Peacekeeping and Peacemaking
After the Cold War

Lynn E. Davis

RAND Summer Institute

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This research was supported by RAND using its own research funds.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Davis, Lynn E. (Lynn Etheridge). 1943-
Peacemaking and peacemaking after the Cold War / Lynn E. Davis.
p. cm.
"Supported by RAND-supported Research."
"MR-281-RC."
JX1981.P7D33 1993 341.5’8—dc20 93-24111 CIP

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Published 1993 by RAND
1700 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
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RAND Summer Institute
The first RAND Summer Institute was convened in July and August of 1992. Its overall purpose was threefold: to make conceptual progress on crucial American foreign and domestic policy issues, to help RAND plan future research, and to provide new ideas to the Administration that would be elected in November.

The institute comprised five weeklong workshops that brought together nationally recognized experts from outside RAND and senior analysts from within. They addressed the following topics:

- Science, technology, and U.S. economic competitiveness;
- Peacekeeping and peacemaking after the Cold War;
- Reforming the U.S. health care system;
- Reshaping international economic institutions in the post–Cold War era;
- Alternative federal roles in precollegiate education.

The discussions have been summarized in publications prepared by the workshop leaders.

The RAND Summer Institute was supported by a major grant from Peter S. Bing. Supplemental funding was derived from RAND’s endowment income.
In July 1992, RAND convened a group of outside experts and RAND staff for a weeklong discussion of the problems of peacekeeping and peacemaking in the new world environment brought on by the collapse of Soviet power and the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

To set the stage for the workshop, Dr. Lynn Davis, then RAND's Vice President, Army Research Division, prepared in advance a short paper setting out some major issues for the group's discussions. She also summarized and distributed, before the group convened, participants' responses to a series of questions on the issues she had identified. This was the basis for the week's discussion, which ranged widely over the gamut of problems connected with the topic.

This report represents Dr. Davis' revision of her initial paper, based on the workshop discussions and her subsequent reflection on the issues. The report was basically completed in January 1993 and selectively updated through the beginning of April. It reflects the personal views of Dr. Davis and not those of RAND or the U.S. government. Dr. Davis is currently the Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs.

The author expresses her thanks to Brent Boultinghouse, Paul Steinberg, and Jennifer Taw for their research assistance and help in updating the manuscript.
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This report addresses the challenges of peacekeeping and peacemaking after the Cold War, looking first at recent efforts to keep the peace and then suggesting a multifaceted approach for the future.

**RECENT EFFORTS TO KEEP THE PEACE**

Although the international community successfully cooperated in dealing with Iraq, that situation was fairly unique. As a result, the UN activities employed to disarm Iraq and protect the Shiites and Kurds are less likely to serve as a precedent for future actions. For one thing, these steps constituted interference in Iraq’s internal affairs and thereby undercut the international principle of state sovereignty. In addition, the cost of similar operations is likely to be a major impediment. And more important, even in this case of a defeated aggressor, the United Nations has faced serious obstacles in accomplishing its goals.

Cooperation among the major powers after the Cold War has also made possible numerous UN operations to bring peace to parties weary of conflict. Unfortunately, many of these operations have faced serious obstacles (e.g., Cambodia), and some have not met their initial goals (e.g., the western Sahara). Moreover, these cases of traditional peacekeeping demonstrate that bringing peace to post-Cold War conflicts will require the international community to take on a role in helping build nations and, in the process, carry out such additional activities as monitoring human rights, demobilizing armies, providing administrative services, and setting up democratic institutions.
Today's intrastate conflicts, which center on ethnic and religious groups and are rarely contained within existing state boundaries, make traditional peacekeeping activities problematic yet impossible to avoid. The violence engulfing the former Yugoslavia demonstrates the current problems with peacekeeping and peacemaking. The conflicts grew out of the demands of ethnic and religious groups for autonomy and independence. No plausible political settlement has emerged, and the warring groups have been unwilling to stop fighting short of victory. Traditional peacekeeping operations have proved inadequate. Primarily because of the public outrage at the human suffering and also out of fear of expanding the violence, the major powers have not been able to ignore the fighting. But they have rejected the alternative of using military force to enforce a peace. And so far, the various UN and European Community mediation efforts have failed to end the violence.

In this environment, governments have focused primarily on procedural steps to improve the peacekeeping and peacemaking capabilities of multinational institutions. On the UN side, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, arguing that the United Nations will have no credibility as a guarantor of international peace and security without the capability to apply coercive measures, has proposed creating a call-up system of rapid-deployment forces consisting of up to 30,000 troops to serve as a deterrent and to assure UN members that their interests will be protected. He has also proposed deploying peace-enforcement units in those situations where a cease-fire must be restored and maintained, with member states staffing such units with volunteers and providing them on an on-call basis.

Although Russia enthusiastically supports a permanent UN peacekeeping force and has offered standing military forces, so far the rhetoric of other UN members has exceeded their willingness to take concrete steps. For example, although former President Bush urged "bold steps" to expand peacekeeping and offered to buttress UN peacekeeping forces with logistics, engineering, and intelligence capabilities, he made no new promises of funds and did not endorse any of the Secretary General’s financial proposals. And in its joint response to the Secretary General’s proposals, the European Community endorsed the proposal to deploy peacekeeping troops to
stop fighting from breaking out, including stationing them inside a
country fearing invasion. But only France has offered to provide
2,000 troops to the United Nations within 48 hours.

Sobered by events in the former Yugoslavia, all the security institu-
tions in Europe—NATO, the Conference for Security and Coop-
eration in Europe (CSCE), and the Western European Union
(WEU)—have been given a mandate for peacekeeping. However, the
corruption of the situation in Yugoslavia became an immediate
test of how these institutional commitments would be implemented.
Plans will be needed to coordinate the peacekeeping activities and
operations of the various multilateral organizations, because the
same military forces will often be operating under different institu-
tional umbrellas. In addition, the regional organizations within
Europe need to spell out their relationships and responsibilities with
each other and with the United Nations. More important, the vari-
ous roles of these security institutions in Europe need further defini-
tion.

Given the demands currently being placed on the United Nations,
the UN Secretary General has asked regional organizations outside of
Europe—e.g., the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Organization
of African Unity (OAU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), and the Organization of American States (OAS)—to share
the burden of peacekeeping. Although these organizations have
raised the possibility of helping keep the peace, they face a difficult
set of obstacles, primarily because their members have widely varying
interests and goals. As a result, groups seeking help in promoting
peace tend to turn to the United Nations and to countries outside
their region for help in resolving disputes, not to regional organiza-
tions.

The future role of Japan and Germany in helping keep the peace after
the Cold War emerged as an issue during the Gulf War, when those
countries defrayed the substantial costs of the military operations
but refused to participate in the military operations. The countries
drew their postwar constitutions as the reason for not participating
militarily; their first steps in taking a role in peacekeeping after the
Cold War have been procedural ones.
APPROACHES TO KEEPING THE PEACE

Keeping the peace in the post–Cold War era will be difficult, and the prospects for success are low for conflicts involving ethnic and religious groups. But this is not reason for despair. What is needed is a multifaceted approach to peacekeeping and peacemaking that is integrated with political, economic, and diplomatic measures. The first step is to define the conditions that have been necessary for success in traditional UN peacekeeping operations.

- The international community (the United Nations and/or regional organization) viewed the conflict as being of sufficient concern to intervene, and it was willing to take the risks of introducing military forces and to bear the costs.
- A plausible political settlement to the dispute existed and could be defined in general terms.
- The parties to the conflict were prepared to stop fighting and accept outside help in moving toward that political settlement.
- The international community was essentially neutral as to how the dispute would be resolved, and it was so viewed by the warring parties.
- Military forces had a role that was relevant to achieving the political settlement, e.g., as truce monitors, patrols in demilitarized zones, etc.

For the conflicts in which these conditions for success in past peacekeeping operations are met, the international community should seize the opportunity to play a role in bringing peace.

When these conditions are not met, the focus needs to be primarily on nonmilitary measures. The international community should give priority to gaining respect for its established international norms of behavior, most importantly the assurance of the rights of minorities and the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Arms control still has an important role to play, since cooperative security measures and a reduction in military forces can help build confidence among ethnic groups. Peacemaking operations become the instrument of last resort, because of both their dangers and their difficult operational requirements. But there may be occasions when they will be needed.
So the international community needs to provide for that possibility in advance. The most important step would be for governments to place "volunteer" military forces under UN command.
With the end of the Cold War came expectations for a peaceful world, where the major powers would cooperate in responding to threats to peace and security. In President George Bush’s “new world order,” the United Nations (UN) would fulfill the historic vision of its founders, and freedom and respect for human rights would find a home among all nations.

In its first effort to keep the peace after the Cold War, the international community succeeded in defeating Iraqi aggression. Subsequently, the United Nations took steps to strip Iraq of its nuclear and chemical weapons and is protecting the Kurds and Shiites inside Iraq. Cooperation among the major powers also made possible UN peacekeeping operations in various countries weary of war, such as Angola, El Salvador, and Cambodia.

If regional powers again seek domination through the force of arms, the international community again might have to take actions similar to those it took in Iraq; peacekeeping operations might also be required in countries where warring groups are weary of war. The problem is that most of the conflicts erupting around the world are very different, and the conditions that made the international community’s responses possible and appropriate do not exist.

These conflicts involve violence within states among ethnic and religious groups seeking autonomy and independence. For such conflicts, political solutions upon which to base a peaceful settlement are difficult even to define. The rival groups are often unwilling to stop fighting short of achieving their goals; thus, any outside inter-
vention to bring peace carries high risks and low probabilities of success.

Consequently, governments have been reluctant to become involved, since their vital interests are not at stake. With the end of the ideological rivalries of the Cold War, they no longer have a need to counter the influence of their rivals in the Third World. What they discovered, however, was that some response was required. They could not afford politically to ignore the conflicts, given the human suffering and flows of refugees. But what the character of that response should be was far from clear, and the difficulties they faced are nowhere more vivid than in the former Yugoslavia. Efforts to mediate that conflict have failed, as have embargoes on arms or economic sanctions. Peacekeeping forces have proved inadequate, but enforcing the peace with military forces has raised unacceptable risks.

The primary approach taken by governments has been to focus on procedural steps to improve the peacekeeping and peacemaking capabilities of multinational institutions. They called upon the UN Secretary General to draft a blueprint for “preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peacekeeping.” They added peacekeeping to the mandate of all the security institutions in Europe. They looked for ways for other regional organizations to share the burden of peacekeeping. This focus on procedural changes cannot, however, mask the fact that governments have been willing neither to intervene in the conflicts erupting around the world to enforce a peace nor to give multinational organizations the capabilities and resources to act on their behalf.

In the summer of 1992, RAND brought together policymakers, journalists, and academics in a workshop to address the challenges of peacekeeping and peacemaking after the Cold War. This report is an outgrowth of their discussions, completed in January 1993 and selectively updated through the beginning of April. It is divided into two parts. The first part describes recent efforts to keep the peace. The second part suggests a multifaceted approach for the future.
This chapter begins by examining the international coalition that formed to deal with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. We then turn to some of the other peacekeeping operations after the Cold War in countries like El Salvador and Cambodia, before looking at the growing trend toward intrastate conflicts that make collective military action and traditional peacekeeping operations problematic. The case of Yugoslavia is examined in more detail, focusing on how both the international community and the major powers have responded. Finally, we focus on the procedural steps that governments have taken to keep the peace since the end of the Cold War, looking at efforts by the UN, by regional organizations both inside and outside of Europe, and by Japan and Germany.

IRAQ—UNLIKELY PRECEDENTS FOR THE FUTURE

The international community was successful in its first attempt to keep the peace in the post–Cold War period. Under the umbrella of the United Nations, the United States orchestrated a response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, beginning with economic sanctions and ultimately moving to collective military action.

In this case, the threat to peace and security was clear. Aggression had occurred across international borders, thus violating a cardinal principle of the international community that is enshrined in the UN Charter. In addition, Iraq’s neighbors agreed that Saddam Hussein was a serious threat, and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council put aside their differences, given the obvious threat to the world’s flow of oil. Moreover, Saudi Arabia, Germany, and
Japan were prepared to defray a major part of the very high cost of the military operation. The operation also benefited from several circumstances specific to the theater: the ability to position forces directly offshore, the prepositioning of equipment and the ability to amass troops in Saudi Arabia, and the proximity of support facilities in Europe. The military coalition included forces from the major powers (United States, Britain, France) and from the region (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria). Finally, the United States exerted strong political leadership in forging and keeping the coalition together.

Following Iraq’s defeat, the United Nations undertook unprecedented steps to strip the country of its nuclear and chemical weapons capabilities, while continuing to apply pressure by banning arms sales, embargoing the export of oil, and continuing economic sanctions. The allied forces stopped Saddam Hussein’s attacks against his Kurdish minority in the aftermath of the Gulf War by declaring a no-fly zone above the 36th parallel, and the UN is providing humanitarian relief to Kurds in this region. Since July 1992, the Americans, British, and French, acting under UN Security Council Resolution 688, have set up a no-fly zone to protect the Iraqi Shiites in the south. The effect has been to create de facto protectorates within Iraq. Recently, Saddam Hussein has attempted to test the allies in the southern no-fly zone by violating air space there and by placing anti-aircraft batteries within range of forces patrolling the area. The allies have responded with strikes against the installations and by downing aircraft violating the zone.

Do these responses in Iraq provide models for the international community to follow in reacting to future threats to peace and security? A military coalition like the one that formed to deal with Iraq could be an appropriate response to future acts of aggression across state borders, were states to seek regional domination (e.g., Russia and the Ukraine, North and South Korea, India and Pakistan, the Arabs and Israel). This would almost certainly be the case if these conflicts involved the use of nuclear weapons.

However, the UN activities employed to disarm Iraq and protect the Shiites and Kurds are less likely to serve as precedents. While the international community wants to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Third World countries and to ensure the safety of minority ethnic groups, these steps by the international community consti-
tuted interference in Iraq's internal affairs and thereby undercut the international principle of state sovereignty. Thus, governments are likely to be very reluctant to use the Gulf War as a precedent for these activities. The cost of similar operations is also likely to be a major impediment. More important, even in this case of a defeated aggressor, the United Nations has faced serious obstacles in accomplishing its goals.

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Cooperation among the major powers after the Cold War has also made possible UN operations to bring peace to those parties weary of conflict. For example, since 1988, UN peacekeeping operations have been undertaken in some fifteen countries. These operations have included fact-finding missions, monitoring of border or buffer zones upon the signing of armistice agreements, verification of agreed-upon force disengagements or withdrawals, supervision of the disarming and demobilization of local forces, maintenance of security conditions essential to the conduct of elections, and even the temporary, transitional administration of countries.1

In El Salvador, the United Nations is helping implement the 1991 peace agreement by observing recent elections, monitoring human rights, and arranging for the disbanding of government police forces and the demobilization of rebel military forces. In Angola, the United Nations became involved in monitoring the withdrawal of Cuban troops and has been overseeing the demobilization and cease-fire agreements between the government and the UNITA forces. When UN efforts to prevent the starvation of millions of people in Somalia were thwarted by disputes between local warlords and attacks on relief stations and convoys, an initial deployment of 500 armed Pakistani peacekeepers was raised to 3,000 by the Security Council after a cease-fire agreement was reached. Yet attacks on relief convoys continued, and in early December 1992 the United States and France sent forces in to restore the peace and facilitate the

delivery of aid in response to a request from the Secretary General. In the spring of 1993, the UN Security Council voted to replace the U.S.-led military forces with UN peacekeepers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which permits the UN to disarm local armies. In efforts to bring an end to the bloodshed in Mozambique, a contingent of 21 UN observers arrived there in the autumn of 1992 to monitor the disarmament provisions of a peace agreement reached in October. While the UN's special envoy has been promised a battalion of 1,200 Italian peacekeepers, their deployment has yet to materialize.

After decades of conflict, the international community has intervened to help bring peace to Cambodia through a comprehensive political settlement reached in October 1991. The United Nations was given authority to assume powers of administration in the transitional period, including the responsibility for verifying the withdrawal of foreign forces, for demobilizing approximately 70 percent of all combatants, for repatriating an estimated 350,000 refugees, and for organizing free and fair elections. In addition, the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) has been given sweeping powers to oversee and, if need be, override the actions of key government ministries. The United Nations is pursuing the highly ambitious task of rebuilding a nation and turning it into a democracy. The costs of the operation are estimated at $1.7 billion and will involve some 19,500 troops, military observers, and civilian police.

On the horizon are some more possibilities for traditional peacekeeping operations, where the rival parties wish help in bringing peace. The UN Security Council agreed in the summer of 1992 to send permanent UN observers to South Africa to help its black political organizations and white minority government resume negotiations toward a democratic constitution. The United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) has deployed 60 observers since the autumn of 1992. These observers have been complemented by an additional 40 personnel supplied by the European Community, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and the Organization of African Unity. While the observers are prohibited from mediating disputes, their presence at political gatherings seems to have reduced the likelihood of violence breaking out.
Yet many of these UN peacekeeping activities face serious obstacles. Deep suspicions between government and rival forces have thwarted progress in El Salvador and Angola. In the former, the government’s intransigence in fulfilling its commitment to purge high-ranking defense officials linked by UN studies to human rights violations in the 1980s serves only to deepen these suspicions and slow the demobilization process. In Angola, despite a personal intervention by the Secretary General, major territorial battles have erupted as UNITA forces refuse to accept the results of last autumn’s elections. UNITA, fearing that the Clinton Administration will recognize those election results, in which they were defeated, have been pressing their military campaign. The UN appears to be frustrated by the situation, with the Secretary General recommending that the number of observers there be reduced from 714 to 64 when their original mandate expires.

In Cambodia, the demobilization and cantonment of forces ground to a halt in late October, as the Khmer Rouge refused to participate. Several attacks on Vietnamese settlers have been attributed to the Khmer Rouge, and large sections of the country remain under its control. UN overflights in some regions must be conducted out of range of ground fire. The Khmer Rouge continue to boycott elections scheduled for May 1993, and with large sections of the country still under its control, the prospects for the future remain unclear. Further complicating the situation, UN receipts for the operation are falling far short of assessments.

Not all the UN efforts have met even their initial goals. Having won agreement to a cease-fire in the western Sahara, the United Nations has failed so far in its attempts to hold a referendum on the future of the Spanish territory. And although UN peacekeeping forces in 1988 monitored the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, they have been in no position to prevent the outbreak of fighting among the rebel groups. Finally, a resolution of the conflict in Cyprus between Greek and Turkish Cypriots seems no closer today than in 1964 when the peacekeepers first arrived.

Whether or not these UN peacekeeping operations ultimately succeed, they began by having met certain critical conditions for traditional UN peacekeeping: the major powers agreed that the United Nations should become involved; a plausible political settlement
could be defined, even if its success seemed far from assured; the rival groups were prepared to stop fighting and seek peace; and the United Nations had the capabilities to help, through observers, truce monitors, etc.

What these cases of traditional peacekeeping also demonstrate is that bringing peace to conflicts after the Cold War will require considerably more than putting in UN truce monitors or election observers, as is evident in Angola and Cambodia. The international community will be required to take on a role in helping build nations and, in the process, carry out such additional activities as monitoring human rights, demobilizing armies, providing administrative services, and setting up democratic institutions.

INTRASTATE CONFLICTS

Although situations may arise that require collective military action and traditional peacekeeping operations, the conditions and circumstances that made such activities both possible and appropriate are absent in most of the conflicts now erupting or on the horizon.

These conflicts involve violence among ethnic and religious groups, and rarely are they contained within existing state boundaries. Their primary cause is the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Within the former Soviet Union, Armenia and Azerbaijan are fighting over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh, a conflict that risks drawing in Russia, Iran, and Turkey. Boundary changes and population movements since 1940 have sowed the seeds of ethnic and territorial disputes in Moldova. Russian community leaders declared a Dniester Republic in the eastern part of the republic, while the Moldovan Popular Front aims for a reunification with Romania. The collapse of Soviet power has also encouraged nationalist aspirations in the Ingush and Chechen regions of Southern Russia, as well as in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which had the status of autonomous regions within the former republic of Georgia. Fighting in Tajikistan has killed thousands of people, as the influence of Islamic groups increases.

These conflicts all risk escalation, since many Russian political leaders believe that Russia has a responsibility to protect the interests of ethnic Russians in all the former republics. Russian troops are cur-
rently deployed in the conflicts in Georgia and in Tajikistan. These same Russian leaders are concerned about alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians in the Baltic states. And a serious dispute has arisen between Russia and Ukraine over the status of the Crimea, which was transferred to the Ukraine in 1954 but is where Crimean Tartars wish to resettle and ethnic Russians constitute a majority of the population.

A major civil war encompassing all the former Yugoslavia also remains a serious possibility, with atrocities being committed on all sides. The Serbs have focused their efforts in “ethnic cleansing” in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, with tragic consequences. Fears exist that they will turn next to Kosovo, where ethnic Albanians make up a sizable majority. Serbia may also be tempted to embrace the cause of the Serbian minority in Macedonia, possibly prompting intervention on the part of the Bulgarians. Ethnic Hungarians may be radicalized in Vojvodina. Muslim Slavs throughout the Balkans have been horrified by Serbian atrocities in Yugoslavia and may seek to take their revenge. Turkey is worried about the treatment of ethnic Turks in several Balkan countries. Yet while Serbian atrocities have garnered the most attention, no party to the many conflicts in the former Yugoslavia is totally without blame. As has been true in the past, the Balkans once again harbor many dangerous flash points.

Factional wars are not confined to Europe, and indeed many people around the world view violence as a legitimate means for righting past wrongs and for achieving political, economic, religious, and nationalistic goals. The Polisario nationalist movement seeks independence from Morocco in the Spanish territory of western Sahara. Having fled to the northern mountains of Iraq in the aftermath of the Gulf War, the Kurds are pursuing their fight for independence through rebel attacks in Turkey. Conflict engulfs Peru, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Ethiopia, and now threatens Algeria, South Africa, and Haiti. Nationalism and religious fundamentalism are spreading into the newly independent republics in central Asia, which could draw in Iran, Turkey, and China.

The norm of peaceful change is a long-term goal, not a reality for most of the world. Members of the international community find themselves facing multiple and competing sources of power rather than single, national government entities. If these members want to
pursue peaceful change, they must deal with the dispersion of power to local warlords or strongmen, who may tenuously control some territory and may have only very incomplete support from the people they claim to represent. The rivalries in many cases also have deep historical and emotional roots.

Most important for keeping the peace are the goals of the warring parties. What they have in common is the search for political autonomy and in many cases independence. But all the claims for self-determination cannot be honored without bringing chaos to the international community. For many of these conflicts, it will be difficult even to define the characteristics of a political settlement, much less gain the agreement of the warring parties. Yet these parties show no willingness to stop fighting short of victory. Any intervention by the international community could well expand the conflict, or make its resolution more difficult. Since such intervention would certainly involve dangers and risks, and since the prospects of success would be extremely low, the international community is clearly wary of involvement.

Under these circumstances, governments and the international community as a whole have sought to stand aside. They saw no vital interests at stake worth the costs of intervention. With the end of the ideological rivalries of the Cold War, they no longer had a need to counter the influence of their rivals in the Third World. The problem was that they could not afford simply to ignore these intrastate conflicts, for they raised some very serious concerns.

Human suffering, along with the denial of human rights, is the most immediate concern, especially given the attention of the media. The suffering gives rise to public pressures for outside intervention and inflames passions, as graphic details of the atrocities filter beyond the local conflict. And such human suffering all too often induces flows of refugees, which create additional concerns for countries. For one thing, these refugees place demands on limited financial resources and can provoke domestic opposition to their assimilation. Moreover, when the refugees flee to countries with few resources, international relief efforts become necessary. Finally, refugee flows may upset already fragile ethnic balances and sow the seeds for future conflicts. More serious concerns arise when conflicts threaten to escalate by expanding to include more groups, by spilling over
into neighboring areas, and by drawing in the international community.

Then there is the risk that if ethnic groups are successful in such conflicts or if the international community fails to respond, it will create a climate in which violence becomes an acceptable form of resolving disputes. Such a development could threaten the legitimacy of international and regional institutions and undermine international norms of behavior. And while individual conflicts are not of great significance to Europe and the United States, cumulatively they might be. It is difficult to imagine a secure and prosperous Europe surrounded by fighting, turmoil, and instability. Ultimately, the rise of ethnic, religious, and ideological rivalries raises dangers associated with a breakdown of the international order.

What governments discovered was that they had to find a response to the intrastate conflicts erupting around the world.

THE CASE OF YUGOSLAVIA

Events in the former Yugoslavia demonstrate the difficulties that outsiders encounter in crafting a response to ethnic and religious conflicts.

Response by the International Community

Once a federal solution disappeared in 1991, no new structure of states emerged, as Serbs in Croatia seized large tracts of territory. After a series of mediating efforts by the European Community and the United Nations, a fragile peace came to Croatia, and UN peace-keeping forces in their traditional role were deployed in the spring of 1992 to monitor the cease-fire. For the Serbs, the United Nations appeared as the means for keeping their enclaves in Croatia, and for the Croats, the United Nations became their only means of regaining lost territories. But this peacekeeping force, numbering 14,000 military personnel, has been unable to disband the Serbian paramilitary force. It could not prevent further Serbian ethnic cleansing. And it was in no position to prevent the spread of violence to Bosnia-Herzegovina, where fighting broke out in the spring of 1992 among Muslim Slavs, Croats, and Serbs.
The international community first called for a cease-fire in the republic and a withdrawal of all foreign forces. With Belgrade’s failure to comply, the United Nations imposed economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, which included establishing a trade embargo and closing its airspace. The violence continued. Next, it undertook to provide humanitarian relief to the people of Sarajevo. Continued shelling made it difficult to bring in supplies by air, so a decision was needed on whether to introduce military forces to ensure the supply of aid and stop the fighting.

In July 1992, the Security Council increased the number of UN troops authorized to operate in Bosnia to 1,600; in the Summit of the G-7 in early July, the members agreed that increased humanitarian assistance was needed and that if road access to Sarajevo could not be guaranteed, the Security Council should not exclude military means to ensure the success of the relief effort. In August, the United Nations authorized the use of force to protect relief convoys to Sarajevo and elsewhere in Bosnia, but it was not until September that the Security Council approved a major expansion of UN peacekeeping forces in Bosnia to protect the relief convoys and the Muslims and Croats recently released from Serbian detention camps. The UN force, numbering some 6,000, is drawn from Britain, France, Spain, and Canada. It was envisioned that this force would open up roads, remove mines, protect aid-storage facilities, and escort relief convoys. The United Nations expanded the force’s right of self-defense, giving commanders discretion to fire at combatants preventing the peacekeeping forces from carrying out their mission. Yet armed Serbian militia have largely thwarted these efforts, keeping many thoroughfares closed and appropriating at will from relief convoys destined for besieged regions. UN troops thus far have been hesitant to engage in actions that would portray them as partisans in the struggle.

In addition, the agreements signed at the London peace conference in August 1992 envisage sending many more observers from the European Community to Bosnia’s borders to stem the flow of weapons into the republic. In Geneva, where talks are under way among all the parties to the Yugoslav dispute, the European Community is also attempting to have all heavy weapons placed under UN supervision. The UN Security Council in October 1992 took the further step of imposing a no-fly zone over Bosnia to prevent
Serbian aircraft from attacking Muslim and Croat militia. But at the urging of Britain and France, who argued that any military response would further endanger their peacekeeping forces, the Security Council did not at that time provide for the enforcement of the zone in its resolution. It did, however, call for transferring all Bosnian Serb combat aircraft to UN-monitored airfields.

In November, NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) agreed to enforce a full naval blockade of the “rump” Yugoslavia to force compliance with the UN’s trade sanctions against the country. In December, the Security Council took the unprecedented step of authorizing the deployment of 700 peacekeeping troops and an additional 100-plus observers, police, and staff to Macedonia as a preventive deployment.

These various actions by the international community have failed to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia. The human suffering has been nothing short of tragic, and the outpouring of refugees is placing serious economic and political burdens on all the European countries. But the Security Council is seeking to avoid steps that would cross the line from ensuring humanitarian relief to enforcing a peace. At the same time, the activities sanctioned increasingly make any such distinction difficult to maintain in practice.

Response by Major Powers

The major powers have differed over how to respond to events in the former Yugoslavia. Unlike it did in the Gulf War, the United States has not taken an active and strong leadership role. Having failed to keep Yugoslavia together, the United States deferred to the European Community in its efforts to mediate the various disputes. The Bush Administration was extremely reluctant to use military force even to ensure the supply of humanitarian aid in Bosnia. Some commentators worried in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War that the United States, as the single world superpower, would be tempted to imperial aggrandizement or to take on the responsibility as the world’s policeman. This has certainly not happened.

In February 1993, the Clinton Administration defined its policies toward the former Yugoslavia. They included active American diplomacy through the Vance-Owen negotiations to bring peace to
Bosnia, a tightening of the enforcement of economic sanctions, enforcement of the no-fly zone, and a U.S. commitment to share in the implementation of an agreement acceptable to all parties. The major obstacle to peace remained the Bosnian Serbs, whose goals were better served by fighting than by diplomacy. The U.S. military services are very reluctant to engage in peacekeeping or peacemaking operations. They view these operations as a distraction from their primary mission to train and prepare for combat. And the nature of the conflicts in which U.S. military forces would be introduced make it unlikely that they could be confident of success and able to avoid casualties. These are two of the critical criteria for employing American forces, defined in the 1980s by then Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and now clearly part of the American military's ethos.

The response of the European Community to events in the former Yugoslavia (as well as to other conflicts) has demonstrated the continuing strains and differences among its members. A common foreign policy is far from a reality. Germany took the initiative early to recognize Slovenia and Croatia. France has been the most willing to commit military forces to UN peacekeeping operations in providing humanitarian aid in Bosnia. The United Kingdom has been hesitant, although the government is now planning on participating in these operations. Germany and Italy have been understandably reluctant to become involved, given the history of their actions in the Balkans. What the European Community did accomplish was to keep its members from outwardly supporting the rival factions, in contrast to what happened prior to the outbreak of World War I.

For both the international community and governments, the violence engulfing the former Yugoslavia has demonstrated the problems of peacekeeping and peacemaking after the Cold War. The conflicts grew out of the demands of ethnic and religious groups for autonomy and independence. The deep-rooted hatreds have made compromise impossible. No plausible political settlement has emerged, and the warring groups have been unwilling to stop fighting short of victory. Traditional peacekeeping operations have proved inadequate. Primarily because of the public outrage at the human suffering and also because they fear an expansion of the violence, the major powers have not been able to ignore the fighting. But they have rejected the alternative of using military force to en-
force a peace. And so far peace has not come as a result of the vari-
ous UN and European Community mediation efforts.

PROCEDURAL RESPONSES TO KEEPING THE PEACE

The primary approach governments have taken to keep the peace
since the end of the Cold War has been to focus on procedural steps
to improve the peacekeeping and peacemaking capabilities of multi-
national institutions. Germany and Japan have also begun to remove
their constitutional barriers to involvement in peacekeeping opera-
tions.

United Nations

Members of the United Nations Security Council in January 1992 re-
iterated their commitment to the “collective security system of the
Charter to deal with threats to peace and to reverse acts of aggres-
sion” and called upon the Secretary General to prepare his recom-
mendations “on ways of strengthening and making more efficient . . .
the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for
peacemaking and for peacekeeping.” Secretary General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali in June 1992 provided his response in a report entitled
An Agenda for Peace, setting forth his vision of future UN responsi-
bilities in the promotion of international peace and security.

The Secretary General’s central argument is that the United Nations
will not have credibility as a guarantor of international peace and se-
curity without the capability to apply coercive measures. He there-
fore proposes that the special agreements foreseen in Article 43 of
the Charter must be activated through negotiations,

whereby Member States undertake to make armed forces, assis-
tance and facilities available to the Security Council for the pur-
poses stated in Article 42, not only on an ad hoc basis, but on a
permanent basis.

Specifically, Boutros-Ghali suggests creating a call-up system of
rapid-deployment forces consisting of up to 30,000 troops. The
Secretary General acknowledges that such forces may not be suffi-
ciently large or well-equipped to counter a major army with sophisti-
icated weaponry, but argues that they would be effective for threats posed by military forces of a lesser order. This is consistent with what the most likely threats will be, given the nature of the conflicts erupting around the world. The rapid-deployment forces would serve as a deterrent and would also provide some assurance to UN members generally that the United Nations would protect their interests. The problem is that such a limited force is being viewed by smaller states as appropriate only to police them.

Boutros-Ghali also recommends that the United Nations deploy peace-enforcement units in those situations where a cease-fire must be restored and maintained. Member states would develop such units from volunteers and provide them on an on-call basis. These units would be more heavily armed and extensively trained than their peacekeeping counterparts. He submits that such units are authorized as a provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter and differentiates between them and either peacekeeping forces or the forces that can be constituted under Article 43 to deal with acts of aggression.

At the same time, the Secretary General recognized that the United Nations cannot carry out future peacekeeping and peacemaking operations without changes in its own organization. He has begun to reorganize the UN Secretariat and streamline UN operations by eliminating high-level positions, merging several departments, and revamping the chain of command. He has reconstituted the Secretariat with foreign/regional desks and is consolidating and upgrading the UN presence internationally with the development of UN political offices. But these are just first steps in what needs to be done if the United Nations is to play a major role in helping keep the peace. Interactions between the UN Secretariat and member governments are not satisfactory. The staff is composed primarily of diplomats without managerial skills. In addition, the United Nations lacks individuals with expertise in planning and implementing peacekeeping operations. Those working in the field are not well linked with UN Headquarters.

\[2\]In his Agenda for Peace, the Secretary General uses the term "peacemaking" to include actions to bring hostile parties to agreement, whereas most use it as synonymous with peace enforcement.
But the most serious problem facing the United Nations is its precarious financial situation. Many countries are behind in their UN payments, with arrearages totaling about $500 million. Of this, U.S. outstanding obligations account for slightly less than half. The costs of its peacekeeping operations over the past year have put the United Nations on the verge of bankruptcy. The peacekeeping bills for the 1992–1993 biennial period are estimated to be $4 billion. The United States paid a substantial share of its back dues in 1992, but it still owes $81 million for special peacekeeping assessments, roughly 12 percent of the outstanding $671 million total.4

The United Nations also lacks financial-management capabilities. It suffers from a complex budget/financing system based on obligatory funding. It does not use standardized cost factors or rely on independent audits. But because financing for the United Nations is a political, not financial, problem, addressing even such simple problems becomes difficult. The Secretary General has called for some basic changes:

- Financing peacekeeping operations through defense budgets.
- Charging interest on late payments.
- Increasing the working capital fund by about 25 percent.
- Developing a $50 million peacekeeping reserve fund to mount new peacekeeping operations quickly, and a $1 billion endowment fund.
- Obtaining payment of some percentage of estimated peacekeeping costs up front.

3The "regular scale of assessment" for financing the UN budget is essentially based on adjusted national income, with a ceiling rate (25 percent) paid by the United States. Since 1973, funding for peacekeeping operations has been carried out under a separate scale of assessment. Member states are divided into four groups, with the five permanent members paying proportionally more, on the argument that they wield greater influence over Security Council decisions. The U.S. share is roughly 30 percent.

4Arrearages are as of December 31, 1992. Note that the 1992 arrearages include assessments made in November for UN operations in Mozambique. Figures are from Funding UN Peacekeeping, a report prepared for the Triilateral Commission by Enid Schoettle. The 1992–1993 peacekeeping budget projection is from the United Nations.
• Raising an endowment fund, independent of member-state governments.
• Receiving authorization to borrow commercially.
• Taxing international airline travel.
• Receiving special drawing rights from the International Monetary Fund.

Russia is an enthusiastic supporter of the idea of a permanent UN peacekeeping force and has offered standing military forces. In his address to the UN General Assembly in the autumn of 1992, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev called for installing hotlines between the major capitals and UN Headquarters. He proposed regular intelligence briefings to the Secretary General and promised that Russia would pay back some $130 million of what it owed the United Nations.

But so far the rhetoric of the other UN members has far exceeded their willingness to take concrete steps. While the members have endorsed the goals of the Secretary General’s Agenda for Peace, they have not been willing to provide additional resources or give the Security Council its own military forces to help keep the peace.

In his address to the General Assembly in September 1992, President Bush urged “bold steps” to expand peacekeeping, and he offered to buttress UN peacekeeping forces with logistics, engineering, and intelligence capabilities. The United States is prepared to help train such units and will conduct joint exercises with UN forces. But President Bush was careful to note that “member states, as always, must retain the final decision on the use of their troops.” He was not prepared to contribute volunteers to standby forces, or to keep troops on call for emergency peacekeeping operations. He promised to “review how we fund peacekeeping and explore new ways to ensure adequate American financial support.” But he made no new promises of funds and did not endorse any of the Secretary General’s financial proposals.

In its joint response to the Secretary General’s proposals, the European Community focused on the need for preventive diplomacy and efforts to stop wars before they break out. The European Community backed the Secretary General’s proposals to make greater use
of his authority under Article 99 to bring any matter before the Security Council as a means of mediating disputes. The European Community also endorsed the proposal to deploy peacekeeping troops to stop fighting from breaking out, including stationing them inside a country fearing invasion. But it warned of the difficulties associated with the timing of the dispatch of such a force. It also supported wider deployment of monitors in tense situations, and it agreed to discuss designating specific military units on a standby basis for peacekeeping duties. Only France has offered to provide, within 48 hours, 2,000 troops to the United Nations.

Following these responses, the Security Council asked member nations simply to "loan military and civilian specialists to the United Nations to help it create a long term peacekeeping plan."

**Regional Organizations—Europe**

Sobered by events in the former Yugoslavia, all the security institutions in Europe have been given a mandate for peacekeeping. NATO agreed in June 1992 to make its resources available to the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) for peacekeeping purposes. NATO also expanded the geographic area in which it would be prepared to respond to future crises to include areas where the conflicts are actually occurring. The territories of the members of the CSCE, from Vancouver to Vladivostok, will now be within NATO's area of interest.

The nations of the Western European Union (WEU) agreed a few weeks later to make military forces available for conflict prevention, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, or "tasks of combat forces in crisis management." The WEU defined its potential roles broadly to include peacemaking operations as well as responses to threats outside of Europe. Left unclear in the WEU declaration was whether the peacekeeping forces could be used to carry out missions under its own umbrella or only in response to requests from the United Nations or the CSCE.

The CSCE followed in July 1992 by agreeing to become a formal "regional arrangement" under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, whereby it could contribute military forces from the WEU and NATO for peacekeeping operations where the conflict is within and among
its members. However, it clearly stated that any such operations required the consent of the parties directly concerned. The CSCE was also careful to limit its responsibility to the peaceful settlement of disputes, leaving to the UN Security Council responsibility for decisions on enforcing the peace. The CSCE members also took steps to strengthen respect for minority rights and to peacefully resolve disputes, established a High Commissioner on National Minorities, and expanded the capabilities of CSCE institutions to provide for crisis management, conflict prevention, and mediation.

The deterioration of the situation in Yugoslavia became an immediate test of how these institutional commitments would be implemented. To monitor the economic embargo against Serbia, the WEU sent six ships to the Adriatic, along with some aircraft and helicopters. NATO followed with the same number of ships from its Standing Force Mediterranean. Potential problems in the command arrangements of these operations have been avoided because of the small size and limited goals of the forces. In addition, these naval forces have the experience of working together from past NATO exercises. However, many have pointed to the inherent inefficiency of conducting operations under two divergent command structures. For the longer term, plans will be needed to coordinate the peacekeeping activities and operations of the various multilateral organizations, since the same military forces will often be operating under different institutional umbrellas.

The responsibilities of the regional organizations within Europe and their relationships with the United Nations will also need to be defined. The Secretary General was publicly critical of the European Community’s giving orders to the United Nations in the case of the Community’s proposal in July 1992 for UN supervision of all heavy weapons in Bosnia. He was equally critical of the Security Council for endorsing that action without having the capability in military forces or finances to accomplish it. A month later, the European Community agreed to contribute additional forces to peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and to cover the costs. The Secretary General then agreed that these forces could operate under the UN flag.

More important, the various roles of these security institutions in Europe need further definition. There is a danger that as NATO’s purview expands to all the countries of the former Soviet bloc and
the CSCE takes on military functions, the distinctions between institutions for collective defense (NATO and WEU) and those for collective security (CSCE) are being blurred. There are also risks to the integrity of both NATO and the WEU as they struggle to forge their identity in the post-Cold War era. They may find themselves with some, but not all, of their members participating in future peacekeeping operations, or immobilized by lack of agreement. They could face a loss of public support if their peacekeeping operations involve a serious loss of life or, paradoxically, if they fail to act in response to human suffering for fear of casualties.

Other peacekeeping activities are also under way in Europe in conflicts in some of the former republics of the Soviet Union. Under the umbrella of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Russian military forces are operating in Georgia and Tajikistan. Russia insisted in July 1992 that the CSCE include the possibility of using the "peacekeeping mechanism of CIS" to support peacekeeping in the CSCE region. Other CSCE members carefully sought not to formally sanction these Russian operations. But implicitly the CSCE gave some legitimacy to these activities.

These institutional changes and of themselves are clearly not sufficient to keep the peace. What has happened in the former Yugoslavia would have occurred even if all these changes in the European multilateral institutions had been in place. The warring parties are not prepared to seek peace, and political will has been lacking among the European and American governments to enforce a peace. At the same time, having made these institutional changes, governments will be in a better position to act in future conflicts if they wish.

Regional Organizations—Outside Europe

Given the demands currently being placed on the United Nations, the UN Secretary General has asked regional organizations outside of Europe to share the burden of peacekeeping. Although these organizations have raised the possibility of helping keep the peace, they face a difficult set of obstacles, primarily because their members have widely varying interests and goals. Many organizations have been around for a long time and do not reflect the true regional in-
terests of their members, tending to be dominated by a major power in the region. These organizations are also in developing areas of the world where state building has not yet been accomplished; thus, a pooling of sovereignty in regional organizations is premature.

Efforts by members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to promote their security collectively have been thwarted by internal rivalries and by suspicions of Saudi Arabia. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) has historically been preoccupied with South Africa and unwilling even to consider a redrawing of the colonial frontiers to reflect ethnic and tribal entities. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has had some success in easing tensions over the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, but the countries in the region turned to the United Nations to bring peace to Cambodia. The Organization of American States (OAS) is struggling to implement its professed goals of freedom and democracy in Peru and Haiti. Regional organizations have few past successes upon which to build for taking a peacekeeping role in the future, and they lack resources as well as expertise.

As a result, groups seeking help in promoting peace turn to the United Nations and to countries outside for help in resolving disputes, not to regional organizations. Still, regional organizations could alert the United Nations to controversies and the possibility of conflict, perhaps making possible UN steps to prevent the eruption of violence. Over time, the United Nations may be able to aid in developing the peacekeeping capabilities of the regional organizations.

Japan and Germany

The role of Japan and Germany in helping keep the peace after the Cold War emerged as an issue during the Gulf War, when those countries defrayed the substantial costs of the military operations but refused to participate in them. Their postwar constitutions were used as an excuse, and so their first responses to keeping the peace after the Cold War have been procedural steps.

After a long and difficult debate, the Japanese passed legislation in the summer of 1992 to permit the deployment of up to 2,000 Self-Defense Force troops in peacekeeping missions. The legislation limits the activities to noncombat tasks, medical care, and helping with
refugees. More dangerous activities, such as monitoring cease-fire agreements, collecting abandoned weapons, and assisting in the exchange of prisoners of war, require additional approval of the Diet. Japan has also now agreed for the first time to provide forces for UN peacekeeping operations, in this case in Cambodia. Eighteen hundred troops are on their way, where they will act as monitors, engineers to repair roads, civilian police, and providers of disaster relief—activities the Self-Defense Force troops perform at home. They will not be authorized to take part in any duties likely to involve fighting; but they do have authority to use small arms in self-defense. Three Japanese officers also served with a peacekeeping unit in Angola in observing the recent elections.

The foreign minister of Germany, in his speech to the UN General Assembly in September 1992, promised to revise the German constitution “to make our armed forces available to the United Nations, with the approval of Parliament, for peacekeeping and peacemaking assignments.” This followed Germany’s tentative steps in sending a German army field hospital to Cambodia, and in having German helicopters fly UN arms inspectors around in Iraq. Events in the former Yugoslavia accelerated the process. A German ship joined in the surveillance of the economic embargo against Serbia, and the Germans are providing crews for airborne warning and control surveillance of the no-fly zone over Bosnia. Nevertheless, there is still considerable opposition within Germany to assuming future peacekeeping roles.

In taking on these new responsibilities for peacekeeping, Japan and Germany are now calling for further procedural changes in the United Nations to give them permanent seats on the Security Council. Most agree that the current membership no longer reflects power realities. Pressure to change is coming from the poorer populous countries, as well as from major regional powers such as Brazil, India, Egypt, and Nigeria. The problem is that it is difficult to find a way to satisfy all the claimants. One possibility is to expand the number of permanent and rotating seats on the Security Council. But such a step will make it even more difficult for this body to act to help keep the peace.

The focus on procedural changes in multinational institutions and in the constitutions of Germany and Japan cannot mask the fact that
governments are not willing to intervene and try to enforce a peace in the conflicts now erupting around the world or to provide these organizations the capabilities and resources to act on their behalf.
Keeping the peace after the Cold War has proved to be more complex and difficult than had been hoped. Indeed, many despair of finding a way to quell the violence erupting around the world and to limit human suffering.

What follows is a description of how governments should go about designing an overall approach to peacekeeping and peacemaking in the post-Cold War era. The first step is to define the conditions that have been necessary for success in traditional UN peacekeeping operations. Depending on which of the following conditions are met in any future individual conflict, different measures will be appropriate.

- The international community (the United Nations and/or regional organization) believed the conflict of sufficient concern to justify intervention, and it was willing to take the risks of introducing military forces and to bear the costs.
- A plausible political settlement to the dispute existed and could be defined in general terms.
- The parties to the conflict were prepared to stop fighting and accept outside help in moving toward the political settlement.
- The international community was essentially neutral as to how the dispute would be resolved, and this was so viewed by the warring parties.
- Military forces had a role that was relevant to achieving the political settlement, e.g., as truce monitors, patrols in demilitarized zones, etc.
RESPONSES TO CONFLICTS THAT MEET ALL CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS

For those future conflicts in which all the conditions are met, an approach to peacekeeping is fairly straightforward, as initially appeared to be the case in El Salvador, Angola, and Cambodia. Simply meeting these conditions, however, does not ensure success. Difficulties will arise in implementing the political settlements. And in contrast to past peacekeeping operations, operations in future conflicts will almost certainly need to encompass UN activities well beyond simply observing elections or monitoring cease-fires.

What will be needed in these cases is for the international community to focus on setting priorities. With some 50,000 peacekeeping forces now deployed around the world, the United Nations is close to its limits in terms of capabilities and funding. Regional organizations may be able over time to take on some of the responsibility, but few regional organizations today hold the confidence of warring parties in their parts of the world. This is the case even in Europe for NATO or the WEU, even when they would be acting under the CSCE. And when regional organizations act, they will need to coordinate their activities with the United Nations. One lesson from the response to events in the former Yugoslavia is that regional organizations cannot presume to act on behalf of the United Nations.

The United Nations may still be overwhelmed, and then its members should consider giving priority to the peacekeeping operations that have the most chance of success, even if they are less significant ones. This would have the advantage of enhancing the UN’s credibility, and it could provide a more persuasive public rationale for government expenditure of scarce resources for peacekeeping operations. To maintain the support of all its members, the United Nations will also need to ensure that its responses to conflicts and human suffering do not show favoritism, as some believe was the case in the attention shown to Bosnia rather than Somalia.

The United Nations also needs to improve its capabilities for planning and conducting peacekeeping operations. Given that these could require military forces of considerable size and involve air, naval, and ground forces, perhaps the most important task will be to define the appropriate command arrangements. Military forces will
also have to be structured and trained for peacekeeping, and here lessons from past peacekeeping operations need to be studied and understood.

In those situations that meet all the conditions of past successful peacekeeping operations, many difficulties will arise. But these are politically manageable, because they will not pose high costs in terms of lives or resources. What is needed is the international community’s willingness to set priorities, provide the financial support, and put in place the necessary organizational arrangements.

RESPONSES TO CONFLICTS THAT DO NOT MEET ALL THE CONDITIONS

For most conflicts in the post-Cold War era, the conditions that were critical to success in past peacekeeping operations are not likely to exist. One approach under these circumstances is for governments and the international community not to become involved in peacekeeping and peacemaking. But this may not be politically feasible, as Bosnia and Somalia have demonstrated. So an approach needs to be designed consistent with which of the conditions for successful peacekeeping in the past have, and have not, been met.

What should be the response for those conflicts where little or no prospect exists of finding a political settlement? Most of the conflicts erupting or on the horizon are related to nation-building and are based on claims for self-determination by religious and ethnic groups. Accepting all the claims would create international anarchy, but no basis exists today whereby the international community could sanction some claims and reject others. And it is not clear that one can be found in the future. Moreover, even if those outside could agree, their views are unlikely to persuade the combatants. This means that there will be many conflicts in which there is simply no political settlement acceptable to the parties and the international community. So far, this has been the case in the former Yugoslavia.

For such conflicts, the international community’s response should involve some or all of the measures listed below, including the potential threat and use of military forces.
• Uphold the principle of peaceful changes in boundaries, and the principle of no enforced movement of peoples.

• Take steps to protect human rights and provide political autonomy and safeguards for the rights of minority groups.

• Seek to build confidence among the parties in dispute through cooperative security measures, demilitarized zones, and mutual constraints on the size and activities of military forces.

• Set up institutional mechanisms, regionally and internationally, for preventing conflicts and providing the means for their resolution. The CSCE has taken such steps, including establishing a Conflict Prevention Center and a CSCE High Commission for Minorities.

• Provide international guarantees of minority rights and possibly security guarantees backed up with military forces.

• If these all fail, introduce military forces simply to control the violence and prevent human suffering, with the knowledge that the prospects for political settlement are remote or may not exist, as has been the case in northern Ireland and Cyprus.

Any introduction of military forces under these circumstances may or may not involve risks to personnel. For example, British troops in Northern Ireland have become an object of attack, whereas in Cyprus, UN peacekeeping forces have faced little danger.

What should the international community’s response be if the parties in conflict are not prepared to stop fighting? It can impose economic sanctions to raise the costs to the warring parties of continuing the conflict. Embargoes can be placed on the transfer of weapon systems to limit the means by which they will be able to continue to fight. But such measures are difficult to enforce, and considerable time is required for them to have any serious effect. It is also difficult to ensure that their effect does not favor one of the warring parties. The ban on weapons sales to the factions in the former Yugoslavia leaves the better-armed Serbian militias at an advantage.

Ultimately, the international community can use military force. Military forces are, however, extremely blunt instruments of policy. Their use will not be successful without clear goals, as the deploy-
ment of the U.S. Marines in Lebanon so clearly demonstrated. But defining such goals will be very difficult in future conflicts. Military force could be used to enforce economic sanctions or arms embargoes, but such steps will not necessarily lead to an end to the fighting. As in Bosnia and Somalia, military forces can be employed to protect shipments of humanitarian aid. But it is almost impossible to keep such military operations limited. It is difficult simply to protect relief convoys without simultaneously seeking to defeat and disarm whoever is attacking them.

Military forces can be used to directly influence the outcome of the conflict. Such operations are now categorized as peacemaking or peace enforcement, and they could involve a number of different goals. One could seek to inflict costs on the warring parties, sufficient to make them decide that the potential gains in continuing to fight are not worth the costs. The problem is that the conflicts may have produced such hatred or so radicalized the leaders as to make rational calculations of costs and gains impossible. Or military forces could be employed actually to defeat the military forces of the warring parties, so they must sue for peace.

The prospects for success in using military forces for any of these purposes are most uncertain. However, what is clear is that such peacemaking operations could lead to a serious loss of life. Recognizing that governments will be reluctant to take any such risk, absent threats to their vital interests, the Secretary General has proposed creating standing and on-call military forces under the command of the United Nations for peacemaking operations. These forces would be volunteers, individually willing to take the risks of war. Their governments would, therefore, be relieved of responsibility for their safety. Members of the Security Council would then be in a position to intervene in these ethnic conflicts to stop the fighting and end human suffering.

But such UN peacemaking operations face their own obstacles. The use of military force in intrastate conflicts would in most cases undermine an international norm of long standing—respect for the sovereignty of states and noninterference in their internal affairs. Collective security under the United Nations is based on an “interstate” order, not on an “international” order where the rights and independence of groups is to be ensured through collective mili-
tary action. That principle of state sovereignty has been chipped away in recent UN actions. The United Nations has clearly violated the sovereignty of Iraq in its military operations to protect the Kurds and Shiites. But the activities followed the defeat of Iraq as an aggressor.

The principle of sovereignty has been the cornerstone of stability in the international community. It will be difficult to decide when—for what kinds of dangers, human rights violations or human suffering—and where to violate that principle. In making such decisions, the United Nations will need to calculate threats and concerns as other governments do when they are deciding whether to use military forces for peacemaking operations. And like these governments, the United Nations will find itself facing a similar impasse. Thus, member states can be expected in the future to violate the principle of state sovereignty only under exceptional circumstances.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

Given that the conditions for past peacekeeping successes may rarely be met in the post–Cold War era and that undertaking peacemaking operations is extremely dangerous and risky, alternative approaches are gaining support.

Preventive Diplomacy

Article 34 of the UN Charter gives the Security Council the ability to investigate any situation “which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute.” The Secretary General in his Agenda for Peace laid out a variety of measures to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflict, and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur. He emphasizes the need for governments to share information on political or military situations, and in so doing, he is asking for an expansion of the intelligence sharing that has occurred in the UN activities to disarm Iraq.

Simply discovering the possibility that a conflict is about to occur will not, however, be sufficient. Nor will be putting mechanisms in place
for fact-finding and mediation. When conflicts erupt, other policies have failed. For example, minority rights have not been protected; ethnic and religious groups have not been given autonomy; or efforts to redraw state boundaries to reflect ethnic groupings have not occurred. Preventive diplomacy depends on finding ways to implement such policies. The fundamental causes of conflicts must be addressed.

The obvious problem with relying on preventive diplomacy is that the dangers of conflicts are never really apparent until they erupt; thus, governments have little incentive to act in advance. Kosovo is a case in point, where Serbs are seeking to deny the ethnic Albanians their autonomy and repress their language and culture. This is the case even though an outbreak of violence could draw in Albania and spill over into Macedonia. It took over a year for the CSCE and European Community even to send fact-finding missions.

The Secretary General has linked preventive diplomacy with preventive deployments of military forces, suggesting that the establishment of demilitarized zones could act as a deterrent to the outbreak of future conflicts. Boutros-Ghali emphasizes the need to respect individual states' sovereignty, but he suggests that if such operations were undertaken at the request—or with the consent—of the governments involved, the actions would not contradict the UN Charter.

Such preventive deployments raise a number of difficulties. The first is whether the existence of UN military forces able to intervene quickly would actually serve as a deterrent to the outbreak of conflicts. Theories of deterrence, born in the Cold War, were based on a number of assumptions, perhaps the most critical being that actions by governments (or in the current case, by warring parties) are based on rational calculations of costs and gains. Although deterrence perse has not truly been tested in the current trouble spots, the deep historical antagonisms and claims for rights of self-determination that characterize the kinds of conflicts in the post-Cold War era raise doubts about whether this critical assumption holds. There is also the issue of how to make the preventive deployments credible, given that the deployments would need to have the approval of a majority of the members of the Security Council, including the five permanent members.
The Secretary General recommends having standing military forces, so that the preventive deployments could occur quickly. Views differ as to whether a deployment of military forces in Kuwait would have deterred the Iraqi invasion. But what is clear is that the effect of such deployments would be to take sides in a dispute. Were a deployment to fail in preventing the outbreak of violence, the international community would then lose the possibility of mediating the dispute as a neutral party and, potentially, of introducing traditional peacekeeping forces.

Preventive deployments represent a tangible effort by the international community to extend collective security guarantees. The international community would seek to anticipate the situations in which force would be used and then act quickly with the acquiescence of one party, not necessarily both parties, if a conflict were to erupt. Such an operation would be difficult to mount militarily, but the primary obstacles will be political. The permanent members of the Security Council will be in a position to veto any preventive deployments not in their interest. As a result, other countries, and particularly those in the Third World, will view such deployments as a threat and as a way for the permanent members to violate their sovereignty. For many, this harkens back to colonialism.

**Peace Building**

The Secretary General defines peace building as postconflict action to identify and support structures that will tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict. He argues that the United Nations must provide a new kind of technical assistance: “Support for the transformation of deficient national structures and capabilities, and for the strengthening of democratic institutions.” Military forces could help in such activities as mine clearing, road building, the transport of food, etc.

Such an approach has many similarities to the goals and activities under the UN trusteeship system. Indeed, Russia’s foreign minister, in his address to the UN General Assembly in September 1992, called for a “contemporary interpretation of the international trusteeship system, as set forth in the UN Charter as a means of protecting national minorities.” His concern was for the Slavic minorities residing in the new states of the former Soviet Union. What the United Na-
tions is undertaking for Cambodia is a form of trusteeship, as are its activities in providing aid to and protecting the Kurds.

The difficulty with such an approach is that the history of the UN trusteeship system holds many bad memories, given its colonial roots. And the situation today is different. Rather than moving from colonialism to independence, many parts of the world need to move from chaos to independence. Taking on such a responsibility would place a considerable burden on the international community. It is important as well to recall the difficulties faced by the UN mandate system when multiple ethnic groups existed.

International Norms

Still another approach is to focus on international norms and link compliance with sanctions and, ultimately, with the use of military force. A candidate norm could be the protection of human rights. The international community would commit itself in advance to punishing genocide. A variety of measures are possible, including cutting off the state or group entirely from the international community, putting the political and military leaders on trial for war crimes, etc. Another international norm could be the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Various steps could be taken to prevent the development of nuclear weapons, ranging from controls on the transfer of technologies and weapons to military destruction. Both of these norms have foundations in already agreed-upon international documents: the UN Charter and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. These norms could be established regionally or internationally. The precedent of the Helsinki Agreement is an important one, since the CSCE principles played a role in improving human rights in the former Soviet empire.

Such an approach poses difficulties as well. The record of the international community's response to international terrorism suggests the difficulty in moving beyond the rhetoric extolling international norms to concrete actions, especially involving the use of military force. Moreover, the steps available to the international community may not be effective. Threatening a war crimes trial in the face of Serbian ethnic cleansing has had little effect. The circumstances permitting the UN's destruction of Iraq's nuclear capability will probably prove unique.
Keeping the peace in the post–Cold War era will be difficult, and the prospects for success are low for conflicts involving ethnic and religious groups. But this is no reason to despair. What is needed is a multifaceted approach to peacekeeping and peacemaking that is integrated with political, economic, and diplomatic measures. For conflicts in which the conditions for success in past peacekeeping operations are met, the international community should seize the opportunity to play a role in bringing peace.

When these conditions are not met, the focus should be primarily on nonmilitary measures. The international community should give priority to gaining respect for its established international norms of behavior, most importantly the assurance of the rights of minorities and the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Arms control still has an important role to play, since cooperative security measures and a reduction in military forces can help build confidence among ethnic groups. Peacemaking operations become the instrument of last resort, because of both their dangers and their difficult operational requirements. But there may be occasions when they will be needed. So the international community needs to provide for that possibility in advance. The most important step would be for governments to place “volunteer” military forces under UN command.
Appendix

RAND SUMMER INSTITUTE:
PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING
AFTER THE COLD WAR
JULY 20–24, 1992

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