"The Day After…” Study: Nuclear Proliferation in the Post-Cold War World
Volume III, Exercise Materials

Marc Dean Millot, Roger Molander, Peter A. Wilson
The research reported here was sponsored by the United States Air Force under Contract F49620-91-C-0003. Further information may be obtained from the Strategic Planning Division, Directorate of Plans, Hq USAF.

ISBN: 0-8330-1427-7

RAND is a nonprofit institution that seeks to improve public policy through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of its research sponsors.

Published 1993 by RAND
1700 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
To obtain information about RAND studies or to order documents, call Distribution Services, (310) 451-7002
"The Day After..." Study: Nuclear Proliferation in the Post-Cold War World

Volume III, Exercise Materials

Marc Dean Millot, Roger Molander, Peter A. Wilson

Prepared for the
United States Air Force

Project AIR FORCE

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
This is the Annex to the Project AIR FORCE report on four sets of exercises conducted as part of the project “The Day After,” on the implications of nuclear proliferation for U.S. national security policy. The research was conducted in the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND's Project AIR FORCE (PAF) for the Director of Plans, Headquarters, United States Air Force. PAF is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the U.S. Air Force.

MR-253-AF, *The Day After...: Nuclear Proliferation in the Post–Cold War World*, documents the results of the four sets of exercises. It describes the assumptions, objectives, and approach of “The Day After...” study, including the exercise technique developed as the primary research tool. It then covers each of the four exercises, which examined: the loss of central control over a nuclear arsenal (The Day After...in the “USSR”); U.S. military intervention against a new nuclear armed regional adversary (The Day After...in the Greater Middle East); nuclear use against a U.S. ally (The Day After...in Korea); and nuclear war between two new regional nuclear powers (The Day After...in South Asia). For each exercise, the main volume highlights participants’ discussion and debate and, based on the results of each exercise, identifies alternative approaches to solving the critical proliferation-related policy problems facing U.S. decisionmakers.

This volume contains the materials that the exercise participants used. The materials include instructions on how to conduct the exercise.

The exercises here were separated from the reports so that they might be used, in combination with the main report, as classroom materials for college and graduate-level national security studies in the post–Cold War world.
CONTENTS

Preface ..................................................................................... iii
Acronyms .............................................................................. vii

Appendix F: THE DAY AFTER... IN THE “USSR” EXERCISE
MATERIALS ............................................................................ 1

Appendix G: THE DAY AFTER... IN THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST
EXERCISE MATERIALS ............................................................ 39

Appendix H: THE DAY AFTER... IN KOREA EXERCISE MATERIALS ....... 71

Appendix I: THE DAY AFTER... IN SOUTH ASIA EXERCISE
MATERIALS ............................................................................ 103
ACRONYMS

ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile
ATBM Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System
CBG Carrier Battle Group
CFE Conventional Forces in Europe
CINC Commander-in-Chief
CNN Cable News Network
CONUS Continental United States
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
C3I Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
DCI Director of Central Intelligence
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DMZ Demilitarized Zone
DSP Defense Support System
EMP Electromagnetic Pulse
GCC Gulf Coordinating Council
GNP Gross National Product
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IRBM Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
MPS Maritime Proposing Squadron
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NMCC  National Military Command Center
NPT   Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSC   National Security Council
PAF   Project AIR FORCE
ROK   Republic of Korea
SLBM  Surface-Launched Ballistic Missile
SLCM  Sea-Launched Cruise Missile
SRBM  Short-Range Ballistic Missile
SSBN  Fleet Ballistic Missile submarine
SSN   Submarine (Nuclear-Powered)
TFW   Tactical Fighter Wing
UNSC  United Nations Security Council
Appendix F

The Day After . . . in the “USSR”
Exercise Materials
The Day After...

...in the "USSR"

Marc Dean Millot
Roger Molander
Peter Wilson

HANDOUT

RAND

1 October 1991
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

**The Day After...**
*...in the “USSR”*

- Introduction
- Overview of the Exercise
- STEP ONE: The Day Of....
  - Situation Report
  - Instructions
  - Memo for the President
- STEP TWO: The Day After....
  - Situation Report
  - Instructions
  - Memo for the President
- STEP THREE: The Day Before....
  - Instructions
  - Memo for the President

**HANDOUT**
The Day After... is a RAND project examining the implications for U.S. national security and military strategy of the spread of nuclear weapons and related capabilities in the post-Cold War world.

A central assumption of the project is that the ability to build nuclear weapons and modern means to deliver them (such as ballistic missiles) will continue to proliferate. The number of nations with deliverable "in-being" nuclear arsenals will almost certainly grow. Also likely to increase are "virtual" nuclear arsenals - arsenals that by design and plan can be built or assembled inside a nation's likely "strategic warning time." The loss or breakup of central control over an existing nuclear arsenal could also add to the number of nuclear weapons powers (as may be the outcome in the former Soviet Union). It will also almost certainly spread "nuclear weapons - competent" personnel and related wherewithal.

In such a global environment, the possibility of actual nuclear weapon use seems worthy of concern and attention. At a minimum, we will probably face many future crises in which there is the implicit or explicit brandishing of nuclear weapons. In this context there is a clear need to frame - for both analysis and policymaking - the spectrum of nuclear proliferation-related policy decisions the United States must now face.

The near-term objective of The Day After... project is to identify (and seek consensus where it exists on):

- A set of generic nuclear proliferation-related scenarios involving nuclear weapon use in future crises.
- A set of candidate nuclear proliferation-related policy issues that might be put to the President for decision in the near term.
- A rough rank-ordering of the most urgent and important of the above policy issues.
- A comprehensive spectrum of clearly drawn policy options for each of these issues.

The Day After... project and this exercise begin with an examination of the decisions confronting a U.S. President on "the day of" some pivotal change in the nuclear status quo - including the possible "next use" of nuclear weapons. As a second pivot point, the exercise turns to "the day after" the initial event - and explores a new set of policy choices facing the nation. As a final decision point, the exercise moves to "the day before" - months or years before the envisioned "day of" - and considers the challenge of adopting policies to minimize the prospects for such scenarios and mitigate their consequences.

The Day After... in the "USSR" is one of a set of policy exercises RAND is developing to explore the implications of various generic nuclear weapon use scenarios. The four policy exercises currently planned are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generic Scenario</th>
<th>Policy Exercise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Loss of Central Control</td>
<td>The Day After... in the 'USSR'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. U.S. Intervention</td>
<td>The Day After... in the Middle East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Nuclear Use vs. U.S. Ally</td>
<td>The Day After... in Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Nth Country vs. Nth Country</td>
<td>The Day After... in South Asia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A fifth "policy process" exercise will model the U.S. policy decision-making process for nuclear proliferation-related issues. Any new U.S. policies in this area must inescapably be forged in that political clash of interests. This final exercise will point toward the development of a sustainable overall national strategy to address the long-term consequences of nuclear proliferation.
OVERVIEW OF THE EXERCISE

The Day After... in the 'USSR' is a three step policy exercise designed to be completed in one three-hour session. Participants take on the roles of advisors to the President of the United States in a group deliberative process akin to a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) minus the President.

In STEP ONE: The Day Of... (est. time 60 min.) the participants address a rapidly deteriorating political situation in the former Soviet Union. The group develops an overall perspective on the situation, considers the issues and options that need to be presented to the President, and then - if consensus can be found - also recommends decisions for the President to take.

In STEP TWO: The Day After... (est. time 60 min.) participants find themselves convened immediately following nuclear weapon use in the former Soviet Union. The group's task is again to help the President get perspective on the situation and decide how to respond to the crisis.

In STEP THREE: The Day Before... (est. time 45 min.) the exercise moves back in time to before the crisis (i.e. to today or the near future). In consideration of the "lessons learned" in the two previous moves, the group seeks to reach consensus on the character and thrust, defining language, and the appropriate options to be presented for those key nuclear proliferation-related policy issues that should now be faced and taken to closure in the United States.

A debriefing (est. time 20 min.) and the completion of a brief survey of views ends the exercise.
STEP ONE: The Day Of...

SITUATION REPORT

Background

...In the former “USSR.” Following the failed coup of August 1991, the former Soviet Union has gone through a “time of troubles.” The just-completed winter has been the worst, but it is now spring - early April 1993.

The three Baltic states, the states of the southern Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan), and Moldavia are now fully independent. The eight remaining republics have gained great autonomy within the loose but still intact Union of Sovereign States (USS). The USS continues to function as the international “legal” heir and successor to the Soviet Union (seat on the UN Security Council, responsibilities under the ABM Treaty, etc.).

Even with substantial direct assistance from the West, all of the former Soviet republics continue to struggle with acute economic and political disruption as they transition to market-oriented economies. Unemployment continues to rise as the military-industrial sector steadily shrinks. An influx of Russian refugees from the Baltics and Central Asia - fleeing the actual and latent threat of forced loss of jobs (or worse) in a growing anti-Russian “economic pogrom” - poses a new and acute political problem. Russian public demonstrations protesting this situation have clearly been spurred by Serbia’s apparent success in annexing large portions of Croatia.

In Central Asia, the political situation remains fluid. Uzbekistan has been pushing the creation of a new Islamic state, merging their republic with Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Things seem generally stable within the newly-independent nations of the Caucasus, though there is intermittent border fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Iran and Turkey have greatly expanded their political and economic ties to both of these regions.

In an attempt to avoid more serious intra-republic conflict, Gorbachev, who remains President of the USS, has been leading a last-ditch effort to negotiate a new constitution binding at least Russia, Byelorussia, the Ukraine, and Kazakhstan in a permanent “economic and security confederation.” There are still major sticking points in what now have become known as the “Kiev negotiations.”

Foreign Relations. Looming on the horizon of renewed “international” worry, especially to the republic of Russia, is the specter of a more militarily potent and assertive China. The death of Deng Xiaoping in 1992 led to a major shakeup in Chinese leadership and the emergence of a new and younger generation of leaders with strong “national socialist” characteristics. This group has articulated a commitment to establishing China’s “rightful status” as a “great power and world leader.” Beijing now appears focused on expanding its influence amongst the governments of Central Asia and Mongolia.

This increased Chinese assertiveness in the politics of Asia was given greater weight in Washington after a national intelligence assessment concluded that a major expansion of the Chinese nuclear weapons program was now well under way. The program appears to be focused on expanding and improving both their ICBM and IRBM ballistic missile forces.

The situation in Central Europe is also increasingly troublesome. Polish leaders, concerned about the instability to their east and the unwillingness of the western democracies to offer credible security guarantees (such as membership in NATO), have begun to speak openly about the nuclear weapons option. The Balance of Terror, the 1961 book by Gen. Pierre Gallois advocating the nuclear option for France, has become a minor best seller in Warsaw and Polish “minimum deterrent” requirements are now openly debated.

There is also a growing debate in Germany over the nature of European security in the post-Cold War era. Last month a former German Defense minister described “the real threat” to German security as “not the Red Army but the Lebanonization of the Balkans and the nuclear Balkanization of the Soviet Union.” With the European Community showing no military identity and NATO’s purpose still confined to direct defense of its sixteen members, many Germans politicians are openly arguing for “an independent German course” on security matters.
The "Soviet" Military. There has been a two million man reduction in the former Soviet Armed Forces since 1991. The Russian republics have gained operational control over most of the military units within its territory and most units remaining in the non-Russian republics. Most non-Russians have returned to their native republics, many to join newly-forming republic military units.

In line with an inter-republic agreement reached early 1992, all tactical nuclear weapons in the non-Russian republics are being removed and destroyed - although the process is going slowly due to a lack of adequate storage and destruction facilities. (In response to the Bush initiatives of September 1991, the USS formally proposed negotiations among "all nuclear weapons states" to ban all "non-strategic" nuclear weapons. After a long period of exchanges - and problems with China and France - a set of "global nuclear goals" negotiations under UN Security Council auspices are scheduled to begin in late June in Geneva.)

Reductions in the former Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal will begin as soon a revised START Treaty is completed and ratified by the U.S. Senate and some confederal authority in the former Soviet Union. The non-Russian "ICBM republics" have so far agreed to cut their ICBM forces by "at least one third" from the 1991 levels.

In theory at least, the USS commands the former Soviet Union's military through its Defense Council. Gorbachev continues to chair the Council, a body whose power and decision-making procedures continue to evolve. On paper at least, ultimate command authority rests with this committee, whose members are the heads of state of the republics still involved in the confederal negotiations plus representatives of the USS Defense Ministry and General Staff. Major decisions affecting all members are made by consensus or remain unresolved. In theory, the Council would be the center of control for the USS nuclear arsenal in any military crisis.

The command, control, and communications systems of the former Soviet military (including tactical warning and attack assessment satellites, etc.) and the technical intelligence assets are for the most part in Russian hands. However, the location of key satellite down links and warning radars in several non-Russian republics gives cause for some uncertainty as to just how well these systems are now working or might work in crisis. The Washington-Moscow MOLINK - the "hot line" - appears to be under the control of the Russified former "Soviet" General Staff.

Technical and procedural means of nuclear weapons control remain in the hands of the former General Staff. However, the August 1991 agreement among the republics to put nuclear weapons control issues on hold has led to a distribution of physical control over the nuclear arsenal between the "Soviet" armed forces and republican military units. Custody of nuclear weapons, delivery vehicles, lower level command centers, and military bases is "shared" between "USS" armed forces units and local military units. However, the Russification of the Soviet military has given the Russian republic de facto control over nuclear forces within its territory. (See Table 1.)

Efforts by the Russians to increase the size of their nuclear garrison forces in the non-Russian republics have to date been met with strong local resistance. For example, in February, air controllers at Kiev refused to grant clearance to several large transport planes from Moscow believed to be carrying special troops bound for nuclear weapons facilities in the Ukraine.

The Ukraine and Kazakhstan also share in the control of the former Soviet nuclear weapons production and weapons system complexes. (See Table 2.) Indeed, a recent U.S. intelligence estimate suggests that, even if the Ukraine agreed to the complete removal of the "Soviet" weapons within its territory, it could become a nuclear weapons power equal to France or Britain in a matter of years. Kazakhstan also has impressive indigenous nuclear weapons capability.

To their American counterparts USS and Russian officials have privately expressed their "deep concern" over the viability of the August 1991 multi-party nuclear control agreement. They quietly tout the advantages of "unambiguous Russian control" over all of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal. They insist it is currently impossible for a non-Russian republic to launch a missile strike by itself, but argue that the world would breathe easier if it knew that nuclear weapons were not in the hands of "potentially unreliable parties."
### TABLE 1. Distribution of Strategic Nuclear Bases By Republic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic</th>
<th>ICBM Bases</th>
<th>Bomber Bases</th>
<th>Naval Bases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>2 (SS-19 &amp; SS-24)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>2 (SS-18)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byelorussia</td>
<td>2 (SS-25)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 2. Distribution of Nuclear Weapons-Related R&D and Production Facilities by Republic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic</th>
<th>Naval</th>
<th>Ballistic Missile</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Plutonium</th>
<th>Uranium</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byelorussia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Russian military officials have also expressed the fear that, added to the on-going CFE reductions in conventional forces, uncertain nuclear control arrangements could make it impossible to respond to a Chinese military threat along the Sino-Russian border, and could actually encourage Chinese aggression or coercion.

In late 1992 it became public that Kazakh technical experts formerly involved with the Soviet nuclear weapons program were engaged in dealings with Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan, including the exchange of nuclear weapons design and production information. Following these revelations, a U.S. official was approached by a high-ranking Russian regarding possible American attitudes towards a surgical, non-nuclear removal of "unauthorized and illegal" stockpiles of nuclear weapons-related materials and equipment. This revelation vanished not long after the German periodical Stern ran a story about secret hard currency dealings by Russian officials involving ballistic missile guidance system and propellant technologies.

**Inter-Republic Negotiations.** Within the confederation the negotiations on the disposition of the "common property" of the former Soviet Union have been long and arduous and at times extraordinarily acrimonious. Several key issues remain unresolved. In the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Byelorussia there have developed splits within the political leadership between: (1) "moderates" who are willing to delegate to a central government considerable powers in foreign relations, international economic matters, and defense (including executive authority over the bulk of armed forces and the former Soviet nuclear arsenal), and (2) the so-called "ultras" who accept the need for some measure of economic cooperation among the republics, but insist on complete national independence (including the right to continue to maintain "strategic" nuclear forces).

Perhaps the most important outstanding issue in the Kiev negotiations is the command and control arrangements for nuclear weapons. Russia has demanded that the system be highly centralized with only the Russian republic having a veto over nuclear use. This position has been strongly resisted by the other republics. They favor a more complex system, with permanent Russian membership and a unanimous vote required for any nuclear weapon use by the confederation government.

A second problem has been the Russian claim that it will be "unnecessary" for any of the confederation's strategic nuclear weapons to be based in the other republics - and that it would complicate the position of the republics with respect to their accession to the NPT. The other republics have indicated a willingness to consider such a move, but insist on "very deep" reductions in the confederation's nuclear arsenal (levels around a thousand strategic nuclear weapons are often mentioned) as a price for this concession. The Russians have so far strongly resisted considering such far-reaching reductions, in part with the argument that this should only be done through comprehensive negotiations with all of the other nuclear powers - whom they claim are not ready for such a far-reaching undertaking.

The scramble for assets in the Kiev negotiations has also brought other serious differences of opinion between the republics into the open. Disputes over their respective borders and rights, based on cross-border ethnic ties, historic claims, and Soviet law are reaching a state many analysts consider unresolvable by the political process. The Russian position has been particularly worrisome to most of the other republics; for example, Russian leaders have at various times suggested that it has "legitimate historical rights" to as much as a third of the territory within the Ukraine's 1991 boundaries.

The joint custody arrangements at the nuclear facilities in the non-Russian republics have become an important element of the non-Russian republics' posture in the Kiev negotiations for both symbolic and practical reasons. High-level officials in these republics have openly stated that this arrangement assures that any border questions will be negotiated "between equals" and "decided on merit." Ukrainian and Kazakh leaders have also claimed ownership of the nuclear weapons production facilities on their territory. Some analysts see this as yet another move to improve the republics' bargaining position. Others believe the Ukraine intends to become a regional nuclear power to counterbalance Russia.
The Crisis. In late April of 1993, the “moderate” Ukrainian government of P. Kravchuk fell in a vote of no confidence over the issue of Ukrainian “nuclear weapons rights” in the negotiations on a new confederation constitution. A new government dominated by the Rukh “ultra-nationalist” party came to power and immediately ordered an in-depth review of the Ukrainian position in the constitutional negotiations.

Trade issues had been a central source of tension in the months leading up to the Ukrainian political crisis. The Russian republic’s demand that all other republics pay world prices in hard currency for its natural gas and oil, may have tipped the political balance towards those Ukrainians convinced that Russia intends to treat the other republics as economic colonies. This “new extortion from Moscow” has been met with strong economic countermeasures in the other republics including the erection of extreme protectionist barriers. The Ukraine also began to slow the flow of food products into Russia. The Uzbek and Tajik republics took similar action with respect to uranium mining and the shipping of uranium hexafluoride and other processed uranium compounds. (Uzbek leaders have suggested that they might expand their nuclear energy program to reduce dependence on Russian energy sources and enter the world uranium market to generate more hard currency.)

In the light of the Ukrainian political crisis, the negotiations over the confederation constitution now appear to be on the verge of collapse. Mass demonstrations have broken out in Moscow and other Russian cities calling for abandonment of the negotiations and the protection of “the rights of greater Russia.” Similar political demonstrations have taken place in Kiev and Lvov under the rallying cry of independence for the Ukraine “now or never.” The leader of the Rukh government addressed the largest of the rallies in Kiev and called for the Ukraine to acquire “the means to ensure its own security for all time.” This was immediately interpreted as a call for nationalization of the ICBMs and other nuclear weapons and related facilities in the Ukraine. Rukh leaders have been conspicuous in not denying that speculation. Within days of the Rukh statement there were media reports that both the Russians and the Ukrainians were preparing to seek autonomous control of the nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory. In a further complication the Kazakh government announced support for “the independent right” of all republics to decide the fate of the “nuclear weapons and related materials and equipment” currently on their respective territories.

In spite of this increasingly tense environment the negotiations in Kiev continue. All sides seem to recognize that although the talks appear hopelessly deadlocked, outright failure at this time would be politically disastrous, including the possibility of leading to inter-republic war. Nevertheless, rumors abound that the Russians have set a deadline of the end of May for completion or abandonment of the negotiations. President Gorbachev has agreed to go to Kiev to chair one more round of the inter-republic negotiations.
# STEP ONE: The Day Of...

## INSTRUCTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How to Proceed</th>
<th>Decisions to Be Made</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. In STEP ONE you will have a total of 60 minutes to deliberate and reach decisions.</td>
<td>1. <strong>U.S. Policy Issues and Options</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Keep in mind that you are in the role of a top advisor to the President of the United States (e.g. a cabinet- or sub-cabinet level official) and a participant in a meeting that can be viewed as akin to an expanded National Security Council meeting minus the President.</td>
<td>The NSC staff-led working group believes that the U.S. will likely want to consider policy issues and options in the following general issue areas:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. At the beginning of the move you will be given approximately ten minutes to quickly read through:</td>
<td>• Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• These Instructions.</td>
<td>• Diplomatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• A Draft Memo for the President prepared under the aegis of the NSC staff.</td>
<td>• Domestic Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. As soon as it is practical, the Chair of the group will begin by asking one participant to serve as the group’s Secretary. The Chair will then lead a discussion that moves through the tasking described in the Decisions to Be Made section. The group will make two kinds of decisions:</td>
<td>• Declaratory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Modifications to the draft Memo for the President - and in particular to the list of policy issues and options contained therein.</td>
<td>The Draft Memo for the President provides an initial set of policy issues and options in the above four areas. Under the guidance of the Chair, the group should discuss and modify this draft “policy options paper.” The objective is to produce a final draft that is:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Recommendations to the President on specific options to select for each of the issues discussed.</td>
<td>• Well-structured and concise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. When the time for STEP ONE is up, you should record your group’s final decisions on the “STEP ONE Draft Memo for the President.”</td>
<td>• Complete in the sense of attempting to set forth only those decisions which the President must now make.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. As part of the discussion of STEP ONE, the Chair of your group will be asked to summarize and explain the group’s final decisions and recommendations.</td>
<td>2. <strong>Recommendations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>After an initial review of the memo the group should discuss whether there are other general issue areas where the President should make decisions at this point in time - and modify the Draft Memo for the President accordingly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>When you have settled on the list of issues and options to go forward to the President, you should attempt to reach consensus on a recommendation to the President on each of the issues. If a consensus cannot be reached, vote on the options to progressively eliminate those with the least support. Record the final vote.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
STEP ONE: The Day Of...

Draft Memo for the President

National Security Council

8 May 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

FROM: The National Security Advisor

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on the Kiev Negotiations

As you know, the republics of the Union of Sovereign States (USS) are now in the eleventh hour of protracted negotiations on a new constitution. All indications are that the negotiations are at an impasse and could collapse completely at any time. The principal obstacle continues to be the disposition of the weapons and the command and control arrangements of the former Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal. There is a good chance that the Russians' apparent June 1 internal deadline for completion of the negotiations will pass without an agreement.

In this volatile political situation there is a real prospect that the Russians could move at any time to seize control of all of the former "Soviet" strategic nuclear weapons. This is likely to be resisted by at least the Ukrainians and the Kazakhs.

There will be a meeting of the NSC at 3:00 pm this afternoon to discuss this situation. An important aspect of the discussion will be the possibility of your making a demarche to one or more of the former Soviet republics, not only to help achieve an agreement but also to influence the outcome.

The purpose of this memo is to prepare you for that NSC meeting.

OBJECTIVES

A major U.S. objective over the past eighteen months has been to do whatever we can to stabilize "the nuclear weapons situation" in the former Soviet Union while the politics there take their course. We especially want to see clear lines of authority over the former Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal emerge and be maintained. In this regard we have made clear a strong preference for a single authority whom we could deal with in both future nuclear arms negotiations and future nuclear weapons-related crises. We have also studiously sought to deter or otherwise diminish the prospect of a nuclear crisis of any kind emerging in this transition period of uncertain control.
We have up to now cautiously avoided any interference in the Kiev negotiations, other than to make clear our desire for their successful conclusion. As described below, our principal near-term objective has been to see a stable political situation emerge in the former Soviet Union. As regards the disposition of the former Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal, we would like to see a revised START Treaty completed soon and early progress in follow-on negotiations on further reductions and the future of strategic defenses. We would also like to move quickly to complete a ban on tactical nuclear weapons through the UN Security Council negotiations. We would prefer (for practical and policy reasons) to pursue all of these kinds of negotiations with a single entity controlling the former Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal – if not a stabilized confederation (which has been our preference), then Russia alone. Under the circumstances movement along such lines may or may not be possible.

THE KIEV NEGOTIATIONS

The negotiations in Kiev have been deadlocked principally over the issue of the eventual disposition of the ICBMs in the non-Russian republics. Up until a few weeks ago, it appeared that these “ICBM-armed republics” – the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Byelorussia – would agree to give up their strategic nuclear arsenals in a START context in which the remaining U.S. and Russian arsenals were significantly reduced. That approach has now faltered on two issues: (1) Just how deep the reductions should be in the revised START Treaty or in follow-on negotiations and (2) Russian unwillingness to state its future intentions regarding ABM deployments.

As a consequence of the above stalemate, a new eleventh hour “interim deal” was recently put forth by the Kazakhs with the support of the other Moslem republics. It calls for agreement to modest reductions in the revised START Treaty with the three non-Russian ICBM-armed republics retaining “a fraction” of their existing arsenals – cited as “ten to twenty percent” for the Ukraine and Kazakhstan and “less than half” for Byelorussia – pending “final resolution” of the reductions and strategic ballistic missile defenses issues. The Russians are irate at the late introduction of a deal that does not call for complete “Russification” of the Soviet arsenal. They suspect (probably correctly) that the new Ukrainian government and Byelorussia are in on this new “interim deal” and will soon throw their weight behind it. Table 1 summarizes the two proposals on the table along with current force levels and estimated force levels under the terms of the original START Treaty.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Byelorussia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Force Levels</td>
<td>13000</td>
<td>11000</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>1080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>START I Force Levels</td>
<td>9000</td>
<td>7000</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakh “Interim Deal”</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>100-200</td>
<td>100-200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Russification”</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. The Kiev Packages and Current/START Force Levels
DIPLOMATIC ISSUES

We have often expressed a strong U.S. preference for a single authority over the former Soviet nuclear arsenal. While we have remained formally neutral on the outcome of the Kiev negotiations, most parties correctly believe that the U.S. vastly prefers seeing all of the former Soviet strategic arsenal based on Russian territory, independent of whether a stable central government eventually emerges. Unfortunately, but perhaps not unexpectedly, the end game of the Kiev negotiations has now produced a situation where there is still a chance that we might see a negotiated "Russification" of the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal, but in effect only at the price of far deeper reductions than we have up to now been prepared to accept. There is also the prospect that the three non-Russian "ICBM republics" will insist that all parties commit to forego the building of significant strategic defenses or (and this is a new development) to the cooperative building of a global space-based system for defending all nations against accidental and unauthorized launches.

In the current delicate negotiating situation as described above, we may wish to reconsider our strong implied support for the "Russification" option although the only other choice really available to us at this time is the Kazakh initiative on an interim deal. At the same time we must recognize that follow-on negotiations on a more palatable permanent deal might not be successful. In such a situation in accepting the interim deal we may well end up having sanctioned three additional nuclear-armed states - and set the stage for the kind of runaway nuclear proliferation we have long sought to prevent. In that sense we may be confronting a critical "nuclear domino" whose fall would dictate the course of nuclear proliferation for the world for the foreseeable future.

The diplomatic issues that must be decided now are:

1. Should the U.S. privately intervene in the Kiev negotiations?
   - A. Not at this time.
   - B. Yes.

2. If we intervene, toward what outcome should we seek to influence the negotiations?
   - A. The "complete Russification" option (accept no changes to the ABM Treaty for now but seek agreement to a START II reductions goal of, say, 1500-2000 strategic nuclear warheads).
   - B. The Kazakh "interim deal" (seek agreement to a START II reductions goal of 2000 strategic nuclear "warheads" with a reduction in non-Russian strategic nuclear arsenals to minimum levels, e.g. no more than 50-100 warheads).
   - C. Better the old START deal than either of the above.
MILITARY ISSUES

If the negotiations do collapse, it is likely that Russia will move immediately to gain control of all of the former Soviet ICBM force (and may even do so before the deadline expires). Kazakh, Ukrainian, and Byelorussian military forces may preempt and will almost certainly resist any Russian move along these lines.

While such a devolution of central control need not lead to conflict, that prospect must be faced. We must be careful not to exacerbate this situation. We have been careful to keep USCINCSC in his normal peacetime posture (DEFCON 4). The strategic bomber forces remain off alert status. Approximately 24 hours would be required to place the bomber force on alert. USCINCSC may soon request authority to move to DEFCON 3 in order to recall the personnel necessary to generate the bomber force. Such a move would unavoidably and immediately become public.

Tactical nuclear weapons for surface ships and submarines remain in storage. At least two or three days would be required to deploy some of these weapons and bring them to a state of operational readiness. USCINCPAC is requesting planning guidance for drafting plans to reintroduce nuclear weapons to the fleet.

In light of this situation there are at this point three decisions that must be made involving guidance to U.S. military forces. These are:

1. Should the alert status of U.S. strategic nuclear forces be changed?
   ______ A. Instruct USCINCSC to stay at DEFCON 4.
   ______ B. Instruct USCINCSC to go to DEFCON 3.
   ______ C. Instruct USCINCSC to generate __% of the U.S. bomber force.

2. What orders should be given to USCINCPAC if Russia or one of the other republics moves to gain control of the ICBMs in the non-Russian republics?
   ______ A. Instruct USCINCPAC to stay at DEFCON 4.
   ______ B. Instruct USCINCPAC to go to DEFCON 3.
   ______ C. Instruct USCINCPAC to go to DEFCON 2.

3. What guidance should USCINCPAC and USCLANT be given to plan for the reintroduction of nuclear weapons into the U.S. fleet?
   ______ A. Instruct USCINCPAC and USCLANT to be prepared to deploy tactical nuclear weapons on U.S. surface ships and submarines at DEFCON 3.
   ______ B. Instruct USCINCPAC and USCLANT to be prepared to deploy tactical nuclear weapons on surface ships and submarines on Presidential orders.
DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUES

There is widespread public apprehension about the course of events in the former Soviet Union. If the Kiev negotiations fail, it will be highly desirable that the United States manifest a clear consensus in its policy statements in the ensuing period of political instability. It may be advisable to meet privately with Congressional leaders to work out such a consensus - or at least to ensure that no Congressional leader steps out and prescribes a particular preferred U.S. policy. On the other hand, such consultations may prove extremely contentious. Several members of the Congressional leadership serve constituencies that will lobby hard for particular U.S. policy positions.

A similar argument exists for thinking through how we might deal with the country's media leadership. It is clear that they, like we, have been assuming for some time that the Kiev negotiations would in time be successful. This could argue for some early off-the-record briefings and discussions that would temper any immediate media response to the failure of the negotiations. We do not want any sensationalizing of the failure to the point where the public is unnecessarily alarmed about the consequences.

While we do not at this time foresee events by which the U.S. might get directly involved (e.g. militarily) in such a political crisis, we may also wish to explicitly reassure the American public on this prospect in advance of any negotiating failure.

The domestic politics issues to be decided are:

1. Should we set up meetings with the Congressional leadership at this point in time to discuss U.S. policy in the event of the failure of the Kiev negotiations?
   
   _____ A. Yes. Should we announce the meeting publicly? _____
   
   _____ B. Not at this time.

2. Should we set up meetings with media leaders at this point in time?
   
   _____ A. Yes. Should we announce the meeting publicly? _____
   
   _____ B. Not at this time.

3. Should we look for an opportunity for you to make a statement in the near future reassuring the American people that whatever the outcome of the Kiev negotiations we see no prospect of an increased threat to the U.S. or any U.S. military involvement?
   
   _____ A. Yes.
   
   _____ B. Not at this time.
DECLARATORY POLICY ISSUES

In the light of the deteriorating state of the Kiev negotiations, there is increasing pressure on the U.S. to make a clear statement about our bottom-line stake in the negotiations and our attitude toward their possible failure. At the same time any U.S. public statement at this time could be counterproductive if it is misused or misconstrued by one of the parties as an unwarranted U.S. effort to insinuate itself in the negotiations. However, as indicated above, we may in fact want to make just such an intervention.

The declaratory policy issues to be decided now are:

1. Should the U.S. make any additional public declaratory statements at this time on the Kiev negotiations?
   ______ A. Not at this time
   ______ B. Yes

2. If we make such a statement, what subjects should it cover?
   ______ A. Strongly emphasize the importance for the U.S. and all nations that the issues on the table be resolved and resolved peacefully.
   ______ B. Articulate in detail those specific elements of U.S. policy that turn on the outcome of the negotiations:
     ______ • The ongoing U.S. aid program to the confederation
     ______ • U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy
     ______ • ________________________________
     ______ • ________________________________
   ______ C. Indicate U.S. willingness to begin negotiations to reduce strategic nuclear force levels well below those of START as soon as the Kiev negotiations are complete.
   ______ D.

3. Another declaratory policy decision is reflected in the Domestic Political decisions on the previous page regarding what we make public.
STEP TWO: The Day After...

SITUATION REPORT

The Continuing Crisis

In spite of much apprehension and tension the Kiev negotiations continued through the summer of 1993 with occasional periods of progress but never a final resolution of the most contentious issues. By mid-August it seemed certain that any day the negotiations would finally and irreversibly collapse.

On August 24 Beijing announced that it was sending a delegation to Ulan Bator, Mongolia with the intention of signing "a free trade and mutual defense agreement to stabilize north Asia." Sources from Iran and Turkey reported the next day that Kazakh and Chinese military leaders have been meeting secretly in Alma Ata.

U.S. intelligence assets almost immediately detected early preparations for military mobilization in Russia, and shortly thereafter also in the Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Most ominous were subtle changes in the nuclear weapons command and control arrangements which suggest that the government of the Russian republic has assumed complete technical and physical control of the nuclear arsenal within its territory as well as the former Soviet SSBN force.

On August 29th, the Russian government announced a partial mobilization of its military forces in the Far East to "insure its ability to protect the republic" from the threat posed by "renewed Chinese imperialism." In private conversations that day with western representatives Russian officials also express a concern that the Chinese may be in league with Ukrainian and Kazakh "fascists."

* * *

In the early hours of September 10, with the crisis in the Far East growing and formal Ukrainian withdrawal from the Kiev negotiations expected at any time, Ukrainian military units moved to seize the ICBM sites at Derazhnaya and Pervomaysk and the 10 remaining tactical nuclear weapon storage sites in the republic. Heavy fighting took place at all of these sites which are defended by "Russified" USS military units. Half of the nuclear storage sites quickly fell to the superior Ukrainian forces but the ICBM sites were fiercely defended by large and well-equipped Russian forces.

By mid-day there was a sudden and unexpectedly successful rebellion at the long-range bomber base at Vinnytsya. A cadre of flight crews and weapon specialists at the base (mostly Ukrainians but including some personnel from other non-Russian republics) surprised the much larger Russian force and seized control of the base and its aircraft which include a large number of long-range nuclear-capable SU-24 fighter bombers.

By late in the day there was heavy fighting in Dnepropetrovsk in and around the SS-18 manufacturing plant between Ukrainian national guard units and Russian plant workers supported by USS Russian armored units that have been "protecting the plant from terrorists." Civilian casualties were very high as the fighting spilled over into residential areas. To the south, Russian naval forces succeeded in gaining control of Odessa and Sevastopol. Only at the port of Nikoliev did the Ukrainians repulse Russian naval infantry units.

Late that night the Russian republican government in Moscow sent the Ukrainian and Kazakh governments an ultimatum: "Russia cannot accept the appearance on its borders of nuclear armed states which have shown hostile intent. The Russian government will accept the total independence of the Ukraine and Kazakhstan only if both relinquish control over all nuclear weapons on their territory and transition to non-nuclear weapon state status. Further, the Russian government demands that the ultimate borders between the three states should be subject to 'arbitration.'"

At this point U.S. intelligence received evidence that within 24 hours the Ukrainians would likely complete preparations to equip as many as a half-dozen SU-24s with at least one and possibly two AS-11 nuclear air-to-surface missiles. This is somewhat of a surprise since it had been assumed that any nuclear weapons captured under such circumstances could not readily be made usable. Other evidence suggested that the Ukrainians had successfully seized approximately 300 nuclear artillery shells, missile warheads, and bombs from the captured nuclear storage sites. Serious radioactive contamination was identified at four of the still-contested nuclear weapons storage sites.
By mid-day on September 11 similar action against ICBM and nuclear storage sites was initiated in Kazakhstan and Byelorussia. By nightfall the U.S. had intelligence indicating that two nuclear storage sites were in Kazakh hands and that the Kazakhs had apparently seized about 50 tactical nuclear weapons at these sites.

By the morning of September 12, all silo-based ICBMs in the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Byelorussia appeared to be still under the control of Moscow. However, there continued to be heavy fighting around the ICBM silos at Pervomaysk in the Ukraine and some indication that those ICBMs might well soon fall to Ukrainian control.

To add credibility to Russian fears on the course of the conflict, U.S. intelligence detected the mobilization and forward movement of the Chinese Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) central strategic reserve toward “jumping off” positions south of Mongolia. These units included the only Chinese airborne and air assault brigades. Rumors abounded in Hong Kong that the Chinese are putting pressure on the Mongolian government to “invite” direct Chinese military protection against a reassertion of Russian hegemony in Eurasia.

The Day of ...

At 23:00 Moscow time (15:00 Washington, D.C. time) on September 12, the White House received a message from the Russian republic via the Hot Line which announced that a single nuclear weapon would be detonated “at very high altitude in the general region of Kiev” at around 23:30 that night. The message promised there would be “no direct loss of life” as a consequence of the explosion and that its purpose was to “end the crisis” that had grown out of the failure of the Kiev negotiations for which the blame rested with “certain non-Russian republics.” Simultaneously, the republic's ambassador to the U.S. requested an emergency audience with the Secretary of State and presented a long message which explained in detail Russia's grievances with the republics of the Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Further, the note requested full political support in Russia's effort to “quench the threat of explosive nuclear proliferation” and restrain China's "imperial ambition."

The President immediately attempted to call the President of Russia. The call failed to go through - with the explanation given on the other end that “all circuits, with the exception of the Hot Line, have been rendered inoperable by the crisis.” At 23:10, the President sent an urgent appeal via the Hot Line that Russia delay the warning shot.

At 23:12, Moscow radio and television channels issued a warning to all residents of Kiev to “look into the night sky and see why they should make every effort to reverse the folly of their irresponsible government.”

At 23:15, an SS-25 launch from a missile complex in Russia is detected by the DSP early warning satellite system. The second stage burns for a relatively brief period and the direction of flight is plotted as south-southwest in the direction of the central region of the Ukraine.

At 23:30, a single nuclear weapon detonates 300 kilometers above the surface of the earth about 30 kilometers south of Kiev. The flash was visible throughout Europe and over much of the Middle East. Based on DSP and other sources the yield is estimated at roughly 300 kt.

As a consequence of the high altitude explosion the entire telephone and power grid for the city of Kiev and the surrounding regions falls from EMP effects.

At midnight Moscow time (4:00 pm Washington time) the President of the United States receives a message from the President of Russia providing further "explanation" for the nuclear "warning shot." The message states that Ukrainian forces had attempted to seize control of confederation nuclear weapons and that the Ukrainians have now been given 48 hours "to allow responsible authorities to assume control of all nuclear forces." The message further states that Russian nuclear forces have been placed on "crisis alert" (equivalent to DEFCON 3 in the U.S.) "pending satisfactory resolution of this matter." Similar messages are delivered by Russian ambassadors in London, Berlin, and Paris.
**STEP TWO: The Day After...**

**INSTRUCTIONS**

**How to Proceed**

1. You will have a total of 60 minutes for STEP TWO.

2. It is now 8:00 pm on September 12. You are scheduled to meet with the President in two hours to discuss the now rapidly escalating crisis in the former Soviet Union.

3. At the beginning of the move you will be given approximately ten minutes to quickly read through:
   - These Instructions.
   - A Draft Memo for the President.

4. As soon as it is practical, the Chair of the group will lead a discussion that moves through the tasking described in the Decisions to Be Made section. The group will again make two kinds of decisions:
   - Modifications to the staff-prepared Draft Memo for the President.
   - Recommendations to the President on specific options to select for each of the issues discussed.

5. When the time for STEP TWO is up, you should record your group's final decisions on the "STEP TWO Draft Memo for the President."

6. As part of the discussion of STEP TWO, the Chair of your group will be asked to summarize and explain the group's final decisions and recommendations.

**Decisions to Be Made**

**I. U.S. Policy Issues and Options**

As in the first move, the NSC staff-led working group believes that the U.S. will likely want to consider policy issues and options in at least the following general issue areas:

- Military
- Diplomatic
- Domestic Political
- Declaratory

The staff-prepared Draft Memo for the President provides a recommended set of policy issues and options in the above areas.

Under the guidance of the Chair, the group should discuss and modify this draft "policy options paper" as was done in Step One.

**2. Recommendations**

When the group has settled on the list of issues and options to go forward to the President, you should attempt to reach consensus on a recommendation on each of the issues. If a consensus cannot be reached, vote on the options presented and record the results.
STEP TWO: The Day After...

Draft Memo for the President

National Security Council

12 September 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
FROM: The National Security Advisor
SUBJECT: Possible U.S. Actions in the Light of the Russian Republic's Nuclear "Warning Shot"

There will be an emergency meeting of the NSC at 10:00 pm this evening to discuss possible U.S. responses to the Russian nuclear warning shot over Kiev. The purpose of this memo is to give you a further update on the crisis and to lay out the issues and options that you will presumably want to consider at that meeting.

Update on the Crisis

The Ukrainian Ambassador to the U.N. (and normally reliable U.S. sources in the Ukrainian defense ministry) strongly deny the Russian claims (and our original report to you in this morning's SitRep) that the Ukrainians made the first move in this crisis. A new composite of reports from these and other sources now suggest that Russian forces had attempted to forcibly remove the nuclear weapons from storage bunkers in the Ukraine as a prelude to demands for territorial concessions - and that it was this that had triggered the Ukrainian action. The truth about who initiated this crisis is likely to remain elusive.

We now understand from several sources that the Russian detonation was followed by a direct call from the Russian President to the Ukrainian President insisting that the Ukrainians withdraw forces from the nuclear storage depots and ICBM sites "or face the most serious consequences." The Ukrainian President bluntly replied that he would not be blackmailed by "a new imperialist Russia." Apparently he also hinted at the existence of other nuclear weapons in Ukrainian possession independent of the former Soviet weapons. This could explain recent intelligence reports of unusual activity at several Ukrainian facilities that we suspect might relate to an indigenous Ukrainian nuclear weapons capability. (There is no question that the Ukrainians have the knowhow and materials to build their own nuclear arsenal.) Some intelligence analysts believe that the Ukrainians might have been able to produce as many as a dozen moderately sophisticated nuclear weapons capable of being delivered by...
airplanes or possibly cruise missiles. Such weapons could conceivably be used in the current crisis. This also may explain the continued activity at the Vinnitsa air base where it appears that the Ukrainians are preparing to equip SU-24s with nuclear weapons.

Adding to the danger of this crisis is the prospect that the PRC and possibly Iran will make military moves to take advantage of the situation. Most worrisome is the mobilization and forward deployment of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) air and ground units south of Mongolia. We should be very concerned that the Chinese government does not imagine that the military occupation of Mongolia will be accepted by Moscow or the international community in a fashion akin to the acquiescence to Hitler’s “Anschluss” occupation of Austria in 1938. Our sources within the Russian General Staff indicate that any attempt by China to occupy Mongolia will likely be met with force. Given the drawdown of Russian theater forces in the Far East, this poses a real chance of explosive escalation, possibly including the use of nuclear weapons.

U.S. OBJECTIVES

At this point the principal near-term U.S. objective is to prevent the further use of nuclear weapons. A second near-term objective is to halt the process by which this inter-republican conflict becomes truly international through Chinese intervention in the Far East. As a third near-term objective, if the use of additional nuclear weapons cannot be prevented, we want to insure that there is no attack on the U.S., its allies, or any other non-combatant nation.

Quite obviously our objective since August of 1991 of keeping the former Soviet nuclear arsenal in the hands of a single entity - either the USS or the Russian republic - is very much at risk. We may already have failed in this goal.

If the outcome in this crisis is an increase in the number of parties with control over portions of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal - assuming the crisis can be halted without further nuclear use - we will want to promote responsible actions by those republics which in effect become nuclear weapons states. This could in the end include the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan. In this context we will want to do all we can to promote regional stability and especially a rapid (however grudging) reconciliation between Russia and these republics. We will also want to take measures to stabilize relations between the republics and their more powerful neighbors (and especially those between Russia and China).

The presentation of issues and options which follows derives from the pursuit of these objectives. While addressing these urgent issues we should keep in mind the larger question of what long-term outcome we would like to see in this troubled region - or perhaps more appropriately, what outcome we can live with. We need to bear in mind that almost any action we take - including inaction - could lead to putting the country and our allies at risk of attack, possibly by nuclear weapons.
DIPLOMATIC ISSUES

It is not at all clear at this stage whether there is any direct diplomatic action that could play a role in restraining this crisis. We are largely dependent on the parties to this conflict coming to their senses before things get even further out of hand. Though we should look hard to identify constructive actions that we might undertake, we must bear in mind the limited effectiveness of outside intervention efforts in the 1991–92 crisis in Yugoslavia.

There are several kinds of diplomatic initiatives that warrant consideration. For example, a large number of nations are already calling for an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council. There remains great uncertainty about the utility of such a step. Considering the current state of affairs, the status of the USS UN Ambassador as the legal (albeit "interim") successor to the Soviet representative is certainly in question. (He is a Russian who is very close to Yeltsin.) Will it be meaningful and legal if he does try to use that seat's veto power? Even if the UN cannot take any real action, we might still be able to take advantage of a Security Council meeting to dissuade China from taking advantage of the crisis.

The diplomatic initiatives that we might discuss include the following:

1. Should we join in the call for an emergency session of the UN Security Council?
   _____ A. Yes.  _____ B. Not at this time.

2. Which of the leaders of the parties involved (or potentially involved) in the conflict should you attempt to talk directly to at this time?
   _____ Russia.  _____ Ukraine  _____ Byelorussia
   _____ China  _____ Kazakhstan

3. How should we communicate our concerns regarding Chinese military action to Beijing?
   _____ A. Military action (e.g. Move U.S. naval forces into the region).
   _____ B. Other military action: ____________________________

4. Should we offer to recognize the non-Russian republics and extend security guarantees to them under the condition that they become non-nuclear weapon states?
   _____ Yes  _____ No
MILITARY ISSUES

Independent of whether the Russian or Ukrainian explanation for the initiation of this crisis is correct, the Russian republic has openly declared its intention to gain full control over the former Soviet nuclear arsenal in the strongest possible manner. Similarly, the Ukrainians (as a minimum) seem intent on resisting to the full extent possible, even in the face of nuclear coercion and the possibility that they too will feel compelled to use nuclear weapons to demonstrate commitment to their goals. As noted, there is the prospect that the conflict will be further "internationalized" if China makes a move toward Mongolia. Nuclear warfare between the Russian republic and China in this context is a real prospect.

Unless otherwise directed USCINCASAC plans to place U.S. strategic nuclear missile forces at DEFCON 3 and place at least 50 SAC bombers on alert. Our military leadership is profoundly pessimistic about the prospect of the crisis remaining contained. USCINCASAC also intends to order an increase in the readiness of his command and control assets by placing "Looking Glass" and other SAC airborne command posts on airborne alert as soon as possible. USCINCLANT and USCINCAPAC have made similar requests to assure connectivity with U.S. SSBNs. The Chairman of the JCS and the Secretary of Defense concur in these recommendations and also urge that the Vice President quietly go aloft on the NEACP in case things go out of control fast and we find ourselves somehow involved.

USCINCAPAC has requested that its forces should go to DEFCON 3. Further, USCINCAPAC has called for nuclear outfitting and forward movement of his command's nuclear strike assets. This would involve transfer of CONUS-based nuclear weapons to the Independence Carrier Battle Group (CBG) in Japan. Four combat ready SSNs would be equipped with long-range nuclear-armed SLCMs and deployed from their home port at Pearl Harbor. USCINCAPAC, with the support of USCINCASAC, has asked that the Strategic Reaction Force (SRF) package be deployed to Anderson AFB at Guam. This force includes 36 nuclear-capable B-52s armed with air-launched cruise missiles. Finally, USCINCAPAC has requested that its theater reconnaissance assets be greatly reinforced with CONUS-based units.

USCINCASAC has also requested authority to increase the alert level of the B-52 force to prepare for potential conventional bombing contingencies in the crisis region. The Chairman and the SECDEF concur in this request. The Joint Staff has also begun working on possible contingency planning guidance for the employment of U.S. forces in the crisis in a wide variety of situations.

In this context the military policy issues to be decided are:

1. What alert level should USCINCASAC adopt at this time?
   
   _______ A. Instruct USCINCASAC to stay at DEFCON 4.
   
   _______ B. Instruct USCINCASAC to go to DEFCON 3.
2. Should U.S. strategic bombers be placed on alert?

   A. Yes.        B. Not at this time.

3. What orders should be given to US CINCPAC regarding the transfer of nuclear weapons to surface ships and SSNs?

   A. Begin the transfer
   B. Await Presidential orders

4. What orders should be given to US CINCSAC, US CINCPAC, and US CINCLANT concerning steps to increase the readiness of strategic communications assets?

   A. Authorize the CINCs to take whatever actions they deem necessary as regards these assets.
   B. Instruct the CINCs to hold off for now on any actions with such assets or any other actions that would be detected and perceived as a significant move in the direction of our preparing for war.

5. Should the Vice President be placed on NEACP (and one Cabinet official dispatched to a secure crisis relocation facility)?

   A. Yes.        B. Not at this time.

6. Are there clearly identifiable circumstances in which you believe the U.S. might intervene militarily in this conflict and if so what guidance should the Joint Staff issue to SAC regarding planning for such contingencies?

   A. 
   B. 

7. Are there military measures beyond those identified above which should be taken to enhance the credibility of any U.S. threat to China to stay out of the conflict?

   A. 
   B. 

5
DOMESTIC POLICY ISSUES

There is widespread apprehension in the general public about the course this crisis might take. This evening's television news reports from Germany and Poland are showing some spontaneous evacuation of major urban areas in these countries. White House and Pentagon press offices are being besieged with calls seeking clarification as to whether the Ukrainians, the Byelorussians, or the Kazakhs could launch the ICBMs on their territory (should they gain physical control of these weapons). At the present time we do not believe that any any of these republics could accomplish this. There are, however, a few detractors to this view - mostly people with technical backgrounds who generally think these kinds of problems can be solved eventually. But the prospect of a Chinese intercontinental nuclear threat does exist if the conflict is internationalized.

Many believe that the most serious intercontinental threat to the United States in this situation is the Chinese ICBM arsenal. Although the Russians now control a far larger intercontinental nuclear bombardment force, we do not anticipate any U.S. action that could be seen as going against Russian interests in the crisis (even if we conclude that they made the first moves that precipitated the crisis).

American public opinion must be prepared for the prospect that we could be defending Russian geo-strategic interests at the expense of China, while simultaneously calling for an end to the brewing civil war in the former Soviet Union. The Administration will face a storm of domestic criticism about our failure to deal with root causes of such a civil war. Further, there will be intense domestic opposition to any policy which hints of a heightened risk of nuclear attack on North America, especially one that is seen as the product of Administration "political-military activism."

At the same time we may wish to begin to make some contingency plans regarding civil defense evacuation of Washington, D.C. just in case the crisis does further escalate and we become involved in a fashion that raises the risk of an attack on the U.S. - in which case the nation's capital is likely the most attractive target.

The domestic political issues to be decided are:

1. Should you or the SECDEF make a statement of some kind indicating that the country is at some risk of nuclear attack either by accident or design?

   _____ A. Yes  _____ B. No

2. Should such a statement be made a part of a larger domestic effort to articulate the concept that the "nuclear peace is globally indivisible" and that the United States must still take some real risks to insure international "peace and prosperity."

   _____ A. Yes  _____ B. No
3. Should you or the SECDEF make a statement indicating that the country has no cause to be concerned that the non-Russian republics might be able to make the ICBMs on their territory operational in the near-term?

A. Yes.

B. We should make no statement on this problem at this time.

4. Should we take steps to prepare for the possible evacuation of Washington D.C. if the crisis escalates?

A. Yes, but say nothing publicly about these preparations and take no action that would alert the public to such a contingency.

B. Yes, and alert the citizens of the Washington, D.C. area to such an evacuation as a future possibility.

C. No, and say nothing publicly at this time about this prospect.

DECLARATORY POLICY ISSUES

While it is probably clear to everyone that this crisis could escalate to the point where the U.S. and other nations outside the former Soviet Union get involved, directly or indirectly, we may be at a point where you would want to publicly and profoundly emphasize our concerns on the crisis. For example, you might want to make an unambiguous statement regarding the significance for all nations and peoples of the use - in this case the further use - of nuclear weapons. You will recall that you have often stated that we cannot ignore the use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world.

You may also wish to consider the possibility that we might proactively use U.S. military force - dangerous as that might be - to quench the crisis. For example we may find at the NSC meeting that one of the contingencies that makes sense to people (on nuclear non-proliferation grounds) is to prepare to destroy any independent nuclear arsenal in the hands of a non-Russian republic - and declare this to be our policy. However, we would want to be careful about any such statement since it will establish us as an implicit ally of Russia in the conflict and an immediate antagonist of the Ukraine or any of the other republics that might end up after the crisis in possession of nuclear weapons (whose current and future locations we may not be able to determine).

The declaratory policy issues to be discussed are thus:
1. Should you make a special public statement regarding the use and/or further use of nuclear weapons?

_____ A. Yes. The theme of the statement should be:

_____ • “Nuclear peace is indivisible”

_____ • ________________________________

_____ B. Not at this time.

2. Should you make a special public statement drawing the line on any outcome that increases the number of parties in control of nuclear weapons and implying that we might take independent action to eliminate any such capability?

_____ A. Yes

_____ B. Not at this time

3. Should you make a public statement which includes the threat of countermeasures against China if the latter makes a move against Mongolia?

_____ A. No

_____ B. Yes

4. (If yes to 3.) Should this statement be designed to alert the American public about the prospect of a wider war which could include a Chinese nuclear counterthreat to the United States?

_____ A. No

_____ B. Yes
## STEP THREE: The Day Before...

### INSTRUCTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How to Proceed</th>
<th>Decisions to Be Made</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. In STEP THREE you will have a total of 45 minutes to deliberate and reach decisions.</td>
<td><strong>I. U.S. Policy Issues and Options</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The time period is &quot;the day before&quot; nuclear weapon use - more literally the present or the very near future. You are preparing for an NSC meeting with the President on the nuclear proliferation problem, with a particular emphasis on those policy issues related to the political instability in the former Soviet Union.</td>
<td>The staff-prepared Draft Memo for the President provides an initial set of policy issues and options for consideration at this time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. At the beginning of the move you will be given approximately ten minutes to quickly read through:</td>
<td>Under the guidance of the Chair, the group should discuss and modify this draft &quot;policy options paper.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• These Instructions.</td>
<td><strong>2. Recommendations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• A Draft Memo for the President.</td>
<td>When the group has settled on the list of issues and options to go forward to the President, you should attempt to reach consensus on a recommendation on each of the issues. If a consensus cannot be reached, vote on the options presented in a fashion that progressively eliminates those with the least support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. As soon as it is practical, the Chair of the group will lead a discussion that moves through the tasking described in the Decisions to Be Made section. The group will make three kinds of decisions:</td>
<td>As a final step you should try to forge a consensus on the three to four most important of these policy issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Modifications to the staff-prepared Draft Memo for the President.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Recommendations to the President on specific options to select for each of the issues discussed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The rank-ordering of the three to four most important nuclear proliferation-related policy issues to be put to the President at this point in time.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. When the time for STEP THREE is up, you should record your group's final decisions on the &quot;STEP THREE Draft Memo for the President.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. As part of the discussion of STEP THREE, the Chair of your group will again be asked to summarize the group's conclusions and recommendations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
STEP THREE: The Day Before...

Draft Memo for the President

National Security Council

xx December 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
FROM: The National Security Advisor
SUBJECT: Nuclear Proliferation Policy and the Political Situation in the Former Soviet Union

There will be a meeting of the NSC tomorrow to discuss the overall nuclear proliferation problem and especially those problems that relate to the unstable political situation in the Soviet Union.

As the Soviet republics seek to forge a viable long term economic and political relationship, the disposition of the nuclear arsenal of the former union is assuredly one of the most difficult negotiating tasks they face. At present the Soviet nuclear arsenal is under the physical control of a relatively unchanged military (except in terms of its leadership) and the political control of a "Defense Council" led by the President of the hastily created United Sovereign States (USS) - a political arrangement of highly uncertain future viability.

We anticipate that the negotiation of a more permanent political arrangement will either precede decisions on the future of the Soviet nuclear arsenal or more probably be a fundamental element in that negotiation. In this context it is clearly in our interest to think through the range of possible outcomes in those negotiations - and take the measure of those outcomes against our own views about nuclear proliferation and the future of nuclear weapons. In so doing we may find that it is in our interest (and those of the international community) to attempt to constructively influence the decisions that are made in those negotiations.

In the material which follows we have presented four key policy issues which appear to be at the heart of this matter. In each case we briefly lay out and analyze the issue, then carefully articulate a specific policy question designed to provide insight into the problem and the decision-making challenge. The policy options which are then presented are designed to provide the basis by which - through extrapolation, interpolation, or merging at the NSC meeting - a sound and temporally stable U.S. position on the issue can be established.
1. LIMITING THE NUMBER OF "NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES"

There is no question that if the outcome of the negotiations between the Soviet republics is an increase in the number of nuclear weapon states, our efforts and those of others to stem the slow but continued growth in the number of nuclear weapons states will suffer a severe blow. The key question is thus whether we should at this time seek complete “Russification” of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal or look to some kind of joint inter-republic control as the most desirable long-term solution.

If we could be assured that a confederation of some kind would remain stable and viable over time (even if it is almost exclusively for military purposes or even just “nuclear arsenal” purposes), that could represent an acceptable outcome. But we do not know if such a stable arrangement can in fact be achieved. Nuclear decision-making within such a structure would obviously be very difficult (if not a nightmare). If we believe that such a confederation in the end would not be stable, we might be far better off seeking exclusive Russian control of the arsenal now, rather than risking a future “breakup” with all of the attendant dangers. The confederation option also raises complicated questions regarding both the former Soviet permanent seat on the UN Security Council and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

An important consideration here is our own thinking as regards further nuclear arms control negotiations – both further reductions in strategic offensive arsenals and associated limits on strategic defenses, as well as potentially ambitious negotiations – or parallel unilateral reductions – on tactical nuclear weapons.

Whatever our preferences an important question to be addressed at the NSC meeting is just where we might find the leverage to influence the confederation negotiations in the direction of our own preferred outcome – and what the costs and risks of using this leverage might be.

Policy Question: What disposition of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal –in a situation where we unambiguously prefer that only a single entity control that arsenal (and its successors) - is most in the long-term U.S. and global interest?

_____ A. Complete Russification of the arsenal at this time.

_____ B. Placing the arsenal in the hands of some kind of confederation (i.e. a multilateral nuclear force).

_____ C. 

_____ D.
2. INCENTIVES TO RESTRAIN FRACTIONATION OF THE SOVIET NUCLEAR ARSENAL

As noted above there is little question that our preference is for the former Soviet nuclear arsenal to end up under the control of a single entity. This raises the question of whether there are actions or positions we might take that would increase the likelihood that this would be the outcome in the inter-republic negotiations.

In spite of much speculation we have to admit that we simply do not yet know just what the position of the non-Russian republics will be in these negotiations. There are a host of complexities that will permeate the debate among the republics. For example, if there are non-Russian republics that retain nuclear weapons will they join the NPT as nuclear weapon states? If so, what kinds of IAEA inspections will be permitted in these republics?

One of the key factors here is inertia. Because both paths - fractionation or a single controlling entity - are fraught with complications, the most likely near term path is stasis. This has the unfortunate disadvantage of tilting the balance toward the fractionation outcome since, in the absence of a clear decision, the weapons and the weapons production complexes will remain where they are. As long as things are peaceful, all sides will - at least in the short term - get ever more comfortable (or less uncomfortable) with the status quo. This argues for an immediate and hard look at what the United States and other nations or international organizations might do to move the inter-republic process toward the more desired outcome of a single controlling entity.

One of the things this argues for is immediate and serious probing of the political leadership in the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan to determine their likely policy on the "to have or not to have" issue as regards an independent nuclear arsenal. This will of course be complicated by the fact that there are undoubtedly few people in any of these republics who, prior to August of 1991, thought through, debated, or probed their citizens or political processes on such questions. In addition it is clear that the leadership in these republics are consumed by more fundamental issues of national political and economic viability. In this context the stimulus and education - even the "staffing" - for the needed process (with the requirement for generating decisions that need to be thorough enough to insure that they are temporally stable) may or could come from the outside. In fact, in consideration of the very primitive state of "strategic nuclear" planning and analysis in these republics, there could now be a once in a lifetime opportunity to influence the outcome of these processes in directions we would find favorable.

It seems clear that it will take more than just the U.S. and other nations showing up in these republics and saying "We know what's good for you; you should forego nuclear arsenals." What then might we do to achieve a more desirable outcome?

Issues that will almost certainly play in the decisions by these republics are:

- The future size of the Russian, and by extrapolation the American, strategic nuclear arsenals.
• The future size of the Chinese strategic nuclear arsenal.

• The future size and character of U.S. and Russian tactical nuclear arsenals.

• The future size and character of U.S. and Russian - and global - strategic defenses.

In the first three examples, it seems clear that the lower the force levels the more willing these republics will be to forego independent nuclear arsenals. In the case of strategic defenses, they will obviously - like our allies - take a dim view of any concept that provides significant strategic defense of Russia but not their own republics. Here, even if there was a Russian willingness to provide them some shelter from strategic ballistic missile attack, their location on the periphery of the Russian land mass makes their defense by ground-based ABM systems technically very difficult.

**Policy Question:** What actions or positions might the U.S. take to increase the likelihood that the former Soviet nuclear arsenal will end up under the control of a single entity?

_____ A. Offer to negotiate with the Russians on very deep reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals (e.g., to a warhead level of no greater than 2000 warheads even if no other nuclear weapons states are involved and to a level as low as, say 1000 warheads, if nations like China will agree to low ceilings on their strategic nuclear arsenals).

_____ B. Offer to negotiate the elimination of all tactical nuclear warheads.

_____ C. Offer to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear weapons test ban or the next thing to it.

_____ D. Offer to perpetuate the ABM Treaty limits on ground-based ABM systems and to not deploy space-based systems except under international agreement.
3. LIMITING THE SIZE OF "NON-RUSSIAN" NUCLEAR ARSENALS

If, despite our best efforts, we find ourselves in a situation where the former Soviet nuclear arsenal ends up divided among two or more republics, what "strategic nuclear relationship" should we seek to forge with Russia and the other republics who end up with nuclear arsenals?

We can be confident that the great bulk of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal will end up in the hands of Russia. The number and character of the weapons that end up in the hands of other republics is, however, somewhat uncertain. In terms of strategic nuclear warheads it could range from current numbers to much smaller forces akin in size to that maintained by the Chinese. In terms of tactical warheads the preferred outcome would be the negotiated elimination of such arsenals from all of the republics. However, that may not be possible outside the context of broader negotiations involving other nuclear-armed states. A further consideration is the indigenous nuclear weapons production capability of the republics, especially Ukraine. It also must be kept in mind that Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have the bulk of the former Soviet Union's uranium mines and first stage uranium processing plants.

The implications for U.S. national security policy of such outcomes - particularly for the building of strategic defenses and further reductions in strategic offenses - are not at this point easy to divine. It may be that small strategic nuclear offensive arsenals in the hands of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Byelorussia in the end affect the U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear relationship much in the same way that the British, French, and Chinese arsenals do, i.e. they limit the degree to which offensive arsenals can be reduced and cause problems for the Russians (and maybe us) in terms of the sizing of strategic defenses. Part of the answer to such questions will come when the outcome of the inter-republic negotiations is clearer and the non-Russian republics have had a chance to reject or rationalize possessing strategic nuclear arsenals.

In the context of an unexpected increase in the number of independent nuclear arsenals in Eurasia with all of its implications, the U.S. will have to seriously reexamine the issue of strategic defenses and especially the fate of the ABM Treaty. If many states choose small nuclear arsenals as their "great equalizer", should the U.S. deploy anti-ballistic missile defenses - and anti-bomber and anti-cruise missile defenses - which can credibly defeat small attacks from such countries? Considering that such forces once established can easily grow (perhaps covertly), to what level of attack might we be prepared to insure effective defense?
Policy Question: What is the size of the "non-Russian" nuclear arsenals that might be "tolerable" as an outcome to negotiations in the light of long-term U.S. objectives as regards the building of strategic defenses and further reductions in strategic offenses?

______ A. No more than ______ "strategic" nuclear warheads in the hands of any one "non-Russian" republic.

______ B. No more than a total of ______ "strategic" nuclear warheads in the hands of the "non-Russian" republics.

______ C. No more than a total of ______ "tactical" nuclear warheads in the hands of the "non-Russian" republics.

4. INSEURING ADEQUATE SAFETY AND CONTROL FOR NON-RUSSIAN NUCLEAR ARSENALS

If it becomes unequivocally clear that we must deal with a reality of genuine fractionation of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal, we should probably do everything in our power to insure the safety and control of the nuclear arsenals of the new non-Russian nuclear arsenals. We should also bear in mind that there may be things we could also do to help the Russians themselves improve the safety and control of their nuclear arsenal. Whether the level of U.S.-Russian cooperation could ever get to that stage remains to be seen.

Policy Question: What technical assistance should we be prepared to give to new non-Russian nuclear weapons states to insure the safety and control of their nuclear arsenals?

______ A. Provide them with Permissive Action Links (PALS).

______ B. Provide them with blueprints for reliable PALS.

______ C. ______________________________________________________________________

______ D. ______________________________________________________________________
Appendix G

The Day After . . . in the Greater Middle East
Exercise Materials
The Day After...

...in the Greater Middle East

Marc Dean Millot
Roger Molander
Peter Wilson

This material is considered proprietary to RAND. These data shall not be disclosed outside RAND and shall not be duplicated, used, or disclosed in whole or in any part for any purpose without the written permission of RAND. This restriction does not limit any individual's right to use information contained in the data if it is obtained from another source without restriction.

HANDOUT

RAND

10 March 1992
"Regional conflicts will increasingly be complicated by increases in both conventional and unconventional capabilities in the third world. During the Gulf War we faced an adversary armed with chemical and biological weapons. Although Saddam Hussein did not use these weapons, we may not be so lucky the next time. We remain concerned that a small number of nations including Iran and North Korea are working to develop nuclear or unconventional weapons. As we learned from our experience with Iraq, it can be extremely difficult to know how far such efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction will have progressed.

The threat is not limited just to weapons of mass destruction. The global diffusion of military and dual-use technologies will enable a growing number of countries to field highly capable weapons systems such as ballistic missiles, stealthy cruise missiles, integrated air defenses, modern command and control systems, and even space-based assets. As a result our regional adversaries may be armed with capabilities that in the past were limited only to the superpowers."

"...we must be prepared to face adversaries on their own terms, possibly involving the use of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic or cruise missiles. We may need to be able to fight earlier than we did this time. If the use of weapons of mass destruction is threatened, we may need to win even more quickly and decisively and we would still want to retain the advantages necessary to keep our losses as low as possible."

Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney
House Armed Services Committee
31 January 1992
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Day After...</th>
<th>Introduction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>...in the Greater Middle East</td>
<td>Methodology Schematic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overview of the Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>STEP ONE: The Day Of...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Situation Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Instructions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Draft Memo for the President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>STEP TWO: The Day After...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Situation Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Instructions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Draft Memo for the President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>STEP THREE: The Day Before...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Instructions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Draft Memo for the President</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HANDOUT
INTRODUCTION

The Day After... is a RAND project examining the implications for U.S. national security and military strategy of the spread of nuclear weapons and related capabilities in the post-Cold War world.

A central assumption of the project is that the ability to build nuclear weapons and modern means to deliver them (such as ballistic missiles) will continue to proliferate. The number of nations with deliverable "in-being" nuclear arsenals will almost certainly grow. Also likely to increase are "virtual" nuclear arsenals - arsenals that by design and plan can be built or assembled inside a nation's likely "strategic warning time". The loss or breakup of central control over an existing nuclear arsenal could also add to the number of nuclear weapons powers (as may be the outcome in the former Soviet Union). Such situations will also almost certainly spread "nuclear weapons-competent" personnel and related nuclear weapons wherewithal.

In such a global environment, the possibility of actual nuclear weapon use seems worthy of concern and attention. At a minimum, we will probably face many future crises in which there is the implicit or explicit brandishing of nuclear weapons. In this context there is a clear need to frame - for both analysis and policymaking - the spectrum of nuclear proliferation-related policy decisions the United States must now face.

The near-term objective of The Day After... project is to identify (and seek consensus where it exists on):

- A set of generic nuclear proliferation-related scenarios involving nuclear weapon use in future crises.

- A set of candidate "heart of the matter" nuclear proliferation-related policy issues that might be put to the President for decision in the near term.

- A rough rank-ordering of the most urgent and important of the above key policy issues.

- A comprehensive spectrum of clearly drawn policy options for each of these issues.

The Day After... project methodology (see the schematic below) and this exercise begin with an examination of the policy decisions confronting a U.S. President and the nation on "the day of" some pivotal change in the nuclear status quo - including the possible imminent or near-term "use" of nuclear weapons. As a second pivot point (tracking the schematic), the exercise turns to "the day after" - in the aftermath of actual nuclear weapon "use" - and explores the set of crisis-driven policy choices that would face the President at that point. As a final decision point, the exercise moves to "the day before" - months or years before the envisioned "day of" or "day after" - and considers the challenge of adopting policies and an overall strategy to minimize the prospects that such scenarios would occur or, if they do, to mitigate their consequences.

The Day After... in the Greater Middle East is the second of a set of four policy exercises RAND is developing to explore the implications of various generic nuclear weapon use scenarios. The generic scenarios and policy exercises currently planned are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generic Scenario</th>
<th>Policy Exercise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Loss of Central Control</td>
<td>The Day After... in the 'USSR'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. U.S. Intervention</td>
<td>The Day After... in the Greater Middle East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Nuclear Use vs. U.S. Ally</td>
<td>The Day After... in Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Nth Country vs. Nth Country</td>
<td>The Day After... in South Asia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A fifth "policy process" exercise will model the U.S. policy decision-making process for nuclear proliferation-related issues. Any new U.S. policies in this area (or U.S. endorsement of new global policies) must inescapably be forged in that political arena and clash of interests. This final exercise will point toward the development of a sustainable overall national and global strategy to address the long-term consequences of nuclear proliferation.
METHODOLOGY SCHEMATIC

OVERVIEW OF THE EXERCISE

**The Day After...in the Greater Middle East** is a three step policy exercise designed to be completed in one three-hour session. Participants (ideally in groups of 6-9 people) take on the role of top advisors to the President of the United States in a group deliberative process akin to a meeting of National Security Council principals (minus the President) and key staff, preparing for a later formal NSC meeting with the President.

In **STEP ONE: The Day Of...** (estimated time 60 min.) the participants address a rapidly deteriorating political situation in the region which the British in the 19th century labeled "the Greater Middle East." The group develops an overall perspective on the situation, considers the issues and options that need to be presented to the President, and, where consensus can be found, recommends decisions for the President to take.

In **STEP TWO: The Day After...** (estimated time 50 min.) participants find themselves convened at a point later in time and immediately following nuclear weapon "use" in an escalating crisis in the Greater Middle East. The group's task is again to help the President decide how to respond to the prevailing situation.

In **STEP THREE: The Day Before...** (estimated time 50 min.) the exercise moves back in time to today or to the near future. In consideration of the "lessons learned" in the two previous moves, the group seeks to reach consensus on the character and thrust, defining language, and the appropriate options for those key nuclear proliferation-related policy issues that should in the very near term be faced and taken to closure in the United States.

Where time permits a debriefing ends the exercise.
STEP ONE: The Day Of...

SITUATION REPORT

BACKGROUND

It is the late summer of 1997.

The “Greater Middle East”

By the mid-1990s the region running from Egypt east to India, and then north to include the Islamic countries of the former Soviet Union, had become known again as the “Greater Middle East” -- picking up the earlier British term from before the national divisions imposed in the 1920s by the now defunct British, French, and “Soviet” empires.

Persia Ascendant

Iranian power and influence rose dramatically following Iran’s 1996 victory in the brief but violent second Iran-Iraq war, a war in which the Iranian military revealed surprising competence in the use of advanced weapon systems and tactics.

Iran now dominates a weak central government in Baghdad which has already granted virtual autonomy to the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the South. Four Iranian “liberation divisions” remain in southern Iraq near Basra.

Iran’s military competence is matched by its Islamic zeal and continuing efforts to extend Teheran’s political sway. Some Iranian leaders have gone so far as to vow to overturn the 1995 peace agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbors (see below). Iran is also the major financial supporter of radical fundamentalist groups that are increasingly active in almost all of the Gulf states.

Iran’s political-military clout in the region has been further enhanced by its close military industrial ties to China and Pakistan. Both have supplied extensive assistance in the development of a Persian military-industrial infrastructure including major roles in the construction of production facilities for the tactical ballistic and cruise missile systems used extensively in the 1996 Iran-Iraq war. A supersonic anti-ship version of the cruise missile is now extensively deployed along Iran’s coast.

Iran recently completed a successful series of flight tests of a new 2500 km range IRBM that is clearly derivative of the Chinese CSS-X (as is the new Pakistani “HAFT III” IRBM). It is expected that the new missile will be deployed on mobile launchers operating from bases in northwestern Iran.

Iran’s ambition to acquire a nuclear arsenal is now widely acknowledged though the Iranians continue to maintain that their rapidly growing nuclear infrastructure is for “nuclear energy alone.” The program has benefitted immeasurably from nuclear training, expertise, and equipment acquired from China and Pakistan.

There remains a wide divergence of views as to whether the Iranians might already have produced some nuclear warheads. Controversial intelligence reports suggest that an Iranian-designed nuclear warhead destined for their new IRBM may have been tested at China’s Lop Nor facility in the fall of 1996. (In response to these reports Israel’s Defense Ministry officials have privately indicated that their policy remains that they “will not be the first nation to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East” - but that as long as it is “within their power” they will not allow anyone else to do so either.)

Aided by a compliant Iraq, Iran has become increasingly aggressive on OPEC pricing and production policy. (Since the early 1960s, the price of oil had remained stable at $22-25 a barrel in FY-92 dollars.) The prospect of increased oil prices is troubling throughout the industrialized world, not the least in the United States where the soft price in oil has led to an increase in oil imports - to 55% of U.S. consumption in 1996.

The Islamic Region of the Former Soviet Union

By 1994, over strong Russian objections, the Islamic states of the former Soviet Union had formed a new security confederation - the Confederacy of Turkistani States (CTS). This region has become the object of intense economic, political, and military rivalry between Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.

The 104 SS-18s in Kazakhstan were gradually “disabled” from 1993 to 1995 under the terms of the revised START Treaty. However, Kazakhstan may have held on to a small arsenal of tactical nuclear warheads. In addition Kazakhstan (and Uzbekistan) have been trading extensively in supposedly “peaceful” nuclear materials and knowhow with Iran.
Israel and the Arabs

Arab-Israeli tensions moderated after a 1995 agreement gave the Palestinians limited autonomy over almost all of the West Bank. As part of the multi-stage agreement, Israel also signed peace treaties with Syria and Jordan. The package included a formal U.S. security guarantee to Israel and the deployment of U.S. personnel as part of a UN peacekeeping force in the Golan Heights. From the Israeli perspective, peace with Syria came at a significant price, especially acceptance of Syrian hegemony over most of Lebanon. The final bargain was forged through heavy U.S. pressure on Israel - which has left U.S.-Israeli relations badly strained.

Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus

Relations between Russia and Ukraine have evolved in a relatively smooth fashion following the late 1992 agreement on the Crimea and the Black Sea fleet. In 1993 Russia was granted de jure control over the former Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal in Belarus and the Ukraine - facilitated by a “deep reductions” annex to the START Treaty. There are concerns in these states - especially in Russia - about the future course of the CTS, heightened by China’s active engagement within the region.

Trade between the U.S. and Russia is booming, in large measure “fueled” by Russia’s rising petroleum export business. There is now widespread speculation in the Western economic press that both Russia and Ukraine could “turn the corner” by the end of the decade. Russian support for the Arab-Israeli peace treaties, and Russia’s constructive role in the UN Security Council, has led many American leaders to speak of a possible emerging Russo-American “security partnership.”

China

The post-Deng Xiopeng leadership has nurtured a policy of “radical perestroika”, but without “glasnost” - while demanding that the outside world treat China like a “great power.” Many in the U.S. view China as a dangerous power, increasingly in league with Islam. However, U.S. views toward China have been tempered by the marked increase in U.S.-Chinese trade that followed the formal rapprochement between Taiwan and the mainland.

The United States Military

While U.S. defense spending fell over 35% from FY-90 to FY-95, the major elements of the base force as set forth by the Bush administration in FY-93 have survived.

The U.S. has pursued a vigorous anti-ballistic missile program in the last five years focused on development of effective ATBMs. (Ground and space-based elements of a CONUS ABM system remain in active R&D.) A large number of PATRIOT III and ERINT (Extended Range INterceptor) battalions have been sold or provided to Israel (in part as a response to the demise of the ARROW ATBM program) and to various Gulf states. THAAD, a new high-altitude ATBM interceptor, entered production late last year and two battalions are now operational. In contrast to PATRIOT III and ERINT, THAAD is believed to be capable of effectively intercepting missiles like the new Iranian IRBM. (Through a cooperative agreement Israel will also soon begin production of THAAD.)

Persian Gulf Security

In the face of Iran’s growing power the U.S. last year concluded a new military agreement with the Arab states of the Gulf Coordinating Council (GCC). The associated military contingency plan includes the prepositioning of equipment for one U.S. Army heavy division in Saudi Arabia, one air-mobile division in Kuwait, one Maritime Prepositioned Squadron (MPS) at Bahrain, and similar arrangements to support two tactical air wings in Saudi Arabia and one in the UAE. The plan also incorporates US and European rapid deployment commitments - operations that are code-named GREEN HORNET and SILVER SABRE, respectively. Table 1 summarizes the major components of GREEN HORNET; Table 2 shows the base force drawdown that results from implementation of GREEN HORNET.

Along with ground and air forces from CONUS, the two U.S. Army divisions stationed in Germany (part of a NATO multinational corps) have been assigned to GREEN HORNET. Britain and France have also made defense commitments to the GCC. A British air-mobile division normally assigned to NATO’s Rapid Reaction Corps (RRC) and a French motorized division constitute the European military components of SILVER SABRE.
The Crisis

On September 13, 1997, OPEC oil ministers met in an emergency session in Caracas to review production and pricing policy. The oil price "hawks" in Iran were promoting a major cutback in OPEC production with a goal of driving the price to $40 a barrel - arguing that their "security and economic needs" required greater oil revenues. (This action was in part spurred by recent projections of very large increases in Russian and Kazakh oil production.)

The Caracas meeting ended in failure and disarray after three days of tense discussions (marked by a final televised shouting match between the Iranian and Saudi oil ministers).

On September 17 a terrorist attack heavily damaged a large oil pumping station in Kuwait.

On September 19 U.S. intelligence detected the forward movement of two Iranian mechanized divisions from Basra toward the Kuwait border. That same day Iran announced that its Foreign Minister was flying to Riyadh with an "urgent proposal."

On September 20, the U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia reported the contents of that proposal:

- Saudi Arabia should immediately cut oil production from eight to six million barrels a day.
- Kuwait and the remaining GCC states should cut their production by 15 percent.
- The GCC states should annul their military agreements with the U.S. and declare "neutrality" or non-alignment.
- Saudi Arabia and other GCC states should join their "Islamic brothers" to "actively reverse the treason" of Jordan and Syria vis a vis Israel.
- Saudi Arabia should embrace "complete political and religious freedom" and drop restrictions on the numbers of Shites attending the Haj in Mecca.

On September 21, Iran and Iraq announced the partial mobilization of their military forces to "deal with Saudi treachery" and "defend the victories of Islam." U.S. intelligence detected the movement of the other two Iranian infantry divisions in Iraq to positions just west of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border.

Three Iranian armored divisions based near Dezful in southwestern Iran were reported being assembled on heavy transporters. Four large pontoon bridges were reported already established across the Shatt al Arab.

At this point Kuwait ordered full mobilization of its two armored, one mechanized, and one motorized brigades and all of its reserves. Saudi Arabia took similar actions with both the Royal Army and National Guard (equivalent to four heavy divisions). Within 24 hours Kuwait had deployed the bulk of its forces to defense positions west and north of Kuwait City with armored cavalry squadrons further north in the Rumaila oil fields.

At about 0300 local time on September 23 a Kuwaiti cavalry patrol encountered an Iranian long-range reconnaissance team west of the Rumaila fields. During the ensuing firefight, Iranian artillery units fired several barrages into Kuwait. Within the hour additional artillery and tank duels broke out all along the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border. The scattered fighting ended several hours later but the U.S. ambassador in Kuwait reported that the exchanges had left the Kuwaiti royal family fearful that an invasion was imminent.

At 1100 local time the commanding general of U.S. forces in Bahrain received a formal alert message from the GCC High Command requesting implementation of GREEN HORNET.

Later on the afternoon local time of the 23rd, Pakistan successfully test-fired what appeared at first to be two of its "HAFT III" ballistic missiles. All telemetry on the missiles was encrypted. U.S. intelligence collection aircraft out of Diego Garcia detected the deployment of exoatmospheric penetration aids during both tests. In both cases the single reentry vehicle executed an unprecedented high acceleration exoatmospheric "dogleg" maneuver. Later analysis left uncertain whether the missile was a new version of the HAFT III or the new Iranian IRBM.
**SITUATION REPORT (cont.)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Phase One (Deterrence Phase)</th>
<th>Phase Two (Initial Defense)</th>
<th>Phase Three (Full Capability)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>• Deploy two battalions of Patriot/ERINT</td>
<td>• Fully deploy 3 divisions with Patriot/ERINT</td>
<td>• Fully deploy 5 divisions (3 CONUS, 2 Europe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Place elements of the 3 Phase Two divisions</td>
<td>battalions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>on higher alert</td>
<td>• Mobilize the 5 Phase Three divisions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>• Move one Carrier Battle Group (CBG) to the</td>
<td>• Deploy 3 CBG’s to theater</td>
<td>• Fully mobilize Rapid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Red Sea</td>
<td>• Deploy 2 Aegis cruisers off Kuwait City and</td>
<td>Reserve Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Al Jubiyal</td>
<td>• Callup of some reserves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>• Deploy one Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) with</td>
<td>• Deploy 3 more TFWs</td>
<td>• Deploy 7 more TFWs and 2 B-52 wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>additional intelligence and control aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>• Deploy one MPS from Indian Ocean, offload</td>
<td>• Deploy 2 MPS from Atlantic and Pacific to</td>
<td>• Marry up 2 brigades from CONUS with in-theater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in-theater MPS</td>
<td>theater</td>
<td>equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Place associated CONUS-based brigades on</td>
<td>• Marry up 2 brigades from CONUS with in-theater</td>
<td>2 amphibious brigades deployed in theater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>alert</td>
<td>equipment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KEY:** MPS (Maritime Prepositioned Squadrons) - equipment for Marine brigades

Table 1. Major Components of GREEN HORNET

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Category</th>
<th>Army Divisions</th>
<th>Tactical Fighter Wings</th>
<th>Carrier Battle Groups</th>
<th>Marine Expeditionary Force Brigades</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Base Force Total</td>
<td>12 active</td>
<td>15 active</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 reserve</td>
<td>11 reserve</td>
<td>1 flight training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 cadre</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Less GREEN HORNET Phases One and Two)</td>
<td>(3 active)</td>
<td>(4 active)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Less GREEN HORNET Phase Three)</td>
<td>(5 active)</td>
<td>(4 active)</td>
<td>(3 reserve)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forces Remaining</td>
<td>4 active</td>
<td>7 active</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 reserve</td>
<td>8 reserve</td>
<td>1 flight training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 cadre</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Forces Remaining After Implementation of GREEN HORNET
### STEP ONE: The Day Of...

#### INSTRUCTIONS

**How to Proceed**

1. You will have a total of 60 minutes for STEP ONE (50 min. for deliberations and 10 min. for reporting).

2. Keep in mind that you are in the role of a top advisor to the President of the United States (e.g. a cabinet or sub-cabinet level official) and a participant in a meeting that can be viewed as akin to a meeting of National Security Council principals (minus the President) and key staff, preparing for a later formal NSC meeting with the President.

3. At the beginning of STEP ONE you will be given a few minutes to quickly review the Scenario, these Instructions, and a very rough Draft Memo for the President akin to that which might have been prepared as a working draft by an interagency working group.

4. The Chair will then lead a discussion that moves through the tasking described in the Decisions to Be Made section. (The Chair should ask one participant to serve as a recording secretary for the group.) The group will make two kinds of decisions:
   - Modifications to the Draft Memo - e.g. adding issues and/or options to go forward for consideration by the President.
   - Where consensus can be achieved, recommendations to the President on preferred options on specific issues.

5. It is recommended that the Chair begin by asking the participants to very briefly give their individual perspectives on the situation and what actions might be considered.

6. When the time for STEP ONE is up, the group should record its final decisions on the issues and options to go forward - and any consensus recommendations - on the Draft Memo.

7. As part of the discussion of STEP ONE, the Chair of each group will be asked to summarize and explain the group’s decisions. The total time period allotted for these presentations is ten minutes. Each Chair should adjust the length of her/his remarks accordingly.

**Decisions to Be Made**

1. **Policy Issues and Options**

   The NSC staff-led working group believes that the U.S. will likely want to consider policy issues and options in the following general issue areas:
   - Military
   - Diplomatic
   - Domestic Political
   - Decleratory

   The Draft Memo for the President provides an initial and presumed partial set of policy issues and options that might go forward for decision in these four areas. Under the guidance of the Chair, the group should discuss this draft “policy options paper” and expand and modify it as judged appropriate in the light of the situation. The objective is to produce a final set of issues that is:
   - Well-structured and concise.
   - Complete but limited in the sense of seeking to set forth only those key decisions which the President must now make.

2. **Recommendations**

   After an initial period of comments on the situation and the memo **the group should discuss whether there are other issues on which they think decisions should be made at this point in time** - and modify the Draft Memo accordingly. The group might then look at adding new options on individual issues.

   When the group settles on the issues and options to go forward for decision, it should attempt to reach consensus on a recommendation on each - keeping in mind that a consensus on all issues is unlikely and not expected (and even then could still be rejected by the President). When it is clear to the Chair that a consensus cannot be reached on some issue, vote on the options still on the table. Record the final vote.
STEP ONE: The Day Of...

Draft Memo for the President

National Security Council

23 September 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

FROM: The National Security Advisor

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on the Greater Middle East Crisis

There will be an NSC meeting at 4:00 pm today on the GCC request to implement Phase One of GREEN HORNET plus other issues related to the escalating crisis in the Greater Middle East. The purpose of this memo is to prepare you for that meeting.

OBJECTIVES

Our principal near-term objectives in the current situation are:

- To deter Iran from attacking Kuwait (and thus preventing what could be a very destructive and possibly disastrous regional war) and

- To deal a blow to Iran's efforts to become the hegemon in the region.

With respect to longer term issues in the region we would clearly like to see our actions serve the following objectives:

- A more moderate Iranian government,

- A sustained relaxation of tensions in the region, and

- Serious regional arms control (especially in terms of nuclear weapons and associated missile delivery systems).

The Greater Middle East clearly presents as a demanding case for our overall effort to persuade nations in crisis regions to forego nuclear arsenals.

MILITARY ISSUES

The GCC request to implement GREEN HORNET presents a clear test of the U.S. commitment to assist in forging a stable peace in this troubled region. You will need to make a clear decision early in the meeting as to whether we want to go forward with GREEN HORNET.
If Britain and France follow a U.S. lead in deploying forces to the region under SILVER SABRE, they would only be committing minimum forces at this time. (Even at full strength the British and French Gulf forces would not make a major contribution in a military showdown with Iran/Iraq.) Nevertheless, their clear endorsement of our actions will be important, especially to the American people.

The Russians are a different story. To date they have not participated in any joint exercises or planning with NATO or GCC forces. But they are in a position to help militarily in the region, including with intelligence collection. One possible early test of the Russians (which relates to an important potential joint attack mission) would be to ask their help in gathering intelligence in those mountainous regions of northern Iran where there are (or could be) covert nuclear and missile facilities.

We will also want to discuss the question of possible Israeli involvement in military planning in the region - as well as deal with their threat to take matters into their own hands.

Tactical nuclear weapons for U.S. surface ships and submarines remain in storage. At least two or three days would be required to deploy these weapons (e.g. bombs to carrier task forces and SLCMs to SSNs) and bring them to a state of operational readiness. US CINCPAC and US CINCLANT are requesting permission to reintroduce such weapons into the fleet at this time.

You will also need to give guidance to the CINCSTRAT on the alert status for U.S. strategic forces.

These military issues need to be addressed at the meeting:

1. What should be the U.S. response to the GCC request to implement GREEN HORNET?

   _____ A. Accede to the request and implement:
   _____ Only Phase One
   _____ Phase One and Phase Two
   _____ All three Phases

   _____ B. Accede only if the British and French also do so.

   _____ C. Do not accede to the request at this time; persuade the GCC to hold off for now on any independent military moves.

2. Should we ask the Russians to assist us militarily in the region?

   _____ A. Not at this time

   _____ B. Yes, but for now only in intelligence collection.

   _____ B. Yes, see if they are prepared to discuss coordinated attack planning.
3. What should the U.S. position be at this time toward the involvement of Israel in U.S. and allied military planning in the region?
   _____ A. Do nothing on this matter at this time.
   _____ B. Initiate discussions on the possibility of such involvement.
   _____ C. Contact them directly with the objective of restraining any Israeli military action at this time.

4. What guidance should be given to CINCPAC and CINCLANT on reintroducing nuclear weapons to the fleet?
   _____ A. Initiate reintroduction at this time.
   _____ B. Await further instructions.

5. Should nuclear weapons be introduced with U.S. air force units which would move into the region as part of GREEN HORNET?
   _____ A. Yes.
   _____ B. Not at this time.

6. Should the U.S. strategic bomber force be placed on a higher alert consistent with possible use in the Gulf region (for conventional or nuclear missions)?
   _____ A. Yes.
   _____ B. Not at this time.

DIPLOMATIC ISSUES

In terms of employing the UN Security Council to help in this situation, we anticipate that the Chinese will veto any proposed joint UN action that runs counter to what they see as Iran's (and their) interests in the region. However, the Council could provide a good multilateral forum in which to engage the Chinese aggressively on these matters.

If you decide to implement GREEN HORNET, we will immediately contact Britain and France to encourage them to proceed with SILVER SABRE. We also want to contact Egypt, Syria, and Turkey regarding their possible participation in the overall effort.

Independent of the decision on possible joint military operations with Russia, we will probably want to contact them to discuss what might be done diplomatically through the CTS states. There may be some fault lines in those nations' relations with Iran that we could exploit. We may also want to directly contact China, Pakistan, and the leading states in the CTS (Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan).
These diplomatic issues need to be addressed at the NSC meeting:

1. Should we support the immediate convening of the UN Security Council on the deteriorating situation in the Gulf?
   _____ A. Yes
   _____ B. Not at this time

2. What diplomatic initiatives should we take at this point in time with countries that could be supportive of our efforts in the region:
   _____ A. Egypt
   _____ B. Syria
   _____ C. Turkey
   _____ D. Russia

3. What special diplomatic initiatives, if any, should we take at this point in time with those countries supporting Iran?
   _____ A. China
   _____ B. Pakistan
   _____ C. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan

4. Should we contact Iran directly and if so with what message?  

5. Are there other diplomatic initiatives which we should undertake at this time?
   _____ A.
   _____ B.
DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUES

There is considerable public and Congressional apprehension about the current course of events (heightened by the need to call up reserves should GREEN HORNET go to Phase Three). This includes the prospect of a serious Congressional battle on the issue of war powers if a substantial and sustained U.S. commitment to the region is required.

It would be best if the United States manifest a clear consensus in its policy statements on the crisis. To this end it may be advisable to meet privately with Congressional leaders to ensure that no Congressional leader steps out and prescribes a preferred U.S. policy.

The domestic politics issues to be decided are:

1. Should we set up a meeting with the Congressional leadership to discuss the situation in the Gulf and related war powers issues?

   _____ A. Yes. Should we announce the meeting publicly? _____
   _____ B. Not at this time.

DECLARATORY POLICY ISSUES

In the light of the escalating crisis, there is increasing pressure on the U.S. to make a clear statement about our stakes and vital interests in the region.

The declaratory policy issue to be decided is:

1. What should be emphasized in a U.S. declaratory policy statement at this time on the crisis and our interests in the region?

   _____ A. Articulate vital interests such as:
        _____ The free flow of oil from the region
        _____ Israeli security
   _____ B. Thwarting Iranian efforts to gain hegemony in the region.
   _____ C. The nuclear threat posed by the crisis.
   _____ D. ________________________________
STEP TWO: The Day After...

SITUATION REPORT

The Continuing Crisis

By the start of October GREEN HORNET Phase Two was nearly completed. (See Table 1 above.) Britain and France approved the execution of SILVER SABRE and their forces are now in Kuwait. Phase Three of GREEN HORNET, including the deployment to the region of U.S. forces in Germany, is scheduled to begin October 28. Congress provisionally approved the Phase Three deployment, but with an accompanying resolution "reaffirming its unique power to declare war."

After a heated internal debate and in response to growing concerns over the Iranian ballistic missile threat (and especially the possibility that the new Iranian IRBM would soon be deployed), the U.S. also decided to airift one of the two U.S. operational THAAD battalions to Daharan. The second was declared held in reserve "for future contingencies." Basically, the argument was between those who believed the second battalion should be held back for deployment to Israel (to restrain the Israelis from offensive operations against Iran) and those who wanted it deployed to Saudi Arabia immediately (to protect U.S. forces).

By October 7 U.S. intelligence had identified nine Iranian divisions (3 armored, 3 mechanized, and 3 motorized) and four Iraqi divisions (2 armored and 2 mechanized) arrayed north and west of Kuwait. Night artillery duels along the Kuwait-Iraqi border had become common.

Throughout this period Iranian diplomats reiterated their September 20 demands. Ongoing backchannel discussions with Iran revealed little if any willingness to compromise.

On October 15 Iran declared a full military mobilization and announced the formation of a joint Iranian-Iraqi military command. The next day a massive civil defense evacuation exercise was conducted in Teheran, Tabriz, and Qom.

On the 16th U.S. intelligence confirmed that Iran had built an estimated 35-40 of what is believed to be a new mobile IRBM.

By October 18 in response to the President's request for military options to destroy the suspected Iranian nuclear and IRBM capability, the Chairman of the JCS had approved planning for three options. The first involved a nuclear barrage of the suspected IRBM deployment area with nuclear-armed SLBMs; the second, nuclear air strikes against identified IRBM locations using B-2s and F-117s; the third, a large conventionally-armed air operation.

By the 24th the first scheduled Egyptian armored division had completed transit to the Red Sea port of Yanbu - part of a three division corps now committed to the GCC. (Figure 1 below provides a map displaying U.S., allied, and adversary military deployments in the region.)

At midnight (local time) on the 24th, Kuwait missile gunboats detected a fleet of Iranian warships passing near Bubiyan Island apparently headed for the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr. When all three Kuwaiti warships were subjected to heavy electronic jamming, the Kuwaiti flagship called in air support. Four Kuwaiti FA-18s arrived and fired on the Iranian ships. In the ensuing battle two of the Kuwaiti gunboats were sunk. When additional FA-18s arrived a short time later they were met by Iranian Mig-25s and F-8s. An air battle involving more than forty aircraft spread out over the northern Persian Gulf.

At 0330 on October 25, the Aegis cruiser USS Princeton (CG-59) and the frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58), both on patrol off Failaka Island, detected four supersonic cruise missiles launched from the Iranian coast. Three of the missiles were shot down but the fourth hit and exploded the forward missile magazine of the Roberts. At 0455, the Roberts sank with most of the crew escaping in lifeboats. The entire engagement was witnessed and broadcast by CNN in Kuwait City with new night vision TV cameras capturing the bulk of the action.

At 0500, A-6Es and FA-18s, flown from the Independence to provide air coverage for the Princeton, were fired upon by two Iranian gunboats east of Bahrain. The gunboats were attacked by the U.S. aircraft and one was sunk. Minutes later, two Iranian coastal defense missile sites attacked two Omani missile boats escorting an ultra large tanker. They sank one of the missile boats and left the tanker adrift and on fire.
The Day After...

It is October 26, 1997. At 0200 EST (1000 Gulf time), CNN reported that spot oil prices in the London futures markets opened at an extraordinary $70 a barrel.

At 0400 EST, the Indian Ocean DSP satellite detected the launch of an Iranian ballistic missile on a depressed trajectory toward the south from a site near Mashad. Twelve minutes later a nuclear detonation estimated in the 100 kt range occurred high over the desert east of Bandar Abbas in southern Iran. The IRBM appeared virtually identical to that recently tested from Pakistan.

By about 1400 local time (0600 EST), Iranian ambassadors had handed the prime ministers of all of the GCC member states and the U.S. Secretary of State identical notes calling for: (1) a freeze in place of all forces on both sides, (2) a halt to further deployments and (3) an immediate summit at a neutral site to discuss a peaceful resolution of the crisis.

At 1430 local time in Iran (0630 EST), the President of Iran announced to the world in a live TV broadcast that Iran possessed “an operational nuclear deterrent” and that “any attack on Iran or any of its allies will be met with the newest fires of Hell.”

At 1500 local time (0700 EST) the Israeli Prime Minister went on television to announce that Israel had “indeed independent means to respond to any nuclear threat.”

At 0725 EST the Israeli Ambassador privately informed the U.S. Secretary of State that Israel was prepared “in the immediate future” to assist coalition forces in an effort to destroy the Iranian nuclear arsenal. He also said that, “if necessary”, Israel would attack the Iranian missile force on its own. Intelligence reports indicate that Israel’s nuclear-capable air and missile units have gone to full alert. The U.S. air attack in Tel Aviv has sent an urgent message to Washington reporting his belief that the Israelis will mount a major long-range air operation within 72 hours.

On the basis of new intelligence it appears that as many as 40 of the new Iranian IRBMs may be deployed on mobile launchers in an isolated and relatively unpopulated area southwest of Mashad. (See Figure 2 on Page 16.) These reports also suggest an increased alert level for all Iranian missile forces, including full dispersal of all mobile IRBMs from all known garrisons.

In his most recent threat assessment, received at 0700 EST, USCENTC stated that he “cannot assure a successful conventional defense of Saudi Arabia in the event of an Iranian nuclear first strike.” He pointed out that he was awaiting the Phase Three deployments of GREEN HORNET and that his entire operation was dependent on the continued viability of vulnerable area targets such as ports of debarkation, assembly areas, and air bases. He passed on his view that the single THAAD battalion in Saudi Arabia did not constitute the kind of “shield” he needed. On this basis the CINC has requested:

1. Immediate airlift of the second THAAD battalion to Saudi Arabia.

2. Authority to destroy anti-ship missile sites on Iran’s coast.

3. Immediate airlift and transfer of nuclear weapons to one Carrier Battle Group (CBG) to provide an in-theater deterrent.


The Chairman of the JCS reports that the most recent update of the October 18th military options paper suggests that a nuclear SLBM barrage of the suspected deployment area should result in the immediate destruction of 90-95% (all but two or three) of the Iranian IRBMs, a residual force that THAAD could probably defeat. The best estimate of prompt fatalities from this attack is about 10-15,000. The nuclear-armed air strike option strike option could probably destroy 75-80% (all but 8-10) of the deployed missiles within about six hours (with no more than 2-3,000 fatalities). The conventional air attack option would destroy roughly the same fraction (75-80%) of IRBMs within about six days (with no significant civilian casualties).
SITUATION REPORT (cont.)

Figure 1. Military Deployments in Theater

Figure 2. Iranian Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Facilities
## STEP TWO: The Day After...

### INSTRUCTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How to Proceed</th>
<th>Decisions to Be Made</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. You will have a total of 50 minutes for STEP TWO (40 min. for deliberations and 10 min. for reporting).</td>
<td>1. <strong>U.S. Policy Issues and Options</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. It is now 2:00 pm on October 26. You are scheduled to meet with the President in three hours to discuss the crisis in the Greater Middle East.</td>
<td>The NSC staff-led working group believes that the U.S. will likely want to consider policy issues and options in at least the following general issue areas:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. At the beginning of the move you will be given approximately ten minutes to quickly read through:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Situation Report on the crisis.</td>
<td>The staff-prepared Draft Memo for the President provides a recommended set of policy issues and options in the above areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• These Instructions.</td>
<td>Under the guidance of the Chair, the group should discuss and modify this draft “policy options paper” as was done in Step One.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• A Draft Memo for the President.</td>
<td>2. <strong>Recommendations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. As soon as it is practical, the Chair of the group will lead a discussion that moves through the tasking described in the Decisions to Be Made section. As in Step One, the group will make two kinds of decisions:</td>
<td>When the group has settled on the list of issues and options to go forward to the President, you should attempt to reach consensus on a recommendation on each of the issues. If a consensus cannot be reached, vote on the options presented and record the results.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Modifications to the Draft Memo.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Where consensus can be achieved, recommendations to the President on preferred options on specific issues.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
STEP TWO: The Day After...

Draft Memo for the President

National Security Council

26 October 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
FROM: The National Security Advisor
SUBJECT: Iran’s Nuclear Detonation and the Middle East Crisis

The NSC will meet at 3:00 pm this afternoon to discuss possible responses to the Iranian missile test and nuclear detonation. The purpose of this memo is to prepare you for that meeting.

U.S. OBJECTIVES

At this point in the crisis the principal near-term U.S. objectives are:

- To prevent further “use” - especially military use - of nuclear weapons.
- To protect U.S. forces in the region.
- To restrain actions by others in the region which could escalate the crisis.

We would like to insure that there is no successful nuclear attack on the U.S. or its allies. This objective may not be achievable in the region. If the Iranians attack with their new IRBM equipped with the new peniads, the likelihood that even our newest ATBMns (the THAADs) will be able to shoot down every attacker, especially in a large volley, is low. At this point we do not know what fraction of this missile force might be nuclear armed or equipped with peniads.

If we cannot defend our forces now in or on their way to the region from missile attack, we have to face the question of whether to attempt a conventional or nuclear attack on the Iranian missiles, challenging and sobering as that task may be. This is obviously a question with important long-term implications.

MILITARY ISSUES

We need to face directly the question of whether we should attack the Iranian IRBM forces now in the field. As I believe you understand (and as we learned in Iraq in 1991), we can never be fully confident of getting all the deployed missiles.
We also need to face the question of whether to begin attacking the Iranian cruise missile shore batteries.

If we deploy our second THAAD battalion now, it could go to Israel and provide a defense of that country's major cities or go to Saudi Arabia and provide expanded protection of U.S. and allied forces (and some protection for Riyadh).

USCENTCOM has requested that nuclear forces be positioned on a CBG in-theater as a deterrent to nuclear attack on his forces.

The military issues that need to be addressed are:

1. Should we attack the Iranian IRBM forces and, if so, how?
   _____ A. Yes. Nuclear barrage
   _____ B. Yes. Nuclear-armed air strikes.
   _____ C. Yes. Conventionally-armed air strikes.
   _____ D. No

2. Should the U.S. proceed with GREEN HORNET?
   _____ A. Yes. Continue with Phase Three.
   _____ B. No. Do not proceed with Phase Three.

3. Should we attack the Iranian anti-ship missile sites?
   _____ A. No
   _____ A. Yes

4. Should we deploy the THAAD battalion now in CONUS?
   _____ A. Not at this time.
   _____ B. Yes. Deploy it to Israel.
   _____ C. Yes. Deploy it to Saudi Arabia.

5. What orders should be given to USCENTCOM regarding the transfer of nuclear weapons to surface ships in his theater of operations?
   _____ A. Begin such transfer
   _____ B. Await further orders
DIPLOMATIC ISSUES

Considering the current situation, China’s UN Ambassador may well use that nation’s veto power to reject any plan for UN Security Council action that it sees as adverse to its interests vis a vis Iran. Nevertheless, we might still be able to take advantage of a meeting to dissuade China from further fueling or seeking advantage in the crisis.

As you will see in the issues set forth below, we could proceed in any of a wide array of diplomatic directions at this point in time.

The diplomatic issues for consideration now are:

1. Should we seek to negotiate with the Iranians to halt further escalation in the crisis?
   __________ A. Not at this time
   __________ B. Propose a freeze on further troop movements and further deployments to the region.
   __________ C. Agree to a cease fire provided Iran accepts a cordon sanitaire around its territory.
   __________ D. ______________________________________________________

2. What initiatives might we now take up with our European allies?
   • ________________________________________________________________
   • ________________________________________________________________

3. What position should we take with Israel?
   __________ A. Inform Israel that we are examining the feasibility of taking out the Iranian nuclear arsenal and that they should take no action on that matter at this time.
   __________ B. Question Israeli military officials on their expectations of success in an attack on the Iranian nuclear and missile forces.
   __________ C. ____________________________________________________

4. What other diplomatic initiatives might we now take?
   • ________________________________________________________________
   • ________________________________________________________________
DOMESTIC POLICY ISSUES

You may wish to take some steps at this time to allay domestic concerns about the impact of this crisis on U.S. energy requirements and the economy. You will also have to decide how to deal with the Congress.

The domestic political issues to be addressed are:

1. What steps should we take to allay concerns about the economic and "energy" impact of the crisis?
   ____ A. Sell oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve
   ____ B. ______________________________________
   ____ C. ______________________________________

2. What should we tell the Congress?
   ____ A. ______________________________________
   ____ B. ______________________________________

DECLARATORY POLICY ISSUES

We may be at a point where you would want to make a strong public statement on our basic position and our concerns regarding the crisis. In this vein, the basic declaratory policy issue to be addressed is:

1. Should you make a special statement on the crisis?
   ____ A. Not at this time.
   ____ B. Yes. The themes of the statement should include:
      • ______________________________________
      • ______________________________________
      • ______________________________________
      • ______________________________________
      • ______________________________________
# STEP THREE: The Day Before...

## INSTRUCTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How to Proceed</th>
<th>Decisions to Be Made</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. You will have a total of 50 minutes for STEP THREE (40 min. for deliberations and 10 min. for reporting).</td>
<td><strong>1. U.S. Policy Issues and Options</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The time period is “the day before” nuclear weapon use - more literally the present or the very near future. You are preparing for an NSC meeting with the President on the long-term nuclear proliferation problem. The meeting will also address those long-term issues related to the possible emergence of one or more new nuclear-armed nations in the Greater Middle East and the problems this poses for U.S. intervention in conflicts in the region.</td>
<td>The staff-prepared Draft Memo for the President provides an initial set of long-term policy issues and options for consideration. The chairperson of the working group apologized for the “roughness” of the list; the group apparently had a lot of trouble reaching consensus on a list to send forward for this meeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. At the beginning of the move you will be given approximately ten minutes to quickly read through:</td>
<td>Under the guidance of the Chair, the group should review this (very) draft “policy options paper”, then expand it and otherwise modify it, as judged appropriate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- These Instructions.</td>
<td><strong>2. Recommendations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- A Draft Memo for the President.</td>
<td>When the group has settled on the list of issues and options to go forward to the President, you should attempt to reach consensus on a recommendation on each of the issues. If a consensus cannot be reached, vote on the options presented in a fashion that progressively eliminates those with the least support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. As soon as it is practical, the Chair of the group will lead a discussion that moves through the tasking described in the Decisions to Be Made section. The group will make three kinds of decisions:</td>
<td>As a final step you should try to forge a consensus and/or vote on the three most important of these long-term policy issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Modifications to the Draft Memo.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Where consensus can be achieved, recommendations to the President on preferred options on specific issues.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The rank-ordering of the three most important nuclear proliferation-related policy issues to be put to the President at this point in time.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. When the time for STEP THREE is up, you should record your group’s final decisions on the STEP THREE Draft Memo.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. As part of the discussion of STEP THREE, the Chair of your group will again be asked to summarize the group’s conclusions and recommendations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
STEP THREE: The Day Before...

Draft Memo for the President

National Security Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
FROM: The National Security Advisor
SUBJECT: Long-Term Nuclear Proliferation Policy

There will be an NSC meeting tomorrow to discuss the long-term nuclear proliferation problem. Special attention will be given to those issues that relate to the security problems in the "Greater Middle East."

The policy issues set forth below were crafted with the objective of getting to "the heart of the matter" in dealing with the long-term implications of nuclear proliferation.

1. DECLARATORY POLICY ON NUCLEAR USE

We may at this time need to articulate a clear and unambiguous post-Cold War U.S. policy on the appropriate role for nuclear weapons. In addition to the role of nuclear weapons in deterring nuclear attack, we and our allies must face the prospect of actually being attacked by nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction.

Policy Question: What should be U.S. policy on the use of nuclear weapons?

B. No first use of nuclear weapons.

C. "Flexible Response": Nuclear first use acceptable in the event of attack by chemical or biological weapons on:

D. No first use of weapons of mass destruction
2. A FAR MORE ASSERTIVE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME

The IAEA has the authority in its charter, to date unused, to be far more intrusive in its inspections. Its current director is laying the groundwork for the IAEA to begin exercising this power. The UN Security Council (UNSC) could be an instrument for enforcement in this arena. However, because of the challenge of achieving consensus in the UNSC, it may be necessary for the U.S. to adopt more "independent" efforts to halt nuclear proliferation.

It should be kept in mind that the far more assertive regime contemplated would undoubtedly require U.S. acceptance of measures that up until now it has strongly resisted.

Policy Question: What new routes might we pursue to effect a more aggressive nuclear non-proliferation regime?

A. Seek a far more intrusive global IAEA inspection regime which covers all nuclear facilities in all countries (including military facilities).

B. Create a more potent UN Security Council military arm to enforce a new highly restrictive non-proliferation regime.

C. Focus on aggressive unilateral actions or actions involving only close allies (such as NATO and Israel).

D. Seek a highly restrictive global export regime covering military and dual-use technology with strong sanctions for non-compliance.

E. ____________________________

3. BASE FORCE PLANNING

In the light of recent intensive examination of the military requirements for conducting power projection operations against nuclear-armed regional adversaries, we may want to take this opportunity to consider adjustments to the base force.

Policy Question: In light of the military requirements for projecting force against nuclear-armed regional adversaries, should there be any significant adjustments to the base force?

A. Base Force about right.

B. Need greater aerospace emphasis.

C. Need greater maritime emphasis.

D. Need greater ground force emphasis.

E. ____________________________
4. IMPROVED DEFENSES FOR REGIONAL CONFLICTS

It is increasingly clear that in regional conflicts U.S. and allied forces will soon face much more sophisticated ballistic and cruise missile threats. In this context we must decide whether substantial improvements in U.S. ABM and air defenses are feasible and warranted.

Policy Question: What initiatives might the U.S. pursue at this time to enhance the prospect of defending U.S. forces and allies in regional engagements?

_____ A. Launch a program to develop and widely deploy dramatically improved ATBM systems.

_____ B. Examine deployment of a space-based ABM system capable of boost phase intercept of IRBM and lesser-range ballistic missiles.

_____ C. Launch a new theater air defense initiative (e.g. AWACS follow-on).

_____ D. _______________________________________________________________________

_____ E. _______________________________________________________________________

5. COUNTERMILITARY CAPABILITIES TO ENHANCE INTERVENTION

If the U.S. is to consider undertaking counterforce strikes against enemy nuclear forces in regional conflicts, careful examination of alternative attack modes and supporting C3I is clearly warranted.

Policy Question: What should be the focus of U.S. investments to enhance intervention capability through improved counterforce?

_____ A. Enhanced conventional counterforce capability.

_____ B. Enhanced nuclear counterforce capability (e.g. low collateral damage).

_____ C. Improved C3I.

_____ D. _______________________________________________________________________

_____ E. _______________________________________________________________________
6. SECURITY MEASURES FOR THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST

Many new nations in the Greater Middle East will soon reach the stage of development where they will have the choice to "plan to build" nuclear weapons on strategic warning or to outright build and deploy such weapons. This could be the right time or the last time to effect some kind of controls on the nuclear arsenals of the region - and possibly even plan for their eventual elimination. This kind of ambitious arms control regime cannot possibly succeed outside the context of progress or even settlement of long-running disputes in the region.

Regional security measures that might lower the chances of major conflict within the region include the establishment of some kind of regional information sharing system for confidence building, including dedicated satellite capability.

**Policy Question:** What regional security initiatives are at this point appropriate for the Greater Middle East?

- A. Regional nuclear arms control.
- B. Regional information-sharing (including satellite information).
- C. ________________________________
- D. ________________________________

7. _______________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________
Appendix H

The Day After . . . in Korea
Exercise Materials
The Day After...

...in Korea

Marc Dean Milot
Roger Molander
Peter Wilson

HANDOUT

RAND

6 May 1992
As I look around the world at places where U.S. forces are deployed, where we could conceivably be at war in the next 24 hours, North Korea is it.

Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney
Sydney, Australia (1 May 1992)
The Day After...
...in Korea
INTRODUCTION

The Day After... is a RAND project examining the implications for U.S. national security and military strategy of the spread of nuclear weapons and related capabilities in the post-Cold War world.

A central assumption of the project is that the ability to build nuclear weapons and modern means to deliver them (such as ballistic missiles) will continue to proliferate. The number of nations with deliverable “in-being” nuclear arsenals will almost certainly grow. Also likely to increase are “virtual” nuclear arsenals - arsenals that by design and plan can be built or assembled inside a nation's likely “strategic warning time.” The loss or breakup of central control over an existing nuclear arsenal could also add to the number of nuclear weapons powers (as may be the eventual outcome in the former Soviet Union). Such situations will also spread “nuclear weapons-competent” personnel and related nuclear weapons wherewithal.

In such a world, the possibility of actual nuclear weapon use seems worthy of concern and attention. At a minimum, the future may well hold military crises in which there is the implicit or explicit brandishing of nuclear weapons by new or “virtual” nuclear powers. In this context there is a clear need to frame - for both analysis and policymaking - the spectrum of nuclear proliferation-related policy decisions the United States must now face.

The near-term objective of The Day After... project is to identify, and seek consensus where it exists on:

- A set of generic nuclear proliferation-related scenarios involving future nuclear weapon “use.”
- A set of candidate “heart of the matter” nuclear proliferation-related policy issues that might be put forward - for example to the President - for decision in the near term.
- A rough rank-ordering of the most urgent and important of the above key policy issues.
- A comprehensive spectrum of clearly drawn policy options for each of these issues.

The Day After... project methodology (see the schematic below) and this exercise begin with an examination of the policy decisions confronting a U.S. President and the nation on “the day of” some pivotal change in the nuclear status quo - including the brandishing or imminent use of nuclear weapons. As a second pivot point (tracking the schematic), the exercise turns to “the day after” - in the aftermath of nuclear weapon detonation - and explores the set of crisis-driven policy choices that would face the President at that point. As a final decision point, the exercise moves to “the day before” - months or years before the envisioned “day of” or “day after.” Here the exercise addresses the challenge of adopting strategies and policies to minimize the prospects that such scenarios might come to pass or to mitigate their consequences.

The Day After... in Korea is the third of a set of four policy exercises RAND is developing to explore the implications of various generic nuclear weapon use scenarios. The generic scenarios and the associated policy exercises are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generic Scenario</th>
<th>Policy Exercise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Loss of Central Control</td>
<td>The Day After... in the ‘USSR’ (Complete)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. U.S. Intervention vs. New Nuclear-Armed Adversary</td>
<td>The Day After... in the Greater Middle East (Complete)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Nuclear Use vs. U.S. Ally</td>
<td>The Day After... in Korea (May/June 1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Nth Country vs. Nth Country</td>
<td>The Day After... in South Asia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A fifth “policy process” exercise will model the U.S. policy and strategy decision-making process for nuclear proliferation-related issues. Any new U.S. policies or a new strategy in this area (or U.S. endorsement of new global policies or a new global strategy) must inescapably be forged in that political arena and clash of interests. This final exercise will point toward the development of a sustainable overall national and global strategy to address the long-term consequences of nuclear proliferation.
The Day After... in Korea is a three step policy exercise designed to be completed in one three-hour session. Participants (ideally in groups of 6-10 people) take on the role of top advisors to the President of the United States in a group deliberative process akin to a meeting of National Security Council principals (minus the President) and key staff, preparing for a formal meeting with the President.

In STEP ONE: The Day Of... (estimated time 60 min.) the participants address a rapidly deteriorating political situation on the Korean peninsula set in 1993. The group develops an overall perspective on the situation, considers the issues and options that should be presented to the President, and, where consensus can be found, recommends decisions for the President to take.

In STEP TWO: The Day After... (estimated time 50 min.) participants find themselves convened at a later point in time immediately following actual nuclear weapons "use" on the peninsula. The group's task is again to help the President decide how to respond to the situation.

In STEP THREE: The Day Before... (estimated time 40 min.) the exercise moves back in time to today or better to the near term. In consideration of the "lessons learned" in the two previous moves, the group seeks to reach consensus on the character, defining language, and appropriate options for those key nuclear proliferation-related policy issues that relate to this kind of generic scenario, and which might be taken to closure in the United States now or in the near future.

Where time permits a debriefing ends the exercise.
STEP ONE: The Day Of...

SITUATION REPORT

Background

It is the early spring of 1993.

Following a year marked by frustrating and still unsuccessful negotiations on an inspection regime for a "nuclear weapons-free" Korea, formal political relations between North and South had taken a turn downward during the early months of 1993. Important domestic changes were clearly underway in both countries.

South Korea

Japanese dumping of excess production in South Korea's traditional Asian markets - plus the looming prospect of increased American trade protection legislation - were both contributing to an increasingly serious South Korean recession. The deteriorating economic situation seemed to give new political weight to those who were arguing that the South should find its economic destiny in expanded relations with the North (already manifest in rapidly rising formal and "informal" trading activity between the two nations).

In the South Korean national elections of October 1992 the ruling party narrowly defeated an invigorated opposition which had skillfully exploited the then-clear signs of an imminent economic downturn and frustration over the lack of progress toward "reunification." The latter issue was championed by a well-organized and growing "Pan-Korean Students' Movement." This movement among young South Koreans, which included well-publicized "exchanges" with leaders of several North Korean university and youth groups, also called for a phasing out of U.S. military presence on the peninsula in the name of "pan-Korean" security and independence.

During the South Korean election debate some leaders among the students and the more nationalist elements of the reunification movement lauded North Korea's impressive nuclear and missile programs as a testimony to Korean "world-class scientific competence" and "an undeniable security asset" for a reunified Korea.

North Korea

Toward the end of 1992 after a particularly frustrating session in the nuclear negotiations some elements in the South Korean defense community began pushing hard for the government to position itself "more formally" to launch a crash nuclear weapons deployment program - arguing that if the talks with the North dragged on much longer some kind of rapidly deployable "strategic nuclear arsenal" would become "an imperative." Sensitive intelligence reports from DIA sources indicated that key scientists had begun "informally" taking stock of the extent of the existing South Korean "virtual" nuclear arsenal and beginning to do "the necessary planning calculations" for a crash weapons building program based on a plutonium bomb.

Although most of the details were not discernible, North Korea in early 1993 appeared to be in the early phases of the long-anticipated struggle for succession. The impact on decision-making was seen in places like the nuclear negotiations where the North Korean position had essentially not changed in months. Kim Il Sung, now 81, had fallen gravely and apparently terminally ill in late December. His son, Kim Jong Il, had over the last few months assumed most of his father's political functions, but there clearly had yet to be any formal transfer of power.

The North Korean economy is in dire straits. Though the government had sanctioned some internal economic reform and launched a joint economic free trade zone in the northeast with China and Russia, North Korean economic prospects appear bleak without a massive infusion of external capital.

Progress on the transfer of executive power in North Korea was apparently being blocked by a political quarrel between two factions within North Korea's political and military elite. One, portrayed by its detractors as "the Mailed Fist," favored charting an independent North Korean course (including immediately abandoning the Korean nuclear negotiations) - a path that was generally
viewed as heading toward military confrontation with the South. The second faction, self-labeled the "New Nationalists," argued that the only viable alternative for North Korea was accelerated radical economic reform and negotiating a pan-Korean Confederation leading toward reunification. Kim Jong il's position on this debate was unclear.

Both factions in the North gave strong support to their country's nuclear program. The hard-line "Mailed Fist" faction saw it in a flagship military role, as a minimum as a guarantee of independence; the "New Nationalists" saw it as a source of leverage in the negotiations on reunification and as the means to make a unified Korea a "powerful and independent nation." Both groups agreed that South Korea's growing conventional superiority made nuclear weaponry essential to North Korean security in the short term.

At this point some intelligence analysts believe that North Korea probably has a handful of operational nuclear-armed SCUD C missiles (600 km range) - even though there is as yet no evidence of special nuclear weapons handling and storage equipment in known SCUD C deployment areas. Others believe that the North's small (and apparently nearly complete) initial stockpile of nuclear warheads is destined for a new IRBM.

North Korea has continued to ship SCUD Cs to Iran and has also provided substantial assistance to the development of an indigenous Iranian ballistic missile production capacity. In return Iran has bankrolled joint development of a 3000 kilometer range IRBM, recently labeled the iNKSS-1 by U.S. intelligence. Five successful flight tests of the missile have so far taken place since late 1992 including one from a new Iranian launch facility. The missile appears to be modeled after the Chinese CSS-2 which has sparked considerable controversy as to the extent of Chinese involvement in this program.

In addition to the acknowledged (now IAEA-inspected) nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and the missile production facilities near Pyongyang, the intelligence community believes that the North Koreans have modest-sized but highly capable underground nuclear warhead and missile production facilities (including for the new IRBM) at a set of well-defended mountain sites.

The Nuclear Negotiations

North Korea's refusal to accept unlimited challenge inspection procedures remains the barrier to completion of a bilateral nuclear agreement. The North Koreans insist that levels of intrusiveness that go beyond existing IAEA practices reflect a "plot" by the United States to maintain political hegemony "over Korea and all of Asia." This line of argument has been accorded "a certain degree of understanding" in a number of recent editorials in South Korean media known to favor reunification.

A U.S. intelligence finding in early 1993 concluded that North Korea would probably continue to attempt to buy time in the negotiations in order to build up a stockpile of weapons-grade material at its covert facilities. That finding also reported evidence of growing concern within the South that a reunified Korea might be required to follow an inspections regime that no other nation had yet been held to - effectively closing a military option that perhaps should be left open given the potential instability of China and Russia, deteriorating economic relations with the U.S., and the possibility of a resurgent Japan.

Japan

The prospect of a nuclear armed and united Korea has generated considerable consternation about Japan's security future among Japanese elites - especially against a background of continued difficulties with the United States, particularly over trade. While some Japanese increasingly favor a new collective security structure based on the United Nations or an "Asian CSCE," there is a growing sentiment among moderates and conservatives that Japan should chart a more independent course on the world stage.

A small nationalist faction within Japan's Liberal Democratic party (LDP) has begun to call for outright reform of the security relationship between Japan and the United States - arguing that Japan as an economic superpower should be accorded a place "second to none" in the international security community. To support this new and expanded role this group has been calling for a substantial increase in Japanese military investment, including a heavy investment in R&D on "advanced technology" ballistic missile and air defenses.
China

With the strong reaffirmation of "radical perestroika but no glasnost" at the November 1992 Party Congress, the transition to a post-Deng Chinese leadership accelerated. Although the old guard of strict "socialism" had left the scene, the new generation seems firmly committed to the idea of building China as a great power under firm governmental guidance.

The new Chinese leadership has continued to articulate a foreign policy based on "opposition to global hegemony by any power or alliance." Central to this approach has been a vigorous arms development and export program focused on the greater Middle East including the Islamic nations of the former Soviet Union.

The Chinese approach to the negotiations between North and South Korea has been a study in ambiguity. The official Chinese line has been to support the North Korea position that any agreement should occur "without prejudice to the sovereign rights of both Korean governments." At the same time there has been some expressed concern about the prospect of a united Korea without real termination of the North Korean nuclear weapons program. U.S. intelligence reports an intense debate within the Chinese military as to whether a "unified and nuclear armed" Korea would be a new and troublesome threat or a potential contribution to stability in East Asia.

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

In spite of substantial direct and indirect financial aid, the economies of Russia and the other former Soviet republics are still struggling.

Relations between Russia and the other republics remain tense over the final disposition of the nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union (FSU). There is a new (July 1, 1993) deadline for removal of all tactical nuclear weapons to Russia and a "deep reductions annex" to the START Treaty in which Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus have agreed to the withdrawal of all long range nuclear forces from their territory by 1997. However, there is widespread worry within the U.S. intelligence community that the "denuclearization" of Ukraine and Kazakhstan is not assured.

The Conventional Military Situation in Northeast Asia.

In January of 1993, the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from South Korea resumed. By the end of February only two brigades of the 2nd Infantry Division remained in Korea and all U.S. units had been withdrawn from their positions along the DMZ north of Seoul. The USAF retained a single composite air wing at Taegu. Given the recent creation of a Korean-dominated joint military command (and polls showing little U.S. domestic support for remaining in Korea), there was widespread expectation that all U.S. ground forces would be out of Korea by 1994, irrespective of progress in the Korean "nuclear negotiations."

In Japan, the U.S. continued to maintain two composite air wings, one on Honshu and the other on Okinawa. Two Marine brigades and a Marine air wing also remained on Okinawa. The Carrier Battle Group (CBG) Independence remained home ported at Yokosuka. A Marine Maritime Proposing Squadron (MPS) remained on Guam along with another composite air wing (a mix of F-111s and B-52e), and substantial naval support facilities, much of it from the Philippines.

Reflecting these new realities, CINCPAC has drawn up a new contingency plan for the defense of South Korea - code-named IRON SHIELD. The plan is summarized in Table 1.

Between the two Koreas, the conventional military balance seems increasingly to favor the South. Expansion of the high technology sectors of South Korea's military industry had led to a plan for accelerated modernization of the South Korean armed forces, especially the air force and navy. The army was already greatly benefiting from the serial production of modern armored fighting vehicles and artillery.

Meanwhile, North Korea, very strapped for hard currency, had been unable to buy advanced weapons from Russia or China. Many military observers believe that South Korea will gain an unambiguously decisive conventional edge by the end of the decade - a perception that has assured widespread support in the North for its nuclear weapons program.
### SITUATION REPORT (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Phase 1 (&lt;=10 days)</th>
<th>Phase 2 (&lt;=30 days)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bomber Wings</strong></td>
<td>• 2 B-52 squadrons to Guam</td>
<td>• 2 more B-52 squadrons to Guam from CONUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tactical Fighter Wings (TFWs)</strong></td>
<td>• 2 TFWs to Korea; 1 TFW to Japan</td>
<td>• 1 more TFW to Korea; 2 more TFWs to Japan from CONUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Carrier Battle Groups (CBGs)</strong></td>
<td>• Independence CBG sails from Japan</td>
<td>• 2 CBGs from U.S. to Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army Units</strong></td>
<td>• 2nd Division to defensive position; airlift two PATRIOT battalions from CONUS to Korea</td>
<td>• Airlift 2 light divisions from Hawaii/Washington state to Korea; airlift three PATRIOT battalions from CONUS to Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marine Prepositioning Squadrons (MPSs)</strong></td>
<td>• Move MPS to Pusan from Guam; airlift personnel from Okinawa to Korea</td>
<td>• MPS from Diego Garcia; airlift personnel from CONUS; Sail marine brigade from West Coast</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Major Elements of Operation IRON SHIELD
The Crisis

In mid-March, the U.S. intelligence community identified two North Korean facilities in the Taedong River valley northeast of Pyongyang as probable operational sites for the INKSS-1. At each site nine vertical silos were identified in various stages of construction - two silos at each site appeared to be finished. Within days, two new missile facilities apparently intended for mobile INKSS-1 launchers were detected under construction near the Yalu River.

At about this time, a combination of human and technical sources confirmed and located a single remote and heavily defended production facility for the INKSS-1. It was also determined that aside from those being used for testing, all of the existing INKSS-1 missiles were currently being stored at that location.

On March 26, 1993, a sixth launch of the Iranian/North Korean IRBM was detected by DSP. The character of the telemetry on the test combined with the identification of the IRBM sites stimulated a debate within the technical intelligence community as to whether the INKSS-1 might be made operational after only a half dozen tests. The consensus was that North Korea could deploy four to six operational silo-based IRBMs in two months, another 10-12 in four months, and begin to field mobile IRBMs within six months.

Another factor prompting re-evaluation of the INKSS-1 program was information provided by the Russian Foreign Ministry that several former Soviet missile experts had joined the North Korean program. Two of the individuals identified were recognized world-class experts in missile propulsion and guidance.

In response to a Presidential request for an examination of available military options, the Joint Staff has approved the development of three counterforce options against the North Korean nuclear and missile programs. The first involves a conventional strike on known INKSS-1 deployment and production sites. It is estimated that two days of round-the-clock air strikes by the B-52s wings that would be available on Guam after Phase 1 of IRON SHIELD would destroy all known INKSS-1 facilities. A nuclear attack with these same objectives is estimated to be achievable with a single sortie from the B-52 force on Guam (once nuclear weapons were deployed to Guam).

or a strike by Minuteman III ICBMs. Estimated prompt and long-term casualties from such nuclear attacks range as high as 100,000 North Koreans.

A heavy conventional attack on all known North Korean missile sites including all SCUD sites is estimated to require six to eight days of sorties with considerable uncertainty as to the accuracy of any post-attack damage assessment. A nuclear attack on North Korean missile sites and facilities was not examined in the light of prohibitive collateral civilian fatalities.

On March 28, the South Korean Ambassador, at a private lunch with the U.S. Secretary of State, revealed that new intelligence information available to the South had led to the conclusion that a handful of INKSS-1 missiles equipped with nuclear warheads would be deployed in "virtually invulnerable" mountain sites in "the very near future." He stated that the South Korean government was now strongly inclined to cancel the next negotiating session with North Korea scheduled for April 10th.

In an off the record aside, the Ambassador expressed great anger that "South Korea and the United States" had been "taken for a ride" in the Korean negotiations. He noted that the South Korean High Command will soon ask to send a delegation to the United States to conduct joint military planning for possible action against the North Korean nuclear and missile program "before it was too late." He added that if this request was refused, the South Korean government may find itself compelled "to do the best it can" on its own in attempting to thwart the North Korean program.

On March 30 the U.S. Ambassador to Japan sent a lengthy memo to the Secretary of the State on the state of mind in Tokyo. The central theme was the widespread perception that the deteriorating Korean situation was "the test case" for the future of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty. Further, he highlighted the comments made by a senior advisor to the Prime Minister that "a unified and nuclear armed Korea would transform East Asia."
## INSTRUCTIONS

### How to Proceed

1. You will have a total of 60 minutes for STEP ONE (50 min. for deliberations and 10 min. for reporting).

2. Keep in mind that you are in the role of a top advisor to the President of the United States (e.g. a cabinet- or sub-cabinet level official) and a participant in a meeting that can be viewed as akin to a meeting of National Security Council principals (minus the President) and key staff - preparing for a later formal NSC meeting with the President.

3. At the beginning of STEP ONE you will be given a few minutes to quickly review the Scenario, these Instructions, and the Draft Memo for the President below.

4. The Chair will then lead a discussion that moves through the tasking described in the Decisions to Be Made section. (The Chair should ask one participant to serve as the group's Secretary.) The group will make two kinds of decisions:
   - Modifications to the draft Memo for the President.
   - Recommendations to the President on specific options to select for each of the issues discussed.

5. It is recommended that the Chair begin by asking the participants in her/his group to very briefly give their individual perspectives on the situation.

6. When the time for STEP ONE is up, the group should record its final decisions on the “STEP ONE Draft Memo for the President.”

7. As part of the discussion of STEP ONE, the Chair of each group will be asked to summarize and explain the group's decisions. The total time period allotted for these presentations is ten minutes. Each Chair should adjust the length of her/his remarks accordingly.

### Decisions to Be Made

#### 1. U.S. Policy Issues and Options

The NSC staff-led working group believes that the U.S. will likely want to consider policy issues and options in the following general issue areas:

- Military
- Diplomatic
- Domestic Political
- Declaratory

The Draft Memo for the President provides an initial set of policy issues and options in the above four areas. Under the guidance of the Chair, the group should discuss and modify this draft “policy options paper.” The objective is to produce a final draft that is:

- Well-structured and concise.
- Complete in the sense of attempting to set forth only those decisions which the President must now make.

After an initial review of the memo the group should discuss whether there are other issues on which the President should at this point make decisions - and modify the Draft Memo for the President accordingly.

#### 2. Recommendations

When you have settled on the list of key issues and options to go forward to the President, you should attempt to reach consensus on a recommendation to the President on each issue. If a consensus cannot be reached, vote on the options and record the vote.
STEP ONE: The Day Of...

Draft Memo for the President

National Security Council

31 March 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
FROM: The National Security Advisor
SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on the Korean Negotiations

The recent test of the North Korean-Iranian IRBM and the prospect of imminent deployment of that missile threatens the Korean nuclear negotiations and raises new fears about the stability of northeast Asia. The purpose of this NSC Meeting is to decide how best to deal with this deteriorating situation.

OBJECTIVES

In the broadest sense our long-term objectives on the Korean peninsula have been to maintain South Korean independence, looking to a goal of eventual reunification of the two Koreas. In the interim we and the South Koreans have sought to prevent war on the peninsula by deterring North Korean conventional attack through conventional strength, backed up by threat, if necessary, to use nuclear weapons. We have also long sought to prevent Korean - North or South - development of nuclear weapons.

Our principal near-term objective in the Korean nuclear negotiations has been to halt the North Korean nuclear weapons program. However, we have also increasingly seen the negotiations as: (1) a forum in which we might achieve a genuine settlement on the long-term "nuclear future" of the Korean peninsula, and (2) an opportunity to make early progress on a new and more stringent set of standards and expectations under the NPT and IAEA.

The North Korean nuclear and missile program appears to have advanced to the point where it will soon present a threat to all of northeast Asia and in particular Japan. This poses the unpleasant prospect that failure of the Korean negotiations will stimulate a Japanese effort to field their own nuclear deterrent, with obvious and profound negative impact on our global nuclear non-proliferation efforts - and on the overall security situation in Asia.
DIPLOMATIC ISSUES

One of the first issues is whether there is any way diplomatically to halt the deployment of the INKSS-1. Only two nations potentially have this kind of diplomatic sway with North Korea – China and Iran. The Chinese, having rescued the North Korean regime militarily in 1951 and given them substantial assistance in the decades since, are far and away in the strongest position. China might be persuaded to act if they can be brought to recognize that a nuclear-armed North Korea (or unified Korea) could eventually lead to a nuclear-armed Japan.

The nuclear developments in Korea have fostered the view in many Japanese circles that for them there is no long-term security alternative to development of some kind of independent nuclear deterrent. Right now our most effective step in holding back this Japanese sentiment would be to halt the INKSS-1 deployment and rescue the Korean nuclear negotiations. The Japanese themselves could play an important role in this effort if they would commit to a new and expanded aid and capital investment program in North Korea.

In terms of the Korean nuclear negotiations we need to ask whether there is any way we can successfully conclude those negotiations short of our original goal of unlimited challenge inspections throughout the peninsula. A better strategy now might be to push for rapid political progress (e.g. through a less ambitious nuclear agreement) looking to Korean reunification as the best way to "deal with" the advanced state of the North Korean nuclear weapons program.

The diplomatic issues that must be decided now are:

1. What diplomatic initiatives should we take at this time with the Chinese?
   - A. Attempt to persuade them to use their leverage to halt the North Korean INKSS-1 deployment.
   - B. ________________________________

2. Should we approach the Iranians to get them to weigh in with the North Koreans to halt the deployment of the INKSS-1?
   - A. Yes
   - B. Not at this time

3. What diplomatic initiatives might we take at this time with the Japanese?
   - A. Seek Japanese commitment to a major financial aid package for North Korea as part of a comprehensive settlement of the Korean situation.
   - B. ________________________________
4. What position should we take on next steps in the nuclear negotiations?
   
   _____ A. Advise the South Koreans to make no changes in their position.
   
   _____ B. Suggest that South Korea modify their position on inspections in a direction that will permit rapid completion of the negotiations.
   
   _____ C. ______________________________

5. What other diplomatic initiatives might we take at this point in time?
   
   _____ A. ______________________________
   
   _____ B. ______________________________

MILITARY ISSUES

The South Korean request to initiate planning to attack the North Korean nuclear and missile program highlights an obvious option in this situation. At the same time we must recognize that our legal justification for such action is tenuous and the international ramifications of any such attack could be severe. The Joint Staff has developed conventional and nuclear attack options ranging from an attack on the apparent INKSS-1 deployment sites and production facilities to an all-out attack on the North Korean missile and nuclear program.

While the South Koreans are proposing that we initiate a joint military planning process, almost all of the capability to disable the North Korean program is in our hands, save possibly for a potential modest contribution from South Korean commando and paratrooper raids. It is important here to recognize that there is almost no chance of our taking out all of the North Korean nuclear capability, even with the use of nuclear weapons - though we might be able to scuttle the apparent INKSS-1 deployment effort.

CINCPAC has requested immediate deployment of all available PATRIOT batteries to U.S. bases in Japan, Okinawa, and Guam, but not to South Korea. He sees little or no hope of defending U.S. bases or cities in Korea against a preemptive North Korean SCUD attack, but believes that PATRIOT barrage tactics might work against single INKSS-1 attacks on non-Korean bases. (Six PATRIOT batteries are available for this kind of mission; roughly three weeks would be required to move them all to the Far East.) The CINC has also requested that selected SSN's and a CBG from CONUS be armed with nuclear weapons to support possible attack options against the North Korean nuclear and missile facilities (and provide an in-theater deterrent). In addition CINCPAC and CINSTRAT have requested that all bomber forces be placed on increased alert and be prepared to conduct nuclear and/or conventional missions against North Korea.
The military issues that must be decided now are:

1. Should we attack the North Korean nuclear and/or missile programs?
   _____ A. No, do not attack at this time.
   _____ B. Yes, finalize preparations to attack:
       ______ The INKSS-1 deployment sites and production facilities.
       ______ All known SCUD-C sites and production facilities.
       ______ All known or suspected North Korean nuclear facilities

2. Should we plan to use nuclear weapons in these attacks?
   _____ A. Yes  
   _____ B. Not at this time

3. Should we involve South Korea in the attack planning?
   _____ A. Yes  
   _____ B. Not at this time

4. Should we provide the North Koreans with an ultimatum and deadline before conducting the attack?
   _____ A. No
   _____ B. Yes, give them an ultimatum with a deadline of _____ days tied to:
       ______ Halting further work on INKSS-1 deployment.
       ______ Completion of the nuclear negotiations.

5. Should we grant CINCPAC’s request for immediate deployment of all available PATRIOT batteries to U.S. bases in the Far East?
   _____ A. Yes  
   _____ B. Not at this time

6. Should we grant the request to place nuclear weapons on SSNs and CBGs?
   _____ A. Yes  
   _____ B. Not at this time

7. Should we grant the request to place bomber forces on alert?
   _____ A. Yes  
   _____ B. Not at this time
DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUES

It would be best if the United States manifest a clear consensus in its policy
te statements on the Korean situation. This would especially be the case if we do decide
to go forward with formulating plans for major attacks on the North Korean
nuclear program since important war powers issues are involved. To this end it
may be advisable to meet privately with Congressional leaders to ensure that no
Congressional leader steps out and gets ahead of us in prescribing a preferred U.S.
policy in Korea at this time, especially as regards the war powers act.

The domestic politics issue to be decided is:

1. Should we set up a meeting with the Congressional leadership to discuss the
situation in Korea and related war powers issues?

   ______ A. Yes. Should we announce the meeting publicly?

   ______ B. Not at this time.

DECLARATORY POLICY ISSUES

In the light of the deteriorating situation on the Korean peninsula, there may
soon be pressure to make a clear statement about our stakes and vital interests in
the region. Some kind of statement of this character is probably now necessary,
especially since the information on possible NKSS-1 deployment will probably soon
leak. Japan in particular will be looking for a clear policy statement from us on the
situation.

The declaratory policy issue to be decided is:

1. What should be emphasized in a U.S. declaratory policy statement at this time
on the Korean situation and our interests in the region?

   ______ A. Articulate vital interests such as:
   ______ South Korean security
   ______ Maintaining the U.S.-Japanese security relationship.
   ______ Halting further nuclear proliferation
   ______ The indivisibility of the nuclear peace

   ______ B. The extension of the U.S. nuclear guarantee to South Korea.

   ______ C. Thwarting Iranian efforts to expand its military capability through its
   cooperative relationship with North Korea.

   ______ D. ____________________________

5
STEP TWO: The Day After...

SITUATION REPORT

The Continuing Crisis

On April 1, 1993, while the U.S. NSC debated how to handle the deteriorating situation in Korea, Kim II Sung died. The North Korean armed forces immediately went on heightened alert.

Within hours of Kim’s death Beijing announced that the Shenyang military district bordering North Korea had been placed on defensive alert. In this same time frame the White House received a Hotline message from Moscow describing defensive measures that were being taken by Russian forces in the Far East.

On April 7, many heads of state including the President of South Korea attended a massive funeral in Pyongyang. The city was clearly tense and heavily guarded by military and security forces. Later that day the U.S. Ambassador to South Korea reported that a meeting between the South Korean President and Kim Jong II had been totally unproductive and that Kim seemed “nervous and preoccupied.” Rumors were rife in Tokyo that a serious split had developed in North Korea over Kim Jong II’s ascension to the status of “great leader.”

On April 9th, the chief of staff of the North Korean air force, a known leader of the “New Nationalist” faction, unexpectedly appeared on national television and announced that Kim Jong II would head a new “collective government.” Pictures of the new leadership, all noted reformers, were also broadcast. Resignations of the previous minister of defense, chief of staff, and the civilian heads of communications, industry, and agriculture “for reasons of health” were also announced.

Within hours the Japanese and several European embassies reported large scale movements of armored vehicles and extensive fighting throughout the center of the city. Reports suggested that members of the reform government had attempted to place Kim Jong II under arrest, but that the plot had been interrupted by security forces loyal to the new leader’s father.

At 1100 local time, Kim Jong II appeared on television and broadcast an appeal for “national unity” claiming that a plot by South Korea and the United States to “destroy the nation and overthrow the works of socialism” had been thwarted. This was followed by scenes which showed several members of the “reform” cabinet garroted by wire from an unidentified ceiling. (The body of the air force chief of staff was not shown, and diplomatic sources later expressed the view that he was at large and had escaped the city.) Kim ended the speech with a diatribe against the “fascist regime of the south.”

At 1200 local time, U.S. and South Korean intelligence picked up clear evidence that several corps of the North Korean Army were “crashing” out of garrison and heading south toward traditional attack positions. Most ominous was the redeployment of all of the North Korea armored units north of Seoul. While there remained the possibility that these forces were to be engaged in the struggle for power in the North, the National Intelligence Officer for Northeast Asia argued that the events showed all the signs of a “standing start” attack on the South.

At 1300, the President of South Korea emerged from an emergency meeting of the South Korean cabinet and announced a “full mobilization” of ROK military forces. The U.S. Ambassador in his analysis of the statement noted a reference to “the cherished goal” of the reunification of Korea and expressed the view that the South might attack north if the North Korea military split continued.

In the late afternoon, U.S. reconnaissance aircraft detected the massing of North Korean armored units north of the traditional invasion routes to Seoul. Adding confusion to the military picture in the North was continued evidence of fighting in Pyongyang, Wonson, and around several air bases along the Yalu River.

At an NSC meeting late on the 9th the President made the decision to implement IRON SHIELD.

On April 10 CINCPAC requested and was granted authority to conduct a counter-surprise defense - code-named STEEL SWORD. The plan relied on the massive use of air power to counter a North Korean attack.
The Day After...

At 0330 local time on April 11 the second Korean War began as two orbiting AWACS detected 200 aircraft rising from five main airfields in the North. (Noteworthy was the absence of air activity at three main operating bases along the Yalu River and two north of Wonson.) At 0340, the Pacific Ocean DSP detected the near simultaneous launch of 80 SCUD missiles toward South Korea. At 0350 local time three attacking SCUD-Cs were intercepted by Patriot II batteries over downtown Seoul. Two minutes later the Patriot battery at Taegue Air Base successfully engaged three of four attacking SCUDs. The fourth hit the main hanger with early reports indicating nine USAF personnel killed and eleven wounded. Most of the SCUDs were targeted against South Korean military facilities with several airfields reporting extensive damage.

At 0400, the NMCC received a flash report that the U.S. Command Post at Osan and several other South Korean bases were under commando attack. Heavy local fighting involving North Korean special operations forces (SOF) units was also reported throughout the Seoul suburbs around key military facilities. All along the DMZ there were massive artillery barrages and extensive attacks by short range tactical ballistic missiles (FROG-7 type) and long range multiple rocket launchers. There were no reports of use of chemical weapons.

At 0530 local time, CINCPLAN sent a message to the NMCC requesting authorization to conduct unrestricted air and naval operations around and over North Korea with an initial 20 kilometer "no attack zone" south of the Yalu River. USAF Korea reported that the initial wave of attacking North Korean aircraft had suffered 40% loss rates and had caused only "moderate" damage. The continuing SCUD bombardment was reported as more worrisome with the count now up to 220 launches with 55 intercepted and 165 detected impacts. 75 U.S. personnel were reported as so far killed.

At 0600 local time, North Korean forces launched a multi-corps attack through the Uijongbu corridor toward Seoul. In the first hour reports from the South Koreans indicated that the main line of defense just south of the DMZ (See Figure 1) was holding.

The two brigades of the 2nd Division had moved overnight into an "operational reserve" position 10 kilometers north of Seoul. As South Korea's only armored corps of two armored and two mechanized divisions were moving to counterattack positions another 15-30 kilometers north of the 2nd Division, the U.S. division commander sent a request to "lean further forward" with the South Korean mechanized forces. At 0700 local time that request was denied by CINCPLAN, although a U.S. commitment to provide heavy air support to the anticipated South Korean counterattack was approved.

In this same time period a flotilla of North Korean missile gunboats and landing craft were sighted by a USN P-3 off Kangnung on the South Korean east coast. A flight of A-6s from the Independence in the Sea of Japan attacked the gunboats sinking five of the vessels in a fifteen minute engagement. A similar one-sided naval engagement occurred on the west coast involving South Korean air and naval units.

At 0655 local time as part of STEEL SWORD, the US commenced launching conventionally armed Tomahawk cruise missiles against key North Korean targets from surface warships with the Independence and two Los Angeles class SSNs in the Yellow Sea. At 0800, the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, after waiting two hours, received a formal note from the Prime Minister which "authorized offensive and defensive air operations from the territory of Japan." In a following memocon, the U.S. Ambassador noted that the vote within the Japanese cabinet to restrict U.S. air operations to "defensive measures" failed by only one vote.

At 0900 local time, Kim Jong II announced on television and radio that the "liberation of Korea was underway." He also claimed that the United States was using cruise missiles armed with chemical weapons to "destroy the Korean people." Seen on television by the Japanese embassy in Pyongyang and rebroadcast by an IMMARAT terminal, Kim appeared verging on hysteria when he concluded that North Korea had "the means to launch an annihilating blow against the southern fascists." Further, he claimed that neither "Japan nor the Americans were invulnerable to counterblows."
At 0915 local time, DSP detected the fifth SCUD missile volley from sites concentrated northeast of Pyongyang. Simultaneously, the first air strike package which included B-52s from Guam was just turning away after releasing their weapons against the transportation center at Kaesong. Eleven minutes later the U.S. AWACS in orbit over Seoul suffered an EMP surge as two nuclear weapons (yields estimated at 60-80 kilotons based on DSP data) detonated over the South Korean armored corps assembly area.

Three minutes later there were four more nuclear detonations of similar yield - one over the South Korean main airbase at Ch'unch'ŏn and the others over the South Korean assembly areas in the Uijongbu corridor. In all cases it appeared that the height of burst was such that the nuclear fireball did not touch the ground.

At 0955, the South Korean High Command relayed fragmentary reports that their forces were being subjected to heavy chemical artillery barrages.

At 1019 local time, the U.S. Command Post Korea received an initial damage assessment from the 2nd Division forward command post reporting at least 20 killed and 400 total casualties -- most with retinal damage. The report indicated evidence of panic in the South Korean ranks with the main road passing through the 2nd Division's field positions jammed with support and some armored fighting vehicles.

At 1130, the NMCC received a military assessment from CINC U.S. Forces Korea. Reconnaissance assets had detected two major breakthroughs by North Korean forces with COMINT indicating panic and chaos in the South Korean ranks. The CINC recommended that the 2nd Division be instructed to "stand and fight" just north of Seoul because the North Koreans could be in the South Korean capital within twenty-four hours.

At 1140, the U.S. Ambassador to Korea forwarded a formal message from the South Korean government demanding an immediate and full retaliation against North Korea.

At 1215 local time, the U.S. Ambassador to Japan was called into a meeting with the Japanese cabinet with the Emperor in attendance. During the meeting the Emperor spoke forcefully of the need for "American restraint" in the response to "the criminal acts of a desperate Kim Jong Il."
## STEP TWO: The Day After...

### INSTRUCTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How to Proceed</th>
<th>Decisions to Be Made</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. You will have a total of 50 minutes for STEP TWO (40 min. for deliberations and 10 min. for reporting).</td>
<td><strong>I. U.S. Policy Issues and Options</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. It is now 10:00 am on April 11. You are scheduled to meet with the President in two hours to discuss the crisis in Korea.</td>
<td>As in the first move, the NSC staff-led working group believes that the U.S. will likely want to consider policy issues and options in at least the following general issue areas:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 3. At the beginning of the move you will be given approximately ten minutes to quickly read through:  
  • The Situation Report on the crisis.  
  • These Instructions.  
  • A Draft Memo for the President. | • Military  
• Diplomatic  
• Domestic Political  
• Declaratory  

The staff-prepared Draft Memo for the President provides a recommended set of policy issues and options in the above areas. |
| 4. As soon as it is practical, the Chair of the group will lead a discussion that moves through the tasking described in the Decisions to Be Made section. The group will again make two kinds of decisions:  
  • Modifications to the staff-prepared Draft Memo for the President.  
  • Recommendations to the President on specific options to select for each of the issues discussed. | Under the guidance of the Chair, the group should discuss and modify this draft “policy options paper” as was done in Step One. |
| 5. When the time for STEP TWO is up, you should record your group’s final decisions on the “STEP TWO Draft Memo for the President.” | **2. Recommendations** |
| 6. As part of the discussion of STEP TWO, the Chair of your group will be asked to summarize and explain the group’s final decisions and recommendations. | When the group has settled on the list of issues and options to go forward to the President, you should attempt to reach consensus on a recommendation on each of the issues. If a consensus cannot be reached, vote on the options presented and record the results. |
STEP TWO: The Day After...

Draft Memo for the President

National Security Council

11 April 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
FROM: The National Security Advisor
SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on the Korean Crisis

The war on the Korean peninsula has now dramatically escalated as a consequence of the North Korean nuclear attack. The purpose of this NSC Meeting is to decide how to respond to that attack.

OBJECTIVES

We are now in the kind of nuclear crisis we have long sought to avoid in Korea and northeast Asia. The situation is further complicated by the prospect that the new North Korean IRBM may give that country the capability to launch nuclear missile attacks against both military and civilian targets in Japan and against U.S. bases on Guam and Okinawa.

In this situation our dominant near-term concern is to stop by whatever means possible further North Korean nuclear missile attacks. As discussed below, there appear to be few diplomatic routes to achieve this objective. Furthermore, the most effective and timely military options available all involve U.S. nuclear attack against North Korea.

We are also facing a critical historical juncture in that this is the first time since 1945 that nuclear weapons have been used in anger. It is difficult to see how we can let such use go unpunished, much less lead to success for the attacker. At the same time we are clearly witnessing a desperate act by a political leader - or perhaps more precisely a military faction - which otherwise was on the road to political failure. We must examine the spectrum of possible responses to the North Korean nuclear attack in this sobering light.
MILITARY ISSUES

Kim Jong Il and the leaders of the military faction that launched the attack on South Korea are apparently either still in Pyongyang (in a hardened underground bunker) or in one of three or four hardened military facilities. Ground burst nuclear weapons would be required to take out any of these facilities. Nuclear attacks on the facilities outside Pyongyang could probably be accomplished without horrific prompt collateral fatalities. An attack on the bunker in Pyongyang would probably result in a minimum of 3-500,000 prompt civilian fatalities and horrendous fallout casualties.

Our prospects for destroying the North Korean missile forces are not very attractive. We know where a large number of the missile sites are located and we could attack these facilities, many of which are underground. However, many of the SCUDs are on mobile launchers and we will never be certain that we have found all of the existing sites. We must also face the reality that any U.S. attack that is not completely successful will probably lead to another North Korean nuclear attack, possibly against U.S. bases in Japan, Guam, and Okinawa.

Our capability against these targets with conventional weapons is substantial, though repeated attacks over many days would be required just to destroy or disable the missile and relocation sites we know about.

The military issues that must be decided now are:

1. Should we launch a nuclear attack at this time against North Korea - and if so what should we target?
   
   _____ A. No
   _____ B. Yes. We should attack the following targets:
   _____ The Presidential bunker in Pyongyang
   _____ All facilities where Kim or the North Korean military command might be located
   _____ All known INKSS-1 sites and production facilities
   _____ All known SCUD sites and production facilities

2. What weapons systems should we be prepared to use in a nuclear attack?
   
   _____ A. B-52s
   _____ B. B-1s
   _____ C. B-2s
   _____ D. ICBMs

3. Should we launch an all-out conventional attack on North Korea?
   
   _____ A. Yes
   _____ B. Not at this time
**DIPLOMATIC ISSUES**

While it is difficult to conceive that diplomatic efforts will prove useful in the current situation, the military options cited above are so grim that some examination of diplomatic options is clearly warranted.

At this point in time it is unlikely that any nation besides China would have influence with Kim Jong Il and the military faction that he nominally heads. We are obviously not in a situation where the North Koreans would capitulate to demands we might make. However, the Chinese may be able to persuade them that without an immediate halt in hostilities and withdrawal of forces a major nuclear attack on the North is a certainty. The question is whether the Chinese would accept such a diplomatic undertaking.

A second alternative, albeit a long shot, would be to involve the Japanese in an effort to halt further hostilities. They may in fact be in a better position to remind the North Koreans of American willingness to use nuclear weapons.

Finally there are the Russians. While their influence with the North Koreans is not great, they may be willing to tell the North Koreans that they are prepared to join the U.S. in conventional attacks on North Korea or permit the use of their air bases for U.S. military operations (difficult as that may be).

The diplomatic issues that must be decided now are:

1. Should we attempt to get the Chinese to broker a cease-fire and withdrawal of North Korean forces?
   - A. Yes
   - B. No

2. What diplomatic initiatives might we undertake with Japan at this point?
   - A. Get them to intercede with the North Koreans to effect a cease-fire.
   - B. ________________________________________________

3. What diplomatic initiatives might we take with the Russians?
   - A. Persuade them to threaten the North Koreans with joint U.S.-Russian conventional attack
   - B. ________________________________________________

3
4. What other diplomatic initiatives might we take at this time?
   _____ A. Convene the UN Security Council
   _____ B. ___________________________________________
   _____ C. ___________________________________________

DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUES

There is great concern in the country and the Congress about the direction that the crisis in Korea might take. Whatever decisions you might take on military or diplomatic action will probably require some kind of consultation with the Congress. Clearly any nuclear attack on North Korea would constitute an unambiguous act of war. In light of this situation we may need to seek a formal declaration of war against North Korea.

The domestic political issue that must be decided now is:

1. Should we seek a formal Congressional declaration of war against North Korea?
   _____ A. Yes           _____ B. Not at this time

DECLARATORY POLICY ISSUES

In light of the extreme character of this crisis the American people and in fact the whole world is waiting for your statement on the situation. In this vein, the basic declaratory policy issue to be addressed is:

1. What should be the themes of your statement on the Korean situation?
   • __________________________________________
   • __________________________________________
   • __________________________________________
   • __________________________________________
STEP THREE: The Day Before...

INSTRUCTIONS

How to Proceed

1. You will have a total of 40 minutes for STEP THREE (30 min. for deliberations and 10 min. for reporting).

2. The time period is "the day before" nuclear weapon use - more literally the present or the very near future. You are preparing for an NSC meeting with the President on the long-term nuclear proliferation problem. The meeting will give particular attention to those long-term issues related to the emergence of new nuclear-armed nations in troubled regions and the problems this poses for U.S. intervention in regional conflicts.

3. At the beginning of the move you will be given approximately ten minutes to quickly review:
   - These Instructions.
   - A Draft Memo for the President.

4. As soon as it is practical, the Chair of the group should lead a discussion that moves through the tasking described in the Decisions to Be Made section. The group will make three kinds of decisions:
   - Modifications to the Draft Memo.
   - Where consensus can be achieved, recommendations to the President on preferred options on specific issues.
   - The rank-ordering of the most important nuclear proliferation-related policy issues to be put to the President at this point in time.

5. When the time for STEP THREE is up, you should record your group's final decisions on the STEP THREE Draft Memo.

6. As part of the discussion of STEP THREE, the Chair of your group will again be asked to summarize the group's conclusions and recommendations.

Decisions to Be Made

1. U.S. Policy Issues and Options

   The staff-prepared Draft Memo for the President provides an initial set of long-term policy issues and options for consideration. The chairperson of the working group that prepared the draft apologized for the "roughness" of the list; the group apparently had a lot of trouble reaching consensus on a list to send forward for this meeting.

   Under the guidance of the Chair, the group should review this draft "policy options paper," then expand or otherwise modify it as judged appropriate.

2. Recommendations

   When the group has settled on the list of issues and options to go forward to the President, the Chair should very briefly attempt to reach consensus on a recommended option on each of the issues. If a consensus cannot be reached quickly, vote on the options presented and record the vote.

   As a final step you should try to forge a consensus and/or vote on the two or three most important of these long-term policy issues.
STEP THREE: The Day Before...

Draft Memo for the President

National Security Council

xx June 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

FROM: The National Security Advisor

SUBJECT: Korea and Long-Term Nuclear Proliferation Policy

There will be an NSC meeting tomorrow to discuss the Korean situation and the long-term nuclear proliferation problem. Particular attention will be given to those Korean nuclear issues that relate to the generic problem of the emergence of new nuclear-armed nations in troubled regions where the U.S. has strong alliance commitments.

1. DECLARATORY POLICY ON EXTENDED DETERRENCE

We may at this time need to articulate a clear and unambiguous post-Cold War U.S. policy on the extended deterrence role for nuclear weapons. Are we, for example, going to make unambiguously clear that a North Korean attack on South Korea will be met, if necessary, by nuclear retaliation against the North?

Policy Question: What should be post-Cold War U.S. policy on the extended deterrence role of U.S. nuclear weapons?

A. The U.S. is prepared, if necessary, to use nuclear weapons to defend the territorial integrity of its allies under all circumstances.

B. The U.S. is prepared to use nuclear weapons to defend its allies but only if they are attacked by nuclear weapons.

C. ________________________________

D. ________________________________

2. A FAR MORE INTRUSIVE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION INSPECTION REGIME

The IAEA has the authority in its charter, to date unused, to be far more intrusive in its inspections. Its current director is laying the groundwork for
the IAEA to begin exercising this power. Alternatively, more intrusive inspection regimes could be negotiated regionally among a limited number of states in places like the Korean peninsula and South Asia.

In the case of Korea such a negotiation is now underway. Its outcome will clearly set a precedent for other regional efforts of this character. In this context we believe that there is strong evidence to support South Korea maintaining its demand for a Korean peninsula inspection regime that goes well beyond current IAEA practices. However, this evidence may not yet be strong enough to effect a consensus within the broader international community that North Korea is violating its NPT obligations.

In considering such a dilemma it should be kept in mind that U.S. support for more intrusive inspection regimes might in time require U.S. acceptance of such inspection procedures within the U.S. itself.

Policy Question: What should be the U.S. position at this point in time on the effort to obtain a highly intrusive inspection regime on the Korean peninsula?

_____ A. Encourage South Korea to continue to insist on a highly intrusive Korean peninsula nuclear inspection regime.

_____ B. Persuade South Korea to abandon the effort to negotiate agreement on a highly intrusive inspection regime in Korea and seek near-term expansion of IAEA inspection procedures as the means of restraining further covert North Korean nuclear development.

_____ C. 

_____ D. 

3. A FAR MORE AGGRESSIVE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ENFORCEMENT REGIME

When it is suspected that a NPT signatory is unambiguously in violation of the NPT and associated IAEA safeguards, the UN Security Council (UNSC) offers an obvious potential instrument for enforcement of NPT commitments. However, the evidence may not always be strong enough to effect a consensus within the UNSC on taking action against a suspected violator or insisting that such a violator accept highly intrusive inspection measures to "prove its innocence."

In such situations should the U.S. be prepared to undertake "independent" measures to halt a nuclear weapons program that potentially threatens one of its allies?
Policy Question: What should the U.S. do when one of its allies is threatened by a suspected covert nuclear weapons program (as is currently the case in Korea)?

   A. Set a deadline for the suspect nation (e.g. North Korea) to agree to an inspection regime intrusive enough to remove any ambiguity as to whether it has a covert weapons program. If the suspect nation fails to meet the deadline:
       1. Go to the UNSC and seek agreement on military action to take out those elements of the covert program that have been identified.
       2. Be prepared to take unilateral military action against the suspect facilities.
       3. Apply other sanctions (e.g. economic).

   B. Accept the new reality until such time that a highly intrusive global inspection regime capable of resolving such ambiguities is established under the IAEA.

   C. _____________________________________________________________

4. PROGRAMMATIC RESPONSES TO THE THREAT POSED TO ALLIES

   It is increasingly clear that in future regional conflicts U.S. and allied forces could well face not only nuclear weapons but also much more sophisticated ballistic and cruise missile delivery systems. In the light of such a prospect we might give particular attention to possible programmatic response that would help serve to mitigate or thwart such threats.

Policy Question: What near-term military procurement and/or deployment initiatives might the U.S. pursue in response to the prospect of U.S. and allied forces facing nuclear-armed adversaries in future regional engagements in the very near future?

   A. Accelerate development and deployment of improved ATBM and air defense systems (e.g. PATRIOT III).

   B. Accelerate development and deployment of an improved low-altitude ABM interceptor (e.g. ERINT).

   C. Expand the U.S. inventory of hard-target conventionally-armed guided munitions.

   D. Develop and deploy earth-penetrating nuclear weapons.

   E. _____________________________________________________________
5. ____________________________

Policy Question:

6. ____________________________

Policy Question:
Appendix I

The Day After . . . in South Asia
Exercise Materials
The Day After...

...in South Asia

Marc Dean Millot
Roger Molander
Peter Wilson

HANDOUT
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Day After...</th>
<th>Introduction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>...in South Asia</td>
<td>Methodology Schematic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overview of the Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STEP ONE: The Day Of...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situation Report</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memo for the President</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STEP TWO: The Day After...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situation Report</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memo for the President</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STEP THREE: The Day Before...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memo for the President</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HANDOUT
INTRODUCTION

The Day After... is a RAND project examining the implications for U.S. national security and military strategy of the spread of nuclear weapons and related capabilities in the post-Cold War world.

A central assumption of the project is that the ability to build nuclear weapons and modern means to deliver them (such as ballistic missiles) will continue to proliferate. The number of nations with deliverable “in-being” nuclear arsenals will almost certainly grow. Also likely to increase are “virtual” nuclear arsenals - arsenals that by design and plan can be built or assembled inside a nation’s likely “strategic warning time.” The loss or breakup of central control over an existing nuclear arsenal could also add to the number of nuclear weapons powers (as may be the outcome in the former Soviet Union). Such situations will also almost certainly spread “nuclear-weapon-competent” personnel and related nuclear weapons wherewithal.

In such a global environment, the possibility of actual nuclear weapon use seems worthy of concern and attention. At a minimum, we will probably face many future crises in which there is the implicit or explicit brandishing of nuclear weapons. In this context there is a clear need to frame - for both analysis and policymaking - the spectrum of nuclear proliferation-related policy decisions the United States must now face.

The near-term objective of The Day After... project is to identify (and seek consensus where it exists on):

- A set of generic nuclear proliferation-related scenarios involving nuclear weapon use in future crises.
- A set of candidate “heart of the matter” nuclear proliferation-related policy issues that might be put to the President for decision in the near term.
- A rough rank-ordering of the most urgent and important of the above key policy issues.
- A comprehensive spectrum of clearly drawn policy options for each of these issues.

The Day After... project methodology (see the schematic below) and this exercise begin with an examination of the policy decisions confronting a U.S. President and the nation on “the day of” some pivotal change in the nuclear status quo - including the possible imminent or near-term “use” of nuclear weapons. As a second pivot point (tracking the schematic), the exercise turns to “the day after” - in the aftermath of actual nuclear weapon “use” - and explores the set of crisis-driven policy choices that would face the President at that point. As a final decision point, the exercise moves to “the day before” - months or years before the envisioned “day of” or “day after” - and considers the challenge of adopting policies and an overall strategy to minimize the prospects that such nuclear use scenarios would occur or, if they do, to mitigate their consequences.

The Day After...in South Asia is the fourth of a set of four policy exercises RAND has developed to explore the implications of various generic nuclear weapon use scenarios. The generic scenarios and related policy exercises are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generic Scenario</th>
<th>Policy Exercise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Loss of Central Control</td>
<td>The Day After... in the USSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. U.S. Intervention</td>
<td>The Day After... in the Greater Middle East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Nuclear Use vs. U.S. Ally</td>
<td>The Day After... in Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Nth Country vs. Nth Country</td>
<td>The Day After... in South Asia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As a final step in this phase of analysis The Day After... project will examine the U.S. policy decision-making process for nuclear proliferation-related issues. Any new U.S. policies in this area (or U.S. endorsement of new global policies) must inescapably be forged in that political arena and clash of interests. Examine of this process question will shed further light on the challenge of developing a sustainable national and global strategy to address the long-term consequences of nuclear proliferation.
**OVERVIEW OF THE EXERCISE**

**The Day After... in South Asia** is a three-step policy exercise designed to be completed in one three-hour session. Participants (ideally in groups of 6-8 people) take on the role of top advisors to the President of the United States in a group deliberative process akin to a meeting of National Security Council principals (minus the President) and key staff, preparing for a later formal NSC meeting with the President.

In STEP ONE: The Day Of... (estimated time 60 min.) the participants address a rapidly deteriorating political situation in South Asia. The group develops an overall perspective on the situation, considers the issues and options that need to be presented to the President, and, where consensus can be found, recommends decisions for the President to take.

In STEP TWO: The Day After... (estimated time 60 min.) participants find themselves convened at a point later in time and immediately following nuclear weapon "use" in a crisis in the region. The group's task is again to help the President decide how to respond to the prevailing situation.

In STEP THREE: The Day Before... (estimated time 40 min.) the exercise moves back in time to today or to the near future. In consideration of the "lessons learned" in the two previous moves, the group seeks to reach consensus on the character and thrust, defining language, and the appropriate options for those key nuclear proliferation-related policy issues that should in the very near term be faced and taken to closure in the United States.

Where time permits a debriefing ends the exercise.
### SITUATION REPORT

#### Background

It is the early summer of 1996.

During the preceding year, political-military relations between India and Pakistan seriously deteriorated after a “false dawn” during the early 1990s. Hopes for a sustained rapprochement between the two countries had been dashed by a combination of domestic and international shocks which characterized the post-Cold War environment in South Asia.

#### India

The five years following Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination in 1991 had become a “time of troubles” for India. Through much of this period, the political process had been marked by a series of political crises flowing from the death throes of the once dominant Congress Party. After a series of weak and ineffective collation governments, the Hindu nationalist party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), gained a decisive majority under the leadership of a young and charismatic member of a long-active Indian political family. She stunned the Indian political stage by leading the BJP to victory during the elections of 1994. At the core of the BJP platform was a strong element of nationalist state capitalism which domestic and foreign critics labeled as “Hindu fascism.”

Noteworthy was the BJP’s commitment to make India a great power, which included an overt call for an Indian nuclear arsenal. Simultaneously, the new Indian government solidified its political, economic, and military relations with the new and more nationalist government of Russia. This move was stimulated in part by the rapid deterioration of relations with Pakistan and its Islamic allies. Adding to Indian and Russian concern was the appearance of an assertive post-Deng regime in China which was very actively engaged in the now renamed “Greater Middle East.”

In response to the political success of the BJP, the domestic environment rapidly deteriorated with several states, including Punjab being placed under martial law. Severe clashes had occurred between Hindu and Muslim militants in many of the major cities throughout north and central India, including New Delhi. This widespread domestic turmoil had prompted the BJP to favor a deeper engagement of the Indian Armed Forces in “internal security” matters which generated controversy within the Indian high command. Further, the advocates within the Indian military for the nuclear program were courted by the BJP hierarchy.

Even with domestic difficulties, the Indian economy continued to grow if only from the stimulus of the early 1990s moves to privatization which the BJP carried forward. Even through U.S. and India trade flourished, there were serious difficulties between New Delhi and Washington. Central was the problem over the BJP decision to press ahead with the widely publicized announcement of the existence of India’s nuclear arsenal in the fall of 1994.

#### Pakistan

Paralleling India’s descent into increased domestic trouble, a series of weak and unstable civilian Pakistani governments followed Benazir Bhutto’s ouster from power in the fall of 1991. To Pakistan’s north a weak coalition government in Kabul barely managed to survive as Afghanistan increasingly took on the character of a crossroads from Pakistan into the Central Asian states of the newly formed Confederation of Turkistani States (CTS). All of this area was now the object of a new “great game” which included Russia, China, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan.

Pakistan’s economy continued to make modest progress in part stimulated by the find of large natural gas fields in Baluchistan and rising trade with the CTS and Iran.

Much to the concern of India and the United States, Pakistan had developed a close military industrial relationship with Iran which included joint development of 3000 kilometer Chinese designed solid propellant IRBM. Chinese military technological ties with Pakistan and Iran had continued on a steady expansion course since the late 1980s.
This contrasted with U.S. and Pakistani political military relations which had been reduced to a bare minimum with all military assistance frozen during the 1990s.

In spite of some progress between India and Pakistan on negotiating their security differences - including a formal pledge not to attack each other’s nuclear facilities - relations rapidly deteriorated during the summer of 1994 after the election success of the BJP. A source of considerable friction was the continued clandestine support by the Pakistani security services to the increasingly effective Kashmiri and Sikh “national liberation” paramilitary organizations. After a new national election of indecisive result following severe communal riots in Karachi and Lahore, the Pakistani military declared a martial law government three days after India announced its formal status as a nuclear weapon state.

**China**

The transition to a post-Deng generation leadership had taken place without major domestic political disruption. The new leadership’s watchword is to continue building China as a great power through a combination of state and private capitalism coupled to strong authoritarian political control - “radical perestroika without much glasnost.” Contrary to the expectations of many foreign observers, the new political military leadership has taken a surprisingly activist stance toward the “Islamic World.” This included expanded political, military and economic ties with the CTS, Iran, and Pakistan. The renewed sense of a common “threat” re-invigorated Russian and Indian security ties.

Although U.S. and Chinese trade and economic ties continued to expand, national security issues are a source of tension between Washington and Beijing. China continued to resist U.S.-authored international restraints on the sale of advanced missile technology. Further, the Chinese continued to hold to the stance that Russia and the United States must accept the principle of numerical parity as part of any multilateral nuclear arms agreement which leads to deep reductions (e.g. to less than 1000 warheads) of the former superpower nuclear arsenals. Further, it claimed that the U.S. and Russia should not be allowed to gain “global supremacy” by deploying a substantial ABM. The new Russia government strongly resisted this stance and demanded that the “lesser” nuclear armed states such as the United Kingdom, France, and China accept a ceiling which is a fraction of the final Russian and U.S. ceiling.

**The Former CIS**

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) proved stillborn by the end of 1992. Russia and Ukraine maintained an uneasy relationship. The Crimea remained a source of tension but the Ukrainian decision to allow the Russian Federation a long term “lease” of Sevastopol had cooled the conflict. Many observers remained concerned about the stability of this “arrangement” after Boris Yeltsin was compelled to retire from political life after a grave, personal health crisis. A young and more nationalist leadership had come to power during the elections of 1994. The new President, a rival of Yeltsin, pressed for a more assertive Russian stance on a wide range of international issues.

Aiding the new government was a Russian economy undergoing a revival in part “fueled” by an internationally financed oil and natural gas boom. U.S. economic ties with Russia had greatly expanded, including a wide spectrum of collaborative efforts between segments of their respective aerospace industries.

A source of conflict between Washington and Moscow was the willingness of the new Russian government to vigorously promote military exports to a wide range of recipients. After “playing ball” with the U.S. government on a number of military export deals, the new government signaled a much more nationalistic stance. Further, U.S. efforts to gain meaningful international restraints on the sale of advanced weapon technology, systems, and expertise was undermined by Ukraine’s aggressive export policy - especially its very large military hardware for oil swap signed with Iran during the summer of 1993.

The new Russian government’s stance on military exports was very popular with the Russian military, which was very unhappy with the rapid disarmament of the Federation. By 1995, the Russian military had shrunk to 1.5 million men with
a focus of effort on maintaining a smaller but technologically well equipped quasi-professional fighting force. From the Russian military’s perspective, the most serious near-term threats flowed from the unresolved conflicts with Ukraine, the CSTC in league with “Islam,” and a more assertive China.

Even with these difficulties, U.S. and Russian political military relations developed in a positive fashion, marked in particular by the steady decline in strategic nuclear forces under START. However, the prospect of multilateral nuclear arms negotiations remained stalled

The United States

The United States had experienced modest growth during the recovery after the 1990-91 recession. U.S. defense budgets have declined steadily to a level just below the modified Base Force levels proposed by the Administration in 1993. Continued large federal deficits, increased demands for domestic programs, and slow growth has put strong pressure on the U.S. to make further major cuts in defense spending after FY-96.

Within the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf region, U.S. peacetime military presence remains relatively unchanged. The U.S. Navy has a small flotilla of destroyers and a command ship based at Bahrain. Some additional prepositioning has occurred on the GCC states. Noteworthy, two Army brigades of heavy armor on prepositioning ships based in the Persian Gulf compliment the Marine MPS brigade in Diego Garcia. USN carrier battle groups (CBGs) operate intermittently in the Indian Ocean from either Japan or the Mediterranean.

The South Asian Military Balance

India continues a major conventional force modernization program through substantial collaboration with Russia, which included the sale of the SA-12B GIANT anti-tactical missile system. Some programs have been cut back to fund the overt and growing nuclear weapons program.

In the summer of 1994, U.S. intelligence detected the beginning of the construction of silos for the Agni II ICBM. At this point in time, four silos appear to be operational with another twelve still under construction. U.S. intelligence has concluded that by the end of 1995, India had an operational nuclear arsenal of 75 200-kiloton boosted fission bombs which could be delivered by SU-24 or TU-26. An additional 25 50-kiloton warheads are estimated to be carried on the Prithvi II, a 900 kilometer range ground mobile SRBM.

India’s fissile material production capability is estimated to be at around 30 bombs per year. U.S. intelligence has evidence that the Indians had conducted very sophisticated design tests of a two stage thermonuclear weapon (using Japanese parallel processing super computers).

Pakistan has been having considerable difficulty in modernizing its conventional forces with first line equipment, in many cases settling for hybrid designs. This pressure insured wide support within the Pakistan military for their nuclear weapon program. By 1996, U.S. intelligence estimated that the Pakistanis had produced 20 50-kiloton boosted fission bombs for delivery by F-16s or the new Chinese B-7 supersonic bomber. 20 50-kiloton weapons were also estimated to be available for the HATF IIIB, a 600 kilometer range ground mobile SRBM.

Flight testing of the Chinese-designed solid propellant IRBM continued with active Iranian financial and technical support. U.S. intelligence hinted that the Chinese might have provided Pakistan with the design of a 200 kiloton boosted warhead for this weapon. By 1995, testing had ended with first evidence of field deployment in Pakistan during the early winter of 1996.
SITUATION REPORT (cont.)

The Crisis

At a July Fourth diplomatic party, the U.S. Secretary of State was approached by the Indian ambassador, who expressed grave concern about the deteriorating situation in South Asia. He requested that the U.S. receive the new Indian Chief of Staff as soon as possible for the expressed purpose of presenting a number of “new and unprecedented” procurement and military cooperation proposals. The Indian ambassador concluded the meeting with the remark that “America must become decisively engaged to tamp down the embers of war.”

During the second week of July, renewed violence occurred in Kashmir and Punjab. During a televised news conference, the Indian Prime Minister formally charged Pakistan with complicity and dramatically revealed evidence from several arms caches seized during the previous week. This news conference created a sensation within the Indian Parliament (Lok Sabha) with many members of the BJP calling for a “final solution” to the Pakistani military threat.

After an intense interagency debate, the Secretary of Defense gained approval to extend an invitation to the Indian Chief of Staff to visit Washington during the last week of July for extensive discussions on future purchases of advanced U.S. military equipment.

During the second week of July, the Indian Army announced that it was going to conduct “a very large” combined armed exercise, DESERT DRUM, in the Indian Desert and the Rann of Kutch during September. Simultaneously, the Indian Navy and Air Force announced that both services would conduct the “largest” air-naval exercise, GOLDEN EAGLE, off the west coast of India during August.

This announcement was promptly denounced by the Pakistani government as an “act of intimidation and aggression” by a government which was “losing its head to fantasies of Hindu imperialism.”

Simultaneously in Beijing, a senior foreign ministry spokesperson announced that a major military delegation would fly to Islamabad for “consultations” with the Pakistani High Command. In the July 17th daily briefing, the National Intelligence Community noted evidence that an Iranian military delegation would arrive in Pakistan a day after the arrival of the Chinese military delegation. The intelligence report concluded that the focus of the trilateral discussion was accelerated deployment of the new 3000 kilometer range IRBM, designated as the “HATF III.” There was now wide consensus within the intelligence community that this missile was a clone of the CSS-12, which had been detected in operational sites in both western and eastern China during the fall of 1995.

By the third week of July, widespread urban warfare had resumed in Amritsar, the capital of Punjab. There was a renewed outbreak of violence in southern India when a Tamil liberation cell attacked a local passenger train and caused a major loss of life.

The Indian Chief of Staff began his meeting with the Secretary of Defense on July 25th with an opening statement which highlighted the common geostrategic interests of India and the United States and their commitment to “democracy and the rule of law.” As expected, the Indian Chief of Staff made a formal request that the United States sell India three Pave Paw class radars to provide “warning of a possible Pakistani and/or Chinese missile attack.”

The second request was for technological assistance to upgrade the Russian designed SA-12Bs to deal with possible follow-ons to the new Pakistani HATF III. The Indian delegation provided a surprisingly detailed appreciation of the technical capabilities of the HATF III and gave emphasis to its high accuracy as a “dangerous counterforce” weapon but expressed confidence in the effectiveness of the SA-12B as a defense of their “strategic weapon” bases.

The larger formal presentations were followed by a private meeting between the Indian Chief of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. During this meeting, the Indian General dropped a “diplomatic bombshell.” He proposed that negotiations begin between India and the United States for a bilateral defense treaty. During this presentation, the Chief of Staff made a passionate plea that the United States, India, and Russia must stand together to resist the rise of an Islamic global threat to peace.
aided by Chinese great power chauvinism." He concluded with the ominous note that "India was prepared to take decisive action if the international community remained indifferent to India's legitimate security concerns."

That afternoon, the Indian Ambassador in a previously arranged meeting with the Secretary of State made a demarche, which restated in more formal language the Chief of Staff's proposal for a bilateral mutual defense agreement which would include:

- A joint Indian-U.S. defense planning council
- A willingness to greatly expand aerospace industrial ties
- A commitment to join the U.S. proposed multilateral nuclear negotiations - accepting the Russian position that all "third party" nuclear armed states should accept a ceiling which was a ratio of the limits placed on Russian and U.S. arsenals
- A willingness to sign a no-first-use pledge to be formally sanctioned by the UNSC

In response to the Secretary of State's question as to "what is the rush?" the Indian ambassador restated the warning of the Indian Chief of Staff that "time was running out for peace in South Asia without decisive action by the great powers, the United States and Russia."

That evening, the Russian Ambassador approached the National Security Advisor. During a private meeting, the Ambassador strongly endorsed the Indian proposal. He concluded the discussion by handing over a private letter from the President of the Federation of Russia to the President. In that letter, the President of Russia called for a "new era in U.S. and Russian political military relations."

On July 28, 1996, Pakistan launched two HATF III IRBMs to their full 3000 kilometer range. Both re-entry vehicles were recovered by a mixed fleet of Pakistani and Iranian research vessels. U.S. reconnaissance aircraft monitored splash-down activity. During a low level pass, a USN P-3 staged from Diego Garcia had a near miss with a Pakistani helicopter which was part of the recovery operation. That afternoon, the Pakistani government lodged a formal protest with the United States that "U.S. air activity had endangered a Pakistani aircraft." U.S. intelligence confirmed that there was a substantial Chinese military and scientific presence at both the launch site and on the recovery fleet.

On August 2, the Chief of Staff of the Pakistani Army announced that a "very large" combined arms exercise would take place during September. The date was not specified, although it was widely understood by the diplomatic community in Pakistan that the exercise would parallel the Indian exercise in time and location.

On August 3, the U.S. Ambassador to Beijing was called to the office of the Chinese Secretary of State on a matter of "grave urgency." In the ensuing memcon to Washington, the U.S. Ambassador relayed Beijing's alarm about "credible reports from India and Japan" that the United States was considering greatly expanded political-military ties with India and Russia. Such a move would be considered by Beijing as a "very dangerous act which would only encourage the militarists in New Delhi to ignite a terrible conflict in South Asia." The Chinese Secretary concluded that "China would not stand idly by if India threatened the national existence of Pakistan."
### STEP ONE: The Day Of...

#### INSTRUCTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How to Proceed</th>
<th>Decisions to Be Made</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. In STEP ONE you will have a total of 60 minutes to deliberate and reach decisions.</td>
<td><strong>I. U.S. Policy Issues and Options</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Keep in mind that you are in the role of a top advisor to the President of the United States (e.g. a cabinet- or sub-cabinet level official) and a participant in a meeting that can be viewed as akin to a meeting of National Security Council principals (minus the President) and key staff - preparing for a later formal NSC meeting with the President.</td>
<td>The NSC staff-led working group believes that the U.S. will likely want to consider policy issues and options in the following general issue areas:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. At the beginning of STEP ONE you will be given a few minutes to quickly review the Scenario, these Instructions, and the Draft Memo for the President below.</td>
<td>• Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The Chair will then lead a discussion that moves through the tasking described in the Decisions to Be Made section. (The Chair should ask one participant to serve as the group's Secretary.) The group will make two kinds of decisions:</td>
<td>• Diplomatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Modifications to the Draft Memo for the President.</td>
<td>• Domestic Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Recommendations to the President on specific options to select for each of the issues discussed.</td>
<td>• Declaratory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. It is recommended that the Chair begin by asking the participants in her/his group to very briefly give their individual perspectives on the situation.</td>
<td>The Draft Memo for the President on the following pages provides an initial set of policy issues and options in the above four areas. Under the guidance of the Chair, the group should discuss and modify this draft &quot;policy options paper.&quot; The objective is to produce a final draft that is:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. When the time for STEP ONE is up, the group should record its final decisions on the &quot;STEP ONE Draft Memo for the President.&quot;</td>
<td>• Well-structured and concise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. As part of the discussion of STEP ONE, the Chair of each group will be asked to summarize and explain the group's decisions. The total time period allotted for these presentations is ten minutes. Each Chair should adjust the length of her/his remarks accordingly.</td>
<td>• Complete in the sense of attempting to set forth only those decisions which the President must now make.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>After an initial review of the memo the group should discuss whether there are other issues on which the President should at this point make decisions - and modify the Draft Memo for the President accordingly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>2. Recommendations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>When you have settled on the list of key issues and options to go forward to the President, you should attempt to reach consensus on a recommendation to the President on each issue. If a consensus cannot be reached, vote on the options and record the vote.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**STEP ONE: The Day Of...**

**Draft Memo for the President**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Security Council</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 August 1996</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** The President  
**FROM:** The National Security Advisor  
**SUBJECT:** NSC Meeting on the Situation in South Asia

You are aware of the deteriorating situation in South Asia and the increasing pressure on the United States to get involved. The purpose of this NSC Meeting is to decide how best to deal with this challenging political-military situation.

**OBJECTIVES**

Since the end of the Afghan war and the tumultuous political events that followed in the former Soviet Union, our long-term objectives in South Asia could be characterized as very broad and general. We have sought to insure that no nation - India is the obvious concern - gains political-military hegemony in the region. In this context we have made an effort to be a constructive force to sustain the peace between India and Pakistan, have sought some restraint in the sale of modern military equipment to those nations, and have attempted to bring both countries into the Non-Proliferation Treaty framework. But we do not have much leverage with either nation and so far we have not justified any of our defense budget on strong commitments of any kind in the region.

The Indians (and Russians) are clearly asking us to change that posture - with obvious long-term implications. In responding to this initiative, we have to ask ourselves whether there might be higher order principles or objectives that are at stake here and now because of the possibility that an Indian-Pakistani war might go nuclear. This basic question - whether "nuclear peace is indivisible" such that the breaking of the unspoken but virtual taboo on nuclear use is everyone's business - will be a fundamental element in the NSC deliberations.

Our principal near-term objective in the current situation would appear to be to keep the two nations from going to war. Of greatest concern in this regard is the thinly-veiled Indian threat to take out - or better, to attempt to take out - the Pakistani nuclear capability.
DIPLOMATIC ISSUES

The diplomatic situation in South Asia is now rapidly becoming complex. The Indians have passed us a "time is running out - let's get together" message; the Pakistanis and Chinese are responding with diplomatic initiatives of their own. The basic diplomatic question we now face is whether to get aggressively involved in the situation and, if so, to what end and how.

An important aspect of the crisis that is now growing is the question of whether either party might be tempted to launch a first strike against the other. In terms of the prospects for a Pakistani attack on India, such a move seems highly unlikely. By our calculations a Pakistani nuclear attack would only be able to kill a fraction of the Indian nuclear force. But do the Pakistani calculations produce the same outcome?

An Indian attack on Pakistan is of much greater concern, especially in consideration of their ominous "time is running out" message. Based on the uncertainties in our own calculations of the outcome of a preemptive Indian attack on the Pakistani nuclear force, the Indians might well conclude - rightly or wrongly (and in a situation where the only true test is the doing) - that they could preempt successfully against the Paki nuclear forces. In fact they might conclude that independent of how well they would do today in such an attack, the situation could be far worse in a few years as the nuclear arms race in South Asia gains further momentum - or maybe not. Clearly we are in a situation where there is a great danger of miscalculation on both sides.

While we deal with the urgency of the Indian-Pakistani situation, we might also ask ourselves whether we should move at this time on the larger issue of further numerical restrictions on the size of our own nuclear arsenal and those of Russia, Britain, France, and China. This relates to the broad issue of whether such reductions might help to meet an overall global goal of moving away from a reliance on nuclear weapons for security.

The diplomatic issues that must be decided now are:

1. Should we become actively engaged in the crisis in South Asia and if so to what end?

   _____ A. No
   _____ B. Yes. Become actively engaged as a mediator.
   _____ C. Yes. Move toward increased military cooperation with India.
   _____ D. ___________________________
2. What should our diplomatic position be with respect to India?
   ______ A. Encourage them to exercise restraint and indicate that U.S.-Indian cooperation is a distinct possibility.
   ______ B. Quietly give them a green light to "solve the Pakistani problem" once and for all but only if they are assured of genuine success.
   ______ C. ________________________________
   ______ D. ________________________________

3. What should our diplomatic position be with respect to Pakistan?
   ______ A. Inform Pakistan that they should have no illusions about being able to carry out a successful preemptive strike against India.
   ______ B. ________________________________
   ______ C. ________________________________

4. What should our diplomatic position be with respect to China?
   ______ A. Tell them to emphasize to Pakistan the futility of attempting a preemptive first strike against India.
   ______ B. ________________________________

5. What should our diplomatic position be with respect to Russia?
   ______ A. ________________________________
   ______ B. ________________________________

6. What should our diplomatic position be with respect to China?
   ______ A. ________________________________
   ______ B. ________________________________
7. If we decide to intervene as mediators, what kind of initiatives might we undertake to defuse the crisis atmosphere and otherwise manage the rivalry in the region?
   A. Confidence building measures
   B. ________________________________

8. What should our diplomatic position be with respect to negotiating further global reductions in nuclear arsenals?
   A. Do nothing on this matter at this time.
   B. Make this subject a major focus of UN Security Council "Perm 5" meetings.
   C. ________________________________

MILITARY ISSUES

The principal pressing military issue in this situation relates to the Indian request for assistance in dealing with the prospect of an attempted Pakistani preemptive strike. While we do not see how the Pakis could conclude that such an attack would be successful, we may want to insure that "analytic outcome" by providing the Indians assistance in upgrading the SA-12B's that they purchased from the Russians. The radar warning system that the Indians have requested would also assist in this regard. It would also provide the Indians with a major step toward the capability to launch under attack - which could also serve to inhibit Pakistani thoughts about a preemptive strike.

On the other hand this same equipment could also play a major role in helping the Indians blunt a Pakistani response to an Indian first strike. We are thus in a position of dealing ourselves into a complex and classic "first strike stability" calculation (with all of the inherent problems of miscalculation, etc. that we can carry forward from our years of analyzing such issues in a U.S.-Soviet context).

While most of our attention will be focused on the question of whether to take sides in this situation or seek to be a constructive mediator, there is also the question of whether we might go beyond mediation and be more of an enforcer - especially in a situation where one of the two sides initiates a nuclear war and we, for moral or long term interest/precedent reasons, decide we would like to quench the conflict. To this end we might ask the State and Defense departments to get together to assess possible contingencies in which we might want to intervene militarily in the region and have some capability to do so.
The military issues that must be decided now are:

1. Should we sell PAVE PAW early warning radars to the Indians?
   - A. Yes
   - B. No

2. Should we assist the Indians in upgrading the SA-12B air defense system?
   - A. Yes
   - B. No

3. Should we ask the Joint Chiefs to assess our ability (possibly acting in concert with others) to militarily quench a Indo-Pakistani nuclear war?
   - A. Yes
   - B. Not at this time

**DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUES**

There is currently no consensus in this country for intimate U.S. involvement in the security issues in South Asia. While we might undertake a major diplomatic initiative in this region without Congressional support, if we are to move in the direction of defense ties with India a major domestic marketing challenge must be faced. In this situation an early meeting with the Congressional leadership may be in order.

The domestic political issue(s) that must be decided now is (are):

1. Should we set up a meeting with the Congressional leadership to discuss the situation in South Asia and the prospect of negotiating a formal defense relationship with India?
   - A. Yes. Should we announce the meeting publicly?
   - B. Not at this time.

2. 

5
DECLARATORY POLICY ISSUES

In the light of the deteriorating situation in South Asia and the prospect that we might undertake major related diplomatic moves, there may soon be pressure to make a clear statement about our stakes and vital interests in the region. On the other hand we may want to hold off on any statement until the path we propose to take in the region is clearer.

The declaratory policy issue to be decided is:

1. Should there be a major policy statement at this time on the situation in South Asia?
   
   _____ A. No
   _____ B. Yes

2. What should be emphasized in a U.S. declaratory policy statement at this time on the South Asian situation and our interests in the region?
   
   _____ Halting further nuclear proliferation
   _____ "Nuclear peace" is indivisible
   _____
   _____
   _____
   _____
   _____
STEP TWO: The Day After...

SITUATION REPORT

The Continuing Crisis

Relations between India and Pakistan continued to deteriorate throughout August and early September. There was much popular media discussion in both countries about a "fourth and decisive war."

On September 9, the Secretary of State sent a formal reply to the Indian demarche of July indicating that the United States was prepared to enter into negotiations about "expanded military-technological ties" without a commitment to a more expansive political-military relationship. The note included a "recommendation" that India take "those steps necessary" to initiate bilateral negotiations with Pakistan on confidence building measures "with a priority on nuclear weapons-matters." The note cited the spiral of implied threats and counterthreats between the two nations, emphasizing the danger in both countries' upcoming simultaneous exercises (now viewed by many as cover for military mobilization by both sides).

On September 12, the President received a direct communication from the Indian Prime Minister expressing "disappointment" at "some aspects" of the U.S. response. Overall, however, the note was conciliatory and contained no threat of imminent Indian military action.

Two days later, Exercise DESERT DRUM began with considerable Indian media fanfare. Simultaneously, the Chief of Staff of the Pakistani Armed Forces announced a massive "all arms exercise," GREEN FLAG, in southern Pakistan. U.S. intelligence noted that Pakistani forces were mobilizing and deploying south of Lahore and east of Multan - traditional invasion routes into Punjab. Overall, U.S. intelligence estimated that both sides had now put over 200,000 troops into the field as part of an apparent mutual game of intimidation and brinkmanship.

On September 17 at noon Indian time, the Indian Prime Minister was slightly wounded in an unsuccessful assassination attempt. However, her teenage daughter and two of her bodyguards were killed in the exchange of gunfire. One of the gunmen remained alive but severely wounded.

Within hours, there were massive demonstrations throughout India which rapidly degenerated into anti-Tamil and anti-Islamic riots. By nightfall, new broadcasts from ITN and CNN reported that Islamic and Tamil enclaves in several Indian cities were under siege with more than 700 people already confirmed dead and thousands more seriously wounded.

At 1900 Pakistani time, the young general who was the Pakistani Prime Minister went on television and denounced the assassination attempt. He appealed for calm in "all of South Asia" but bluntly called on the India government to "protect all of its citizens against lawlessness." He concluded his speech with a warning that Pakistan could be on the verge of a "great trial."

By September 18, U.S. intelligence detected an acceleration of airlift into Pakistan from two Chinese military airfields associated with the shipping of missile systems. That evening, the U.S. Ambassador to Alma Ata reported that the governments of the CTS had refused a request from the Russian government to grant "emergency over flight rights of a military airlift" to India.

At 0300, September 19, the entire western Indian naval fleet, including two aircraft carriers, sorted and headed to position 200 nautical miles southwest of Karachi. By 0600, the entire Pakistani navy began preparing to go to sea.

Throughout the day of the 19th, mobilization of Pakistani and Indian forces continued. In both nations massive demonstrations cheered troop convoys that moved through the cities. One aged European correspondent remarked to his close friend, the U.S. station chief in Rawalpindi, that the Paki send-off reminded him "of the film clips of the crowds in Paris and Berlin in August of 1914."

Late on the 19th U.S. intelligence confirmed that the Chinese were airlifting CSS-12s to Pakistan.

By September 20 there were clear indicators that Pakistani nuclear forces were going into a dispersed posture. Four field sites (a total of 36 launchers - double the previous estimate) for the HATF III were almost immediately identified by photoreconnaissance satellites.
Indian nuclear forces were not yet fully dispersed. Especially noteworthy was the retention in place of all of the Indian Air Force long range SU-24 and TU-26 nuclear bombers at their six main operating bases in central India. However, heightened activity was detected around the Agni IRBM launch site 600 kilometers southeast of Jaipur. SA-12B sites near the bomber bases and the Agni site were on full alert (and were observed receiving reinforcements in the form of Russian PVO personnel and additional electronic equipment).

On the evening of September 21, the Prime Minister of India announced to a cheering Indian Parliament that the surviving gunman had confessed to being a member of a fanatic Islamic group financed by the Pakistani Secret Service. She demanded that Pakistan immediately demobilize its forces “to preserve peace” and pay “proper restitution” for the loss of her daughter’s and bodyguard’s lives.

At 2200 EDT, the Chinese formally called for an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council. Later, the Chinese Ambassador to the UN declared on a late night U.S. news broadcast that India was “spoiling for a fight with Pakistan that would plunge South Asia into a horrible war.”

At 0300 EDT, the U.S. Situation Room received a Hotline message from Moscow informing the President that the Russian Air Force was conducting an airlift of “anti-missile equipment and personnel” from the Russian Far East via Vietnam to India. It requested that the U.S. use its “good offices” to convince Thailand to provide over-flight rights even in the face of Chinese counterpressure.

At 0500 local time, 150 nautical miles off the coast of Karachi the Indian carrier battle group Viraat (ex-British Hermes) encountered three Pakistani destroyers. At 0515, the lead destroyer launched two missiles at a Sea Harrier launched from the Viraat. The Harrier successfully evaded attack and launched a Sea Eagle anti-ship missile which hit the second Pakistani ship through a cloud of chaff. Ten more Sea Harriers were immediately launched from the carrier. A few minutes later the surviving destroyers launched a mixed volley of Chinese and French designed anti-ship missiles at the Indian carrier task force.

Within 30 minutes, all three Pakistani ships had been sunk at the loss of four Harriers, one Indian frigate and a damaged oiler. At 0659 local time, the Indian naval victory turned to disaster when the Viraat was struck by three torpedoes. Two minutes later, the carrier was struck by two cruise missiles launched from a second Pakistani submarine. With its back broken, the Viraat in flames rolled over and sank at 0905 local time. Most Indian aircraft were successfully transferred to the second carrier, the Vikrant (the ex-Russian Baku) but 550 Indian seamen and officers were lost with the Viraat.

Throughout the day, heavy artillery and tank duels occurred across various points of the Indian-Pakistan border. By nightfall, the Indians were launching major probing actions east of Hyderabad and Lahore. There were a number of aerial dogfights in the vicinity of the border but neither side’s air force saw major action. At 1600 the Vikrant launched a 26 Sea Harrier strike against the naval base near Karachi.

At 1700 local time, the Prime Minister of India went on national radio and television and declared that as of 2400 local time, September 20, 1996, India was in a “state of war with the Republic of Pakistan.”

At 0300 local time, September 21, the Indian Army launched a multi-corps attack along the rail line to Hyderabad. To the north another multi-corps offensive pushed east of Multan. Fighting was fierce, but it appeared that the Pakistani ground forces were not holding up well at all. Early reports indicated that the Pakistanis had fallen back several tens of kilometers during the opening hours of combat.

At 0530 local time, U.S. intelligence detected a coded signal to all Pakistani major commands to execute OPERATION THUNDERBOLT.
SITUATION REPORT (cont.)

At 1700 EDT, the National Security Advisor to the President received a urgent phone message from the DCI to “put the senior members of the Emergency Action Group on the video hook-up - that the Warning Staff had concluded that Pakistan was about to conduct nuclear operations!”

At 0645, the two Indian Ocean DSPs detected the launch of 36 HATF IIs from four launch sites. The missiles were launched in two distinct volleys of 18 missiles separated by 90 seconds. Almost simultaneously 70 HATF IIB SRBMs were launched from sites in north and south Pakistan. Other intelligence collectors indicated that an all-out Pakistani air operation was also underway.

At 0657 local time, the nuclear event detection system on the two DSP and the four GPS satellites in view of the region detected 12 atmospheric nuclear detonations with an estimated yield in the 50-70 kiloton range. Six detonations took place over the Indian corps positions east of Multan and six over the Indian forces east of Hyderabad. Within minutes similar yield detonations occurred over the nine Indian air force main operating bases within 300 kilometers from Pakistan.

At 0659 local time, SA-12Bs were launched from defense sites around the Indian bomber and IRBM bases at the first HATF III volley. Within minutes three 200 kiloton detonations were detected at high altitude over central India. At 0703, the Agni IRBM site was hit by three ground burst 200 KT weapons. Three minutes later the six Indian main long range bomber bases were hit with air burst 200 KT detonations. Five minutes later, a 200 KT weapon detonated 60 kilometers over New Delhi. U.S. diplomatic communications promptly went off the air.

During the course of the next 20 minutes, an additional 18 nuclear weapons detonated over Indian field forces and additional key logistic sites and airfields. The Indian Navy escaped damage when a B-7 attempted to attack the carrier battle group and was shot down by a Sea Harrier. On crashing some 20 kilometers north of the battle group, the B-7 detonated (apparently salvage-fused) a 60-80 kiloton weapon.

Within an hour after the last detonation, the U.S. intelligence community issued a “preliminary” conclusion that the Indian national command system was “in complete disarray and unlikely to act for at least two to three hours.” The assessment also indicated that both Indian ground penetrations into Pakistan were now being subjected to encircling ground counterattacks with Pakistan having gained local air superiority over the battlefield.

At 0800 local time, the Prime Minister of Pakistan declared on national radio that all citizens should continue to take precautions against “the increasingly remote possibility” of an Indian nuclear attack. He claimed that he ordered the preemptive attack “to save Pakistan” because of “clear evidence of an imminent Indian nuclear attack.” He concluded with the claim that the Pakistani strike had succeeded even beyond our hopes” and that Pakistan was “on the verge of a great and glorious victory.” On receiving this news, many residents left their shelters in Islamabad to celebrate.

At 0830 local time the eastern hemisphere DSPs detected a single missile launch from the Agni IRBM site. Over the next few minutes eight additional launches were detected from suspected Prithvi SRBM field sites. Ten minutes later 70 kiloton airbursts were detected over six Pakistani main operating bases and the nuclear production facilities at Kahuta and Sihala. At 0846 the headquarters of the Pakistani High Command in Islamabad was the clear ground zero for a 200 kiloton low-altitude airburst.

At 0900 local time, the Pakistani government began transmitting through a seized circuit of the Indian domestic satellite system and commercial short-wave an ultimatum that any further nuclear attacks by India would lead to nuclear retaliation against Indian nuclear power plants.

During a video hook-up with the President, the DCI estimated that India had suffered 80,000 prompt civilian and 40,000 prompt military fatalities. Pakistan’s losses were heavy, 100,000 civilian and 15,000 military dead, but the military advantage had dramatically shifted in Pakistan’s favor. He
highlighted the DIA and CIA estimate that there was a very real chance that the Indian military had suffered a decisive defeat.

The DCI estimated that if the war continued and if Pakistan carried out its threat to attack India’s nuclear reactor infrastructure, India might suffer another 1,000,000 prompt fatalities and another 20,000,000 slow deaths. He went on to say that if India recovered and the war continued, and the nuclear attacks moved to the cities, the number of deaths on the sub-continent “could reach 100,000,000.” In closing, the DCI noted that the Russian air defense personnel associated with the airlift to Indian airbases might have suffered up to 2000 fatalities.

By mid-day the Chinese military had gone to a full war mobilization in Xinkiang and Tibet and all other Chinese forces were rapidly going to higher levels of readiness.

At 0330 EDT, September 21, the White House received a Hotline Message from the President of the Russian Federation which “requested” that the United States join Russia in seeking a UNSC resolution that “guarantees to the world that Pakistan’s nuclear aggression will not stand.” If China vetoed the joint initiative, then Russia and the United States should be prepared to take decisive military action in the very near future to insure that Pakistan was denied the “fruits of a nuclear crime.”
# STEP TWO: The Day After...

## INSTRUCTIONS

### How to Proceed

1. You will have a total of 60 minutes for STEP TWO.

2. It is now 0600 EDT pm on September 21. You are scheduled to meet with the President in two hours to discuss the war in South Asia.

3. At the beginning of the move you will be given approximately ten minutes to quickly read through:
   - These Instructions.
   - A Draft Memo for the President.

4. As soon as it is practical, the Chair of the group will lead a discussion that moves through the tasking described in the Decisions to Be Made section. The group will again make two kinds of decisions:
   - Modifications to the staff-prepared Draft Memo for the President.
   - Recommendations to the President on specific options to select for each of the issues discussed.

   The individual members of the group will also be asked to provide a "personal perspective" on the situation in South Asia and its implications.

5. When the time for STEP TWO is up, you should record your group's final decisions on the "STEP TWO Draft Memo for the President."

6. As part of the discussion of STEP TWO, the Chair of your group will be asked to summarize and explain the group's final decisions and recommendations.

### Decisions to Be Made

#### 1. U.S. Policy Issues and Options

As in the first move, the NSC staff-led working group believes that the U.S. will likely want to consider policy issues and options in at least the following general issue areas:

- Military
- Diplomatic
- Domestic Political
- Declaratory

The staff-prepared Draft Memo for the President provides a recommended set of policy issues and options in the above areas.

Under the guidance of the Chair, the group should discuss and modify this draft "policy options paper" as was done in Step One.

The Chair should set aside five minutes at the end of the move for each member of the group to craft a maximum of three sentences through which they as "an NSC principal" give a personal perspective on the crisis and its implications to the President as he or she prepares to take a set of critical decisions.

#### 2. Recommendations

When the group has settled on the list of issues and options to go forward to the President, you should attempt to reach consensus on a recommendation on each of the issues. If a consensus cannot be reached, vote on the options presented and record the results.
STEP TWO: The Day After...

Draft Memo for the President

National Security Council

21 September 1995
0800 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
FROM: The National Security Advisor
SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on the South Asian War

The NSC meeting on the war in South Asia will begin at 0900. The DCI and the Secretary of Defense will bring updated assessments on the war to the meeting, including updated casualty estimates. (It appears that our earlier estimate of casualties was too low.) This memo will serve to guide discussion at the meeting.

As described below there is a new development on the matter of the prospects for quenching the war with military force. It turns out that we may be able to ascertain the locations of both the Pakistani and Indian operational nuclear arsenals with far greater confidence and accuracy than we previously thought. This will be a major issue for discussion in the hook-up with the Russian Security Council which is now scheduled for 1000 EDT (with the large screen video).

OBJECTIVES

Our immediate objective in South Asia continues to be to stop the war. The prospects for achieving this goal diplomatically appear grim. The recent message from the Russians makes it clear that they are prepared to use force in this situation, at least against the Pakistanis.

The Russian message throws the ‘long-term implications of decisions taken now’ issue down hard in calling on us to join them in punishing Pakistan now for the nuclear attack. This moves us well beyond the regional issues that brought India and Pakistan to war and the allocation of blame for that situation. Is there to be a global taboo on nuclear weapon use punctuated from this point forward in history by extreme punishment imposed now on Pakistan? Or if we could stop the war - by whatever means - could the mere example of the South Asian human tragedy serve to insure that no human suffering of the kind that now faces South Asia will ever again take place?
Because of the extraordinary character of this situation that chance has thrust upon us, I have asked each of the members of the National Security Council to provide in writing a few sentences giving his or her perspective on the decisions you are about to make. Their comments are at the end of this memo.

MILITARY ISSUES

The new development on the military options front is the distinct possibility that we may be able to obtain accurate day-to-day information through a British-Swedish-Pakistani connection on where the remaining Pakistani nuclear forces and nuclear weapons are located. In addition we have been told by one of our scientists that the Russians almost certainly have this same information about the Indians.

The information on the Pakistani program is apparently available through a nuclear industry connection that is highly personal. The British have full confidence in the information. We are told that there are twelve sites in Pakistan that would have to be attacked. The tentative conclusion of our military operations people is that, with Russian help, we could probably take out ten, maybe eleven of the sites with high confidence with conventional weapons. The last one or two sites would likely require nuclear weapons (with some collateral casualties) to gain high confidence in their destruction.

According to our scientific source, the Russians can find out if they need to (through a spy) where the Indian nuclear forces and weapons are located and where the critical command and control nodes are. The number of key sites is apparently low. While the Russians have never acknowledged to us access to this information, they may be willing to get it and use it in the context of a bilateral or multilateral effort to quench the South Asian war. Our military people think that the best operational approach - which may also be the best political approach - would be for us to concentrate our attacks on the Indian sites and for the Russians to do the same for the Pakistani sites. To gain high confidence in nullifying the Pakistani nuclear forces, we would probably have to carry out ICBM attacks on one or possibly two Pakistani facilities.

The military issues that must be decided now are:

1. Should we pursue in earnest the planning for a joint military operation with the Russians against Pakistani and Indian nuclear sites?

   _____ A. Not at this time.

   _____ B. Yes. Place no constraints on the planning; use nuclear weapons if necessary to achieve high effectiveness.

   _____ C. Yes. But confine the planning to conventional operations.
2. __________________________________________________________________________

____ A.
____ B.

3. __________________________________________________________________________

____ A.
____ B.

DIPLOMATIC ISSUES

While it is clear that we do not possess much leverage on the situation in South Asia, the magnitude of the disaster that is unfolding there compels us to do everything we can to halt further nuclear attacks - and halt the war altogether.

If we decide to pursue military action as a means to this end, we will have to decide quickly whether to seek UN Security Council approval for such action. The Russians have suggested that we go together to the UNSC on this matter but the prospect of delay and an eventual Chinese veto of any joint military action is high. They (and possibly also the French) would almost certainly not endorse any action that was restricted to punishing the Pakistanis.

There is also the question of what kind of direct messages we might send to the Indians and Pakistanis.

The diplomatic issues that must be decided now are:

1. Should we take up the issue of military action to quench the South Asian war at the UNSC?
   ____ A. Yes
   ____ B. Not at this time

2. What message might we send at this time to the Pakistanis?

   __________________________________________________________________________

   ___________________________________________

   3
3. What message might we send at this time to the Indians?

4. ________________________________________

   ______ A.

   ______ B.

**DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUES**

There is great concern in the country and the Congress about the situation in South Asia. Whatever decisions you might take on military or diplomatic action will probably require some kind of consultation with the Congress. While some may claim that any U.S. attack on the combatants is an act of war, if we undertake such action jointly, and especially if backed by a UNSC resolution, we probably do not need to seek a formal declaration of war against the parties.

The domestic political issue(s) that must be decided now is(are):

1. Should we arrange consultations with the Congressional leadership at this time?

   ______ A. Yes.

   ______ B. No. Wait until we have reached agreement with the Russians on a course of action.

2. ________________________________________

   ______ A.

   ______ B.
DECLARATORY POLICY ISSUES

In light of the extreme character of the turn of events in South Asia, the American people are waiting for you to make a statement on the situation. They will be looking, as will others around the world, to see where the United States comes down on the issues outlined above. Most importantly, they will be looking to see whether the United States considers the nuclear crisis in South Asia to be fundamental in any way to U.S. long-term interests on the nuclear front. In this vein, the basic declaratory policy issue to be addressed is:

1. What should be the themes of your declaratory policy statement on the South Asian situation?
   •
   •
   •

PERSPECTIVES ON THE CRISIS FROM THE NSC PRINCIPALS
# STEP THREE: The Day Before...

## INSTRUCTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How to Proceed</th>
<th>Decisions to Be Made</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. You will have a total of 40 minutes for STEP THREE (30 min. for deliberations and 10 min. for reporting).</td>
<td><strong>1. U.S. Policy Issues and Options</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The time period is &quot;the day before&quot; nuclear weapon use - more literally the present or the very near future. You are preparing for an NSC meeting with the President on the long-term nuclear proliferation problem. The meeting will give particular attention to those long-term issues related to possible conflict between nuclear-armed nations in a context where the U.S. does not appear to have vital interests at stake.</td>
<td><strong>The staff-prepared Draft Memo for the President provides an initial set of long-term policy issues and options for consideration.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. At the beginning of the move you will be given approximately ten minutes to quickly review:</td>
<td>Under the guidance of the Chair, the group should review this draft &quot;policy options paper,&quot; then expand or otherwise modify it as judged appropriate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• These Instructions.</td>
<td><strong>2. Recommendations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• A Draft Memo for the President.</td>
<td>When the group has settled on the list of issues and options to go forward to the President, the Chair should very briefly attempt to reach consensus on a recommended option on each of the issues. If a consensus cannot be reached quickly, vote on the options presented and record the vote.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. As soon as it is practical, the Chair of the group should lead a discussion that moves through the tasking described in the Decisions to Be Made section. The group will make three kinds of decisions:</td>
<td><strong>• Modifications to the Draft Memo.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Modifications to the Draft Memo.</td>
<td><strong>• Where consensus can be achieved, recommendations to the President on preferred options on specific issues.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Where consensus can be achieved, recommendations to the President on preferred options on specific issues.</td>
<td><strong>5. When the time for STEP THREE is up, you should record your group's final decisions on the STEP THREE Draft Memo.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. When the time for STEP THREE is up, you should record your group's final decisions on the STEP THREE Draft Memo.</td>
<td><strong>6. As part of the discussion of STEP THREE, the Chair of your group will again be asked to summarize the group's conclusions and recommendations.</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
STEP THREE: The Day Before...

Draft Memo for the President

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Security Council</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>xx Xxxxxxber 1992</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President  
FROM: The National Security Advisor  
SUBJECT: Long-Term Nuclear Proliferation Policy

There will be an NSC meeting tomorrow to discuss the long-term nuclear proliferation problem. Special attention will be given to those issues that are called forth when we confront the emergence of nuclear arsenals - and the attendant possibility of nuclear use/war - involving nations or regions where our vital interests as we have traditionally defined them are not at stake. South Asia and the possibility of an Indian-Pakistani nuclear confrontation is the immediate example of concern. As we look to the 21st century and an ever more rapidly maturing nuclear age - possibly stimulated by a strong move away from fossil fuels (a credible legacy of the June 1992 Rio conference) - other examples of mutually antagonistic nations with nuclear weapons or the ability to quickly build them (and who might choose to do so, independent of their NPT status) could easily emerge.

Confronting these kinds of issues demands that we look well beyond the kinds of problems that we face in regions like the Middle East and Northeast Asia where our interests are mature and well-defined. In so doing, it is a more global and fundamental question with which we come face to face (it might well be called "the nuclear asymptote question"). If the START agreement completed in June of 1992 defines the next steady state in the U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear relationship, what is the longer term global goal in terms of the number of countries with nuclear arsenals of what size?

Because of the recent U.S.-Russian success in START, this latter question could well dominate the critical upcoming 1995 NPT Review Conference (moving well beyond and encompassing the expected strong global effort to get a CTB negotiated at or before that conference).

The policy issues set forth below were crafted with the objective of getting to "the heart of" such matters.
1. **India, Pakistan and the NPT**

   If there is to be a serious effort to chart a long-term nuclear future for the planet, it seems almost certain that such an effort will take place in the context of the NPT. With China and France in the process of acceding to the Treaty, the key remaining countries whose accession will be imperative if a global nuclear asymptote is to be achieved are India, Israel, and Pakistan. The initial challenge to be faced in this context is getting India and Pakistan into the NPT. While Israel seems unlikely to be the penultimate nation to subject its nuclear arsenal to multi-lateral limitations, it might be the last nation to do so. In the case of all three of these nations we must be prepared to respond to their offering to enter the NPT but only as nuclear weapon states.

   **Policy Question:** Should the U.S. "spend the capital" and make bringing India and Pakistan into the NPT regime a high U.S. priority?

   - **A.** Yes, without conditions
   - **B.** Yes, but only if they accede as non-nuclear weapon states.
   - **C.** No

   **Policy Question:** What price is the U.S. willing to pay to have India and Pakistan join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states?

   - **A.** Extended nuclear deterrence
   - **B.** U.S. security guarantees
   - **C.** Security guarantees from the UN Security Council
   - **D.** ____________________________

   **Policy Question:** What price is the U.S. willing to pay to have Israel join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state?

   - **A.** Extended nuclear deterrence
   - **B.** U.S. security guarantees
   - **C.** UN security guarantees
   - **D.** ____________________________
2. The NPT Renewal Conference and The Nuclear Asymptote

As indicated above, we can anticipate that the upcoming NPT Renewal Conference will prove a major forum for debating the nuclear future of the planet – especially insofar as the ownership of nuclear arsenals. Are all of those nations in the NPT with acknowledged nuclear arsenals (coincidentally the five permanent members of the UN Security Council) prepared to accept negotiated limits on their nuclear arsenals in the context of a global agreement? Or even more demanding: Is there a real long-term nuclear asymptote which all the nations of the world (including Israel, India, and Pakistan) could subscribe to under a new NPT II? What kind of restrictions on nuclear weapons testing might accompany such an agreement?

If there is to be a serious effort to chart the long-term future of the planet at the 1995 NPT Review conference, our initial preparations will likely focus on the five UN Security Council permanent members - the so-called "Perm 5." A hard look at their nuclear requirements by all Perm 5 members will likely lead to a conclusion that at least some reductions are possible if everyone does it. How low such reductions might go - and what testing constraints would be therein "appropriate" - would be less certain.

Policy Question: What kind of long-term equilibrium or stability points - in terms of nuclear arsenal size - might be explored in the context of an NPT II-type global nuclear arms restriction regime?

______ A.  
______ B.  
______ C.

Policy Question: What would be the key stabilizing mechanisms to strive for in a restrictive "NPT-II" regime with multi-party nuclear arsenal constraints?

______ A. Global monitoring information collection systems
______ B. Global sharing of verification and monitoring technology
______ C. 
______ D. 

3
Policy Question: What limitations on testing would be acceptable in a restrictive "NPT-II" regime with multi-party nuclear arsenal constraints?

_____ A. A mildly restrictive "quota plus threshold" regime
_____ B. A highly restrictive "quota plus threshold" regime
_____ C. A comprehensive test ban after completion of a test program for a new generation of "needs no testing" strategic nuclear weapons.
_____ D. A comprehensive test ban
_____ E. 

4. Dealing with New Nuclear Weapons States

It may simply prove impossible to stop India and Pakistan - and other nations after them - from building nuclear arsenals. If this does happen, we face the question of whether we should provide such countries with the best possible technology (safing/fusing/firing, command and control, attack warning, etc.) to insure that their arsenals are as safe as possible. On the other hand, if countries know that we (or some other nation) is sure to give them such technology, it may encourage them to "go nuclear."

Policy Question: Should we provide nations that acquire nuclear weapons with the wherewithal to make those arsenals as technologically safe as possible?

_____ A. No
_____ B. Yes. Give it all to them.
_____ C. Yes, but only provide them with the following:

______ 1. Safing/Fusing/Firing technology
______ 2. Command and Control technology
______ 3. Early warning systems for detecting missile and bomber attack.
_____ 4. 

4
4. NPT II and the Future of Civilian Nuclear Power

It is increasingly clear that one of the "legacies of Rio," with its strong focus on persuading nations not to industrialize based on fossil fuels, might be a renaissance in fission power. The nuclear power industry is beginning to market aggressively a new generation of presumably much safer nuclear reactors that could well prove the avenue of least resistance for nations that need new power sources. How might such a trend - which could, for example, lead to a situation where in twenty years a hundred nations might possess nuclear power plants and the associated infrastructure (and virtual nuclear arsenals) - affect the effort to forge a more restrictive "NPT II"? It might, for example, generate a consensus on a much more intrusive NPT II inspection regime.

Policy Question: How do we accommodate possible renewed strong growth in fission power in a strategy to control the spread of nuclear arsenals?

1. Launch a crash program to develop alternative power sources.
2. 
3. 
4. 

Policy Question

1. 
2. 
3. 