Policy Options for Army Involvement in Youth Development

Elizabeth Heneghan Ondaatje
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Policy Options for Army Involvement in Youth Development

Elizabeth Heneghan Ondaatje

Prepared for the
United States Army

Arrayo Center

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This report presents background research, a description of options, and a framework for examining possible effects of increasing Army involvement in youth development programs. *Youth development* encompasses a wide array of educational, training, and service activities that seek to develop the intellectual and personal skills of youth on the threshold of adulthood (i.e., roughly between 16 and 24 years old). It is part of a larger project on possible new U.S. Army noncombat activities within the Arroyo Center’s Strategy and Doctrine program. Other parts of the project examined the U.S. Army's role in domestic disaster support (John Schrader, *The Army's Role in Domestic Disaster Support: An Assessment of Policy Choices*, MR-303-A, 1993) and possible U.S. Army assistance activities in the former Soviet Union (Steedman Hinckley, *Department of Defense Assistance to the Former Soviet Republics: Potential Applications of Existing Army Capabilities*, MR-245-A, 1993). All three parts followed from preliminary research on a wide range of possible new noncombat activities at home and abroad (see Elizabeth H. Ondaatje, *New Army Noncombat Activities*, IP-106-A, 1993). The activities illustrate a possible new organizational vision of the U.S. Army as the nation's general military servant, that is, an Army that performs more than its traditional warfighting missions and provides a larger, though still secondary, portion than in the past of noncombat service. The project is sponsored by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.\(^1\)

\(^1\)Previous RAND research concluded that the U.S. Army’s then-current vision of a rapidly responsive armored defender of central Europe was increasingly inappropri-
This study should be of interest to those in the Army and the other services who are thinking about possible future activities for the military in the areas of youth development, national service, and employer-sponsored volunteerism. Those outside the military concerned with these issues and possible Army contributions to them may also find the report of interest.

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Note. That research argued that an alternative vision of the Army as the nation’s general military servant better suited the Army’s future. This conclusion was based in part on the assumption that the Army is likely to be tasked with new or expanded noncombat responsibilities in the decades ahead and should orient itself and its thinking toward that possibility. See John K. Setear, Carl H. Builder, M. D. Barcus, and Wayne Madewell, The Army in a Changing World: The Role of Organizational Vision, RAND, R-3882-A, June 1990.
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The increasing importance of youth development policy, combined with an apparent willingness and desire to tap military resources and expertise to address civilian problems including those of youth, has generated mounting pressures from Congress, the Administration, and possibly the public for the Army to contribute to a national youth development plan. These pressures become stronger when they interact with a desire both inside and outside the Army to mitigate the effect of the military drawdown on individuals (by opening new job opportunities in youth development programs for early retirees) and on communities (by steering program funding to communities hardest hit by military budget reductions and base closures).

This report describes options for redefining the role for the Army in youth development activities consistent with an evolving Army vision and presents a framework for developing hypotheses about possible consequences of increasing Army involvement in such programs. Specifically, it addresses four questions:

1. What recent trends in youth development are of interest to the Army?
2. What youth development activity is the Army currently engaged in?
3. What policy options are available for expanding youth development activity?
4. What are the possible effects of each option?
WHAT RECENT TRENDS IN YOUTH DEVELOPMENT ARE OF INTEREST TO THE ARMY?

Several general trends suggest youth development will be an important public policy concern during the next few years. First, Congress established in 1990 an independent federal agency, the Commission on National Community Service, to spur development of youth community service and to test models for a national service program. Second, President Clinton is a long-time enthusiast of youth development through community service and has promised to make national service one of his five policy priorities. Third, the last five to ten years have witnessed a groundswell of innovative youth community service and other youth development programs and a growing interest in military-modeled youth programs. Finally, public support for some form of voluntary national service for youth has reached 83 percent, according to Gallup polls.

In addition to these general trends indicating the growing popularity of youth community service, there is a strong urge in policy circles and the public to draw upon the military to help young people. One trend within Congress is the desire to draw upon capabilities developed as a result of the nation’s investment in the military during the Cold War (such as skilled and disciplined personnel, effective training technologies, and multifunctional facilities) to address pressing domestic needs. This quest for a “peace dividend” is embodied in proposed legislation on new cooperative arrangements between the military and civilian sectors to solve decidedly nonmilitary problems. Noteworthy among these arrangements is involving the military in the challenge of enhancing the prospects of at-risk and minority youth and instilling civic responsibility in all youth. Perhaps the most important recent legislative development in this regard was an amendment to the fiscal year 1993 Defense Authorization Bill that appropriated over $100 million for several youth development programs.

The presence of so many disparate interests and conditions united in favor of a federal plan for youth development and for military participation in that plan suggests that the issue will become increasingly important for the Army.
WHAT YOUTH DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITY IS THE ARMY CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN?

The Army has been involved in several youth development activities through community service activities by individuals and units, cooperative programs with the Department of Education and local school systems, such as the Junior Reserve Officers Training program, and, recently, transition programs designed specifically to help early retirees work in youth development programs.

Nevertheless, these activities represent only a fraction of what the Army could contribute to civilian youth. And even if the Army's current efforts were better known outside the Army, as recommended in this report, they are probably insufficient to withstand mounting pressures on the Army to do more for the nation's youth.

The gap between what the Army is doing and could do has been filled by a host of new initiatives for Army youth development. The Army must now decide what additional actions it will take.

WHAT POLICY OPTIONS ARE AVAILABLE FOR EXPANDING ARMY YOUTH DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITY?

This study presents an array of options ranging from the status quo (before the initiatives in the last year) to substantial commitments of the institution's resources and attention. In addition, some options might be combined to provide still more alternatives. In short, the options are:

**Status quo:** Under this option, the Army would continue the current array of Army volunteer activities as well as efforts to find employment in youth programs for Army alumni, but, in addition, collect and disseminate information on these efforts to audiences outside the Army.

**Major installations as the locus of activity:** Under this option, the Army would develop, support, and encourage voluntary activities benefiting youth in those communities surrounding major installations.

**Employer-sponsored volunteerism:** In this option, Army leadership would develop, support, and encourage volunteer activities
throughout the organization—active, reserve, civilians, and alumni at headquarters, major commands, and in units—to benefit young people who reside relatively close to where Army soldiers and civilians work and retire.

**National-level partnerships:** This option involves more than channeling voluntary activities toward youth development and sharing control over activities with outside actors. Here, the Army would seek and forge partnerships with civilian agencies and organizations, public and private, to support their primary objective of youth development and integrate into the Army’s organizational objectives a commitment to both the success of these civil-military partnerships as well as the purposes of the partnerships.

**National service model:** Like the previous option, this option would share control with other actors. However, it goes one step further and incorporates the Army into a national plan for youth development. Moreover, volunteer activities for youth are irrelevant to this option. Here, the Army would embrace the concept of national service and work with Congress and government agencies to formulate and implement the Army’s portion of the federal plan. This portion might involve creating and integrating a new type of enlistee, the citizen soldier; organizing and operating the national service program; or recruiting and processing youth into national service programs, as well as locating, tracking, and matching national service jobs to available youth. Unlike all the previous options, this option will necessarily require changing existing structures, procedures, operations, training, etc., to accommodate national service requirements.

The five options can be characterized in terms of four dimensions that distinguish the potential scope of Army involvement:

**Responsibility** describes the degree of Army control and accountability for each option. Will the Army act independently or collaboratively? Will the Army formulate, implement, evaluate, and pay for these activities on its own or share those responsibilities with outside organizations, either public or private?

**Commitment** characterizes the Army’s approach to youth development and the types of activities involved. Will the Army take a laissez
The approach (i.e., primarily or exclusively voluntary activities, with some institutional support) or actively develop programs with the requisite funding and staff? Will a significant investment of time, resources, and leadership be required?

Management describes to what extent control over, and accountability for, design and implementation of activities or programs will be centralized or decentralized within the Army.

Participating personnel describes the scope and type of individual involvement in each option. Who in the Army participates? Do efforts focus on the active Army, reserves, National Guard, civilian, retired personnel, or families?

Table S.1 summarizes and compares the five options along the four dimensions.

### Table S.1
Comparing Options

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>Commitment</th>
<th>Management</th>
<th>Participating Personnel&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Status quo</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Laissez faire</td>
<td>Decentralized</td>
<td>AC, AR, NG, civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major installations as locus</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Laissez faire</td>
<td>Decentralized</td>
<td>AC, civilians, families; AR and NG where appropriate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer-sponsored volunteerism</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Laissez faire, but programmatic support</td>
<td>Centralized coordination with decentralized implementation</td>
<td>AC, AR, NG, civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National partnerships</td>
<td>Collaborative</td>
<td>Programmatic, but possibly including voluntary programs</td>
<td>Centralized</td>
<td>AC, AR, NG, civilians, alumni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National service</td>
<td>Collaborative</td>
<td>Programmatic</td>
<td>Centralized</td>
<td>AC, AR, NG, civilians</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>AC = Active Component, AR = Army Reserve, NG = National Guard.
WHAT ARE THE LIKELY EFFECTS OF EACH OPTION?

The report offers a framework for assessing the effects of the various options. The options are assessed according to:

**Effect on primary missions:** How will force structure, routine operations, and other requirements for primary missions be affected? Will Army leadership be involved? How is morale likely to be affected?

**Effect on Army budgets:** What is the incremental cost to the Army over what it is currently doing (described in degrees rather than in actual dollar amounts)? What are the possibilities for cost sharing as well as for expanding the Army’s resources?

**Effect on public perceptions of the Army’s image:** What are the expected consequences, good and bad, of each option for the Army’s public image? To what extent is the Army addressing the issues that most concern the American public and identifying its relevance to the nation’s needs? Will the Army be perceived as part of the solution to youth development or part of the problem (e.g., draining budget resources away from domestic programs; unwilling to contribute to national needs, despite the perception of reduced readiness requirements in the wake of the Cold War)? Within the public, are there strong minority opinions in favor of or opposed to particular Army roles?

**Effect on nation’s youth:** How many and what sorts of youth will each option affect? What are the expected benefits?

The above roughly represent “costs” (to primary missions and budgets) and “benefits” (of public perceptions of the Army and to youth). Although imperfect, since not all possible impacts on missions and budgets are costs nor all impacts on the Army’s image or on youth beneficial, this framework provides a means to consider how the Army could make tradeoffs among the options (see Chapter Six). For example, an option might “cost” the Army in terms of primary missions but “benefit” the Army by decelerating budget reductions through enhanced public support.

First, the status quo option promises little change from the situation today. Although this option does not affect Army primary missions or resources much, it also does not contribute much to the nation’s
youth, garner public support for the Army, or improve the Army's image. The Army could experience a setback in terms of public support by appearing uninterested, unwilling, or unable to assist with urgent national needs. Moreover, given that there are many indications that the Army will become more involved in civilian youth development in the near future, committing the Army (consciously or by default) to this option may not serve the Army well in anticipating and responding to requests from Congress and the Administration.

Second, making major installations the focus of voluntary youth development activities does not gain much more for the Army than the status quo option. This option makes sense only in conjunction with another option, such as national-level partnerships. For example, the Army could decide to keep the locus of activity at major installations, but hook up with nationally known partners to develop joint programs at all major installations such as a mentoring program with Big Brother/Big Sister or rural and urban youth service and conservation corps with the Commission on National and Community Service.

Third, employer-sponsored volunteer programs for youth development face roughly the same limited costs in terms of primary missions and budgets as the first two options, but are likely to provide greater benefits in terms of the Army's image and the larger number of youth aided by Army programs nationwide.

Fourth, national-level partnerships and national service may have tremendous payoffs, but the costs are uncertain. The wide variation of possible effects on the Army's primary mission, in particular, does not mean it is an extremely risky option, with an equal chance of high payoffs or costs to the Army, but that (1) there are differences of opinion about possible outcomes that cannot yet be resolved, and (2) the effect on the Army depends on how the options are implemented.

The study also suggested several major tradeoffs among the options. First, in terms of the Army's image, three alternatives provide potentially large benefits: employer-sponsored volunteerism, national-level partnerships, and national service. The first two, however, are accompanied by possible negative effects on the Army's image, largely as a function of the degree to which the public reacts nega-
tively to the Army's apparent diversion from strictly military activities into serving other national needs.

Second, employer-sponsored volunteerism and national-level partnerships are most attractive in terms of their benefits to youth. The costs to the Army's budget and primary missions of employer-sponsored volunteerism, in particular, are appealingly low. Although national service might help youth as much or more than those options, the Army's additional contribution under that option is limited (since the Army's role in that option is confined to those it would enlist anyway) and, depending upon implementation, the costs may be high.

Third, in terms of enhancing the Army's image while maintaining the Army's budget and primary missions, the best options are status quo, employer-sponsored volunteerism, and national service, with the aforementioned caveats about the status quo and national service options. Employer-sponsored volunteerism has potential high payoffs for the Army in terms of public support. Potential costs must be managed, but the budget should be little affected.

Fourth, to maximize the positive impact on youth but limit the possible negative impact on the Army, employer-sponsored volunteerism and national service are the most attractive options, providing that the effect of national service on recruiting is judged acceptable. Otherwise, the Army would limit itself to employer-sponsored volunteerism.

RECOMMENDATIONS

This study does not recommend any particular option presented herein as the best approach for the Army to take. Rather, it provides a framework for crafting and assessing more detailed options. However, this study does offer two recommendations to the Army for examining possible roles in youth development.

First, the Army should make every effort to understand what it is already doing for civilian youth and to quantify the benefits of military service for the nation's youth who serve.

Second, the Army should attempt to reduce the polarization of the current debate over whether support for youth development is an
appropriate role for the Army. On the one hand are those who fear that these activities will divert the Army from a single-minded focus on combat readiness for the inevitable next war. On the other hand are those who believe that every institution that can must contribute to resolve this national crisis. To reduce the polarization, the Army could begin to consider the following questions: What are the true, as opposed to the perceived, effects of the Army’s current contributions? What are the Army’s core competencies related to youth development? Based on these core competencies, what additional contributions could the Army make, and what would be the consequences? To what extent should the Army be a direct provider of youth programs as opposed to a model for youth programs?
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This report benefited substantially from the insights and advice of RAND reviewers Elizabeth Rolph and John Winkler. Thanks are also extended to others at RAND who helped review, revise, and retype earlier drafts, including Nanette Gantz as Program Director, Jeanne Heller as editor, David Adamson as Communications Analyst, and Anna Harrell as Research Support Staff. Finally, fellow project members Steedman Hinckley, LTC William McCoy, and John Schrader offered comments on earlier drafts and made the author’s job as project leader as easy and enjoyable as possible.

Within the office of the sponsor of this study, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army Robert Emmerichs and Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary Cheryl Marcum provided their customary thorough and helpful reviews of this and other documents in this project. Their support and commitment has contributed substantially to the project’s success.
Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. military's successful performance in combat as well as non-combat assignments during the last few years has brought not only renewed and widespread respect for the armed services, but also demands that the military undertake still more activities in pursuit of a broader range of military and non-military objectives. For example, several thousand troops deployed to Northern Iraq in March 1991 and Somalia in December 1992 for a combination of humanitarian relief and combat operations, lately called "humanitarian intervention." The military's performance in the wake of Hurricane Andrew in South Florida in August 1992 prompted calls for the military to take over leadership for emergency response from the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Similarly, in the wake of the Los Angeles riots in May 1992, calls were heard for new youth intervention programs, including some with military involvement.

As part of this public appeal, congressional coalitions of liberal advocates of youth programs and more conservative supporters of the military passed legislation to encourage military support for youth development. The most significant was the National and Community Service Act of 1990 to explore and develop innovative models for youth service and volunteerism more generally.\(^1\) This Act was the

\(^1\)Community service is used interchangeably with volunteerism, though in many cases, including activities covered in the Act, it involves some remuneration of participants. Community service and public service are often used interchangeably as well, but this report distinguishes between the two, reserving the latter term to describe employment and elected office in local, state, and federal government (but not the armed forces, or military service). The use of the term community service to describe an alternative to incarceration is not included here. Finally youth service and national
culmination of scores of legislative initiatives for youth service as a means of youth development, most of which envisioned some form of military involvement. Although not an explicit purpose of the Act, developing military-modeled youth programs is an objective of many of its supporters and is high on the agenda of the Commission established to implement the Act. Another important legislative initiative followed in 1992 to fund civil-military youth development programs in the 1993 Defense Authorization Act. Senator Nunn justified these programs to his colleagues by arguing that:

The American people have made an enormous investment in developing the skills, capabilities, and resources of the armed forces. These resources, if properly matched to local needs and coordinated with civilian efforts, can make a useful contribution to addressing the serious domestic needs of the United States.

THE CONCEPT OF YOUTH DEVELOPMENT

*Youth development* encompasses a wide array of educational, training, and service activities that seek to develop the intellectual and personal skills of youth on the threshold of adulthood (i.e., roughly between 16 and 24 years old). These programs are sponsored by schools, private organizations, and government. They supplement normal kindergarten through grade 12 schooling in the public and private school systems by assisting young people who lack educational, occupational, and social skills required to become productive citizens. Some programs may target subgroups within the youth population, such as those "at-risk," disadvantaged, or juvenile.

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service describe a range of concepts for usually voluntary, but occasionally mandatory, military or civilian community service for American youth. These concepts are elaborated upon later.

*2Interview with Commissioner Shirley Sagawa, October 1992.*


*4There is significant overlap between at-risk and disadvantaged youth, but the two groups are distinct. In addition, disadvantaged youth may be economically and/or educationally disadvantaged. According to Richard H. deLone:

The adjective "at-risk" has been borrowed from epidemiology to define youth who face a high probability of unemployment, economic dependency, and various manifestations of antisocial behavior and personal disorganization in*
delinquents. Only a few programs consciously seek a diverse group of youth to build "a broad-based constituency, avoiding the stigma attached to programs for the poor and bringing a cross-section of youth together to teach and learn from each other."5

Regardless of the target population, in general the types of development sought are personal, educational, and civic. Personal development is directed toward enhancing self-esteem, responsibility, and ability to work in teams, among other social skills. Educational development depends upon the educational level of the target group of youth (e.g., students at risk of dropping out of school, school dropouts or "out of school" youth, high school graduates without job skills, or college-bound youth) and is directed toward helping youth continue and complete their education. Civic development is directed toward teaching youth why and how to participate in a democracy, instilling "civic virtues" (abiding by the law, paying taxes, etc.), and developing attachments to the local community.

Programs pursue some or all of these general objectives for youth development differently. They range from service-learning6 curricula their adult lives. Youth are at risk because they lack (and appear unlikely to acquire on their own) the basic competencies and credentials that research has shown to be strongly associated with a successful transition from high school to college or the work force. Among the factors that predict high risk are poor grades and low test scores, a combination of poor school performance and lack of work experience, low school attendance, and teenage pregnancy. These factors are most prevalent among low-income students, vastly disproportionate numbers of whom come from minority families, and the problem is often compounded by teenage drug or alcohol abuse, other health problems, court involvement and dysfunctional family life. In short, at-risk youth typically need a lot of change—and a lot of help—in a lot of areas.


5This description is taken from an evaluation of the California Conservation Corps, which, along with City Year in Boston, is one of the few programs that seek a heterogeneous group of youth. The California Conservation Corps: An Analysis of Participant Characteristics (Philadelphia: Public/Private Ventures), October 1985, p. 1.

6Service-learning describes both a philosophy and design for community service that includes structured time for critical reflection on the service experience, integration with academic or vocational educational curricula including opportunities to use newly acquired skills and knowledge in the service activity, and development of civic responsibility. Service-learning overlaps in many regards with another concept, experiential learning, whereby learning is reinforced in the workplace, through community service, or other experiences.
inside schools, to extracurricular programs either inside or outside the school systems, to weekend and summer camps, to full- and part-time nonresidential programs, to full-time residential programs lasting up to a year.

PURPOSE AND ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT

Given the aforementioned strides toward national service and civil-military cooperation for youth development, and in light of the expressed goals of the new Administration to reexamine these developments, the principles that underlie them, and the coalition that engendered them, it is important to identify trends and possible implications for the U.S. Army. Having done that, this report goes on to provide a framework for thinking about possible future activities for the military in civilian youth development. It describes options for defining the role for the Army in youth development activities and presents a framework for assessing the possible consequences of increasing Army involvement in such programs. The study addresses four questions:

1. What recent trends in youth development are of interest to the Army?
2. What youth development activity is the Army currently engaged in?
3. What policy options are available for youth development activity?
4. What are the possible effects of each option?

Chapter Two briefly describes the backdrop of youth development programs and trends outside the Army. Chapter Three then outlines Army regulations, programs, and trends in the Army and suggests several implications for the Army. Having set the stage, the second part of the report outlines five options for Army support for youth development ranging from maintaining the status quo to embarking on a full-scale partnership with civilian institutions to implement proposed national service models (Chapter Four) and provides a framework for assessment and preliminary evaluation of the effect of these options on the Army and the nation’s youth (Chapter Five).
Chapter Six offers some preliminary conclusions and recommendations that follow from the research.

The research reported here is based upon a review of the available literature on current Army youth development activities, existing civilian programs, recent legislation on youth development (particularly involving the military), and proposals for youth development. In addition, the author interviewed Army personnel, practitioners, and policymakers in the youth development field, as well as RAND and other researchers with relevant expertise.
Chapter Two

THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT: TRENDS IN YOUTH DEVELOPMENT

The current environment is marked by new programs, activities, and organizations that reflect trends in youth development and suggest possible roles for the Army. This chapter identifies and explores the most important general trends in youth development and specific trends as they relate to the military. The large amount of detailed information on civilian programs—many of which have nothing to do with the Army—is included because it may not be known to Army readers, is increasingly important for some Army readers to become acquainted with, and is unavailable elsewhere in a single source.

GENERAL TRENDS: GROWING POPULARITY OF YOUTH COMMUNITY SERVICE

Several general trends indicate that youth development will become a public policy concern in the next few years and that a principal approach to youth development will involve youth performing community service. In addition, there is a desire in policy circles and the public to rely, at least in part, on the military to help youth out of disadvantaged circumstances (e.g., as the Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (JROTC) did for now Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell).

Congressional Initiatives for Youth Development

In 1990 the National and Community Service Act focused attention on the desirability of community service, particularly by youth. In
brief, the Act provides funding to test possible national service models, to expand youth service and conservation corps\(^1\) and other projects to integrate community service into academic curricula and involve all students in community service. The Act establishes an independent federal agency (the Commission on National and Community Service\(^2\)) to administer four major programs, described in Table 1. The programs range from curriculum enhancements in elementary and secondary schools (Serve-America and Higher Education Innovative Projects) to full-time, residential youth service corps (Conservation Corps and Youth Service Corps) to possible models for a national service program (National Service Models). Funding for individual programs ranges from a few thousand dollars for small, exploratory programs to nearly $7 million to create a model national service program in several cities.\(^3\)

In addition to awarding grants and administering these programs, the Commission also provides technical assistance, orchestrates evaluations of these and other service programs, and establishes up to four regional clearinghouses on national and community service.\(^4\) The Commission will work with the Department of Defense in those areas outlined below in which DoD was assigned a specific role in youth development.

\(^1\) Youth corps or youth service corps describe programs for youth working in crews on conservation projects, delivery of social services, urban beautification, and so forth. These corps combine community service, education, and life skills development in a three-month to one-year program, both residential and nonresidential, rural and urban. They generally pay participants a small stipend and often offer educational and cash benefits at the completion of the period of service. Those that focus on environmental projects, such as maintaining parks and trails or managing national forests, are called conservation corps.

\(^2\) The Commission has 27 members, 21 of whom the President appoints and the Senate confirms.

\(^3\) For readers accustomed to Defense budgets, these amounts may seem insignificant; however, in the world of youth development, they are substantial.

\(^4\) The Act also stipulates that the Commission must fund at least three of the following five minor programs:
- Employer-based retiree volunteer programs
- Peace Corps and VISTA training programs to establish ROTC-like training programs on college campuses
- Rural youth service demonstration projects
- Foster Grandparent programs to serve the Head Start Program
- Governors' innovative service programs.
Table 1

Summary of the National and Community Service Act of 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Program</th>
<th>FY92 Authorization</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serve-America</td>
<td>$16.3 million</td>
<td>Programs to involve elementary and secondary school students in service projects, emphasizing service-learning innovations and programs that involve adult volunteers in schools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education Innovative Projects</td>
<td>$5.2 million</td>
<td>Campus service and teacher training programs in service-learning sponsored by higher education institutions or public agencies working with higher education institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservation Corps and Youth Service Corps</td>
<td>$21.5 million</td>
<td>Full-time, part-time, and summer corps programs for diverse youth in service projects, including job and skills training (10 percent of funding must support training), especially for high school dropouts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National and Community Service Models</td>
<td>$20.1 million</td>
<td>State-sponsored full-time and part-time service programs for youth as possible models for national service. Programs provide education or housing benefits to participants upon completion of their term of service.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Support Within the New Administration

There are several indications that youth development through national service will remain "one of the defining ideas" of the Administration, in the words of an aide to President Clinton.

First, it is an idea that President Clinton and some of his close advisers (including Hillary Rodham Clinton) have been committed to for a number of years. As governor, Mr. Clinton played a key role in developing the Democratic Leadership Council’s (DLC) 1988 plan for voluntary national service—both civilian and military—rewarded by vouchers for college education, vocational training, or a down pay-
ment for a house. This plan served as the blueprint for the Nunn-McCurdy legislation on national service in 1989, many aspects of which were adopted in the National and Community Service Act in 1990. Although the legislation Congress enacted did not include some of the important characteristics of the blueprint Governor Clinton helped draft, many observers believe that its proponents envision an incremental process building on the National and Community Service Act and eventually including omitted aspects of the DLC plan (such as one umbrella program for both civilian and military service, two enlistment tracks for military service, and the eventual replacement of the existing federal student loan program).

Second, during his campaign, President Clinton promised a domestic G.I. Bill for lower and middle income youth for college, vocational training, and other benefits, with the stipulation that, in return, they perform community service. This plan seeks to help youth develop in two ways: through educational opportunity and through community service.

Third, since his election, President Clinton has underscored his commitment to these ideas by repeatedly listing national service as one of five priorities of the new Administration (the others being economic growth, deficit reduction, health care, and political reform). In addition, he has reiterated his campaign promise to create a National Service Trust for college loans that youth would repay over time or "earn" through a year or two of national service. Eventually, the National Service Trust would replace the existing federal student aid program. President Clinton emphasizes that, more than just help young people go to college, these programs are meant to develop commitment to the community and a strong sense of civic responsibility. By wedding mainstream values to progressive programs and ideas, in the words of an aide, this plan represents an innovative formula to address both liberal ideals of service and conservative concerns about student loans.

5In large part, the DLC was inspired to include these last two uses for vouchers by a William T. Grant Commission on Work, Family, and Citizenship study entitled The Forgotten Half: Non-College Youth in America, January 1986.
Grassroots Development of Youth Programs

In the last half of the 1980s and the early 1990s, interest in involving young people and adults in community service has increased.\(^7\) Within the field of youth development, the proliferation of new programs and pace of innovation is apparent along several dimensions.

First, the number of youth service programs has expanded significantly: college and university students have organized themselves in various service groups (most notably Campus Opportunity Outreach League, whose founder is one of the 27 Commissioners for National and Community Service); college and university presidents have also organized themselves to promote an increased commitment by higher education to youth service (Campus Compact).\(^8\) The number of youth corps programs has grown from two in 1981 to over 58 in 26 states and the District of Columbia in 1991 involving 13,500 young people in year-round programs and another 4600 in summer programs.\(^9\) By 1992 there were 75 year-round programs for 17,500 participants.\(^10\) Moreover, advocates of youth service are seeking ways to accelerate this growth until hundreds of thousands, possibly millions, of youth participate nationwide. Their goals: all youth sharing the community service experience (much the same way military personnel share the basic training experience) and all youth forging civic bonds as well as lifelong habits of volunteerism.

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\(^8\)According to Youth Service America, 300 colleges and universities sponsor community service programs for hundreds of thousands of students.


\(^10\)The largest and one of the earliest is the California Conservation Corps, whose 3600 youth members clear trails, plant trees, and maintain forest properties. The Los Angeles Conservation Corps, with about 110 full-time participants and 200 part-time participants from junior high schools, focuses on neighborhood beautification, tree planting, and recycling projects.
Second, there are several qualitative trends regarding particular types of organizations, activities, and participants:

- Mandatory community service requirements for high school graduation. In 1988, Atlanta became the first city to require community service for graduation from the public school system; in 1991, Maryland became the first state. Many individual school districts had already adopted similar requirements and many more are studying proposals. Some colleges require community service for admission as well as for graduation.

- Emphasis on partnerships for successful programs involving coalitions of state and local government with private agencies and local business.

- Substantial interest in integrating social services into schools for early preventative intervention to enhance prospects for successful school completion.

- Substantial interest in socioeconomically and racially integrated youth programs, of which there are few.

Finally, new public and private money is available for experimenting with youth development programs as well as for replicating the most successful models in other parts of the country.\textsuperscript{11} Increased attention on youth development programs by Congress, in particular, has sparked interest in evaluation of successful programs and research on youth service more generally.

**Shifting Public Attitudes**

Congressional actions, Administration proposals, and grassroots developments reflect observable shifts in public attitudes toward federal programs for youth development, and national service, in particular. Gallup polls indicate strong support for voluntary national

\textsuperscript{11}City Year is the first successful youth corps program funded until 1992 solely by private money. It is also one of the few youth programs that attracts and enrolls a truly diverse group of approximately 240 youth annually. In 1992, the Commission on National and Community Service awarded City Year $7 million over two years to test the replicability of the City Year program as a national service model.
service. In 1988, Gallup found that general public support for voluntary national service reached 83 percent (with only 11 percent opposed), the highest approval rating since Gallup began polling on the question in 1969. Although over 80 percent of each age group favored voluntary national service, the highest support was found among those who would serve, with 87 percent in favor (6 percent opposed) among 18 to 24 year olds. Gallup also found that 55 percent of the public favors obligatory service for young men (though that figure is the lowest it has been for 20 years) and 44 percent for young women.

**SPECIFIC TRENDS: GROWING DESIRE TO EMPLOY THE MILITARY IN YOUTH DEVELOPMENT**

There are several trends in youth development that relate to the military.

**Quest for a “Peace Dividend”**

An important trend within Congress is the desire to draw upon capabilities developed as a result of the nation’s investment in the military during the Cold War to address pressing domestic needs. This desire is manifested in decisions to remove the barriers between military and civilian technological research and development by re-crafting the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency into the National Advanced Research Projects Agency, to expand military support to civilian agencies combattling illicit drugs, and to consider increased military participation in domestic disaster relief. This quest for a “peace dividend” is embodied in proposed legislation by Senator Nunn and others on new cooperative arrangements between the military and civilian sector to solve decidedly nonmilitary prob-

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12A DLC-commissioned study found similar results in 1987 with 97 percent of those polled favoring a “national program for military and civilian service for both young men and women that would be voluntary but strongly encouraged through access to G.I. Bill-type benefits, like college scholarships and home mortgages.” *Citizenship and National Service: A Blueprint for Civic Enterprise*, The Democratic Leadership Council, May 1988.

13The quest for a peace dividend also includes cutting defense budgets to fund domestic programs.
lems. Noteworthy among them is involving the military in programs to enhance the prospects of at-risk and minority youth and instill civic responsibility in all youth. Perhaps the most important recent legislative development in this regard was The Community Works Progress Act, passed as an amendment to the fiscal year 1993 Defense Authorization Bill. This Act authorized over $100 million for several youth development programs and funds for other related programs were included in the FY93 Appropriations Act:

- National Guard Civilian Youth Opportunities Programs: The National Guard Bureau received $57.5 million in FY 1993 to conduct the following four National Guard Civilian Youth Opportunities Programs in 18 states and Puerto Rico:
  - Challenge (formerly called National Guard Military Youth Corps), a five-month residential program followed by at least one year of postresidential mentoring for 16- to 18-year-old high school dropouts. The objectives of the program: to obtain a GED (General Equivalency Diploma); to develop civic, group, and personal skills; to provide job training and placement; and to enhance health, fitness, and hygiene. The staff of these programs will include members of the National Guard. The staff will also include civilian social workers and youth experts. This is the centerpiece of the National Guard's youth development efforts, for which $44 million of the total $57.5 million is set aside.
  - Urban Youth Corps, a six-week nonresidential program held at military bases and inner-city armories based on the "Challenge" curricula without the GED component.
  - Youth Conservation Corps, a six-week residential version of the Urban Youth Corps.

Although these programs are internal military programs and therefore might be considered part of the following chapter on the internal environment, the impetus for the programs came from outside the military in the civilian youth development field. The programs are consequently discussed in this chapter on the external environment.
— *Starbase*, a five-day program for 6–18 year olds aimed at math and science literacy. The FY93 DoD Bill appropriated $2 million for this program.\(^{15}\)

- **Civilian Community Corps**: Congress authorized $20 million for DoD to run two residential programs within the "new CCC," a modern-day version of the Civilian Conservation Corps camps run by the Army in the 1930s. A retired military officer will be the director of the new CCC, which will be housed to the maximum extent possible on excess space on military bases. One portion of the CCC is a Summer National Service Program for 14–18 year olds from disadvantaged backgrounds who will perform community service in their neighborhoods. In addition to a weekly subsistence stipend, participants will receive either $1000 educational credit or up to $500 in cash at the end of the summer.\(^{16}\) The second portion of the CCC, The National Service Program, will draw from a more diverse group of 16–24 year olds (though at least 50 percent should be economically disadvantaged) who will perform community service projects for one year. Corps members will receive a subsistence wage during the program and a $5000 educational credit or up to $2500 in cash at the end. The community service program will be supplemented by a service-learning curriculum designed to “promote team building, discipline, leadership, work, training, citizenship, and physical conditioning” and may also include advanced service training in coordination with vocational and technical schools. The program is an experiment to determine:

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\(^{15}\) Participating states for the Challenge program in FY93 are Arizona, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana, Georgia, Illinois, West Virginia, Maryland, New York, and Connecticut. Participating states for the Starbase program in FY93 are Oregon, New Mexico, Kansas, Minnesota, and Michigan.

\(^{16}\) At this point there is no link between the proposed CCC summer program and President Clinton’s Summer of Service program for summer 1993; however, it is possible that once the proper officials are in place in the Office of the Secretary of Defense to implement the CCC proposal, a link between the two programs will be created. In the meantime, the Army will help host the opening and closing weeks of the Summer of Service in support of the President’s pilot national service program. Interview with COL Richard Seitz, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army for Operations, March 19, 1993.
— for the country "whether residential service programs administered by the Federal Government can significantly increase the support for national service and community service by the people of the United States;"

— for individual participants "whether such programs can expand the opportunities for willing young men and women to perform meaningful, direct, and consequential acts of community service in a manner that will enhance their own skills while contributing to their understanding of civic responsibility;" and

— for the military whether retired members and former members of the armed forces discharged or released from active duty or discharged or transferred from the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve "in connection with reduced Department of Defense spending . . . can provide guidance and training under such programs that contribute meaningfully to the encouragement of national and community service."17

Table 2 provides a quick comparison of the National Guard programs and the Civilian Community Corps.

Legislatively Mandated Civilian-Military Partnerships

The various legislative initiatives have also created formal liaison responsibilities between the Department of Defense and the Commission on National and Community Service and between DoD and the CCC.

Links between DoD and the Commission: First, the National and Community Service Act authorized $30 million for the Commission to expand nonresidential youth service programs that will assist "in the economic transition of localities affected by Department of Defense conversion." The Commission is instructed to give special consideration to programs located in communities in which military

Table 2
Comparison of the National Guard Youth Programs and the Civilian Community Corps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>National Guard Youth Opportunities Program</th>
<th>Civilian Community Corps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policymaking responsibility</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs</td>
<td>Commission on National and Community Service with DoD liaison&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility for implementation</td>
<td>National Guard Bureau and participating states</td>
<td>At federal level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location of activities</td>
<td>National Guard facilities</td>
<td>To the maximum extent possible on military bases, including NG facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staffing responsibility</td>
<td>National Guard members and other civilian staff</td>
<td>Retired military personnel only</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>In addition, an advisory board for the CCC will consist of the Secretaries of Defense, Labor, Interior, Agriculture, Education, Housing and Urban Development, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, the Chairman of the Commission on National and Community Service, and outside representation from education, industry, voluntary organizations, and youth and labor unions.

installations have been closed, programs that employ retired, inactive, or discharged military personnel or that involve active military personnel in volunteer services, and programs that test the ability of military-trained youth to apply their skills and training to improving their communities.<sup>18</sup> This authorization is in addition to the three-year authorization of $270 million for the Commission. Second, the Director of the Commission on National and Community Service is responsible for monitoring the new CCC, coordinating their activities with other corps and youth service programs administered by the Commission, and conducting an annual evaluation of the military-run CCC program. Third, as part of the mandatory program for DoD

<sup>18</sup>The funds for the CCC and the Commission programs have not yet been released pending a ruling by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on whether these funds can be counted against the defense category of discretionary spending limits for 1993 or must be counted against the domestic category. If the latter, the appropriation would exceed the spending limit as defined in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 and, therefore, not be allocated. The new OMB Director will make the ruling.
to assist "members and former members of the armed forces to enter into public and community service jobs after discharge or release from active duty."\textsuperscript{19} DoD will transfer funds from active personnel accounts to the Commission to supplement the pay of retired service members who enter public and community service.\textsuperscript{20} Fourth, the National and Community Service Act specifies that for conservation and youth service corps,

the Commission shall make arrangements with the Secretary of Defense to have logistical support provided by a military installation near the work site, including the provision of temporary tent centers wherever needed, and other supplies and equipment.\textsuperscript{21}

In addition, the Act stipulates that the Commission must

coordinate with the Secretary of Defense in evaluating the effects of the national service demonstration program on the recruitment efforts of the active and reserve components of the Armed Forces, and carry out any other activities determined appropriate by the Secretary.\textsuperscript{22}

Finally, in June 1994 (or 24 months after its first programs are initiated), the Commission must submit a report to Congress on the impact of its programs on recruitment for the regular and reserve armed forces.\textsuperscript{23}

\textit{Links between DoD and the new CCC:} There are several additional links established between DoD and the CCC. First, the Director of the CCC (who will be a retired commissioned officer) "shall give consideration to retired, discharged, and other inactive members

\textsuperscript{20}The supplement will equal one half of the difference between the individual's retired or retainer pay and the CCC staff salary. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Conference Report, October 1, 1992, p. 225.
\textsuperscript{21}The Congressional Record, October 17, 1990.
\textsuperscript{22}Public Law 101-160 and The Congressional Record, October 17, 1990.
\textsuperscript{23}The Commission must also report on the effect of its programs on recruitment for the Peace Corps, VISTA, and older American volunteer programs.
and former members of the Armed Forces” for staff positions. Second, the Act establishes a liaison office under the Secretary of Defense to coordinate DoD activities with the CCC and to help recruit staff as part of the aforementioned mandatory DoD program to encourage and assist service members to enter public and community service jobs. Third, to the maximum extent possible the new CCCs will use excess capacity in military bases. Fourth, the Department of Labor and the Department of Defense will help identify and assist in establishing a recruiting system for young men and women Corps members. Fifth, armed forces recruiters may inform potential applicants about the Corps as an alternative to military service.

Growing Interest in Military-Modeled Youth Corps

Several national service models circulating in recent years have a substantial military component. The pedigree of these proposals traces back to William James’ speech in 1906, “The Moral Equivalent of War,” in which he proposed a mandatory period of service in coal mines, fishing fleets, dishwashing, and roadbuilding that would instill in America’s “gilded youth” the “military ideals of hardihood and discipline,” knock the “childishness” out of them, and send them “back into society with healthier sympathies and soberer ideas.” More recent debates about the military draft in the early 1970s included proposals for civilian service as an option for young men who chose not to serve in the military. West Germany has provided this option, called Zivildienst, since the introduction of conscription in 1957. In 1992, approximately 100,000 young Germans served in hospitals, child care centers, and homes for the elderly. Instead of 15 months of military service, young men can choose three years with

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25Memorandum from the Office of Senator Harris Wofford, co-sponsor of the CCC amendment, October 14, 1992.
26Memorandum from the Office of Senator Harris Wofford, co-sponsor of the CCC amendment, October 14, 1992.
the police or border patrol, two years with an overseas program like the Peace Corps, or ten years of an unpaid part-time commitment to civil defense and disaster relief.\textsuperscript{29}

Never before in U.S. history have so many disparate interests and conditions united in favor of a federal plan for youth development and for military participation in that plan. This fact suggests that the issue of youth development will become increasingly important for the Army.

This chapter summarizes Army involvement in youth development activities from the perspective of regulatory guidance, current programs, and implications for the Army.

POLICIES AND REGULATIONS CONCERNING VOLUNTEER ACTIVITIES

Army community service activity (whether to benefit youth or any other group) has been regulated by relatively few policies; however, primary among them was the Domestic Action Program, detailed in Army Regulation 28-19, rescinded in 1988. This 1975 regulation established policy, assigned responsibilities, and furnished general guidance for using Army personnel and physical resources to assist and support "the continued improvement and development of society." The program was intended to:

- Provide opportunities for cooperative civil/military efforts to foster mutual understanding,
- Advance equal opportunity and alleviate racial tension,
- Enrich the civilian economy by transfer of technological advances and manpower skills,
- Improve the environment and economic and social conditions in society,
- Provide training opportunities for individuals or units,
• Provide training opportunities for military and civilian members through voluntary involvement in community, state, and regional projects,

• Increase employment, training, educational, and recreational opportunities for disadvantaged citizens, and

• Enhance individual and unit morale through meaningful community involvement.¹

The program was decentralized under local commanders to permit them to assess their installation/unit capabilities in light of mission requirements and local needs. Commanders were encouraged to use innovative training techniques to gain or maintain mission readiness by integrating domestic action projects into training programs. Constraints on domestic action by the Army were designed to permit the widest flexibility in the use of Army resources without derogation of the military mission.² The constraints were intended to ensure that projects:

• Would not interfere with primary missions,

• Would be designed and selected so that sudden termination of Army involvement would not adversely affect the civilian community,

• Would not conflict with private enterprise or compete with the civilian labor force,

• Could not be accomplished more effectively or efficiently by other agencies,

• Would not endorse or benefit a private individual or group, corporation, sect, fraternal organization, quasi-religious or ideological political group, or be associated with solicitation of votes in an election.


² The program allowed for National Guard and reserve participation in funded training status if the project was mission related and contributed to readiness. Other projects less closely tied to training could earn National Guard and reserve members retirement credit points, but not pay.
• Would not detract from services to military personnel and their dependents or from service to civilian employees, and

• Would not involve enforcing the local law, statutes, or ordinances.

In practice, the regulation had a limited effect. Domestic action programs consisted largely of loans of equipment, meeting rooms, playing fields, and the like to community groups that approached Army installations. In 1988, the Army rescinded the regulation for reasons unknown even to the sponsoring office (DCSOPS). No effort was ever made to assess it while in force or the impact of the rescission and no new regulation has replaced it.

The second most important regulation affecting current or expanded Army volunteerism was outlined in an Office of Personnel Management (OPM) memorandum for federal employees participating in volunteer activities during federal working hours. Departments and agencies are encouraged to support the employee volunteers—the memorandum instructs departments and agencies to permit federal employees to arrange flexible schedules, job sharing, and leaves of absence to perform volunteer activities, unless such arrangements would harm "work operations and productivity." The memorandum also authorizes supervisors to grant, under certain circumstances, excused absences or administrative leaves with pay if the employee’s volunteer service "is directly related to the department’s or agency’s mission, is officially sanctioned by the head of the department or agency, or will clearly enhance the professional development or skills of the employee in his or her current position."3 In addition, the OPM memorandum suggests that agencies acknowledge and recognize the contributions of employee volunteers as part of their own ongoing recognition and awards program to demonstrate the federal government’s interest in and support of employees who participate in community service activities.4

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4 In 1992, President Bush signed Executive Order No. 12820 to increase federal employees’ opportunities for community service. It requires every executive agency to implement and oversee an employee community service awareness program to encourage participation in service initiatives that address such problems as homeless-
Third, DoD directives enable the Army to establish affiliations with specified private voluntary organizations, which includes permission to establish offices or chapters of such organizations on Army installations and to receive small amounts of logistical support and services (e.g., meeting and activity space, equipment loans, utilities). DoD sanctions affiliations with a number of "youth development" organizations, by which DoD means organizations that promote "the total development of youth up to age 18 by offering quality programs and information that foster social and recreational skills, and otherwise promote personal growth of youth." This directive also sets out relevant policies on social services for Army families and communities. Although this directive pertains mainly to the Army rather than the civilian community, it is important to understand what the Army offers its own members and families when considering Army service in the civilian community more generally.

"SERVICE TO THE NATION": CURRENT ARMY CONTRIBUTIONS

The Army's primary contribution to youth development consists of educating and training its own enlistees, many of whom are from disadvantaged backgrounds. The Army's success in this regard is well documented and well recognized.

Less well known, even within the Army, are the community service activities that individuals and units in the Army perform that benefit youth, cooperative programs between the Army and the Department of Education to support educational reform, and transition programs that help early retirees work in youth development programs. Current Army activity has evolved piecemeal and has come unintentionally to focus on civilian youth. In addition, the Army makes no attempt to assess the ramifications of its community service programs. These two observations become relevant now as the Army

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ness, illiteracy, AIDS, teenage pregnancy, and the environment. The Commission and the White House Office of National Service will serve as resources for information and support for federal agencies implementing the Executive Order.

2Department of Defense Directive No. 1342.17, December 30, 1988. The directive authorizes DoD affiliations with the following youth organizations: Junior Army Navy Guild Organization (JANGO), 4-H Clubs, Scouting Organizations, Little League, and youth organizations within religious groups.
considers how to respond to the increasing pressure to help the nation’s youth.

**Army Community Service Activities for Youth Development**

A recent compilation of National Guard activities documents over 300 separate activities benefitting youth, senior citizens, disabled children, needy families, and communities at large with drug demand reduction, park and trail renovation, cleanups, and emergency/survival education. See Table 3.

A similar catalogue of active and reserve Army activities collected at the request of the Chief of Staff of the Army documented several hundred additional efforts.⁶

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Guard Community Service</th>
<th>Loan equipment, facilities, etc.</th>
<th>Loans plus volunteers</th>
<th>Co-sponsor of activity</th>
<th>Sole sponsor of activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mentor/tutor programs for youth</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>12&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>32&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disadvantaged youth</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs and youth</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disabled youth</td>
<td>13&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>13&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With youth groups (Scouts, Little League, etc.)</td>
<td>15&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>22&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular community service</td>
<td>8&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>15&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special events</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community education and training</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donations only</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3**

**National Guard Community Service by Type and Level of Effort**

SOURCE: Data compiled by the National Guard Bureau.

<sup>a</sup>Substantial effort within a single program.

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⁶Not included are data from the U.S. Military Academy, which has a strong student community service component (although it has no community service coordinator or mandatory community service requirement for cadets, as there is at the U.S. Air Force Academy). Approximately 20 of over 100 student clubs at West Point are oriented toward community service and sponsor such activities as the Special Olympics, Big Brothers/Big Sisters, and Scouts’ events. MAJ Paul McCarthy, RAND Army Fellow, supplied information on military academy programs.
These data demonstrate not only the quantity of volunteer and community services performed and provided (i.e., in some cases Army members do not participate, but facilities and equipment are loaned or donated) but also the breadth of activities. Within this wide range of activities, the Army has concentrated on the needs of youth, and at-risk youth in particular. In the National Guard data, well over 55 percent of the efforts are targeted at youth. Many of the National Guard's most intensive programs concentrate on at-risk youth. If anti-drug efforts are also included, then the percentage of National Guard youth programs that concentrate on at-risk youth is over 22 percent.

The data indicating a focus on youth development in Army volunteer programs do not include the Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps established by the National Defense Act of 1916 to "inculcate high ideals and correct views on the duties of the citizen to the State."  

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7The concentration on at-risk youth is not entirely inadvertent since the regulation governing community service instructs the Army to focus community service on disadvantaged citizens, which includes most at-risk youth (Army Regulation No. 28-15, Domestic Action Program, March 13, 1975). However, this regulation had little effect on the direction of volunteer programs.

8This information was compiled by voluntary reports or through a general request for community service activities to the major commands by the U.S. Army Office, Chief of Public Affairs. Consequently, the data are incomplete and inconsistent, particularly for the active and reserve Army. However, even with these caveats in mind, it is possible to say with confidence that youth development is a major focus of Army community service. Unfortunately, the shortcomings of the data make it impossible to use them to compare Army volunteer rates with the rest of the population. In the nation as a whole, an estimated 54.4 percent of adults (18 years and older) volunteered an average of four hours per week in 1989. Approximately 75 percent of the 20.5 billion hours of their volunteer time involved formal volunteer commitments to organizations and 25 percent involved informal volunteer help to neighbors or assistance to organizations on an ad hoc basis. Eighteen percent of the activity was for religious organizations, 10 percent for education, 10 percent for youth development, 9 percent for human services, and 7 percent for health. These data were collected by Virginia Ann Hodgkinson, Murray S. Weitzman, Christopher M., Toppe, and Stephen M. Noga. The Nonprofit Almanac 1992-1993: Dimensions of the Independent Sector (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers), 1992.

9Military Training In Public Schools, Senate Document No. 452, 64th Congress, First Session, May 17, 1916. The JROTC program is governed by:

- Title 10, United States Code, Section 2031, which in addition to requiring the services to establish JROTC programs (made mandatory because the Army has tried to cancel the program in the past), requires that these units be equitably distributed throughout the country;
JROTC programs sponsored by the Army operate in 856 high schools for approximately 130,000 "cadets."\footnote{The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps also operate JROTC programs in high schools throughout the country.} This extracurricular program seeks to encourage citizenship, develop leadership potential, strengthen self-esteem, improve physical fitness, promote high school completion, and help students stay away from drugs. It includes academic and technical tracks, health and first aid, and draws upon military diagnostic testing, technology, and leadership training and expertise. In addition, the Army and the other services subsidize the salaries of the retired military instructors who run the program.

The JROTC program has rather broad legislative authority, with one exception: The current law does not authorize hiring officers and noncommissioned officers who have been separated but not retired (i.e., many of those affected by the current drawdown). The retirees draw their retired pay plus the difference between retired pay and what their pay and allowances would be if they had remained on active duty. The Army and the high school each pay half the difference. The program is funded within the DoD budget.

This concentration of volunteer effort is noteworthy in that it has come about unintentionally. Army leadership did not assess its capabilities, its comparative advantages, or the areas of greatest need. The focus on youth developed willy-nilly through many simultaneous and independent efforts by individuals and groups throughout the Army and National Guard over many years. In fact, had the Army sought to set a strategy for volunteerism for its members, it would have searched in vain for models or lessons in the civilian sector. Until very recently, there has been almost no attention given to designing community service programs for large organizations whose primary purpose is something other than community service (e.g., IBM and Johnson & Johnson).\footnote{Only now that more large employers have decided to sponsor employee volunteerism is there a chance that planning strategy for other employers to follow will be developed. Nascent efforts are under way at the Points of Light Foundation and pos-}

\footnote{DoD Directive 1265.13, which defines the intent of the program and specifies responsibilities of the Army and schools involved in the program; and
Army Regulation 145-2, which governs the Army’s portion of the program.}
is (1) a relatively new concept and (2) not as complicated or risky as, for example, designing an employee health benefits plan for which there is a great deal of support and expertise.

The qualitative and quantitative effects of such volunteer services and programs have not been examined. For example, the JROTC program, despite its more than 75 years in existence, and the Adopt-A-School Program established in 1984, remain virtually unevaluated.\textsuperscript{12} Until the second half of 1992, the Army had not attempted to collect data on the Adopt-A-School Program. These omissions can be explained by volunteers’ orientation toward action rather than reflection, the relatively small stakes that are involved for the Army, the widespread acceptance and support for volunteerism and youth programs, and by the fact that these efforts supplement rather than compete with other youth programs. However, with the increased national attention on youth service and congressional funding for evaluating possible model programs for youth service, it is likely that in the next few years a wave of studies on youth development programs will help identify what types of programs are most successful and why. Certainly, the Army’s recent attempts to collect data on its voluntary youth programs will not only serve as solid evidence of the Army’s current contributions, but will also provide data for those outside the Army who are trying to evaluate youth programs more broadly.

\footnotetext{\textsuperscript{12}For example, an Army assessment of the 1980-1985 JROTC expansion plan noted that the expansion had been conducted without an analysis of the program. However, that assessment itself evaluated the JROTC only in terms of its impact on Army recruiting and its image within the Army without assessing the program’s impact on nonmilitary bound youth. (JROTC Study Group Report, Volume II: Junior ROTC Program, Study Group for the Chief of Staff of the Army, May 1986.) The Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has recently solicited proposals for a three-year longitudinal study of the JROTC program. The Air Force has purchased and distributed to all its installations materials on setting up youth service programs, but no effort was made to determine whether they were used or if they were effective. The creators of the materials themselves (United Way and StarServe) have only anecdotal reports of the materials’ usefulness.}
Army Support for Educational Reform Plans

After President Bush launched his America 2000 educational reform plan in 1991, Secretary Dick Cheney committed the Department of Defense to the National Education Goals developed by the nation’s governors and requested a DoD-wide plan to support the President’s plan for achieving those goals. These actions prompted the Secretary of the Army to outline an Army plan to: (1) Implement the America 2000 plan in dependents’ schools, and (2) expand upon ongoing volunteer activities to create an Armywide mentoring and tutoring program. In response, Forces Command (FORSCOM) has turned to Fort Sam Houston’s mentoring program to serve as a model for several pilot programs on other installations; the Major Commands (MACOMs) recently submitted a report on their activities for youth and education (including data on Army and youth participants, data on the schools’ and Army units involved, and an accounting of resources utilized, and an application to the America 2000 plan); and each MACOM designated a Point of Contact for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel who will oversee the implementation of the DoD plan to support America 2000.

In June 1992, the Secretaries of Defense and Education signed a memorandum of understanding to develop a collaborative effort between their departments for youth education. The end result was a pilot program combining the military’s Junior Reserve Officer Training program, outlined above, with an innovative model of a specialized vocational “academy” within a school. The “Career Academies,” as they are called, will provide academic instruction, vocational and technical training, and work and life skills training for the transition from school to work for at-risk students. In August 1992, through the efforts of General Colin Powell (a JROTC graduate himself), President Bush pledged a near-doubling of the size of the JROTC program from 1500 to 2900 high schools by 1996. “Expansion of this program is the Department’s best opportunity to make an immediate impact on youth skill development,” the DoD announced. “The expanded JROTC will provide at-risk youth with positive instructor role models, an alternative to gangs and drug use, and
an incentive to stay in high school and graduate.\footnote{13}{Junior Reserve Officers Training Corps for At-Risk Youth," News Release from the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), August 24, 1992.} The Army will likely double the number of its JROTC programs to 1700, which, if extrapolated from current participation rates, would reach a quarter of a million youth.

**Early Retirees Transitioning into Youth Programs**

In 1992, the Secretary of the Army signed a memorandum of understanding with the president of the largest dropout prevention program in the country, Cities in Schools, to aid the transition of retiring Army personnel into program directorship and administration of Cities in Schools programs. Since 1977, Cities in Schools has developed a program through public-private partnerships that coordinates and channels a community's social services directly into the schools to reach students at risk of dropping out. In particular, Cities in Schools moves existing local social service workers into the schools to work alongside teachers and administrators. Cities in Schools operates through a national network of regional, state, and local programs, with the national headquarters providing training, technical assistance, and informational services. Each program is funded, staffed, and operated locally. In 1984, there were five Cities in Schools programs in operation when the Department of Justice funded 13 additional programs. By 1988, 26 programs operated at 128 sites; and by 1992, 64 programs operated at 384 sites. As the growth of Cities in Schools programs surges, in part through the attention of the Bush Administration, experienced program directors and administrators are supplied through the agreement with the Army to start up and staff these labor-intensive programs and provide leadership for new state-level organizations. For the Army this is one example of programs that ease the transition of individuals voluntarily or involuntarily retiring from military service.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ARMY**

The foregoing discussion suggests that national service and youth development through community service will be important national-
level issues in the coming years. If it is true, as some claim, that the National and Community Service Act was the first of several legislative steps (and the youth programs in the 1993 DoD authorization bill the second) leading to enactment of the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) plan, then there are important consequences for the Army.

To understand these consequences, one needs to understand different notions of national service, which in turn have different implications for the Army. All proponents see national service as a means of accomplishing three principal goals:

- Fostering greater civic consciousness and responsibility, particularly among youth.
- Marshaling the nation’s human resources to meet national needs.
- Providing opportunities for young people to serve their country.

Two additional groups of proponents have two other goals for national service:

- Asking youth to give something back for the benefits they receive (e.g., student loans, housing subsidies). These proponents argue that at a time of crushing national debt, this program spends one dollar to accomplish two objectives (improve youth, improve communities) and that part of that dollar can be found in the federal student loan program.\(^\text{14}\)

- Equalizing the burdens of citizenship that now fall disproportionately on the shoulders of America’s minority and lower income youth serving in the military. Proponents argue that although their program would be voluntary, more middle and upper income youth would participate to defray the rising costs of

\(^{14}\) The Citizen Corps would also include senior citizens who would help administer and supervise youth programs, thereby defraying the Corps’ overhead costs and supplementing their retirement incomes. The National and Community Service Act contains an optional authorization for two types of senior citizen grants: (1) to Foster Grandparents programs that place senior citizens in Head Start programs, and (2) to employer-based retiree volunteer programs developed by public and private nonprofit organizations.
college tuition, and some proportion of these participants would serve in the military.

The DLC model seeks to achieve all five goals and is probably the most prominent model at present. As such, it has substantial implications for the Army. Under this plan, a new type of military enlistee would become part of the "Citizens Corps" and would serve either in the Selected Reserve for six years or in the active component for two years and the Selected Reserve for two years. These "citizen soldiers" would become "the contemporary equivalent of the draftee—someone who joins the military to fulfill a civic duty, not to make a career."15 As noted above, aspects of this model were adopted in the final National and Community Service Act, which is viewed by many as an essential building block of a national service program. The national service program would likely incorporate key aspects of the DLC plan, including an umbrella program for both civilian and military service and two tracks within the military services.

A second implication for the Army stems from the desire to capitalize on the Cold War investment in the military, recognition that the military has successfully trained and developed a relatively diverse population,16 and the availability of appropriations to develop and test innovative youth development programs. The Army may feel increasing pressure to contribute its resources and expertise to youth development programs. It may be approached by organizations that seek civilian-military collaborations and possibly required to enter into civilian-military partnerships by Congress. For example, the Commission plans to find ways to forge civilian-military links for youth development programs in addition to those already established in the Act.17 Congress has already offered opportunities and assigned new responsibilities to the military, such as National Guard


16*Relatively* because African-Americans are overrepresented in the Army and individuals from wealthy backgrounds are underrepresented compared to their representation in the population as a whole.

17Interview with Commissioner Shirley Sagawa, October 1992. The recently retired Chairman of the Board of Commissioners and current Commissioner, former Congressman Pete McCloskey, is a longtime advocate of mandatory national service and a proponent of military-modeled youth corps.
youth corps on military installations, directorship of the new CCCs, instruction to use excess capacity on military installations for the new CCCs, subsidies for retiring military who staff the new CCCs, and logistical support to youth service and conservation corps from military installations near their work site, including the provision of temporary tent centers and other supplies and equipment.18

Third, the JROTC program may be of particular interest to the national service community given its parallel objectives—enhancing civic responsibility, personal and academic skills, and the like. Although to date little research exists on the JROTC program from which to draw lessons, there is new public and private money available for evaluating programs, experimenting with new programs, and replicating the most successful models in unserved and underserved areas. This is an opportunity for the Army to quantify and highlight the successes of its program.

Fourth, given growing interest in employer-sponsored volunteer activities, the Army may feel pressure from inside and outside the Army to provide such programs to its employees. The Points of Light Foundation, established under President Bush, set as one of its objectives the expansion of employer-sponsored service programs. In the National and Community Service Act, appropriations were earmarked to develop and distribute these programs.

Finally, the combination of a larger proportion of the Army based at home and the consequent longer tour durations will change the way that individuals in the Army, as well as Army installations as a whole, interact with the surrounding civilian community. This change is reflected in the Army Installations Strategy for the 21st Century, which pledges to transform Army installations from “isolated self-sufficient outposts inherited from past generations” to “valued neighbors, trusted partners, and recognized leaders in city management and public administration.” The strategy envisions installations establishing partnerships with local authorities to share responsibility for support and service activities normally provided by the installation.

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18The Army hosted a week-long training program for over 1000 youth participants in President Clinton's Summer in Service program in June 1993. (Conversations with COL Richard Setz, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army for Operations, the Army liaison to the White House for the Summer of Service program, March 1993.)
such as water and waste disposal, recreation, fire protection, libraries, and training support. Efforts to cultivate and improve base-community relations may direct more attention to volunteer efforts in local communities and generate demands to harness and direct these disparate efforts into an overall Army plan for community relations.

The trends and programs outlined in Chapter Two on the external environment reflect a growing willingness and desire to turn to the military for help with civilian youth programs. This chapter has highlighted the many ways the Army has supported youth development over the years, as well as initial responses to these external pressures in the last year or two.

In light of these trends and possible implications for the Army, it is in the Army's interest to consider what it can do in support of youth development. The following chapter outlines five options for consideration.

Chapter Four

POLICY OPTIONS

This chapter outlines five options for Army support to youth development identified in this research. They are: status quo, major installations as locus of activity, employer-sponsored volunteerism, national-level partnerships, and national service model. The options represent benchmarks of increasing involvement and commitment by the Army, and constitute an array of activities for Army involvement in the development of the nation’s youth. Other options are possible (for example, Army involvement in a national service program could take different forms depending on the models of national service that may be enacted); however, they are likely to share essential characteristics with these options.

FOUR DIMENSIONS TO DESCRIBE AND COMPARE OPTIONS

The five options can be characterized in terms of four different dimensions that distinguish the potential scope of Army involvement:

1. **Responsibility** describes the degree of Army control and accountability for each option. Will the Army act independently or collaboratively? Will the Army formulate, implement, evaluate, and pay for these activities on its own or share those responsibilities with outside organizations, either public or private?

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1 The intent is to distinguish various organizational mechanisms through which the Army may become involved in youth development programs. These distinctions were generated to support systematic comparison of the policy options with respect to activities and potential effects.
Commitment characterizes the Army's approach to youth development and the types of activities involved. Will the Army take a laissez faire approach (i.e., primarily or exclusively voluntary activities, with some institutional support) or actively develop programs with the requisite funding and staff? Will a significant investment of time, resources, and leadership be required?

Management describes to what extent control over, and accountability for, design and implementation of activities or programs will be centralized or decentralized within the Army.

Participating personnel describes the scope and type of individual involvement in each option. Who in the Army participates? Do efforts focus on the active Army, reserves, National Guard, civilian, retired personnel, or families?

Table 4 summarizes and compares the five options along these four dimensions. The options are shown in the rows of the table and the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>Commitment</th>
<th>Management</th>
<th>Participating Personnel(^a)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Status quo</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Laissez faire</td>
<td>Decentralized</td>
<td>AC, AR, NG, civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major installations as locus</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Laissez faire</td>
<td>Decentralized</td>
<td>AC, civilians, families; AR and NG where appropriate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer-sponsored volunteerism</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Laissez faire, but programmatic support</td>
<td>Centralized coordination, decentralized implementation</td>
<td>AC, AR, NG, civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National partnerships</td>
<td>Collaborative</td>
<td>Programmatic, with some voluntary programs</td>
<td>Centralized</td>
<td>AC, AR, NG, civilians, alumni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National service</td>
<td>Collaborative</td>
<td>Programmatic</td>
<td>Centralized</td>
<td>AC, AR, NG, civilians</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)AC = Active Component, AR = Army Reserve, NG = National Guard.
dimensions in the table's columns. The cell entries describe each option according to the various dimensions. For example, the table shows that the status quo option, not surprisingly, is likely to require little change in any of the dimensions, the major installations and employer-sponsored volunteerism options require changes to expand existing programs throughout the Army with centralized coordination in the case of employer-sponsored volunteerism, whereas the remaining options require substantial changes in the degree of collaboration with outside organizations and programmatic commitment by the Army.

**STATUS QUO**

This option represents a minimalist response to the question of what else the Army can do for America's youth. The Army would continue the current array of Army volunteer activities described in Chapter Three and temporarily continue the various new activities the Army has undertaken recently to assist early retirees with transitions into youth development programs (e.g., facilitating entrance into teaching programs, identifying early retirees for program leadership and administration in agreement with Cities in Schools, or identifying minority retirees for teaching careers in agreement with a consortium of historically Black colleges, universities, and corporations). The Army's response to the DoD initiative to support America 2000 education reform is an example of this option. The Secretary of the Army looked at what the Army already does, attempted to coordinate that activity under an umbrella program, and encouraged the MACOMs to build upon these initiatives as part of the umbrella pro-

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2The status quo in this case describes the Army prior to the recent groundswell of initiatives in youth development, which at this point are too new to determine their long-term impact. Consequently, this option would include such programs as the expanded JROTC and the partnership with Cities In Schools (until the drawdown is completed), but exclude the new National Guard youth programs, the new CCCs, the JROTC-Career Academies, and programs with the Commission on National and Community Service (except a temporary transition program during the drawdown).

3National Consortium for Educational Access, Inc. (NCEA) proposed a partnership with the Army for "transitioning military personnel into civilian careers as educators" in K-12 schools as well as colleges. Letter from Leroy Ervin, NCEA Executive Director, to Mr. Robert Emmerichs, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, December 1, 1992.
Program, while emphasizing that additional effort should also be on a voluntary basis.⁴

Responsibility

Under this option, the Army would retain sole responsibility for its activities. The many partnerships that individuals, installations, and units currently enter into with civilian entities (e.g., local schools, housing authorities, and youth organizations) would continue to be limited; ending them might hurt the Army's local community relations, but not the Army as a whole.

Commitment

This laissez faire option would restrict additional effort to assisting separates with obtaining employment in youth development programs (probably only during the reduction in force during the 1990s) and obtaining credit for what Army volunteers already do. It involves predominantly voluntary efforts with some centralized public relations support, though not enough to require new staff positions or programs. The Army would begin to collect and disseminate information on these efforts, seeking to inform outside audiences of current Army contributions.

Management

Development, implementation, and support of current volunteer activities would be entirely decentralized down to either the individual, unit, or in a few cases, post command level. Transition help for retiring service members, on the other hand, would be centrally conceived and implemented, but, again, viewed as a temporary service for early retirees due to the drawdown.

⁴Memorandum from the Chief of Staff of the Army to the MACOMs, November 14, 1991.
Participating Personnel

The Army would seek to capture the story of volunteer service by all current and retired, military and civilian, active and reserve personnel. Additional participation under this option would be limited to public affairs officers from the Department of the Army level down to the unit level. Assistance with transitions into new careers related to youth development activities would extend to active and reserve, military and civilian personnel, and recent early retirees.

MAJOR INSTALLATIONS AS THE LOCUS OF ACTIVITY

Under this option, the Army would make major installations the locus of youth development activity and restrict additional efforts to developing, supporting, and encouraging voluntary activities to benefit youth in communities surrounding major installations.\(^5\) For example, Fort Sam Houston already runs an extensive mentoring program, with nearly 300 Army mentors, for at-risk youth in seven San Antonio schools as well as “Outward Bound”-type weekend camps for hundreds of San Antonio’s at-risk youth.\(^6\) Possible programs for all major installations would include replicating the Fort Sam Houston model, supporting the introduction of JROTC programs in surrounding high schools, recruiting local Army retirees to establish and staff Cities in Schools and other highly visible programs, providing logistical support to nearby youth service and conservation corps as outlined in the National and Community Service Act, and running one-day “serve-a-thons” for community youth—an increasingly popular and visible outgrowth of youth programs that involve the entire community for a day of service.

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\(^5\)The definition for an active Army installation is “an aggregation of contiguous or near contiguous, common mission-supporting real property holdings under the jurisdiction of the DoD controlled by and at which an active Army unit or activity is permanently assigned.” (Base Structure Report for Fiscal Year 1993, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production and Logistics), February 1992.) DoD defines a “major installation” as having at least 5000 service members and civilian employees assigned to it.

\(^6\)Fort Sam Houston’s mentorship and drug demand reduction programs received one of the Secretary of Defense’s “Military Services Community Drug Awareness Awards” in 1993.
Responsibility

Responsibility for activities would remain within the Army. However, the number of partnerships with community organizations, but not the scope of such partnerships, would necessarily increase as more installations establish programs for local youth.

Commitment

The activities under this option would be voluntary. Army volunteer efforts, with modest support rather than a specific Army program, would be directed toward youth development. Installations might undertake youth activities that require paid staff time or other resources, but only as offshoots of volunteer programs that would be covered by installation recreation programs, outside contributions, or training accounts.

This option would expand upon existing activities by ensuring that some sort of youth development program would operate at all major Army installations, but would be limited to fewer than 50 locations and the communities surrounding them and would be, therefore, modest in comparison with the remaining three options below.  

Management

Each installation would have a full-time or part-time volunteer program coordinator in the Morale, Welfare and Recreation division, the Chaplain's office, or the installation commander's office. A Navy program to support and encourage volunteering for youth activities

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7The major Army installations affected by this option include: Fort McClellan (AL), Fort Rucker (AL), Fort Richardson (AK), Fort Wainwright (AK), Fort Huachuca (AR), Fort Irwin (CA), Fort Ord (CA), Fort Carson (CO), Fort Benning (GA), Fort Gordon (GA), Fort Stewart (GA), Schofield Barracks (HI), Fort Benjamin Harrison (IN), Fort Leavenworth (KS), Fort Riley (KS), Fort Campbell (KY), Fort Knox (KY), Fort Polk (LA), Fort Meade (MD), Fort Devens (MA), Fort Leonard Wood (MO), Fort Monmouth (NJ), Fort Drum (NY), Fort Bragg (NC), Fort Sill (OK), Fort Jackson (SC), Fort Bliss (TX), Fort Hood (TX), Fort Sam Houston (TX), Fort Belvoir (VA), Fort Ruckers (VA), Fort Lee (VA), and Fort Lewis (WA), as well as miscellaneous special facilities such as arsenals (Redstone (AL), Rock Island (IL), Detroit (MI), Picatinny (NJ)), R&D centers (Aberdeen Proving Ground (MD) and White Sands Missile Range (NM)), Walter Reed Army Medical Center (MD), and the Letterkenny Army Depot (PA).
assigns at least a part-time program coordinator to every station or ship commander. Although control over the programs’ design and implementation would likely remain decentralized in the hands of the Army volunteers themselves, installation commanders would probably show more interest and exert more control over programs than at present since these programs would be a mandatory part of their installation’s activities. The Department of the Army’s role would virtually end once it issues a policy for youth programs at major installations.

**Participating Personnel**

Army volunteers for youth development would be recruited from among service members, civilians, and family members who live and work on or near major installations. A reserve unit or retiree organization affiliated with an installation would also be enlisted. Participation might extend to civilian contractors closely integrated into particular installations. In other words, all members of the installation community would have an opportunity to volunteer to help local youth.

**EMPLOYER-SPONSORED VOLUNTEERISM**

In contrast to the previous option, under this option Army leadership would develop, support, and encourage volunteer activities throughout the organization in a dual commitment to Army volunteerism and civilian youth development. For example, IBM sponsors employee volunteer programs (adopt-a-school and mentoring programs), provides cash and IBM products to support projects in which employees volunteer, and grants leaves with full pay to work in nonprofit organizations. Half of IBM’s U.S. workforce volunteer in its communities. An Army-sponsored program of volunteerism for youth development could support a panoply of diverse activities (including individuals serving as mentors in nearby schools, units adopting a neighborhood youth center, or installations offering access to and training on computers or sports or other facilities to

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8 The Commander of the Naval Military Personnel Command issues a Personnel Excellence Partnership Guidebook to all ships and stations.
lower-income school districts); or it could support one program for the whole Army, such as a literacy or fitness campaign, focusing the Army's resources on a particular aspect of youth development. However, unlike the first two options, the Secretary of the Army or the Army Chief of Staff would be more active. Army headquarters would ensure, facilitate, and provide technical support for implementation, in addition to collecting information. Information would be collected not just for external distribution, as in the first two options, but also for coordinating and sharing lessons across the Army.

Responsibility

The Army would retain responsibility for its activities, budgets, staff, and objectives, although, again, limited partnerships with local community groups would be encouraged. The higher profile and public expectations of this option in contrast to the previous two would make it a more difficult program to abandon, thereby weakening the Army's exclusive control.

Commitment

This option would expand Army efforts substantially by committing the entire institution to the twin objectives of volunteerism and helping youth. Army leadership would commit itself to achieving certain participation rates for volunteer activity for youth development (e.g., by half or most Army personnel), rather than just supporting the relatively few that now volunteer (as in the first option). This option's voluntary efforts would be, bolstered by leadership support and recognition, a centralized clearinghouse of information, centralized guidelines, and modest technical and financial support, including part-time program coordinators. The Army would create and fund an umbrella program, possibly along the lines of the Navy's Personnel Excellence Program, but stop short of undertaking youth development as an organizational objective.

Management

There are two variations to this option. One variation would centralize design of objectives, coordination, and financial support, but de-
centralize implementation of a menu of particular activities (e.g., similar to the Navy's Personal Excellence Program and the National Guard’s Drug Demand Reduction campaign). Army headquarters would provide a menu of programs under a national umbrella that stresses the youth development theme, but allow installations and individuals to tailor their programs to their own and their community's needs. The other variation would centralize both policymaking and implementation in the Department of the Army and, consequently, standardize the program throughout the organization. Army leadership would provide centrally planned and funded programs and hold installations and individuals accountable for successful implementation. In either variation, the Department of the Army would coordinate and build upon existing volunteer efforts both in service of Army communities and surrounding localities and establish a strategy for expanding and maximizing their impact on youth. Additional specific responsibilities would be (1) providing incentives and rewards for participation to individuals, units, and other parts of the organization (2) collecting and disseminating information to participants (3) developing and providing support materials (4) adopting necessary regulations to permit expanded Army volunteerism and, importantly, (5) providing funding.

**Participating Personnel**

This option would employ current Army personnel, not their families, retirees, or civilian contractors, since they are not technically part of the organization. It would, however, encompass both active and reserve, military and civilian personnel.

**NATIONAL-LEVEL PARTNERSHIPS**

This option would involve more than channeling voluntary activities toward youth development and sharing control over such activities with outside organizations. The Army would seek and forge partnerships with civilian agencies and organizations, public and private, whose primary purpose is youth development. It would integrate into its organizational objectives a commitment to both the success of these civil-military partnerships as well as the more specific purpose of the partnerships (e.g., dropout prevention, vocational training).
For example, a vocational training partnership might train civilian youth in Army vocational programs. It might also involve agreements with civilian job training programs, such as The Jobs Corps, to train civilian youth in high demand skill categories in the Selected Reserve and set aside Selected Reserve positions for a portion of them upon completion. In addition, it might consider sabbaticals for Army personnel to work in youth development organizations (e.g., partnerships for providing staff support and training in youth service corps) and training programs for science and math teachers in public schools (e.g., partnerships with the Department of Education, state and local school systems, and teachers’ organizations). The Cities in Schools partnership to channel retirees into program directorship and administration is an example of this option. It contains the elements of a national-level partnership in that it commits the Army not only to making a civilian-military partnership succeed, but also to sharing some responsibility for one of its objectives—transition out of military service and into civilian employment—with an outside partner.

Responsibility

Unlike the three previous options, this option would assume a willingness to share control, leadership, resources, and accountability for youth development programs with outside entities, either governmental or private. For example, a partnership with the civilian vocational education community committed to at-risk youth might give outside civilian educators an opportunity to assess and possibly provide input into Army vocational training programs. Partnerships for assisting youth with “school-to-work” transitions might include recruiting youth at risk of failing to make that transition into a special Army program built upon the family services the Army provides its own members (e.g., substance abuse counseling, education and career counseling, financial responsibility). A performance evaluation of the Army program in the partnership might include the civilian partner’s assessment of the impact on civilian youth. The Civilian Community Corps, described in Chapter Two, illustrates this option: A former military officer will head the CCC and to the maximum extent possible retired or discharged military personnel will run the CCC camps on underutilized bases, but the Commission on National
and Community Service and the Department of Defense will share oversight and administration of the program.\footnote{This is an imperfect example since the Commission will have primary responsibility and DoD will play a supportive role in the partnership.}

Commitment

Army efforts for youth would be expanded under this option. It assumes a bold commitment to youth development and to new military-civilian partnerships to achieve national youth objectives. Army leadership would seek out, forge, and cultivate new civil-military cooperatives and would draw upon portions of the Army not now involved with assisting civilian youth.

This option would not preclude volunteer service; indeed, volunteering could be part of a national-level partnership with volunteer organizations such as Big Brothers/Big Sisters or the United Way, in which the partners would share a common objective and responsibility for its accomplishment (e.g., achieving certain mentoring participation rates). However, in contrast to the previous three options, this option would also draw on existing programs, assets, and personnel as part of their normal duties. Partnerships might tap other Army resources, such as the training infrastructure, to train civilian youth in electronics, nursing, computer programming or health services to provide education and care to disadvantaged youth.

Management

A partnership at the national level would be centrally organized within the Army. Formulation of policy, regulations, program design, and evaluation would take place at the Department of the Army level. Oversight for implementation would be centralized as well, though actual implementation might be decentralized. For example, Army participation in vocational training partnerships might be supervised and evaluated by TRADOC, but implemented at the various Army training sites (e.g., at the Transportation School at Fort Eustis, Virginia, for truck driver training). A partnership for providing basic training and remedial skills to at-risk youth might be centrally de-
signed and organized by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel or the Recruiting Command, but implemented at various recruiting and training sites throughout the country. For this option to succeed, the Army would identify successful partners, such as those identified by the Commission on National and Community Service, Congress, and the "Points of Light" awards.

Participating Personnel

Participation would be a function of the types and objectives of the partnerships and would most probably be limited to active and reserve, military and civilian personnel. In some cases, retirees would also participate. For example, the JROTC-Career Academy collaboration between the Departments of Defense and Education draws upon military retirees as JROTC instructors. Other than screening applicants, paying a portion of their salary, and overseeing the operation of the JROTC component, the military services are untouched by this partnership. However, it is a rather modest effort and other more ambitious products of such a partnership would likely involve current Army personnel and units.

NATIONAL SERVICE MODEL

Under this option, the Army would embrace the concept of national service and work with Congress and government agencies to formulate and implement the Army’s role within the federal plan. Given the many competing concepts of national service, we can envision several possible roles for the Army. The Army role might involve creating and integrating a new type of enlistee, the citizen soldier, as described above in Chapter Three; (this might include coordinating military and civilian service benefits, modifying Army benefits, and mitigating possible effects on recruiting and training the All Volunteer Force). Or it might organize and operate the national service program, recruit and process youth into the national service program, or locate, track, and match national service jobs to available youth.
Responsibility

Like the previous option, this option would involve sharing responsibilities with other organizations. External partners might include the Commission on National and Community Service (or its successor under the national plan), civilian youth organizations, and the Departments of Labor, Education, and Health and Human Services. Control would shift from the Army to Congress under what would likely be a congressionally mandated program. For example, the Army may not be able to control key aspects of the program, such as selecting civilian partners, determining how many youth will participate, and determining the level of benefits the civilian national service participants will receive compared with regular enlistees.

Commitment

This option would represent the most ambitious and expansive Army program for youth development. Like the previous option, it would incorporate youth development into the Army’s organizational objectives; unlike the previous option, it would go one step further than forging partnerships with leaders in youth development and incorporate the Army into a national plan for youth development, as outlined in Chapter Two.

The Army’s volunteer activities for youth would supplement this option but not be the driving force behind it. This plan would create a new type of enlistee to perform the same activities as other enlistees (basic training, advanced skills training, active duty service). They would be identical to their peers in every way, except possibly for their term of service and benefits. Under some proposals these, too, would be standardized for both national service and regular enlistees.

Management

The overall national service plan would be designed by an interagency team, and would probably include the Department of Defense together with the Departments of Labor, Education, and Health and Human Services, who now serve on the Commission for National and Community Service. The Democratic Leadership Council’s plan
envisions joint administration of national service by the "Corporation for National Service" (much like the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and embodied to a large extent in the Commission) and the Department of Defense. Detailed plans for implementing the Army's portion of national service would be centralized within the Army as would responsibility for implementation. As with the previous option, certain implementation aspects might be decentralized throughout the country (that is, citizen soldiers would be integrated into the Army rather than located in one place or unit). Other aspects, such as providing stipends and vouchers, might be centrally administered in the Army's payroll and benefits systems.

**Participating Personnel**

Both active duty and reserve personnel would participate in the Army's portion of the national service plan. Under all the plans circulating now, participants would be military rather than civilian.
This chapter provides a framework for assessing each of the five options described in Chapter Four in terms of the following aspects:

**Effect on primary missions:** How will force structure, routine operations, and other requirements for primary missions be affected? Will Army leadership be involved? How is morale likely to be affected?

**Effect on Army budgets:** What is the incremental cost to the Army over what it is currently doing (described in degrees rather than in actual dollar amounts)? What are the possibilities for cost sharing as well as for expanding the Army’s resources?

**Effect on public perceptions of the Army’s image:** What are the expected consequences, good and bad, of each option for the Army’s public image? To what extent is the Army addressing the issues that most concern the American public and identifying its relevance to the nation’s needs? Will the Army be perceived as part of the solution to youth development or part of the problem (e.g., draining budget resources away from domestic programs; unwilling to contribute to national needs, despite the perception of reduced readiness requirements in the wake of the Cold War)? Within the public, are there strong minority opinions in favor or opposed to particular Army roles?
Effect on nation's youth: How many and what sorts of youth will each option affect? What are the expected benefits?

The above roughly represent “costs” (to primary missions and budgets) and “benefits” (of public perceptions of the Army and to youth). Though imperfect, since not all possible impacts on missions and budgets are costs nor all impacts on the Army’s image or on youth beneficial, this framework provides a means to consider how the Army could make tradeoffs among the options (see Chapter Six). For example, an option might “cost” the Army in terms of primary missions but “benefit” the Army budget by decelerating budget reductions through enhanced public support.

In this chapter, the likely effects are shown as bands on a scale ranging from “high negative” to “unchanged” to “high positive” (see Figure 1). More precise effects measures will be feasible (though still difficult) if detailed implementation plans for each option are drawn up. In the meantime, this framework serves to compare the various options, identify the primary effects, and provide a structure for further assessment.

STATUS QUO

Effect on Primary Missions

This option has no expected impact on the Army’s primary missions, as depicted in Figure 1. Voluntary activities are conducted for the most part during free time and involve relatively few Army individuals. Internally, individuals and units that already volunteer will find new recognition and rewards for their ongoing activities; others will perceive little or no change.

\[1\] This study assumes that the programs the Army currently sponsors or might initiate would have a positive effect on youth or would otherwise be discontinued. Although it is possible that a program might have a deleterious effect on youth, this study does not consider these programs as possible Army initiatives.
Effect on Army Budgets

The incremental or marginal cost of this option is small. Ongoing efforts already fit within existing budgets, are inexpensive, and are often subsidized (e.g., by school districts, United Way, or other programs for youth development). The only additional cost is that of compiling and distributing information on activities. There is also a slight chance that a portion of the Army budget will be protected from cuts as a result of increased public appreciation of Army efforts for youth, which would push the band in Figure 1 in a positive direction.

Effect on Public Perceptions of the Army’s Image

Under this option, the Army stands to enhance its public image with little additional effort by capturing and telling the story of what it already does in youth development, not only through voluntary efforts but also through training and educational opportunities for enlisted
members. By pulling information on unintended positive results of its primary objectives\(^2\) into a description of an overall plan for youth development, the Army might withstand pressure from those who would like the Army to do more for youth development as well as those searching for a “peace dividend.” However, the benefits are likely to be limited (see Figure 1). There is also a risk that this option will be viewed cynically as a repackaging of existing programs to gain credit for individuals’ efforts the Army cared little about at the time. In addition, some might criticize this minimalist response by the Army (relative to its capabilities). Such critics would argue that national needs are so critical that every available resource and institution must be committed, particularly if, like the Army, the institution has relevant expertise with large-scale training and integration of racially and economically diverse youth.

Effect on Nation’s Youth

Though existing efforts are laudable, their benefit to youth is limited and will remain so under this option. Not only is a small proportion of the youth population affected, but the benefits are constrained by purely voluntary efforts, as discussed in greater detail below. Transition efforts designed primarily to assist soldiers, civilians, and family members that also benefit youth are a positive, though secondary, consequence of their primary objective of settling into civilian life. Such partnerships might be temporary and scaled down or eliminated after the current downsizing.

MAJOR INSTALLATIONS AS THE LOCUS OF ACTIVITY

Effect on Primary Missions

Because existing programs have virtually no effect on structure, operations, training, etc., replicated programs at other installations will

\(^2\)The Army’s primary objective in programs that help early retirees find employment in youth programs is to ease the transition of people who must leave the military involuntarily due to the defense drawdown. The benefits to youth and other social programs are a positive but unintended consequence. The Army would probably be just as happy to move people into jobs supporting the defense industrial base if it were feasible.
probably have little or none as well. Any significant effect on Army individuals will be on personnel on major installations who have the inclination and time to devote to volunteer programs. A possible outcome is a small change in the culture of installations, since every major installation will now have a youth development volunteer program. There are possible indirect benefits to unit cohesion and morale, according to some proponents. A possible adverse effect on primary missions may come from an overzealous installation commander who feels pressure to support and encourage volunteerism on base and, therefore, (1) ceases to make it voluntary, (2) distracts himself/herself from other installation duties, or (3) draws existing volunteers away from base and into community volunteering.

Effect on Army Budgets

This option will require a small operating budget for each major installation, primarily for personnel costs. Drawing from the Fort Sam Houston model—of one of the most extensive (and possibly most expensive) programs—the most significant cost is the part-time salary of a program developer and coordinator. The Fort Sam Houston coordinator is also one of the directors for religious education in the Chaplain’s office, whose salary (Government Service 9) is paid for by the Department of the Army. The rest of the program costs at Fort Sam Houston are minimal and usually covered by the supportive post commander or the program’s community partners (e.g., school district, low income housing authorities, a United Way–supported youth development organization). The bulk of the costs under this option (i.e., personnel costs) would be borne by the Army. External partnerships are unlikely to increase or decrease costs sig-

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3 For example, in the preface to the youth development programs in the FY1993 Defense Authorization Act, the Senate Armed Service Committee argues that “Creative commanders have always devised innovative activities for their units, beyond routine training, to build morale and unit cohesion. Community service projects present an excellent opportunity to do so while providing important services to society.” (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Report of the Senate Armed Services Committee, July 31, 1992, p. 279.) Another example is found in the now-revoked Department of the Army Regulation on the Domestic Action Program. One of the objectives of the program was “Enhancing individual and unit morale through meaningful community involvement.” (Domestic Action Program, Army Regulation No. 20-019, March 13, 1975, p. 2.)
significantly for the Army. If no additional funds are appropriated for this purpose, these costs would most likely come at the expense of other programs in Morale, Recreation, and Welfare or the Chaplain’s office.

Effect on Public Perceptions of the Army’s Image

This option will certainly enhance the Army’s image in communities near major installations. However, the public relations benefits to the Army will be limited by the localized effort, thus the narrowness of the band in Figure 2. Nevertheless, one program accomplishes two objectives—improving base-community relations and supporting Army volunteer programs for youth. As with the previous option, the constrained nature of the partnerships means that their impact (both positive and negative) will be confined to that installation and local community. Consequently, successful and failed programs alike will receive local, not national, attention. Combining this option with elements of the previous option would expand visibility nationally and together may suffice to respond to pressures for a “peace dividend” and youth development support. On the other hand, this option, like the previous option, might be criticized for not drawing upon the Army’s particular strengths for helping youth, since the programs and resources will be functions of what is available at major installations.

Effect on Nation’s Youth

As an expansion upon existing efforts, this option will benefit more youth than the previous option, although participants will be limited to youth in communities surrounding installations, who choose to participate, whose parents allow them to participate, and who fit within the program’s capacity (constrained by volunteers and post commander support). Consequently, this option helps only a small subset of youth. Major cities such as Los Angeles, Portland, Phoenix, Cleveland, Houston, Miami, Santa Fe, and Buffalo would receive no benefit because the Army is virtually absent within 60 miles of those
cities. There is as yet no data or evaluation to quantify any effects on the youth involved. Finally, benefits will be constrained by the amount of volunteerism, as discussed next.

EMPLOYER-SPONSORED VOLUNTEERISM

Effect on Primary Missions

Because this option envisions voluntary service performed during individuals’ or units’ free time, there is little expected impact on primary missions. The greatest effect on the Army would be at the Department level and on Army leadership who would be making a visible commitment to this option to ensure its implementation.

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4RAND research by John Bondanella and Debra August identifies major and minor Army installations within 60 miles of major U.S. cities. This approach would also exclude such cities as San Diego, although as of 1990 the Navy had over 70 commands in San Diego county participating in civil-military partnerships for youth development.

5However, several data collection and evaluation efforts are under design.
Under this option, the Army would provide opportunities to individuals who are inclined to volunteer, but for one reason or another have not done so (e.g., it may be easier to participate during free time in activities the Army values and supports or difficult to arrange volunteer opportunities). To the degree that other activities an individual might choose add value to the Army (e.g., physical training), diverting people away from them would be detrimental to the Army’s interests. On the other hand, some activities, such as socializing with colleagues or joining sports teams, which the Army also values for enhancing unit cohesion and teamwork, could be combined with volunteer activities, thus serving two objectives simultaneously. If volunteerism is found to benefit individual and unit morale (anecdotally at this point), more individuals and units would reap those benefits. Moreover, existing volunteers might receive retroactive recognition for their efforts. Nevertheless, there is likely to be a strong aversion to a new commitment to community service from those, primarily within the Army, who oppose any emphasis other than combat readiness and reluctantly accept noncombat service only when it draws upon required skills, such as engineering and medical units for disaster relief.

**Effect on Army Budgets**

Although the impetus behind this option is voluntary service, the programmatic support (i.e., direction, coordination, leadership) required would increase the costs to the Army. The most important incremental costs associated with this option are salaries for one or two coordinators and one or two assistant coordinators at the Department of the Army level and partial salaries for coordinators throughout the Army to oversee groups of 5000 or more Army employees. Alternatively, budget constraints might force the Army to redraft job descriptions rather than hire new staff, thereby keeping budget costs low but raising opportunity costs substantially. Coordinators would develop and maintain an umbrella program to assist with local implementation, collect and disseminate information within the Army and outside, and interact with regional or local coordinators. Additional implementation costs are usually small and might be covered by (or shared with) civilian entities (e.g., school districts, other government agencies, charitable organizations) or within existing budgets for community relations. It is uncertain to
what extent additional costs might be offset by increased public support for sustaining Army budgets, since how this option might affect public perceptions of the Army’s image is uncertain. However, legislation supporting employer-sponsored volunteerism initiatives (e.g., Commission grants to employer-sponsored volunteer programs for retirees) might result in a source of minor funding.

Effect on Public Perceptions of the Army’s Image

This option calls for a commitment by the Army to both volunteer service and youth development and in that regard will affect the perception of the institution by those inside and outside the Army. It will also raise the profile of the Army’s support for youth development. Overall, this is likely to be a positive outcome for the Army given the nationwide support for volunteerism, in general, and youth development, in particular. The fact that it is “employer-sponsored” may also be viewed favorably as part of a trend in progressive management of large organizations. However, a potential negative backlash may be realized from those in the public who perceive this option as either too much or too little. Those who see it as too much will argue that the Army is doing enough already, and additional emphasis on volunteerism is a costly and inappropriate distraction from primary missions. Those who see it as too little will criticize a reliance on strictly volunteer efforts without drawing upon the full potential of the Army to help the nation’s youth. Consequently, the range of possible costs and benefits of this option exceed those for previous options, as depicted in a wider band in Figure 3.

Effect on Nation’s Youth

Under this option, the presumable benefit would expand to more youth throughout the country, again depending on the number and location of Army personnel and retirees as well as the limits of volunteerism to help youth. Youth in the District of Columbia and northern Virginia would benefit disproportionately because of the large concentration of Army employees in the Capitol region, whereas youth in those cities without an Army presence listed above would
Table: Effect of Option 3 on various aspects

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Figure 3—Option 3: Employer-Sponsored Volunteerism

accrue little benefit. With institutional support, volunteer programs might draw upon Army capabilities, facilities, and people that would not otherwise be available to civilian youth. This option would broaden the pool of volunteers who, depending upon their backgrounds and skills, may contribute substantially to youth programs. Commanders may also be more inclined to share resources and expertise as part of an umbrella Army program for youth. Institutional support, including administrative structures and policies, will also increase the chances that the Army will make a continuing commitment which, in turn, will increase the benefits to youth over time.

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6The Army could have a program in most cities by drawing upon recruiting stations, the Selected Reserve, National Guard, and retirees, but the programs would be limited by the size of those Army populations. To achieve a truly national program, the Army could link up with Navy or Air Force community service programs, for example, in cities and regions without a significant Army presence.
By constraining the Army’s contribution to volunteerism, this and the previous three options may limit the ability of volunteerism to benefit youth. On one end of the spectrum, critics of volunteerism argue that it is a misplaced activity that diverts attention and support away from fundamental solutions to long-standing and complex problems, such as educational reform (involving higher salaries for teachers, more funding for facilities, new textbooks, etc.). They argue further that helping youth requires special skills that volunteers do not generally have. And even when they do, by virtue of their part-time availability, they cannot provide the intensity and continuity needed. On the other end are those who see volunteerism as a cost-effective means of tapping human and physical resources and strengthening community ties without vast bureaucracies and expensive public policy programs. The lack of data and analysis on the benefits of volunteerism prevents a definitive resolution at this time, but the debate is an important one for the Army to keep in mind when considering what it can contribute to youth development.

NATIONAL-LEVEL PARTNERSHIPS

The uncertainty surrounding the type and scope of national-level partnerships makes it particularly difficult to generalize about possible benefits. This uncertainty is reflected in the width of the impact bands in Figure 4.

Effect on Primary Missions

By stepping beyond voluntary support for youth development to shared responsibility for particular youth development objectives (e.g., vocational training), this option is likely to affect primary missions and possibly even their definition. Depending upon the type and degree of partnership, portions of the Army may find the experience of sharing control, responsibility, and leadership for accomplishing objectives with civilian partners problematic and frustrating (as has been the case in counterdrug activities with supporting civil-
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**Figure 4—Option 4: National Level Partnership**

ian agencies) or mutually beneficial (as with the Cities in Schools–U.S. Army partnership for identifying retirees for Cities in Schools programs and partnerships as an alternative to downsizing or closing vocational training infrastructure and underutilized bases). In contrast to the previous three options, individuals would participate in programs as part of their normal duties rather than as volunteers in their free time. Consequently, some partnerships would require changes in operations, routines, regulations, and possibly training. Depending upon the partnership, existing operations could be little affected (e.g., if the partnership emphasizes volunteer efforts through Big Sisters/Big Brothers) or could be consistent with the military mission of units and individuals involved (e.g., training). Nevertheless, these partnerships are likely to raise more concerns than the previous three options about detracting from primary Army missions in that they may divert (or be perceived to divert) Army resources and personnel away from an exclusive focus on core requirements.
Effect on Army Budgets

The incremental cost increases over current efforts will vary greatly depending upon the nature of the partnership. At a minimum, these partnerships will likely lead to some incremental increase in costs to the Army as a result of the requirement to develop new procedures, training, and staff positions (e.g., liaisons, program coordinators) to accommodate the civilian partnership. Some partnership costs, such as for civilian youth participation in military vocational training, might be paid for by the Departments of Education, Labor (Job Corps), or Health and Human Services, or by private charitable organizations supporting youth development. In fact, in some cases, the presence of civilian youth might save the Army money by sharing fixed costs with nonmilitary users or might lead to the Army contracting out for services (e.g., family support services for youth or vocational training). Alternatively, some partnerships might enable the Army to tap entirely new sources of funds for other Army objectives. For example, in the fiscal year 1993 DoD authorization, Congress allocated $30 million to the Commission on National and Community Service to disburse to areas and individuals hit by base closures and drawdowns. On the other hand, the popular perception that military budgets are a source of funds for domestic programs might mean that the Army would be asked to bear the bulk of the cost burden. In any case, the Army should not expect partnerships to become the basis for justifying additional overall defense expenditures or for retaining military personnel. Partnerships should be undertaken only with personnel, resources, and facilities that exist for legitimate military purposes.

Effect on Public Perceptions of the Army’s Image

This option marks a step beyond support into shared responsibility for youth development. By forming an alliance with a nonmilitary partner for accomplishing something other than current Army objectives and by elevating this new shared goal among Army objectives, this option would change public perceptions of the Army’s role in society. The novelty of creating the partnership would increase the visibility of each partner’s efforts (i.e., to a level that is greater than the sum of the parts). These partnerships would reduce the relative isolation of the current Army community and integrate Army
programs and personnel at working levels with private and public civilian agencies.

This is a controversial option, the ramifications of which are uncertain. Proponent argue a national youth crisis threatens the future of this country more than any external threat. Proponent argue that can help, must help. Moreover, to the degree this crisis remains unresolved, the Army's recruiting efforts will not be helped. Not only will youth benefit from increased emphasis on youth development activities, one might argue, but the Army will have a chance to highlight comparative advantages (e.g., discipline, diversity, esprit de corps, training) and current contributions (to both its own youth enlistees and civilian youth), providing a popular example of a "peace dividend" the country earns from its investment in the military. And finally, by forming partnerships with civilian organizations, the Army will presumably enable such organizations to accomplish objectives for youth development they otherwise could not, which will also reflect well on the Army.

Those opposed would perceive any shift in Army objectives away from primary combat missions as inappropriate, even reckless, in terms of national security. They fear that these partnerships and the programs they spawn will grow at the expense of long-term readiness of the Army to fight the inevitable next war. Opponents would argue that these ideas are part of a 30-year cycle of government-sponsored social activism (e.g., New Deal programs in the 1930s, Great Society and War on Poverty programs in the 1960s, and current national youth service initiatives) that will inevitably wane. They fear that the Army will make a long-term commitment to policies and programs that are fashionable now, but that will lose popular support in the future after the Army has invested its resources and diverted its focus. They would argue that national-level civilian-military partnerships

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7Representative Jim Leach (R-Iowa) is one of many who argue that growing economic and social divisions in the country mean that the nation's biggest challenge "is more from within than without," and is in some ways similar to the situation that confronted America in the 1930s. "What distinguished the '30s was that everybody was in the same boat. What distinguishes the plight today is that there are different boats for different folks. And in that circumstance, the prospect of societal division has never been greater, and that's why the Commission was formed." (Quoted in "Quest for service ethic gets a bipartisan sendoff," Commission on National and Community Service Newsletter, October 1992, p. 1.)
also entail risks of entanglement in domestic welfare programs and local politics which in the end will hurt Army community relations and the Army’s public image. They might also lead to too much interaction with (i.e., meddling by) outside civilians. Finally, opponents would argue that partnerships among organizations with such different cultures and primary objectives may be more trouble than they are worth and may generate substantial costs in terms of efficiency of collaboration between large and very different organizations.\(^8\)

**Effect on Nation’s Youth**

Again, the potential benefit to youth will be a function of the partnership. Ideally, a partnership will seek to maximize each partner’s comparative advantage so that together the partners can achieve what neither could accomplish individually. Consequently, it is safe to assume that this option would have a positive, possibly substantial, impact on the nation’s youth. Civilian partners would provide the Army with expertise, insights, and links to the civilian youth community it seeks to help. The Army may tap its own expertise, resources, and personnel developed for Army purposes but with civilian applicability (e.g., evaluation tools and methods, remedial training and testing, vocational training, family support services, drug and alcohol demand reduction programs, etc.). However, the type of partnership is an important variable that will determine the number of youth helped as well as the qualitative degree of help provided. For example, a vocational education partnership may help fewer youth (but possibly help them permanently and significantly) than the volunteer activities in the first three options. A Big Brothers/Big Sisters partnership for Army mentoring may help youth to the same degree as existing Army mentoring programs, but provide that benefit to many more youth around the country.

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\(^8\)Although youth service corps and the military seek to inculcate their members with many of the same values, the cultures of the two are so different they may be incompatible. Of course, this is not true for all youth corps, and the military is likely to find compatible civilian partners, but much of the field of volunteerism and youth development is marked by group consensus building, not hierarchical decisionmaking, and by a bias in favor of domestic welfare programs over national security and foreign policy spending.
NATIONAL SERVICE MODEL

Effect on Primary Missions

Possible effects on primary missions range from highly negative to highly positive, partly because of the variety of proposals as well as uncertainty about costs and consequences. See Figure 5. For example, an Army Recruiting Command study of national service proposals in 1989 found that national service would increase the pool of eligible applicants for military service while a separate Recruiting Command assessment suggested the opposite. The Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed national service legislation primarily on the grounds that civilian service opportunities would attract youth who might have gone into the military. To try to remove this uncertainty and relieve military concerns, the National and Community Service Act requires the Department of Defense to assess the effect of national service on military recruiting.

This option might require creating and integrating a new type of enlistee, the citizen soldier, as described in Chapter Three; organizing and operating a national service program; or recruiting and processing youth into a national service program as well as locating, tracking, and matching national service jobs to available youth. These requirements could be met with little or no perturbation to primary missions or, depending upon how the Army or Congress chooses to implement national service, they might necessitate profound changes in recruiting, training, and benefits. Those who oppose national service in the military (along the lines of the Democratic Leadership Council model) argue that introducing a lower-paid soldier into the Army would stir discontent in the enlisted force because citizen soldiers would receive different pay and accrue different benefits for the same position as professional soldiers. Moreover, the Army would lose trained soldiers after two years at a time when training budgets are shrinking. These outcomes, they argue, would

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hurt unit cohesion and morale. However, these outcomes can be avoided by sensitive program design. The Army’s 2+2+4 recruiting experiment has so far suggested that two-year active-duty enlistments need not have deleterious effects.\textsuperscript{10}  

**Effect on Army Budgets**

The cost of a national service program ranges from $2 billion annually (for a modest starter program for 100,000 participants at $20,000 per person proposed in the Commission on National and Commu-

\textsuperscript{10}The 2+2+4 program is a tool the Army designed and tested to attract high-quality young people during difficult recruiting periods and to help channel trained, experienced personnel into the Selected Reserve. The program expands eligibility for the Army’s post-service educational benefits to include recruits entering two-year active-duty tours (not including initial training time) in selected noncombat occupational specialties, provided they agree to serve an additional two years in the Selected Reserve. However, the program has not been expanded beyond its experimental stage. See Richard Buddin, *Enlistment Effects of the 2+2+4 Recruiting Experiment*, RAND, R-4097-A, 1991.
nity Service January 1993 report to Congress) to $8 billion annually (by advocates such as the Democratic Leadership Council which assumes substantial savings to federal student aid accounts) to more than $70 billion annually should all the roughly 3.5 million Americans who turn 18 every year choose to participate. But the impact on Army budgets is a separate matter and may work in the Army’s favor. According to the Democratic Leadership Council model, citizen soldiers would draw educational benefits from the national service accounts rather than the Army College Fund, would receive less pay than their career Army colleagues, and would not accrue retirement benefits. In any event, the potential costs in terms of recruiting, training, new administrative procedures and staff, and the like might be covered by supplementary appropriations as part of a congressionally mandated national service plan.

Effect on Public Perceptions of the Army’s Image

Given that public support and approval for national service is broad and long-standing, this option is likely to improve public perceptions of the Army’s image. It would highlight Army service to one’s country and place it within the national service framework. Proponents of national service are a varied group. Some are strong supporters of the military who point out that the country can preserve and expand the military virtues of order, discipline, service, and physical fitness, even as the military itself is shrinking. Those less enamored of military service, such as conscientious objectors, support national service proposals because they provide civilian alternatives to military service for youth seeking training and benefits. Other strange bedfellows include fiscal conservatives who believe youth should give something in return for the educational and financial benefits society gives them.

On the other hand, opponents of national service argue that tying benefits to service would undermine the service ethic these pro-

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11If national service is mandatory and therefore accompanied by a military draft, the costs of manning the active-duty military force would decline by $8.7 billion (in 1980 dollars) largely because of decreases in military pay. Costs for manning the Selected Reserve would decline by $200 million. See Costs of the National Service Act (H.R. 2206): A Technical Analysis, Congressional Budget Office, December 1980.
grams seek to instill or would effectively coerce youth into mandatory service, possibly leading to the replacement of the All-Volunteer Force with the draft. Moreover, they argue that there is already a great deal of community service, and that it has increased among youth in recent years, without federal interference or incentives. Finally, once these programs are implemented it is likely that portions of the population that previously supported hypothetical notions of national service would withdraw their support once the full implications of national service became known.

However, these general criticisms of national service are unlikely to harm the Army's image since the Army already performs many of the roles of national service proposals envision for it.

Effect on Nation's Youth

There is substantial disagreement on how a national service program would affect the nation's youth. Clearly, many more youth would be involved, but the number in the Army is unlikely to increase. If national service alters the composition of enlistees, the Army would influence a different group of youth than it does now. If the portion of the Army's total enlistment made up of the new citizen soldiers increases, then the Army's contribution would increase.
The increasing importance of youth development policy combined with a public willingness to tap military resources and expertise to benefit civilian youth (among other civilian noncombat purposes) suggests that pressures will mount on the Army from Congress, the Administration, and possibly the public to pursue two national objectives—helping to develop America's youth and obtaining a peace dividend—in one Army program. These pressures will be combined with a desire both inside and outside the Army to mitigate the effect of the military drawdown on individuals by opening new job opportunities in youth development programs for early retirees and on communities by steering program funding to communities hardest hit by military budget reductions and base closures.

Before responding with new initiatives, it is important to recognize that the Army already supports civilian youth development through Army volunteer programs, Junior ROTC, National Guard youth programs, and other efforts (see Chapter Three). Nevertheless, however laudable, these activities cannot compare with what the Army could contribute to civilian youth. Even if the Army's current efforts were better known outside the Army, as suggested in Option 1, they are probably insufficient to withstand pressures on the Army to do more for the nation's youth.

Recognition of this fact has led to a groundswell of new Army initiatives for youth development. The Army and the other services have already entered into several new civilian-military partnerships (some by choice, such as the Cities in Schools--Department of the Army partnership, and some by law, such as the new CCCs) and may enter
into others. There are several new programs, such as the collection of National Guard Youth Opportunities programs, and expanded existing ones, such as the doubling of the Junior ROTC program.

The Army is at a crossroads in deciding what will be made of these initial steps inside the Army in view of the mounting pressures outside the Army. Chapter Four presents an array of options ranging from the status quo (ante the initiatives in the last year) through to substantial commitments of the Army’s resources and attention.

COMPARING OPTIONS AND EFFECTS

The preceding chapters have developed an assessment framework and, in the absence of definitive information upon which to complete an assessment, suggest probable costs and benefits directions of the options. The comparisons in Figures 6 through 9 suggest several conclusions. Though tentative, the conclusions are useful for generating and assessing options and designing and implementing possible programs, while recognizing that many predicted negative effects might be compensated for by sensitive program design and many predicted benefits might be lost through insensitive program design. First, several general conclusions about each option emerge:

- By definition, the status quo option promises little change from the situation today. However, while this option does not affect much Army primary missions or Army resources, it also does not contribute much to the nation's youth, garner public support for the Army, or improve the Army's image. The Army could experience a setback in terms of public support by appearing uninterested, unwilling, or unable to assist with urgent national needs. Moreover, given the indications discussed here that the Army will become more involved in civilian youth development in the near future, committing the Army (consciously or by default) to this option may not serve the Army well in anticipating and responding to requests from Congress and the Administration.

- Making major installations the focus of voluntary youth development activities does not gain much more for the Army than the status quo option, given the limited scope of the second option. This option makes sense only in conjunction with another
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Figure 6—Impact on Primary Missions

option, such as national-level partnerships. For example, the Army could decide to keep the locus of activity at major installations, but hook up with nationally known partners to develop joint programs at all major installations, such as mentoring programs with Big Brothers/Big Sisters or rural and urban youth service and conservation corps with the Commission on National and Community Service.

- Employer-sponsored volunteer programs for youth development face roughly the same limited costs to primary missions and budgets as the first two options, but are likely to provide greater benefits in enhancing the Army's image and aiding a larger number of youth nationwide. By elevating involvement in youth development to an Armywide program with leadership support, the Army will raise the profile of its contributions. This possible benefit to the Army's image is balanced, as discussed, by the possible public opposition to any perceived increase in Army support for civilian development.
National-level partnerships and national service may have tremendous payoffs, but the costs are uncertain, as depicted by the wide range of possible effects. The variation of possible consequences to the Army's primary mission, in particular, does not mean these are extremely risky options, with equal chances of high payoffs or costs to the Army, but that (1) there are differences of opinion about possible outcomes that cannot yet be resolved, and (2) the effect on the Army depends on how the options are implemented. However, in the case of national service, the Army's 2+2+4 experiment may already provide a model for implementation with little adverse effect on recruiting, morale, or turnover.

Looking at the major tradeoffs between possible benefits and costs, several additional conclusions emerge:

- In terms of the Army's image, three alternatives provide potentially large benefits: employer-sponsored volunteerism, na-
tional-level partnerships, and national service. The first two, however, are accompanied by possible detriments to the Army's image, if the public reacts negatively to the Army's apparent diversion from strictly military activities into serving other national needs.

- In terms of benefits to youth, employer-sponsored volunteerism and national-level partnerships are most attractive. The costs to the Army's budget and primary missions in the case of employer-sponsored volunteerism, in particular, are appealingly low, too. Although national service might help youth as much or more than those options, the Army's additional influence under that option is limited (since only those youth who would enlist anyway would be affected) and, depending upon implementation, the costs may be high.

- In terms of enhancing the Army's image while limiting costs to the Army's budget and primary missions, the best options are status quo, employer-sponsored volunteerism, and national ser-
service, with the aforementioned caveats about the Status Quo and National Service options. Employer-sponsored volunteerism has potential high payoffs for the Army in terms of public support. Potential costs must be managed, but the likely effect on the budget is small when compared to the total budget.

- To maximize benefits to youth, but limit any detriment to the Army, employer-sponsored volunteerism and national service options are most attractive, providing that the effect of national service on recruiting is judged acceptable. Otherwise, the Army would confine itself to employer-sponsored volunteerism.

RECOMMENDATIONS

This study does not recommend any one option as the best approach for the Army to take. Rather, it provides a framework for crafting more detailed options and for assessing and comparing such options. However, this study does offer several recommendations to the Army for further research into possible roles in youth development.
Evaluate the Contributions the Army Already Provides to Youth

This report provides a preliminary compilation of what the Army is already doing for the nation's civilian youth. The Army should make every effort to understand what it is doing for civilian youth in more depth and to quantify the benefits of military service for the nation's youth who serve in the military.

The Army's initial efforts to collect information on its members' service contributions to civilian society received uneven and erratic responses. As a next step in pursuing this topic, the Army should comprehensively review ongoing activities. A systematic survey of Army service activities followed by regular data collection would include program genesis, budget size and sources, partnerships with local agencies and actors, numbers and types of participants (e.g., military and civilian, active and reserve service members, family members, officers, enlisted), level of support and interest by commanding officers, and outcomes.

The requirement for data on outcomes is critical. The Army must do more than just tell the story of what it already does for youth, although that is important. It must begin to analyze its effects on civilian youth as well as the current costs and benefits to the Army. The Army must also tap into the latest thinking about what makes successful community service programs. Because research on this subject is limited, the Army will be best served by linking up with youth organizations that are the source of innovative thinking, such as those identified by the Commission on National and Community Service, as well as the Commission itself. Thorough evaluation is essential, particularly with experimental, and possibly controversial, programs.

1 The Army's first attempt to collect information on volunteer activities was largely unsuccessful. At the request of the White House, the Army Community and Family Support office sent out requests for information to about 160 installations. The four responses that came back provided largely anecdotal information about individual efforts. A second effort undertaken at the request of the Chief of Staff of the Army and implemented by the Army's Public Affairs office retrieved more information, but still of uneven quality. This second request for information instructed the MACOMs to be prepared to supply information quarterly on their unit's "service to the nation," but no subsequent requests were made.
Attempt to Resolve the Debate on Army Support for Youth Development

Equally critical is to attempt to resolve the debate over whether support for youth development is an appropriate Army role. As discussed in the previous chapter, the debate has polarized those who envision important Army contributions to a national crisis and those who fear that the Army will be diverted away from its goal of combat readiness. Both sides agree that the end of the Cold War presents the United States with new opportunities and challenges, but disagree on the extent to which civilian youth development presents opportunities or is an appropriate challenge for the Army to address. Within this debate, there is little research and analysis to support either side’s contentions and concerns. This report highlights some of the initial questions to consider: What are the true, as opposed to the perceived, effects of the Army’s current contributions? What are the Army’s core competencies related to youth development? Based on these core competencies, what additional contributions could the Army make, and what would be the consequences? To what extent should the Army be a direct provider of youth programs as opposed to a model for youth programs?

This last question deserves elaboration. The Army provides many unexplored models for civilian youth programs. The Army’s experience and accomplishments in inculcating productive values, building esprit de corps, and integrating socioeconomically and racially diverse youth are obvious attractions to policymakers. However, no one has determined whether it is more efficient or desirable for the Army to perform these functions for civilian youth directly (i.e., national service option) or indirectly by transferring its expertise to other organizations with greater civilian experience (i.e., national-level partnerships and transition programs for early retirees under several different options). This is an important policy question. In addition, the Army is experienced in linking and sequencing service and educational benefits in ways that might help national service policymakers. For example, the Army has documented that less than half the youth that earn educational benefits through the Army College Fund actually use those benefits. The Army has experience with at least two of the models for national service currently circulating—requiring service before receiving benefits and receiving benefits before performing service. Enlistees serve their terms before
they obtain their Army College Fund benefits, whereas ROTC and U.S. Military Academy cadets and medical doctors receive financial benefits for schooling, then perform their military service.²

Continue to Analyze Army Support for Youth Development

Finally, the public debate about possible new noncombat activities in the Army, notably civilian youth development, is advancing rapidly and may quickly lead to actions by Congress which, should the Army not join in the debate, may fail to consider possible opportunities and costs to the Army. The Army is operationally capable of pursuing any of the options and activities mentioned in this study (with appropriate authorizations and appropriations). However, a great deal of effort would be required to develop concepts of operations, define the activities, and highlight the opportunities and costs of performing these activities. The risk of not pursuing these and other noncombat activities is that new missions may be thrust on the Army without adequate analysis of whether and how the Army can most appropriately accomplish them.

As with other noncombat activities, the importance of Army support to youth development is measured against the current Army vision, “A total force, trained and ready . . . to serve this nation at home and abroad . . . capable of decisive victory.” In the final analysis, Army support to youth development must be evaluated within the context of this vision.

²This paragraph draws on conversations with RAND economist Beth Asch.


Memorandum from the Office of Senator Harris Wofford, co-sponsor of the CCC amendment, October 14, 1992.


*The Congressional Record*, October 17, 1990.


