have to work together to create a future that makes a liar out of history. The task facing U.S. policy is to help ensure that history, in fact, is telling a lie.

Europe has had illusions before, and they always gave way to harsh realities. Several decades ago, British author Norman Angell wrote a popular book, *The Great Illusion*, proclaiming that modern civilization and economic interdependence had advanced to the point where major war was no longer possible in Europe.\(^1\) He was feted for his wisdom all over Europe, and surface appearances argued in his favor: The balance of power, spreading democracy, expanding trade, intermeshed finances, growing prosperity, and moderate diplomatic agendas all seemed to make war improbable. The year was 1910, only four years before the continent plunged into a deadly bloodbath. World War I, moreover, sprang out of the blue, from complex causes that were obvious in the aftermath, but not easily seen at the time. Seething social unrest, economic dislocation, shortsighted diplomacy, interlocking treaties, massive armaments, and fixed mobilization schedules conspired to transform a minor crisis at Sarajevo into an uncontrolled rush to destruction. Not all of these negative features are present today, but some are showing signs of reappearing in the post-Cold War era.

The problem today is not that Europeans have lower moral standards than other cultures, but that some people everywhere remain acquisitive and aggressive. This sobering conclusion was reached by Freud and Jung, and it is reflected in the writings of the most esteemed political philosophers. Edmund Burke’s conservative endorsement of political order stemmed from belief in the permanence of human conflict, and John Locke’s liberal emphasis on individual rights grew out of concern that humans, left to their own devices, would oppress one another. Moreover, the propensity to produce conflict seems to

---

worsen as the ladder of social organization is climbed. As Reinhold Niebuhr said, there is moral man and immoral society.²

Severe conflict and war are not inevitable or even normal, but their likelihood increases in direct proportion to the presence of economic strife, ethnic hatreds, social upheaval, nationalist rivalries, social frictions, territorial disputes, and historical animosities. National governments can control social conflicts lying within their boundaries, but beyond their borders, there are few institutions (none with coercive power) to contain the anarchical forces of the nation-state system. Because Europe is a small continent with many densely populated nations living in close proximity, it is especially vulnerable to this anarchy. Moreover, modern Europe still contains many of the explosive ingredients that in years past have sent its nations to war.³

These ingredients by no means doom Europe to an endless sequence of bloody wars, but neither is permanent peace an obvious outcome of the structural conditions prevailing today in Europe. The hope for a tranquil “Euro-Atlantic community” is based on four building blocks: a solid transatlantic partnership, a united EC, stable nations and governments in Eastern Europe, and the success of democratic reforms in Russia and the Commonwealth. The events of early 1992 cast into doubt all four building blocks. NATO is eroding, EC integration is slowing down, Eastern Europe is disintegrating, and democracy is being put to a severe test in the former Soviet Union. These trends do not guarantee failure, but they suggest that success will not come automatically as a result of the impersonal forces of change in Europe. Success will have to be won, against troublesome odds, through purposeful policy.

A common hope is that the spread of democracy will dampen Europe’s propensity to stressful conflict between nations and within them. Whether democracy takes root in former communist nations is an open issue, but there should be no false illusions that democracy guarantees peaceful conduct toward other nations. Undeniably, democracy often does have a moderating effect by embracing pluralism and moderate ideologies, but not in some straightjacket way. In the past, democracies have engaged in expansionism: Witness post-revolutionary France, 19th century Britain, and America’s conduct early this century. Democracies, moreover, have waged war against each other. In the War of 1812, the United States fought Britain, and in the American Civil War, two self-proclaimed democracies engaged in a massive slaughter brought about by conflict not only over slavery, but also over competing economic and territorial goals.


Following Napoleon's defeat in 1815, Metternich's Concert of Europe was partly anchored on the belief that democracy was warlike and ruling aristocracies needed to collaborate to protect peace. The Concert of Europe was upended by German unification, but after France was defeated in 1870, the conservative Chancellor Bismarck sought peace and anchored his foreign policy on containing an angry democratic France. Democratic Britain supported Bismarck because it too feared France. During Europe's tense "balance of power" days after 1890, the spread of democracy tended to inflame nationalist passions, and authoritarian governments often exercised restraint. Had Kaiser Wilhelm listened to his Reichstag and the German press, he would have gone to war far earlier than 1914, as would have Britain and France. When Archduke Ferdinand was assassinated at Sarajevo, the French and British democracies eagerly sprang to war against liberalizing constitutional monarchies in Germany and Austria in a conflict driven not by conflicting political values, but by deeply seated human emotions. Moreover, France and Britain were not restrained by democratic ideology from aligning with reactionary Russia. World War II and the Cold War were ideological conflicts between democracy and totalitarianism, but their recent legacy should not obscure the dimmer but real memory of democracies at war for other reasons.

Had Iraq been led by a democratic government when it invaded Kuwait in 1990, would the United States and its coalition partners have hesitated to use force? Would a greater infusion of democracy truly dampen Israeli-Arab hatreds in the Middle East, or calm Indo-Pakistani rivalry in South Asia? Perhaps Palmerston was too cynical when he said that there are no permanent friends, only permanent interests. Nevertheless, all nations have interests, are capable of using military force, and respond to their unique values and beliefs. Democracy ensures that representative government and the people make the choice between war and peace. When governments and their populations want war, democracy is no barrier, even if the victim is another democracy that is hated for reasons that transcend political ideology. This elementary political axiom continues to apply in Europe today.

Europe's prospects also should be gauged in the context of changes occurring in global security politics. The Cold War's end does not mean that history has come to an end, but it does mean that the world has been turned upside down. A three-fold revolution is now under way across the globe that is reshaping the foundations of international politics created by the Cold War. Most obvious, the old bipolar security structure has broken down, and is being replaced by growing multipolarity, loosening alliances, a fragmenting communist empire, a more restive Middle East, and a more powerful Asia. Second, the already interdependent world economy is undergoing a profound upheaval driven by newly emerging powers, by poverty-stricken regions seeking a better fate, and by growing emphasis on self-serving strategic trade policies that often border on mercantilism. Third, nuclear weapons and modern conventional armaments are falling into the hands of revolutionary nations and groups not satisfied with the status quo.
Although it is impossible to determine the consequences of these changes, the principal outcome may be less than global tranquility. Indeed, these changes could produce a witches' brew of rising international tensions amidst a more complex, less manageable, and more dangerous setting than characterized the Cold War. The struggle to reshape the world economy may well replace the old causes of interstate rivalries to become the central axis of international politics. If so, economic strife could become the ingredient that transforms spreading multipolarity and proliferating military technology into an explosive mixture. Even if the worst does not occur, economics will have a major bearing on the degree to which the world is a peaceful or dangerous place. To the extent that economic relationships are cooperative, prospects for stability will be enhanced, but if these relationships become conflictual, security crises might become common fare: in Europe and elsewhere.

Thus, the appealing vision of a stable transatlantic partnership and a peaceful European continent remains one possibility for the future, but there are other, less attractive, outcomes as well. The NATO alliance might remain unified, but political-economic reform to the east might fail, thereby producing a cascading slide into fragmentation, chaos, and local violence. Even worse, Russia might reemerge as a malevolent power, and Europe might plunge back into a new form of confrontation, with an unstable power vacuum in Eastern Europe separating the two antagonists. Worse yet, the NATO alliance might fall apart, leaving a volatile tri-polar security system with the United States, Western Europe, and Russia maneuvering against each other on a global stage, amidst circumstances that only Metternich and Bismarck could appreciate. These four models by no means exhaust the alternatives, but they do help illuminate the possibilities ahead. What is important to recognize is that none of these alternatives is foreordained. The outcome will depend upon how individual nations act, and upon whether Europe's security institutions are maintained in a sufficiently healthy state to dampen the troubles that might well lie ahead.

AMERICAN VISIONS, INTERESTS, AND ASPIRATIONS

Uncertain about its destiny, Europe today stands at a crossroads, with lanes branching out in many directions, some of them leading to a dark abyss. What can be done to steer Europe toward a favorable outcome, and to what degree should the United States commit itself to the effort? What are our visions and interests? What are our aspirations for the NATO alliance and our role in Europe?

Because economic and social problems at home call for prompt solutions, surface appearances suggest that the United States should seize the moment to disengage from Europe in order to focus on its domestic agenda. Careful thought, however, reveals a different relationship. Because international peace

---

and tranquility are not newly minted conditions of nature, we cannot afford the luxury of withdrawal from global politics now. History shows that isolationism, especially from Europe, can bring disaster. Having fought for democracy in Europe for the last 75 years, moreover, we cannot lay down the banner at the moment when our most fundamental values stand at the threshold of spreading across the entire continent, but success is rendered uncertain by grave problems.

If these imperatives are not persuasive, a bread-and-butter thought should be kept in mind: We will not retain the freedom to address our internal problems unless the external environment remains unthreatening. Any slide into new disorder could compel us to rearm, and thus divert money and political attention from badly needed domestic investments. Nor can we restore our economic prosperity in the absence of a collaborative world economy. In order to engage in economic and social renewal at home, we need a safe and cooperative world abroad. For these reasons, neither an unvisionary retreat into isolationism nor a low-profile role in Europe makes sense, either now or in the foreseeable future. We need to remain actively involved with means that are affordable and effective.

Constructing a vision should begin with recognition that, at bottom, the United States is not an imperial nation, and especially so in Europe. By tradition, the United States has sought free trade, access to open markets, and an international environment that allows its own democratic values to flourish at home. If our basic security instincts have erred, the error normally has been on the side of isolationism, not imperial expansion. Our overseas military involvements normally have been driven by defensive motives, and our interventions typically have been launched too late and terminated too quickly. Some nations fail to see the United States in the innocent light that it perceives itself, but far and away, we have never been a predatory power, and we have no need to become one now. Our vision should continue to be that of a benign superpower seeking to enhance Europe's vitality and expecting fair treatment in return. This vision should be an outgrowth of a larger policy aimed at promoting the emergence of a peaceful democratic community around the globe.

America's interests and goals in Europe remain derivative, but even in an era when domestic renewal will be given top priority, they are still of vital importance. They are a product of our core values and legitimate aspirations. Simply stated, our bedrock interests are to prevent any threat to the United States, its democratic institutions, and its prosperity. Also, we seek to maintain normal diplomatic relations in Europe that protect the rights of American citizens to overseas travel and commerce. These interests call for policies aimed at discouraging major war in Europe, the return of a malevolent hegemony with global power, any slide into bipolar rivalry or chronic turmoil, or a reversion to economic protectionism and mercantilism. Beyond these negative goals, our interests also call on us to pursue positive objectives: the promotion of democracy, prosperous stability, peaceful change, and an open transatlantic economy.

Now that the Cold War has produced a new Europe, moreover, our interests can no longer be defined as ending at the eastern borders of our NATO allies. At
Western instigation, our democratic values are spreading eastward, and will require support to nations that are trying to embrace these values. Equally important, our security and prosperity (and that of our allies) will be influenced by developments in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The failure of reform there, and the accompanying downslide into authoritarianism and/or chaos, could make it difficult for Western Europe and the United States to reap the rewards of victory in the Cold War. Indeed, if the worst were to occur, we might look back fondly on the simpler days of bipolar rivalry. For these reasons, our interests and goals now extend into Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

Because of these interests and our expanding horizons, the United States needs to remain involved in Europe in a leadership role. Prudence dictates that we should be cautious about premature military withdrawal from Europe: A sizable force presence there makes sense in light of the potential threats and instabilities ahead. But a leadership role and a military presence alone are insufficient means to achieve our goals. As was the case during the Cold War, we will continue to require close partnership with our NATO allies.

In theory, the United States could remain involved in Europe even if NATO were abolished. As was done before World War II, we could pursue our interests and goals through unilateral actions, bilateral ties, and other multilateral institutions. But unilateralism is a poor recipe for success in Europe, bilateralism has distinct limits, and while multilateralism is the best way to magnify our leadership potential, NATO has unique attributes that are not matched by other bodies.

NATO helps ensure that the American agenda is taken seriously. Its existence as an effective alliance is required as long as the United States continues to have collective defense commitments in Europe. It is the only vehicle by which U.S. extended nuclear deterrence coverage to many allied nations can remain credible to those nations. NATO is needed to provide the U.S. influence over conventional force plans and crisis management policies that makes entangling nuclear commitments in a fluid depolarized setting acceptable to the United States. Moreover, NATO is the only multilateral body that can plan, mount, and sustain a large conventional military operation in Europe and nearby regions. In the absence of an effective NATO, the United States could become marginalized in political terms, and might be compelled to terminate military commitments that no longer could be carried out safely.

NATO, moreover, helps the United States pursue its worldwide defense strategy at affordable budget levels. The United States would not be able to protect its interests in Europe in absence of the military contributions provided by the West European allies. Nor would the United States be free to respond to threats elsewhere if NATO forces were not available to maintain the peace in Europe. Absent NATO, the United States would always be looking over its shoulder, fearing for the worst in Europe if it sent troops elsewhere. For that matter, U.S.

---

military forces could not even deploy to the Persian Gulf with any haste in absence of the military bases and infrastructure in Europe that NATO provides. NATO thus magnifies American military power in Europe and worldwide. In theory, the United States could adopt unilateral measures to offset the loss of NATO, but only at far greater budget cost.

The growing role of economics amplifies the need to keep NATO alive. Ricardo was not fully right: A liberal trading regime does not automatically bring satisfying prosperity to everyone. But Lenin was mostly wrong: A descent into "beggar thy neighbor policies" is neither inevitable nor desirable. Because interdependence is irreversible, cooperative economic relationships are key to mutual prosperity, but they will be far harder to maintain in the absence of a still-solid security alliance. Conversely, security partnership will be hard to preserve in the face of deteriorating economic relations. Because of growing strains, sound policies will be needed to safeguard healthy relationships in both arenas, and to prevent downturns from infecting each other.

A principal reason for keeping the western alliance together is that, in the absence of an external military threat, diluted security ties could interact with mounting economic strains to produce damaging political relations among the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. The result of this Hobbesian triangle could be diminished prosperity and weakened security for all three participants, eventually giving way to outright military rivalry among them. If economic competition does begin rising in serious ways, continued security ties could help contain this competition. Conversely, economic collaboration can help instill confidence that, even in an ambiguous era, security commitments can still be relied upon.

Alliance partnership is also needed to help produce the joint Western economic policies needed to bring stability and prosperity to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. What applies to these two regions is relevant also to the Middle East. In the absence of economic progress in all three regions, spreading military power is likely to produce a host of heavily armed nations committed to punishing Western powers that are seen as predators. To reduce this risk, the Western nations will be required to funnel economic aid to these regions, but they could be hard-pressed to carry out coordinated policies in the absence of a common security foundation.

TOWARD AN EFFECTIVE ALLIANCE ANCHORED ON A NEW TRANSATLANTIC BARGAIN

Because NATO still has an important role to play, halting its erosion and restoring its vitality should be a high priority U.S. goal. But how is this objective to be accomplished? The answer lies in arriving at a new understanding of how influence should be allocated, how a new pattern of defense and security relationships can be established within NATO, and how NATO should relate to the WEU/EC and CSCE. Together, the changes required in these three areas would amount to the crafting of a new transatlantic bargain.
A healthy alliance partnership requires a still-substantial degree of American influence in Europe, but what principles are to govern the sharing of influence with our increasingly vocal allies? Our influence inevitably will decline now that the Soviet Union is dissolved, Germany is unified, and the EC is growing stronger. But the United States no longer requires the level of influence needed during the Cold War. What we require is sufficient influence to protect our vital interests in Europe, to discharge our still-existing responsibilities, and to reflect our heavy financial commitment to Europe’s security.

This requirement provides ample scope for accepting the growth of allied influence and assertiveness. Indeed, our global problems elsewhere and our domestic priorities create good reasons for welcoming a unified Western Europe that can handle a greater share of security and economic problems than was the case during the Cold War. If there is a risk that a unified West European pillar will rise to frustrate American interests, it is a distant risk. At the moment, allied pillar-building is in a germinal state. The Franco-German corps is several years away from operational status, and there is uncertainty that this corps will be anything more than a paper force. Britain and the Netherlands have declined to join it, and even the Germans are ambivalent.

The WEU force will take even longer to create, the WEU defense staff will have only modest planning capabilities, and the idea of an EC common security policy is vague and not fully supported by many EC members. As a practical matter, the WEU members will remain hard pressed to project any significant forces beyond their borders in absence of major U.S. help. A West European force that cannot even march off to war without U.S. military support is hardly a major threat to American influence over crisis-management policies in Europe. Although often overlooked, West European pillar-building serves American interests in important respects. The Franco-German corps will help bind Germany closer to its Western neighbors, while also bringing France into closer association with NATO. Efforts at allied military integration may help reduce wasteful redundancy and duplication, while achieving greater efficiency in armaments and logistics policy: goals promoted by the United States but not achieved by NATO. Also important, allied pillar-building wedds the allied defense establishments to the larger cause of West European community-building, and therefore might help stave off parliamentary pressures for deep defense spending cuts.

Moreover, financial constraints leave Western Europe heavily dependent on U.S. military help. If U.S. forces were removed from NATO's ledger, the West Europeans would have to increase their defense budgets by 50-100% to offset the loss. Barring an unexpected enthusiasm for larger defense budgets that would damage West European welfare state policies, this dependency will remain even after an allied defense pillar is fully erected. For the foreseeable future, the real risk is not that an allied pillar will replace NATO, but that the West European nations will disarm, slacken their security collaboration, and slide into self-involved military impotence.

---

The failure of the West European powers to play a larger military role in Desert Storm is a warning sign in this regard. Britain and France contributed, but their military deficiencies at power projection permitted only small force deployments. Impaled on a bitter domestic debate, Germany hid behind its alleged constitutional prohibition against using force beyond its borders. Despite the efforts of the Kohl government, Germany has not yet forged a consensus in favor of helping NATO allies when the alliance's interests are endangered but Germany's borders are not threatened. Because of anti-military euphoria that already is sweeping over Western Europe, reluctance to make responsible use of military power may well increase in the years ahead. The Yugoslavia crisis, for example, found Western Europe unable to respond militarily. Britain feared a repeat of the Ireland quagmire, Germany hesitated because of its scarred history, and France held back due to pro-Serbian sympathies. If this pattern prevails, the United States will be left alone to handle a wide range of regional and global security problems, without the cooperative allies needed to help make our efforts successful.

Critics argue that the act of creating a West European defense identity will impose stifling consensus principles, thereby preventing even willing allies from acting at a time of crisis. This is a valid reason for arguing against the emergence of a fully federated EC, but the cause for concern here is a policy of weak-willed neutralism rather than institutional structures. The proper solution is not to block a West European pillar, but to ensure that this pillar is animated by a sound security policy. In any event, the EC is far removed from this kind of political unity, and might never get there. At the moment, allied military pillar-building is focused on the WEU, and this body is politically closer to NATO than the EC and seemingly better able to pursue constructive defense policies. The debate over a European security identity should focus on issues that are real, not theoretical.

A close relationship with an assertive Britain is a permanent fixture of U.S. policy, and our interests would best be served by a Britain that plays a leading role in the EC while also maintaining its anchor in the transatlantic alliance. For many Americans, the emergence of Germany and France as leaders of the European Community touches off deep apprehensions. The memory of Germany as rogue elephant lingers on, and France has acquired a reputation for preevish hostility to American designs. Yet, Germany has been a reliable if silent partner for many years, and France's attitude is partly a product of heavy-handed U.S. conduct over the years. Regardless of the causes, the escalating dispute between France and the United States is destructive and serves the strategic interests of neither country, much less Europe.

The Franco-American dispute leaves Germany caught in the middle, torn between its long-standing security partner and its European destiny. Plausibly Germany will side with the United States, but the rapid disappearance of the Soviet military threat makes this outcome ever more unlikely. Moreover, tensions between Paris and Washington have an impact on Germany's internal politics by weakening the position of pro-American conservatives. Unless the underlying reasons for the Franco-American dispute are resolved, the ultimate
consequence could be deteriorating relations between the United States and Germany once Germany begins pursuing a more assertive foreign policy embodying France's aims for greater independence. If American relations with Germany were to fracture, a future of mounting transatlantic rivalry would be almost unavoidable. Equally bad, the outcome could be the collapse of Germany's ties to both the United States and France, thereby leaving Germany detached from any security foundation and adrift in Central Europe.

The fault by no means lies entirely with the United States. Both France and Germany are losing sight of the fact that the United States has valid security reasons for maintaining a strong role in Europe, that its policy is animated by more than a desire to preserve an imperial realm, and that constructive American leadership is essential for Europe's stability. Yet, U.S. policy has been coming across in Europe as flawed in several respects: refusal to reform NATO to a sufficient degree, failure to support European unity, and inactivity toward Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. During early 1992, the United States began to respond to these complaints with a more responsive policy, but only partly and in ways that failed to remove doubts about consistency, follow-through, and ultimate goals. To an important degree, the bottom line in Europe is harsh but simple: The United States is welcome to retain a leading role, but only if it leads purposefully with vision. Otherwise, it deserves to be relegated to the backwaters.

A visionary U.S. diplomacy is needed, one that provides scope for both France and Germany to play weighty roles in Europe within the framework of collaboration with the United States. If they are treated right, both Germany and France have the potential to remain working partners of the United States. The trick is to devise policies that support their basic interests, to insist that American interests are respected in return, and to devise balanced compromises when conflicts occur.

If the U.S. profile is to be lower in the years ahead, power and responsibility will need to be concentrated in the hands of a few West European nations. If NATO is to endure, Germany and France, along with Britain, will have to remain committed participants: Their support for the U.S. agenda thus is essential. We do not need to agree with Bonn and Paris on everything. What matters is whether we agree on the core issues, including respect for mutual interests, the need to maintain a stable equilibrium with Russia, and basic approaches to security, alliance defense policy, burden-sharing, and assistance to former adversaries.

NATO endured throughout the Cold War because it was anchored on a mutually satisfying set of defense and security relationships that was often updated to accommodate evolving conditions and requirements. The set of relationships that existed at the Cold War's end has been overtaken by the new conditions emerging in Europe. The failure to craft a new set of relationships is a core reason why NATO has begun eroding. Because the United States and Western Europe are applying new standards that have not been codified on the basis of open exchange, balanced compromise, and follow-through actions, both sides of the Atlantic are becoming dissatisfied with the alliance. This unhealthy sit-
uation must be rectified, and not only by words, but also by deeds. Otherwise, NATO's erosion will gather momentum, the United States will move toward disengagement, and Europe's security will suffer.

A new set of relationships should embody a sound security policy, and restore internal alliance cohesion by establishing a satisfactory equilibrium of interests among NATO's principal partners. What should be U.S. priorities for shaping a new set of relationships? What must be offered to our allies in exchange for their agreement to honor these priorities? These questions can be answered in the following way: A new set of defense and security relationships would seek to preserve a reformed but active NATO military structure. Its goal would be to fashion an agreement enabling all sides to accept an enduring U.S. military presence and a reinvigorated integrated NATO command that performs combined planning on the issues that will affect common security. This planning would be conducted under conditions in which key U.S. and West European requirements are fulfilled, thereby leaving the participants satisfied with the alliance and more inclined to support it.

In order to reestablish harmony, both the United States and the West Europeans would be obligated to make concessions to each other. These concessions, however, would be an acceptable price in relation to the gains made through restoring NATO's cohesion. The United States would receive assurances that there will be no marginalizing of American influence, that the allies will fulfill their military obligations to NATO, and that the integrated command has the authority to prepare for contingencies in Europe that could involve U.S. forces and interests. In exchange, the allies would receive assurances of enduring American constancy and leadership involvement in Europe's new security affairs, and they would be granted a larger leadership role in NATO's command structure.

Under this approach, the West European nations would agree to the following U.S. requirements:

- A still-strong but streamlined NATO integrated command charged with carrying out a coherent alliance military strategy and security policy that supports transatlantic interests.
- A degree of U.S. leadership and involvement in NATO defense planning that is commensurate with American interests, military commitments, and financial expenditures on European security.
- Sufficient allied military contributions to carry out NATO defense plans and strategy, anchored on burden-sharing formulas that fairly reflect economic capacities on both sides of the Atlantic.
- Expansion of NATO's Rapid Reaction Corps into a "Rapid Reaction Force" of field-army (10 divisions) dimensions; development of the strategic mobility, logistics, doctrine, command and control, and sustainment programs needed to allow this force to fight effectively at distances far removed from current bases.
• Sufficient U.S. involvement in crisis-management practices to ensure that escalation is avoided and conflicts are ended on terms acceptable to the United States.
• A broadening of NATO’s military planning to prepare for jointly agreed contingencies in Europe and nearby areas that might be conducted under the auspices of Article 4 because they lie beyond NATO’s borders.
• Allied assurances that efforts to build a WEU military force and a European defense identity will be harmonized with NATO’s defense plans and strategy.
• Allied recognition that, in extreme circumstances, U.S. forces based in Europe are available for use elsewhere in response to American defense needs.
• Allied assurances that, in event of another major war in the Persian Gulf or any peripheral area in which vital West European interests are being defended, the allies will provide strong and appropriate military support to U.S. forces committed there.

In order to satisfy allied interests, the new bargain would obligate the United States to:

• Meet its own military, security, and financial obligations to the alliance, and broadly coordinate its global security policies with the West European allies.
• Maintain a U.S. military presence in Europe that satisfactorily responds to allied preferences and requirements, and that justifies continued American leadership roles in NATO’s command structure.
• Accept adjustments in NATO’s command structure needed to ensure that West European nations are fairly represented in a manner that reflects their growing responsibilities and contributions. When appropriate, employ less formal command arrangements for developing plans in which French forces might be committed.
• Participate heavily in NATO’s Rapid Reaction Corps/Force, multinational formations, and related efforts to develop common plans and doctrines.
• Provide unambiguous support for the evolutionary growth of a WEU/EC security pillar and defense identity that works in harmony with NATO.
• Provide consistently strong U.S. involvement in West European efforts to manage security affairs and economic developments in European areas east of NATO’s borders.

If these principles were to be implemented, very different NATO defense arrangements would evolve. The United States would remain highly influential, but West European military officers would perform larger roles in SHAPE; for example, if all sides agree, the SACEUR position might be rotated among U.S. and allied commanders. The NATO International Military Staff, rather than SHAPE, might handle defense planning that involves French forces and out-of-area missions. The defense efforts of the WEU/EC would be welcomed as useful contributions to the alliance’s agenda. The alliance would prepare military
plans not only for Article 5 missions in defense of NATO borders, but also for Article 4 contingencies beyond those borders. The alliance would develop a far better power projection capability to conduct major military operations at long distances. NATO thus would acquire a new military face, and along with this change would come major advantages. The poisonous frictions among the United States, France, and some other allied nations would give way to greater harmony. Equally important, NATO would retain adequate defense strength, and would become capable of responding to the crises and wars of the future, rather than remain impaled on the scenarios of the past.

A key feature of this plan is that the United States and Western Europe would share responsibility for handling security affairs in both Eastern Europe and the Persian Gulf. Initial impressions might suggest that a regional division of labor is desirable: The United States should handle the Persian Gulf and the West Europeans should handle the region to their east. This concept, however, breaks down under close scrutiny. The United States and Western Europe each have interests in both regions, and for complex political-military reasons, neither can conduct successful defense operations in either region without help from the other. Moreover, a division of labor approach might easily result in the United States and Western Europe drifting apart, and perhaps developing political entanglements that foul each other's designs in their respective regions. For both regions, collective security and combined defense make sense.

These conceptual principles provide a workable arrangement, but if agreement cannot be reached, a fallback effort could be launched to construct a different arrangement embodying less integration of U.S. and allied forces. For example, U.S. military forces could be withdrawn from peacetime continental roles, and the United States could revert to the 1949 practice of performing specialized off-shore missions, including sea lane defense, wartime reinforcement, and nuclear deterrence. In the extreme case, the United States could withdraw entirely from NATO's integrated command and revert to the style of purely political membership that de Gaulle crafted for France in 1966.

Both of these alternatives, however, have serious drawbacks in the years immediately ahead. Under the specialized approach, a limited American portfolio of naval, reinforcement, and nuclear missions might not be acceptable to the United States or credible to the West Europeans. If the United States were to cease any formal military participation, there would be little sense in retaining a NATO integrated command, but the West Europeans could be hard-pressed to build a WEU command in time to take its place. Until the West European security pillar matures and Europe stabilizes to the point where the United States has no need to keep forces there to protect its interests, neither alternative seems viable or acceptable.

If a new transatlantic bargain is to be forged, it also will have to be accompanied by a more healthy understanding regarding institutional relations in Europe. At the Rome Summit, the Western powers endorsed the concept of interlocking institutions, but in reality, NATO has been competing with the WEU/EC and CSCE for supremacy. This conflict has been exacerbated because each institution has a powerful constituency. The United States and Britain are
NATO's principal supporters; France, Belgium, and Italy have supported the WEU/EC and CSCE. Germany has had its feet planted in all three bodies, thereby allowing Bonn to cast its lot with whichever body wins the competitive struggle.

Quite apart from producing tensions within NATO, this competition is unhealthy because it has created a situation in which these three bodies have been blocking and diluting each other. In the process, the United States and France have become so embroiled in fouling each other's institutional designs that they have been weakening their own ability to lead constructively on behalf of positive visions. If this negative competition continues, the risk is that Europe will be left with a multiplicity of anemic institutions too weak, apart or together, to handle the security challenges ahead. Yugoslavia has been a sobering case in which all three bodies, along with the United Nations, proved incapable of responding to even a local crisis, thereby creating the impression of American and West European impotency. A solution therefore needs to be found.

Because of its unique situation as a military superpower located across the Atlantic, the United States requires that NATO remain a premier European security architecture. If the other two bodies were to supplant NATO, the United States would be rendered far less capable of exerting leadership, protecting its interests, and carrying out its commitments. Moreover, NATO is still the strongest of the institutions; neither WEU/EC nor CSCE are capable of performing NATO's vital security, defense, and crisis-management functions. The WEU/EC is a fledgling body still lacking real military teeth, and is officially intended to work within NATO, not replace it. CSCE also has no military teeth, and it is impaled on the need to forge overwhelming consensus among its 52 members. For this reason, NATO's role in Europe should be expanded, not contracted. Good steps in this direction have been the creation of the NACC and the recent decision to employ NATO as a military arm of CSCE.

Support for NATO, however, should not be carried to the point of trying to enfeeble the other two institutions. Indeed a sensible U.S. policy would provide scope for these institutions to grow in steady ways. As a practical matter, political realities dictate that, if the United States does not support the WEU/EC pillar and CSCE, support for NATO will not be forthcoming from key allies, including France and Germany. Beyond this, NATO cannot handle the full set of security requirements emerging in Europe, and the other two institutions are capable of playing useful roles in important areas. The emergence of a West European pillar may complicate American efforts to wield influence within NATO, but the benefit will be a more unified allied position rather than a discordant cacophony of voices that itself can dilute the alliance. As for CSCE, it has a track record of handling human rights and arms control measures, is developing an improved institutional capacity to handle crises, and provides a security institution for many nations that do not enjoy full membership in NATO.

In the final analysis, the debate over these institutions is being conducted amid a fog of uncertainty about Europe’s future that obscures the ability to make sound judgments. Because these institutions as yet have not proven their
mettle in the new era, judgments about their relative merits are based on a combination of abstract theorizing and narrow parochial interests. Most probably, Europe will present sufficient problems to occupy the talents of all three bodies, and if these bodies overlap, the effect may prove beneficial, not damaging. Careful efforts will be needed to minimize conflicts and maximize coordination among them, but if these efforts are made, a strategy of institutional pluralism makes sense and need not pave the way to NATO’s demise.

DEALING WITH EASTERN EUROPE AND THE COMMONWEALTH

The idea that Russia should join NATO seemed anathema only a short while ago, but it was given official recognition when Boris Yeltsin officially proposed this step. Although NATO responded by offering membership in the NACC, it blanched at the notion of providing collective defense guarantees to Russia or any other nation east of NATO’s borders. The issue, nonetheless, is not likely to go away.

Russia’s most pressing need is for economic aid, Western investments, and technical assistance, but especially if the West expects Russia to demilitarize, that nation also requires credible security guarantees. This requirement applies also to Russia’s Commonwealth partners. Although Ukraine and Kazakhstan have agreed to give up strategic nuclear weapons on their soil by 2000, their willingness to comply will be affected by whether their security is underwritten by the West. Moreover, Eastern Europe is also affected; the nations there lack nuclear weapons and sizable conventional forces, and they will be especially vulnerable if left in a security vacuum.

Because nearly all of these nations are pursuing democracy, they cannot be disqualified from NATO on the basis of unacceptable political values, and their security aspirations are legitimate in ways that the West cannot ignore. Most of these nations, moreover, are not likely to gain entrance into the EC and WEU, and their dependence on other institutions therefore will be all the greater. Many Western observers hope that membership in CSCE will suffice, but these nations already seem to have grasped that a huge multilateral body of diverse interests and no military forces provides little real security. Barring CSCE’s emergence as a stronger body, or creation of some other viable alternative, the growing desires of these nations to join NATO will be ever harder to reject.

If the NACC prove unable to satisfy their demands, the core issue will be whether these nations can be admitted into NATO under Article 4, but not Article 5. An alliance consensus is unlikely to emerge in favor of extending Article 5’s collective defense commitments to these nations, but Article 4 provides political reassurances that may be credible to these nations and acceptable to NATO’s members. In earlier years, the alliance never contemplated the step of establishing what amounts to associate membership, but this step might make sense now. NATO’s experience as a flexible alliance provides a basis of confidence that this innovative departure could be implemented, and would have its desired effects.
Regardless of how this issue is resolved, it illuminates an important point about NATO's future role in Europe. Although some members are opposed to any extension of NATO's charter and would prefer to relegate the alliance to the backwaters, the requirements of European security are pulling in the opposite direction. If NATO's role is not to be expanded, then other institutions will have to carry the load, but neither the CSCE nor WEU/EC as yet seem strong or versatile enough. The clamor from the east to join the alliance suggests that NATO may have little choice but to remain active and expand.

The alliance cannot expand its geographic coverage eastward if its internal strength is being weakened by West European allies determined to marginalize the United States and uproot the integrated command. If Europe's future security requirements can be ignored, then NATO can be retired, and the United States can depart. But if the core goal is to enhance European security by establishing a cooperative relationship with Russia and other former adversaries, a more far-sighted course will have to be pursued. The United States will have to remain in Europe as a superpower capable of acting decisively, and NATO will have to continue on the path of becoming an alliance for the future.

POLICY CONCLUSIONS

In summary, U.S. policy needs to be anchored on the premises that America still has vital interests at stake in Europe, and that history has not come to an end there. The United States should reject the impulse to withdraw, and stay actively involved. Its efforts should aim at keeping under control the serious threats of turmoil and upheaval, but its ideal aspiration should be to help build a peaceful Europe of democratic nations that cooperate with each other and the United States. For security and economic reasons, the United States should aspire to maintain a vibrant NATO alliance, but because NATO's cohesion is eroding, a new transatlantic bargain must be fashioned. This new bargain will need to reflect bedrock U.S. requirements, but it also must respond to legitimate West European concerns within NATO and find useful roles for the WEU/EC security pillar and CSCE. The alliance, moreover, will need to make way for new members as they democratize.

A policy designed along these lines will be more complex and ambiguous than U.S. policy during the Cold War. But it provides a framework for managing the difficult challenges ahead. If it is carried out, the United States and the NATO alliance can face the new era with confidence that the outcome will be as satisfying as the West's victory in the Cold War. Provided the West Europeans cooperate in ways dictated by their own interests, the United States and NATO can still have an opportunity to make a sustained commitment to a new but worthy purpose.
POSTSCRIPT: A NEW NATO FOR AN ENDANGERED EUROPE

Writing of this book was completed in early 1993, a time when many observers were still optimistic about Europe's future in the post-Cold War era. Events of subsequent months not only have dashed most of this hope but also have suggested that, only four years following the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe is once again headed toward crisis—a deep-seated crisis of the sort that already has brought about the continent's undoing three times during the 20th century alone. The effect has been to cast a bright spotlight on whether NATO can play a new role as a guarantor of security and stability across all of Europe, for if NATO fails to do so, Europe's future may be bleak indeed. With new challenges and dangers emerging far faster than almost anyone thought possible only a short time ago, the issue facing the alliance is simple but profound: Can NATO reform itself in the ways needed to prevent the loss of Europe yet again? Can it muster the political will and strategic vision to project security and democracy into the regions east of its Cold War borders, where instability and strife are constant threats?

The answers to these questions will determine not only whether NATO survives as an effective alliance, but also whether Europe itself endures as a continent where peace and democratic prosperity rule. The West cannot hope to attain a peaceful Europe by clinging to outdated Cold War security missions, naively pursuing partnership with Russia, and ignoring the turbulent arc of crisis covering East Central Europe and the Balkans. Nor can the West rely on multilateral bodies to solve problems it is unwilling to address itself. A short while ago, there may have been ambiguity about whether NATO still has a worthy mission to perform in Europe. The emerging crisis in Europe has wiped away that ambiguity. Except for Russia, virtually every country in Europe is now calling upon NATO to remain alive and vital. Indeed, many are begging NATO to become far more active than it has recently been. These advocates have their strategic bearings correct. In essence, a new NATO is needed for an endangered Europe.

The causes of the accelerating downturn threatening to sweep over all of Europe are manifold. First and foremost, prospects for democratic reform in Russia have been dealt a cruel blow by tumultuous events in that country. Against the background of a faltering economy, a bitter political struggle broke out during 1993 between reformist elements led by President Yeltsin and hard-line opponents in the parliament. For a time, Yeltsin seemed to have triumphed
when a bloody October showdown allowed him to dissolve parliament and jail his principal antagonists. But subsequent nationwide elections led to a new parliament dominated by former communists and nationalists, one seemingly as hostile to reform as the other. Moreover, the neo-fascist Vladimir Zhirinovsky was given strong public backing and a platform to press his threatening agenda. By early 1994, Yeltsin himself was calling for a slowdown of economic reforms and reinstitution of a strong central government. Equally ominous, Russia's foreign policy was becoming more assertive. This especially was the case in the "near abroad"—the territories of the former Soviet Union—where Russia began embarking upon strong-arm tactics aimed at coercing Commonwealth republics to once again come under Moscow's sway. Yeltsin claimed that Russia was merely carrying out a peacekeeping mission and still wanted to be a partner of the West, but to many observers the effort suggested a return to Russia's old neo-imperial ways.

Quite apart from Russia's travails, the bloody war in the former Yugoslavia, brought about primarily by Serbian aggression and ethnic cleansing reminiscent of Hitler's cruelties, also suggests a dark future for Europe. As of early 1994, fighting remained confined to Bosnia, but the war has far larger implications because it threatens a return of the savage ethno-nationalism that did so much to destroy Europe earlier this century. As the Balkans have slid steadily toward violent upheaval, unstable security dynamics have seemed to be taking hold in East Central Europe as well. Fearing Russia, Ukraine backpedaled on its earlier promises to yield the nuclear weapons on its soil by joining START and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Meanwhile, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and other East European nations all voiced fears about the security vacuum in which they found themselves and began considering unilateral steps aimed at protecting themselves in ways allowing for their experiments in democracy to succeed. These countries turned to the West in search of security assurances, but the West itself was mired in the doldrums. With the Maastricht Treaty in a stall pattern, the European Union's future was uncertain. Meanwhile, neither NATO nor the WEU showed much capacity to halt the violence in Bosnia, much less bring stability elsewhere. Together, all of these developments pointed toward a Europe that was becoming truly endangered by an insidious combination of faltering democratic reforms, economic stagnation, mounting ethno-nationalism, reborn historical antagonisms, and renewed geostrategic rivalries.

Alarmed by these negative trends, two RAND colleagues—Ronald Asmus and F. Stephen Larrabee—and I published an article in Foreign Affairs calling upon NATO to rise to the challenge. Entitled "Building a New NATO," the article laid out a comprehensive plan for the alliance to reorganize itself on the basis of a new transatlantic bargain, one aimed at projecting stability and democracy to the east. Urging NATO to abandon its traditional preoccupation with border defense in favor of a broader concept of European security, it called for closer U.S.-French relations, the strategic emancipation of Germany, and intensified transatlantic cooperation in upgrading NATO's forces and security policies for operations beyond alliance borders. While underscoring the importance of cooperative relations with Russia, this article called for the admission of Poland
and other Visegrad countries (Hungary, the Czech Republic, and possibly Slovakia) into NATO, and for an outreach effort toward Ukraine, a country whose independence is critical to Europe’s stability. In these ways, the article attempted to boldly project a strategic vision into what previously had been a void of conceptual thinking.

To our delight, the article provoked a storm of controversy that drew attention to Europe and helped crystallize a healthy public dialogue on NATO’s future. The article was featured in many newspapers and broadcasts in the United States and across Europe. Not everyone agreed, but vocal support came from many quarters, for as it turned out, other observers shared our worry about NATO and Europe. Our arguments were endorsed by U.S. Senator Richard Lugar (R. Ind.), German Minister of Defense Volker Ruehe, nearly all East European governments, and other distinguished European experts. In varying ways, such American luminaries as Zbigniew Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger, James Baker, and Dick Cheney endorsed key aspects of our proposals. Within weeks, senior officials of the Clinton administration, although cautious about any early expansion of NATO, were echoing our concerns about Europe’s future and the need for Western action. The only severely critical European response came from Moscow, where Yeltsin’s initial willingness to acquiesce to Poland’s entrance into NATO was quickly replaced by a hostile rejection of any eastward expansion by NATO that did not include Russia.¹

The months following publication of our article witnessed an intense debate within the alliance on NATO’s policy toward Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Some called for prompt admission of new members, but others called for a go-slow approach aimed at avoiding any provocation of Russia. The result was a compromise plan that was adopted at the January 1994 NATO Summit in Brussels. There, the alliance endorsed the U.S.-backed idea of a Partnership for Peace (PFP), whereby NATO would postpone any decisions on new members in favor of a slow but steady expansion of security ties with any European nation (including Russia) seeking closer relations with the alliance. In addition, the Brussels Summit also endorsed a plan to create Combined Joint Task Forces that would allow the WEU, or other ad hoc coalitions of the willing, to draw on common NATO assets to project military power beyond NATO borders in crises where NATO itself decided not to act.

These decisions were given a mixed reception. Those who placed highest priority on relations with Russia were pleased with NATO’s sense of caution, as were those who feared any headlong or premature plunge into Eastern Europe’s turbulent affairs. Critics, however, derided the Brussels outcome as weak, unimaginative, and overly accommodating to Russia. In particular, several key East European leaders lamented NATO’s decision not to admit new members any time soon. Military critics noted that flexible command arrangements are far from a cure-all if NATO lacks the political will and military wherewithal to use its forces for anything other than traditional border defense missions.

Those disgruntled with the West's Balkans policy noted that the Brussels decisions did nothing to halt the fighting in Bosnia. Yet even the harshest critics cannot deny that NATO has shifted strategic gears in ways that go beyond decisions at earlier summit meetings. Although NATO's pace is slow and its ultimate destination is unknown, the meaning of the Brussels Summit is that the alliance has made a firm decision to go east in ways that are intended to gather momentum as the future unfolds. The great issue now is whether NATO will move far enough and fast enough. A momentous race is unfolding in Europe pitting the forces of instability against the West's efforts to lay a foundation of democratic peace. This is a race that NATO and Europe cannot afford to lose.

The situation requires an internally reformed and outward-looking NATO. It requires an alliance that can reassure emerging democracies of their security, mount powerful military interventions in local crises that threaten to destabilize Europe, and maintain a political equilibrium and military balance of power with a Russia that is destined to pursue its own interests in ways that often may conflict with those of the West. Whether the alliance will be able to act with sufficient energy to carry out this strategic concept will be determined by the actions taken in the years ahead. What can be said now is that success will depend heavily upon whether the Clinton administration rises to the occasion by leading NATO into the future in the ways that American leadership is always needed if NATO is to succeed. During its first year in office, the Clinton administration was besieged by critics from across the political spectrum who lambasted it for an allegedly anemic foreign policy, naiveté about Russia, blindness to the European dangers ahead, and lack of purposeful direction. The Clinton administration now has a golden opportunity to prove these critics wrong. It needs to muster the necessary political will and a strategic vision of its own. Europe's future, and that of the United States, demand nothing less.


———. "NATO Myths," Foreign Policy, No. 48 (Spring 1982): 48–68.


Holmes, John W. "The Dumbell Won't Do," *Foreign Policy,* No. 50 (Spring 1983): 3–22.


——. *NATO’s Future Role in Europe: Toward a More Political Alliance in a Stable “1.5 Bloc” System*. R-3923-FF. Santa Monica, California: RAND, May 1990.


INDEX

A-7 attack aircraft, 336
A-10 attack aircraft, 308, 336, 338, 353
AAFCF, 440
AAW, of U.S. Navy, 211
ABM systems, 165–169, 241, 256, 277, 279, 464, 530
ABM Treaty, 417, 467–470, 487
Abrams tanks, 447
ACE Mobile Force, 176–176
Acheson, Dean, 32, 136
“Active defense” idea, of NATO ground force employment, 445–446
AD-70, 237, 268(n), 269–273, 303, 319, 324(n)
Adenauer, Konrad, 63–64, 74, 83, 108, 118, 139, 147, 148, 151, 162, 177
and rearmament and reunification of FRG, 65, 66, 70, 106, 114–115, 526
Aegis air defense system, 339
AFCENT command, 61, 218, 222, 223
Afghanistan, 281, 344–348, 372, 373, 464, 475, 498
AFNORTH command, 51, 218
Africa, communist influence in, 373, 374
AFSOUTH command, 56
Agricultural policies, U.S./Western Europe disputes over, 285, 458, 459
Aircraft carriers, 130, 340, 354, 397
Air defenses, 57, 69, 145, 229–230, 325–326, 439–441
Air Force, U.S., See United States Air Force
Air forces: NATO, 86–87, 125, 230, 365. See also United States Air Force
Warsaw Pact, 122, 365, 468–490. See also Soviet Union, air strength of
AirLand Battle strategy, 447–448
Albania, 501
ALCM missiles, 392, 484, 485
Algeria, 86, 92, 221, 374
Allen, Richard, 372
Alliances, role of in history, 11–14
Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AAFCF), 440
Alleys. See Western Europe
All-Union Treaty, in Soviet Union, 515
AMX 13 APCs, 98
Andropov, Yuri, 412, 414, 417, 450, 463, 464, 478
Angell, Norman, 551
Angola, 373, 374
Ann Arbor Speech, of McNamara, 140
Antiair warfare (AAW), of U.S. Navy, 211
Antiballistic missile system. See ABM system
Antisubmarine warfare (ASW), 211, 326, 340
Antitank guided missiles, 236, 272, 325, 361, 445, 469
Appeasement, lessons learned at Munich on, 39, 522
Arabs, Soviet support for, 281
Argentina, 427, 458
Armenia, 512, 549
Armored personnel carriers, 84–85, 98, 229, 231–232
Arms trade: controversy on NATO commitment to, 530–531
and détente, 276, 279–280
and Gorbachev, 450, 464–465, 495–496
and INF Treaty, 485–487
in MC14/3, 166, 192–194
and neutron bomb, 322
and Pershing/ GLCM missiles, 332, 333
Reagan’s attitude to, 373, 374, 381, 407, 417–418, 454–455, 456, 477. See also MBFR, SALT negotiations
Arms trade, Carret’s attack on European, 316
Army, U.S. See United States Army
Artillery, Improvement in, 9E, 206, 229. See also Tube artillery
Asia, 253–254, 291, 300, 351
ASW, 211, 326, 329
Assured destruction doctrine: McNamara’s proposal of, 164(n), 165-166, 168-169
in triad nuclear posture, 254, 298, 299
Assured retaliation, 297
Athens Speech, of McNamara, 140-142, 146-151, 171
Atlantic Fleet, French, 221
Atlantic Ocean, GIUK naval barrier in, 339-341
Atomic bomb, 7, 29, 33-35, 52, 55. See also Nuclear weapons
Attack helicopters, 338, 353, 361, 396, 445, 489
Attrition, likelihood of war in Central Europe, 434, 445
Austria, 218, 547
Austrian State Treaty, 83
AWACS aircraft, 369, 390, 376, 385, 427, 440, 461
Azerbaijan, ethnic unrest in, 549
B-1 bombers, 277, 316, 320, 363, 392, 396, 404, 485
B-2 stealth bombers, 363, 396, 453, 484
B-29 bombers, 34
B-36 bombers, 41-42, 71
B-47 bombers, 77, 125
B-50 bombers, 34
B-52 bombers, 77, 119, 125, 255, 256, 277, 363, 392, 397, 398, 467, 469-485
B-56 bombers, 125
B-70 bombers, 125
Bagdall, Marshal, 447
Bahr, Igon, 332, 406, 415
Baker, James, 503-504, 507, 510
Bakhtiar, Shapur, 343
Balanced federal budget, 452
Balance of payments issue, between U.S. and FRG, 181, 208, 283, 285, 305
Balance of power, Nixon and Kissinger attempt to establish, 249
Ballistic missiles, 121, 165, 411, 482
Baltic Sea, German naval defense of, 213
Baltic States, independence of, 511-512
BAOR, 62, 93, 102, 177, 190, 210, 220, 525
Baruch Plan, 34(n)
“Base Force” level, of U.S. forces, 541
Basic Law, as constitution for FRG, 59
“Basic Principles of U.S.-Soviet Relations,” 277
Bavaria, 216
BBC, Soviet jamming of, 373
Belgium: defense spending of, 62, 272, 309
deployment of forces in Germany, 67-68, 218
and missile deployment, 331, 416-417
and MLF, 158
NATO role of, 49, 223, 233, 527, 564
and neutron bomb, 322
state of forces, 93, 184, 220, 326, 444-445
Belorussia, 512
Berlin: as continuing problem, 115, 169
German sovereignty restored to, 508
NATO’s firm stance on, 528
in Paris agreement, 66
Soviet threat to:
post-war, 30, 40, 55, 61
in 1958, 77-78
in 1961, 135-139, 147
stabilization of situation in, 275, 276-277, 308
Berlin Agreement, 279
Berlin Summit, 1978, 536
Berlin Wall, 139, 501
Bevin, Ernest, 26
Bigault, Georges, 26
Bipolarity, breakdown of at end of Cold War, 553
Black Sea, U.S. naval presence in, 457
Blank, Theodore, 61
Blitzkrieg, NATO ability to meet, 433-435, 493
BLOODHOUND SAM missile launchers, 239
Blue Steel missiles, 79
Blue Streak missiles, 79
BMP fighting vehicles, 489
Boehm, Wald, 218
Böhlen, Charles, 23
Bombing campaigns, in military planning, 33-34, 38, 41-42
Bonn Convention, 63
Bonn Economic Summit, 1985, 458
Bonn-Paris Bilateral Accord, 1960, 223
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 549
Bradley, General Omar N., 22, 33
Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, 338, 353, 447
Brandt, Willy: 308, 406, 509
Ostpolitik of, 178, 225, 226, 249, 274-277
Braunschweig, 218
Brazil, 316, 458
Breakthrough and maneuver, military strategy of, 434, 435, 438, 439
Breton Woods accords, 64, 140, 284, 284-285, 286
Brezhnev, Leonid: 225-226, 247, 412
and détente, 273-274, 277, 278
and Euromissile deployment, 406-409, 410-411
and Soviet aggression, 343, 344, 372-373
Brezhnev Doctrine, 377, 498, 501
British Army of the Rhine. See BAOR
Broad-front attack, 433-434
Brosio, Manlio, 268, 269
Brown, General George, 313
Brown, Harold: defense spending of, 314, 323-324, 348
military strategy of, 324, 327, 336, 345, 362
modernization of military, 337-341, 354
and NATO, 363, 366
and Pentagon, 311-313, 334-335, 361
Bush: fire conflicts, danger of in nuclear reliance policy, 118
Brussels Pact, 41, 42-44
Brussels Treaty, 65
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 311-312
BYR personnel carriers, 232
Buccaneer aircraft, 230
"Budapest call," 467, 470
Bulgaria, 500-501, 549
Bulge, Battle of, 22, 91
Bundeswehr, 68, 72, 147, 172, 180, 212-216, 438, 447
Bundy, McGeorge, 118, 119, 126
Burden-sharing issue: Allied/U.S. contribution, 361, 457, 460-461
in NATO, 240, 529-530
U.S. Congress concern about, 226, 283, 304, 425, 426, 430, 444
U.S./Japan, 346-347, 461, 530
Burke, Edward, 551
Bush, George: 3, 476, 525
and arms control, 509-510
and German unification, 503, 504
nuclear policy of, 485-487, 540
C³ systems, 326
C⁴ systems, 442
C-5 transport aircraft, 212, 300, 345, 397
C-130 transport aircraft, 130, 212
C-135 transport aircraft, 130
C-141 transport aircraft, 130, 212, 397
Callahan, James, 319, 524, 531
Canada, 62, 156, 220, 309
Cargo ships, and overseas force deployment, 212
Carrucci, Frank, 384, 452, 484(n)
“Carre Blanche” operation, 76
Carter, Jimmy: defense spending of, 314, 323, 342-343, 345, 349-351, 386-387, 453
division in administration, 311-312, 361-362
economic policy of, 315-316, 351, 357-358
foreign policy of, 311-312, 315, 316, 345-346, 351, 353
and Iranian hostage situation, 343-344
and LTDP, 320, 425, 427
military relations of, 313, 339-341, 351, 354
NATO policy of, 312-314, 355, 363, 366, 394, 524, 525
and natural gas pipeline, 404
and neutron bomb, 320-323
nuclear strategy of, 330, 331, 382, 484-485
and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 544-345, 347
Carter Doctrine, 345
Casey, William, 372
CDI, 431, 444
CDU party, in FRG, 163, 363, 407, 545
CDU/CSU party, in GDR, 506
CDU/EDP coalition, in FRG, 115, 414, 526
CDU/SPD coalition, in FRG, 178
Ceausescu, Nicolae, 501
CENTAG, 218, 436
CENTCOM, establishment of, 397
Central Region, NATO defense of, 61, 63, 95, 216-218, 335, 338
CIE talks, 474, 475, 495, 497, 498, 503, 533
CIE Treaty, 509-511
Charter of Paris, 511
Cheb gap, 218, 436
Chemical weapons, 417, 510
Cheney, Dick, 272(n), 484(n), 542(n)
Chernenko, Konstantin, 417, 418, 478
Chernobyl nuclear accident, 467
Chieftain tanks, 229
China, People’s Republic of: communist victory in, 55
relations with Soviet Union, 254, 257, 281, 323
relations with U.S., 253-254, 257, 374, 385
Churchill, Senator Frank, 273
Churchill, Sir Winston, 24(n), 45(n), 59(n)
CIA, view of Soviet Union of, 143, 252
CINCHAN military command, 60
Civic Forum group, in Czechoslovakia, 500
Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), 345
Clay, General Lucius, 36, 137
Clinton, Bill, 3
Close air support operations, 94, 336, 338
“Club sandwich” concept, for front line defense, 218
CMF, 431, 444
Coalition diplomacy, of NATO, 534
Coalition planning, of NATO, 13, 307, 351, 432–433
Cobra antitank guided missile system, 230
Coburg approach, 218
Cold War: causes of, 19–23, 26, 28, 29, 57, 282, 350, 528–532	on end of, 476, 495–511, 553
reasons for, 3, 9–11, 519–532
Collective security system, NATO commitment to, 69, 521
Co-located Operating Bases (COBs), 336
COMECON, 460
Cominform, creation of, 36
Command Data Buffer System, 299
Command post exercises (CPX), of NATO, 176
Common Agricultural Policy, of EC, 530
Common Market. See EC
EC
Commonwealth of Independent States, in place of Soviet Union, 511, 515
economic failure of, 9–10, 20, 460, 488
Reagan’s view of, 380
in Soviet Union, 19, 512–513
threat of as motivating force of NATO, 520–521
Communist Party: in Eastern Europe, 55, 498–501
in Italy, 38, 308
in Soviet Union, 495, 497, 511, 515
Conceptual Military Framework (CMF), 431, 444
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. See CSCE
Congress of People’s Deputies, 496, 497
Conqueror tanks, 98
Consolidated Guidance (CG), of PPBS planning, 335
Containment policy, 10, 24–31, 56, 57, 78, 94–95
Contractual Agreement, 1952, 64
Conventional Defense Initiative (CDI), 431, 444
Conventional forces: in 1950s, 81, 89–91, 92
in 1970s, 270, 277–302, 304, 327, 352
in 1980s, 393, 395, 396
post–cold war levels, 541–542
in MC14/3, 185, 198–197, 203, 259, 279
NATO policy towards, 7, 194, 363, 423, 427–428
and nuclear warfare interconnection, 77, 60, 81–82, 104, 153, 171, 174, 177, 188, 192, 240, 430
of Soviet Union, 251–252, 293–294, 467, 488
Conventional Forces in Europe talks. See CFE
Conventional Military Framework (CMF), 431, 444
Convoy system, 21
Corporal missiles, 78
Cost control, in MC14/2 and MC14/3, 195, 205
Council of Deputies, of NATO, 42
“Counterair 98,” 428
Counter blitzkrieg strategy, of NATO, 437
Counterforce doctrine, 124, 154–165, 298
Countervailing strategy, 362–363, 392
Coupling, as NATO strategy, 406, 410
Credibility factor, in deterrence, 186–187
Crimea, Russian/Ukrainian friction over, 549
Crisis stability, in MC14/3, 192–193
Croatia, 500, 547, 549
CROSSPIECE, 43
Crowe, Admiral William, 384
Cruise missiles, 277, 363, 411, 467–470
CSBM conference, 417, 474–475
CSCE: during Cold War, 4, 277, 278, 355, post–Cold War, 508, 511, 526, 534, 535, 543, 557, 564–566
CSCE Review Conference, 470
CSU party, in FRG, 407
Cuba, 281, 374, 450
Cuban Missile Crisis, 158–159, 169, 530
CVN-72 nuclear aircraft carrier, 397
CVN-73 nuclear aircraft carrier, 397
Cyprus, 140, 308
Czechoslovakia: decline of Soviet influence in, 497, 500, 501, 507
division of, 548
and Polish situation, 375  
rejection of German neutrality, 506  
Soviet influence in, 38, 70, 144, 415  
Soviet invasion of, 226, 231, 376, 500, 531  

D-5 missiles, 363, 392, 398, 483, 485  
Damage limitation doctrine, 164 (n), 166–168  
DC 6/1, 49  
DDG-47 destroyers, 339  
"Declaration of Atlantic Relations," 288, 305  
Decoupling effect, of SS-20 missiles, 330, 331  
Defense, as MC14/3 objective, 189–192  
Defense Department. See United States Defense Department  
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), warning of Soviet military build-up, 252–253  
Defense Planning Committee (DPC), of NATO, 42, 184–185, 279, 319, 347–348  
Defense spending: 14, 556  
Japanese, 346–347, 461, 530  
LTDTP 3% target, 319–320, 348, 358–360, 426–427, 452–453, 529–530  
by mission category, 83–67, 399–400  
of Warsaw Pact, 323, 389, 486, 497  
Defensive defense, strategy of, 438  
Defensive frontage, extent covered by one division, 218  
Defensive war, advantages of fighting, 233  
Deficit, U.S., 388, 450–451, 460  
De Gaulle, Charles, 249, 267  
and EEC, 160, 161, 178, 287  
and European unity under France, 87, 115, 161, 240  
FRG relationship of, 161–163, 178  
NATO relationship of, 92, 105, 115, 208, 220–224, 525  
nuclear strategy of, 147, 150, 160, 163, 220  
and Soviet Union, 139, 159, 161, 276  
and United States, 133, 139, 159–161, 175, 182, 200. See also France  
DeLauer, Richard, 384  
Deliberate escalation, 199, 259  
Demobilization, of forces, post-World War II, 31, 32, 35  
Democracy: as NATO policy, 9, 11, 532, 550, 552–553  
in Soviet Union, 512  
Democratic Party, 3, 452, 476–477, 524  
Denmark: defense spending of, 62, 93, 135, 272, 309, 326, 444–445  
and EEC, 287, 547  
NATO role of, 213, 218, 220, 527  
nuclear policy of, 85, 158, 322, 417  
Desert Storm, Operation, 536–540, 558. See also Gulf War  
Détente: and Afghanistan situation, 372–373, 378  
Carter's contribution to, 355  
effects of, 267, 280, 529–531  
and FRG, 275, 308, 502  
French goals for, 276  
NATO’s policy for, 185, 230, 226, 276–277, 520  
and Nixon administration, 247, 274–276, 350, 525  
and Polish situation, 377, 378  
Reagan’s tempo for, 380, 454  
Soviet call for, 184, 225–226, 241, 252, 264–265, 280  
stagnation of, 277–278  
Western European attitude to, 249–250, 272, 282, 350, 378, 454  
Détente diplomacy, process of, 268, 274–282  
Deterrence: and conventional military forces, 47, 133, 189  
in 1950s, 103  
MC14/2 emphasis on, 205  
MC14/3 achievement of, 199  
McNamara’s policy of, 133, 139–140, 149, 150  
rationale behind, 186–187, 189, 297  
Diego Garcia, U.S. base on, 397  
Diplomacy, controversy over NATO’s, 530  
Direct defense, policy of, 199–200, 259  
Directorate for Development, Research and Engineering (DDR&E) 168  
Division/equivalents (DE), rise of in NATO, 228  
Division of labor strategy, in NATO, 48–49, 60, 71, 105, 306, 348  
Dollar, value of, 283, 284–285, 286, 356  
DOUBLESTAR emergency plan, 36  
Double-zero agreement, on INF Treaty, 471, 472  
PDP, 42, 184–185, 279, 319, 147–348  
Draft, military, 40, 461
Dual track decision, of NATO on missiles, 406, 408, 415
Dubcek, Alexander, 509
Dukakis, Michael, 476
Dulles, John Foster, 68, 80
Dunkirk, Treaty of, 40

Eastern Europe: fall of communism, in, 495–501
NATO involvement in, 531, 542–543, 552, 557, 563, 565–566. See also Warsaw Pact
East Germany. See German Democratic Republic (GDR)
EC: admission policy of, 503, 513, 547, 548
British membership in, 525, 559
EEC's name change to, 459
and France, 526, 547
integration policy of, 540–541, 547–548
NATO relationship, 9, 534, 535, 544–546, 548
as security pillar of Europe, 4, 543, 552, 558–558
and united Germany, 503, 505, 507, 547. See also EEC

Economic conservatism, of Reagan Administration, 382, 454, 457–460
Economic damage, to Soviet Union by increased defense spending, 488
Economic integration, steps towards in Western Europe, 64–65, 540–541, 547–548. See also EC: EEC
Economic power, Western Europe/Warsaw Pact compared. 142–143, 481
Economic recovery, post–World War II, 25, 42, 48, 51–52, 57
Economic Recovery Program (ERP), 27
Economics: as cement of NATO, 523–524
importance of to peace, 556–558
Economic shock, Nixon's policy of, 283
Economic summits, under Carter, 356, 357
Economic trends, 357, 358, 404, 426, 457–458, 512, 542, 553–554
EDC treaty, 56–68, 70
Eden, Sir Anthony, 71, 77
EEC: admission policy of, 178, 287
and Afghanistan, 372, 374
beginnings of, 134
Carter's attitude to, 357
and De Gaulle, 160, 161, 178, 287
development of in 1980s, 459
different concepts of by France and FRG, 138–139
as NATO replacement, 225, 267–288
natural gas embargo policy of, 405
protectionist policies of, 249, 285, 286, 356. See also EC
EFTA, 139
Egypt, 261, 352, 385, 397
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 22, 59(n), 84(n), 88(n), 96(n)
commitment to NATO, 524, 525
defense budgets of, 81, 92
and German rearmament, 86, 67
nuclear policy of, 78, 118, 133
as SACEUR, 59
Elbe river, 31
Elbe–Seiten canal, 435
El Salvador, 373, 374, 450
"Emerging Technologies," 428
Emigration policies, of Soviet Union, 280
Enhanced radiation warhead. See Neutron bomb
ENTAC antitank guided missile system, 230
Erhard, Ludwig, 177, 181, 184
ERW. See Neutron bomb
Escalation: ladder of, 180, 203, 259
in MCI14/3, 192–193, 203
McNamara's strategy of, 123, 126, 140, 142, 150
NATO's stance on, 137, 154, 179, 187, 224, 234–235, 430
Essential equivalence, 257–259, 363
Estonia, declaration of sovereignty, 511
Ethiopia, communist influence in, 374
EUCOM, 222, 223
EURATOM, 287
"Eurogroup" caucus, 268
Euromissile issue, 406–418. See also GLCM missiles
Pershing II/GLCM missiles
Europe: elements needed for peace in, 552
reasons for U.S. interests in, 265, 301, 555
scenarios for future of, 555
European Coal and Steel Community, 64, 287
European Commission, role of, 459
European Community. See EC
European Council of Ministers, 459
European Defense Community (EDC), 67–68, 69
European Defense Improvement Program (EDIP), 270
European Disarmament Conference, 462
European Economic Community. See EEC
European Free Trade Association (EFTA), 139
European Monetary System, 357
European Parliament, role of, 459
European Recovery Program, 33
European security conference, demand for, 276, 277
Evil empire speech, 380, 419
Exchange rates, establishment of flexible, 283, 284, 286, 306, 355, 457–458
Exercise Bright Star, 346
F-4 fighter bombers, 130, 145, 210, 230
F-14 fighter bombers, 339
F-16 aircraft, 309, 338, 353, 361, 440, 443, 461
F-18 fighter, 339
F-100 aircraft, 94(n)
F-101 aircraft, 94(n)
F-102 aircraft, 94(n)
F-104 aircraft, 94(n), 181, 230
F-105 fighter bombers, 130, 145
F-111 bombers, 170, 364, 487
Falkland Islands, 427
FALLEX exercise, 177
Farnall, Marshal, 447
Fast Deployment Logistics (FDL) ships, 212
FB-122 bombers, 256, 484
FDP party, in FRG, 383, 407, 413, 414, 545
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG):
defense spending of, 135, 269, 272, 360
and détente, 275–277, 308
economy of, 26, 286, 307, 357, 457, 458
and EEC, 138–139, 178, 459
establishment of, 38, 54, 64–68
and flexible response, 185, 203, 430
and France, 160–163, 178, 223
and GDR, 138, 169, 277, 501, 502
and host nation support, 326–327, 427
military forces of, 145, 212–215, 230, 309, 326, 437, 438, 440, 445
and missile deployment, 331, 332, 406, 407, 413–414, 416, 418, 471–472
NATO contribution of, 6, 73, 87, 105–107, 114–115, 133, 220, 230–240, 319, 450, 526, 527
natural gas pipeline agreement, 381, 404–405
nuclear policy of, 63, 86, 135, 147–148, 151, 158, 163, 169–170, 195, 321, 456, 533
Ostpolitik of, 225, 226, 268, 275
and Paris Agreement, 71, 179, 195
and Poland, 70, 275–277, 503, 506, 509
political changes in, 178, 394, 497, 413, 418, 502–509
rearmament of, 46, 49, 62–75, 85, 92, 98, 102, 97–99, 135, 212–213, 529
and Soviet Union, 159, 277, 508, 509
Federal Reserve Board, 356, 457
Federated multinational nuclear force, 155
Fencer aircraft, 459, 467, 469
FPG-7 guided missile frigates, 339
Field training exercises (FTX), of NATO, 176
Fifty to sixty division posture needed for defense of Central Europe, 233, 234, 444
Fighter interceptors, 354
Final Act, 278
Financial and Economic Board, of NATO, 41
Finland, in EC, 547
First strike capability, 124, 124–125(n), 141–142, 362, 482
Fitter aircraft, 439, 489
Five-Year Defense Program (FYDP), in Pentagon, 334–335
FLEETWOOD emergency plan, 37
Flexible response strategy, 7, 528, 522, 526, 527
as basic to MCI/3, 185–189
and forward defense, 179, 203
in 1960s, 124, 176, 222, 238, 525
in 1970s, 258–263, 309, 314–315, 352, 360, 363
in early 1980s, 394, 430
neutron bomb's contribution to, 321
revision of, 537
and Soviet build-up, 330, 493
Flogger aircraft, 439, 489
Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA) 443–447, 493
Follow-on to Lance missile (FOTL), 354
Force de frappe, De Gaulle’s policy of, 87, 160
Force d’Action Rapide, 447
Force goals, as NATO planning document, 205, 425
“Force Planning Exercise,” of NATO, 171, 173
Ford, Gerald, 245, 278, 281, 307, 349, 350, 524, 525
Forty to fifty division posture, needed for defense of Central Europe, 233
Forward defense concept: French non-participation in, 222, 224
in 1950s, 45–47, 72–73, 84, 101
in 1950s, 199–197, 203, 214–218
in 1970s, 309, 314–315, 352, 360
in 1980s, 394, 438–439, 445
military strategy for, 46–47, 100, 131,
172, 212, 216–218, 233, 343–435, 437,
447
NATO commitment to, 72–73, 106, 148,
179, 438, 493, 525, 527
replacing of, 537
FOTL, 534
Four-Power Control Council, 27
Foxbat aircraft, 489
France
and conventional warfare, 49, 134,
172–173, 177, 269, 319, 447
defense spending of, 62, 135, 272, 309,
360
détente goals of, 276
economic policy of, 286, 382, 405, 455,
457, 458, 544
and EEC/EC, 130–139, 170, 267, 459,
547, 559
and FRG, 65, 67, 68, 160–163, 178, 223,
547
NATO role of, 5, 44–45, 85, 87, 93, 105,
115, 202, 222–224, 239–240, 526–527,
564
NATO withdrawal of, 160, 182, 183, 218,
220–224, 249
nuclear policy of, 83, 86–87, 135, 141,
156, 158, 163, 170, 185, 220–222, 224,
407, 409, 454, 465
overseas commitments of, 85, 92, 316,
347, 558
as source of reserves for NATO, 224,
309, 326, 435
and U.S. relationship to, 83, 86–87,
107–108, 115, 133, 138, 146, 147, 220,
249, 302, 419, 459–460, 521, 525
post-Cold War, 541, 543–546, 559, 564.
See also De Gaulle, Charles
Franco-German brigade. 430, 540–541, 543,
544, 558, 558
Frankfurt area, defense of, 102, 216
Free-market principles, Reagan’s policy of
return to, 382
Freud, Sigmund, 551
FRG. See Federal Republic of Germany
Friendship, Treaty of, between Germany
and Soviet Union, 1991, 509
Friendship and Cooperation, Treaty of,
between France and FRG, 1963, 160–
162
FRG missiles, 85, 190
Frogfoot aircraft, 469
Fuerth approach, 218
Fulcrum aircraft, 469
Fulda gap, 218, 436
Fulda-Meiningen area, 218
“Full Counterforce” strategy, of U.S.
nuclear policy, 124–125(n)
G-7 Summit, Munich, 1992, 544, 545
Gaither Committee Report, 99(a), 119(n)
Galvin, General John, 424, 487, 491
GATT negotiations, 139, 181, 265, 306, 357,
453, 460, 530, 544, 545
GDP, defense spending as proportion of,
264, 358, 361, 460, 461
GDR. See German Democratic Republic
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs,
negotiations. See GATT
General nuclear response, 199, 259
Geneva Summit, 1955, 77
Geneva Summit, 1983, 463
Genscher Hans-Dietrich, 322, 407, 411–414,
505–507
Gerbach, Manfred, 501
German Democratic Republic: collapse of
communism in, 501, 504, 506
and FRG, 71, 115, 116, 139, 275–277,
279
opposition of to reunification, 502–503
rearmament of, 69–70
Soviet influence in, 24, 85, 135–136,
144, 415, 497, 531
Germany: neutrality of, 504–509
rearmament of, 63–74, 93, 97, 98, 102,
105–108, 135, 212–213, 528
reunification of: achievement of, 502–509, 558, and détente, 508
FRG commitment to, 115, 138
NATO attitude to, 27–28, 71, 66
and Ostpolitik, 225, 229, 268, 275
Soviet attitude to, 5, 63, 71, 85, 508
state of post-unification, 353–556, 539,
541, 542, 545, 547, 559–559, 564
See also Federal Republic of
Germany
German Democratic Republic
Gilpatrick, Roswell, 127, 165(n)
Giscard d’Estaing, Valéry, 308, 319, 331, 373
GIUK naval barrier, 339–341
Glasnost, 465, 513
GLCM missiles, 260, 331–333, 364, 411, 466.
See also Euromissiles
Pershing II/GLCM missiles
Global flexibility, as aim of McNamara’s
reorganizations, 131
Global security order, fragmentation of, 14
Global strategy, Nixon’s, 256–258
GNP, defense spending share of, 134(n),
296, 307, 390, 529–530
Gold convertability, Nixon’s suspension of,
283
Goodpaster, General Andrew, 51(n), 268–
269, 272, 303, 313
Gorbachev, Mikhail: and arms control
negotiations, 449, 450, 462–468, 471,
487, 493–498, 510
and Baltic independence, 511–512
coup d’état against, 511, 513, 514
domestic agenda of, 449, 464–466, 475,
495–497, 512–515
economic policies of, 449, 465, 497, 512
and German unification in NATO, 502,
504–509
resignation of, 515
and Warsaw Pact, 7, 497–498, 501
Göttingen gap, 218, 435
Graham–Rudman–Hollings bill, 452
Grain sales, resumption of U.S./Soviet
Union, 380, 381
“Grand Design,” of integrated Europe,
160–161, 249
Great Britain: defense spending of, 86, 93,
134, 135, 158, 176–178, 220, 272, 308,
360, 542
economic policy of, 139, 181, 225, 304,
382, 455, 457, 458
and EEC, 139, 160, 161, 287, 459, 547,
559
and Euromissile deployment, 331, 332,
407, 416, 417
and FRG, 65, 71–73, 220, 503
independent nuclear program of, 86–
87, 147, 171, 195, 330, 407, 409, 465
military policy of, 31, 32, 44, 48–49, 62,
67, 71–73, 185, 220, 269, 319, 445,
447, 542, 558. See also BAOR, NATO
role of, 6, 45, 239, 460, 525–527, 564
nuclear policy within NATO, 83, 85, 95,
114, 135, 146, 147, 154, 156, 163, 322,
456
overseas responsibilities of, 220, 347,
427, 558
and U.S. relations, 20–23, 522–525, 545
in 1950s, 83, 86–87, 105, 98
in 1960s, 114, 132, 159
in 1970s, 248, 349
in 1980s, 397, 418–419, 427, 455
The Great Illusion, 551
Greece: communist rising in, 26
and NATO, 6(n), 61, 62, 156, 417
relations with Turkey, 149, 308, 527
Green party, in FRG, 414, 415
Grinevsky, Oleg, 509
Gromyko, Andrei, 406, 408, 418, 496
Gross Domestic Product. See GDP
Gross National Product. See GNP
Grosz, Karoly, 500
Ground attack capability, NATO/Soviet air
forces, 145, 354
Ground employment doctrine, call for
changes in, 445
Ground forces, NATO/Warsaw Pact, 488–
491
Ground Zero movement, 409
Group of Soviet Forces Germany. See GSFG
Grunther, General Alfred, 68, 117
GSFG, 69, 251–252, 364
Guadeloupe Summit, 1979, 331
“Guam Doctrine,” 258
Gulf War, 513, 539–540, 546, 558
Haig, Alexander, 313–314, 372, 380(n), 404,
405, 408, 425
HALFMOON, emergency plan for war in
Europe, 38–40, 41
Hallstein Treaty, 169, 274
Hamburg, NATO protection of, 215, 218
Hannover, 215, 218
Harmel Report, 184, 185, 200, 226, 267, 520,
527
Harrier aircraft, 461
Harriman, Averell, 23, 57
Hart, B. H. Liddell, 5
Harz Mountains, 435
Havel, Vaclav, 500
HAWK SAM missile launchers, 230
Healey, Denis, 177, 184, 268, 269
Helicopters, improvement in U.S. army,
269. See also Attack helicopters
Helmstedt-Dortmund corridor, 435
Helsinki accords, 315
Herter, Christian, 155
Hessen corridor, 218, 436
High Level Group (HLG), 331
Himmeleder memorandum, 69
Hiroshima, impact on military strategy, 35
Hitch, Charles, 127
HNS program, 327, 336, 353, 396, 427
Hof corridor, 218, 436
Honest John missile, 77, 260
Horizontal escalation, 393, 399, 401
Host nation support program. See HNS program
Hot Line Agreement, 184(n)
Honecker, Erich, 501
Hungarian Socialist Party, 500
Hungary: fall of communism in, 497, 500, 501, 506, 507, 547-549
1956 uprising in, 84, 376, 500, 531
Hunter aircraft, 94(n)
Husak, Gustav, 500
Hussein, Saddam, 513, 540
Hydrogen bomb, development of, 55, 57.
See also Atomic bomb
Nuclear weapons

ICBMs: arms control negotiations of, 411–412, 458, 487
Minuteman, 119, 124–125(n), 251, 255, 256, 292, 277, 398
mobile housing of, 398, 464
NATO/Warsaw Pact comparison of, 121, 122, 227, 251, 292, 362, 468, 482, 483
Soviet use of, 85, 96, 114, 158, 277, 292–293, 464, 486, 487
U.S. use of, 119, 154, 165, 166, 171, 255, 256, 392, 397, 402, 453
Iceland, NATO defense of, 61
Iké, Fred Charles, 384
Imperialism, U.S. not prone to, 555
Imports, Nixon’s surcharge on, 283
India, 281
Indian Ocean, Soviet naval activity in, 374
Indochina, French forces in, 62, 68, 86
Industrial reparations, payments of
Allies/Soviet Union, 27
Industrial strength, importance of FRG’s, 47
INF negotiations, 406–411, 414–418, 463, 466–471
INF program, 330, 371, 410, 418–423, 455
INF Treaty, 471–472, 473, 487
Infantry, mechanization of, 228, 231–232
Initial defense, NATO reliance on, 279
Initial support increment (ISI), of army combat units, 210
Integrated military organization, for NATO, 59–60, 106, 344, 569
Integration, question of European commitment to, 287, 459
Interceptor program, to modernize NATO air forces, 440
Intercontinental ballistic missiles. See ICBMs
Interest rates, increase of, 457, 458
Intermediate-range nuclear forces. See INF
Intermediate-range ballistic missiles. See IRBMs
International Monetary Fund, 357
International Security Affairs Staff, of OSD, 143
Iran, 26, 343–344, 346
Iran-Contra scandal, 452, 470, 476
Iran hostage crisis, 343, 345, 349, 355
Iran-Iraq War, 373, 498
Iraq, 344, 373, 374, 513, 539
IRBMs: NATO use of, 88, 87–88, 154
Soviet development of, 85, 96, 122
Ireland, 287
Iron Curtain Speech, 24(n)
Israel, 281, 352, 373, 385
Italy: Communist Party power in, 38, 308
defense spending of, 62, 135
missile deployment in, 95, 154, 158, 331, 416
and NATO, 6(n), 61, 527, 564
Jackson, Senator Henry, 280, 384
Jackson-Nunn Amendment, 283
Jaeger infantry units, of Bundeswehr, 214
Jakes, Milos, 500
Japan: defense spending of, 346–347, 461, 530
Soviet threat to, 56, 281, 373, 415
U.S. policy toward, 25, 253–254, 303, 394
Jaruzelski, Wojciech, 377, 378, 498–499
Javelin aircraft, 94(n)
ICS, 236, 252, 261, 279, 313, 384, 391, 397
Jet aircraft, development of, 35
Johnson, Louis, 58
Johnson, Lyndon B., 123, 137, 163, 167, 182(n), 184, 225
contribution to NATO, 524, 525
Joint Chiefs of Staff. See JCS
Jones, General David, 313, 384
JSTARS aircraft, 443
Jung, Carl, 551
Jupiter missiles, 154
Kania, Stanislaw, 375
Karmal, Babrak, 373
Kazakhstan, 565
KC-10 cargo aircraft, 397
Kennan, George, 91(n), 23, 24, 430(n)
Kennedy, John F.: assassination of, 163
  election as president, 113
  and GATT negotiations, 285
  and "Grand design" of, 160–161, 248
  military policy of, 119, 128–132, 136–
  138
  NATO contribution of, 116, 524, 525
  and nuclear strategy, 119–120, 122–126,
  158
  West European reaction to, 115, 133–
  135, 139
Kenya, U.S. bases in, 397
Keynesian economics, 113, 457
Khomeini, Ayatollah, 343, 352
Khrushchev, Nikita, 113–116, 142, 225, 231
  threats to Berlin, 77–79, 135–138
Kiesinger, Kurt-George, 178
Kilian report, 119(n)
Kim II Sung, 253
Kissinger, 118
  foreign policy views of, 246–249, 253,
  274–276, 379
  as Secretary of State, 281, 282
  systems analysis office of, 261
Kisoczak, Czeslaw, 500
Kohl, Helmut: conservative economic
  policy of, 458
  and German unification, 502, 505, 507,
  509
  and NATO nuclear policy, 412–415,
  430, 472, 534
  and U.S. relations, 430, 456, 478, 545
Komer, Robert, 313, 349(no), 389(n)
  and LTPD, 318, 320, 327, 334
Korea, 132, 253, 281, 349, 373, 415
  U.S. forces in, 258, 314, 316, 320
Korean War, 7, 55–56, 58, 65, 117
Kosygin, Aleksei, 225–226, 247
Krasnoyarsk, Soviet ABM network at, 464
Kravchuk, Leonid M., 515
Krenz, Egon, 501, 502
Kuwait, 513, 539
Kvitsinsky, Yuri, 411

Labour Party, of Great Britain, 163
Laird, Melvin, 246, 252, 257, 261, 263–264,
  268, 291, 277, 279
Latin government, of France, 68
Latin America, Soviet influence in, 373, 374,
  460, 484
Latvia, declaration of sovereignty, 511

“Layer cake” concept for frontline defense,
  218–220, 435, 435, 445
Lebanon, violent situation in, 373
Lebanon landing, 92
Lehman, John F. Jr., 384
Lemnitzer, General Lyman, 141, 175–176,
  268
Leopard I tanks, 229
Libya, 374, 467, 539
Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1963, 169
Limited war, NATO’s nuclear strategy and,
  90, 91, 95, 117, 141–142, 168, 197
Linear defense, NATO move away from
  after Cold War, 537
Lisbon Force Goals, 61–63, 78–79, 89, 134
Lithuania, declaration of sovereignty, 511,
  512
Locke, John, 551
Logistics support system, NATO’s, 209, 211,
  237, 270, 326–327, 432–433
London Declaration, 508
London Economic Summit, 1304, 458
London Summit, 1977, 317–318, 327
London Summit, 1990, 508, 537–538
Long-range intermediate nuclear forces.
  See LPINF missiles

"Long Telegram," 24
Long Term Defense Plan. See LTPD
LPINF missiles, 332, 411, 471–473
LR/SRINF missiles, 487
LTPD, 237, 318–320
  air defense segment of, 440
  attempts to enforce, 354–352
  and Carter administration, 330–331,
  335, 357–359, 425, 427
  and counter blitzkrieg strategy, 437
  effects of, 324–327, 333, 348, 380–361,
  433
  logistics category of, 325–327
  and NATO/Soviet Union comparison,
  364, 490
  and Reagan administration, 347, 396,
  425
  3% standard spending increase in,
  319–320, 348, 358–360, 426–427,
  452–453, 529–530
Lübeck, NATO protection of, 218
Luneburger Heide, as gap in NORTHAG,
  435

M-59 APRs, 98
M-75 APRs, 98
M-113 armored personnel carriers, 200–209
M-1 tank, 338, 353, 443
M-47 tanks, 98, 213
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>600</td>
<td>M-48 tanks, 98, 206, 213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M-60 tanks, 208, 229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maastricht Treaty, 541, 543, 544, 547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Macmillan, Harold, 114, 147, 159, 163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Magdeburg, 137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maginot Line, 438, 444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Malzière, Lothar de, 506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Major, John, 547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Malta Summit, 1989, 594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manchuria, Soviet threat to, 254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maneuver, lack of in active defense doctrine, 446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mansfield, Senator Mike, 226, 250, 273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mao TSE Tung, 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS), for U.S. Marines, 345, 397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Market economy, Gorbachev's attempts to introduce into Soviet Union, 512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marshall, George C., 27, 33, 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marshall Plan, 27, 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marxism, development of, 19. See also Communism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Massive retaliation, 7, 79-80, 89-91, 103-104, 116-117, 192, 526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>McNamara's rejection of, 123, 135, 140, 150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Matador missiles, 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mazowiecki, Tadeusz, 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MBFR negotiations, 189(n), 268-270, 273, 277-279, 355, 361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>failure of, 416, 424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>resumption of, 417, 462, 463, 467, 470, 474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MC14/1 strategy statement, 60, 77, 80, 91, 104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MC14/2, 82, 81-84, 95, 95-96, 116-117, 135, 165, 184, 197-198, 205, 221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>support for in FGR, 92, 117, 147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MC14/3 strategy statement: arms control as factor of, 192-195, 195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>combination of conventional and nuclear forces in, 91, 198-199, 203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>cost control in, 195, 205, 227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>defense as consideration in, 189-192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>deterrence as consideration in, 186-187, 227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>differences from MC14/2, 197-198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>forces needed to comply with, 199-197, 232, 233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and forward defense concept, 199, 214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>inconsistencies of, 197, 199-203, 205, 490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>replacement of, 91, 540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>support for in 1970s, 259-260, 267, 269, 272, 279, 303, 360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MC 48, 88, 89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MC 48/3, 199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MC 70, 89, 92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MC 106/1, 172-173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MC 324, 431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>McMahon Act, 1946, 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>McNamara, Robert S., 119, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>allied reaction to, 146-148, 170, 177, 182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Athens Speech of, 140-142, 146-151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and conventional force build-up, 126-132, 142-146, 150-151, 153-154, 171-174, 186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>counterforce concepts of, 124, 163-165, 298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and logistic readiness standards, 130, 199(n), 204, 209, 211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>management techniques of, 126-128, 153, 173, 183, 209-210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>modernization of military services, 127-131, 208-211, 230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NATO role of, 153, 166, 173, 183, 236-239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>nuclear strategy of, 120, 122-126, 148, 156-157, 158, 165, 170, 186-187, 255, 276, 430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>policy differences from Nixon administration, 249, 259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mechanization, of infantry, 228, 231-232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mediterranean, naval presence in, 176, 221, 340, 352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medium-range ballistic missiles. See MRBMs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Meiningen Gap, 218, 436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding, on SDI, 456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mendes-France, Pierre, 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mercantilism, trend towards, 15, 553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mexico, default on debt payments, 458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle East: NATO policy to protect, 25, 43 tensions in, 39, 281, 295, 373, 374, 464, 536, 557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MiG-21 fighters, 145, 232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Appropriations Bill, 1982, 428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Committee, of NATO, 42, 194-195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Production and Supply Board, of NATO, 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Minimalist,&quot; strategy, of U.S. nuclear policy, 124-125(n)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minuteman ICBM missiles, 119, 124-125(n), 251, 255, 256, 292, 277, 398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minuteman silos, for M-X missiles, 483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mirage 2000 aircraft, 361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MIRV warheads, 251, 255, 256, 277, 278, 292, 277, 328, 468, 482, 483</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Missile gap, fear of between Soviet Union and U.S., 120
Mitterrand, Francois, 382, 409, 458, 478, 507, 541, 547
MK-12A warhead, for Minuteman ICBM, 277
MLF, 155-157, 160-160, 163-164, 169, 170, 174-175
MLRS rocket launcher, 339, 353, 443, 447, 461
Mobile bases, for M-X missiles, 483, 485
Mobile defense, as military strategy, 437, 537
Mobilization rates, NATO/Warsaw Pact compared, 234-235, 251-252, 364
Modernization rates, NATO/Warsaw Pact forces compared, 364-365, 433
Moldova, 512, 549
Mondale, Walter, 315
Monnet, Jean, 61
Montebello decision, 415-416, 487
Montgomery, Field Marshal Bernard, 22, 45-48, 59, 60, 68, 86, 144(n)
Moscow Conference, 1947, 27
Moscow Summit, 1988, 476, 496
Most favored nation status, not granted to Soviet Union, 280
MPS ships, acquisition of, 345, 397
MRBMs, 85, 96, 117, 122, 154-155
Mulroney, Brian, 476
Multilateral Force, for NATO. See MLF
Multilateralism, advantages of, 16, 556
Multinational forces, NATO espousal of, 537
Multiple targeting options, as element of Schlesinger’s nuclear policy, 275-277
Multipolarity, development with end of Cold War, 553
Munich, lessons learned at, on appeasement, 30, 522
Murray, Russell, 315(n)
Mutual balanced force reduction. See MBFR
Mutual Defense Assistance Bill, 1949, 52
Mutual deterrence, SDI threat to, 167, 168, 227, 256, 417, 420
Mutual Security Act, 1851, 59
M-X missiles, 277, 383, 392, 397-398, 483, 485
NAC, 42, 48, 49, 67, 81-82, 173, 183, 184, 223, 249, 319, 324
NACC, 543, 564, 565
NADGE, French participation in, 223
Nagasaki, impact of on military strategy, 35
Nassau/Ottawa accords, 150, 161, 163
National Guard. See United States National Guard
National Salvation Front (NSF), of Romania, 501
National Security Council, and OFFTACKLE, 43
NATO: achievements of, 6, 8-11, 102-103, 238, 510, 519-521, 528-532, 552
administrative structure of, 6, 10-12, 20, 41, 42, 46, 59, 96-97, 172, 173, 175, 527, 528
and aerial warfare, 94-96, 145-146, 221, 223, 229-230, 338, 439-441, 489-490
and arms control, 168, 278-279, 407-409, 416, 470, 473, 487, 510
British role in, 20-23, 525-527
Carter administration policy towards, 312-314, 334-335, 352, 353, 355
conventional forces of: deficiencies of, 96, 151, 261-262, 424
levels of, 97-99, 146, 174, 175, 227-231, 268-269, 270, 272, 273, 280, 541
modernization of, 228-231, 361
role of, 96, 117, 172, 193, 195, 280-284, 279, 423
critics of, 11, 107-118, 355
defense spending of, 135, 348, 389-390, 426-427, 452-453
and détente, 201, 226, 274-282, 287-288, 350
and division of labor concept, 48-49, 60, 71, 105, 306, 348
and Eastern Europe, 375-378, 506-506, 531
economic role of, 48, 142-143, 226, 308-309, 356-359, 481, 523-524, 535
flexible response strategy of, 7, 179, 199-199, 308, 493
force levels of, 50, 58-59, 81-82, 88-92, 97-100, 119, 135, 185, 221, 232-233, 541-542
North Atlantic sea lanes (SLOCs), U.S. navy protection of, 339, 341
North Atlantic Treaty, signing of, 36
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. See NATO
Northern Army Group. See NORTHAG
Northern Ireland, British forces in, 220
North Korea, 295
Norway: military policy of, 62, 85, 158, 353
NATO protection of, 6(n), 59(n), 61, 176, 199, 197, 218, 237, 340
NATO role of, 527
NPT, 169–170, 184(n), 195
NSC-20/4, 52
NSC-68, 56–58, 78, 104, 127
NSC-114, 59
NSC-152, 79
NSSM-3, 256–257, 314, 391
Nuclear and Space Talks, 462, 495
Nuclear deterrence, 185, 259, 523
Nuclear escalation. See Escalation
Nuclear parity, NATO/Soviet Union, 191, 247, 255, 256, 294, 277, 363–364, 492
Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), 170, 171, 327
Nuclear strategy: NATO adoption of, 6–7, 57, 78, 83, 86, 104, 107, 134, 141–142, 240, 529
of United States, 35–37, 48, 123, 297–299, 392, 397–398, 454, 523
Nuclear testing, U.S./Soviet negotiations on, 464–467, 470, 471
Nuclear threshold, 193, 221, 259, 304, 536, 537
Nuclear war, shift from to conventional warfare, 93, 165, 187, 192, 240, 252
Nuclear weapons: military nature of, 47, 78, 83, 82–84, 191
modernization of, 329–334, 405–418
post-Cold War problem of, 533–534, 543, 549, 553, 565
Nunn, Senator Sam, 364–365, 426, 430
Nunn-Roth-Warner Amendment, 461

Occupation zones, in post-war Germany, 26
Ocean Venture 89, 375
October War, in Middle East, 280
Office of International Security Affairs, under McNamara, 127
Office of Management and the Budget, 342
Office of Systems Analysis, 261
OFFTACKLE plan, 43–45, 48–49, 73
Offutt Air Force base, SHAPE/SAC liaison at, 164
Oil price crisis, 356
Oman, U.S. bases in, 397
One-and-a-half war strategy, 257–258, 278, 315, 393
OPEC, 288, 305–306, 357
Operations research, McNamara’s use of in Pentagon, 120
OSD staff, management of Pentagon, 143–146, 313, 334–335, 342, 384
Osipolitik, 178, 225, 226, 239, 249, 268, 274–275, 287, 308, 502
Ottawa Economic Summit, 1981, 457
Ottawa meeting on MLF, 158–160
Out-of-area operations, NATO participation in, 539, 540
OVERLORD, 23(n)
Overseas deployment of forces, 130–131, 211–212, 237

P-3 patrol aircraft, 211, 339, 340
Pacific, U.S. role in, 340, 351
Paderborn plan, 218
Pakistan, 316, 344, 373, 385
Panama Canal Treaty, 317
Paris, as NATO’s institutional home, 222
Paris Conference, 1951, 62
Paris Speech, of Gorbachev on START, 463
Paris Treaty, of 1954, 67, 68, 71, 179, 195
Patriot Air Defense System, 336, 353, 441, 461
Patton, General George S., 22, 446
“Pause” concept, of conventional defense forces in NATO, 88, 117, 141
PD-18, 315
PD-59, 362–363, 392
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, 1976, 279(n), 466
Peacekeeper missiles, 463, 465
PEMA Paradox, of Soviet military spending, 143
Pentagon: during Carter administration, 313, 334–335, 345–346, 349
funding in, 34, 127, 142–143, 342, 351
and German rearmament, 64
and Kennedy administration, 119, 127, 165–167
and Nixon administration, 253, 291
and nuclear policy, 43, 80, 156, 165, 167, 276, 321, 330–331, 417
Index

and Reagan defense policy, 383–384, 400, 428, 452
warning of Soviet military build-up, 252, 261
Pentomic divisional structure, of army, 93, 129, 213
PEOPLE Paradox, of Soviet military force, 143–144
Perestroika, 465, 513
Perle, Richard, 384
Pershing IA missiles, 471–472
Pershing II missiles, 260, 331, 364, 415, 454, 464, 465
Pershing II/GLCM program, 331–333, 363, 403–418
and arms control, 409, 464, 466, 487
deployment of in Europe, 406–418, 471
opposition to deployment of, 332, 333, 406–410, 415. See also Euromissiles
Persian Gulf: Soviet threat to, 39, 364, 393, 394, 397, 450
as trouble spot, 343, 345–346, 352, 373, 536
U.S./Western European policy in, 43, 385, 493, 503
Petersberg talks, on German rearmament, 46
Planning Programming and Budgeting System. See PPBS
Pleven, Rene, 67
Pleven Plan, for German rearmament, 67, 68
Plowden, Sir Edwin, 61
POL system, 309
Poland: fall of communism in, 498–499, 547, 548
and FRC, 71, 275–277, 503, 506, 509
reform movement in, 371, 374–378
Soviet influence in, 24, 144, 371, 405, 508
Polaris missiles, 95, 119, 154–156, 160, 177, 260
Policy Troops and the NATO Alliance, 304
Polish Communist Party, 375, 377
Poltiburo, 450, 465, 496
POMCUS plan, 336, 353, 396
Pompidou, Georges, 248, 289, 276, 287
Portugal, 158, 308, 397, 527
Poseidon S/LBMs, 256, 277, 483
“Post Afghanistan NATO defense measures,” for Allies in Western Europe, 347
Potsdam agreement, 24
PPBS process: in NATO, 153
at Pentagon, 127–128, 334–335, 384
Press leaks, under Carter, 314
PRM-10, 314, 391
Procurement problem, in U.S. military, 342, 352, 354, 385, 389, 390, 396
Program Analysis and Evaluation Office, of Pentagon, 314(n)
Program Objective Memorandum (POM), 334, 335
Program of Cooperation (POC), to establish nuclear stockpile, 88
Puerto Rico Summit, 1976, 386
Quadrapartite Agreement on Berlin, 277
Quayle Amendment, 461
Radford, Arthur, 92
Rambouillet Summit, 1975, 306
RAND, call for more flexible NATO strategy in 1980s, 118
Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), 345–347
Rapid Reaction Corps, 537, 543, 552
Rapid reinforcement programs, NATO strengthened by, 335–336, 396, 425, 493
Rapier Air Defense System, 427
Rationalization, LTDP plan for, 326
RDF, 345–347
RDTTF, 397
Readiness, as LTDP goal, 325–326
Ready Reserve Fleet, 345
Reagan, Ronald: affinity with Gorbachev, 456, 466, 468–470, 476
and arms control, 381, 408, 410–414, 417, 419, 456, 464, 468–470
criticism of, 397–399, 403–404, 453–454
defense policy of, 7, 366, 376, 380–383, 391–394, 399, 425
defense spending of, 345, 386–388, 400, 425–426, 449–453
NATO contribution of, 393–394, 476–479, 524, 525
and NATO conventional forces, 424–425, 428
nuclear policy of, 362, 369, 397, 398, 403, 409, 427, 484–485
and SDI, 417, 456
Soviet Union attitude to, 371–383, 420
Reganomics, 455, 456. See also Reagan, Ronald, conservative economic policy of
"Realistic deterrence," strategy of, 257
Rearmament, German. See Germany, rearment of;
Recession, economic. 306–307, 388
Recoilless rifles, 229
Reconnaissance systems, 35
Recovery, as plan for post-war Europe, 28–29
REFORGER program, 207–208, 376
Regional Planning Groups, of NATO, 49–50
Regulus missiles, 77
Reinforcement process, improvements in
NATO, 62, 207, 211–212, 425, 433
Reinforcement rates, NATO/Warsaw Pact,
261–262, 308, 325
Renunciation of Force Treaty, FRG/Soviet
Union, 277
Republican Party, 450, 479, 524
Reserves, availability of to NATO, 131, 144, 261, 272, 326, 353, 366, 435, 436, 444, 542
Resource guidance, as NATO planning
document, 425
Retaliation, use of nuclear forces as means of, 123
Reykjavik Summit, 1985, 456, 469–470
Rhine defense concept, 46–48, 51, 60, 86, 215
Rhine river, in NATO strategy, 100, 233–235, 436
Ricaudo, David, 556
Richardson, Elliot, 291
“ROAD” division, McNamara’s
introduction of, 129
Rogers, General Bernard, 385, 424, 425, 444, 487, 491
Rogers, William, 246
Roland point defense systems, 440
Role specialization, NATO rejection of, 437
Roman Catholic Church, and Polish
situation, 375, 377, 499
Romania, fall of communism in, 501, 549
Rome Summit, 1991, 540–544, 564
Rome, Treaty of, 1957, 139
Ruhr, defense of, 216, 435
Rumfeld, Donald, 307
Russia: Czarist, 19, post-communist, 512, 549, 559, 552, 565
SAC, 77, 95, 125, 164
SACEUR: and conventional forces, 88, 236, 426, 427, 447
nuclear policies of, 86, 117, 154–156, 331
responsibilities of, 59, 67, 71, 176, 214
rotation of position of, 141, 174, 258–269, 313, 363
SACLANT, 60, 176
SAGGER antitank missiles, 232
Salami slice tactics, of Soviet Union against
NATO territory, 188, 199
SALT negotiations, 167, 256, 277, 279, 276, 531
Carter administration’s emphasis on,
315, 320, 330, 349, 355, 362
SALT II Treaty, 277–278, 343, 344, 381, 407, 463
violations of, 464, 467, 470
SAM missile launchers, NATO
development of, 229–230, 232
Saracen APRs, 90
Saudi Arabia, 346, 385
Schlesinger, James R.: career of, 291, 307, 361
and NATO conventional forces, 295–297, 299–303
and U.S. nuclear posture, 292, 2997–299, 302
Schmidt, Helmut, 118, 258, 509
and Afghanistan, 373
and Polish situation, 377
Schroeder, Gerhard, 178
Schwerpunkt, in AirLand Battle strategy,
447
SCUD missiles, 85, 190
SDI: negotiations on, 463–465, 467–471
use of, 417, 419, 456, 477, 486–487
Seabed Treaty, 1971, 279
Second echelon threat, from Warsaw Pact,
441, 444
Second strike policy, for nuclear use, 124
Serbia, 500, 549
Service life extension program (SLEP), to
extend life of carriers, 339
Shah, of Iran, 343, 345, 349
SHAKEDOWN plan, 43
SHAPE: and conventional balance, 280, 334, 428, 447, 537
development of, 31(n), 58, 136, 164, 175, 222, 223, 563
policy formation and, 151, 177, 178,
260, 270, 427, 487
Shevardnadze, Eduard, 463, 502, 507, 510, 513
Shillelagh antitank guided missile system,
230
Index

Short-range systems, possible elimination of, 487, 533
Shot across the bow nuclear strike, 192, 293, 259
Shultz, George, 405, 418, 425, 463
Single European Act, 459
Sixth Fleet, 352
Skybolt missiles, cancellation of, 159
SL-7 fast sealift ships, 397
SLBMs, 114, 120, 154, 171, 255, 256, 277–278, 286, 284, 283, 293–324, 314, 362, 373, 472, 482, 488–489
in START negotiations, 411–412, 460
U.S./Soviet comparisons, 122, 227, 292–293, 362, 482, 483
SLOCs, U.S. Navy protection of, 339, 341
Slovenia, 500, 547
"Smart" munitions, 441, 442
Smithsonian Agreement, 287, 305
Social Democratic parties, development of in Western Europe, 19
Social Democratic Party, of the Polish Republic, 500
Solidarity, 374–376, 498–499
Somalia, U.S. bases in, 397
SOSUS surveillance system, 340
Southeast Asia, U.S. policy statements on, 258
South Korea, U.S. defense of, 278, 365, 394
South Yemen, communist influence in, 374
Soviet Military Power, 15
against Afghanistan, 344–347, 372–373, 450
against Persian Gulf, 347, 453
air strength of, 37, 68, 231, 252, 293–294, 439, 488–490
Carter’s relations with, 315, 344, 351, 355
and China, 254, 257, 268, 323
collapse of, 449, 450, 495–496, 504, 511–515, 543, 549, 558, 565
defense spending of, 143, 323, 343, 389–390, 488, 496–497. See also Soviet Union, military build-up of
and détente, 201, 225–226, 245, 247, 267, 274–275, 289, 282
and Eastern Europe, 68, 84, 226, 375–376, 505–500
and Germany, 26–28, 159, 277, 414, 502, 505–509
military modernization of, 68, 85, 235–236, 252, 292–294, 364
missile deployment policy, 95, 114, 120, 150–151, 158–159, 169, 329–330, 414, 420
naval challenge to NATO, 237, 252, 340–341, 373–374, 398–399, 493
and Nixon administration, 246, 281, 264–265, 274–275
reaction to NATO missile deployment, 331, 332, 409, 410, 415–418
Reagan’s policy towards, 371, 372–383
strategic nuclear forces of, 292–293, 362, 482
tank warfare strength, 85, 229, 293–294, 336, 353, 489
Spain, 527
Spartan missiles, 165
SPD party, in FRG: defense ideas of, 70, 118, 148, 163, 322, 438, 526
and deployment issue, 332, 406, 409, 415–418
neutralism of, 406, 414, 545
political fortunes of, 178, 249, 383, 407, 413
SPD party, in GDR, 506
Sprint missiles, 165
Sputnik, launching of, 85
SRAM missiles, 277
SRINF missiles, 471, 473
SS-series, of ICBMs, 230, 292, 329, 409, 464, 471, 485
SS-20 missiles: negotiations over elimination of, 322, 407, 409, 411, 420, 466, 473
Soviet deployment of, 323–333, 363, 410, 414, 415, 463
SSBN submarines, 293, 277, 410, 415
SSN-688 submarines, 339
Stagflation, Carter failure to control, 355, 356
Stalin, Joseph, 19–20
development of atomic bomb, 37
and German unification, 28, 69, 70
and Western Europe, 23–24, 26, 29, 37, 55, 65
Standardization, of NATO forces, 433
Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), 176
Standing Group, of NATO, 42
START talks, 301, 406, 412, 416, 463, 467
471, 485
START Treaty, obstacles to, 473–474, 487, 510
Stealth bombers, 363, 398, 453, 484
Stockman, David, 365, 388(n)
Strategic bombers, 35, 57, 255, 362, 482, 484
Strategic Defense Initiative. See SDI
Strategic lift forces, 130–131, 211–212, 237
Strategic nuclear forces, 227, 254, 351, 362, 395, 482, 484–485
Strauss, Franz Josef, 172, 177, 407
SU-7 fighters, 232
Submarine warfare, 21, 277, 339, 340, 483, 485
Suez crisis, 83, 105, 107, 220
“Sufficiency,” Nixon doctrine of on nuclear weapons, 254, 298
Summits, establishment of annual economic, 308, 356
Super carriers, nuclear function of, 75
Support structures, of NATO troops, 143–144, 304, 308, 395, 432–433
Supreme Soviet, and political change, 496
Sustaining support increment (SSI), of combat units, 210
Sustainability, NATO deficiencies in, 262, 304, 309
Sweden, 547
Switzerland, 547
Syria, 281, 373, 374, 539
Systems analysis, McNamara’s use of, 128, 153
Systems Analysis Office, of Secretary of Defense, 127, 143, 314(n)
T-34 tanks, 70
T-54 tanks, 70
T-62 tanks, 232, 251
T-64 tanks, 232, 251, 293
T-72 tanks, 293
T-80 tanks, 409
TACMS missiles, 443
Tactical air balance, NATO/Soviet Union comparison, 145–146, 193
Tactical air bombs, 190, 260, 293
Tactical air command, French not assigned to NATO, 220
Tactical nuclear weapons, 77, 81, 90, 125–126, 170, 176, 190–192, 199–197, 259, 540
Taiwan, U.S. fighter planes sold to, 385
Tajikistan, declaration of sovereignty, 512
Tank warfare, 98, 226–229, 251, 336, 353, 411, 441, 461, 469
Tariff barriers, 357. See also GATT negotiations; protectionism
Tax cut, Reagan support of, 388, 450
Taylor, General Maxwell, 82(n), 117, 141
Territorial Defense Forces, of FRG, 160
Test Ban Treaty, 184(n)
Thatcher, Margaret, 362, 404, 407, 409, 456–458, 478, 503, 507, 547
Theater nuclear forces, 190–192, 199–197, 227, 259, 293, 327, 363–364
Third Review Conference, on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 462
Third World, Soviet aid to, 491
Thirty-division posture for conventional forces, in nuclear strategy, 69–91, 100, 117, 135, 160, 233
Thor missiles, 154
Threshold Test Ban Treaty, 1974, 279(n), 465
THUNDERBIRD SAM missile launchers, 230
Tornado aircraft, 361
Toronto Economic Summit, 1988, 460, 461, 476
TOW antitank missiles, 338
Trade agreements, U.S./Soviet Union, 280, 380, 381
Trade Reform Bill, 1974
Trade restrictions, Western Europe/Warsaw Pact, 381
Trade policies. See Protectionism
Transport aircraft, 130, 211–212, 308, 345, 397
Triad nuclear posture, 254, 276, 277
Trident I SLBM missiles, 277
Trident II missiles, 277
Trident submarines, 277, 363, 392, 483, 485
“Triennial Review,” of NATO force planning, 171
Triple zero, NATO rejection of, 487, 533–534
"Tripwire" concept, of conventional defense forces in NATO, 88, 172, 260, 279
Truman, Harry S.: defense policy of, 31–32, 40, 58, 525
fiscal austerity of, 35, 48–50
Truman Doctrine, 27
TU-4 bombers, 37
Tube artillery, 190, 227, 260, 293, 353, 363
Tudeh Party, in Iran, 344
Turkey: conflict with Greece over Cyprus, 140, 306, 527
defense of by NATO, 26, 62, 176, 199–197, 347, 365, 427, 539
deployment of IBMIs in, 95, 154
NATO role of, 46(n), 44, 61, 158, 237, 527
Turnberry meeting of NATO foreign ministers, 507
Two-and-a-half war strategy, 132, 257
two plus Four Treaty, 506, 507–509
"Two-track decision," at Guadeloupe
Summit, 331, 332

Ukraine, declaration of sovereignty, 512, 549, 565
Unemployment, rates of, 457, 458
Unilateralism, 454, 556
Union of Sovereign States, in place of
Soviet Union, 511, 515
United Kingdom. See Great Britain
United Nations, inability to stop Yugoslav civil war, 549
United Nations Disarmament Conference, 465
economy of, 113, 264, 357–359, 414–415, 456, 523–524
foreign policy opinion in, 245, 246, 249–250, 282, 292, 408–410, 555
German relations after unification, 503, 559
and Great Britain, 20–23, 86–87, 105, 107, 114, 159, 418–419, 427
isolationism of, 16, 25, 94–95, 114, 122, 554–555
military presence in Europe, 31–34, 46, 49, 50, 58, 73, 92, 97, 126–132, 208, 352, 360, 383–391, 554–555
non-European foreign policy of, 33, 70, 131–132, 156, 253, 258, 264–265, 349–344, 347, 374, 427, 493
nuclear commitments to Europe, 141, 146, 148–151
nuclear force command structure of, 151, 154, 156–157, 330
nuclear force levels of, 34, 35, 77–79, 129, 122, 154, 297–298, 362
nuclear strategy of, 108, 120–122, 163, 188, 203–204, 293, 362
and Polish situation, 377, 378, 405
Western Europe’s attitude to, 83, 134, 226, 247–248, 267, 372–373, 529–530, 544–546, 558
United States Air Force: under Brown, 336–339
under McNamara, 130, 210, 230
nuclear strategy of, 35, 124–125(n), 145(n), 263–264, 272
strength of, 34, 81, 82, 278, 308, 353–354, 395–396
United States Army: force levels of, 33–34, 81, 82, 272, 278, 308, 395–396
technological change in, 208, 209, 338, 353, 444
United States Congress: burden-sharing issue, 226, 263, 304, 425, 426, 430, 444
and Carter administration, 278, 316, 353, 356
NATO commitment of, 27, 33, 41, 184, 304–305, 524, 542
Index 609

Valeska, Lech, 377, 378, 498
"Walk in the woods" compromise, 411
War, propensity of Europe to, 552
Warsaw Pact: break-up of, 501, 510, 513
defense spending of, 323, 389, 488, 497
and détente, 184, 226
economic and political problems of,
10, 164, 142–143, 481
force levels of, 228, 231–233, 252, 444,
488–490
formation of, 78
future of, 507
and German neutrality, 506
military strategy of, 79, 145, 190, 432,
434–435, 475
NATO force levels comparison, 91–94,
143–145, 172, 173, 190, 232, 236,
279–280, 423, 432, 481–487, 490–491
nuclear trends in, 100, 227. See also
Soviet Union, nuclear posture of
and Polish situation, 375–378
threat of against Central Europe, 180–
181, 201(n), 261–262, 364, 436, 4641.
See also Soviet Union
Washington Ambassadorial Group, 136
Washington Post, neutron bomb articles,
321
Washington Summit, 1978, 323, 324, 329
Washington Summit, 1987, 471
Watergate crisis, 201, 238, 350, 525
Weapon: NATO, 98, 326, 433, 439, 444,
445, 461
Soviet, 489, 513
Wehrmacht, 438
Weinberger, Caspar, 372, 452
military build-up of, 383–391, 395–396,
399–400, 449–450, 452
and NATO, 385–386, 394–396, 404, 425,
427
and Pentagon, 391, 406–401, 429–430
and U.S. Navy expansion, 393, 394, 397
and U.S. nuclear posture, 392–393
"Weser-Lech" defense, as NATO strategy,
101, 179, 218, 223, 435
West, Frances (Bing), 384
Western Europe: and Carter
administration, 315, 319–320, 330,
356
defense spending of, 270, 309, 319–320,
See also Burden-sharing issue
and détente, 248–249, 272, 282, 351,
378, 454

Valiant bombers, 85
Vaizey, Cyrus, 127, 311–312, 343
Vandenbergh Resolution, 41
Verification issue, in INF Treaty, 471, 472
Versailles Economic Summit, 1982, 458
Vessey, General John, 384, 444
Vietnam War: impact on defense spending,
167, 184, 350, 499
impact on U.S. foreign policy, 207–208,
226, 245–247, 258, 272, 277–278,
522–525
U.S. conduct of, 246, 247, 250, 253, 254,
281
Vladivostok Accord, between Ford and
Brezhnev, 278, 279
Voice of America, jamming of, 373
Volecker, Paul, 356
von Hassel, Karl-Uwe, 177
Vulcan bombers, 85, 364
economic influences on, 25, 134, 142-143, 147, 283-286, 288, 305-306, 344, 357-359, 404, 457-460
and Germany, 23-24, 26-28, 503-505
and integration, 287, 459. See also EC EEC
nuclear policy of, 122, 134-135, 141, 146, 153, 158, 158, 168, 169, 206, 259, 331-332, 419-420
and Reagan policy, 371, 381-383, 403-404, 409, 453-454, 457-460
security pillar of, 534, 544-546, 548, 558-559
and Soviet Union, 28-29, 378, 462, 466
West European Union. See WEU
Western Union Defense Organization, 41, 44-46
West Germany. See Federal Republic of Germany
WEU: formation of, 71, 430, 548, 557-558, 562
and Franco-German corps, 540-541, 544
WEU/EC force: NATO relationship to, 534, 540-541, 545-546, 557-559, 563-564, 566
and Yugoslav civil war, 519
Williamsburg Summit, 1983, 414-415, 458
Wilson, Harold, 163, 177, 184
Wohrer, Manfred, 382, 415
World Bank, 357
World War I, causes of, 551
World War II, British/U.S. partnership during, 20-23, 167, 134
XM-1 tanks, 308
Yalta Agreement, 24
Yanayev, Gennadi, 514
Year of Europe, 1973, 288
Yeltsin, Boris, 465, 497, 512-515, 549
and Russian membership of NATO, 550, 565
YF-16 aircraft, 308
Yugoslavia: civil war in, 500, 540, 544, 545, 549
lack of action on, 558, 564
Zero option, 406-414, 419, 464, 467-468, 471-473
Zhikov, Todor, 509
Dr. Richard L. Kugler is a Senior Social Scientist at RAND, where he specializes in European security affairs and U.S. defense planning. He received his Ph.D. in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1975. His fields of study were defense policy, Soviet studies, and operations research. From 1968–1972, he served as an officer in the United States Air Force, including a tour in Southeast Asia. During 1975–1980, he was a senior analyst in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation), where he was responsible for analyzing the military balances in Central Europe and Korea. From 1980–1984, he was Director, Europe/NATO Division in this office. From 1984–1988, he served as Director, Strategic Concepts Development Center at the National Defense University. During 1979–1988, he also was Adjunct Professor of International Relations at the George Washington University, where he taught graduate-level courses in U.S. defense policy. He has been Associate Head of RAND’s Political Science Department and a member of the RAND Graduate School Faculty.

His other major RAND publications include: NATO's Future Role in Europe: Toward a More Political Alliance in a Stable "1.5 Bloc" System (R-3923-FF, 1990); NATO's Future Conventional Defense Strategy in Central Europe: Theater Employment Doctrine for the Post–Cold War Era (R-4084-A, 1992); The Future U.S. Military Presence in Europe: Forces and Requirements for the Post–Cold War Era (R-4194-EUCOM/NA, 1992); and NATO Military Strategy for the Post–Cold War Era (R-4217-AF, 1992). His current research activities include U.S. global military strategy for the 21st century, NATO out-of-area operations, the future of the Western alliance, defense cooperation with Russia and Ukraine, Northeast Asian security affairs, strategic planning, and dynamic simulation analysis.
A new book by the coauthor of the
pathbreaking article, "Building a New NATO,"
seen in Foreign Affairs . . .

COMMITMENT TO PURPOSE
How Alliance Partnership Won the Cold War

Richard I. Kugler

Now that the collapse of communism has brought the Cold War to an end, the time has come to review the history of this forty-year conflict. Commitment to Purpose is the story of how the West survived the darkest hours of the Cold War and won a resounding victory by its sustained commitment to a worthy purpose. Its instruments of victory were coalition planning, community building, economic partnership, a balanced security policy, and sound management of NATO's defense strategy and military posture.

The book's central arguments offer some fresh and controversial perspectives that present NATO more favorably than the media typically do. Focusing on how the United States led the alliance by working with its West European partners, author Richard Kugler rejects the conventional wisdom that the United States alone won the Cold War or that a single president or policy was responsible for the success of U.S. leadership. Rather, success resulted from constant, bipartisan support across several administrations and a consistent body of mutually reinforcing policies.

Intellectually stimulating, yet highly readable, this book serves a wide audience. Its policy orientation will interest readers on both sides of the Atlantic, and its detailed and powerful hypotheses on the military history of the Cold War will trigger debate among scholars and students. Finally, it will appeal to those interested in modern European affairs following the tumultuous events of 1989.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Richard Kugler, a senior social scientist at RAND, is associate director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center. He draws on his nearly two decades of experience in the Department of Defense as an analyst and senior executive specializing in NATO and European security affairs. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from MIT.