Intervention in Intrastate Conflict

Implications for the Army in the Post-Cold War Era

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This report focuses on helping the Army identify the issues and some of the answers associated with changes taking place in the nature of intrastate conflict. The report focuses principally on intervention (and its termination) in intrastate disputes of interest to the United States. This is the first of the two volumes that constitute the study. Its principal and somewhat unique contribution is the use of speculative "case studies" of possible future scenarios that might involve the United States in general and the U.S. Army in particular. This device is intended to help the Army experience the future before it encounters it, with the objective of providing insights that may be useful in helping it perform strategic and program planning, update doctrine, and support intervention operations. The second volume of this study, MR-554/2-A, presents the complete version of the case studies that are only briefly outlined in this main volume.

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During the Cold War, low-intensity conflict (LIC) was seen as synonymous with revolutionary or ideological war. While this old-style revolutionary or ideological conflict has not disappeared in the post-Cold War world, there is evidence that a "new" and potentially more important form of conflict has emerged to pose a major threat to international security: ethnic, nationalist, and separatist tensions that have already erupted in violence or have the potential to do so.

The United States has a keen interest in watching most of these ongoing or incipient conflicts, and the Army has a keen interest in better understanding the changing security situation so that it will be better positioned to support U.S. national security policies. This research is intended to help the Army contemplate the effects of change on its plans, programs, doctrine, structure, and operations. More specifically, it analyzes five questions:

- What are the implications of changes in the intrastate conflict environment?
- How are the criteria changing for U.S. intervention in intrastate conflict?
- How is the process of intervention decisionmaking changing?
- What is the place of exit strategies in intervention planning and decisionmaking?
- What do a series of "prospective" case studies tell us about demands that might be placed on the Army—given the changes in the international security environment and the changes in intervention criteria and processes?
THE CHANGING FORM AND CONTENT OF INTRASTATE CONFLICT

A comparison of past and current intrastate conflict reveals some important similarities. First, the potential for spillover continues to loom large, as illustrated by what could happen if a Serbian crackdown in Kosovo brings Albania, Greece, and Turkey into hostilities and sparks a large interstate war in southeastern Europe. A second similarity is the continued relevance of counterinsurgency concepts and tactics, since intrastate conflicts often still pit conventional government forces against lightly armed insurgent forces. Finally, intrastate conflicts still have their origins in the struggle of local elites for power, although the tools have changed from ideological ones to ethnic, nationalist, and religious ones.

Despite these similarities, intrastate conflict is significantly different from its Cold War kin along three dimensions of change—a new geopolitical environment, the emergence of an ideological vacuum, and changing demographic factors. In terms of the new geopolitical environment, the end of the bipolar order has led to an increase in the number of failed states or states that have descended into conditions of anarchy as the result of a collapse of all political order (e.g., Somalia); it has also facilitated the breakup of multinational political units such as Yugoslavia, the USSR, and Czechoslovakia.

The end of the Cold War has also led to an era of ideological impoverishment. While Marxist-Leninist and even state socialist values have been discredited, liberal Western democracy and free-market economics have not been fully accepted by the people of much of the developing world. This has left the polities that choose not to embrace liberal Western values with two options: fundamentalist Islam (for states in the Muslim world) or ethnic self-awareness, each of which has profound consequences for the nature of intrastate conflict.

Finally, two major demographic trends have had an impact on the nature of intrastate conflict: population increases and urbanization. The existence of dense concentrations of relatively young people in crowded and ramshackle urban shantytowns increases the likelihood of social explosions that could bring governments down, cause social chaos, and ultimately result in more failed states for the international
community to deal with. In addition, this increasing urbanization signifies that the critical nodes in future intrastate wars will be urban rather than rural. Finally, there is the issue of refugee flows resulting from population pressures, environmental degradation, political unrest, and increasing urbanization.

These three dimensions have a clear impact on a number of the characteristics of intrastate conflict. First, there is a much wider spectrum of conflict types in current intrastate warfare, with, for example, anarchy in failed states, intercommunal violence, local warlordism, and disputes over residual ethnic enclaves existing alongside the traditional ideological insurgencies and ethnic/separatist conflicts. Second, where Cold War insurgencies tended to involve fairly well-organized, centralized, and somewhat hierarchical command structures, today's actors in intrastate conflict are more amorphous, decentralized, and nonhierarchical. Third, where many of the ideological insurgencies of the Cold War focused on capturing the allegiance of the populace, today's intrastate conflict places more of an emphasis on the pure possession of territory. And fourth, more armed conflicts are coming to be centered in cities as opposed to rural areas.

The changing concept of sovereignty has also had an impact on the nature of intrastate conflict. The international community tends to define sovereignty along a continuum that runs between state and national sovereignty. Currently, the concept of national sovereignty is preeminent, which means that the international community will look favorably on demands for interventions into intrastate conflict for reasons of national self-determination or humanitarian need, even when these demands come at the expense of an existing nation-state.

All of this—similarities, differences, and the changing concept of sovereignty—has implications for the U.S. Army. In terms of similarities, since the concept of counterinsurgency will remain relevant, many of the older tactical tenets of counterinsurgency will still be valid. Also, because today's intrastate conflicts still have their origins in the struggle of elites for pure power, placing pressure on, and constructive incentives before, relevant elites very early in their campaign for social mobilization is one of the best ways to prevent a serious conflict from occurring.
In terms of differences, the fact that there are now so many more types of conflict possible means that U.S. leaders cannot afford to rush into a conflict without understanding the stakes, background, and nature of the local actors involved. The amorphous nature of the opponent means that such groups may be more difficult for a conventionally equipped Army to decisively defeat. The increasingly urban backdrop for combat, with densely packed civilians in the likely areas of military action, will force conventional units to decrease their use of firepower and increase the quality of their intelligence.

The overall effect of the recent move toward national sovereignty is an increase in international pressure for U.S./UN interventions, making it important for the U.S. military to devote significant resources to plan for "peace operations."

Finally, one general implication emerges: Settlements will require long-term commitments from outside forces, ranging from simple political promises to the presence of peacekeepers on the ground.

**THE CHANGING NATURE OF U.S. INTERVENTION IN INTRASTATE CONFLICTS**

The fact that conflict and intervention no longer take place in the context of superpower competition has countering implications. On the one hand, the perceived *stakes* in most plausible post-Cold War conflicts are likely to be lower than they would have been during the Cold War; on the other hand, the *risks* of intervention are also likely to be seen as lower. The net result of this odd combination of reduced stakes and lowered risks is the introduction of a systematic bias *against* intervention, with a shift that places domestic priorities and concerns above foreign policy.

This shift has a number of implications for U.S. policymakers making intervention decisions:

- Intervene only if there is a high probability of success, not simply to raise the price of aggression or send a message to would-be aggressors.

- Avoid intervening—especially on the ground—without a high confidence the intervention will be relatively brief and inexpensive and will cause minimal casualties and collateral damage.
• Avoid committing U.S. ground forces, which means limiting contributions to "unique" military capabilities (e.g., strategic lift, intelligence, and communications).

• Retain operational control over U.S. combat forces.

• Secure authorization by UN or other international organizations and obtain multilateral participation as a way to build and sustain domestic political support.

THE CHANGING NATURE OF THE U.S. INTERVENTION DECISIONMAKING PROCESS FOR INTRASTATE CONFLICT

In an ideal process of intervention decisionmaking, the political leadership would define for the military leadership both the political objectives sought and the military objectives to be achieved to reach that political goal. The military would then advise whether the stated military objective was attainable and, if so, what options were available for doing so in terms that were both understandable and relevant to political considerations and concerns. After the civilian leadership chose an option, the military would describe in detail how it would be implemented, again in terms salient to the civilian leadership.

Unfortunately, the system has a series of problems that lead to difficulties in practice. First, civilian leadership may try to micromanage. Second, there is an uneasy working relationship between military and civilian officials, with military planners sometimes seeing civilian policymakers as trying to pass judgment on operational matters for which they have no expertise, and the civilian leadership sometimes fearing they will be blindsided by policy issues because the military is not entirely candid in presenting options for a decision and in explaining how the decision would be implemented. Finally, the system can fail when political choices are incorporated into military plans, as was the case in the Marine barracks bombing in Lebanon, when military leaders made political calls that increased their vulnerability to terrorist attack.

In today's world, where the political stakes are less clear and the risks harder to calculate, these problems in making intervention decisions will be exacerbated. First, the threat and use of force is increasingly
likely to be seen as an integral part of an overall political strategy. And second, the decisionmaking process itself is changing, with the ideal of a well-structured and orderly process confronting the reality of a process that tends to be increasingly fluid and complicated.

These changes affect the characteristics of the decisionmaking process in specific ways:

- How "candidates" for intervention get on the decision agenda is relatively idiosyncratic—driven by media coverage and self-generated assessments by officials of "what's at stake"—and relatively unpredictable—driven by the combination of lower risks and reduced stakes that makes it increasingly difficult to decide how to respond.

- The participants' identity is fairly stable and predictable, but the decisionmaking process is ad hoc—driven by the fact that intervention policy now is still inchoate.

- How the military frames the issue and formulates its assessment and advice is a "black box" to most outside the Pentagon.

- Slippery slopes are a frequent source of concern, in part because they really exist, as was the case in Somalia (and could have been the case in Bosnia).

- Concerns about slippery slopes notwithstanding, planning is often shortsighted, with decisionmakers sometimes failing to look more than a few moves ahead or account for responses available to the other side.

One implication of this is striking: The military strongly depends on the civilian leadership for inputs to be able to play its proper role in the decision process. In addition, because the decision process about what gets on the agenda is both idiosyncratic and unpredictable, anticipating which conflicts warrant detailed contingency planning is difficult, decisions related to the use of U.S. forces can emerge abruptly, and U.S. policy for a particular conflict can be highly volatile as the definition of "the" issue rapidly shifts. All this means that the Army should make sure it has a highly adaptive contingency planning process.
Moreover, although the Army is likely to play a role in any intrastate intervention, its contribution to the decision process is likely to be diluted. And finally, given the not entirely misplaced concerns about slippery slopes and shortsighted plans, Army planners should design and brief options that explicitly account for slippery slopes—their likelihood, their risks, and ways to mitigate those risks.

THE ROLE OF TERMINATION IN THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS IN INTRASTATE CONFLICT

In prosecuting "absolute" wars—wars in which the object of using force is the complete and total imposition of one's will on the adversary—the idea of exit strategies makes little sense, since force is applied continuously and uninterrupted until the adversary ceases to exist as an alternate center of power. However, U.S. interventions in future intrastate struggles will probably not be absolute wars, because they will involve derivative objectives like international order and regional stability rather than core interests like physical survival. In such less-than-absolute conflicts, the notion of exit strategies becomes relevant and necessary. And the necessity for an exit strategy is only heightened by the fact that the kinds of missions facing the Army in future intrastate conflicts will be very different from the traditional peacekeeping missions usually associated with the aftermath of interstate conflicts in the past.

In such missions—which will span the spectrum of combat intensity from preventing conflict to peace enforcement in both anarchic conditions and against organized entities—the operational environment will often be marked by confusion, which means that policymakers, along with the higher military leadership, will need to construct a viable exit strategy before undertaking any intervention. Such an exit strategy would include a clear and considered statement of the limited, stable, and worthwhile political objectives to be pursued, a derivative set of the discrete and attainable operational goals that must be secured if the political objectives are to be successfully obtained, and a set of fallback options that must be anticipated if the original political objectives and operational goals could not be secured.
In looking at six past interventions across three generic classes—low-level, mid-level, and high-level (each distinguished from the other by the degree of combat intensity involved)—to see how well they met the above criteria for exit strategies, the research reveals that an exit strategy receives great attention only when high-level interventions are involved, because these run relatively higher risks of failure. By contrast, exit strategies tend to be neglected for low-level interventions, because the level of commitment is low to begin with; the amount of attention also tends to be a function of how visible the intervention is to the public eye.

The most troubling finding is the failure to integrate exit strategies in mid-level interventions. Yet it is in these interventions that attention to exit strategies is most relevant: The political objectives sought are often diffuse and, consequently, likely to be shifted when operations are under way. Further, the political objectives sought often do not lend themselves to clear and precise goals at the operational level to begin with, goals that can at any rate be secured without potentially great cost.

Given these findings, two general considerations stand out: (1) Army officials, especially at the higher command level, must demand from civilian leadership clear political guidance; and (2) Army officials must make every effort at translating these political objectives into succinct operational goals.

At a more specific level, for low- and mid-level involvements, the Army should pay more attention to goal definition than is usually the case. While deploying a superior force can compensate for not setting appropriate goals, such an approach is risky. For high-level involvements, the Army should focus more on tactical execution proper, since problems of combat effectiveness tend to affect the prospects of quick and successful termination more in such interventions than problems of goal definition.

FLASHPOINTS AND PROSPECTIVE INTERVENTION CASE STUDIES

To help the U.S. Army in planning for future contingencies, the research examined six “prospective” case studies where U.S. political authorities order the U.S. military to participate in an intrastate in-
Intervention in a given region facing a specific type of internal strife (documented in the companion volume, MR-554/2-A). Using eight potential missions the military could be assigned to perform—prevention (deterrence), peace building, traditional peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping/peace enforcement, peace enforcement (anarchy), peace enforcement (organized actors), and foreign internal defense/support for insurgency—the research examined potential flashpoints, identified 28 specific cases, and then narrowed those down to six for in-depth examination that illustrated a variety of regional differences and a range of tasks the Army may be asked to perform. The six included a Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka, secessionism and intra-Army conflict in Indonesia, civil war in Algeria, civil war in South Africa, internal strife in Macedonia, and post-coup anarchy in Venezuela.

Based on the analysis, the research led to the following findings:

- An urban environment is likely but not exclusive, with some cases requiring operations in terrain as varied as the arid plains of South Africa, the tropical forests of Sri Lanka, and wooded deep valleys and mountains in the Balkans.

- Force training needs are diverse, ranging from mountain warfare training to jungle warfare and including linguistic and culture skills.

- Logistics and support forces are most in demand, particularly large airlift and air support capabilities.

- The multilateral nature of the interventions yields complexities, particularly in the command, control, and communications realm.

- Outside intervention is needed to implement a cease-fire or accord.

- Sound political judgment about the need to intervene is critical.

- All situations have a substantial potential for mission evolution that would place U.S. military forces into demanding combat conditions.

- Most cases involve less-than-vital U.S. interests.
• All interventions have a high potential for unpleasant surprises, most of which result from a shift in attitudes toward the intervention by one or more of the warring parties.

• Most interventions reveal deficiencies in Army area knowledge and language capabilities.

• Conflicts have significant potential to spill over into neighboring countries or regions.

• Most cases require fast U.S. response, which will diminish the lead time for planning the operation carefully.

• Interventions will likely spark intense U.S. domestic debate, primarily because the cases do not involve vital U.S. interests and because of the public's fear of casualties and long-term entanglements.

These findings imply that there is a need for mission clarification before deployment, for rapid, on-hand extraction capability, and for sound intelligence analysis.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ARMY

The changing nature of post–Cold War intrastate conflict, along with its likely prevalence, presents the United States with a dilemma: maintaining readiness to deal with a renewal of interstate conflict while simultaneously being prepared to intervene in intrastate conflict. The U.S. Army is in the middle of this dilemma; it is the service most likely to have to provide intervention forces and will, as in the past, have to be the instrument of last resort if important U.S. interests are endangered and deterrence of interstate conflict fails.

During the Cold War, the Army structured its forces using the Total Force concept, and current guidance calls for the Army to structure to support two near-simultaneous major regional contingencies (MRCs). While public statements of Army leaders recognize that peace operations and operations other than war are becoming more common, these same statements point out that the Army has always done such things and that they do not comprise a new mission. There is no public guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and no indication from the Army leadership that any
effort will be made to structure specifically for operations other than war. Indications are that such operations would be accomplished on an ad hoc basis by the forces structured for MRCs in accordance with the Bottom-up Review (BUR).

However, such operations can have special problems. For example, if the Army were called upon to conduct multiple or repeated operations like those postulated in the case studies, it could easily find itself combat rich and support poor, meaning that one or more relatively small operations other than war could seriously impair the Army's ability to respond to an MRC in a timely fashion. In addition to tradeoff pressures between combat and support, there are issues about the type of support. As the case studies show, peace operations tend to occur in locales where the Army has limited familiarity. Programs like the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program, which attempt to keep the Army current in as many areas as possible, are limited; and those limits are strained even further because programs like the FAO support missions other than war, so even the few skilled in a particular area may not be available.

Moreover, the limited number of peace operations the Army has participated in indicate that few Army units are ideally equipped for peace operations. And even if the troops are properly equipped, there is the problem of training them for peace operations and then retraining them for MRC operations later. The Army is developing doctrine for peace operations and incorporating new training into the training centers, but it is doing so without broad agreement about whether to truly prepare for such missions or to accept them only grudgingly and prepare for each operation on an ad hoc basis.

Based on these concerns and the preceding analysis, the research recommends the following for the Army:

- Strike a careful rhetorical/capabilities balance between preparing for MRCs and interventions.
- Ensure that intervention operations do not become neglected in Army doctrine, training, and force structure.
- Remind Army planners of the potential gaps in national security planning—that Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) talks to the peace operations decision process and the BUR addresses
MRCs in the context of *budget constraints*, but that neither speaks to the national interests and strategies that are the touchstones of intervention decisionmaking.

- Ensure that the military planning process keeps a wide range of options open to respect political sensitivities.
- Do not treat exit strategies separately from intervention.
- Shed any reluctance to estimate the casualties associated with various intervention options.
- Do not depend on PDD-25 as the last word on intervention criteria.
- Recognize that public support of the Army will hinge more on its success in performing interventions than on its success in less frequent MRCs.
- Ensure that the civilian leadership understands the effects of incremental force commitments on the "two-MRC" strategy.
- Put more support forces in the active structure.
- Do not count on rapid withdrawal from intervention operations in the face of a subsequent MRC.
- Reconsider the conventional wisdom that additional specialized training can be quickly provided and is all that is needed for forces' intervention operations.
- Stand up a cadre staff dedicated to intervention operations.
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During the Cold War, U.S. analysts saw guerrilla warfare as synonymous with revolutionary or ideological war. To the theorists and organizers of guerrilla warfare in the developing world, it was a way to bring about radical political change. For our purposes, we define ideological guerrilla warfare as political conflict with the object of securing the allegiance of populations. The phrase “war for hearts and minds” applies. The premier Cold War examples of this type of conflict are Indochina and El Salvador.

This old-style revolutionary or ideological conflict has not disappeared in the post–Cold War world; some notable proponents are the Shining Path in Peru and the New People’s Army in the Philippines. But there is evidence that a “new” and potentially more important form of conflict has emerged, or rather reemerged, to pose a major threat to international security: ethnic, nationalist, and separatist tensions that have already erupted in violence or have the potential to do so. The United States must retool its thinking in strategy, policy, and program decisionmaking for this form of conflict, a phenomenon that is likely to characterize the international security scene for the end of the century. The evidence of the need to rethink is around us: The United States has only recently faced difficult decisions on whether to intervene in Somalia, Liberia, Bosnia, Haiti, Macedonia, and Rwanda. One step removed from possible military intervention are the current unsettled conditions in states of the former Soviet Union—Ukraine, Armenia–Azerbaijan, the Baltics, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova. Incipient conflict on the Indian subcontinent and South Africa also poses potential dangers to U.S. global
interests. In addition, international terrorism, a threat during the Cold War years, continues as an adjunct to the new style of conflict.

The United States has a keen interest in the potential risks posed by most of these ongoing or incipient conflicts. In terms of U.S. strategy and policy, the key questions are

• How do we deter or otherwise prevent new forms of intrastate conflict?

• Under what conditions might the United States intervene militarily if deterrence or prevention fails? What form should intervention take to be most effective? What military capabilities would be most useful? How does intervention square with traditional notions of sovereignty?

• Under what conditions should a U.S. intervention be terminated?

The U.S. Army wishes to maintain a good understanding of the changing security situation, in order to best position itself to support U.S. national security policies. To this end, the Army has been fast off the mark in sponsoring studies and analysis to help it anticipate—and cope with—the effects of change. Specifically, the Army has sponsored numerous symposia oriented specifically to its concerns and to gaps in institutional knowledge. A large number of in-house studies have been conducted, and the policy analysis community has been fully engaged to help the Army come to grips with the characteristics of, and challenges posed by, intrastate conflict in the post–Cold War era.

1See, for example, "Ethnic Conflict and Regional Instability: Implications for U.S. Policy and Army Roles and Missions," a symposium sponsored by the International Security Studies Program, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, MA, November 17–18, 1993. Similar symposia have been held at the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, and at Norwich University, Northfield, VT. Moreover, the Army has been a principal participant in a number of related symposia sponsored by the National Defense University.

OBJECTIVES AND APPROACH

The objective of this study is to extend the reach of the Army's own in-house analysis as it contemplates how the changing security environment affects its plans, programs, doctrine, structure, and operations. More specifically, the research analyzes five questions:

- What are the implications of changes in the intrastate conflict environment?
- How are the criteria changing for U.S. intervention in intrastate conflict?
- How is the process of intervention decisionmaking changing?
- What is the place of exit strategies in intervention planning and decisionmaking?
- What does a series of "prospective" case studies tell us about demands that might be placed on the Army—given the environmental changes and the changes in intervention criteria and processes?

As these questions imply, the two building blocks of the analysis are an understanding of the nature of intrastate conflict now that the restraining influences of the Cold War are gone, and an examination of U.S. intervention and termination decisionmaking in response to the new environment. Together, these building blocks, grounded in the recent history of U.S. interventions, suggest the classes of relevant future scenarios and the factors that might prompt U.S. intervention. If we are able to improve our understanding of the nature of intrastate conflict as it is likely to occur over the next five to ten years, and if we gain a similar understanding of why, how, when, and with what and whom the United States may decide to intervene in such conflicts, it remains to determine what this all means for the Army. The method the Arroyo Center selected to satisfy this objective is a series of prospective case studies.

Using the results of current scholarship, we surveyed the horizon of current and possible future conflict to identify potential areas of future internal strife. We then shortened this list—using the lens of perceived trends in U.S. intervention decisionmaking—to conflicts that might involve the United States. We further shortened the list by
focusing on conflicts that have a high probability of substantially involving the U.S. Army.

We overlaid on this shortened list of potential intrastate conflicts a short list of generic intervention missions (e.g., traditional peacekeeping) to identify representative possible future intervention contingencies that might portray some important dimensions of each mission. Then, with an eye to geographic distribution to ensure that we captured regional implications (e.g., language proficiency, mountain/jungle/desert terrain), we defined specific candidate case studies. Six of these were developed further.

These case studies were not exercises in discursive tale-spinning. Rather, they were tightly structured in a common format to focus on a specific intervention mission and possible transitions to other missions in a particular intrastate conflict environment. The case studies directly addressed the intervention decision itself (i.e., the risks associated with ground force intervention, Army capabilities and limitations, needed support from other DoD components, mission formulation, etc.) and implications for the Army. We used the device of a "perfect Army" (i.e., given such a mission under such circumstances, the Army would deploy a force of this size, with this type of training and force capabilities, this form of command arrangements, etc.). Where appropriate, we posited "workarounds" and alternative arrangements.

The complete versions of the case studies are presented in a companion report, MR-554/2-A, and are intended as the beginnings of an Army database. Here, however, we use the case studies to identify implications for the Army under a number of headings:

- Advisory role in national command authority (NCA) decision-making
  - Information needed by the NCA
  - Information needed from the NCA
  - Mission formulation, assessment
  - Unit capabilities and limitations
  - Risks
  - Risk-reduction measures
• Posturing implications
  — Doctrine
  — Plans
  — Training
  — Force structure and support
  — Organization
  — Readiness
  — Intelligence
  — R&D.

REPORT ORGANIZATION

The report is structured to answer the questions raised earlier and to provide the implications of those answers for the Army. Although the authors take collective responsibility for its contents, the report is a collection of related analytic essays that address the integrating issue of what intrastate conflict in the post–Cold War era means for the U.S. Army. Each chapter has different authorship, and although this obliges us to accept some redundancies, it also has allowed us to bring different perspectives to bear on a very broad set of relevant and related developments and policy problems. The final chapter of this report is both a summary and an integration across earlier chapters to derive a set of recommendations for the Army.

In Chapter Two we examine the characteristics of intrastate war as they exist today and as they are likely to develop over the next decade. Although intrastate war is not a new phenomenon, it has some new or emerging dimensions that warrant special attention. Changing concepts of sovereignty and commonalities and differences between Cold War and post–Cold War intrastate conflict are but two changes we examine for their implications for future interventions.

Chapter Three reviews the history of recent interventions and attempts to identify guideposts and trends in intervention decision-making. What do ground force commanders need from the national command authorities (NCAs)? What must those authorities un-
stand about ground force capabilities and limitations? Which
ground operations most influence and are most influenced by
the political considerations of intervention? What are the risks of using
ground forces? In short, what questions should the NCAs ask of their
ground force experts and field commanders as the former contempl-
ate intervention, and what guidance and information must the
latter have if they are to offer useful advice and carry out orders ef-
effectively? This important chapter examines the interface between
political objectives and a combination of political and military im-
plementation.

Chapter Four examines the continuing problems associated with the
process of intervention decisionmaking. These problems have their
common focus in the different styles and objectives of political deci-
sionmaking and military planning. Some examples are the tendency
at the political level to micromanage military operations, an uneasy
working relationship between military and civilian officials (team-
building rhetoric to the contrary), and an often imperfect reflection
of political sensitivities in military plans. The chapter concludes by
discussing the fact that although the military and political leaderships
critically depend on full and frank cooperation and open
communication, the Army is not optimally located in the advisory
and planning process to have a major voice in effecting improve-
ments.

Chapter Five examines the decision to terminate an intervention and
distills some of the lessons from a number of historical examples.
While it would be preferable in an ideal world to prescribe before in-
tervening the conditions for termination, events have a way of pre-
venting such neat formulations in practice. Our interest is in what
ground force planners and commanders can learn from previous op-
erations as they make plans before and during future interventions.

Chapters Two through Five provide a point of departure for the
prospective case studies that follow in Chapter Six. Earlier, we de-
scribed how those case studies would be selected: oriented to likely
future hotspots that might require U.S. ground forces, covering a
range of generic mission-oriented situations, focusing on situation
development and mission evolution, and allowing for as much geo-
graphic coverage as study resources allow. The case studies selected
were intrastate conflicts in Macedonia/Kosovo, South Africa, Algeria,
Venezuela, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka. They are intended to help an-
swer such questions as: What are the demands the situations place
on ground forces in terms of doctrine, training, command arrange-
ments, force size and makeup, etc.? What is common and what is
situation-specific? What capabilities are likely to be most prized?

Chapter Seven draws on all the other chapters to lay out what future
intra-state conflict means for the Army in doctrinal, planning, opera-
tional, and programmatic terms. We suggest where current para-
digms are incomplete or need change, and what Army strengths need
to be nurtured.
Although most of the armed conflicts in the world today are within states,¹ currently there is little formal discussion in U.S. policy analysis circles of intrastate conflict as a distinct phenomenon. Most policy analysis has focused on the related topics of ethnic conflict, conflict over natural resources, the evolving concept of national sovereignty, the emergence of failed states, and UN peacekeeping/peacemaking operations. The force analysis literature has scarcely addressed intrastate conflict, and when it has, it seems to consider training to be the key difference in preparing forces for inter- and intrastate conflict.

This chapter looks at intrastate conflict as a distinct topic, answering the questions of how it is changing and what the implications of those changes are. It argues that intrastate conflict today, while sharing some common elements with such conflicts of the past, is different from its Cold War kin because of three dimensions of change: a new geopolitical environment, the emergence of an ideological vacuum, and changing demographic factors. It further argues that when some of the past characteristics of intrastate conflict are filtered through these dimensions of change, distinct differences with clear implications emerge.

SIMILARITIES BETWEEN PAST AND CURRENT INTRASTATE CONFLICT

Despite the substantial changes in the nature of intrastate conflict, there are important areas where strong similarities endure between past and present. It is important for U.S. decisionmakers to understand that not everything about intrastate conflict has changed since the Berlin Wall came down.

Potential for Spillover

Perhaps the most important area of consistency is in the potential for spillover in many intrastate conflicts. During the Cold War, several key intrastate conflicts increased instability in neighboring states or increased regional tensions. The Vietnam War, for example, had a major impact upon Cambodia in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The passage of parts of the Ho Chi Minh Trail through eastern Cambodia helped to spread armed conflict into that nation and probably led to the Khmer Rouge victory of 1975. Also, the Sandinista takeover in Nicaragua in 1979 energized the Marxist rebels in El Salvador and gave them a ready source of arms and ideological support that had previously not been present in the area.

In the post–Cold War era, this spillover potential continues to loom large. The mass exodus of Kurdish refugees fleeing internal civil strife in Iraq during the spring of 1991 raised the specter of the destabilization of southeastern Turkey, where a Kurdish insurgency had been smoldering for many years. NATO intervention into northern Iraq was required in part to lower the spillover risk. More recently, the Bosnian war has led to tensions in the Kosovo area of Serbia, raising fears that a Serbian crackdown could be coming, which in turn could bring Albania, Greece, and Turkey into the hostilities and spark a large interstate war in southeastern Europe. Clearly, the intrastate conflicts of today are just as capable of spreading to neighboring states as were the wars within states that took place during the Cold War.

Continued Relevance of Counterinsurgency Concepts

Another region of similarity is the continued relevance of counterinsurgency concepts in those intrastate conflicts that develop into
full-scale guerrilla warfare. Even though, as we will soon see, much about intrastate conflict is changing, the fact remains that many intrastate conflicts will continue to pit conventional government forces against lightly armed insurgent forces. The insurgents, whether they operate in urban or rural settings, will continue to use some of the same day-to-day tactics used by guerrillas of past decades. They will try to use the local terrain to mask their movements, routinely target road and rail networks to paralyze transportation in critical areas, launch hit-and-run surprise attacks against government forces to cause heavy casualties and weaken morale, and periodically employ terror tactics to intimidate resident populations.

Most insurgent groups in future intrastate wars will shy away from toe-to-toe, large-unit battles against government forces that are better equipped than they. Instead, like their Marxist predecessors of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, these guerrillas will seek to fight short engagements against small government units under favorable circumstances and then withdraw into their base areas, where they can easily mingle with the local civilian populace with little risk of detection. These day-to-day tactics can be dealt with through the standard counterinsurgency practices developed by the West during the Cold War and proven to be effective in several conflicts. At the day-to-day operational level, few effective substitutes for counterinsurgency doctrine will exist in the post-Cold War era.

**Continued Disparities in Wealth as a Source of Discontent**

Just as they were during the years of the Cold War, large wealth disparities between socioeconomic classes within states are a major cause of the precursor conditions for armed conflict. Frustration among the impoverished, especially if they have no expectations of better days ahead, often plays directly into the hands of local elites aiming to seize greater power for themselves. In the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, these wealth disparities were usually best exploited by Marxists. Now that Marxism has been effectively discredited around the globe, pure ideology will play a lesser role in the use of wealth imbalances for political gain during intrastate struggles. However, this emerging ideological vacuum (to be discussed in more detail later) does not ensure that wealth disparities can no longer lead to
intrastate conflict. They will simply be "fed into" ethnic conflicts, failed-state strife, and separatist rebellions as a key independent variable. Although perhaps less visible than in the past, wealth disparities will continue to cast an ugly shadow over political discourse in the developing world.

Origins in Struggle of Local Elites

In most of the developing world, intrastate conflicts still have their origins in the struggle of local elites for power. During the Cold War, the tools used by these elites to fight over shares of power were heavily ideological in nature. Today, ethnic, nationalist, and religious themes are more often used by elites to achieve the social mobilization of those groups whose support is essential for them to increase their share of local political power.

THREE DIMENSIONS OF CHANGE

The New Geopolitical Environment

The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the accompanying end of the bipolar order has had important consequences for intrastate conflict. One of the more salient of these is the increase in the number of failed states, or states that have descended into conditions of anarchy as the result of a collapse of all political order. In recent years, Somalia, Haiti, Afghanistan, and Angola have all, at one time or another, fallen into this category.

During the Cold War, the superpowers did not wish to see any of their client states collapse because they feared this could lead to regional political losses. Thus, regimes in developing-world states like Somalia, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and North Korea, which would otherwise have had difficulty in maintaining legitimacy and social order, were propped up by financial aid, arms transfers, and diplomatic support. The removal of much of this support with the end of the East-West rivalry has left some states incapable of maintaining a

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functioning domestic order that can ensure the safety of the citizenry and provide economic subsistence. This results in anarchy, lawlessness, and warlordism, factors that often bring about mass violations of human rights, interminable low-level violence between armed gangs of irregulars, and large refugee flows into neighboring countries.³

Additionally, the end of the bipolar order facilitated the breakup of multinational political units such as Yugoslavia, the USSR, and Czechoslovakia.⁴ It has also raised the potential for the emergence of violent centrifugal forces in places like Ukraine, India, Pakistan, and Iraq. In the zero-sum political environment of the Cold War, each bloc had an incentive to work to suppress ethnic forces within its camp because those forces, if allowed to run unchecked, would afford the rival state with great opportunities for “mischief making.” The leaders of those multinational states that were neutral, like Yugoslavia, used the specter of threats from both the West and the Soviets to motivate their disparate peoples to stay unified. After 1989, all these overriding incentives to dampen the flames of ethnic rivalry disappeared.

Another factor that kept many multinational states together during the Cold War was that ideological loyalties came to supersede ethnic ones among their elites. The dominant position of the East-West struggle in the international arena and the high stakes most states had in the outcome of that struggle allowed the elites in multinational federations to hold ethnic passions in check for much of the time. The end of the Cold War moved ethnic concerns to the forefront of political discourse in many multinational states, which, in turn, fostered increased conflict. Thus, one of the features of modern


intragrade conflict that has recently become prominent is the appearance of violent ethnic cleavages within multinational federations.\textsuperscript{5}

Two of the immediate consequences of the centrifugal forces in multinational states are the increasing incidence of mass communal violence (such as in Bosnia) and conflict over minority ethnic enclaves left behind in the territory of another ethnic group (such as in Nagorno-Karabakh).\textsuperscript{6} These types of wars did exist during the Cold War, but they occurred with less frequency than has been seen since 1989.

\textbf{The Emergence of an Ideological Vacuum}

In many parts of the non-Western world, the current era is one of ideological impoverishment. This reality has wrought changes in the nature of intrastate conflict.

The end of the Cold War left Marxist-Leninist, and even state socialist values, discredited in both the former East bloc and the developing world. This left liberal Western democracy and free-market economics as the dominant paradigm throughout the industrialized North of the globe. However, as Zbigniew Brzezinski has pointed out, the dominant values of the West have not yet been fully accepted by many in the developing world.\textsuperscript{7} This is so primarily because it is difficult to translate the values of secular materialism to countries that still rely on sustenance agriculture and basic industry for their economic development. New ideologies that offer a substantive alternative to liberal democracy could arise over the long term. But since such ideologies will take a long time to develop, the politics in the developing world that choose not to embrace liberal


Western values now have two options: fundamentalist Islam (for states in the Muslim world) and ethnic self-awareness (for states in the non-Muslim world). Both offer ways for groups in the developing world or the former East bloc to regain the sense of identity that may have been lost with the end of the Cold War.

The impact of Islamic fundamentalism is evident in the case of Iran since 1979. It can result in virulently anti-American regimes bent on spreading their ideology throughout the Middle East, Persian Gulf, and North Africa through terrorism and guerrilla operations. Algeria today is an example of an Islamic fundamentalist insurgency in mid-course.\(^8\)

A more complex phenomenon is the rise of ethnic self-awareness as a response to the death of the communist and socialist ideologies. As the familiar bipolar political structure of the Cold War era collapsed, and as some of the multinational states that had been held together by the support of one of the superpowers came unglued, many groups of people found themselves with no real sovereign or ideological identity to which to devote their allegiance and with no solid self-identity that would promote group cohesion. At the same time, they found themselves in a very uncertain geopolitical environment in which numerous other groups in the same region were seen as a potential threat in the competition for land, resources, and governance.\(^9\) The most rapid way for such groups to mobilize to assert their various claims was to organize political entities along predominantly ethnic lines. This would prove to be the most efficient means of achieving a quick mobilization in the scramble for the remains of dying states, because ethnic identity is not hard to define in most parts of the world. The trend toward the increasing ethnification of conflict has been accelerated by the shrewd manipulation of ethnicity by local elites bent on increasing their own power. The cases of Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan Milosevic in the former Yugoslavia immediately spring to mind.

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Changing Demographics

One cannot speak about the changing nature of intrastate conflict today without considering the demographic issues confronting the developing world. Two major demographic trends impact on the nature of intrastate conflict: population increases and urbanization.

Population increases. Statistics show that dramatic population increases are taking place in the developing world. For example, from 1985 to 1990, the world added about 88 million people to its population per year,10 with the overwhelming majority of this increase occurring in the developing world. Whereas Europe's population is expected to increase at a rate of .22 percent per year in the 1990–1995 period, Africa's will grow at 3 percent per year.11

Several regional powers in the developing world are becoming very large states at a fast pace. For example, by the middle part of the next century, Kenya may have as many as 77 million people, Zaire may increase to 99 million, and Brazil could find itself with a population of 245 million.12 These increases are occurring primarily because most of these states contain agrarian societies in which high fertility rates continue to be the social norm at the same time that advances in medicine are significantly reducing death rates.

In addition, the populations of most states in the developing world are relatively young. In Kenya, for example, about half the population is under 15, while only 2.8 percent is over 65.13 This youthfulness of the populace can translate into a potential for social unrest if the economy fails to create jobs at a high rate.

Urbanization. As the population of the developing world increases, an ever greater proportion of that population will live in large cities. As the environmental damage to rural areas in the developing world

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12Kennedy, p. 25.
13Kennedy, p. 25.
worsens because of the rapid development policies of governments interested in fast growth, more and more rural residents are moving to the cities in search of employment and opportunity. This trend is overburdening the already meager public services of many large urban areas and creating slum areas that surround these cities. In 1985, 32 percent of the citizens of the developing world lived in cities. In the year 2000, this number will have risen to 40 percent, and in the year 2025, as much as 57 percent of this population could be residing in urban areas.

Some important consequences are associated with these demographic trends. The existence of dense concentrations of relatively young people in crowded and ramshackle urban shantytowns increases the likelihood of social explosions that could bring governments down, cause widespread chaos, and ultimately result in more failed states for the international community to deal with.

Additionally, the increasing urbanization of the developing world signifies that the critical nodes in future intrastate wars will likely be the poor urban slum areas that encircle the downtown districts of large cities. These may be the places where antigovernment groups will create safe havens from which to rally their supporters and plan military operations. These peripheral urban areas have the advantage of being close to key financial and political centers of power, making it easier to mount hit-and-run campaigns against the core centers of a national regime than would be the case if the insurgency’s sanctuary were located in a remote rural area.

Finally, there is the issue of refugee flows resulting from population pressures, environmental degradation, and increasing urbanization. Although refugee flows are normally viewed through the

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14This phenomenon is described in James A. Winnefeld and Mary E. Morris, Where Environmental Concerns and Security Strategies Meet: Green Conflict in Asia and the Middle East, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MR-378-RC, 1994.
prism of conflict between states, there is an intrastate dimension to these migrations as well. Economic deprivation and unlivable conditions in densely packed urban areas can spawn large numbers of refugees desperate to move into a neighboring state where the possibilities for a better life are perceived to exist. The presence of a large number of displaced persons in an adjacent state could destabilize that state by causing ethnic conflict (especially if the refugees are part of an ethnic group that has a presence in the host state) or by straining its resources to the limit. This destabilization could, in turn, result in an intrastate war. An example of this phenomenon is the mass Kurdish migration from Iraq into southeastern Turkey in the spring of 1991. The Turkish government's fear that this migration would foment trouble in Turkey's already volatile Kurdish regions helped convince the United States and NATO to create a safe zone for the Kurds in northern Iraq.19

HOW THE DIMENSIONS OF CHANGE AFFECT THE CHARACTERISTICS OF INTRASTATE CONFLICT

The three dimensions of change discussed above have had a clear impact on several characteristics of intrastate conflict. Below we discuss these changes from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era.

The Types of Intrastate Conflict Have Increased

There were two basic types of intrastate conflict during the Cold War: those central to the international system and those peripheral to it. "Central" conflicts were the classical ideological Marxist-Leninist insurgencies against U.S.-supported governments that so heavily concerned U.S. leaders for most of the Cold War. Examples of this type of conflict included the Viet Cong insurgency, the FMLN's guerrilla war in El Salvador, and the Sandinista takeover in Nicaragua. "Peripheral" conflicts were the various ethnic/separatist conflicts that simmered in the developing world during the Cold War. Some of these took on an East-West dimension, but many remained outside the arena of the superpower competition. These included the

19 For a review of Turkey's political situation, see Morton L. Abramowitzz, "Dateline Ankara: Turkey After Ozal," Foreign Policy, Summer 1993, pp. 164–181.
Kashmir conflict in India, the continuing Kurdish insurgencies in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, the rebellion in southern Sudan, the East Timor conflict in Indonesia, the Basque movement in Spain, the Muslim separatist insurgency in the Philippines, and the Irish Republican Army's terror campaigns in Northern Ireland.

Today, a much wider spectrum of conflict types is present in intrastate warfare. Ideological insurgencies and ethnic separatist conflicts will continue to flare in some areas, but alongside them we are seeing the emergence of anarchy in failed states, intercommunal violence in splintering multinational federations, local warlordism, disputes over residual ethnic enclaves, urban warfare between central governments and gangs of desperate "have-nots," Islamic fundamentalist uprisings, and ethnically based disputes between rival elite groups over the control of an existing state.

In essence, the problem of intrastate conflict has ballooned from an easily definable set of conflict types during the Cold War into a large array of armed disputes, many of which were not even contemplated by scholars and analysts a few years ago. The relaxation of the East-West rivalry has created geopolitical and ideological vacuums, which, when coupled with fast-growing populations and depleted resources, have unleashed new types of political cleavages.

**Intrastate Conflict Combatants May Take New Organizational Forms**

During the Cold War, especially in rural Marxist-Leninist insurgencies, the United States confronted fairly well organized, centralized, and somewhat hierarchical adversaries. The Viet Cong, for example, had a clear military command structure, well-established village cadres, and a political apparatus that honed a unified strategy for the guerrilla movement as a whole. The FSLN in Nicaragua operated along similar lines, at least in the late 1970s.

Today, many of the actors in intrastate conflict are more amorphous, decentralized, and nonhierarchical, compared to their predecessors. Local commanders may not always be willing to obey the

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20See van Creveld, *The Transformation of War.*
orders that come from the putative leaders of an armed group. In the Bosnian war, for example, many cease-fires signed by the leaders of the factions involved have broken down because lower-level commanders have chosen not to abide by them.

The reason for this phenomenon could be that the actors in modern intrastate wars place less emphasis on organization-building and more on fast armed action than their predecessors did. Whereas Marxist guerrilla groups like the Viet Cong, FMLN, and Khmer Rouge believed that time was their ally, the ethnic militias of today often feel that time is an enemy. Their leaders perceive that rival ethnic groups must be defeated quickly before they are able to develop a strong sense of cohesion and identity. Furthermore, in the fast-moving, fluid environment of a disintegrating state like Bosnia or Rwanda, the sheer speed of events can force combatant groups to move rapidly to gain what they can before the political atmosphere stabilizes. Organization-building can be too time-consuming in such circumstances.

Capturing Territory Has Grown in Importance

In many of the ideological insurgencies of the Cold War, the principal prize for either side was the support and allegiance of the populace, often mainly the rural populace. Almost everyone remembers the phrase coined by the government and U.S. forces in South Vietnam in the 1960s, “We are winning the hearts and minds of the South Vietnamese people,” as a symbol of the hopes of the Johnson administration. Generally, Marxist insurgent groups did not seek, as their ultimate objective, control of a certain part of a country and the creation of a new sovereign entity. In many cases, these insurgent groups behaved as if they were content with the existing nature of the state system. Although their appeals were often transnational in nature, they rarely called for the abolition of existing borders.21

In today's intrastate conflict, the allegiance and support of the entire national populace may be relatively less important than before, while the pure possession of territory could be becoming relatively more important.

Many of today's communal ethnic conflicts, for example, have little to do with winning the allegiance of an unswayed group of people. In these conflicts, the lines of demarcation are stark. Those who are co-ethnics are on your side, those who are members of the rival group are the enemy. There are few shades of gray. The goal in many of these wars is simply to capture as much territory as possible as space for your ethnic group. In these wars, the firm possession of territory constitutes power. In Bosnia, the terms of settlement are framed in the language of enclaves and percentages of total territory. In Azerbaijan, the conflict has boiled down to the Armenian desire to possess a safe corridor to the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave. In the Middle East, one of the major snags to the Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization accords of September 1993 had to do with the size of the Palestinian political entity around Jericho. Even in “failed state” conflicts, territory seems to be important. In Mogadishu during 1993, both Mohammed Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi jealously guarded their urban zones of influence. These areas were carefully demarcated, and UN forces paid attention to the boundaries.

All of this is not to say that the ideological insurgencies of the Cold War had little to do with territory. Obviously, Marxist insurgent groups did wish to establish secure base areas for their forces. Ultimately, however, their core objective was to turn the rural populace against the central government. If they were forced to periodically cede territory to make a tactical retreat, they would accept this as a necessary course of action. Today's ethnic combatants see the "liberation" of ancient homelands and the restoration of violated borders as their primary purpose.22

As we approach the 21st century, it appears that the possession of land is becoming more important in intrastate conflict than it has been in recent decades. The stakes of intrastate conflict have shifted.

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22Serbian policy toward Kosovo, for example, is strongly influenced by historical memory.
Intrastate Conflict Is Becoming Increasingly Urbanized

To accomplish their objectives during the Cold War, Marxist groups generally used a patient and methodical process quite different from the intense, spasmodic campaigns mounted by the various ethnic militias and armies fighting around the world today. These Marxist guerrilla movements usually began in rural areas through an exhaustive process of local organization building. Only when this process was complete would armed action be undertaken. Progressively, a network of rural base areas would be constructed to serve as safe havens and replenishment areas for the insurgents. They would also become areas in which the insurgents could establish their legitimacy as a governing authority. The final phase in the revolutionary process was an assault on the major urban areas of the country, which were the last strongholds of the central government.

As a greater proportion of the developing world's population comes to live in urban areas, more armed conflicts will come to be centered in cities as opposed to rural areas. The reason for this has to do with migratory patterns. As resource depletion and environmental degradation afflict many rural areas in the developing world, the most productive workers in those regions (i.e., the young and healthy) find opportunities lacking. Thus, they are the most likely members of the rural populace to move to urban areas in search of better jobs and higher wages. Once established in an urban area, many of these workers undoubtedly hope to either remit part of their wages to relatives still living in rural districts or to actually bring those relatives to the city to live with them. However, many of these rural migrants become disillusioned with the quality of urban life. The large flow of rural residents to the cities quickly exhausts the supply of mid- to low-range jobs, resulting in ever-increasing numbers of unemployed and underemployed youths in the cities. Many of these people are forced to live in vast slums that grow on the edge of large cities, slums where often even the most rudimentary public services, such as sanitation, are absent. When such disillusionment combines with the fact that these young migrants are living outside the familiar

traditional rural family structure, there is increasing potential for the emergence of politically volatile groups of “rural transplants” in many major developing world cities. These groups of impoverished and frustrated young people can easily become converts to all sorts of antigovernment insurgent groups. They are a class of individuals ripe for violent actions against political orders they perceive to be cruel and unjust.

THE CHANGING CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY

Before addressing the implications of the changes between current and past intrastate conflict, it is important to discuss the changing international norm of sovereignty. Since most outside interventions in intrastate conflicts require that the intervening party take into account international perceptions of what sovereign rights are, some consideration of this issue is warranted in any discussion of contemporary intrastate conflict.

Throughout modern history, the meaning of sovereignty has fluctuated between two poles on a continuum: state sovereignty and national sovereignty. State sovereignty holds sway in international politics during periods when “the international community and its institutions will tend to defend the rights of established states against nationalist claims of domestic ethnic groups.” Conversely, national sovereignty comes to the fore when “the norms of the international order favor national over state sovereignty.” When national sovereignty is ascendant, the international community will look favorably on demands for interventions in intrastate conflict for reasons of national self-determination or humanitarian need, even when these demands come at the expense of an existing nation-state. When state sovereignty is preferred, the international community will tend to avoid forcible interventions in intrastate conflicts simply because each state is seen to possess the inalienable right to govern its own affairs.

With the end of the Cold War, the concept of national sovereignty has seemed preeminent, at least as far as the developing world, East Central Europe, and the former Soviet Union are concerned. The right of national self-determination has become a potent political tool in the hands of many skilled political leaders, as demonstrated by the international community’s acquiescence in the creation of a Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq, the willingness of most states to recognize as sovereign the republics of the former Soviet Union (as well as the provinces of the former Yugoslavia), the breakup of Czechoslovakia into two new states, and the quasi-fragmentations of Ethiopia and Somalia along ethnic lines. Ethnic self-determination has become more respected as a legitimate notion in international bodies than it was during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. In many ways, the recent international climate has resembled that of the period just after World War I, when the claims of aggrieved ethnic minorities in the former Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian empires were given positive consideration by the victorious allies at Versailles.\(^{25}\)

**IMPLICATIONS**

This chapter has argued that although some elements of intrastate conflict have not changed since the Cold War, many characteristics have changed, driven primarily along the three dimensions of a new geopolitical environment, an emerging ideological vacuum, and changing demographic factors. It has also argued that the concept of sovereignty itself has changed since the Cold War era. All of this—similarities, differences, the changing concept of sovereignty—has implications for the U.S. Army that will require it to reexamine its doctrine, force structure, and plans.

**Implications from Common Elements**

As mentioned above, one region of similarity between past and present intrastate conflict is that the concept of counterinsurgency will remain relevant. This means that although the type of opponent the Army is likely to fight in future insurgencies will be somewhat different and the goals of these conflicts will be different, many of the

\(^{25}\)See Barkin and Cronin, pp. 119-122.
older tactical tenets of counterinsurgency will still be valid. The importance of airmobile infantry, civil affairs units, special operations forces, good intelligence, indigenous self-defense units, and sophisticated acoustic and infrared ground-based sensors was shown in many Western counterinsurgency efforts during the Cold War. These tools will still be helpful against the loosely organized, irregular militia units fighting in many of today's intrastate wars. The overall strategy of counterinsurgency to be used will undoubtedly be different in most cases, but basic tactics will often be similar.

Another common element between current and past intrastate conflicts is that they still have their origins in the struggle of elites for pure power. This means that today, as was the case in at least some Cold War intrastate conflicts, placing pressure on, and constructive incentives before, the relevant elites very early in their campaign for social mobilization (before widespread fighting has begun) is one of the best ways for outside states and international institutions to prevent a serious conflict.

Implications from Changing Elements

One of the larger changes in intrastate conflict has to do with the mushrooming types of conflict now possible. Because there are far more types of conflict than the classic ideologically driven Marxist-Leninist insurgencies and ethnic separatist conflicts that dominated the Cold War era, U.S. leaders cannot afford to rush the nation rapidly into interventions in intrastate conflicts without thoroughly understanding the stakes at hand, the background of the conflict, and the nature of the local actors involved.

There are also important changes in the way actors in intrastate conflicts organize themselves. As a result, many future intrastate conflicts could pit loosely organized actors against one another—actors who resemble networks more than hierarchies.20 Such groups may be more difficult to decisively defeat than hierarchical opponents simply because there are few, if any, critical leadership and decision nodes that a conventionally equipped Army can target.

20Our thinking on this issue has been heavily influenced by the ongoing research of RAND colleague David Ronfeldt.
The increasingly urban backdrop of combat in the developing world also has some important implications because it confronts conventional military and security forces, especially those from foreign countries, with a set of difficult challenges. Large numbers of civilians are densely packed into the areas of likely military action, forcing conventional units to decrease their use of firepower. The use of fixed-wing combat aircraft (which have traditionally been a force multiplier for the United States) will be heavily circumscribed because of the risks of collateral damage. A premium will be placed on the use of small packages of light infantry and light mechanized forces as well as special urban commando units. Achieving high force densities in selected districts will also be vital. Good intelligence on the day-to-day whereabouts of the opponent’s leadership will be needed. The British army’s experience in Belfast since the late 1960s could serve as the model for Western military operations in urban intrastate warfare.\textsuperscript{27}

\section*{Implications from the Changing Concept of Sovereignty}

The overall effect of the recent move toward national sovereignty is that international political pressure for U.S./UN interventions in intrastate conflicts is likely to continue, making it important that the U.S. military devote significant resources to plan for “peace operations.” One cautionary note should be made here: The current pendulum swing toward national sovereignty is not by any means irreversible. In the next several years, in view of the current fast-paced nature of world events, it is possible that the accepted international norm of sovereignty could shift back toward the concept of state sovereignty.

\section*{Overall Implications}

In general terms, when we look at the changing nature of intrastate conflict, one implication looms large and ties into the process of intervention and termination decisionmaking discussed in the next

\textsuperscript{27}One of the better studies of urban warfare is Michael Dewar, \textit{War in the Streets: The Story of Urban Combat from Calais to Khaffi}, Newton Abbot, Devon: David and Charles, 1992.
Conflict settlements will require long-term commitments from outside forces.

The bulk of intrastate conflict ongoing today cannot be resolved by a few short-term military campaigns, no matter how successful they might be. This is especially true of ethnic conflicts that include a communal violence component. Short of eradicating one or the other of the warring populations (which will seldom occur), the antagonists will continue to exist in close proximity, creating abundant opportunities for renewed fighting. This means that outside forces intervening in such conflicts must be prepared to make long-term commitments to the area if real peace is to be ensured. These commitments could take the form of simple political promises, or they may entail the physical presence of peacekeepers on the ground. Such long-term peacekeeping missions would ideally be performed by multilateral UN contingents that would have the full backing of the UN Security Council.

A battlefield defeat of one side or the other will most likely not prove to be a decisive solution in an ethnic war. This is less true of nonethnic intrastate wars. In ethnic conflict, the loser can easily revert to low-level warfare for long periods as a way of keeping his grievances on the international agenda. The case of Bosnia illustrates this. Although the Bosnian government’s army was solidly defeated by the Serbs in 1992, fighting between the two sides continues to the present day. It is simply not possible for the Serbs to eliminate all Bosnian resistance, and the Bosnians have no incentive to accept the current territorial status quo. The losses incurred by the Bosnians until now have been so enormous that the price in blood and treasure of continuing the fight at a fairly low level for the foreseeable future does not seem prohibitive to Bosnian government leaders. Any peace agreement that leaves the Serbs with most of their territorial gains will probably not be respected by the Bosnians unless a strong outside peacekeeping force is on the ground enforcing that agreement. Without long-term guarantees backed by foreign countries, most peace settlements in this type of war are likely to be transitory.

There will also be risks associated with these kinds of enforced peace settlements. Peacekeepers can easily become the targets of one or both sides if their behavior is perceived as being nonneutral and
partial, or alternatively if they are seen as being too passive. These dangers notwithstanding, such “post-termination” operations can be successful under the right conditions. The UN’s longstanding mission to Cyprus serves as an example of the benefits to be accrued when such operations are executed professionally in appropriate circumstances.28

Chapter Three

THE CHANGING NATURE OF U.S. INTERVENTION
IN INTRASTATE CONFLICT

Aggression and sources of instability that in the Cold War might have been seen as bearing on the Soviet-Communist threat and therefore warranting a U.S. military response, today appear much less dangerous for U.S. interests and certainly do not seem to be threats to “vital U.S. interests. The nation has not yet identified clearly threats and opportunities that it views as extensions of the vital interest in national survival in the post–Cold War period.”

The criteria that determine whether the United States will intervene in an intrastate conflict are critically important to the Army’s potential role in an intervention and the capabilities it must be prepared to field. The intervention decision sets in motion events that often demand a rapid and effective response. The elements of that decision—where, when, how, with whom, for how long—shape the response and, by implication, the required capabilities. It is important that the nature of the response not exceed the capabilities available, and Army planners and field commanders have a potentially key role in seeing that intervention decisions are executable.

This chapter defines the distinguishing characteristics of U.S. military interventions in the post–Cold War world by examining the criteria for intervention in intrastate conflicts: how they are changing and what the implications of change are. The chapter argues that there are systematic biases against intervention today, driven by the fact that both the stakes and the risks of post–Cold War conflicts are

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lower. It then presents the implications of this for policymakers in terms of some rules of thumb for intervention.

DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS OF INTRASTATE CONFLICT IN THE POST–COLD WAR WORLD

The most obvious characteristic of conflict and intervention decisions in the post–Cold War world also is the most salient: They no longer take place in the context of superpower competition. The twin implications of this fact are somewhat confusing. On the one hand, our perceived stakes in most plausible post–Cold War conflicts are likely to be lower than they would have been during the Cold War, if only because there is no superpower balance for their outcomes to affect. On the other hand, the risks of intervention also are likely to be seen as lower, if only because we no longer have to worry about the possibility that U.S. intervention could escalate into a superpower confrontation and conflict. Perhaps the ultimate paradox here is that although most of today’s potential interventions involve lower risks and lesser stakes, U.S. willingness to intervene in such conflicts may be decreasing.

This odd combination of reduced stakes and lowered risks is producing what are likely to be fundamental changes in the decision calculus related to U.S. participation in intrastate conflict. For a variety of reasons, the net result has been to introduce systemic biases against intervention. Foremost among these reasons, the domestic political context has undergone a transformation as the Cold War primacy of foreign policy has yielded to the post–Cold War ascendency of domestic priorities and concerns. Not only have serious military threats to vital U.S. interests all but disappeared, but only “vital” national security interests are now likely to be able to compete effectively with domestic concerns for top rank on our national agenda.

This shift has affected both leaders and those who elect them. Political leaders themselves are now more likely to give priority to domes-

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2 This section is adapted from Arnold Kanter, “Intervention Decision-Making in the Bush Administration: Deciding Where to Go In and When to Get Out,” unpublished paper, March 1994.
tic issues and to be reluctant to engage in any activities that might distract from that agenda. Moreover, these leaders know that far from being able to take for granted domestic political support for U.S. actions abroad, they will have to work hard to generate it and even harder to sustain it. This shift, in turn, can have a significant impact on which intrastate conflicts are considered to be candidates for U.S. participation, what conditions are imposed on that participation, and how options are identified and evaluated.

IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERVENTION

Political leaders’ sensitivity to these potential impacts can be expressed in terms of the following implicit rules of thumb, which are likely to apply to most intervention decisions. As will be seen, the underlying themes of these criteria are to minimize the need for domestic support and the risk of negative political consequences, at the same time taking steps to build and sustain the political support that will be required.

Intervene Only If There Is a High Probability of Success

Following this guideline means that if the United States intervenes, it needs to “win” or otherwise “succeed.” One corollary of this criterion is that the United States should not intervene simply to “raise the price of aggression” or send a message to would-be aggressors. Another important corollary is that the perceived costs of a “failed” intervention are almost always seen to exceed the costs of inaction, both at home and with respect to deterrence of future intrastate conflicts. This perspective creates a strong presumption that it is better to take no action than to launch an intervention that risks failure. Finally, the application of this guideline tends to equate the conditions for terminating the intervention with “success” (i.e., once begun, the U.S. intervention typically must continue until the United States “wins”). A distant second choice is to set a fixed, but essentially arbitrary, deadline for withdrawal, as was the case for U.S. military participation in the Somalia operation.
Avoid Intervening—Especially on the Ground—Without High Confidence the Intervention Will Be Relatively Brief and Inexpensive and Will Cause Minimal Casualties and Collateral Damage

This guideline reflects the intersection of ambiguous (but clearly less-than-vital) stakes and problematic domestic political support for intervention. Quick, clean, and cheap interventions are more likely to be commensurate with the stakes and—importantly—are less likely to generate significant domestic political problems. Conversely, the prospects for sustaining support over an extended period—especially as things go wrong, setbacks occur, and costs mount—often appear forbidding.\(^3\) Ironically, this criterion also can be used to advocate the doctrine of bringing overwhelming force to bear on the grounds that such an approach is most likely to minimize casualties and collateral damage by intimidating would-be opponents and discouraging combat engagements.

Avoid Committing U.S. Ground Forces

To some extent, this guideline reflects the premium placed on keeping interventions (or, more precisely, the U.S. role in a given intervention) quick, clean, and cheap. It usually is explained by a policy to limit U.S. contributions to when and where they would be “unique” and would make the critical difference. Typically, this has been interpreted to refer to unique or distinctive American military capabilities (e.g., strategic lift, intelligence, communications).\(^4\) The clear implication is that the United States has no comparative advantage in the ground forces that might be required as part of an intervention force and, therefore, usually would look to others to contribute these capabilities.

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\(^3\) Woodward argues that an important consideration in Bush's decision to use military force to drive Iraq out of Kuwait was his conviction that there was not enough "time politically" for a containment strategy to be effective. See Bob Woodward, *The Commanders*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991, p. 42.

\(^4\) There is another sense in which U.S. capabilities can be unique, namely, when American participation is *politically* indispensable.
Retain Operational Control Over U.S. Combat Forces

In part, this guideline reflects the increased stakes that result from the commitment of U.S. forces. It also reflects greater confidence in the competence of U.S. military leadership, particularly compared to Third World commanders who traditionally have been in charge of UN peacekeeping operations. Finally, and perhaps most important, it reflects an appreciation that the President not only will be held politically responsible for American casualties regardless of whose command they occurred under, but also that he is likely to be more severely criticized if those casualties occurred while the Americans were carrying out the orders of a foreign (and, by implication, less capable or less caring) commander.

Whatever its origins and rationale, this guideline has the potentially perverse consequence of making U.S. military participation in intrastate conflicts tantamount to an "all-or-nothing" proposition. If the United States insists that its forces only serve under U.S. commanders, then other potential contributors may expect, and in any event will argue, that it should also contribute the bulk of the forces. This means that if, for whatever reason, the United States determines that it is in its interest to have U.S. forces play some role in a given intervention, it will be under considerable pressure to have them play a substantial role.

Secure Authorization by UN or Other International Organizations

In the post–Cold War world in which only less-than-vital interests are militarily threatened, unilateral interventions such as Operation Just Cause may increasingly become rare exceptions to the rule of operations authorized by UN Security Council resolutions. In part, this is a requirement imposed by allies as a condition of their participation. In part, it is a condition imposed by the political rhetoric and realities at home (i.e., a way to build and sustain political support by offering an independent source of legitimation).\(^5\) Whatever its origins, how-

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\(^5\)There is an important political distinction between participation in a UN operation and participation in a UN-authorized operation. Somalia is an example of the first. Operation Desert Storm is an example of the second.
ever, it is a source of additional legal and political constraints on U.S. action.

Obtain Multilateral Participation

This dictum is based on the presumption that tangible evidence of burden-sharing will help build and sustain domestic political support. As such, it might be considered a straightforward corollary to the guideline above, but this should not obscure the fact that it imposes an additional set of constraints. That is, it is one thing for an ally to offer political support, including support in the form of a yes vote on a UN Security Council resolution. It is quite another thing, however, to agree to join with the United States in a military operation. The price of that participation is likely to be additional conditions and constraints on the operation (as well as possible "side payments" on other, unrelated issues). Compared to unilateral operations, multilateral participation can also complicate the execution of the military mission and/or degrade the effectiveness of the force.

Changes in the nature of intrastate conflict have clearly had implications for the criteria for intervention. As we will see in the next chapter, those changes also affect the intervention decisionmaking process.

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6Operation Provide Comfort and Operation Southern Watch—the no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq that are enforced by British and French as well as American aircraft—are good illustrations.
Chapter Four

DEFICIENCIES IN THE U.S. INTERVENTION DECISIONMAKING PROCESS FOR INTRASTATE CONFLICT

The U.S. Army\(^1\) finds itself in a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, the Army ordinarily will have the major responsibility for implementing the most difficult and sensitive decisions about U.S. military participation in the resolution of intrastate conflicts (i.e., the commitment and use of ground combat forces). On the other hand, the Army's advisory and decisionmaking role for U.S. military participation in intrastate conflicts is, at best, indirect and heavily mediated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and national command authority (NCA) decisionmaking processes.

This chapter examines the intervention decisionmaking process in light of how it has been affected by the focus on, and changing nature of, intrastate conflict. There are continuing problems with the process, and these problems are exacerbated by recent changes in the role of force at present—force now being increasingly seen as an integral part of an overall political strategy rather than as an instrument of last resort—and in the decisionmaking process itself as it confronts an increasingly fluid and complicated world. The chapter ends with some implications from this discussion for force and decisionmaking.

\(^{1}\)The term "Army" is used to refer to those Army officers who, by virtue of their positions, provide essential information and advice that become part of the decisionmaking process with respect to military interventions. The terms "military" and "military advisers" are used to refer to those senior officers, regardless of service, who by virtue of their positions play a direct role in the NCA decisionmaking process with respect to military interventions.
PROBLEMS WITH THE INTERVENTION DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Ideally, prior to the intervention decisionmaking process, the political leadership2 would define for the military leadership both the political objectives sought and the military objectives3 to be achieved to reach that political goal.4 The military would then advise whether the stated military objective was attainable and, if so, what options were available for doing so. Without substituting its political judgment for that of the civilian leadership, the military would describe the advantages and disadvantages of these options in terms that not only were understood by the civilian leadership, but also were relevant to their political considerations and concerns. After the civilian leadership chose an option, the military would describe in detail how that alternative would be implemented, once again in terms that were particularly salient to the civilian leadership.

Unfortunately, the system has some problems that lead to difficulties in practice. First, civilian leadership often tries to micromanage. For example, in the Cuban missile crisis, the civilian leadership became deeply involved in the details of how the Navy was implementing the “quarantine” of Cuba. Secretary of Defense McNamara went to Flag Plot to quiz the Navy leadership on how far Navy ships were deployed off the Cuban coast, how Soviet ships would be identified,

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2The term “political leadership” is used throughout to refer to the President and his senior civilian appointees who are the politically accountable officials on decisions involving the use of force. The use of the term “political” in this context should not be taken as a reference to electoral, partisan, or domestic politics. For stylistic convenience, this report will use the terms “political leadership” and “civilian leadership” interchangeably.

3The term “military objectives” is used to refer to the goals to be achieved through the application of military force, which goals in turn are essential to the accomplishment of the stated political objective. As such, “military objectives” reflect the intersection of military capabilities and political conditions and constraints on the utilization of these capabilities. “Liberate Kuwait” might be a political objective. “Assemble and lead a multinational military coalition to defeat and reverse (victor punish) Iraqi aggression” might be a related military objective.

4Closely related is the need for a clear specification of what constitutes “success.” For better or worse, the military objective specified for Desert Storm was to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait. When that had been accomplished, the mission had been “successful.” This reasonably clear standard of success helped to avoid “mission creep” in the form of calls to destroy the operational effectiveness of the remaining Iraqi forces, march to Baghdad, or overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime.
stopped, and searched, what Russian-language capability was available aboard the Navy ships, and what the rules of engagement were. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Anderson, finally erupted, telling McNamara: “Now, Mr. Secretary, if you and your deputy will go back to your offices, the Navy will run the blockade.”

McNamara’s questions all went to the entirely appropriate political implications of the measures the Navy was taking to implement the quarantine decision. The fact that he had to ask these questions indicates that the Navy’s briefing of the quarantine operation did not anticipate his concerns. The answers he got in response to his questions suggest that the Navy planners did not share his awareness of the political sensitivities. Faced with this situation, McNamara attempted to manage the quarantine himself, down to a level of operational detail that warrants the characterization of micromanagement. Neither McNamara nor the Navy could have been pleased with this result.

A second problem is the uneasy working relationship between military and civilian officials. For example, on the one hand, military planners sometimes see civilian policymakers pressing to pass judgment on operational matters for which they have no expertise and, in so doing, complicating if not compromising the military’s ability to execute the mission they have been given.

On the other hand, civilians sometimes feel as though they risk being blindsided by policy issues of which they were unaware because the military is not being entirely candid and forthcoming in presenting options for a decision and in explaining how a decision would be implemented. Perhaps the most striking, but far from unusual, manifestation of this is the practice of presenting the military plan (i.e., a single option) to the political leadership. Being briefed on a single “option” rather than a range of alternatives does nothing to allay these suspicions.

6A variant would be those instances in which the civilian leadership recognized ex post facto that they had failed to convey their political concerns to their military advisers and/or those advisers had not taken those sensitivities sufficiently into account in designing their military options and executing the option that was selected.
Operation El Dorado Canyon, the attack against sites in Libya in retaliation for the Libyan-sponsored terrorist attack on a German discotheque frequented by American servicemen, provides an example:

Aware that the military was not happy with the target selection, the NSC staff tried to find out more about the strike plan—the number of planes against each target, the specific aim points for the bombs. As usual, the Pentagon was reluctant to provide that kind of military detail to civilians—or even to military officers temporarily assigned to the NSC staff. Suspicious that the Joint Chiefs would somehow tamper with the plan the President had approved, the NSC staff secretly ordered the National Security Agency to monitor Sixth Fleet communications in an effort to detect any last-minute change in orders.⁷

Countering these tendencies requires considerable discipline and trust on the part of both civilian and military leadership. On the one hand, the President's senior military advisers must be willing to explain to the civilian leadership both the options available and the operational plan to implement the alternative chosen in sufficient detail to allow the latter to assess the full range of policy implications. On the other hand, the political leadership must have the discipline both to hold the information it receives very closely and to avoid the temptation to get into operational details in which it has no expertise and which have no significant policy implications.⁸

A shared sense of the political leadership's policy priorities, concerns, and sensitivities can help foster a climate of mutual trust. For the military, such a sense would transform the issue from one about how much operational detail to provide the civilian leadership to one


⁸Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm provide examples of extensive and productive interaction between the military and political leadership prior to the operations. Upon Secretary of Defense Cheney's request, for example, Secretary of State Baker conducted the last thorough review of the targeting plan for Desert Storm the day before the attack began (see Woodward, The Commanders, p. 365). Even so, JCS Chairman Powell was fearful of the kind of civilian micromanagement of the targeting plans applied by President Johnson during the Vietnam War. Rather than risk similar problems, Powell removed the temptation; the next-day targeting plan was not sent to Washington (see Woodward, p. 368).
of what kind of information the civilian leadership needs to make its decisions. For the civilians, it would help build confidence that their military advisers are providing the information about military options and operational plans required to make the necessary policy tradeoffs.

A final problem with implementing the decisionmaking system involves the incorporation of political choices into military plans. The Marine barracks bombing provides an example. The Marines standing watch at the Beirut airport failed to stop the truck carrying the bomb before it detonated next to the barracks. One of the reasons the Marine sentries were unable to stop the truck in time was that they were under orders to carry only empty magazines in their weapons. By the time the Marine guards were able to chamber a round, the truck had raced past them and was out of range. Also in Lebanon, the United States used aircraft rather than naval gunfire to attack Syrian air defense sites, even though relying on air-delivered weapons exposed pilots to the danger of being shot down and captured or killed.

Both decisions reflected an essentially political choice among contending alternatives. The colonel in command of the Marine force ordered his sentries to carry unloaded weapons to reduce the risks of inadvertent harm to the many civilians who frequented the Beirut airport, even though this measure increased the vulnerability of his men to terrorist attack. Likewise, the preference for air-delivered weapons over inaccurate naval gunfire reflected a willingness to increase the risk of friendly casualties (i.e., the aircrews) in order to reduce the risk of collateral damage and injury to noncombatants.

These episodes in Lebanon suggest another way in which the system may fail. In both cases, political calls apparently were made by military officers, rather than being referred to the civilian leadership. The officers instead relied on their understanding of the political leadership's sensitivities and tradeoffs (or substituted their own tradeoffs). The point here is not to argue whether these officers

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9In fact, one U.S. pilot was killed and his back-seater was captured in the attack on the Syrian air defense site. See Martin and Walcott, Best Laid Plans, p. 144.

10The question of which “political” decisions should be referred to civilian policymakers necessarily is a matter of judgment. For example, there is no point in burden-
made the right or wrong choices, or even whether the political leadership would have chosen differently. The point rather is to illustrate a breakdown in the process characterized by a blurring of the division of labor between military and civilian officials.

While the civilian and military participants behaved differently in each of these cases, all of the episodes have a common theme: politically sensitive issues played or should have played a major role in

- How options were described by the military to the political leadership, and which characteristics and features were emphasized.

- The choice made by the political leadership among the military options presented.

- The military leadership's description of how the option selected would be implemented.

THE INTERVENTION DECISIONMAKING PROCESS IN THE POST–COLD WAR WORLD

In the post–Cold War world, where the political stakes are less clear and the risks are harder to calculate, policymakers face two challenges in making intervention decisions that will exacerbate the problems discussed above.

First, the role of force may be undergoing change. Throughout most of our history, force has usually been considered an instrument of last resort, the path to take only after diplomacy has been tried and failed. In the post–Cold War world, by contrast, the threat and use of force is increasingly likely to be seen as an integral part of an overall political strategy (i.e., the continuation of politics by other means). This is nowhere more true than in issues related to whether and how the United States should become involved in intrastate conflicts. It is precisely in such cases that the political issues, concerns, and sensi-

ing the decision process with a series of military options that self-evidently are political nonstarters. Likewise, the commander on the scene will often find himself in situations in which he can or, because of circumstances, must make decisions that have political implications.
tivities displayed by the civilian leadership in the episodes described above are likely to loom large.

Second, the decisionmaking process itself is undergoing change. The ideal of well-structured and orderly decisionmaking confronts the reality of a process that, in the post–Cold War world, tends to be increasingly fluid and complicated, if not downright disorderly.

Below we discuss some of the characteristics of the decisionmaking process for the potential use of force that emerged during the Bush administration and continued in important respects into the Clinton administration.11

How “Candidates” for Intervention Get on the Decision Agenda Is Relatively Idiosyncratic

As the contrasting responses to the seemingly similar Somalia and Sudan cases suggest, media coverage can have a significant impact. Media coverage helps to put the issue on the agenda of senior decisionmakers who, like the rest of us, watch television, read newspapers, and are prey to human emotion. Moreover, intensive media coverage—reinforced by questions at regularly scheduled press briefings and congressional inquiries, hearings, and floor speeches—all but compels senior-level decisionmakers to address the issue, whatever their personal predilections. As the Bosnia case illustrates, however, although media coverage can substantially increase the chances that an issue will get onto the decision agenda, it does not necessarily lead to a decision to intervene.

Ad hoc, self-generated assessments by officials about “what is at stake” is another way that candidates for intervention get on and rise to the top of the decision agenda. For example, the ebb and flow in U.S. policy toward the conflict in former Yugoslavia can be explained in part by “the” issue being variously defined as a humanitarian tragedy, a test of NATO in the post–Cold War world, a test of the European Community’s ability to act, a test of U.S. leadership, a risk of spillover and escalation, an important precedent for dealing with

11The following discussion draws on Kanter, “Intervention Decision-Making in the Bush Administration.”
intrastate conflict in the post–Cold War world, and a clear signal to Russia about the constraints on its actions toward breakaway republics.

Which of these definitions of “the” Yugoslav issue prevails at any given time, however, can be highly idiosyncratic, depending on such factors as who has access to senior-level decisionmakers, who reads what, who talks with whom, and even the sequence in which seemingly diverse issues get addressed.

How “Candidates” for Intervention Get Decided Is Also Relatively Unpredictable

If the manner in which issues related to intrastate conflict get on the decision agenda is idiosyncratic, the decisions that emerge often are all but unpredictable. This is largely due to the combination of the lower risks and reduced stakes that characterize U.S. intervention options in the post–Cold War world, which make it increasingly difficult to gauge what the United States will decide and how it will respond in any given instance. Many of the characteristics of the decisionmaking process described below add to that uncertainty.

The decision to intervene in Somalia in late 1992 with nearly 30,000 American troops caught most people, inside as well as outside the government, by surprise. A review of the record will most likely show that “even” the decision to take military action to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait was neither certain nor obvious in advance. The net result of this unpredictability—reinforced by a long list of cases in which the United States did not intervene, (e.g., Sudan, Georgia, Tajikistan, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Bosnia)—is to undermine the deterrent effect of threats to intervene.

The Participants’ Identity Is Fairly Stable and Predictable, but the Decisionmaking Process Itself Is Ad Hoc

To some extent, this feature is simply a reflection of the decision-making process with respect to any “important” issue, particularly issues such as intervention decisions, which are nonroutine and often take place in a “crisis” atmosphere. It also is a reflection of an “intervention policy” that is still inchoate. We are very much feeling
our way toward a “new world order” in the post–Cold War world, including the central questions about whether various U.S. interests are engaged and how we should try to protect or advance them. Put differently, at this point we are still in an inductive, “learning from experience” mode, with little precedent, much less mature policy, to serve as a guide to action.

How the Military Frames the Issue and Formulates Its Assessment and Advice Is a “Black Box” to Most Outside the Pentagon

Although the Chairman and Joint Staff routinely task the relevant command(s) for assessments, recommendations, and plans, it is not clear how much—or what kind of—guidance and context is provided with that tasking. It likewise is unclear how much and what kinds of informal communications between the field and Washington take place within service and other military channels.

The civilian leadership’s perception that the military process of designing and evaluating options is a “black box” reinforces its concerns that important policy considerations may not have been adequately addressed. As suggested above, when this process yields a single option, the civilians’ misgivings only increase. One way to allay some of these concerns would be to present several options, if only to show other alternatives that were considered and the reasons why they were rejected.

Finally, the joint impact on the process of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms and Colin Powell’s tenure as JCS Chairman is uncertain but appears to have been substantial.

Slippery Slopes Are a Frequent Source of Concern, in Part Because They Really Exist

One of the arguments regularly invoked in interagency debates to oppose U.S. military involvement in an intrastate conflict is that the U.S. role, however modest initially, will start the country down an uncontrolable “slippery slope,” both toward growing political responsibility for the outcomes that emerge and toward increasing military intervention to ensure that outcome is satisfactory. Put dif-
ferently, there is concern that the United States will lose control over its stakes and therefore over its involvement—specifically, that it will be unable to keep either one limited. An important corollary is that it becomes increasingly difficult to terminate U.S. military involvement short of having achieved “success” or setting an arbitrary deadline for withdrawal.

Although these “slippery slope” arguments may be invoked by bureaucratic participants who are opposed to U.S. intervention for other reasons, there is enough real-world experience to preclude simply dismissing such objections out of hand. Somalia provides a good illustration. The U.S. airlift of relief supplies to a handful of Somali airfields in the autumn of 1992 seemed to be a relatively modest operation with clear limits, but it paved the way for UNITAF (Unified Task Force). Given the overwhelming U.S. role in and responsibility for UNITAF, it proved to be virtually impossible politically for the United States to do a clean handoff to UNOSOM II (UN Operation in Somalia).

It is easy to imagine how the United States could have found itself on an analogous slippery slope in Bosnia. In early 1992, the United States reached a consensus with several of its NATO allies to initiate an airlift of relief supplies to Sarajevo. Such an airlift required that the airport at Sarajevo be reopened, which in turn necessitated the deployment of air controllers, other technicians and experts, and a security force to protect them, i.e., a contingent totaling several hundred military personnel. The United States was prepared to provide this on-the-ground capability, but France preempted this deployment with a contingent of its own. One is left to wonder whether subsequent U.S. policy toward Bosnia, particularly with respect to the use of military force, might have been different if U.S. rather than French ground personnel were sent to reopen and secure the Sarajevo airport.

12The tacit competition between the United States and France over which would provide the personnel to reopen the Sarajevo airport was a reflection of intra-Alliance politics, intramural disputes about the “European security and defense identity,” and the respective roles for NATO and the European Community in expressing this identity.
Concerns About Slippery Slopes Notwithstanding, Planning Is Often Shortsighted

This may be partly due to a tendency to discount "slippery slope" objections to intervention as being little more than stalking horses for other, often unstated, objections. Thus, if a decision is made to intervene, the worries, concerns, and risks expressed by those who have been overruled tend to be forgotten or ignored. This tendency may be reinforced when the origins of an intervention decision stem from a seemingly irresistible, albeit ill-defined, pressure to "do something." Whatever the reasons, decisionmakers often fail to look more than one or two moves ahead, or to take into account responses available to the other side.

IMPLICATIONS

When one views the decisionmaking process described at the beginning of this chapter, one implication is striking: The military strongly depends on the civilian leadership for inputs to be able to play its proper role in the decision process. That is, the military not only needs to know what it is supposed to accomplish, but also needs to know the policy concerns and sensitivities on which the options it designs might impinge. Provided they have this information, military advisers can—and should—describe military options to the political leadership not only in terms that the politically accountable officials understand, but also that relate to their policy concerns. The same holds true for explanations of how the military option chosen will be implemented.

A second series of implications stems from the uneven nature of the current process. First, the relatively idiosyncratic and unpredictable manner in which questions about the U.S. role in one or another intrastate conflict get on the decision agenda means that it is difficult, if not impossible, to anticipate which conflicts warrant detailed contingency planning. Second, decisions related to the use of U.S. forces in intrastate conflicts can emerge abruptly. This means that there may be very little time to do contingency planning. Third, U.S. policy with respect to a particular intrastate conflict can be highly
volatile as the definition of "the" issue rapidly shifts. This means that it will be difficult to anticipate the political objective of a potential intervention or the military objectives that would flow from that political goal. Taken together, these implications suggest that the Army should ensure that it has a highly adaptive contingency planning process and/or highly adaptable contingency plans.

A third implication is that although the Army is likely to play a role in any intrastate intervention, any Army contribution to the decision process is indirect and diluted. The problem has been exacerbated by the civilian leadership's continued view of the military process of designing and evaluating options as a "black box." This suggests that the Army's inputs into the decision process have become less direct and more mediated by a more autonomous Joint Staff process.

Finally, the not entirely misplaced concerns about slippery slopes and shortsighted plans suggest that Army planners should give careful attention in designing and briefing options to (a) where slippery slopes might be encountered, (b) the risks that the United States would find itself sliding down each one, and (c) the features in the option that reduce the risks or attenuate the consequences. In this connection, Army planners should be explicit about the "contingency planning" embedded in the options being briefed (i.e., how the other side might react if a given option is implemented and, in turn, how we would respond).
Chapter Five

THE ROLE OF TERMINATION IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN INTRASTATE CONFLICT

The frustrating experience of Vietnam was a clear turning point in the history of U.S. intervention in intrastate struggles. Vietnam is seen as the classic example of a “dubious battle,” where more and more resources were progressively committed merely to safeguard those investments already made. This escalating spiral of commitment and investment acquired a life of its own over time, bearing little or no relationship to the action’s initial objectives.

The debacle in Vietnam illustrated the importance of clearly articulating end conditions for limited wars. Current discussion centers around the term “exit strategies,” which is now popular both in the public debate and in discussions involving the uniformed military. Unfortunately, this term is somewhat fuzzy, but this much at least is clear: It is intended to capture an understanding of how the United States can terminate its interventions after they have been initiated. This idea is certainly influenced, in part, by the desire to avoid “another Vietnam” and, as such, is aimed at preventing both civilian decisionmakers and military commanders from losing sight of the larger political objectives and operational goals that make any military activity meaningful.

This chapter answers the question of what role termination should play in the intervention decisionmaking process. Addressed to both


civilian policymakers and the uniformed military, it argues that while exit strategies are less relevant in “absolute wars,” they are vitally important in “limited wars” and, especially, in the intrastate conflicts that will dominate the future. The chapter also examines how exit strategies were implemented in practice during the post–World War II period. It argues that attention to exit strategies at the level of entry decisionmaking has been inconsistent, that higher-intensity interventions get the most attention, and that the lack of attention in mid-level contingencies is most troubling given likely future U.S. involvement in intrastate conflicts. The chapter concludes with some implications.

THE ROLE OF TERMINATION IN INTRASTATE CONFLICT

When viewed from within the Clausewitzian tradition of understanding military activity, the current emphasis on developing exit strategies prior to intervention appears odd at first sight. After all, this tradition focuses principally on the relationship between ends and means: The ends are understood to be the objectives toward which some effort is directed, and the means, in turn, are understood as being the resources used for attaining the specified objectives. What is important for success, therefore, is simply a sound calculation of the affiliation between ends and means.\(^3\) Terminating the use of force, consequently, becomes little more than a trivial consequence of obtaining one’s political objective, which can be defined in a generic sense simply as securing “victory” over the adversary.

Given this conclusion, a casual observer might argue that military forces should spend their time and resources concentrating on mastering the enemy in the field (thereby securing both the operational goals and the political objectives) rather than expending their energies on exit strategies, which in any case are an insignificant consequence of victory. Such an argument, no matter how attractive, is misleading. It is sustainable only if military forces are employed, or should be employed, in prosecuting “absolute” wars—wars in which

\(^3\)A good, succinct discussion of how Carl von Clausewitz perceived the ends-means relationship can be found in Book One of his classic work *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, pp. 75–99.
the object of using force is the complete and total imposition of one’s will on the adversary.\textsuperscript{4} In such wars, force is applied continuously and uninterruptedly: The conflict is “total,” and it does not cease until the adversary itself ceases to exist as an alternate center of power.

However, U.S. interventions in future intrastate struggles are not likely to be absolute wars, because they will involve derivative objectives like international order and regional stability rather than core interests like physical survival. Such interventions will be limited engagements in which policymakers will not have “simple” and easily comprehensible political goals like “eliminate the opponent completely.”

Limited engagements are, thus, uniquely burdensome phenomena that impose uneasy tasks on both political and military authorities. Of the political leadership, they demand a clarity of purpose: Political objectives have to be clear, well understood, and limited, and these limited objectives cannot be expanded in the face of failure or shifted in the face of success, except by a deliberate decision based on carefully evaluating all the alternatives and guided by a clear conception of the value of the ends sought to be attained. Of the military leadership, they demand a clarity of mission: Political objectives must be translatable into clear, distinctive, and attainable goals at the operational and tactical levels of planning, and these goals must not be altered midway, except as a result of deliberate decision and, even then, only if such alteration enables a speedier accomplishment of the overarching political objective.

Thus, the potential involvement of the United States in such limited, less-than-absolute conflicts implies that the notion of exit strategies becomes relevant and necessary in a way that it may not have been in situations of “absolute” war. The necessity for an exit strategy is only heightened by the fact that the kinds of missions facing the Army in intrastate conflicts in the future will be very different from the traditional peacekeeping missions usually associated with the aftermath of interstate conflicts in the past.

\textsuperscript{4}Clausewitz, \textit{On War}, Book One, Chapter I, p. 75.
Such traditional peacekeeping missions serviced clear and limited political objectives and were oriented to strictly definable operational goals, like monitoring a cease-fire line or an international frontier, or manning a buffer zone between clearly defined state actors who generally consented to the presence of the peacekeeping force. Undertaking such missions was often dangerous, but the operational goals and the indicators of success were clear and identifiable.

The peace missions anticipated in the post–Cold War era will in many instances have a different quality. They span the spectrum of conflict intensity from preventing conflict to peace enforcement in both anarchic conditions and against organized entities; they include pacifying intrastate disputes, which often may have transborder sources of support and sanctuary; and they will probably confront U.S. expeditionary forces with a netherworld that, as one previous description of American intervention in intrastate conflict termed it, is "not war, but like war."6

In such circumstances, when confusion rather than clarity will often mark the environment of operation, policymakers in association with the higher military leadership must construct a viable exit strategy before undertaking any intervention. Such an exit strategy would include (1) a clear and considered statement of the limited, stable, and worthwhile political objectives to be pursued; (2) a derivative set of the discrete and attainable operational goals that must be secured if the political objectives are to be successfully obtained; and (3) a set of fallback options that must be anticipated if the original political objectives and operational goals could not be secured for any conceivable reason. Each of these three elements deserves brief elaboration.

A clear statement of limited political objectives is necessary because, unlike the case of absolute war, clear and natural political objectives do not suggest themselves automatically when intervention in intrastate conflicts is concerned. Thus, the desired objectives have to

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5 This spectrum of missions is comprehensively detailed in Chapter Six.

be defined "artificially" by political authority—after duly recognizing what attaining these objectives will entail at the level of military operations in the field. This, in turn, implies that even in the definition of political objectives, higher military leadership has a clear, if only subordinate, role to play. It has to advise the civilian policymaker about what military costs are entailed by the choice of a particular political objective and what military forces can and cannot achieve, given the constraints imposed by other competing commitments and obligations.

The importance of this first element cannot be overemphasized, particularly in the context of intrastate conflicts. If clearly defined, stable and limited political objectives are absent: Civilian and military leaders would be unable to discern the "victory" criteria in any given intervention, and so they would run the risk of pursuing an open-ended set of continually moving targets; they would hazard continual entrapment, where additional resources are committed merely to salvage previous investments. Moreover, they would never be able to evaluate whether the intervention itself was ever worth the candle because both the desired objectives (and the valuation of their worth) would be continually changing.

The second element of the trio also seems straightforward. The military must endeavor to translate political objectives into discrete and attainable operational goals in the field, and it must resist the temptation to change goals in midstream. Of course, this is easier said than done, if for no other reason than that civilian policymakers often succumb to the inclination to change the overarching political objectives under pressures of perceived political necessity and with little regard to how such changes affect the Army's ability to attain its operational goals.

For this reason, the third element of the trio—considering fallback options—becomes critical. This does not imply that civilian and military leaders should develop a rigid set of alternative plans beforehand, each embodying several different sequences of action to be mechanically enacted if the original objectives become difficult to attain. Rather, it simply requires both the civilian and military leadership to pay attention to the various ways that a given mission may evolve; what alternative objectives and goals, if any, may be desirable in such circumstances; and whether these alternative objectives and
goals are worth the price in terms of direct and opportunity costs. Very obviously, policymakers and planners are not omniscient; they cannot be expected to map out a priori the infinite number of patterns in which a given mission may evolve. Yet it is not unreasonable to expect that both policymakers and planners will consider beforehand which sequences of events are in principle intolerable and what must be done—schematically—should these sequences appear on the horizon.

Considering fallback plans a priori is thus an attempt to minimize risk in the face of uncertainty. The nature of these fallback plans will obviously vary depending on the nature of the intervention in question. Where low- and medium-intensity interventions are concerned, it would not be unreasonable to expect fallback plans to speak to the entire gamut of activity, ranging from the political decision to either escalate or abort intervention down to operational decisions involving changes in the mix of forces and modes of employment. In high-intensity interventions—to the degree that such operations tend towards the limit of absolute war—it would not be unreasonable to expect that fallback plans would focus more on the operational end of the decision spectrum. In these instances, the political preference for certain objectives is presumably more durable (since the costs to credibility are high), and most alterations in plan presumably would focus on changing the number or mix of forces in order to secure the requisite operational goals more easily. There is, however, nothing ironclad about this expectation. The exact nature of fallback planning will be determined principally by the circumstances of each intervention; what is important here is that both policymakers and military planners anticipate the various ways a mission may evolve in order to recognize a priori which counterresponses are acceptable and which are not.²

These three constituent elements, taken together, thus suggest that not having an exit strategy prior to intervention will only be an invitation to disaster. This is particularly true because interventions in-

²This process is illustrated in the decision cycles relating to various case studies of hypothetical interventions in the companion volume to this report: Thomas Szayna et al., Intervention in Intrastate Conflict: Implications for the Army in the Post–Cold War Era: Supplemental Materials, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MR-554/2-A, 1995.
volving "internal peacekeeping" will often be confronted with those instabilities characterizing most intrastate struggles: the heightened passions of the belligerents, who struggle for immediate rather than remote claims; the coalitional (as opposed to hierarchic) character of the belligerents, which makes it difficult to reach agreements or make stick agreements already reached; the spatial context of operations, which being related to internal violence is not defined and limited by the existence of relatively permanent borders; and, finally, the intensity of the violence, which occurring in an arena where individual vulnerability is at its strongest results in political struggles taking on a "life-and-death" character. Consequently, the need for an exit strategy in interventions involving such conflicts is all the greater.

HOW EXIT STRATEGIES HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED IN PRACTICE

Given this construction of what an exit strategy is and how it is linked with the issue of terminating an intervention, it is easy to recognize that exit calculations must be integrated from the start into the intervention decision. All studies that focus on conflict termination admit to this fact readily. Here, we examine whether intervention decisions in practice have integrated exit strategies in the manner judged desirable—that is, whether clear, defined, and limited political objectives existed prior to intervention, whether commensurate operational goals were defined to secure these political objectives, and whether fallback strategies were examined before the intervention was initiated. As part of this inquiry, we also focused on whether having an exit strategy was in fact a condition prior to intervening, whether exit conditions were discussed or announced prior to intervention, whether the intervention went according to plan or if changes in circumstances forced a rethinking of the terms of de-

8This phase is borrowed from Alan James, "Internal Peacekeeping: A Dead End for the UN?" Security Dialogue, Vol. 24, No. 4, December 1993, pp. 359-368.
9Some of these issues are discussed at greater length in James, "Internal Peacekeeping," pp. 365-367.
ployment, and, finally, whether policymakers had prepared for or anticipated changes in the way the intervention was executed.

To do this, we chose six interventions divided into three generic classes—low-level, mid-level, and high-level—each distinguished from the other by the degree of combat intensity involved. The interventions in Greece (1946–1949) and Congo (1964–1965) are termed low-level interventions because U.S. military personnel involved in these missions were engaged in relatively low-intensity military operations. The interventions in Lebanon (1958) and the Dominican Republic (1965–1966) are termed mid-level interventions because U.S. forces here were engaged in military operations of relatively greater intensity in comparison with the activity witnessed in Greece and in the Congo. The interventions in Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989) are dubbed high-level interventions because U.S. forces in these missions were engaged in military operations of the highest intensity when compared with the other two sets of interventions described above. These three classes are, therefore, differentiated not by how they match up to some abstract threshold of operational intensity but rather by how the relative intensity of combat appears when these interventions are viewed synoptically.

The object of this exercise is to examine whether some insights can be recovered for future interventions in intrastate conflict. Since the logic of an exit strategy is not affected by the changes in the international political environment, the insights drawn from intervention experience during the Cold War are adequately, if not more relevant, to intervention in the post–Cold War era as well.

Table 5.1 summarizes the results of examining the six interventions in terms of how well they integrated exit strategies into the original intervention decision. (For a full discussion of each individual case, see Chapter One of the companion volume, MR-554/2-A.)

The first conclusion that emerges is that attention to exit strategies—at the level of entry decisionmaking—has been very inconsistent in practice (as shown in the top half of Table 5.1). Exit strategies could be deemed to be well integrated only in Greece (1946–1949) and in Grenada (1983–1984). They were arguably well integrated in Panama (1989–1990), but were more or less completely neglected in the
Table 5.1
Summary of Termination Case Study Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low-Level Interventions</th>
<th>Mid-Level Interventions</th>
<th>High-Level Interventions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Integrating “exit strategies” with entry decision</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were political objectives absolutely clear prior to intervention?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were operational goals adequately specified prior to intervention?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were fallback options considered prior to intervention?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconciling general outcome with cleanliness of termination</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Partial success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low-Level Interventions</td>
<td>Mid-Level Interventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconciling general outcome with cleanliness of termination (continued)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficulty of executing mission in the field</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High initially, lower after operational goals were clarified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attention paid to having &quot;exit-strategy&quot;</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factors promoting cleanliness of exit</td>
<td>Clear objectives and goals, and some fortuitous external factors</td>
<td>Mostly fortuitous external factors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This implies that the neglect of exit strategies can be found without prejudice to time. They were certainly neglected almost consistently before Vietnam (Greece being the prominent exception here) and were neglected after Vietnam as well. Even if Panama is chalked up as a clear success from the viewpoint of clean termination, a larger survey of U.S. interventions would have discovered that the missions of the Multinational Force in Beirut (1982) and Operation Restore Hope in Somalia (1992–1994) were failures from the perspective of having clean and neat exit strategies. This finding appears somewhat perplexing at first sight, given the searing experience of Vietnam in the psyche of both U.S. policymakers and the general public.

It can be explained, however, when intervention decisions are examined not by reference to time but by intensity of mission. Here a somewhat different, but ultimately unreassuring, conclusion emerges. When intervention decisions are varied by intensity of mission, it appears as if an exit strategy acquires great attention only when high-level interventions are involved (the second row from the bottom in Table 5.1). This is perhaps appropriate in some sense, if only because high-level interventions run relatively higher risks of failure. The political objectives tend to be defined more clearly, the operational goals are most succinct, and the tactics employed are designed to quickly attain a favorable outcome. The concentrated focus on successful campaign execution, combined with the overwhelming material superiority usually brought to bear in these interventions, often renders the need for systematic thinking about fall-back options redundant, and this has usually been true whenever the intervening U.S. force has been so asymmetrically advantaged that the final outcome of operations has never been in doubt. Shortcomings, insofar as they manifest themselves, show up more at the level of tactical execution than at the level of goal definition. This is to some degree conditioned by the complexity of high-level operations, and such failures were witnessed most conspicuously in Grenada, where notable deficiencies were uncovered with respect to intelligence and interservice coordination.
In contrast, attention to exit strategies appears relatively weaker in low-level interventions. This is certainly because the level of commitment is low to begin with, but more important, it appears to be a function of how visible the intervention is to the public eye. This factor explains the difference between the interventions in Greece and in the Congo in the pre-Vietnam period. Public attention in the former instance was great, Congress was involved in the decision to create the aid mission, and the intervention was clearly understood to be an operation of some length. The extended nature of the mission, coupled with the visibility of the commitment, appears to have made having an exit strategy crucial to begin with. The Dragon operations in the Congo, however, were different on all these counts. They were relatively quick and fairly invisible, even within the Pentagon. Consequently, the failure to integrate exit strategy with entry-level decisionmaking was all but inevitable. Luckily for the Johnson administration, the partial failure of the mission did not have grievous consequences at the domestic political level. That administration, in fact, came through unscathed, although its failure to continue operations resulted in the massacre of a couple of hundred foreign hostages at Wamba.

Even though there were no similar low-level interventions in the post-Vietnam period, it would not have been surprising to find exit strategy being neglected in such operations—particularly if these were to occur outside of public focus. The explanation here is simple: The less important the political and military commitment, the less attention paid to how one exits an intervention—especially because the potential damage to credibility, reputation, and overall readiness is, by definition, small in a low-level engagement.

The most troublesome finding of the survey, therefore, is the failure to integrate exit strategies in mid-level interventions. These interventions are particularly troublesome because they do not invoke the concentrated attention usually lavished on high-level interventions, even though they incur many of the potential hazards associated with them. The level of commitments in such interventions is usually significant (witness Lebanon (1958 and 1982), the Dominican Republic (1965), and Somalia (1992–1994)). However, because these interventions do not appear as demanding as high-level operations in the first instance, exit considerations are usually neglected until it is too late. Yet it is in these interventions that attention to exit
strategies is most relevant: The political objectives sought are often diffuse and, consequently, are susceptible to shifting once operations are under way. Further, the political objectives sought often do not lend themselves to clear and precise goals at the operational level to begin with, goals that can at any rate be secured without potentially great cost. The problematic nature of such mid-level interventions has often been obscured by the success of the U.S. interventions in Lebanon (1958) and in the Dominican Republic (1965) in the pre-Vietnam period. Yet in both these instances, the success of the mission and the relatively clean termination of the intervention were conditioned by fortuitous circumstances that when unavailable, as in Lebanon (1982) and Somalia (1992–1994), could have led to disaster.

Vietnam, therefore, has bequeathed imperfect "lessons" with respect to exit strategy. It has made policymakers and higher military commanders more sensitive about clarifying goals and objectives a priori when major commitments are contemplated. This indeed is a welcome development. But it should not deflect attention from the fact that mid-level interventions are equally dangerous and volatile phenomena that must be watched with an even stricter eye where political objectives, operational goals, and fallback plans are concerned. These enhanced demands arise precisely because mid-level interventions generally appear deceptively unambitious at the time of entry.

IMPLICATIONS

Given the foregoing conclusions, the following suggestions are offered. To begin with, three general considerations stand out.

First, Army officials, especially at the higher command level, must demand from civilian leadership clear political guidance. The political objectives must be distinct and feasible, given the multiplicity of obligations that the Army is expected to fulfill with the limited resources available at hand.

Second, Army officials must make every effort to translate these political objectives into succinct operational goals. The nature of these goals must be communicated to the civilian leadership so that it clearly understands what its political objectives—which are often painted in broad strokes—predicate at the operational level of com-
bat. Clearly delineating these operational goals, then, allows policymakers to reassess the desirability and the feasibility of the political objectives sought. Such reassessment is made much easier if Army commanders can communicate an understanding of what the potential costs (e.g., casualties) of achieving the operational goals are and what opportunities are being forgone by pursuing these goals in place of some others.

Third, the Army must be prepared for the fact that, no matter how undesirable, political objectives may change in midstream as policymakers attempt to respond to various political pressures. The best the Army can do about such eventualities is to plan and prepare for them. This involves making changes in two different dimensions. Along one dimension, it implies developing and strengthening the adaptive planning process. This includes developing a better understanding of the arena of operations, the nature of the mission and its potential for evolution, and the intelligence markers that indicate when mission evolution is likely or incipient. Along another dimension, however, it implies reinforcing organizational changes already under way. The move toward task organizing is a right step in this direction because it gives local commanders the ability to marry together units of different skills and capabilities rapidly enough to cope with changing contingencies in the arena of operations.

Aside from these general considerations, the following specifics might also be relevant. Where low-level and mid-level involvements are concerned, it is in the Army’s interest to make certain that relatively more attention is paid to goal definition than is usually the case. A failure to set appropriate goals a priori can sometimes be compensated for by the deployment of superior force, understood in both numerical and technological terms: Such an approach fortunately worked in Lebanon (1958) and in the Dominican Republic (1965), but in general it is a risky approach that often reaches the limits of its success rather quickly. Where high-level involvements are concerned, it is in the Army’s interest to make certain that relatively more attention is paid to tactical execution proper, in comparison to questions of goal definition. This is because problems of combat effectiveness tend to affect the prospects of quick and successful termination more in high-level interventions than problems of goal definition, which are usually better sorted out because of the gravity inherent in the enterprise.
A study of exit strategy cannot be concluded without a few remarks specifically directed at policymakers. To begin with, policymakers must recognize that military forces are truly blunt instruments. They are most efficacious when attaining policy objectives requires the use of absolute, untrammeled violence. In such circumstances, military forces do what they do best: engage and conclusively destroy the enemy. In circumstances short of absolute violence, however, military forces are constrained instruments. And to the degree that political objectives warrant less than absolute violence, military forces deviate from their ideal utility. Hence, great caution must be applied when using them in such circumstances. It is in the interest of policymakers to learn how to resist quick and facile calls for applying military force—whether such calls emanate from the media, the public, or other politicians at large. To admit that the U.S. military cannot secure all manner of political objectives is not an admission of weakness. It is merely a recognition of the capabilities and the limitations of the military instrument.
Informed observation of the changing nature of conflict and studies of previous U.S. decisions to initiate and then terminate interventions goes a long way toward pointing out the problems the United States is likely to encounter in any future interventions in intrastate conflicts. However, speculative thinking is needed to transpose these problems from the theoretical to the practical level to provide specific information to help the U.S. Army in planning for future contingencies. In other words, what is called for is the "what if" question. What if the U.S. political authorities order the U.S. military to participate in an intrastate intervention in a given region facing a specific type of internal strife? The speculative exercise, when performed in sufficient depth, explores the details of a specific potential intervention by providing hypothetical but concrete examples of interventions, and it helps clarify the potential future needs of the Army in terms of doctrine, training, logistics, equipment, and force structure by alerting it to the specific scenarios and missions it may be asked to undertake.

This chapter addresses the "what if" question by providing an overview of six detailed case studies of potential U.S. interventions in intrastate conflicts. The case studies are a part of an exercise designed to aid planning and are not intended as an endorsement of a U.S. interventionist role in the various intrastate conflicts around the globe. Nor should the case studies be taken as proposing a larger Army role in any potential U.S. interventions in intrastate conflicts. In addition, the case studies should not be taken as predictions of internal strife in the future in the countries examined. It is entirely possible that none of the scenarios suggested here will come to pass.
But each case study should also be considered a partial surrogate for a larger group of somewhat similar cases that could have been developed given more time and study resources.

INTERVENTION MISSIONS

The case studies are organized in a functional framework of the missions that could be assigned to the specific intervention force commander or to the U.S. component of such a force. In other words, rather than looking at the multitude of situations that could lead to a U.S. intervention, we differentiated the case studies on the basis of what the intervening troops would be asked to do. The mission framework explicitly links the political goals of an intervention with a specific set of tasks for the troops. As such, the mission framework provides a link to the termination decision for an intervention.

There are at least eight major categories of missions that could be assigned to the Army by U.S. political authorities:

- Prevention (deterrence)
- Peace building
- Traditional peacekeeping
- Humanitarian intervention
- Peacekeeping/peace enforcement
- Peace enforcement (anarchy)
- Peace enforcement (organized actors)
- Foreign internal defense/support for insurgency

The list does not exhaust the set of possible missions, but it does focus on the most likely missions that infringe on traditional notions of sovereignty and that the Army may be asked to undertake in conditions of intrastate conflict in the post-Cold War era. The distinctions among the missions listed above are based on current thinking about the problem and use terminology currently accepted by the Army.1

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1Army Field Manual FM 100-23, Peace Operations, Version 6 (draft), January 1994. The framework here also borrows from UN terminology; see Marrack Goulding, "The
but the missions should be understood as analytical constructs set up for the case study exercise.²

Two distinctions should be kept in mind when thinking about the intervention missions. The distinction along the lines of expected initial threat environment (the actual situation on the ground and the threat to soldiers' lives) seems crucial to the consideration and assessment of an intervention. Is it a low-threat environment or, at the other extreme, is it a battlefield situation? In other words, are the intervening forces called on to perform unarmed observer-type duties, or are they going into a war zone? Figure 6.1 lists the missions discussed above in a specific order, starting from a low-threat situation and moving up to a high-threat environment.

Expected initial threat environment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very low</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Low-medium</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Medium-high</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Very high</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Prevention
- Peace building
- Traditional peacekeeping
- Humanitarian intervention
- Peacekeeping/peace enforcement
- Peace enforcement (anarchy)
- Peace enforcement (organized)
- Foreign internal defense/support for insurgency

Figure 6.1—Intervention Missions and Initial Threat Environment

²The current typologies of peace operations cover most but not all of the potential intervention missions presented here. The difference is that the constructs presented here have a more comprehensive nature and do not rule out unilateral U.S. interventions that fall outside the scope of peace operations (for example, foreign internal defense or support for insurgency).
A second distinction, and an important factor in determining the threat environment, is whether the intervention takes place with or without the consent of the authorities in power in the target territory of the intervention. In a consensual situation, there is a probability of a low-threat environment. Conversely, in a nonconsensual situation, there is a strong chance for a battlefield situation. The absence of any clear authority in power leads to anarchy-type situations, which fall in between consensual and nonconsensual deployments.

Each mission is defined below.

Prevention (Deterrence)

Fears of probable aggression from without against a nascent or existing state. The situation may call for a preventive deployment, with the mission defined as the prevention of conflict. The troops’ task is to deter conflict by deploying in a border region of the country/territory that is likely to be the target of aggression and to watch for signs of preparations for armed conflict (by engaging in patrolling, intelligence collection, observation, and surveillance). The troops also are to serve in the political role of “trip-wire” force (that is, any attack upon such troops risks a substantial punitive response). The current deployment of U.S. troops in Macedonia is an example of such a mission. Usually, preventive deployments will take place by consent (perhaps even by request), and initially, forces deployed in such a fashion probably will operate in a low-threat environment. Generally, troops engaged in such a mission will be under strict rules of engagement. The core of their mission is fulfilled through their very deployment and presence, not their weaponry. This mission is included here because it represents initial deployments that may escalate quickly.

Peace Building

Conflict that has stabilized and in which the warring sides have reached a peace accord. The situation may call for a military deployment to support the implementation of a comprehensive settlement. An alternative term for the mission might be “peace implementation,” since the mission would be defined as the military
component of outside efforts to implement peace accords. The troops’ duties can encompass a variety of tasks ranging from monitoring of cease-fire agreements, destruction of weapons, and training of new armed forces, to providing protection for human rights monitoring teams, and even assisting in administering a given territory. A recent case of such a type of UN-sponsored “peace building” was the deployment in Namibia. Such a mission generally will take place by consent, after the negotiating process has been completed. The intervention may amount to a follow-up of a “traditional peacekeeping” mission. Initially, forces deployed in such an intervention will operate in a low-threat environment, though they may encounter rogue elements bent on preventing the implementation of the peace accords. While under restrictive rules of engagement, forces committed in such an intervention may have some enforcement tasks.

Traditional Peacekeeping

Conflict that has stabilized (moved past its initial stage) and resulted in a military stalemate but with the warring sides continuing hostilities at a low level (occasional shelling, raids, etc.). The situation may call for a “traditional” peacekeeping deployment, with the mission defined as the military component of support of negotiation efforts between the warring sides. The troops’ tasks range from monitoring cease-fires to controlling buffer zones. For example, the deploying troops take control of a strip of territory and they accomplish their mission by separating the warring parties. This has been the usual mode of intervention during the Cold War (Kashmir and Cyprus are cases of traditional peacekeeping missions in situations of ethnic conflict). The traditional type of peacekeeping deployment generally will take place in the aftermath of open battles but before any peace settlement. This type of intervention will be consensual (when both sides agree to it as part of the peace negotiations). Initially at least, forces deployed in a traditional peacekeeping mission will operate in conditions of low- to medium-threat environment and they will be under strict rules of engagement (fire only in self-defense). The traditional peacekeeping mission does not include any enforcement provisions.
Humanitarian Intervention

"Intractable" intrastate conflict or civil war, with each side refusing to settle for partial gains and instead aiming to outlast the other in conditions of mainly low-level hostilities (occasional shelling, raids, etc.). In order to ameliorate the suffering of the civilian population, the situation may call for an intervention and operations to protect the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies in an area experiencing open (though low-level) warfare. The mission of the troops would be to protect shipments of relief supplies sent to limit civilian suffering. The troops' duties can range from shows of force, convoy protection, and relief distribution to mine-clearing and breaking through barricades, to major operations securing corridors for the passage and/or delivery of aid. Current UN-sponsored efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina provide an example of a humanitarian intervention. A humanitarian intervention does not require the consent of all of the warring sides. The forces initially deployed in such an intervention will operate in an environment that ranges from medium to high threat. Depending on rules of engagement established for the intervening forces, the troops may undertake extensive enforcement operations. The specific extent of enforcement operations will depend on the political decision of how much force to use to ensure the delivery of relief supplies.

Peacekeeping/Peace Enforcement

Self-perpetuating “intractable” conflict, with the warring sides unwilling or unable to respect cease-fire agreements (intermittent shelling, raids, ambushes, etc.). Thus, although the political actors may have agreed to a cease-fire, sporadic fighting on the ground continues. The situation may call for a "cease-fire enforcement" intervention, with the mission defined as active suppression of all hostile activities (anyone violating a cease-fire agreement will be fired upon by the intervening forces). A potential intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina might take the form of a cease-fire enforcement mission. The troops' duties may range from monitoring cease-fire truces all the way to full-scale operations against the offending units. Such an intervention may take place with limited consent of the
warring sides. Initially, forces deployed will be entering a medium- to high-threat environment (because the warring sides are understood to have misgivings about respecting the cease-fire agreements). The intervening forces will have the authority to act with force against any and all violators (i.e., full enforcement provisions), though the right of pursuit will depend on the political decision regarding rules of engagement. A "cease-fire enforcement" intervention of this type represents a step up from the "traditional peacekeeping" mission, with the difference being that in this case the political authorities of the warring parties have less control over their forces and/or the intervening troops have enforcement authority.

**Peace Enforcement (Anarchy)**

Breakdown of central authority and its ability to administer a given territory, resulting in widespread warlordism, anarchy, and "meaningless" self-perpetuating violence (in other words, strife itself has become a way of life and the goal). Such a situation may arise under conditions of a breakup (or "failure") of a state and a consequent conflict in its ending stages (without a clear winner). The situation may call for an intervention in order to create, impose, or facilitate a political settlement, with the mission defined as the prevention of anarchy and lawlessness. The troops' duties can encompass a range of tasks, from protecting humanitarian relief operations and rebuilding the communications network to overseeing the disarmament and/or demobilization of troops and putting in place an administrative infrastructure for the territory. The UN-led UNOSOM II (in Somalia) provides an example of such an intervention. An intervention with the mission of anarchy prevention will probably take place without the consent of any governing authorities because there will not be anyone in a position to give consent. The forces deployed in such an intervention will operate initially in anywhere from a low-threat to a high-threat environment. The troops committed to such an intervention will probably have to use force to achieve their tasks. The specific rules on the use of force will depend largely on the political decision concerning the extent of the intervening troops' role in establishing new central authority in the state undergoing anarchy.
Peace Enforcement (Organized Actors)

Self-perpetuating "intractable" conflict, with the warring sides unwilling or unable to come to a cease-fire agreement. The situation may call for an intervention in order to force a stop to the fighting and impose a cease-fire (in preparation for a political settlement). Such a "cease-fire imposition" intervention would have the mission defined as active suppression of all hostile activity. The intervening forces will deploy into a war zone and then use force against anyone opposing it with arms. An intervention in, say, Bosnia-Herzegovina might fit this mission. The difference between this mission and peacekeeping/peace enforcement is that in the latter mission the warring parties have reached a cease-fire agreement but cannot or will not implement it; in the case of this mission, they have not reached such an agreement and the intervention is to force them into one. The difference between this mission and peace enforcement (anarchy) is that in the latter mission there are no clear organized central authorities in charge of the fighting forces; in the case of this mission, there are easily identifiable actors who command forces. The scenario amounts to a forceful entry of a third party into a war zone. The troops' duties might be close to those found under battlefield conditions: seize territory and suppress all armed resistance. Such an intervention is assumed to take place without the consent of the warring sides. Initially, the intervening forces will deploy into a high-threat environment. They will have the authority to use all necessary force to suppress potential or actual armed resistance.

Foreign Internal Defense/Support for Insurgency

An insurgency and government efforts to counter it. The situation may call for an intervention in favor of one side (either the government forces or the rebels), with the mission defined as defeating an insurgency or defeating the central authorities' efforts at counterinsurgency operations. The intervening forces will deploy and assist the allied (either insurgent or counterinsurgent) forces. The mission bears many similarities to some of the Cold War era interventions (Vietnam, for example), but the post-Cold War era is likely to see nonuniversal motivational dimensions (sectarian or ethnic) dominant in such conflicts rather than the universal ideological dimension common during the Cold War. This mission is included because
some of the missions described earlier may easily develop into an insurgency/counterinsurgency support mission. The troops' tasks could range anywhere from special forces operations (psychological operations, civil affairs, civil-military operations) to beefing up local forces in certain areas, all the way to conventional warfare. Initially, the intervening forces will deploy with the consent of one of the warring sides. They will deploy into a medium- to high-threat environment (though perhaps not immediately, if one of the sides is in possession of territory secure from the rebellion or central authorities' reach). The extent of U.S. Army involvement in actual combat operations will depend on a political decision.

POTENTIAL INTRASTATE FLASHPOINTS

Applying the mission framework to hypothetical but realistic scenarios first required us to make a survey of the various actual and potential intrastate flashpoints around the globe where Army units may be called upon to intervene. The list of flashpoints can be quite lengthy, depending on the criteria one uses to judge the feasibility of a U.S. intervention. The judgement of feasibility entails a set of assumptions about the use of power by the United States in the world and the definition of the U.S. national interest. As such, the judgment varies according to one's beliefs; an isolationist will see virtually no justifiable interventions, while an advocate of a U.S. role of world policeman will see almost any conflict as potentially entailing a U.S. intervention. In practice, as earlier chapters show, the United States has no easily identifiable pattern of intervening. Other than perhaps a few cases in the immediate geographical vicinity of the United States, a lack of an intervention might have been just as likely an outcome as an intervention. Conversely, an intervention might have been just as likely an outcome in other cases where a potential U.S. intervention did not materialize. Idiosyncratic and not easily identifiable criteria have been the rule rather than the exception.

Such a setting presents problems for the compilation attempted here. The authors did not wish to eliminate some potential cases out of hand, because that would eliminate surprises and would not take into account the seemingly ad hoc nature of some U.S. decisions to intervene. Consequently, five criteria were used to limit the number of potential cases.
The survey of flashpoints focused on intrastate conflict rather than interstate war. Most intrastate conflicts revolve in practice around ethnic, nationalist, or sectarian tensions (that often lead to secessionist tendencies), and the survey bears it out. There is sometimes a thin line between intra- and interstate conflicts, and linkages between the two usually exist.

The survey lists both ongoing conflicts (without a U.S. intervention yet) and those that may break out in the future. The criterion used to determine the inclusion of potential conflicts in the survey stemmed from the "not implausible" determination. By definition, a survey of potential conflicts based on "plausible" determination rules out the surprises. The use of the "not implausible" criterion was designed to permit examination of some lower-probability cases.

For a specific case to make it into this survey, reasonable potential for a U.S. intervention had to exist. This criterion involved a judgment about areas in which U.S. interest is strong enough to conceivably lead to U.S. intervention. As a result of the seemingly ad hoc nature of U.S. decisionmaking when it comes to interventions in intrastate conflicts, this criterion had necessarily vague aspects.

Army involvement in any potential U.S. intervention had to exist for a specific case to appear in the survey. Cases where U.S. ground forces involvement was judged implausible did not make it onto the list. Similarly, a limited number of cases may exist where the U.S. Marines would be called upon to be the exclusive component of any ground force deployment. Such cases also were not included in the survey.

The time frame for this survey consists of short- to mid-term, meaning up to five years. The authors realize that the list may change in a year, as some cases drop off the list and others are added to it.

After surveying the globe for potential or actual conflicts, the authors came up with a list of thirty specific cases that met the criteria outlined above. We tried to err on the side of caution, but we realize that no list of this type can be exhaustive. Nevertheless, we believe that the survey captures most of the potential intrastate conflicts where
the Army may be called upon to intervene during the next few years. Table 6.1 lists the cases, organized by region. Longer descriptions of each case, including the type of conflict and the potential missions in any U.S. intervention in the conflict, are provided in the companion volume to this report, MR-554/2-A.

We realize that the decision to include some cases and to exclude others is, in the final analysis, a subjective one. The problem stems at least in part from the ultimate judgement calls regarding the five criteria listed above. The authors welcome a debate on the topic, which can only improve the preparation and planning process and may lead to greater clarification of the nature of intervention decisionmaking in the United States.

The survey should in no way be taken as an indication of expectation of conflict (in cases where it is only potential), nor should it be taken to imply in any way that a U.S. intervention may be forthcoming in any of the cases, actual or potential. The authors wish to reemphasize the speculative and illustrative nature of the whole exercise.

THE SELECTED CASE STUDIES

To provide an in-depth look at several potential interventions, six of the thirty cases in the survey were selected for detailed examination: the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka; secessionism and intra-Army conflict in Indonesia; civil war in Algeria; civil war in South Africa; internal strife in Macedonia; and post-coup anarchy in Venezuela. Depending on the course of events during the next few years, U.S. military involvement in the internal strife (sometimes the strife is currently ongoing, sometimes it is hypothesized) in all six cases above is possible.

The six cases were chosen to illustrate the variety of regional differences and the range of tasks the Army may be asked to perform. Since the Army has been involved in areas of the world as diverse as Macedonia, Rwanda/Zaire, and Haiti just during the past year, we believe that the inclusion of a number of regions is a necessary part of any case study effort of this type. Consequently, one case study was chosen from each region of the world. Similarly, the case studies illustrate a variety of missions, from peace building to peace enforcement. In keeping with the changing notions of sovereignty in
### Table 6.1
Actual and Potential Intrastate Flashpoints

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>East Asia</th>
<th>South Asia</th>
<th>North Africa and the Middle East</th>
<th>Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
<th>Europe and the Former USSR</th>
<th>The Western Hemisphere</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secessionism and intra-Army conflict in Indonesia</td>
<td>Civil War in Afghanistan</td>
<td>Azeri separatism in Iran</td>
<td>Civil war in South Africa</td>
<td>Civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>Post-Cedras anarchy in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return of ethnic Chinese insurgency in Southeast Asia</td>
<td>Renewed strife in the Sind (Pakistan)</td>
<td>The Kurdish problem</td>
<td>Anarchy as the final stage of the civil war in Angola</td>
<td>Internal strife in Macedonia</td>
<td>Post-Castro unrest in Cuba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fractioning of China</td>
<td>A sectarian-based insurrection in India</td>
<td>Iraq and the Shi'a</td>
<td>Renewed civil war in Mozambique</td>
<td>The ethnic Hungarian problem</td>
<td>Upsurge of insurgency in Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurrection and terrorism in the Philippines</td>
<td>Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Anti-Alawite revolt in Syria</td>
<td>Political breakdown and social unrest in Zaire</td>
<td>The ethnic Russian problem</td>
<td>Rebel success in the civil war in Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jordanian-Palestinian strife in Jordan</td>
<td>Post-coup anarchy in Venezuela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Islamic fundamentalism and the rebellion in southern Sudan</td>
<td>The unraveling of Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fundamentalist strife in Egypt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Civil war in Algeria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the post–Cold War era, the focus of the case studies is on the more intrusive interventions, tending toward enforcement rather than traditional peacekeeping. Table 6.2 shows the cases and the missions they represent. All the case studies also address the issue of mission evolution.

Implementing Peace Accords Ending the Civil War in Sri Lanka

The insurgency spearheaded by the Tamil rebels has ground into a stalemate. A cease-fire and a political accord are reached by the government and the rebels; both sides request that the UN provide an international peacekeeping force to help monitor/stabilize the situation and oversee the implementation of the peace accord. U.S. forces form a component of the UN peacekeeping forces, with the mission being a hybrid of peace building and traditional peacekeeping. An engineer battalion, a hybrid mechanized/light infantry brigade, and communications and support units are the principal Army assets deployed. Dissatisfaction with the post–civil war political arrangements by either of the combatants may lead the mission to evolve to peace enforcement (organized).

Table 6.2
Cases and Principal Missions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Principal Mission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. End of insurgency in Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Peace building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Secessionism and intra-Army conflict in Indonesia</td>
<td>Peacekeeping/peace enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Civil war in Algeria</td>
<td>Humanitarian relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Civil war in South Africa</td>
<td>Peacekeeping/peace enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Internal strife in Macedonia</td>
<td>Peacekeeping/peace enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Post-coup anarchy in Venezuela</td>
<td>Humanitarian relief</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Controlling Piracy Amidst Civil Strife in Indonesia

A hypothesized death of Suharto precipitates a failed coup, which leads to armed conflict between regions and army factions. After attacks on international shipping in waters adjacent to Indonesia, and after considerable international uproar, the ineffective central government requests UN assistance. A mission that combines elements of traditional peacekeeping, peacekeeping/peace enforcement, and peace enforcement (anarchy) is undertaken. U.S. forces provide logistics, helicopter, signal, engineer, transportation, and other support assets to support the peacekeeping forces drawn largely from Muslim countries. U.S. forces also embark on pirate-suppression operations in the waters surrounding Indonesia. A number of events, generally revolving around the possibility of the UN troops becoming drawn into the regionalist/secessionist strife, could drive the mission to evolve to peace enforcement (organized).

Humanitarian Relief in a Civil War—Ravaged Algeria

The Algerian government loses its ability to contain the existing campaign of violence conducted by Islamic fundamentalists (Islamists). A humanitarian disaster looms as the virtual civil war disrupts supply lines to cities and basic services break down. The UN, acting through NATO (with France taking the lead), sponsors a humanitarian relief mission that has aspects of peacekeeping/peace enforcement and peace enforcement (anarchy). Although the Europeans provide most of the forces, the U.S. Army contributes an airborne brigade to serve as a general reserve for the force and a number of support units. The reaction of the Islamists to the presence of the UN forces will be the crucial element determining whether the mission evolves to full peacekeeping/peace enforcement, peace enforcement (anarchy), peace enforcement (organized), or even foreign internal defense.

Enforcing a Cease-Fire in a Multifaction Civil War in South Africa

The end to white minority rule leads to a wave of instability, a multi-sided civil war, and a fracturing of South Africa into four separate political entities. Fighting takes place in Natal and Western Cape
provinces and in the Orange Free State region. As a UN-brokered cease-fire shows signs of collapsing, the UN launches a peacekeeping/peace enforcement mission with aspects of peace enforcement (anarchy) in order to prevent a lengthy period of strife and to facilitate negotiations between the rival factions over South Africa's future. The U.S. Army provides five battalions of ground troops (including mechanized infantry and airmobile infantry), attack helicopters, a variety of special operations forces (civil affairs troops, military intelligence), and assorted support units (especially military police and substantial transport assets). The multitude of combatants could easily cause the mission to evolve to peace enforcement (anarchy) or peace enforcement (organized).

**Upholding Macedonian Sovereignty in Conditions of Strife in Kosovo**

Large-scale strife in Kosovo spreads to northwestern Macedonia because of the ethnic links between the Albanians inhabiting both sides of the border. The spillover results in casualties among the UN forces (including a U.S. Army contingent) deployed in the area. As evidence mounts of direct cross-border Serbian involvement in Macedonia, the UN, through NATO, reinforces the UN forces in Macedonia and gives them enforcement provisions in order to prevent the complete unraveling of Macedonia and a potential wider Balkan war. The specific mission is one of peacekeeping/peace enforcement, with some elements of interstate war. The United States provides an Army brigade to the beefed-up UN forces in Macedonia. Logistics for the operation are very complicated and substantial Army engineer and transport assets also will be needed. The mission could evolve to peace enforcement (anarchy), peace enforcement (organized), or foreign internal defense. Mission evolution may well be forced upon the UN forces by the Serbs.

**Humanitarian Assistance Amidst Post-Coup Social Unrest in Venezuela**

A failed army coup, similar to the one in 1992, triggers prolonged urban unrest that exceeds the loyal Venezuelan military's ability to control. Urban centers decline into violence and chaos. After two
months of fighting, the rebels and loyalists reach a cease-fire agree-
ment and request humanitarian assistance from the Organization of
American States. The OAS sponsors a mission that combines
humanitarian relief with aspects of peace enforcement (anarchy) and
aims to reestablish basic services and assist in the protection of oil
production facilities. The intervention force is composed mainly of
local security and police forces. The United States provides much of
the extensive logistical, transport, and communications assistance
for the force. An equivalent of two Army battalions represents the
U.S. commitment to the operation. The possibility of a breakdown in
the consensus between the loyalists and rebels could lead to the in-
tervening forces becoming caught up in combat and the evolution of
the mission to peacekeeping/peace enforcement or peace enforce-
ment (anarchy).

ASSESSMENT OF CASE STUDIES

Table 6.3 summarizes the assessment of the case studies across a
number of categories. Perhaps the broadest point that can be made
is that the Army can be assigned a wide range of potential missions.
Beyond that, we can derive a number of important findings. Some of
the findings have direct relevance to Army planning and preparation.
Other findings have relevance to the overall intervention decision.
Army planners should keep these issues in mind during the deci-
sionmaking process preceding an intervention. The various findings
are listed below.

ARMY PLANNING ISSUES

Urban Environment Is Likely But Not Exclusive

The case studies illustrate the importance of the urban environment
as the setting for many operations in intrastate interventions. At
least some urban operations are found in each of the case studies
examined and, in the Algerian and Venezuelan scenarios, the urban
setting was paramount. However, the urban setting was not exclu-
sive. The other case studies posited extensive operations in terrain as
varied as the arid plains of southern Africa, the jungles of Sri Lanka,
and the wooded deep valleys and mountains of the southern
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Study</th>
<th>Probability of Analogous Scenario Within Five Years</th>
<th>Missions Involved</th>
<th>Major Domestic Debate Associated with U.S. Intervention</th>
<th>Potential to Encroach on MRC Capabilities</th>
<th>Army Combat Force Required</th>
<th>Army Support Forces Required</th>
<th>Stress Army FAO, Linguist Capabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Low-medium</td>
<td>Peace building</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Traditional peacekeeping</td>
<td>Maybe</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Medium-high</td>
<td>Peacekeeping/Peace enforcement/Peace enforcement (anarchy)</td>
<td>Maybe</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Peacekeeping/Peace enforcement/Peace enforcement (anarchy)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Medium-high</td>
<td>Peacekeeping/Peace enforcement</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>Low-medium</td>
<td>Humanitarian relief/Peace enforcement</td>
<td>Maybe</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Balkans. Perhaps the most unorthodox terrain was found in the Indonesian case study, where the troops were called upon to be prepared to carry out some amphibious operations in a coastal tide-water environment.

**Force Training Needs Are Diverse**

Training needs are likely to be quite diverse, depending on the specific situation. Units with mountain warfare training and experience in alpine and snow conditions may be needed in some cases, such as in Macedonia. In other cases, such as Sri Lanka or Venezuela, jungle training will be useful. The needs are situation-specific and difficult to generalize. Linguistic skills may prove to be especially difficult, as the case studies have shown. Even more problematic is that the Army has had little exposure to some of the languages and cultures present in certain areas where it may be called upon to intervene. The Tamil (Sri Lanka) and Xhosa (South Africa) languages are two examples that came up in the case studies.

**Logistics and Support Forces Are Most in Demand**

In terms of the types of forces needed, it is instructive to see the dominance of logistics and support forces that the United States provides in the various case studies examined. Because of their unique capabilities, they are among the most important U.S. contributions. The dedication of large American airlift and air support capabilities in support of some of the interventions may diminish the U.S. ability to intervene in other areas and may result in a reduction of capabilities to meet the needs of a subsequent major regional contingency (MRC). The potential to diminish U.S. capabilities in an MRC may take place as a result of even limited intrastate interventions, such as the ones presented in the Macedonia or Indonesia case studies.

**Most Interventions Reveal Deficiencies in Army Area Knowledge and Language Capabilities**

In four of the six case studies, the Army would experience serious shortfalls in area knowledge and language capabilities. The Venezuela case study proved to be simple for the Army in this respect...
because there is a significant number of Spanish speakers in both the enlisted and officer ranks. The South Africa contingency, while a bit more demanding in its requirements for Army language capabilities (due to the need for some expertise in the “lesser” languages of the country), is also not problematic in view of the widespread knowledge of English in South Africa.

Each of the remaining four cases seemed likely to overtax the Army’s area knowledge and language capabilities. In the Sri Lanka contingency, the Army finds itself with very few Tamil linguists capable of maintaining effective liaison with the LTTE (Tamil rebel) leadership. Indonesia presents a similar challenge. While the Army might be able to draw on Arabic linguists from the Arab units taking part in the UN operation, it has very few personnel capable of communicating effectively in the major Indonesian languages and dialects. The Algeria case would allow the Army to employ some of its considerable French linguistic capability, but this may not fully substitute for a strong cadre of Army Arabic linguists, which probably would not be immediately available for rapid deployment. Finally, one can also anticipate at least short-term linguistic and area knowledge shortages in the Macedonia scenario. There may be a paucity of qualified Serbo-Croat and Albanian linguists in the Army as well as a shortfall in institutional expertise about the cultural features of the Albanian regions of Macedonia.

The Army’s area knowledge would come up short in most of the case studies examined, with the worst problems evident in the South Africa and Sri Lanka cases. Indonesia, Algeria, and Macedonia would provide some difficulties in terms of area knowledge.

**Multilateral Nature of Intervention Yields Complexities**

In keeping with current U.S. policy on intrastate interventions, all of the case studies posit a multilateral intervention, usually sponsored by the UN. The complexities involved in the use of regional security organizations as mechanisms for the implementation of U.S.-assisted interventions mean that the jury is still out on whether the use of such organizations detracts from or benefits the effectiveness of “peace” missions. In any event, while the provision of forces by other countries is welcome, the action has potential drawbacks in the command, control, and communications (C3) realm. In some cases,
where political reasons may necessitate the participation of military forces from countries where English is not widely known, substantial problems may result. The Indonesia case study illustrated this problem. In the Macedonia case study, an otherwise welcome contribution of troops by some countries did not materialize, in part because of the language problem. Another problem concerns the political sensitivities about the command of an operation. Unwieldy and complicated command-and-control channels may be set up for those reasons. The Indonesia case study illustrated this aspect most clearly, but all the case studies pointed it out. Indeed, unusual or even irrational (from the military standpoint) C3 and rules of engagement arrangements should be expected as routine.

Most Cases Require Fast U.S. Response

The case studies showed that an intervention was mounted in response to a specific event, and even though the decisionmaking process may have been ad hoc and idiosyncratic, once the decision was made, there was a high premium placed on a rapid deployment of the intervening forces to the given area. In this sense, there may not be much lead time for planning the operation carefully; planning is bound to go on as the initial troops already take up their positions.

There Is a Need for Rapid, On-Hand Extraction Capability

If carried out successfully, the missions examined in the case studies clearly advance U.S. interests and contribute to a lesser incidence of armed conflict. However, if the original mission falters or evolves to a different mission, a substantial involvement may follow. In all cases, the United States would be well served if sufficient assets necessary for a rapid extrication of the intervening troops were in place or available on a short-term basis. The importance of having such forces ready is necessitated by high mission evolution potential, sometimes forced onto the intervening troops by the local forces.

There Is a Need for Sound Intelligence Analysis

The Army would be well served to insist on sound intelligence preparation of the battlefield and input of its opinion into the decision-making process. The Army is most likely to be asked to intervene in
the ending stages of intrastate conflicts and given the task of peacekeeping or enforcing cease-fires. As such, a crucial element that will decide whether a mission is successful or not will be an accurate determination—prior to the intervention—of whether a given conflict is indeed in its final stages or simply in temporary remission. The consequences of a wrong assessment include a rapid mission evolution and a substantial engagement of forces. The intelligence needs to be sound both with respect to the political situation in the country (and this relates to close Army cooperation with the civilian intelligence agencies) as well as the more military-related aspects. The fallout from mistakes usually is not limited to the country in question, but to the region as a whole.

OVERALL INTERVENTION ISSUES

Outside Intervention Is Needed to Implement a Cease-Fire or Accord

An important feature that came across in most of the case studies was that an intrastate intervention is often (but far from always) carried out to provide an outside contribution and an added incentive to implement a cease-fire or reach a peace accord. For example, the Sri Lanka case study concerned an end to a decades-old civil war. The Venezuela, South Africa, and Algeria case studies also dealt with efforts to assist the warring sides in resolving their differences. If the intervention is a part of an effort to support a peace process, then U.S. government authorities need to invest the necessary resources at the political level to make sure that the peace process goes forward. In other words, a military deployment that is part of a cease-fire or a peace implementation effort should call for an increased political effort. If nothing else, careful monitoring of cease-fire or peace accords negotiations will give the United States early warning of any trouble, leading to preparation for a rapid extrication of forces if that becomes necessary.

All Situations Have Substantial Potential for Mission Evolution

Each of the six case studies has the potential for a mission evolution that would place U.S. military forces into demanding combat condi-
tions. There is some variance, however, across the cases in terms of the likelihood of mission evolution. The following is a brief summary of the potential path(s) of mission evolution in each case.

In the case of peace building in Sri Lanka, mission evolution toward enforcement functions could result from the rebel forces becoming dissatisfied with the implementation of the peace agreements (posited in the case study as initiating the intervention) and turning against the intervening forces. Alternatively, the enforcement functions could enter into play as a result of dissatisfaction on the part of either of the two belligerents with the outcome of the referendum that would crown the peace agreements. If the intervening forces were not withdrawn upon the first signs of the evolution, the mission could evolve easily to peace enforcement (organized actors) and require costly combat operations. The risk of mission evolution in this case study is lower than in the others because of the likelihood of a rapid withdrawal of the intervening forces in the face of signs of such an evolution.

There is a high risk of mission evolution in the Indonesian case study because the fluidity of the situation (the involvement of several rebel factions, pirates, and the government) creates many opportunities for the intervening forces to run afoul of the interests of at least one of the warring parties. The intervening troops might be drawn into the secessionist/regionalist strife posited in the case study, leading to a peace enforcement (organized actors). A mission evolution also could come as a result of a successful fulfillment of the original peacekeeping/peace enforcement mission, since forces may be tempted to build upon the initial success. The result could be either a peace enforcement (organized actors) mission or a humanitarian relief mission with heavy enforcement provisions.

The risk of mission evolution in Algeria is among the highest of all the case studies. The mission of the intervening troops could evolve to any number of higher-risk missions than the initial humanitarian relief mission (with some aspects of peace enforcement) posited in the case study. Most of the potential causes of the mission evolution revolve around resistance to the foreign presence on the part of some of the belligerents. Even the moderate elements of the Islamic opposition could turn to support (at least temporarily) the more radical
groups in the Islamic resistance if the intervening forces came to be viewed as representatives of "western imperialism."

The South African case study shows that the mission could evolve easily to peace enforcement (organized actors). The most likely path toward such evolution might stem from the emergence of resistance against the intervention force’s presence by one of the combatants in the hypothesized civil war. Just as in the Indonesian case study, the large number (six) of military actors hypothesized in the South African case increases the chances for mission evolution.

Of the case studies examined, the Macedonia scenario provided the clearest danger of mission evolution to an interstate war. In addition, evolution of the mission to one of peace enforcement (either anarchy or organized actors) or even foreign internal defense could be triggered by Serbian cross-border raids and the weakness of the Macedonian government combined with the ethnic tensions within Macedonia.

The Venezuela case study demonstrated the possibility of mission evolution from humanitarian relief to peace enforcement (anarchy) as a result of one of the parties to the cease-fire agreement (positing in the case study) becoming dissatisfied with the progress of the peace negotiations and opting to resume the fighting.

**Most Cases Involve Less-Than-Vital U.S. Interests**

In most of the case studies, it is clear that the U.S. interests involved can be regarded as major or important but "less than vital." Only in the Macedonia scenario is this arguably not the case. Any successful Serbian attempt to weaken the position of the Macedonian state would raise the prospect of Greek intervention to forcibly absorb parts of a collapsing Macedonia and Turkish intervention to block any such Greek expansion. The resulting Greek-Turkish conflict could irreparably damage the NATO alliance, at least in its present form. Such a weakening of NATO would threaten the U.S. strategic position in Europe.

Algeria is another case that comes close (though not quite) to involving vital U.S. interests, since the emergence of a radical Islamic fundamentalist regime in Algeria would negatively affect the southern
European NATO countries. At first the effects might be economic (oil and gas links) and social (refugee flows fueling domestic instability), but they could turn into outright military problems with the prospect of an Islamic fundamentalist regime acquiring theater ballistic missiles capable of striking major cities in southern Europe.

In the case of Indonesia, the United States does have a strong interest in the continued free flow of shipborne commerce through the Malacca Straits. However, the issue here is one of the principle of freedom of navigation rather than more concrete U.S. strategic interests. Interruptions in the flow of merchant shipping might cause short-term dislocations, but by itself the problem is “less than vital.”

A South African civil war could foster some very undesirable outcomes in southern Africa on political and humanitarian grounds, but none of these would impinge upon vital U.S. interests. The only “vital interest” worry might revolve around the residual South African capability to produce weapons-grade nuclear materials. However, most sources indicate that the bulk of this capability has been dismantled and any reconstitution effort would require time and generate warning signs that the international community could use to put in place an effective monitoring and sanctions regime.

Neither of the main factions in the hypothesized Venezuelan civil strife has an anti-American agenda; therefore, a lack of a U.S. intervention should not harm any concrete U.S. strategic interests. The United States probably could establish an acceptable diplomatic relationship with whoever ultimately came to power in Venezuela.

The Sri Lankan contingency does afford the United States a chance to counterbalance any expanding Indian politico-military presence in the Indian Ocean region, but the recent warming in U.S.-Indian relations and India’s ongoing preoccupation with internal issues make it unlikely that it will aggressively reach for hegemony in the Indian Ocean in the near future. In the current geopolitical environment, no vital U.S. interests are at stake in the Sri Lanka peace building case study. However, if Indian behavior were ever to become highly aggressive and threaten to drastically alter the regional balance of power, the United States could well come to determine that its interests in such a Sri Lankan scenario were indeed vital.
All Interventions Have High Potential for Unpleasant Surprises

In each of the case studies, there is a risk that U.S. Army forces will encounter “unpleasant surprises.” Though the nature of these unpleasant surprises varies from scenario to scenario, most of the potential problems are the result of a shift in attitudes toward the intervention by one or more of the warring parties. Usually, the unpleasant surprises lead to mission evolution or even an interstate war. Because they are “surprises,” they are difficult to plan for, and they are likely to catch the intervening forces unaware and will probably result in substantial casualties.

Conflicts Have a Significant Potential to Spill Over into Neighboring Countries or Regions

Three of the six case studies (Macedonia, Indonesia, Venezuela) have the potential for problems to spill across borders. The Macedonia case study stands out in this respect, in that a major regional war could easily erupt from the strife hypothesized in the scenario. The other three cases (Sri Lanka, Algeria, and South Africa) lack significant “spillover” potential.

Interventions May Spark Intense U.S. Domestic Debate

In each of the six case studies, it is quite likely that the intervention decisionmaking process will be accompanied by a public debate. The debates may take an especially bitter tone and could affect the morale and preparation of the troops. The most important reason for the debate stems from the fact that in arguably all of the case studies, vital U.S. interests are not involved and fairly strong rationales could be developed against an intervention. The U.S. public’s fear of casualties and long-term entanglements would undoubtedly play a large role in such debates.

Since these interventions are being mounted in a global environment that is more “low threat” than that of the Cold War, there is less of a domestic consensus on foreign policy matters for U.S. leaders to build on when they wish to bring public opinion in line behind a
specific overseas intervention. This lack makes it likely that the outcomes of future public debates on proposed U.S. interventions such as those studied here will be determined largely by idiosyncratic factors like the nature of media coverage, the mood of Congress, current public perceptions of the U.S. standing and role in the world, and the expectations and demands of key U.S. allies. (See related discussion in Chapters Three and Four.)

There Is a Need for Mission Clarification Before Deployment

Because some of the interventions are bound to spark divisive and emotionally charged debates within the United States prior to the decision to intervene, the impact of such debates on troop morale needs to be taken into account before the deployment. Whether resulting from the internal debate or not, sometimes the missions given to the intervening forces may conflict with each other or may not be sufficiently clear. These aspects should be considered an unwelcome but probably a persistent part of any U.S. intervention in an intrastate conflict.

Sound Political Judgment About Need to Intervene Is Critical

Although this may sound like a truism, what emerges from all of the case studies is the need for political authorities to use good judgment and a sound political assessment of whether an insertion of outside forces into an intrastate conflict is warranted. If the political authorities make a strategic error about the good intentions of the warring sides to end their conflict, then no amount of operational ingenuity by the U.S. Army will clear the subsequent morass. Moreover, the decision will expose the intervening troops to casualties and may in fact worsen the situation. The Army would be well served to insist on sound intelligence analysis and input of its opinion into the decisionmaking process.
Chapter Seven

RECAPITULATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The future of war is often taken to be simply a function of new technologies. There are certainly growing opportunities for precision warfare emerging as a result of the information revolution. . . . Yet it is hard to conduct precision warfare in imprecise situations.1

Intrastate war, a very imprecise form of conflict, has been the most prevalent form of conflict both during and since the Cold War. It is likely to remain so over the next decade. But the U.S. military is more attuned to preparing for and conducting interstate war than it is for dealing with the disorderly future of intrastate conflict. This chapter focuses on that dichotomy. By sifting through our discussion of the nature of intrastate conflict in the post–Cold War era, intervention decisionmaking, our experience in terminating interventions, and the selected case studies of possible future interventions, we distill some lessons and directions the Army might benefit from keeping in mind as it performs its roles and functions in a changing conflict and budget environment. We refer to and discuss, but do not repeat here in full, the implications derived in each chapter for the particular subject. The focus is on the cross-cutting issues and the bottom line of recommended Army actions.

THE NATURE OF INTRASTATE CONFLICT

No two intrastate conflicts are alike. In the space of a decade such conflicts have been largely transformed from wars with heavy ideological and Cold War components to wars flowing from ethnicity, nationalism, separatism, and religious fundamentalism. The result is often a “failed state.” To use Steven Metz’s term, the boundary between war and civil mayhem has broken down along “primal” lines. Military forces (whether from the intervener or “intervenee” states) are taking on more civil policing and public service functions, often without a clear mandate from the publics they are intended to serve. The result of these causes and effects is a much wider and more varied spectrum of conflict than occurred during the Cold War.

The implications of post–Cold War intrastate conflict for the Army lie in understanding what has changed and what remains the same. Intervening Army forces will

- Be placed more often in urban settings.
- Deal with contentious and factionalized leaderships that cannot always control their forces and whose command structure and communications links are so crude that traditional intelligence sources and methods often are either not applicable or not particularly useful.
- Face populations whose hostility is more inward than outward directed and whose beliefs are less susceptible to change in the short term.
- Be deployed more to prevent violent internal boundary change (or establishment) than to prevent the takeover of an existing government.
- Be committed for extended periods to give accommodation or political settlements time to work.

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THE U.S. RESPONSE TO CHANGES IN THE CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT

The likely prevalence of intrastate conflict in forms different from those of the Cold War presents the United States with a dilemma: maintaining readiness to deal with a renewal of interstate conflict while simultaneously preparing to intervene in intrastate conflict. The former is more demanding in its stakes and required resources and less likely to occur, while the latter poses special challenges and is more likely.3 The U.S. Army is in the middle of this dilemma; it is the service most likely to have to provide intervention forces and will, as in the past, have to be the instrument of last resort if important U.S. interests are endangered and deterrence of a conflict fails.4

The Emerging Conflict Paradigms

Based on our analysis, we see three future conflict paradigms in the emerging U.S. national security strategy.5

- **War avoidance and prevention**: deterrence, readiness, maintenance, overseas presence, preventive diplomacy, preventive force deployments, and confidence-building exercises with security partners. This category covers most of the daily activities of U.S. overseas and continental United States (CONUS)-ready forces.

- **Intrastate war**: interventions and associated contingency operations, usually in a multilateral context.

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3See John A. Hall, "Nationalisms: Classified and Explained," *Daedalus*, Summer 1993, p. 21. Steven Metz believes that "over the next 10 years, the chance of major American involvement in sustained land warfare in the Third World will drop to zero." Metz, *America in the Third World*, pp. 31–32. Missing from this judgment is the value of forces configured to deter such conflict. A zero probability, if indeed it exists, does not happen by itself.

4Carrier battle groups and Air Force tactical fighter squadrons play little if any role in our selected case studies or in most of the other flashpoints we examined in Chapter Six. Navy and Air Force lift and special capabilities do play a role, but mainly in support of intervening Army forces.

5This strategy is based on our interpretation of the practical application of the July 1994 National Security Strategy.
• **Interstate war:** major regional contingencies where U.S. forces are deeply involved. This type of conflict is sure to become more complex with the proliferation of missile technology and weapons of mass destruction.

Most DoD strategies and programs focus on the first and last of these paradigms—best typified by the enduring interest of the armed services in overseas presence and in major regional contingencies—because these are the force **builders** that drive the DoD budget. Although intrastate war is receiving more attention than it once did, it still receives much less than the other paradigms, because it does not provide a basis for a popular mission. There are few clearly identifiable opponents, few set-piece battles, and less need for such expensive high-tech major military end-items as warships, bombers, and missiles. In addition, there is often no clear definition of “victory.” Moreover, there is the distinct possibility of casualties over an extended period and a consequent loss of public support. Many outside the DoD clamor for intervention, but move to the sidelines when the costs start to mount. One Army officer described the progression as follows:

• How long can we let this go on before we do something?
• When are we getting out of here?
• How did we get in this mess?  

We have seen this progression in Lebanon and Somalia (and earlier in Vietnam). In the 1989–1990 Panama intervention, the United States got out just as the second question started to become a problem. In Bosnia we are still wrestling with the first question, and in Haiti the second is under discussion. Under ideal conditions, we would want the answer to the second question before responding to the first one. The recurrent responses to our experience in intrastate conflict (e.g., the War Powers Act, Presidential Decision Directive 25) are more the result of past failure than of anticipating the future.

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All this suggests that change is the most enduring dimension of U.S. intervention policy. Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) is unlikely to be the last word, even for the current administration, in defining what that policy is. As a Congressional Research Service analyst observes,

The changes in U.S. peacekeeping policy embodied in PRD-13 probably are accurate reflections of the current U.S. popular and political view of peacekeeping. However, . . . they do not respond to many of the realities of peacekeeping in general or of peacekeeping in the post–Cold War period. The current guidelines for U.S. participation may be so stringent as to curtail to a very large extent any significant U.S. role. . . .

Given the volatility of U.S. peacekeeping policy over the last seven years, it is entirely possible that it will reverse again. At present, such a reversal would appear to be more dependent on unforeseeable external events than on the independent development of executive, congressional, or public views.7

**Force Reductions and the Army Response**

In 1990, at the beginning of Operation Desert Shield, the active Army had an authorized strength of more than 775,000 and contained 18 division flags, of which seven and a brigade of another division were deployed outside of CONUS. As of the end of fiscal year 1994, the active Army was reduced to an authorized strength of 540,000 personnel and the 12 divisions authorized by the Bush administration Base Force. Three heavy divisions and three light divisions have been deactivated. The Clinton administration’s Bottom-Up Review (BUR) called for further reductions in the Army’s end strength and reduction to 10 divisions. The fiscal year 1995 budget projects an end strength at the end of the decade of 495,000 personnel.8 The Army recently announced the composition of the 10-division force which, while eliminating the necessary two divisions, actually results in only two brigade deactivations.

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8*Army Times*, February 21, 1994, p. 16.
In 1990, more than one-third of the Army's strength was forward-deployed, mostly in Europe and Korea. The reductions currently planned and under way will reduce forward deployments to around 100,000 personnel or about 20 percent of the projected end strength. Two of the three heavy divisions deactivated were from Europe, whereas the light divisions deactivated were in the United States. Hence, the CONUS-based force has shifted somewhat toward heavy forces, but the 18th Airborne Corps has retained its previous mix of two heavy and three light divisions.

During the Cold War, the Army structured its forces using the Total Force concept. Critical assets required early were placed in the active force structure, while those units that could deploy later were assigned to the reserve components. Thus, although the active structure could support the initial deployment of a corps, mobilization was required to sustain that deployment. Current guidance calls for the Army to structure support to two near-simultaneous major regional contingencies (MRCs). The objective at U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) is to develop a support package best suited to support the deployment of up to a 5-1/3-division contingency corps that would react to the first MRC. Included in this support package are National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) units under the operational unit program. Virtually all the support forces, and some of the combat forces, to support the second MRC would be in the reserve components.

Public statements of Army leaders recognize that peace operations and operations other than war are becoming more common. These same statements, however, point out that the Army has always done such things and that they do not comprise a new mission. There is no public guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and no indication from the Army leadership that any effort will be made to structure specifically for operations other than war. Indications are that such operations would be accomplished on an ad hoc basis by the forces structured for MRCs in accordance with the BUR.

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One implication is that there is a gap opening up between public discourse (and the media attention that stimulates it) and the historical momentum of DoD military strategies, doctrines, and programs. If one were to take a survey of the past six months' reading of the nation's major newspapers and news magazines and compare the amount of space given to Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti to that given to DoD plans, strategies, and budgets, it would quickly be apparent that the latter is overwhelmed by the former. Clearly the public, still basking in the glow of the Desert Storm victory, believes its military is up to the demands of intervention. Is this confidence well placed?

The DoD response to the increased likelihood of intrastate conflict, and the U.S. role in stopping it if it endangers U.S. interests, has been to subsume it under the "two-MRC strategy." The bet is that the forces fielded to deal with interstate conflict will be suitable and sufficient to deal with intrastate conflict when the United States must get involved in the latter. The DoD leadership, setting out its views in the BUR, and the Army have bought into this proposition for somewhat different reasons. The BUR writers questioned the affordability of extra forces to deal with intrastate conflict. The Army, faced with a major reduction in its force structure, believes that it should maintain its traditional mission focus on large unit combat (e.g., exemplified in the post-Cold War era by MRCs) and the forces oriented to it rather than setting up specialized forces for peace operations.

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11 The need to respond to the North Korean nuclear program runs counter to this judgment.

12 Option 4 of the BUR, which would have provided a force increment for peace operations, was explicitly rejected because it would eliminate "the peace dividend the American people are expecting as a result of the end of the Cold War." Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, October 1993, p. 30. The Army increment of Option 4 (over the Option 3 that was selected) was two active divisions.

13 For one recent survey of Army views, see Sean D. Naylor, "Hard Lessons, New Options," Army Times, June 13, 1994. This article is based on a meeting of Somalia veterans and peacekeeping experts convened by Major General Thomas Montgomery, who led U.S. forces in Somalia in 1993. Although there is some ambivalence in the reported results of the conference, participants mostly rejected the notion of specialized peace operations units and believed that a well-trained soldier in existing force structure is the answer. There was, however, some recognition that peace operations, while requiring traditional soldier skills, are nonetheless "different" and do require some special training and preparation.
Underwriting the BUR bet is the assumption that if an MRC were to erupt, committed peace operations forces would be withdrawn as necessary to reconstitute the two-MRC capability. Underwriting the Army bet is the assumption that existing general-purpose force units are suitable for intervention operations if they receive predeployment area and peace operations functional training. Both of these bets require closer scrutiny, because if they fail, the country and its soldiers will pay a heavy price. We will return to this subject when we examine the implications of the case studies. For now, suffice it to say there is a significant gap between the focus of public attention and the focus of DoD planning that under some future circumstances could result in a rapid decline in public support for the DoD budget. Simply stated, it is vital that DoD—and the Army in particular—perform well in intrastate conflict and get it right the first time if they receive orders to intervene. Being prepared for the war that did not occur has seldom received much praise despite the clear necessity for sufficient usable power to deter and, if necessary, to fight a major regional contingency.

DECIDING TO INTERVENE

The Army as an institution will probably have little role in the intervention decision, but Army officers should, and in many cases do, have a major role in advising the national leaders who make the decisions and in carrying out those decisions.

The Biases Against Intervention

As mentioned earlier, an odd combination of reduced stakes and lowered risks in the post–Cold War era is resulting in systemic biases against intervention. PDD-25 merely documents the accretion of these biases over the past two years as the administration has been forced to confront the ultimate consequences of its earlier rhetoric. The new intervention criteria are quickly emerging: a high probability of success, brief and inexpensive use of force, retention of U.S. operational control over its own forces, and multilateral participation. The result of these factors is to make U.S. intervention an “all-or-nothing” proposition.
The Gap Between the Headlines and DoD Plans and Programs

One implication is that the interventionary commitment of Army forces is less likely, but that when Army forces are committed, they are likely to face a major effort on short notice. Moreover, as we have seen in our case studies, the commitment may ultimately be of long duration, intervention criteria notwithstanding. The bottom line is that the Army is likely to have little time to train up the initial force, is likely to have a greatly reduced capability to respond to a subsequent MRC, and will face the need to look out farther ahead in planning and be ready for fast response to the unexpected.

The Domestic Context of Intervention Decisionmaking

The high barriers to intervention are largely a reflection of a public more focused on internal matters. Moreover, the public appears to be relying on the perceived utility of Desert Storm capabilities if intervention becomes necessary. The Army's rhetoric on the basic suitability of general-purpose force units for intervention can feed this misperception because the public does not read the fine print that speaks to needed training and fast-deployment capabilities, to say nothing of the important drain on a relatively small pool of available support units.

Figure 7.1 suggests the public's implied paradigm for intervention. Nowhere in this representation is there reference to the national interest. Instead, it settles on the related questions of whether the public is aware of the problem, whether its emotions are aroused, and whether the United States has the capability to act quickly and on the cheap. Note also that in this portrayal, national leadership has no

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14 RAND's David Gompert observes that "Desert Storm taught the American people, wrongly, that vital interests could be defended with a handful of casualties in a videogame war." Quoted in Sloan, "The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War World."

15 The figure draws heavily from Lowenthal, "Peacekeeping in Future U.S. Foreign Policy."

Figure 7.1—The U.S. Public's Implied Paradigm for Intervention
role in setting out a political vision of the national interest that engages the public sufficiently to act on it and sustain it. In the absence of leadership, the media will lead and is capable of shifting focus quickly.\textsuperscript{17} The lesson is that public support for intervention is not something the Army can depend on for long. It must get the military aspects of intervention right the first time and hope the political leadership has established achievable political objectives and understands the full implications of the military objectives. There is a distinct possibility that ad hoc forces and a pick-up intervention planning structure will not measure up to the heavy demands placed on them.

**Politically Sensitive Issues in Military Planning**

The current and emerging intervention decisionmaking process reflects a level of mistrust between political and military authorities. Politically sensitive issues should play a major role in developing military options and in the military’s descriptions of how the options would be implemented. Military planning staffs see advantages in “closed shop” planning to produce completed staff work that yields a neatly packaged single option and preempts unwanted political meddling. However, there is a heavy potential price to be paid if the resulting plan does not encompass political sensitivities. Real alternatives need to be formulated that reflect explicitly the role of political concerns.

Questions whose answers hinge on political sensitivities need to be answered before they are asked. Indeed, the Army and other planners and advisers need to anticipate and present answers to questions that should have been asked prior to the intervention, not discovered as a nasty surprise when encountered in the field. Single options and black box processes tend to assume these issues away or otherwise bury them in the planning.

The Army, as the service most involved in planning and force readiness issues, can play a constructive role in opening up the interface of planning and political issues to careful scrutiny. This is particularly important in the usual intervention environment where polit-

\textsuperscript{17}Peter Grier, writing in the *Christian Science Monitor*, August 3, 1994, p. 7.
cal, strategic, operational, and tactical issues tend to get collapsed into a single decisionmaking venue.

The Use of Force

This study does not provide advice on the use of force in a Clausewitzian sense, though we offered some comments on the subject in Chapter Five. We are, nevertheless, struck by the gradual transition in "inside the beltway" thinking that suggests the use of force is less the last resort (e.g., the Weinberger Doctrine) and more an instrument in the national security policy orchestra. An Army that believes it has to wait for and prepare for "the big one" (an MRC) is less likely to be ready to perform in meeting the day-to-day demands of the post–Cold War era. While interventions may well be fewer, they will each probably be more important for the nation and for the Army as an institution. Unless the Army can perform expertly and quickly in meeting such demands, it runs the risk of becoming irrelevant to the public policy dialog that shapes its missions, functions, and budgets.

TERMINATING INTERVENTION OPERATIONS

The Vietnam experience has left a lasting legacy of fear about being incrementally drawn into intractable conflicts—particularly where the engagement of important U.S. interests is problematic. That experience has also highlighted the importance of clarity in articulating objectives at the political, operational, and tactical levels, and of raising the question "What is the end state we seek?" This question is the bridge between, indeed the essential underpinning of, intervention and termination decisions. And as in any bridge building, a safety net is necessary to provide for outcomes that do not meet the original objective.

The gist of intervention decisionmaking is setting up political objectives that fall short of complete subordination of the adversary or the factions in internal conflict. The military is a very blunt instrument for exacting compliance. If it is to be "metered" in its application to realize political ends, it requires clear operational objectives that are seen as supporting political objectives. Thus, the term "exit strategies" is something of a misnomer: an exit strategy is an integral part of the proclamation of limited objectives followed by a definition of
precisely what is to be achieved at the operational level. In short, exit
calculations are integral to the intervention decision. Moreover,
such calculations should be an important part of the contingency
planning in the event original intervention objectives cannot be met.
The two become separated in planning at the intervener’s peril.

The Vietnam conflict aside, failures in large interventions tend to oc-
cur more at the level of tactical execution than at the level of goal
definition. But the lower the level of intervention, the less the atten-
tion apparently paid to exit strategies. The most important problem
historically has been the failure to integrate exit strategies in mid-
level interventions. In those interventions, objectives tend to be
more diffuse and often are shifted once intervention operations start.

The implications for Army officials are that Army planners and
commanders must translate political objectives into operational
goals and then cycle them back to political authorities to ensure that
the latter’s intent has been fully accommodated. In addition, Army
officers need to ask (and have intervention decisionmakers answer)
the following questions:

- What is the end state you want to achieve?
- What limits do you place on the use of force?
- Does our plan (operational objectives, force employment) meet
  your political objectives?
- Are there operational modalities that jeopardize achievement of
  political goals?
- How would you change political goals if operational goals cannot
  be met?

WHAT THE CASE STUDIES TELL US

A portion of the dilemma facing the Army, and indeed the other ser-
VICES as well, is illustrated by the case studies discussed in Chapter
Six, reported in more detail in the appendix to this report, and closely
described in the companion volume, MR-554/2-A. Although each is
illustrative only, none is implausible in our view. It is certainly ar-
guable that each has a higher probability than one MRC, let alone
two simultaneous MRCs. Briefly, the Army force requirements in the case studies are as follows:

- Sri Lanka: one light brigade, one engineer construction battalion, communications, transport, and logistics elements.
- Indonesia: communications, medical, and other support units.
- Algeria: airmobile brigade, logistics support.
- South Africa: mechanized brigade, a two-battalion airmobile brigade, ground and air transport, civil affairs, psyops, and military police.
- Macedonia: one mixed light brigade, one engineer construction battalion, transport, and communications.
- Venezuela: helicopter transport and communications.

There are several salient characteristics of these case studies that bear consideration. First, the Army was consistently the largest contributor (in part because we selected cases that had a large Army role). Second, there was some urgency in stabilizing the situation that suggested rapid U.S. response. Third, none required any significant fraction of the planned U.S. combat force and only one required heavy forces. These requirements are consistent with those postulated by other writers on the subject.\textsuperscript{18}

As noted earlier, the MRC approach to force structure planning tends to limit the active-duty support structure to that needed for peacetime operations and to support the very early stages of deployment. The support units needed later in the operation are placed in the reserve components, thus allowing the active-duty structure to be concentrated in combat forces, which are the most difficult to have trained and ready for immediate deployment. However, if an Army thus structured were called upon to conduct multiple or repeated operations of the types postulated in the case studies, it could easily find itself combat rich and support poor.\textsuperscript{19} A unit tied down sup-


\textsuperscript{19}The same problem would, of course, occur in an MRC in the absence of a timely decision to mobilize the reserve components.
porting a UN operation in Sri Lanka would not be available to support a deployment of the 82nd Airborne Division to Latin America, even if the former could be immediately released from Sri Lanka, which is unlikely. In addition, if the operation has been sustained, there will be a like unit just returned from Sri Lanka and another preparing to deploy, and neither of those will be fully ready for other missions immediately. Hence, one or more relatively small operations other than war could seriously impair the ability of the Army to respond to an MRC in a timely fashion.

**Special Problems in Peace Operations**

In addition to tradeoff pressures between combat and support, there are issues about the type of support. Peace operations tend to occur in locales where the Army has limited familiarity. Some programs, such as the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program, attempt to keep the Army current in as many areas as possible. The program conducts language training in nearly 50 languages and develops specialists in far more countries than that. However, even with over 2,000 officers in the program, there can never be a high density available for any given location, and they cannot cover all languages or cultures. For example, neither Tamil nor Sinhalese is among the languages in the FAO program, so it could not support the Sri Lanka case. Both the special operations community and the intelligence community contain a wide range of language and cultural skills, but again the density for any given area can never be high. In addition, all these programs have missions other than supporting peace operations, so even the few skilled in a particular area may not be available. While peace operations provide pressure to increase the pool of qualified linguists, the Army can do so only by further diverting declining resources from other missions. As a proportion of total strength, these programs are already increasing, with the FAO program growing from approximately 1 percent of the total officer strength in 1990 to 1.4 percent in 1994 (although there were actually some small reductions in FAO strength in that time).²¹

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²¹ Ibid.
Even the limited number of peace operations in which the U.S. Army has participated have indicated that few Army units are ideally equipped for peace operations. The equipment of mechanized and armored units is difficult to deploy and tends to have more firepower and less visibility for the occupants than are necessary. Infantry and special operations forces have a limited number of vehicles, and those they do have lack protection for the operators and other occupants. Issuing suitable vehicles, such as the recently developed armored HMMWV or its planned replacement, at the time of deployment is an option, but one that places an additional burden on a deploying unit of having to learn to operate and maintain a new vehicle while it is conducting essential training for the mission. Riot-control agents and riot protective gear have also proved to be important in many operations. There is no evidence that needed equipment is unavailable to the Army. The issue is one of having properly equipped troops properly trained at the appropriate time.

Training for Peace Operations

There has been, and continues to be, considerable debate about training for peace operations. At one extreme are those who contend that a properly trained unit can conduct peace operations as well as any other operation, needing only minimal country and cultural orientation. At the other extreme are those who contend that peace operations are a unique mission and require unique training. From the Nordic countries, for example, comes this statement:

Even if their ordinary military training gives all commanders and soldiers a good military background for carrying out their tasks, UN service is something special, demanding particular skills and attitudes.

22See, for example, the discussion of "The Montgomery Board" reported in Army Times, June 13, 1994. The panel considered many related questions and the report indicates a considerable spread in opinion, but generally the consensus did not support specially designed or trained units for peace operations.

Part of the disagreement undoubtedly arises from the individual’s image of the type of peace operation involved. On the one hand, the operations generally referred to as peace enforcement are close to conventional combat, generally would have liberal rules of engagement, and would require combat-capable units. Classic peacekeeping, on the other hand, entails minimum force and maximum restraint and generally has very restrictive rules of engagement. There appears to be no disagreement, however, that the essential starting point for any type of peace operation is a well-trained and disciplined soldier. It is far easier to apply restrictive rules of engagement to a disciplined unit than to conduct any type of operation with poorly trained and disciplined soldiers. While there are statistics that strongly indicate an inverse relationship between the amount of peacekeeping-specific training and casualties, the data are empirical and of insufficient volume to exclude other causal factors such as an effort on the part of the belligerents to single out particular nationalities for attack.

A related question pertaining to training is whether peace operations actually constitute a “new” mission as such or one of the Army’s normal missions. The Army is developing doctrine for peace operations and incorporating training into the training centers seemingly without broad agreement on whether to truly prepare for such missions or to accept them only grudgingly and prepare for each operation on an ad hoc basis. The nations that have historically participated in peacekeeping generally considered it a separate mission and prepared separate doctrine and training programs. The Nordic countries, for example, have joint doctrine and training standards and specialized staffs and training centers, and they form units specifically for peacekeeping. These units are unique and are separate from the mainline military force. In fact, while deployed, members of a Finnish peacekeeping unit are not even considered part of

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25 John P. Abizaid and John R. Wood argue that these missions are not “new” and that conventionally trained forces have accomplished such missions with little specialized training since at least Lebanon 1988. “Preparing for Peacekeeping: Military Training and the Peacekeeping Environment,” Special Warfare, April 1994.
26 The Nordic UN Tactical Manual, for example.
the military establishment, even if they were regular officers before and will return to regular status thereafter.\textsuperscript{27}

The U.S. Army has opposed creation or even designation of units or headquarters specifically for peace operations. This has the advantage of reducing the complexity of the Mission Essential Task List (METL) and has some justification as long as U.S. policy is to avoid such operations if at all possible. However, a first step toward such specialized units is under way with the current experiment to form a battalion for the MFO (Multilateral Force of Observers) in the Sinai, which is composed in large part of individual National Guard and Army Reserve volunteers formed and trained for a single deployment. One problem the Army faces in considering these issues is that although the Army Staff and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) prepare doctrine and establish training standards, any real unit would be formed, trained, and deployed under the command of one or more unified commanders in chief (CINCs). Thus, although the Army certainly has influence in the process, the decisionmaking apparatus in this regard is much more broad than simply the Chief of Staff or the Secretary of the Army.

Alternative Approaches to Preparing for Peace Operations

A variety of approaches can be used in preparing for and conducting peace operations. The following list covers the range of options but is hardly exhaustive, since many alternatives could be devised by combining subsets of the options.

1. Continue to organize, train, and equip the Army based on the two-MRC guidance and conduct peace operations on an ad hoc basis from the force list thus produced. Continue to conduct familiarization training, but organize no special units or staffs.

2. Establish a dedicated staff element for planning of, and initial deployment to, peace operations, but organize no special units. This staff element would logically be at FORSCOM as the Army component of U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) that controls all CONUS-based conventional Army units.

3. Organize a full-time staff as in (2) above, but add a few specially organized, trained, and equipped units that provide rapid-response capability and high leverage in initial operations.

4. Organize a hybrid “peace operations brigade” for initial response. Such an organization could contain all the elements likely to be required early in a deployment, but it would still require augmentation of specialists for specific operations, since it could not logically be large enough to encompass all possible areas of deployment.

5. Attempt to staff peace operations from the reserve components. It would be possible to do so using involuntary mobilization, but this would be unlikely to be politically acceptable for very long, if at all. If deployments did not become too large, establishing a training center and relying on volunteers as the Nordic nations have done should be possible for operations at the low-intensity end of the peace operations scale. It seems unlikely, however, that any such approach would relieve the active component of the requirement to support peace enforcement operations.

We are particularly attracted to alternative 2 as a feasible compromise between the need for some specialization and the heavy demands that would be inherent in dedicated intervention units. Such a staff could have a double mission: to be the core element of a deployable planning and operations headquarters, and to serve as an operational center of excellence for distilling lessons learned and setting standards for performance in intervention tasks. A research and educational center of excellence is being formed at the Army’s Peacekeeping Institute at the Army War College. What is needed is an extension of the concept to the operational arena.

**POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS**

Based on the preceding analysis, we posit the following recommendations. The first group would not require specific action but rather would change the way the Army talks about itself. The second group involves change in thought by others as well as the Army, but the Army is most affected. The third group would require action by OSD, a CINC, and/or possible legislative changes.
Changes in Army Rhetoric

- Strike a careful rhetorical balance between preparing for a possible major conflict (MRC) and the more probable lesser-included intervention operations. Current Army rhetoric that places emphasis on MRC capabilities, with the addition of training as needed for intervention operations, conveys a powerful subliminal message that getting ready for intervention operations is quickly and easily done. The Army will be "graded" by Congress and the American public on how it dealt with the contingency that happened, not one that did not.\(^28\)

- Avoid allowing intervention (or "peace") operations to become the stepchild of Army doctrine, force structure, and training decisions; it will come back to haunt the Army in future post-mortem debates on readiness, training, and other programs. The Army must do peace operations well and get it right the first time, even while laboring under mission definition and force structure handicaps. Intrastate war is different, as different as policing is from a combined arms offensive. While some skills and equipment are common, many are not. and the former are not always quickly developed.

- Reverse, through Army doctrine and public statements, the perception and culture that holds that intervention is a political option intended to achieve a humanitarian "good," while termination is a the result of a "failure" of the military to live up to expectations.\(^29\)

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\(^{28}\)We note that after the American Civil War, the Army transitioned to "intrastate" operations on the Western frontier and manning coastal defenses. The Army's reputation was maintained (and occasionally faltered) with the U.S. public as a result of generally successful frontier operations, not for coastal defense against an enemy that never came. Note also the U.S. Air Force experience after World War II, when the then Strategic Air Command–dominated service did not receive high grades early in the Korean and Vietnam conflicts because nuclear conflict (for which it was prepared) did not occur, but nonnuclear warfare did.

\(^{29}\)Compare the outpouring of op-ed and pundit pieces in mid-May 1994 supporting military intervention in Haiti on humanitarian grounds with the widespread public condemnation of the Somali intervention after incurring some U.S. battle casualties in the fall of 1993.
• Remind Army planners of the potential gaps in national security planning. PDD-25 talks to the peace operations decision process; the BUR addresses MRCs in the context of budget constraints. Neither talks to national interests (in any operational sense such as priorities, regions, etc.) and strategies that are the touchstones of intervention (and hence termination) decisionmaking. The vacuum is currently filled by ad hoc reactions prompted by the media and the public mood. Until this void is filled by a responsible and reasonably complete articulation of military strategy (one that goes beyond listing fielded capabilities and nominal threats), the Army and the other services risk being committed to operations that do not have a clear linkage between political and operational objectives (see Chapters Five and Six). 30

• Be skeptical about the assertion that training is the “silver bullet” that will quickly turn MRC-oriented forces into suitable intervention forces. There has been a blurring in Army rhetoric between what is necessary and what is sufficient in preparing a soldier and his or her officers for intervention operations. While the basic ingredient of an intervention force is the soldier who is well trained for conventional force operations, the additional training and preparation time is not likely to be trivial. 31 Note that most of the case studies examined in Chapter Six suggest rapid response. This is inconsistent with lengthy training periods prior to intervention.

**Actions Affecting Other Defense Entities**

• Use all possible means to ensure that the military planning process that supports intervention decisionmaking keeps open a

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30 For a critique of this vacuum, see Gray, “Off the Map.” For a critique of PRD-13 (the draft predecessor of PDD-25) and the reversibility of U.S. peace operations policy, see Mark M. Lowenthal, “Peacekeeping in Future U.S. Foreign Policy,” CRS Report for Congress, March 21, 1994.

31 Note that FM 100-23 (draft version 6) estimates 4–6 weeks of training will be required to be ready for peace operations (p. D-1). But some observers note that the Army has encountered a more fundamental training problem in the underlying basic unit field training. See “Cassandra, Another Bataan Waiting to Happen,” *Armed Forces Journal International*, June 1994, p. 39.
wide range of options and that political sensitivities are recognized in such planning. Ensure that planning addresses questions that should have been asked by political leaders as they assess military options.

- Ensure intervention advisers and decisionmakers are provided with the effects of incremental force commitment decisions on the ability to execute other plans. This is more than a bookkeeping exercise; it goes to the heart of providing the capabilities for carrying out the national security strategy.

- Avoid getting captured by policy rhetoric, founded on budget considerations, that asserts the United States will withdraw from ongoing peace operations if an MRC occurs. The peace operations may have to continue to prevent a second or third MRC. Moreover, such rhetoric glosses over the ability to extract committed units quickly and the time needed to retrain peace operations forces for MRC operations. The United States would find it extraordinarily difficult to withdraw from some of the historical examples discussed in Chapter Five and the case study contingencies discussed in Chapter Six (Indonesia and South Africa in particular).

- Insist that exit strategy planning not be treated as a separate phenomenon from intervention planning, and that the latter provide for the possible failure of operations to achieve operational (and hence political) objectives.

- Shed, gradually and carefully, the historic reluctance to articulate casualty estimates associated with intervention options and decisions. Estimated casualty costs must be frankly discussed if serious intervention decisions are to be made and their makers

32The training cost of reconfiguring and "unconfiguring" units for peace operations has been addressed in testimony by two CINCs (General George A. Joulwan, USCINCEUR, and General Joseph F. Hoar, USCINCENT) before the Senate Armed Services Committee (March 3, 1994). See also the commentary of General I.C. Douglas of the Canadian army on the difficulty of retraining forces for conventional combat after they have been trained for peace operations, in William H. Lewis (ed.), Military Implications of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, McNair Papers, No. 17, June 1993, p. 37.
held accountable. The Army should not be a party to sweeping this important factor under the rug. Intervention experience is now extensive enough to provide credible ranges of casualty forecasts.

- Move the needs of intervention operations up to a par with MRC needs in structuring support forces. Even though specialized intervention forces may not be needed (or affordable), the case studies demonstrate an early and priority need for support forces that greatly jeopardizes the Army's ability to provide the initial support increment for the first subsequent MRC. There is a good argument to be made that the active Army structure cannot support the BUR strategy if there is a prior intervention operation that draws down a major portion of support available in the active structure.

**Actions Requiring Action and/or Approval by Others**

- Stand up a cadre staff (probably in FORSCOM) oriented to planning and directing intervention operations. This staff would be fleshed out with regional experts and linguists as necessary to prepare for specific contingencies broaching the early-warning horizon. This staff would extend to the operational planning arena the Army's study of peacekeeping undertaken by the Peacekeeping Institute (PKI) recently established at the Army War College. In conjunction with the PKI, it would provide the core of a "center of excellence" and institutional memory for planning for peace operations.

- Develop ways to expand the pool of soldiers with the requisite knowledge of language and culture associated with potential trouble spots around the world. The Army "culture" discriminates against individuals with such qualifications and rewards those who fit the more traditional warrior profile in experience and qualifications. The Army might, for example, expand special pay for acquiring and maintaining language skills in certain languages to all Army personnel, not just those whose specialty requires such ability. Such pay, even if a nominal amount, would go far to demonstrate that the Army leadership values the skills.
THE NEED FOR A CULTURAL SHIFT

Apart from the policy suggestions just provided, we should add that the Army is currently caught in a time warp between the world in which it prepared to fight—and did so successfully in Desert Storm—and the changing world in which it may need to fight. Even more certainly, it will need to be the nation’s right arm in intervention operations. The Army’s “culture” is still caught on the plains of Central Europe and captivated by its superb performance during the Gulf War almost five years ago. By culture we mean what the service holds most dear in its equipment, doctrine, ethos, training, readiness, and the management of its force of soldiers.

Other services have undergone—albeit with great difficulty—cultural shifts in the face of changed circumstances. While the SAC mentality is still alive and well in parts of the U.S. Air Force, that service has successfully shifted its focus to theater operations. The U.S. Navy, while still focusing on large deck aircraft carriers, has turned its attention to “brown water operations” in its “From the Sea...” doctrine. This doctrine has forced the Navy to “rediscover” the U.S. Marine Corps and drastically reduce the size of the submarine fleet dear to the heart of its recent top leadership. We are not convinced the Army needs such a fundamental cultural realignment (or new veneer, as some would see it). But we are also convinced that the Army’s thinking about intrastate war and its role in such conflicts has not gone much beyond assessing the experience in Somalia, developing a draft peace operations field manual, and talking up how the well-prepared soldier can do just about anything given good leadership and a little tailored training. These attitudes and actions, and others like them, are necessary but not sufficient to meet the challenges sure to come in the 21st century.
SUMMARIES OF PROSPECTIVE CASE STUDIES

This appendix contains summary versions of the six full-length case studies in the companion volume, MR-554/2-A. The cases include a Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka; secessionism and intra-Army conflict in Indonesia; civil war in Algeria; civil war in South Africa; internal strife in Macedonia; and post-coup anarchy in Venezuela. To allow for an easy comparison and analysis across regions and missions, each case study follows a uniform format:

- Background
- The U.S. decision
- The mission
- Termination

PEACE BUILDING IN SRI LANKA

This case study illustrates the potential U.S. role in an extensive UN-sponsored peace-building effort that follows a hypothesized end to the longstanding civil war in Sri Lanka. The scenario is noteworthy for reversing the usual way of thinking about U.S. interventions in intrastate conflicts. Rather than positing a U.S. entry to forestall an escalation of a conflict, this case study looks at the commitments associated with assisting an end to a conflict that predates the end of the Cold War. While the ending of strife may be a welcome development, in some countries this may imply a substantial drain on U.S. assets. As such, the case study is useful in a much wider sense than just for its Sri Lanka focus.
Background

The scenario looks at the Sri Lankan civil war, which has roots in the ethnically based hostility between the Sinhalese and the Tamils who inhabit the island-state. Beginning with sporadic attacks on government troops in the late 1970s and moving to a full-fledged civil war in 1983, the conflict has gone through three stages since that time: a classic guerrilla war (with Indian help to the Tamils), an Indian "peacekeeping" effort in Sri Lanka that led to the Indian army fighting the Tamils and, subsequently, its withdrawal, to the current stage of indecisive guerrilla and conventional operations on both sides. Currently, the insurgency spearheaded by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has ground into a stalemate, with neither the government of Sri Lanka nor the LTTE able to secure decisive military victory on the battlefield.

This scenario hypothesizes that, after an especially bloody but indecisive engagement in 1996, both sides recognize that neither one can defeat the other militarily. After some negotiations, the two sides reach a cease-fire and a political settlement. The settlement has four main provisions: (1) both sides promise to cease military operations; (2) the Sri Lankan government promises to legislate constitutional commitments to preserving a multiethnic, multilingual, federal state that defends the rights of all individuals and preserves the social and cultural heritage of all ethnic groups in Sri Lanka; (3) the Sri Lankan government promises to conduct a free and open referendum in the Eastern Province about its becoming a part of a larger Tamil-dominated province in the future; (4) the Sri Lankan government promises to hold elections to the Provincial Council/state legislature in the Northern and Eastern provinces (the two Tamil-inhabited provinces).

Both sides in the Sri Lankan civil war jointly request UN assistance in ensuring that the agreement is implemented as scheduled. Sri Lanka simultaneously sounds out the United States, UK, Australia, and several African nations about contributing troops; it requests the United States and the UK to take the lead in forming an appropriate multilateral force for the task. The UN Security Council accepts the Sri Lankan government's request, seeing an opportunity to finally end a long-running and bloody conflict.
The hypothesized cease-fire and political accords have an even probability of occurring if the future performance of the Sri Lankan army and the "Tigers" conforms to the pattern established so far. Given present trends, the probability of a negotiated cease-fire that the UN is called upon to police must be judged low to moderate because both sides still believe that military solutions are feasible.

The U.S Decision

The United States has no primary strategic interests in Sri Lanka. However, the United States does consider maintaining the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka to be an important objective, given South Asian regional policy in particular and its Indian Ocean/Asian policy in general. Assisting Sri Lanka in ending the civil war is important for a variety of reasons. First, Sri Lanka has always supported U.S. foreign policy objectives, including the U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean, throughout the Cold War. Assisting Sri Lanka via a peacebuilding operation is a way of tacitly repaying a "debt," supporting a friendly state in a difficult situation, and signifying in a nonprovocative way the promise of continued U.S. support for Sri Lanka's territorial integrity. Second, Sri Lanka has excellent airfields and port facilities, particularly Trincomalee, which possesses the finest natural harbor between the Suez and Singapore. Having access to these facilities would be useful in an emergency arising either in southwest or southeast Asia. Third, it is in the U.S. interest to help Sri Lanka maintain a certain freedom of action vis-à-vis India. Helping Sri Lanka to end its civil war communicates U.S. support for Sri Lankan independence and opens the door to acquiring diplomatic and logistical leverage in the Indian subcontinent should that be required down the line.

The commitment by both sides to maintain the cease-fire and the seeming genuineness of the political accords mean that a peacebuilding operation has a fair potential for success. In addition, a number of other factors speak in favor of a U.S. role: the mission requirement is not overly demanding, India has no inclination to undertake the mission because of its past experience on the island, no parties in Sri Lanka desire Indian involvement, only countries like the United States and UK have the right combination of sophisti-
icated military capability and appropriate political detachment from the principal combatants to put together a viable peace-building force, and there is good evidence that both parties intend to make the agreement stick.

The Mission

The mission, as explained by the U.S. President, has the goal of helping to bring about the end of the Sri Lankan civil war, where the warring parties have agreed in good faith to stop fighting. It would not last more than 18 months and it would consist of five tasks: (1) monitor the confinement of Sri Lankan troops and aircraft in their cantonments and air bases throughout the Northern and Eastern provinces; (2) supervise the collection and safekeeping of LTTE arms and ensure the safety of LTTE commanders should they request such protection; (3) maintain law and order in the Northern and Eastern provinces; (4) supervise the referendum on amalgamation in the Eastern Province and subsequently prepare for regionwide elections; and (5) supervise the elections to the Provincial Councils/state legislatures in the Northern and Eastern provinces.

Because of regional sensitivities and the required capabilities, the ideal multilateral peace-building force in Sri Lanka would consist of forces from the United States, Great Britain and/or Australia, and at least two other non-European states, preferably with Commonwealth ties, such as Zimbabwe and Tanzania. Other potential candidates acceptable to both sides in Sri Lanka include countries such as Egypt. For political purposes, it would be an operation nominally under the UN, but with actual control maintained either by the United States or Great Britain. The commander of the operation will likely be either American or British, but there are good arguments for an Australian.

The intervention force would need to build up rapidly to prevent the shift of recalcitrants from a controlled region to an uncontrolled region. This implies a maximum commitment of lift during the de-

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1Since the military units of both sides will be in barracks or cantonments and the militia in the two provinces is compromised because of its active involvement in military operations alongside the government forces, the intervening troops will have to support local police units in the Northern and Eastern provinces in the maintenance of order.
ployement phase. Much of the airlift required would be for moving passengers and could be supplied by chartered civilian airliners. However, a great quantity of mobility assets, albeit mostly relatively light-wheeled vehicles, would be required as soon as possible. This implies a significant commitment by the U.S. Air Mobility Command for the deployment phase. The use of a high-speed roll-on/roll-off vessel from the Military Sealift Command would also be necessary.

To maintain contact with the many small observer detachments, the operation would require helicopters and communications capabilities in amounts high in relation to the number of people involved. Compatibility of communications assets is essential. There is a need for a construction capability to quickly prepare protected and secure storage for LTTE arms and ammunition turned in. After the construction phase, the engineer capability will be useful for maintaining surface routes and preparation of helicopter landing areas as needed. After the initial deployments, the bulk and tonnage of supplies required will be fuel. This should be available commercially. The remainder of the required supplies can easily be delivered through the available seaports with airlift available for high-value, time-sensitive, or perishable items. Most of the lift required can be commercial.

The force will operate with two major components. The first and most critical is an element of unarmed observers composed of both civilians and military personnel. A group of 5 to 10 observers will be assigned to each cantonment of the Sri Lankan military to monitor compliance with the agreement to cease military operations. Observer groups will also be stationed at each point designated for the turn-in and storage of LTTE arms. An additional element of the observer group will help set up and monitor the elections. The individual in charge of the observer force will not be military, and that group will have a separate command structure from the military chain of command. The initial size of the observer group will be about 500 personnel, but this is likely to increase as the elections near.

The peacekeeping element of the force will be responsible for ensuring free travel for UN personnel, for securing supply routes, for guarding weapons and ammunition turned in by the LTTE until it can be turned over to the government, and for securing the Tamil area to facilitate their turn-in of weapons and ammunition. The
peacekeeping force will consist of four brigades of roughly 2,500 personnel each. A support force of about 6,000 personnel will include a battalion of engineers whose initial task will be to construct facilities for securing weapons turned in by the LTTE. The remainder of the support force will be primarily personnel support, medical, food service, supply, and maintenance units.

The peacekeeping force will be authorized to use deadly force as a last resort to protect itself or the observer group. The peacekeeping force will also, as appropriate, assist civil authorities in maintaining law and order, but will be authorized to use only nonlethal means to do so. The UN force will not intervene to prevent new outbreaks of fighting between the Tamils and the government forces. Both sides will be informed clearly (though informally) that renewed fighting on any significant scale would be grounds for terminating the operation regardless of which side appeared to be at fault.

The highest-priority forces for this operation will be an engineer battalion with experience in tropical construction and a peacekeeping unit (likely a brigade) that is equipped and acclimated to the tropics. Since Sri Lanka is in the U.S. Pacific Command area of responsibility, the actual selection of the units will likely be the responsibility of that command, but the Army will be called upon to supply people and equipment to fill out and sustain the selected unit. Hence, early coordination will be important.

The Army will require extensive deployment support from both the Air Force and the Navy. It would be useful at the time of initial deployment to have a Marine Expeditionary Unit stationed in the vicinity of Sri Lanka to assist in evacuating the force if the situation turns out not to be benign. Subsequent to deployment, there should be limited support from other services required. The United States will need at least some Tamil-speaking individuals, particularly at the command headquarters where a liaison is maintained with LTTE leaders.

Prior to deployment, the troops would need special training in local customs and in tropical medicine. There is also likely to be a need to obtain special vehicles for the force. The infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) of a mechanized force are heavier than would be needed for
an operation of this type, and light infantry do not have the needed vehicles.

Termination

The mission will have been accomplished successfully if (a) the disarmament of the LTTE is carried out without major incidents; (b) a reasonably honest referendum is carried out in the Eastern Province in an atmosphere where none of the ethnic groups (Sinhalese, Sri Lankan Tamils, Indian Tamils, and Moors) have to fear the consequences if they vote freely for a political arrangement of their choice; (c) there are fair elections in the Northern and Eastern provinces undertaken pursuant to a devolution of powers at the federal level. There are few temptations to proceed to another mission once the original mission is accomplished. The United States must be prepared, however, for the possibility that the Sri Lankan government requests some forces to stay behind to train the Sri Lankan army in internal defense (counterinsurgency) operations. This issue should be treated as completely separate from the peace-building effort.

At least four different paths could lead to the breakdown of the original agreement, leading to an imposed choice between either a pull-out or an evolution of the original mission to one of peace enforcement (organized actors): (1) the appearance of significant resistance to disarmament by certain LTTE factions; (2) the perception by the LTTE that peacekeepers are sympathetic to the Sri Lankan government rather than impartial and, as a consequence, that they will take up arms against them (a variant of the events involving the Indian peacekeeping force in 1987); (3) the possibility that the LTTE may not like the results of the referendum seeking an opinion about whether the Eastern Province should be merged with the Northern, leading it to renege on the cease-fire accord; and (4) the possibility that there may be a Sinhala backlash if the Eastern Province chooses to merge with the Northern.

The hazards of early termination are a function of how the entry decision is configured. If the decision to enter is publicly predicated on the willingness of both sides to continue to abide by the cease-fire agreements and accept the outcomes of the elections called for in the
political accords, a decision to terminate short of completion will not redound to the disadvantage of the UN/United States. This is because any termination short of completion will occur only if one or both parties reneges on the cease-fire agreement and changes the military environment within which peace-building is to take place. Even if the decision to enter is not publicly predicated on the cooperation of both antagonists, a decision to terminate short of completion can be salvaged if it is formulated in terms of "we cannot help those who will not help themselves." Of course, the important point is not to reach this juncture in the first place. Consequently, the UN/United States should not even contemplate intervention unless there is good evidence to begin with that the cease-fire political accords are made in good faith.

PEACEKEEPING/PEACE ENFORCEMENT IN INDONESIA

This case study illustrates the potential U.S. role in a UN-sponsored peacekeeping effort with elements of peace enforcement designed to control piracy amidst a hypothesized civil strife that breaks out after the removal of Indonesia's longstanding ruler from power. The scenario is noteworthy for the combination of missions it entails: aspects of traditional peacekeeping, peacekeeping/peace enforcement, and peace enforcement (anarchy). Such missions, illustrating the greater enforcement elements to international peacekeeping efforts, may become more common in the future. The case study focuses on Indonesia, but the situation has some applicability to other island states.

Background

This scenario looks at the potential fractioning of Indonesia along ethnic and regional lines and amidst intramilitary strife. It is based on the history of separatism in Indonesia, on deep military involvement in the country's political and economic affairs, and on the endemic problem of piracy in the Indonesian waters. The scenario hypothesizes that the death of Suharto (Indonesia's ruler) precipitates a failed coup, which leads to armed conflict between regions and between army factions. The breakdown of central authority and emergence of regional power centers leads to a resurgence of piracy. After attacks on international shipping in waters adjacent to Indonesia
and after considerable international uproar, the ineffective central
government and some rebel force commanders agree to a UN offer
to provide an antipirate force and the stationing of UN peacekeeping
forces at four Sumatran sites.

The Indonesian decision to cooperate in the stationing of foreign
troops on Indonesian soil is a surprising one, but it stems from the
urgency accompanying the threat perception by the central govern-
ment authorities, who see a danger to the continued existence of the
Indonesian state and a threat to the position of the current ruling
elites. The decision comes at a time when pirate attacks continue,
with neither the central government nor the Sumatran rebel com-
manders able to suppress them.

The hypothesized civil strife and piracy in Indonesia have a moder-
ate possibility of occurring when Suharto passes from the scene. The
probability of the strife increases if the Indonesian economy shows
signs of being unable to sustain high growth rates. Piracy has been
endemic in the Malacca Straits for decades. Only the combined ef-
forts of the Malaysian, Singaporean, and Indonesian governments
have succeeded in controlling the problem in recent years. Should
the cooperation break down, the reemergence of piracy is likely.

The U.S. Decision

The United States has a strategic interest in the area because of the
crucial importance of the Malacca Straits for international shipping
lanes and trade routes. Piracy in the Straits would raise the issue of
freedom of navigation in international waters, an issue of primary
concern for a maritime power such as the United States. The United
States also has a keen interest in limiting the disruption to world
trade flows. Using the auspices of the UN to protect these U.S. inter-
est also would demonstrate UN support for such operations. A
corollary to the strategic interest in the area is the U.S. interest in
restoring stability in an important regional state such as Indonesia.

The Mission

The mission, as explained by the U.S. President, has the goals of
reestablishing a semblance of order in areas of Indonesia adjacent to
the straits and of suppressing pirate and other attacks on international shipping to restore security to the sea lines of communication in the South China Sea, the Straits of Malacca, and the Java Sea. U.S. forces are authorized to conduct pirate-suppression operations on the high seas and in Indonesian coastal waters. Hot-pursuit operations in or over Indonesian territory must be approved by the peacekeeping force commander in Sumatra. U.S. forces will deploy with the understanding that their commitment may be of long duration, perhaps a year or more.

The ground forces concept of operations in Sumatra consists of interposing UN peacekeepers between attacking central government and opposing regional forces for the duration of reconciliation talks (held at Kuala Lumpur). The forces are to be withdrawn when requested by either side. The intervening troops are to set up UN force support bases in cantonments designated by each side.

The central government in Indonesia agrees to the UN presence with the proviso that the peacekeepers themselves be selected from Muslim states. The United States provides logistics and support units. The peacekeeping units supported by the United States are from Pakistan, Egypt, Morocco, and Oman. The pirate-suppression forces consist of U.S., Indonesian, and other units. The UN peacekeeping units, almost completely dependent on U.S.-provided logistics support, are inserted (with U.S. support) in four locations (mainly in Sumatra).

The high command of the UN peacekeeping force is set up in central government–held Palembang on Sumatra. The high command of the UN pirate-suppression force is set up in Singapore, as is the U.S. joint task force (JTF) headquarters (both the Indonesian central government and dissident commanders objected to establishing a U.S. JTF headquarters on Indonesian soil). The U.S. JTF headquarters is responsible for U.S. forces supporting the peacekeeping operations and antipirate operations. This scattering of the various headquarters and liaison offices—necessary for political reasons—makes planning, coordination, and situation monitoring extraordinarily difficult and requires numerous liaison officers and excellent communications to support effective operations. Command and control could become a nightmare because of the geographic separation of various oversight and command echelons.
The intervention force would need U.S. logistics support sufficient to support six infantry battalions (two Pakistani, two Egyptian, one Moroccan, and one Omani), two helicopter battalions (two U.S.) and three other support battalions (one U.S. signal, one U.S. engineer, one U.S. transportation, plus assorted medical and personnel support units). The large size of the peacekeeping force is justified by the large number of locations to be monitored and the distinct possibility that the peacekeeping forces may come under attack by dissident forces not party to the agreement.

The U.S. support element to the UN peacekeeping force would be authorized to fire only in self-defense, but it would provide logistics support to any engaged UN peacekeeping forces. As for the U.S. forces supporting the UN freedom of navigation force, under the direction of a UN force commander (a Malaysian), their rules would be to escort international shipping on innocent passage through Indonesian coastal waters and neutralize irregular or other forces attempting to interfere with it. Hot-pursuit operations would be coordinated with the UN peacekeeping force commander (a Pakistani).

The highest-priority support forces and capabilities for this operation will be C3I, inter- and intratheater lift, and personnel support (including medical). The Army would require extensive deployment support from both the Air Force and the Navy. USAF would provide airlift, C3I, and surveillance. USN would provide sealift and landing craft (and possibly some amphibious support elements such as beachmasters, obstacle clearing and salvage units, and special amphibious craft such as LCACs). There also might be a need for USN/USMC/USAF rapid-extraction support and covering forces.

The deployed forces would have to have the ability to support operations in a tropical environment with poor indigenous communications and economic infrastructures. Intelligence on Indonesian regional and military politics (intelligence preparation of the "battlefield" may be the most important needed special capability) also would be essential. Other capabilities include surveillance of pirate operations and the establishment of multiple communication nets for UN and U.S. commanders and political authorities.

Prior to deployment, the troops would need tropical orientation, including tropical medicine. In addition, area familiarization (local
economy and customs, political-military situation), and routine self-
defense brushup would be needed. Knowledge of basic target coun-
try languages (plus Arabic, the common language of the UN peace-
keeping forces) would be sorely needed.

Termination

For the UN, the mission will have been accomplished successfully if
there is a reconciliation between Indonesian factions and piracy is
suppressed in Indonesian and adjacent waters. The United States
has the same determinants of success; in addition, it also has the goal
of gaining regional acceptance of the United States as a positive force
for stability and respect for international law.

If the original mission is successful, there may be a temptation to
proceed further to destroy pirate strongholds on Sumatra. Such a
task would have to be fully supported by the Indonesian central
government and various local (and perhaps still dissident) regional
military headquarters on Sumatra. In effect, this would be evolution
to a peace enforcement (organized) mission. Another path to mis-
sion evolution would occur if the UN peacekeepers were to be given
the task of delivering humanitarian aid to destitute populations in
Sumatra, while regional Indonesian commanders saw that as an in-
trusion on their role (reinforcing their political clout) and opposed
UN delivery. In effect, this would be evolution to a humanitarian
mission with a heavy potential for a peace enforcement (organized)
mission.

A number of potential developments could cause a breakdown in the
Indonesian consensus for agreeing to the deployment of the UN
forces and could cause one of the actors to ask the force to leave
(implying a threat of mission evolution if the UN force does not
leave). Examples of such developments include the following: the
peacekeepers and U.S. support units come under serious and con-
tinued attack by dissident elements who see a truce as working in
favor of central government attempts to regain control; a successor
Indonesian central government sees political gains in demanding
withdrawal of "foreigners from our soil"; fighting between factions
degenerates into a full-blown civil war, with the UN forces caught in
the middle; or rebel military commanders in Sumatra declare a new
Sumatran state, and see no need for any foreign presence on the island.

Among the variety of potential unpleasant surprises developing subsequent to intervention, the most important ones revolve around the possibility of the intervening UN troops becoming drawn into the secessionist/regionalist strife. One possibility centers on the inability of UN peacekeepers to keep the peace, accompanied by attacks on peacekeepers and U.S. support forces by either side in the Indonesian civil strife. Another option is the possibility of hot pursuit of pirates into lairs near either central government or regional forces, leading to the spread of fighting. A complicating element, either in conjunction with other actions or by itself, is the possibility of the warring factions attacking U.S. nationals in rebel-held areas, forcing a mission evolution. Still another possibility stems from the potential sheltering of pirates by warring factions in Indonesia. For example, if the Sumatran dissident military authorities provide shelter to the pirates, the action could lead to UN (and U.S.) naval and air attacks on bases, which could lead to attacks on peacekeepers and support personnel. In this case, the mission would shift from a mixture of traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement (anarchy) to extraction, hostage rescue, and a possible withdrawal while under attack.

Interstate conflict might occur if the evolving situation in Indonesia were to result in a new central government that based its existence on resistance to outside interference. If such a government were unable, at the same time, to control piracy and stop impediments to safe navigation by international shipping in its coastal waters, a conflict could develop between Indonesia and those states that rely on maritime transportation transiting Indonesian coastal waters (under the right of innocent passage).

The hazards of early termination are the continuation of piracy in the Malacca Straits (indeed, the strengthening of it as a result of an early UN withdrawal) and further instability in Indonesia. In addition, two issues specific to the deployed U.S. forces would come into play: (1) need for extraction of U.S. support forces, endangered by continuing UN/U.S. attacks on pirates near or affiliated with rebel commanders; and (2) inability before the withdrawal to free any U.S. hostages that might have been taken.
HUMANITARIAN RELIEF IN ALGERIA

This case study illustrates the potential U.S. role in a UN-authorized, NATO-implemented humanitarian relief effort in a civil war-ravaged Algeria. This scenario is noteworthy for looking at a mission that is judged to be dangerous in terms of its mission evolution and risk potential but is undertaken nevertheless because of political pressures and allies' concerns. As such, the case study has a much wider applicability than its specific focus on Algeria.

Background

The scenario looks at what is increasingly becoming an Algerian civil war, a conflict that pits the Islamic fundamentalist (Islamist) forces against the military-dominated regime. The Islamists won an electoral victory in Algeria in 1991, but the military refused to let them come to power. Consequently, a wave of violence has steadily grown amidst Islamist terrorism and the security forces' counterterror campaign. The military is hardly unified, and there are signs of some units in the provinces defecting to the Islamists. Making matters worse, there are deep social and some ethnic cleavages in Algeria, accentuated by the rapid modernization over the past three decades.

This scenario hypothesizes that the civil war has stalemated, with the country having moved toward gradual paralysis. Some military commanders openly advocate negotiations with the Islamists, while others are uncompromising. An ethnic dimension to the conflict emerges with the Berbers in northeastern Algeria attempting to establish de facto autonomy from the ineffective central government. As a result of civil disorder and confrontation between security forces and the Islamists, city services grind to a halt. Water supply is damaged, electricity and gas service breaks down, disease spreads, and food is running short. An increasingly greater flow of refugees heads across the Mediterranean for Western Europe. The concern in Spain, France, and Italy grows further when gas terminals become targeted by guerrilla fighters seeking to discredit the regime, to place it under economic pressure, and to make clear to the outside world that the present leadership does not constitute a legitimate government and is not in control. Disruptions in natural gas supplies to Western Eu-
rope (Spain will soon receive most of its natural gas supplies from Algeria) occur more and more frequently.

The massive refugee crisis, and the international reaction to it, forces the rump government in Algeria to face its loss of control and the gravity of the humanitarian situation. In response to the international attention, it appeals to the UN to help stem the refugee flow by meeting urgent humanitarian needs of the urban population. The French government, concerned for French investment, property, and remaining French citizens in Algeria, demonstrates particular willingness to carry out an operation of humanitarian intervention to maintain a semblance of order and daily life in the cities, to intercept refugee boats seeking to cross the Mediterranean, and to take care of those intercepted or living in camps outside the cities to avoid urban warfare. Both France and Spain are particularly anxious over the situation and the consequences it entails for the continued flow of natural gas to Europe.

The UN requests that NATO act on its behalf and provide assistance in patrolling the coasts, assisting refugees, bringing in food and technical assistance, restoring power and water facilities, controlling looting, and sending needed medical supplies. With France taking the lead, and with U.S. backing, NATO organizes an assistance effort on the condition that the Algerian government will agree to negotiations with Islamist forces in an effort to reach an interim compromise settlement. The condition is satisfied, as the Islamist forces, anxious to bring about change in the political and military stalemate, welcome an end to the bloodshed and the opportunity to enter negotiations made possible by foreign intervention. Most Algerians welcome the foreign troops as a potential way to break the endless cycle of fighting, restore a semblance of normalcy, and to break the impasse between opposition forces in a way that saves the face of both sides.

The continuing deterioration of the Algerian situation, leading to major internal conflict or chaos, has a medium to high probability. The likelihood of French or UN involvement in the situation in some way seems good. NATO or U.S. involvement seems less likely, though it is one option. While the United States is exceedingly unlikely to seek involvement in a civil war, humanitarian involvement is
a distinct possibility. Currently, a resolution of the confrontation by military means by either side seems unlikely. There is no clear sign yet of any firm resolve on the part of the Algerian government to seek a negotiated solution, though that may change if the situation worsens. The willingness of Islamists to accede to Western intervention to keep order and play honest broker in a situation otherwise out of control would be a very positive event in the region. Such willingness by Islamists, especially the most radical elements during such a conflict, is among the most debatable assumptions in this scenario.

The U.S. Decision

The United States has strategic interests in North Africa generally (in the context of European and Mediterranean security) and in Algeria specifically, as the largest and most important of the North African states. In addition, the United States has a broad interest in the continued flow of energy resources (oil and gas) from Algeria because of the impact that disruptions in the flow would have upon Western Europe. The United States also would like to lessen the chances of an Islamist government takeover in Algeria, especially by revolutionary force. The United States is concerned for the stability of other friendly countries in the region that would be affected by such a takeover, Morocco and Egypt in particular. While the U.S. interest in preventing an Islamist takeover may not warrant the high cost such a task would entail, the United States could act to manage the problem politically to ensure a less radical outcome.

In view of the strategic interests and the desire to moderate the effects of the Islamist takeover, a decision to participate in a humanitarian intervention would probably come when at least the government sought assistance to handle the deteriorating urban situation. There is also a chance that the Islamists would welcome an end to the fighting implied by the government’s seeking assistance to meet civil needs (the implication of a cease-fire). Without Islamist agreement on the humanitarian role, the UN, NATO, or a U.S. humanitarian intervention would not be possible, though intervention on a peacekeeping, anarchy-prevention scenario would still be possible.
The Mission

The mission, as explained by the U.S. President, has the goal of ameliorating the civilian population's suffering in conditions where normal distribution channels for basic services have ceased to function. The intervening actors will not take any action purposely aimed at preventing Islamist participation in a new government. The credibility of the U.S. and Western effort in Algeria hinges on their neutrality in a process that led to free and open elections. U.S. forces, as part of a NATO operation, will leave Algeria as soon as basic services and order can be restored to the cities and urban life returns to some normalcy. The UN will then continue to provide its good offices for negotiations as long as it is required. If civil conflict and urban warfare continue, that is, if the parties to the conflict choose to continue fighting, NATO troops will be withdrawn until such time as the parties agree there is a need for a cease-fire, external assistance to rebuild urban services, and assistance in brokering a political agreement. Although no time frame for withdrawal would be set prior to the intervention, the linking of the intervention to the negotiations to end the civil strife would imply certainly no more than a year of substantive involvement by outside forces.

The United States acts in concert with other concerned nations in the region, most especially France, under NATO auspices. U.S. involvement comes first politically via the UN Security Council resolutions, and then operationally via NATO acting in response to the UN. France, Britain, Spain, Italy, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Russia all might be candidates as potential participants. France might be expected to take the lead, given its deep historical involvement and extensive economic and cultural interests in Algeria, though there is also the danger that the French could be perceived as engaging in "neocolonialism." Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt might lend an Arab aspect to the operation, but conceivably could be resented by the Algerian public, especially Morocco. Russia's long association with Algeria gives it some clout. Russia has an interest in both stemming the spread of fundamentalism and in preventing excessive U.S. or NATO monopolization of international peacekeeping operations.
The UN force will assign operational sectors in such a way that there is one security battalion for roughly each million inhabitants. The units will escort relief convoys, secure distribution points, and patrol urban areas to assist in the security of personnel providing services and to convince the populace that order is being restored. Elements of the airmobile reaction force will be available for an additional show of force when the occasion calls for it.

The primary requirement in this operation is the provision of services and supplies. Both are normal civilian activities and can and will be provided by civilian agencies in this case. Delivery and distribution of relief supplies will be by UN agencies and such non-governmental organizations as are willing to participate. The restoration of essential services will be by contract personnel who will be from Arabic-speaking countries to the extent possible. The primary military task will be to provide security to the relief agencies during transportation and distribution within the country, although urban police/security tasks will fall on the military because of the lack of civilian police available to the operation.

The primary focus of the operation will be on the urbanized north of the country within approximately 200 miles of the Mediterranean coastline. Twenty-five battalions (three reinforced divisions) will be used for the security mission initially to ensure adequate visibility to the populace. The number will be gradually reduced as order is restored. These security forces will be drawn from European and North African participants. The United States will station a Marine Expeditionary Unit offshore during the early stages of the operation to provide security during the insertion and withdrawal if one of the parties withdraws from the agreement after deployment begins. The U.S. Army will deploy an airmobile brigade to serve as a general reserve for the force.

Forces will use deadly force only in extreme circumstances necessary to protect themselves or personnel providing relief and services from serious injury or death. In the event of hostilities between indigenous groups, the action of the UN force will be to contain the spread of violence in the specific locality and to protect others, but it will not intervene to terminate such hostilities. The parties will be warned that such violence may jeopardize the continuation of the UN mission. Personnel participating in what are essentially police activities
may use lesser forms of force, such as riot batons, as necessary but will use deadly force only for self-protection.

The individual in overall charge of the operation will be a civilian from a European NATO country (most likely France) who would also serve as the Secretary General's representative. Another civilian, probably from the UN headquarters, would coordinate the relief effort. The military command is a NATO field headquarters augmented with staff and liaison from non-NATO countries participating in the intervention. Operational sectors are assigned by nationality to minimize difficulties of language and interoperability. A critical control element for the operation will be civil-military coordination centers at each operational echelon to coordinate the schedules of the relief agencies and their security forces.

The highest-priority force provided by the United States for this operation will be the airmobile reserve force. This force will come from CONUS, since no such brigade exists in U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR). Support units required will come from the European Command, although there may be some need to backfill USAREUR for the sustainment of forces not committed to the Algerian operation. The Marine battalion and an aircraft carrier will be critical during the deployment phase of the operation, both for actual security and as a show of force to limit interference with the deployment. Because of bulk and limited airfield facilities, the airmobile brigade should be deployed by fast sealift, which will require the commitment of at least one SL-7 from the Military Sealift Command. The Military Airlift Command will need to support the initial deployment and to establish regular flights to sustain the operation.

Predeployment training will concentrate on the rules of engagement and the need to rely on a show of force to accomplish the mission rather than the actual use of force. In addition to the usual cultural briefings, attention will be given to working with international relief organizations and what can be expected of them. The primary special capabilities are language skills. There should be a reasonable availability of French-speaking individuals, but it will take considerable effort to locate a sufficient number of Arabic linguists to meet the needs of the force for liaison. The units selected for the mission should be those that have recently completed training for urban operations.
Termination

The operation will have been accomplished successfully if (a) basic law and order is restored; (b) the urban logistical crisis is eased and a semblance of normalcy returns, including basic services; (c) widespread further refugee flight from the country is prevented; and (d) warring parties agree that external intervention is useful to help reach an end to conflict. A peace-building or a traditional peacekeeping effort may be tempting to follow a successful humanitarian effort, for the latter implies that negotiations would result in an agreement to end the civil strife.

A number of paths could lead to the breakdown of the conditions that allowed for the initial intervention. One path centers around the continuation of the fighting and its spread to the intervening troops: (1) if both warring parties (assuming only two) could not agree on negotiations and fighting flared back up, catching the intervening troops in the crossfire; (2) if outside agitation and support by, for example, Libya or Iran, fueled the hostilities, and the fighting continued with the intervening troops caught in the middle (a variation of the preceding path); (3) if the intervening forces came to be perceived as parties to the conflict, leading to open attacks upon them; and (4) if there was a falling out in the relations between the intervening forces and the leaderships of the interim government and the Islamists. Another path to breakdown centers around the inability of the intervening troops to restore order without a massively increased presence. The mission could evolve to one of peacekeeping/peace enforcement, peace enforcement (anarchy), peace enforcement (organized), or even foreign internal defense. All of these possible ways of mission evolution involve the stepping up of effort (perhaps justified as an attempt to keep the negotiations on track) in the face of resistance to the foreign presence by some of the parties to the Algerian conflict.

The main hazard of early termination would be return of the situation to the status quo ante. The negative consequences would be regional perception of what might be described as a defeat for the West (France, the United States, NATO) in its attempt to stop the advance of Islamist governance in the Middle East. In principle, an Islamist government emerging from the chaos would then be doubly suspicious of the basic Western intention to prevent it from coming
to power by any means, including a victory at the ballot box. Other regional states would be highly intimidated by an Islamist victory by force in Algeria and would become more vulnerable to their own Islamist forces, although not necessarily with a fatal result. Failure of the intervention to manage the situation, leading to withdrawal without fulfillment of mission, would add to the lore of the "invincibility" of Islam in Muslim eyes against superpowers—as was demonstrated in Afghanistan, and "now in Algeria."

PEACE ENFORCEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA

This case study illustrates the potential U.S. role in a substantial UN-led effort to police a cease-fire to a hypothesized civil war in South Africa. The scenario is noteworthy because it stipulates U.S. military involvement in a distant region where the United States has little experience. In addition, the hypothesized multisided civil war presents a situation that is especially difficult to bring to an end and carries a strong potential for mission evolution. As such, the case study provides lessons for a similar type of engagement in other regions.

Background

This scenario looks at the aftermath of the political changes in South Africa. The 1994 elections have led to the final dissolution of apartheid in South Africa and the accession of African National Congress (ANC) head, Nelson Mandela, to the presidency. The event is a watershed in South African history. Since the elections, several centers of power, concentrated around political-geographical distinctions, have emerged. The National Party (NP) dominates in the Western Cape province, while the Inkatha has taken power in Natal. The other seven provinces have ANC governments. The leadership of the police and of the South African Defense Forces (SADF) has remained largely as it was before the elections.

This scenario hypothesizes that the precarious political consensus that led to the elections breaks down amidst the political infighting after the elections. The initial NP-ANC cooperation collapses. At the same time, the Natal province witnesses a steady stream of violent clashes between Inkatha and ANC activists. There are signs that Chief Buthelezi is about to proclaim Natal to be a sovereign state.
Another point of friction emerges in the form of guerrilla activity in the rural Afrikaner agricultural regions west and southwest of the Pretoria/Johannesburg area. The Afrikaner Freedom Movement (AFM) is behind the incidents. The AFM is a shadowy underground organization made up of cadres from the old Afrikaner Resistance Movement, disgruntled SADF veterans, and Afrikaner small farmers fearing government nationalization of their land.

A full-fledged civil war results when the NP quits the governing coalition and condemns most of the ANC’s policies. The leaders of the NP declare Cape Town and the rest of Western Cape province to be an NP sanctuary with political autonomy. Several SADF units immediately side with the NP leadership and deploy to guard Cape Town against assault. Indecisive clashes between the units and the new Popular Militia (an ANC offshoot) take place. When the fighting begins around Cape Town, Inkatha sees an opportunity to take advantage of the weak position of the central government and increases its attacks upon ANC cadres in Natal. The SADF and police units in the area prove unable or unwilling to restrain the Inkatha paramilitary forces. ANC Popular Militia units are sent into Natal to protect ANC members, and the fighting escalates into large-unit battles. Inkatha holds its own in this fighting; shortly thereafter, the Inkatha leadership feels secure enough to proclaim the birth of a fully sovereign Zulu nation-state in Natal. Once the violence escalates in Natal, the AFM sees a window of opportunity and declares that a large swath of territory south and southwest of Johannesburg/Pretoria (in the agriculturally fertile Orange Free State) is a sovereign Afrikaner “Volksstaat.” Several SADF battalions immediately pledge their loyalty to the AFM and deploy on the borders of the new political entity. Fighting on this front settles down to intermittent artillery barrages and commando raids. At this stage, there are six main military actors: the SADF units that remain loyal to the government, the ANC Popular Militia, Afrikaner irregulars, the SADF units that join the AFM, the Inkatha paramilitary units, and the SADF units that fight for the NP enclave in the Western Cape province.

As the casualty count in South Africa continues to rise, the international community makes a concerted effort to achieve a cease-fire through the United Nations. Heavy UN pressure on all four parties results in a nationwide cease-fire. The cease-fire is to provide a respite during which negotiations among the four political parties
can produce a peaceful settlement to the conflict. After the UN monitor force is harassed, the UN Security Council votes to deploy a heavily armed peacekeeping/peace enforcement force to the region. Several countries, including the United States, are called on to contribute troops. The peacekeepers are to be deployed in the volatile border regions of the Western Cape province, in Natal province, and along the edges of the Afrikaner enclave.

The hypothesized civil war has to be rated in the medium range because it is a composite of several different local political situations that all explode into conflict at the same time. The chances of post-election combat between Inkatha and the ANC in Natal must be rated as high. The likelihood of the emergence of an Afrikaner homeland in the Orange Free State through violence must be rated as low. Finally, the chances of combat around an NP enclave in Cape Town are probably in the moderate range. The high visibility of apartheid as a matter of concern for the UN and the international attention to the recent political developments in South Africa indicate a high level of attention to the country, making extensive UN involvement likely in case the situation develops negatively. Because of the high visibility of apartheid as a political issue in the United States and the strong U.S. interest in the South African transition, a substantial U.S. contribution to a UN effort designed to stabilize the situation seems quite likely.

The U.S. Decision

The United States has a number of strategic interests in South Africa. Besides its important location astride major shipping lanes, South Africa is the most developed country in Africa and could become an important U.S. ally if it manages a peaceful transition to a democracy. The setting up of a stable, democratic, multiracial state in sub-Saharan Africa would be a watershed event and would have great importance for the entire continent.

These same reasons also contain a negative strategic rationale for U.S. interest in South Africa. If the end result of a bitter civil war in South Africa were the rise of one or more extremist, anti-Western regimes on South African territory, and should the sophisticated indigenous weapons-production capabilities fall into the hands of a radical regime, South Africa could serve as a new arms supplier to
roguish states throughout the developing world. Last but not least is the nuclear issue. By its own admission, South Africa possessed a small stockpile of nuclear weapons in the 1980s. In 1993, then President De Klerk claimed that all nuclear weapons had been dismantled. Even if one assumes this is true, there is still the risk that enough indigenous nuclear research and production capability exists in the country to allow one or more militant regimes to begin the process of producing nuclear weapons once again. If such a scenario were to develop, the actions of the South African successor states would become a matter of global, not just regional, attention. Finally, an important dimension of the U.S. interest in South Africa is the existence of strong emotional ties to South Africa's political development; this is a dimension that no U.S. President can ignore.

Despite the considerable U.S. interests, any decision to deploy substantial U.S. troops as part of a UN operation to South Africa is likely to come only after an intense, prolonged, and divisive public debate, probably launched by the UN Secretary General's request for U.S. participation in UN South Africa Force (UNISAF). Television footage of the carnage in South Africa may sway the decision in favor of participating in the intervention.

The Mission

The mission, as explained by the U.S. President, has the goal of ensuring that a fragile cease-fire would last and lead to a negotiated solution to the conflict. In an overall sense, there are three major goals: (1) preserve stability in southern Africa; (2) help build democracy in South Africa; and (3) alleviate the hardships being suffered by South African civilians.

Although no fixed end date for the operation is specified, U.S. officials privately tell the press that they wish to withdraw all American troops from South Africa after six to eight months. The setting of a specific duration upon the operation prior to deployment could have the counterproductive effects of the various combatants simply playing for time in the negotiations and preparing for the departure of the UN forces.

The U.S. component to UNISAF would be a part of a large multinational military team that would also include soldiers from the UK,
France, Nigeria, Kenya, and Egypt. These national contingents would be selected to provide a balance between North American, European, and African forces. No countries would be consciously excluded from UNISAF, but the United States and the UN are likely to be far more selective in choosing national contingents than they had been during the Somalia operation.

In view of the multisided civil war situation and the expectation of combat with at least some of the sides involved, UNISAF would necessitate a substantial strength among the intervening armed forces. The UN would be likely to expect the U.S. contribution to be most vital in the following areas: sealift/airlift, civil affairs personnel, ground transportation units, attack and transport helicopters, light infantry, and some military police. A total of 85,000 troops would be deployed to South Africa, of whom 20,000 are Americans. In all, seven battalions of U.S. ground combat troops would be deployed (five Army, two Marine). The U.S. force roster would include: one Army mechanized infantry brigade, two Marine Corps battalions, one understrength airmobile brigade (one airmobile infantry battalion, one attack helicopter battalion), strategic airlift/sealift assets, in-country transport (both ground and air), military police, a robust complement of civil affairs troops, and the core elements of a military intelligence brigade. Language should not be a major problem, since most South African elites speak English. However, the military intelligence brigade deployed should include a substantial number of Xhosa and Zulu linguists.

The U.S. Army concept of operations involves the setting up of a handful of garrison strongpoints in each battalion area. Small, platoon-sized mobile teams fan out from each of the garrisons to patrol the battalion area of responsibility. The mobile patrols have the task of controlling any outbreaks of organized violence. These small patrols (mounted on HMMWVs and Bradleys) can be reinforced by company-sized Quick Reaction Forces consisting of 2–3 attack helicopters and heliborne light infantry. The two Marine battalions will be deployed close to the coast in Natal province (where they could be supported by the Navy), while the Army mechanized brigade is deployed further inland. The airmobile brigade is divided up into company team quick reaction task forces distributed throughout the country to offer rapid support to any UN unit that may need assistance. U.S. commanders order the use of heavy fire-
power to be kept to a minimum. Civil affairs troops are distributed widely throughout the U.S. force. Local U.S. civil affairs officers are ordered to make contact with the local populace and the local political leaders and to set up crisis management centers in each district.

The overall command of UNISAF is given to a U.S. Army general. He is empowered by the UN to make all necessary military decisions relating to the deployment and employment of UNISAF forces. His deputy is a Nigerian general. The U.S. commander reports to the Secretary General's special representative for South Africa on all UN matters. On U.S. issues, he reports to the commander of the U.S. European Command. Each national contingent of UNISAF has its own area of operations (to reduce problems resulting from language and doctrinal differences), so there is little chance for command confusion resulting from the mixing of different contingents. The U.S. airmobile brigade and two French parachute battalions are held in strategic reserve to support any element of UNISAF that finds itself in military difficulty.

The rules of engagement issued to UN forces are not restrictive. All UN troops are empowered to use force when they judge themselves to be in danger or when they witness a cease-fire violation.

The highest-priority U.S. Army units for this operation will be transport units (truckling and transport helicopter), the airmobile reaction brigade, and civil affairs personnel. The greatest initial attention must be given to the civil affairs personnel, since there are relatively few on active duty and the Army probably will have to rely on reservist volunteers. The civil affairs troops will play a crucial role in monitoring any emerging tensions and defusing crises in their initial stage. The relatively robust infrastructure that exists in much of South Africa reduces the demand for heavy, space-consuming support engineering units.

The Army naturally requires deployment support from both the Air Force and the Navy. The deployment of both the mechanized and airmobile units will require fast sealift, since weight and/or bulk make each difficult to deploy by air. In addition, the two Marine battalions will be supported throughout primarily by the Navy. Navy Seabees will be employed to expand some of the South African port facilities. Once established in-country, the Army will require only routine supply effort by the other services.
Since the military tasks will be routine, predeployment training will be largely limited to mission orientation and country familiarization. The participating U.S. troops would need to be briefed on the need to be sensitive to the different cultures existing in South Africa. This is especially vital for the Americans going into Natal province, where relations with both the Zulu and Xhosa ethnic groups must be handled carefully. In view of the critical role of, and the need for, the effective use of civil affairs personnel, all civil affairs officers will be extensively briefed on the specific situation in South Africa before they deploy. They would be given great autonomy and would be allowed to operate outside normal chains of command during exceptional circumstances.

**Termination**

The mission will have been accomplished successfully if the ceasefire lasts long enough to facilitate a comprehensive national political settlement. This means that the UN has to suppress all major violence in the country during the negotiations. At the point when a settlement is signed during a period of tranquility, the military would withdraw its forces from the country. A success for the United States in this contingency could spark demands for the military to become more deeply involved in the South African peace process. As such, a South African request for U.S./UN presence in a mission of peace building may follow. Alternatively, should some radical elements fail to abide by the peace agreement, there may be a request for U.S. assistance in counterinsurgency operations. In effect, that would mean a mission of foreign internal defense.

The most profound danger is that U.S. forces will be perceived by one side as favoring its main rival and/or as having lost their neutrality. In such a situation, the U.S. mission could face the prospect of an evolution into a de facto full-blown counterinsurgency operation against a well-armed and dispersed foe with combat experience. If this were to happen, the result could be a hasty U.S. withdrawal.

There is a high risk of mission evolution in this scenario. One path toward mission evolution could be triggered by a general turn against the UN operation by the populace at the "street level." Another path toward mission evolution could stem from the unwelcome discovery by the U.S. command in South Africa that the non-
U.S. elements of UNISAF are far less militarily capable than expected, leading the United States to take on a greater role in the operations. But the most worrisome cluster of potential developments that could drive an evolution of the mission revolves around the possibility of one or more combatants in the South African civil war turning against the UN presence and working actively to force it to leave. In such a case, the mission could evolve to one of peace enforcement (organized).

Should the mission evolve to a full-blown peace enforcement mission in South Africa, the United States probably would need to deploy 4–5 additional light infantry battalions, a mechanized infantry brigade, 1–2 tactical fighter wing equivalents, a Ranger battalion, several additional companies of civil affairs and special forces troops, and 2–3 additional attack helicopter battalions. These new combat deployments would require an associated buildup in support forces. More ground transportation, heavy support engineer, ordnance, quartermaster, and maintenance units would be required. Needless to say, a large portion of the readily available U.S. strategic airlift and sealift assets would be tied down in transporting and sustaining this force for the length of the counterinsurgency campaign. Deployments of this magnitude would draw down the available U.S. conventional force structure, making it more difficult for the United States to respond quickly to regional crises in other parts of the world and perhaps even threatening U.S. capabilities in an MRC elsewhere. Any substantial peace enforcement operations in South Africa probably would result in high U.S. casualties, which could touch off a bitterly divisive domestic political debate over U.S. foreign policy in general.

Besides creating a potentially difficult operation to extricate the U.S. forces from a failed operation, an early withdrawal would damage not only U.S. but also UN credibility in the entire region. Finally, in case of failure of the mission, the ongoing UN efforts to restore political stability to Mozambique, Angola, and Namibia also might begin to unravel. Moreover, an unsuccessful intervention in South Africa probably would lead to a lengthy and indecisive period of strife in the country and would make the development of a democratic South Africa a distant option.
PEACEKEEPING/PEACE ENFORCEMENT IN MACEDONIA

This case study illustrates the potential U.S. role as part of a UN-sponsored, NATO-administered operation designed to counter the further spread of the Yugoslav succession war. The scenario is noteworthy in that it builds upon current U.S. commitments in the area and looks at the issue of a U.S. response if the current policy of deterrence fails. The scenario demonstrates the difficulty of dealing with the spillover of conflict among new states. As such, the study has a much wider applicability in Europe and in Asia.

Background

This scenario looks at the consequences to Macedonia of the potential outbreak of ethnically based strife in Kosovo (a Serbian province) between ethnic Albanians and Serbs. Kosovo is almost entirely populated by ethnic Albanians, and it is controlled by Serbian authorities through officially sponsored repression and intimidation. By most accounts, Kosovo is a powderkeg, waiting only for a spark to set it off. Serbian ultranationalist paramilitaries (led by accused war criminals) operate in the province, and they periodically threaten to "ethnically cleanse" the area. Macedonia, a new state that has had trouble acquiring international recognition (and facing a measure of hostility from all of its neighbors), has a substantial ethnic Albanian population, concentrated near the Kosovo and Albanian borders. There are uneasy relations between the ethnic Albanians and the Slavic-speaking population in Macedonia. Although they view each other warily, both are currently more concerned about Serbia.

Any ethnically based conflict in Kosovo would be difficult to contain just to the province. The Albanian government has proclaimed openly that Albania would not stand still and watch while the ethnic Albanians were subjected to an ethnic cleansing policy. Ethnic Albanian leaders in Macedonia have made similar statements. The connections between the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia are especially close. Up until a few years ago, there was no state border between Kosovo and Macedonia, and the ethnic Albanians on both sides of the border are linked by many family and clan ties.
International concern over the possibility of Serbian aggression against Macedonia has led to the deployment of a UN protection force (UNPROFOR) to Macedonia. The protection force includes a contingent of U.S. Army troops. The troops are stationed on the Macedonian border with Serbia and Albania. U.S. concern over the possibility of a crackdown on the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo has led Presidents Bush and Clinton both to issue warnings to Serbia.

This scenario hypothesizes that, following the stabilization of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and a continued uneasy truce between Croatia and Serbia, a Serbian terror/settler campaign in Kosovo leads to open fighting. The fighting spreads to a border war between Albanian and Serbian units. The fighting also spreads to northwestern Macedonia, where thousands of ethnic Albanian refugees from Kosovo seek shelter. In addition, since the Serbs succeed in cutting off supply routes to Kosovo from Albania, northwestern Macedonia becomes the only available ground route through which aid can reach Kosovo. In an attempt to cut off the aid, Serbian armed units widely ignore the Serbian (Kosovo)-Macedonian border. Serbian paramilitaries carry out "punitive" raids on ethnic Albanian villages and refugee camps on the Macedonian side of the border, while regular Serbian army units pursue groups of Albanians into Macedonian territory. The Macedonian government, distrustful of the ethnic Albanians and fearful of Serbian designs, is paralyzed. The infant Macedonian military is ineffective in controlling northwestern Macedonia. There are signs of a looming larger Balkan war, as all of Macedonia's neighbors jockey for position.

The UNPROFOR troops in Macedonia, including a U.S. contingent, suddenly find that they are in a war zone and they take casualties. Amidst sporadic fighting, ambushes, intermittent shelling, and raids along the Serbian (Kosovo)-Macedonian border and among fears that a general Balkan war is about to break out, the UN Security Council (with Russia abstaining) responds to the Macedonian government's request and authorizes the strengthening of the UNPROFOR forces in Macedonia and gives them limited enforcement powers. Although the Greek government declares that it does not support the operation, the UN authorizes NATO to act as the regional organization in charge of the undertaking.
The scenario has a moderate to high possibility of occurrence during the next five years. Probability of strife in Kosovo becomes greater as the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and along the Serb-Croat border decrease in intensity or settle to uneasy cease-fires. All the important elements of the scenario are already in place, with only the spark missing.

The U.S. Decision

The main U.S. interest is the strategic concern to limit further Serbian aggression and prevent a regional war that could easily lead to the unraveling of NATO. A lengthy and indecisive conflict in Macedonia would most likely lead to a regional war that would also involve Serbia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey, with the latter two on opposite sides. If fighting between Greece and Turkey were to erupt, the war could mean the end of NATO in its present form. Because NATO forms the basis for a U.S. presence in Europe and because it is among the most important, if not the most important, U.S. alliance commitments, the United States would go to great lengths to keep the alliance from unraveling. In addition, a regional war of Balkan dimensions could possibly further stimulate the growth of ultranationalist forces in Russia, while the refugee flows would cause further social and political problems in western Europe. The strong U.S. presence among the UNPROFOR forces in Macedonia is a recognition of the importance of preventing the spread of fighting to Macedonia. The unilateral U.S. warnings to Serbia against launching an ethnic cleansing policy in Kosovo also should be seen in the light of preventing the spillover into Macedonia.

The Mission

The mission, as explained by the U.S. President, has the goal of upholding Macedonian sovereignty, especially in the northwestern part of the country, and preventing foreign encroachments into Macedonia. Subject to modification, this operation would have a two-year limit set on its duration. The reasoning behind the time limit is that two years should be enough time for Macedonia to build up its own capability to control its territory against armed incursions. Subject to
parallel efforts, either by the United States or by proxy (Turkey), to build up the Macedonian military, the time limit should have no easily discernible and direct effect on the conduct of operations by NATO forces.

Besides the United States, the major NATO countries (except for Germany) would take a prominent role. A Turkish, Greek, German, and perhaps Italian role would not be advisable. France and Britain each would send two battalions. Spain and Netherlands each would send one battalion. Sweden and Finland each would provide a reinforced company. Poland (and perhaps Slovakia and the Czech Republic) might offer a mountain battalion, and these countries could play a useful role because of their Slavic linguistic background, but the Poles’ participation would be problematic because of communications and interoperability problems. Russia may take an informally pro-Serbian role. Indeed, U.S.-Russian tensions over the intervention may rise and lead to heated exchanges at the United Nations. U.S.-Greek relations also may become tense.

NATO Southern Command coordinates the action. Troops are flown into Macedonia through Albanian airspace with Albanian concurrence. Some equipment and supplies are flown in, but most materiel is delivered overland using routes through Bulgaria, Albania, and (to the extent the Greeks will allow) Greece. A total of about 7,500 combat troops and an additional 7,500 support forces deploy to Macedonia. In addition, some 2,000 troops are assigned to operate and improve the supply route through Albania and 1,000 to operate the route through Greece. The headquarters of the operation is established in Skopje, with a U.S. Army officer in command.

The mission requires logistics support to allow for extensive operations by a force equivalent to three brigades (of which one is a U.S. brigade). At least a part of the troops deployed should have extensive airborne capabilities. Since this is a NATO operation, English language is used throughout the intervention. Swedish and Finnish troops are not a problem on this point. Interaction with Macedonian police, military, and government officials will necessitate substantial linguistic skills; fluency in Macedonian will be needed (though Bulgarian and/or Serbo-Croat proficiency would suffice in most cases). Albanian language skills would be useful in dealing with the local and refugee population in northwestern Macedonia. Serbo-Croat and
Albanian linguistic capabilities would be needed in actual operations. In terms of special combat training, units trained in mountain warfare would have an advantage.

The concept of operations involves establishing battalion-strength NATO forces in sectors adjacent to the Macedonian border with Serbia and Albania. The main focus of operations would be on the Macedonian-Serbian (Kosovo) border; a lesser presence would be established on the Macedonia-Albania border and the Macedonia-Serbia border proper. The units would aggressively patrol the border area and perform surveillance and interdiction of any armed group movements across the border. Any armed groups would be stopped, disarmed, and turned over to the Macedonian legal authorities. Anyone firing upon the NATO forces would be considered hostile; all necessary force would be used to suppress such opposition.

The logistics concept for this operation will be very complicated. Macedonia is land-locked, with poor land lines of communications other than into Greece. It is expected that Greece will reluctantly allow the use of Salonika for supply of the NATO force but would likely insist on control of the cargo to ensure that supplies are not being brought in for the Macedonian economy. Since Greece could close this route at any time, full reliance on it would not be prudent. Hence, NATO will also open a supply route through the Albanian port of Durres and will assign a military engineer battalion as well as contract resources to improving the rail and road link into Macedonia. Some material will continue to be shipped on the circuitous rail route through Bulgaria to keep that open as well.

In addition to having permission to fire in self-defense, units also will be authorized to stop, search, and interrogate anyone suspected of armed activity. Anyone entering Macedonia from Kosovo would be liable to be stopped and interrogated. Anyone attempting to escape being searched or refusing to stop may be considered hostile and may be fired upon. The decision will rest with the immediate commander on the ground. Any groups or individuals offering resistance will be suppressed and/or pursued if necessary.

Highest priority would be on airborne forces with some mountain warfare training. Mountain-trained light infantry with attached lift would probably be the force of choice, but some armor and artillery
support will be necessary. A Ranger detachment for reaction forces and special missions would be desirable. An engineer battalion would be needed to upgrade the route through Albania, but it would require no specialized training. Some communications support to other national detachments can be expected.

Considerable airlift support will be required for the initial deployment. Given the long distances and tenuous nature of the land lines of communications, the U.S. Air Force will need to commit lift over the long term for critical items of resupply and be prepared to resupply the force entirely by air if events happen to affect all supply routes simultaneously. There is a lack of airports in Macedonia, which complicates the supply problem. In addition, substantial coordination from air traffic controllers would be required. A special problem with logistics would arise in the winter, when the communication lines through Albania would be almost impassable. To deal with the eventuality of the Serbs massing forces on the border with Macedonia, a substantial standby air capability (based in Italy) will be required. There should be no requirement for support by the U.S. Navy beyond the force that is normally committed to the Mediterranean.

In terms of predeployment training, familiarity with mountain warfare and operations in mountainous and forested areas will be important. If the intervention were to take place during the winter, substantial preparation for alpine ice and snow conditions would be necessary. Linguistic training in Serbo-Croat and in Albanian will be sorely needed. Familiarity with the basic elements of the Yugoslav breakup and the pattern of Serbian military actions since 1991, including the use of paramilitaries, would be useful for officers at all levels of the chain of command. The intervening forces will have to have the support capabilities to operate in a mountainous-forested area that has poor or nonexistent communications infrastructure. The presence of NATO personnel who had served with the UN forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina and have direct experience with observing Serb units would be useful.

Termination

A reduction in the level of violent incidents in northwestern Macedonia carried out against the ethnic Albanians by Serbs and the
elimination of uncontrolled border crossings between Kosovo and Macedonia would be the best indicators of success on the ground. Maintenance of Macedonian sovereignty and the prevention of the spread of the conflict in Kosovo to Macedonia (and the potential eruption of a regional war over Macedonia) would be the indication of success at the political level. If the original mission is successful, there may be considerable pressure to expand the scope of the operations to Albania (i.e., to control the fighting on Albanian-Serbian border). In addition, once the original intervention is successful, there may be pressure to use some of the forces deployed in Macedonia for any potential humanitarian operations in Kosovo.

The causes of early termination fall into four general categories: Serb-induced, Albanian-induced, Macedonian-induced, and a result of international pressures. Regarding Serb-induced measures, the Serb response to the intervention may be to up the ante and target the UN troops. Regarding Albanian-induced measures, some Albanian groups may decide to harass the UN forces (and blame the Serbs for it) to deepen the UN involvement. Also, if the UN forces do interdict arms and ammunition from reaching the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo through Macedonia, then they will provoke the ire of ethnic Albanians, who will see them as taking a pro-Serb position. Regarding Macedonian-induced measures, it is far from a given that a Macedonian government will remain steadfast in its anti-Serb attitudes if there is fighting against the ethnic Albanians. Indeed, the Slavic-dominated Macedonian government is suspicious of its ethnic Albanian population, it may be alarmed at the influx of ethnic Albanian refugees into Macedonia, and it may strike an anti-Albanian deal with the Serbs. In such a case, the Macedonian government would ask the UN troops to leave Macedonia. Finally, the survival of Macedonia as a sovereign state is far from given. Should the state begin to collapse and should it become divided (peacefully or not) among Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Albania, the UN forces would be in limbo. If the intervening forces face either a Serb escalation of effort or a sudden breakout of a regional war over Macedonia, they need to have sufficient air assets on hand (in bases in Italy) to allow them either to defeat the Serb efforts or to protect themselves while they are extricated from Macedonia.

The mission could easily evolve to one of peace enforcement (organized actors). Should the Serbian government treat the inter-
vention as a hostile move aimed against Serbia, and if it ordered Serb forces to increase the pressure on the intervening troops, de facto the mission would change. The situation would resemble more a border war between UN forces and Serb units. The mission also could evolve to one of peace enforcement (anarchy) or to foreign internal defense. Regarding the first option, the weakness of the Macedonian central government combined with the massive influx of refugees and a breakdown of local government could lead to the local clans in northwestern Macedonia taking over a direct role in running the area. While the clans probably will unify in the face of Serb aggression, the chaos may also allow the various clans to try to settle old scores with each other. The resulting situation would be akin to one of anarchy. UN troops then would be faced with considerable armed strife all around them. Regarding the second option, the mission could shift to U.S. support for Macedonian internal defense. As the Macedonian military takes on the tasks of ensuring the country’s sovereignty, U.S. advice and support may be needed to make it effective.

Besides the evolution of the mission to a conflict against Serbia, the uncertain future of Macedonia presents a number of potential paths to an interstate conflict. Several of Macedonia’s neighbors have not recognized the country and pursue policies that aim to subvert its future. Should Macedonia show signs of a collapse, Greece and Serbia probably would come to an agreement on its partition. Albania also could be involved in claiming the ethnic Albanian-inhabited western Macedonia. Bulgarian ultranationalists would like to see the incorporation of all of Macedonia into a greater Bulgaria. Turkey supports Macedonia, most of all because it sees Macedonia as a potential ally against Greece and Serbia. All the intricate regional rivalries probably would lead to an armed conflict if Macedonia were seen as “up for grabs.”

Early termination probably would entail the collapse of Macedonia as a sovereign state. Such a collapse probably would develop into a regional war, as the various neighbors would try to seize parts of Macedonia. One of the potential consequences of a failure to successfully carry out the intervention would be the complete discrediting of collective security arrangements and a remilitarization by the countries in the Balkans. In retrospect, it probably will have been seen that a failed intervention was a marginally worse course of ac-
tion than no intervention at all. The potential negative consequences could be as serious as the unraveling of NATO in its present form (as the institution would be shown to be incapable of dealing with post-Cold War conflicts) and perhaps an open conflict between Greece and Turkey.

HUMANITARIAN RELIEF AND PEACEKEEPING IN VENEZUELA

This case study illustrates the potential U.S. role in an OAS-sponsored mission of humanitarian relief with elements of peace enforcement (anarchy) in hypothesized conditions of post-coup political, economic, and social unrest in Venezuela. This case study is noteworthy because it focuses on a situation that is endemic to most of the countries in the Caribbean basin. As such, the case study has regional applicability.

Background

This scenario looks at the potential aftermath of another failed coup in Venezuela. It hypothesizes some developments based on the course of events that followed an attempted coup in Venezuela in 1992, as well as unrest in 1989. In 1992, widespread unrest, including riots, strikes, and other coup attempts, followed the initial attempt. Both recent outbreaks of unrest point to deep dissatisfaction that appears to be rooted in diverse elements, including inflation, poverty, economic disparity, social policy, corruption, and government indifference. Historically, the Venezuelan military has not been politically neutral, and the 1992 coup attempt was an effort to reestablish its traditional role as a locus of political power. The persistence of underlying causes of earlier strife, combined with the currently badly splintered parliament and a government led by an elderly politician point to continuing problems.

This scenario hypothesizes that, amidst the deteriorating economic conditions in Venezuela and the growth of political radicalism, key Venezuelan military leaders again decide to intervene to stabilize the situation. The coup attempt, substantially larger than the 1992 effort, is neither successful nor completely rebuffed. The lack of a clear resolution to the conflict triggers widespread civil unrest that neither
the government nor the coup leaders are able to put down. Rioting breaks out in the major cities, disrupting transportation links, public services, and economic activity in general. Some local authorities renounce loyalty to the federal government and usurp federal powers. Populist groups, unions, and students make various attempts to seize key industrial centers, including the oil production facilities.

With a stalemate developing after two months of intermittent fighting and unrest, and with growing dismay at the deterioration of social conditions, the neutral and key loyal legislators threaten to support the coup unless the government agrees to a cease-fire and a joint request with the coup leaders for outside assistance in restoring order. After some bickering, both the coup leaders and the government of Venezuela agree to a cease-fire and jointly appeal to the Organization of American States for help in resuming basic services and providing humanitarian assistance.

As it has on many other occasions, the OAS dispatches an unarmed observer force to Venezuela upon the commencement of hostilities. The OAS consultations are paralleled by convocation of the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), an organization that, while part of the OAS budget, functions independently of the OAS and its suborganizations. As a result of the hemispheric nature of the crisis and the Venezuelan government’s appeal for assistance, the OAS in conjunction with the IADB moves quickly to provide military assistance under a joint intervention agreement. The intervention, sanctioned by the OAS and executed under the authority of the IADB, has at its core the extension of basic OAS peacekeeping principles. That is, the purpose of the intervention is to provide humanitarian relief while remaining neutral in the larger conflict between the coup leaders and the government. The distinction between the Venezuelan intervention and previous OAS peacekeeping missions lies in the execution of the operation through the IADB, and the clear authorization of the mission to use force to protect itself.

The United States chooses to initiate the response through the OAS rather than the United Nations for several reasons. First, OAS-led assistance helps confine the crisis to the Western hemisphere, an outcome a UN-based intervention does not accomplish. Second, OAS-led intervention helps isolate the crisis from other ongoing world tensions and from the UN’s slow, and often indeterminate,
efforts to resolve such matters. Third, OAS-based assistance keeps resolution of the crisis firmly grounded in an institution where the U.S. role is dominant, not only through the U.S. influence in the OAS, but by virtue of the permanent U.S. leadership of the IADB.

The intervention decision meets with markedly little disapproval. Motivated by their reliance on concessional oil sales from Venezuela and hoping that a quick resolution of the crisis will lead to the resumption of exports, Venezuela's immediate neighbors and the smaller Caribbean and Central American states approve the OAS decision. In addition, they fear the longer-term consequences of the Venezuelan strife and think that an example of a successful coup in Venezuela might encourage similar insurrections among their own military forces.

Another stronger (than in 1992) coup attempt has a low to moderate probability of occurring through 1998, with the greatest danger in latter 1998 and through 1999 (end of the current and the beginning of the new government's term). The probability then decreases until the subsequent election cycle. Elections are likely to be a turning point, not only because they tend to emphasize the failures of the current government, but because the new government may take dramatic actions that worsen the situation. The scenario could also unfold in the event that the current president dies before his term is complete, not an unlikely occurrence given that his present age is 78.

Although the United States has a history of unilateral interventions in Latin America, U.S. troops have not intervened in Venezuela. As such, there is no specific anti-U.S. animosity in Venezuela based on prior experience. The lack of animosity may contribute to an expectation of fewer problems.

The U.S. Decision

Venezuela is an important U.S. strategic partner. Venezuela's role as a guarantor of regional security is a status that the United States has augmented through sales of military equipment, including F-16 aircraft. Venezuela provides stability in Central America and the Andean region through concessional oil sales and through its efforts to mediate regional conflicts. As one of Latin America's most prosperous economies and a country with a history of democratic govern-
ments, Venezuela also serves as an important example for the developing and democratizing countries in this region. Additionally, the United States has a strong economic interest in Venezuela. The United States purchases about 8 percent of its oil imports from Venezuela, which amounts to more than 50 percent of Venezuelan oil exports. The United States would be concerned by any threat of unrest spreading to the Venezuelan oil fields and threatening disruptions in production.

The Mission

The mission, as explained by the U.S. President, has the goal to provide humanitarian relief to Venezuelan urban and industrial centers and to assist in reestablishing civic order. The participating forces would provide logistics and noncombat support to international relief agencies. Additionally, the OAS contingent will provide logistics and noncombat support to neutral Venezuelan security forces, whose responsibilities include restoring civic order and protecting potential assets and targets, such as oil fields and industrial installations. This operation would have an expected duration of six to eight months, and it would not last more than a year. By that time, the parties to the conflict in Venezuela would be expected to come to an agreement and the rationale for the foreign forces would disappear. A specific time limit, communicated openly prior to the intervention, would not be advisable because it could act as a disincentive to the negotiations among the rebel and loyalist forces in Venezuela.

The ideal makeup of the intervention force would consist of the major countries in the Western Hemisphere, thus limiting the U.S. role and visibility. The major contributors to the contingency might include Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, and Costa Rica. For different reasons, neither Colombia nor Mexico would participate. A Canadian might be a good candidate to be in charge of the intervention forces. The intervening forces are inserted in several Venezuelan urban settings and in the oil-producing region.

The main requirement of the Venezuelan government is reinforcement of its security forces to help it restore order. Hence, the intervention forces need to be local security and police forces rather than large or heavy combat forces. To the maximum extent feasible, these forces should be Spanish speaking. Their main concern will be to
increase security without arousing animosity. Extensive logistics, transport, and communications assistance will be necessary. Much of this must come from the United States and/or Canada but will be provided as unobtrusively as possible to avoid the impression that the operation is being controlled by the United States. Altogether, the total U.S. Army commitment to the operation would consist of a force equivalent to two battalions.

The OAS forces assigned will supplement the Venezuelan security forces, but they will avoid any appearance of supplanting them. Hence, the OAS forces will concentrate on the security of fixed sites and on border patrol, letting the Venezuelan forces thus relieved accomplish the more visible activities of restoring order and services in urban areas. The OAS security forces will have Venezuelan liaison available at all times to conduct negotiations or to provide a government cover for OAS actions. Transportation and technical support for the restoration of services will be provided by civilian employees or contractors with military personnel used only in emergencies.

The OAS forces may use deadly force only to protect themselves from serious bodily harm. Lesser means of force such as riot batons may be used when necessary to accomplish their security mission. Venezuelan forces will operate under their own rules but will be encouraged to follow the OAS example.

Since the primary mission is the restoration of calm and order in Venezuelan territory, all actions will at least appear to be coordinated with both of the main combatants in Venezuela. The OAS will establish a coordination cell in Caracas to coordinate military and civilian activities, and subordinate cells may be established in other locations as appropriate. These cells will be clearly identified as coordination mechanisms to avoid the appearance of outside control. Intervening military units will have liaison officers in charge of coordinating their actions with local authorities but will remain under national command.

The highest-priority U.S. Army units for this operation will be helicopter transport and communications units. Since U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) possesses only a limited number of such assets, the Army will have to work with USACOM to select units from CONUS for the operation. There will also be a need for individuals
with a Latin American background (Venezuelan to the extent possible) for liaison and other missions.

The relative proximity of Venezuela and the limited commitment of U.S. assets limits the requirement for other service support. Deployment support from the Air Force will be necessary, and supply within the country may require the assignment of a few C-130 airlift aircraft. Naval and Marine Corps support will be limited to that required in the event of an emergency evacuation.

There will be a limited requirement for predeployment training, and that training will concentrate on the background of the conflict and cultural sensitivities. This operation will require little in the way of special capabilities. The missions to be performed will be routine, and there is no shortage of Spanish-language capability within the U.S. Army.

**Termination**

The mission will have been accomplished successfully if (a) basic services, including water, electricity, banking, and schools resume functioning; (b) Venezuelan authorities take over full responsibility for maintaining civil order (this assumes some form of resolution of the conflict between government and coup leaders); (c) Venezuelan authorities recognize that foreign assistance is no longer needed. There may be some temptation to proceed to a peace-building mission in the aftermath of an agreement between the loyalist and rebel Venezuelan forces.

The most likely developments causing early termination are linked to the political situation in Venezuela. Another successful coup might lead to early termination, since the new government probably would request that the foreign troops leave. Presumably, the joint request for foreign assistance will imply a consensus among the loyalist and rebel forces not to let the situation worsen, but the consensus will be liable to break down. A worsening of unrest, progressing toward civil war, that poses a threat to the security of contingent forces (but falling short of coup) might force an early termination.

A breakdown in the consensus between the loyalists and rebels in Venezuela could lead to the intervening forces being caught amidst
open combat and forcing either an evolution of the mission toward peacekeeping/peace enforcement or peace enforcement (anarchy) or a withdrawal. One path that may lead to mission evolution stems from deliberate attacks by parts of either loyalist or rebel forces upon the intervening troops in an attempt to force their withdrawal. The foreign forces engaged in protection of fixed sites, such as oil production facilities, may be especially vulnerable to ambushes. The rationale for such an action could stem from dissatisfaction with the progress in negotiations. Besides a deliberate targeting of the intervening troops, there is also the potential for their being caught inadvertently in a cross fire, stemming, for example, from another coup attempt and a flareup into perhaps brief but intense fighting.

If the loyalist-rebel negotiations do not produce a solution and the conflict becomes prolonged, social and economic infrastructure may deteriorate to the point where the initially ad hoc gangs become organized into (intrastate) regional alliances, power centers, and command organizations. Should an organization of such a type become dissatisfied with the foreign presence and request the departure of the intervening troops from the territory it controls, the whole mission might be placed in jeopardy.

Early termination would probably signal transfer of control from civilian authorities to a military junta. This could lead to the emergence of a situation where international pressure fails to reverse a coup and where an international embargo worsens conditions for noncombatants (essentially a situation similar to what happened in Haiti). Such an event would mark the first major reversal of democratization trends among the major Latin American countries.
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