U.S.–West European Cooperation in Out-of-Area Military Operations
Problems and Prospects

Richard L. Kugler

National Defense Research Institute • RAND
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Richard L. Kugler

National Defense Research Institute • RAND

Prepared for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

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During the Cold War, the United States and its West European allies focused their military planning on defense of NATO's borders. The arrival of the "out-of-area era," an era in which military intervention may be required outside the alliance area, confronts these nations with new and troublesome questions: Under what circumstances will Western interests dictate military intervention in crises outside the alliance area? To what degree will the United States and its allies be able to cooperate together when military force is required? How can political cooperation among these nations best be nourished? Now that downsizing is under way, will U.S. and West European military forces be adequate to the task, and how can their forces be improved to make them better?

Focusing on these and related questions, this study conducts a political-military appraisal of the out-of-area era now rapidly dawning. It analyzes the issues surrounding out-of-area military operations and offers options for making improvements. Its goal is not to prescribe future policies, but rather to illuminate and inform.

This study was prepared at the request of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy). It was conducted during 1992 within the International Security and Defense Strategy Program, a component of RAND's National Defense Research Institute (NDRI). The director of this program is Charles Kelley. NDRI is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff.
The material presented here is intended to be helpful to U.S. government officials who deal with defense policy, alliance planning, military strategy, and force development. It also will be of interest to other analysts interested in these issues. It is hoped that it will help illuminate for all readers the problems and prospects regarding U.S.-West European cooperation for out-of-area missions. The material is current as of fall 1993.
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Out-of-area (OOA) operations are any security operations, large or small, that are conducted outside NATO’s borders on behalf of interests deemed sufficiently important to merit the use of military forces. For example, the Persian Gulf is “out of area,” as are Bosnia, Poland, and all other European nations not members of NATO. Because this term has a definition that grows out of the NATO Treaty, it thus is not limited to events in distant places. Indeed, future OOA operations might be launched in Europe, in NATO’s own backyard.

The OOA challenge already is a key feature of contemporary security affairs. It is being magnified by the fluid multipolar politics, power vacuums, ethnic tensions, and festering regional hotspots that are replacing the bipolar system of the Cold War. Born in the Middle East–Persian Gulf, and still thriving there, the OOA challenge is now migrating to the Balkans and East Central Europe. Exactly what OOA conflicts lie ahead in Europe and peripheral areas is rendered uncertain by the complex changes now occurring. Present trends suggest that they might occur with growing frequency, diversity, and dangerous consequences.

This prospect has important implications for Western security policy. The West’s interests, values, and goals no longer stop at NATO’s borders but are spreading outward in an ever-growing pattern. Even if OOA crises do not threaten NATO territory, they might endanger vital Western interests and prospects for stability, democracy, and peace. Consequently, the United States and its NATO allies could find themselves compelled to intervene in a number of such crises.
The act of launching future OOA operations does not promise to be easy, especially if preparations are not made in advance. OOA crises can take place amid complex political settings and less-than-ideal military conditions. The Persian Gulf War was a successful OOA operation, but it was an outgrowth of a full decade of concerted U.S. defense planning. It required effective coalition policies that can be difficult to re-create at a moment’s notice. The Balkans situation, moreover, shows how an OOA crisis can defy ready solution, and can complicate efforts to forge a coherent response as such a crisis is unfolding. For these reasons, the United States and its West European allies face the need to plan and prepare for future OOA operations that might have to be launched.

BARRIERS TO OOA OPERATIONS

The arrival of the OOA era already has attracted official attention. The United States and key allies continue to stress defense of the Persian Gulf, plans are being developed for the eventuality of expanding peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, and steps are being taken to improve the UN’s capacity for peacekeeping missions. Even so, the Western powers today are not taking energetic efforts to plan and prepare for future major OOA operations in Europe and its periphery. In particular, NATO is moving into the OOA era slowly and without an alliance-wide response. This state of affairs owes to political and military barriers to OOA operations’ being seen as a focal point of alliance defense planning. Many NATO officials perceive a need for greater emphasis on OOA missions, but this view is not yet shared by enough national governments to bring about a major change.

Future OOA operations will be multilateral endeavors. For many, NATO will play a key role. Indeed, owing to its established institutions and combined forces, NATO will be far better able to conduct sophisticated military operations than any other security organization. For many years, the West European Union and the European Community (WEU/EC) will lack military muscle, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) will be too large and cumbersome for security operations. Precisely for these reasons, most West European nations want a WEU/EC security pillar to emerge within the framework of a U.S.–led NATO, and NATO has of-
ferred to become a military arm for CSCE. For OOA operations, however, NATO still relies primarily upon informal ad hoc procedures under Article 4 of the NATO Treaty; it does not employ the formal collective defense mechanisms authorized by Article 5 for border defense. The effect is to limit NATO’s capacity for OOA missions.

Under ad hoc procedures, those NATO nations willing to participate in an OOA operation band together at the time a crisis occurs. Their response is improvised: it neither draws on existing NATO plans nor employs the integrated command. Current practices allow for the use of the more effective formal mechanisms only when alliance-wide consensus exists. But this consensus can be difficult to forge, even during a crisis, and it is far harder to create in advance. Although criticized in many quarters, ad hoc procedures thus continue to rule OOA planning, and NATO remains primarily focused on border defense—a mission of diminishing relevance in today’s setting.

Reliance on ad hoc procedures inhibits the alliance’s ability to plan and prepare for OOA operations in advance. In a stressful crisis, improvisation not only could impair NATO’s ability to forge political consensus on behalf of a coherent policy, it could also bar the way to an effective military response. Recognition that military improvisation is unwise was the reason that NATO embarked upon integrated military planning in 1950 and has continued such planning since then. If integrated planning was deemed necessary for the comparatively simple task of border defense, how can improvised planning be expected to handle the often more difficult task of projecting forces well beyond NATO’s borders?

NATO’s ability to prepare for future OOA crises is also being weakened by the military drawdowns now under way across the alliance, and by the failure of most members to prepare still-existing forces for OOA missions. The United States will retain large forces and lift assets, but its mounting global involvements will place sharp constraints on the availability of forces for most OOA operations in Europe. For this reason and because of the need for burden-sharing, requirements for OOA missions will have to be met by sizable West European contributions.
In Western Europe, however, failure to prepare for the OOA era is especially marked. Most West European nations exited the Cold War with military forces primarily designed for the dominant border defense and coastal protection missions of that conflict. Responsibility for OOA operations—chiefly in the Persian Gulf—was entrusted to the United States. Indeed, German forces were intended to fight only in Germany, and were tied into the civilian infrastructure and reserve mobilization plans to help prevent distant operations. To a lesser but still notable extent, other West European forces were designed for nearby border defense; with money in short supply, they were not given the movable assets to deploy elsewhere.

All West European forces are now undergoing major cutbacks. In the aggregate, forces are being reduced by at least the following amounts: Active ground forces in Central Europe are being reduced by 45 percent; mobilizable ground forces (counting reserves), by 25 percent; air forces, by 25 percent; and naval forces, by 15 percent. The forces that remain will be capable of still-existing border-defense missions, but these missions are being defined mostly in terms of slow-breaking crises that allow for extended periods of mobilization. Most of these forces will not be well-designed for OOA missions.

Indeed, the idea of using West European forces for NATO OOA missions is controversial and, as yet, far from being widely supported. Germany is now willing to use its forces to defend other NATO borders, but commitment of its forces to OOA missions is still limited to UN-sponsored peacekeeping missions. Although German support for other OOA missions is emerging, the process is slow and far from complete. France is more willing, but, until recently, its attitude toward NATO had been standoffish, and its laws constrain the use of conscripts—assigned throughout its posture—for missions outside France against their will. Some other nations have similar legal constraints. Only Britain has a fully professional military and the demonstrated willingness to use it for OOA missions—but only when British interests are directly involved.

Most West European nations have long fielded some forces for OOA missions, and these forces are not being cut. Britain and France have played the most active roles. Indeed, France's Force d'Action Rapide (FFAR) contains fully 5 divisions oriented to missions abroad, but mobility assets are adequate to transport and supply only about 1
division of 9,000 soldiers. As was shown in the Persian Gulf War, France would need to assemble volunteers from many different units to fully populate this 1 division. Britain maintains 3 lightly configured brigades, and has the air and naval assets to project them, but nothing more. The OOA forces of other nations are also small: Most nations have assembled the combat units, support structures, and lift assets only for brigade- and division-sized operations. Taken together, the principal OOA-oriented forces provide a total of about 4 deployable divisions (counting separate brigades), 200 combat aircraft, and associated naval combatants.

These forces are distributed primarily among six different nations, are not designed to operate together, and many are not even assigned to NATO’s integrated command. There is no guarantee that all six nations would agree to commit their forces to any single OOA operation, because all six view OOA operations through the lens of national priorities, and these priorities are far from identical. The ground forces, moreover, are nearly all equipped for light infantry missions and lack sustainability. Assembled primarily for low-intensity combat for brief durations, they are not capable of major operations against powerful opponents for long periods. West European air forces have more impressive capabilities but lack the projectable assets in command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I), logistics support, and modern munitions needed to match the OOA skills of the U.S. Air Force (USAF). The supporting naval forces are mostly designed for coastal defense, not blue-water power projection. Especially lacking is sophisticated air defense. Britain and France have aircraft carriers. But because those carriers are small, they do not provide the interceptors and strike aircraft deployed by U.S. carriers.

In principle, West European active ground forces that are intended for border defense could be used for OOA missions: They have weapons for modern warfare. Resort to such interchanges is, however, constrained by dependence on reserve manpower to fill many slots and to a lack of mobile logistics assets for projection missions. The outer limit is probably defined by the forces earmarked for NATO’s Rapid Reaction Force (NRRF) by nine nations: about 8 division-equivalents, supported by up to 400 combat aircraft. In addition, the newly created Eurocorps provides 2 French divisions and 1 German division that could be assigned to either NATO or the WEU.
Although the NRRF has been created to help build an organized multinational capability for quick reaction, the original intent was alliance-wide border defense, and the idea of using it for OOA missions does not yet enjoy widespread support. Also, NRRF forces have not yet been welded into a cohesive whole. Led by British forces, but also including units from the United States and eight other West European nations, the NRRF today offers a “menu” from which forces can be selected à la carte, but not a unified posture.

Because it is composed of enough ground divisions to form a field army but only enough support forces to deploy a single corps, the NRRF is a force for only one contingency. Moreover, these ground forces have not been designed for projection missions. Many lack the C³I systems, mobile logistics, war reserve stocks, and lift assets needed to deploy them abroad and to allow them to wage intense combat for long durations. Similar constraints apply to the corps. The effect is to make actual West European forces for OOA missions less than are suggested by surface appearances.

ASSESSING MOUNTABLE RESPONSE

Because these constraints do not imply that NATO will be militarily impotent in the face of an OOA crisis, the issue is one of assessing the magnitude of the response that will be mountable in the years ahead. Owing primarily to U.S. military strength, the Western nations will remain capable of defending the Persian Gulf. The central question is: How many forces will be available for OOA missions in Europe, assuming deterrence and defense in the Gulf must be concurrently maintained? Any attempt to answer this question is subject to a plethora of uncertainties, not only about governmental commitments but also about physical constraints on power projection. But, in general, the answer is that, owing to the status of West European forces and lift assets, only a relatively modest response could be mounted with any haste.

If an OOA force was assembled drawing from U.S. forces based in Europe (or dual-based in CONUS) and from deployable British, French, and German forces, total available assets could amount to about 7 divisions, 400 combat aircraft, and associated naval combatants. The number would be somewhat larger if other nations contribute, but also smaller if one or more of the four principal nations
desists. Deployment of air and naval assets could be accomplished quickly; that of ground forces would take far longer, especially if heavy ground forces had to be moved by any means other than rail transport. Although light ground forces can be moved by air, sealift is needed to move large numbers of heavy ground forces, and Western Europe has no organized military sealift force. Nor have European rail assets been organized for force projection beyond NATO borders. Even with U.S. help, the process could take several weeks or more, depending on the amount of force, the distance, and reception facilities.

Taking all these constraints into account, the bottom line is that enough multinational forces will be available to perform a sizable peacekeeping mission or limited forms of peacemaking and peace enforcement requiring modest combat missions. NATO's capacity to engage in OOA missions requiring major warfighting operations, however, might fall short of adequacy, especially for quick-breaking emergencies: NATO's forces might not be quickly deployable, might not be sustainable for lengthy periods, and, depending on their composition, they might not be fully effective against a powerful opponent.

RISKS FOR OOA MISSIONS

Even assuming available forces are promptly deployed and fight effectively, another risk is that an OOA mission might necessitate larger forces, or that more than one OOA operation might be required. In particular, NATO could be hard-pressed to wage even a small war if such a conflict erupted in the midst of a major peacekeeping operation (or several small ones) and ongoing tension in the Persian Gulf. Whether these stressful conditions will actually emerge is impossible to know, but they are far from implausible in the turbulent era ahead. Indeed, they are the kind of conditions that occupy the attention of prudent military planning.

Beyond these constraints on crisis response, there is the additional risk that NATO's ability to perform demanding OOA operations will lack credibility in peacetime. One of the most important functions of a power-projection capability is to reassure friends and deter adversaries in regions beyond NATO's borders. Especially if potential adversaries abound, reassurance of friends can be needed not only to
protect NATO’s geostrategic interests but also to encourage democracy and free enterprise in nations undergoing reform. In the absence of security, these reforms could be hard-pressed to succeed. Moreover, it is possible that, along with the EC’s expansion, NATO might extend membership to some countries in these regions (e.g., Poland). The “Partnership for Peace” proposal, unveiled in October 1993, points to growing NATO collaboration with nations in East Central Europe and, possibly, their eventual membership in NATO. If NATO lacks adequate projection forces, it will not be able to help defend those nations, even if they are granted membership status. Even if NATO is not expanded, the lack of reassurance and deterrence can contribute to various forms of instability in Europe and surrounding areas: nationalist policies, self-serving security agendas, competitive rivalries, and proliferation. Western goals can be pursued through a variety of instruments. However, reassurance and deterrence cannot be accomplished in the absence of credible military power.

MEASURES TO IMPROVE NATO’S CAPACITY FOR OOA MISSIONS

If NATO is to become better able to project security and military power beyond its borders under Article 4, it will need to develop an improved capacity to conduct OOA operations. To achieve this goal, a combination of political and military steps will be required. Political measures are needed to strengthen cooperation within NATO for such operations, and military measures are needed to upgrade NATO’s forces. Outlined below is a composite package of measures that could be begun immediately and then be pursued over a period of years. These measures are illustrative: Others could be selected. The point is that a coordinated program designed to propel NATO into the OOA era will be required.

An Activist Agenda

Will NATO be able to marshall the resolve to embrace any activist agenda? NATO can be reformed only if member nations are willing. At the moment, most NATO governments are inward-looking and hesitant. But over the long term, the interests of NATO nations seem destined to expand outward in ways that will compel these nations to
extend their security horizons and to address potential dangers. At issue is whether, in today’s ambiguous environment, support for a new security agenda will grow fast enough to enable NATO to be prepared for the future when it arrives. With the pace of change accelerating in Europe and signs of turbulence growing, many West European foreign and defense ministries are becoming more willing to realign NATO. But support is not yet strong outside these ministries. The political foundation for change, nevertheless, is emerging. The outcome will depend largely on how the United States exerts leadership.

A Strategic Policy

Above all, NATO needs a strategic policy that illuminates the growing importance of regions beyond its borders and the importance of being able to project military force there. This policy needs to spell out not only NATO’s geostrategic interests but also its values and visions for each region. Otherwise, future OOA operations will remain hostage to a multitude of political factors that will inhibit NATO’s ability to mount a credible response. In particular, NATO nations view OOA operations solely from the perspective of their national interests and narrow horizons, a perspective that will inhibit their ability to shape the coherent strategy, cooperative policies, and combined forces needed to mount successful OOA operations. A visionary strategic policy will not eliminate all these political barriers, but it can reduce them—perhaps enough to allow NATO nations to adopt a common stance toward many OOA challenges.

For this reason, a case can be made for replacing, or at least updating, NATO’s current strategic concept, adopted at the 1991 Rome Summit, which reaffirms the primacy of border defense. Although it calls attention to the importance of outlying regions, it does not spell out a clear agenda for action in the realm of defense policy. As a result, it leaves NATO suspended between an old, eroding mission and the military demands of the new era, perhaps dooming NATO to a future of declining relevancy and dissolving internal bonds. Indeed, a worrisome risk is that if NATO does not go out of area, it will go out of business, and Europe’s stability will suffer all the more. A new or revised strategic concept thus not only could better prepare NATO for the future, but it could also give it a new lease on life.
A Transatlantic Bargain

Required also is the forging of a new OOA-oriented transatlantic bargain that assigns constructive roles for NATO's dominant powers within the framework of partnership and fair burden-sharing. This bargain needs to provide room for the United States to lead and for Britain, France, and Germany to exert influence that reflects their own weighty contributions and future visions. It must preserve the special relationship between the United States and Britain, repair the recent damage to U.S.-French relations, and encourage Germany to assert itself in European security affairs. While preserving NATO's vitality, it must encourage a European security identity, because the primary risk today is not that the WEU/EC will supplant NATO, but that Western Europe will drift into self-involvement and impotence. The new bargain also must transcend any slide into regional-based specialization that inevitably would produce paralysis and fracture NATO's unity. Just as the United States cannot expect the West Europeans alone to handle East Central Europe and the Balkans, the West Europeans cannot expect the United States alone to carry the load in the Persian Gulf. The outcome of a new bargain should be a strong capacity among NATO's leading nations to work together in both regions.

Formal Military Plans

NATO's nations also need to intensify planning for future OOA operations. This goal could best be achieved by preparing formal military plans under the direction of NATO's integrated command. If this step proves infeasible, a halfway solution is to prepare informal plans. That is, NATO would conduct a normal planning effort to identify contingencies, campaign strategies, force requirements, and program priorities. Alliance members would make no formal commitments, but they would provide a broad indication of likely participation. NATO thus would be given a reasonably accurate picture of force availability for each contingency, which would ease the task of mounting a response at the time a crisis occurs.
Institutional Reforms

For the near term (1–2 years), NATO will continue relying on its existing organizational structure and command arrangements. When the existing command system is not suitable for OOA operations, combined joint task forces (CJTFs) probably will be created to enable WEU forces and "coalitions of the willing" to act on their own while employing common NATO assets. Over the long term (5 years and beyond), more fundamental changes may prove necessary. This study offers three measures:

- Create a new "Preventive Diplomacy and Crisis Management Committee" that would develop policy for OOA operations.

- Create a new Allied Command Europe (ACE) Military Command, "Force Projection Command." Composed of separate branches for mobility and/or logistics and operations, it would become responsible for developing the military plans, force requirements, exercise schedules, mobility assets, and improvement measures needed to prepare for OOA missions. In actual OOA crises, it could assume command of NATO's forces if a formal alliance commitment is made and use of another ACE commander in chief or a CJTF is not deemed appropriate. The Force Projection Command thus would be charged with building forces for OOA missions, but also could use them when the situation demands.

- Reorganize and upgrade the NRRF in ways that would strengthen its capacity to conduct these missions. It would be assigned to the Force Projection Command and would include ground, air, and naval component commanders. The guiding concept would be to build not only a cohesive and flexible posture, but also one capable of responding to more than one OOA contingency at a time. The entire NRRF would be composed of 13 active divisions, 680 combat aircraft, and sizable naval assets.

The ground force would be composed of 4 separate multinational corps (including the Eurocorps), each with primary and secondary regional affiliations. Each corps would be led by a nation likely to support these affiliations. All 4 corps would be provided not only 3 combat divisions but also adequate C3I systems and logistics support. They also would be somewhat
modular: The heavy–light mix and the multinational mix could be adjusted to meet the situation. These formations would provide a capacity to project corps-sized forces to all regions, backed by follow-on reinforcements when larger commitments are needed. In essence, the NRRF ground posture would be designed to operate as 4 separate corps, each corps being sent to a different situation, or as 2 separate forces with 2 corps apiece, or as a field army with 3 to 4 corps.

Military Programs to Establish NRRF

The final step toward reforming NATO is to pursue the military programs needed to bring an upgraded NRRF to life. This task does not require the fielding of new forces but, rather, better use of forces that already exist. Combat formations assigned to the NRRF would be brought to high readiness and given robust training in OOA missions. This effort also would include measures to develop the C³I systems, mobile logistics units, and war reserve assets needed for OOA operations. Finally, programs would be launched to improve NATO’s mobility forces, including procurement of additional transport aircraft, creation of a NATO sealift force, organization of rail assets, and related measures. An estimate is that this composite program could be funded through commitment of $5 to $7 billion annually over a decade. This is an upper limit for the entire program; many important initiatives could be undertaken at considerably less cost. With modest re prioritization, most of this program could be accomplished within current budgets.
# ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAW</td>
<td>Anti-air warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACE</td>
<td>Allied Command Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>AD-70</td>
<td>Alliance Defense, 1970</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARRC</td>
<td>ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ground force)</td>
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<td>ASW</td>
<td>Antisubmarine warfare</td>
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<td>ATTU</td>
<td>Atlantic to the Ural</td>
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<td>AWACS</td>
<td>Airborne Warning and Control System</td>
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<td>BAOR</td>
<td>British Army of the Rhine</td>
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<tr>
<td>C³I</td>
<td>Command, control, communications, and intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDI</td>
<td>Conventional Defense Initiative</td>
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<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFE</td>
<td>Conventional Forces in Europe; Conventional Forces, Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCCHAN</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Channel</td>
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<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Combined joint task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRAF</td>
<td>Civil Reserve Air Fleet</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CS/CSS</td>
<td>Combat support and/or combat service support</td>
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<tr>
<td>CVBG</td>
<td>Carrier Battle Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMZ</td>
<td>Demilitarized zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERM</td>
<td>Exchange Rate Mechanism (EC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td><em>Frei Demokratische Partei</em> (Germany)</td>
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<td>FFAR</td>
<td>French <em>Force d'Action Rapide</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>FIR</td>
<td>Rapid-reaction force (Spain and Italy)</td>
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<td>FPE</td>
<td>Force Planning Exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>G-7</td>
<td>Group of seven nations that coordinates global economic policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>GLCM</td>
<td>Ground-launched cruise missile</td>
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<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross national product</td>
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<tr>
<td>HOT</td>
<td>An anti-tank system</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFV</td>
<td>Infantry fighting vehicle</td>
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<td>IRBM</td>
<td>Intermediate-range ballistic missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSTARS</td>
<td>Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTDP</td>
<td>Long-Term Defense Program</td>
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<td>MC</td>
<td>Military Committee (NATO)</td>
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<td>MLRS</td>
<td>Multilateral Radar Strike</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNC</td>
<td>Major NATO Commanders</td>
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<td>MND</td>
<td>Multinational division</td>
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<td>MRC</td>
<td>Major regional contingency</td>
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<td>NACC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Cooperation Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAVOCFORMED</td>
<td>Naval on-call force for the Mediterranean</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
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<td>NRRF</td>
<td>NATO Rapid Reaction Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>OOA</td>
<td>Out of area (operation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPBS</td>
<td>Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System</td>
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<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Reserve component</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACLANT</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic</td>
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<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Surface combatant</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHORAD</td>
<td>Short-Range Air Defense [System]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSRN</td>
<td>Subsurface ballistic nuclear (vessel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOW</td>
<td>Track-on-Wire (missile)</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>U.S. Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>U.S. Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>V/STOL</td>
<td>Vertical/short takeoff and landing</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>West European Union</td>
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Throughout the Cold War, the United States and NATO confronted severe military threats in Europe, but they benefited from a fairly clear idea about the contingencies to be faced, the missions to be performed, and the forces from allied nations that would be fighting alongside American troops. These comforting certitudes have been swept away by the new era that has dawned since 1989. The massive Warsaw Pact military threat has passed into history. Left in the wake of that passing are a more fluid, multipolar security system, a host of new political tensions, and a less straightforward environment for defense planning. Whereas NATO military strategy previously focused on protection of alliance territory, a different and more amorphous type of operation has now come to the fore: “out-of-area” (OOA) operations, which take place outside NATO’s boundaries. Not only are specific OOA contingencies difficult to predict in advance, but American interests and policies are less easily determined. Moreover, such contingencies also create uncertainty about the allied forces that are likely to join the United States in dealing with them. The effect is to make U.S. and NATO force planning a more nebulous task than it was earlier.

OOA OPERATIONS AS AN EMERGING ISSUE

Exactly what is meant by the term OOA operation? When it first appeared in the aftermath of Desert Storm, the term was used to refer to large-scale combat operations outside Europe, primarily in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and Africa. But since then, it has been broadened to include situations in Europe as well, including Eastern
Europe, the Balkans, and even the territory of the former Soviet Union. Moreover, it has been enlarged to cover the entire spectrum of military operations, including the relatively small commitments often seen in humanitarian aid, peacekeeping, and crisis-management missions. The term OOA operations is now used to apply to all military missions—small or large—conducted beyond NATO's borders, in Europe or nearby areas.

Out-of-area operations confront the United States and NATO with a host of new missions in geographic areas once deemed beyond the scope of defense planning. OOA operations also open up a new, more complex political and legal dimension to alliance defense policy. They are permitted by Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which calls on NATO nations to consult and take appropriate action when the alliance's security interests are threatened. If all NATO nations agree, then an alliance-wide military response can be mounted. If only a few nations choose to respond, they are free to do so with confidence that their interests in Europe will be defended by the nations that remain behind. But because OOA operations do not involve direct defense of member-nation borders, they do not qualify under Article 5: the collective defense clause that creates automatic commitments to joint action. This distinction is crucial, for it plays a major role in shaping the current approach to combined force planning for these missions.¹

Owing to the Cold War, NATO conducts its force planning under Article 5, an approach that enables the alliance to develop agreed-upon plans for border defense and to establish force commitments that member nations are called upon to honor. Every two years, NATO engages in an elaborate “Force Planning Exercise” similar to the DoD’s Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). Initially, strategy and resource guidance are prepared, then force goals are adopted based on the advice of NATO’s military commanders, and, finally, country plans are evaluated in relation to those goals. Especially because NATO’s members retain their sovereignty over defense choices, the process falls far short of perfection. The result normally is a fairly well-developed plan that helps coordinate

national defense efforts on behalf of the common good and acceptable burden-sharing arrangements. The process played a large role in NATO’s efforts to build a sound defense posture during the Cold War. Although it has shown signs of weakening in recent months because the threat is reduced, it continues to provide an effective instrument for ensuring defense of NATO’s borders in the new era.

By contrast, extensive formal planning has not yet been undertaken for Article 4 contingencies. This situation reflects the lack of internal alliance consensus on OOA goals and missions. Although NATO’s new strategic concept adopted at the Rome Summit of 1991 calls attention to regions beyond alliance borders, it stops short of mandating organized defense planning for such regions. During the months when the new strategic concept was being adopted, some nations argued in favor of a stronger focus on OOA challenges, but others favored the idea of keeping NATO focused on traditional border defense missions. The result was an ambiguous compromise that left NATO suspended between the two positions: The alliance acknowledged the growing importance of OOA challenges but stopped short of allowing its military commanders the authority to develop plans and programs for them.

Some movement in the direction of joint OOA planning has been seen in recent months in reaction to the Balkans crisis. In any event, NATO planners have latitude for informally gauging the capacity of Article 5 programs to meet Article 4 requirements. Nonetheless, force planning is a complex exercise that cannot be conducted by incomplete techniques, and NATO is still far removed from developing the elaborate mechanisms for OOA missions that guide the biennial exercise for Article 5 missions. As a result, OOA operations are not yet fully considered in developing NATO strategy, force goals, and resource guidance. Nor are NATO’s members mandated to carry out force commitments and defense programs on their behalf. If adequate forces for Article 4 missions are the result of member-nation efforts, adequacy will be achieved more by unilateral actions that coincidentally blend together than by collective design.

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3 Ibid.
Equally thorny problems arise when the time comes to actually mount OOA operations in a crisis. Under NATO procedures, OOA operations can be undertaken by interested participants on behalf of NATO’s values and interests. But because of their nature, such operations do not automatically elicit a joint and fully coordinated response by NATO’s members, and they normally are not conducted by NATO’s integrated command. By common practice, they are mounted by a group of nations that band together and employ ad hoc mechanisms to accomplish their purposes. Those who want to join the fray are admitted, and those who choose to refrain are allowed to “sit on the sidelines,” regardless of either previous assurances or the consequences. The typical result is a time-consuming, helter-skelter approach that can produce mixed results. To be sure, this approach worked in Desert Storm, but Iraq showed the courtesy of allowing the U.S.–led coalition fully six months to prepare, time that was needed in full to overcome the liabilities of ad hoc procedures. Future crises may not be so similarly obliging.

The above informal approach to plans and operations was deemed acceptable throughout the Cold War because OOA missions did not figure prominently in expectations. Equally important, the large and well-equipped forces generated by Article 5 for demanding, Cold War missions seemed capable of meeting any OOA challenges that might occur. Also, the alliance adopted an informal burden-sharing arrangement that called on the West Europeans to meet then-sized defense challenges in Europe while the United States acted to defend the Persian Gulf: at the time, the only area seemingly requiring OOA operations.

Whether these assumptions were valid then is open to question. Beyond a doubt, all have now been overturned. Not only are OOA operations gaining far greater prominence and requiring new approaches to burden-sharing, but the declining threat to NATO’s borders means that the now-smaller forces generated under Article 5 conceivably might not be adequate for Article 4 missions. By virtue of its sole preoccupation with Article 5, NATO is left with insufficient means to assess whether its forces are adequate or inadequate, much less to launch coordinated programs to rectify problems. For both advanced planning and actual crisis operations, the alliance is, to some degree, flying blind.
The problem of planning for OOA operations, moreover, is complicated by another factor that has grown more prominent in recent years: OOA operations are no longer exclusively the province of NATO members. For example, Desert Storm was led by the United States, Britain, and France, but it also included several Arab countries that made important contributions. Already, Russian and Ukrainian forces are participating in UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. Conceivably, these or other nations might join OOA missions in the years ahead (see the Appendix). The United States might therefore find itself lacking many of its traditional allies and fighting alongside forces from nations that once were adversaries, or at least detached observers. But this participation by new friends is also likely to be decided upon only at the time a crisis arises, not in advance.

This state of affairs raises the issue of whether NATO should develop altered policies and better mechanisms for Article 4 planning. Equally important, it also has implications for the United States. The OOA era confronts U.S. defense planning with a need to develop clearer insights about the types of military cooperation that can be expected from future partners. Such cooperation will influence U.S. force requirements, the military operations that might be launched in various situations, and the prospects for success. It also has important implications for specific U.S. program decisions, including mobility forces, support units, weapon systems, and command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) systems. Robust allied participation begets a need for one kind of U.S. defense program; weak allied participation, a need for something entirely different.

The central policy dilemmas here are simply stated: How can the United States know what is needed to defeat its enemies if it is uncertain about who its allies will be? How can combined multinational operations be conducted if there is little advance preparation?

Coalition planning helped answer such questions during the Cold War, and the absence of coalition planning threatens to make them unanswerable for the new era. Although many nations are involved in the OOA military calculus, the status of the West European allies is especially important. As in the past, these nations will remain available for OOA missions, but only conditionally: not because of binding NATO commitments, but because they regard their interests and
values as sufficiently threatened to justify being available. Moreover, the sweeping force reductions now under way across Western Europe raise worrisome doubts about the extent to which allied forces, currently configured mostly for homeland defense, will be capable of OOA operations in distant areas.

Beyond these military issues, a host of larger policy questions must be addressed. OOA military operations cannot be seen in a policy-and-strategy vacuum. If such operations are to be the wave of the future, preparations to conduct them should be undertaken not only to safeguard against future conflicts but also to help prevent war by shaping peacetime security affairs to enhance stability. The preparation issue is particularly relevant in forging NATO’s stance toward Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the former Soviet Union. How is NATO to be reformed in order to deal with challenges emanating from these regions? How is an altered stance on OOA military operations to fit into a larger security policy toward them? These questions are integral parts of the OOA calculus.

METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION

This study’s methodology can best be described as a combination of political-military analysis and program evaluation. Political analysis is employed to examine the policies and strategies of key nations, and the implications posed for coalition behavior. Military analysis is employed to examine the strategies, doctrines, and force levels of key participants. Program evaluation is employed to provide suggestions on how current U.S. and allied force capabilities can be improved at affordable cost. Data for this study were gathered through a review of public documents and interviews with U.S. and allied government officials.

Focusing on the United States and NATO, this report addresses the issues surrounding OOA planning for the future in three central tasks, and its organization reflects this methodology:

1. It assesses whether, and to what extent, U.S. and allied security interests in future OOA crises can be expected to converge, thereby allowing for greater cooperation. Employing political analysis, Chapter Two places OOA operations in historical and analytical
perspective; Chapter Three examines U.S., West European, and other nations’ policies toward OOA operations; and Chapter Four examines multilateral policies for OOA operations.

2. It examines how military force trends in the United States and Western Europe are interacting to shape future capabilities for OOA operations. In particular, it seeks to determine the extent to which drawdowns are reshaping the capacities of these nations to conduct OOA missions either unilaterally or multilaterally. It also briefly surveys developments among other European powers that might affect OOA operations. Employing military analysis, Chapter Five outlines future OOA military requirements; Chapter Six assesses the military capabilities of the United States and Western Europe.

3. It assesses options for achieving improved military capabilities for joint action, for strengthening NATO’s capacity for OOA planning and operations, and for configuring U.S. forces in light of likely allied contributions in future OOA crises. Additionally, it provides insights on how enhanced OOA capabilities can fit into a larger policy aimed at increasing NATO’s relevance and at fostering stability in the European regions east of alliance borders. Employing program analysis, Chapter Seven outlines approaches for achieving improved military capabilities.

Chapter Eight provides conclusions and recommendations. The Appendix assesses the military capabilities of Russia and Ukraine.
Chapter Two

OUT-OF-AREA OPERATIONS IN HISTORICAL AND ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVE

The dilemmas confronting NATO today can best be understood if OOA operations are examined in an historical, analytical perspective. To set the stage for an analysis of how and why OOA coalitions can be formed in the current era, this chapter begins by discussing NATO's experiences during the Cold War, then describes the recent OOA operations in the Persian Gulf and the Balkans.

NATO'S ORIGINS

When the North Atlantic Treaty was written in the late 1940s, its authors were well aware of the successful experience with the anti-German alliance in World War II, but they were also cognizant of the disastrous failures of 1914 and the 1930s, when both multipolar arrangements and collective security failed. They also had a firm grasp of the diplomatic constraints that govern coalition formation, and of the limitations that must be established on the making of collective defense commitments. This knowledge played a key role in shaping how the treaty was constructed.¹

The treaty's three main clauses were Articles 4, 5, and 6. Article 4 specified that the parties would "consult together" when the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any of them was threatened. The commitment to consultation, however, mandated no formal obligations to take action, especially no obligations to use

military force. Rather, Article 5 addressed the thorny issue of using military force. It said that an armed attack against any member would be regarded as an armed attack against them all, and that each of them would take actions deemed necessary, including the use of armed force, to "restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." Article 6 went further by defining an armed attack as an aggressive act on the territory of treaty members. The definition of territory was narrowly construed. Beyond the sovereign lands of the members, Article 6 included only the Algerian Department of France, the occupation forces of any member in Europe (i.e., forces in West Germany), North Atlantic islands north of the Tropic of Cancer that were under the jurisdiction of treaty members, and the vessels or aircraft of members operating in that area.²

Although Article 4 thus created a security bond between treaty members, Article 5 made clear that automatic defense commitments would be invoked only when one or more of the members was directly attacked. Even then, each alliance member reserved the right to make its own decisions about the nature of assistance to be provided. By establishing NATO as a defensive alliance, Article 5 thus made clear that no automatic guarantees were provided to members that were employing force for reasons other than defending their borders. It did not rule out this step, if found justifiable under Article 4, but neither did it obligate use of this step if conditions fell short of triggering Article 5.

Moreover, Article 6 clearly specified the territorial limits of Article 5's guarantee. It generally stopped at the borders of members, and included only a limited set of territories beyond them, all of which were deemed vital to the military defense of Western Europe and North America. Left out were a host of territories that many members deemed vital to their own interests. Nothing was said about the Suez Canal, the Persian Gulf oil fields, French and British colonial possessions in Africa (Algeria aside), or American-owned islands in the Pacific Ocean. Combined defense of these territories was left open as an option under Article 4, but it was not formally mandated by Articles 5 and 6. Also, these articles were silent on the issue of Eastern Europe and the northern Balkans: areas where many mem-

bers had historical interests, but which were occupied by communist governments. Again, military intervention there was left to deliberations under Article 4 and was not mandated by Articles 5 and 6.

These strictures were no accident: They were the product of tough-minded negotiations that took place when the treaty was drafted. The United States, reluctant to become entangled in Western Europe’s colonial travails or to be dragged into a war over political arrangements in Eastern Europe, played a large role in defining them. The hesitancy to extend formal military guarantees beyond alliance borders was further reinforced as NATO membership expanded in succeeding years. Indeed, some of NATO’s charter members were reluctant to admit Greece and Turkey on the grounds that these nations fell beyond the alliance’s collective vital interests. Their reservations were overcome in late 1951, but the protocol admitting those two nations repeated Article 5’s strictures and set further limits on Article 6. The protocol said that armed attack included aggression against member-nation force, vessels, and aircraft “when in or over” alliance territory or areas administered by occupation forces. By implication, military forces operating outside these geographic limits were not covered by Article 6.

A seminal event in defining NATO’s outer limits came in 1954, when the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was admitted. At the time, the FRG refused to recognize the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and maintained that Germany eventually should be unified. The protocol provided military protection to the FRG under Articles 5 and 6, but offered no formal guarantees of military support for anything more. Indeed, it noted the FRG’s agreement to refrain from any action inconsistent with the strictly defensive nature of the treaty. Accompanying agreements specified that FRG military forces would be large enough only to carry out the border-defense mission, and that those forces would be incorporated into NATO’s integrated military command. In doing so, the alliance sent notice that any FRG external ambitions would not be underwritten. By implication, it reinforced the same message to other members.3

3For a detailed history of NATO defense planning, see Richard I. Kugler, Commitment to Purpose: How Alliance Partnership Won the Cold War, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, MR-190-F71WC, 1993.
The integrated military command structure and planning mechanisms set up by NATO during these years reflected the treaty-established focus on border-defense missions. Reporting to the NATO Military Committee, the three Major NATO Commanders (MNCs)—Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), and Commander in Chief, Channel (CINCCHAN)—were assigned to carry out military missions deriving from Articles 5 and 6. Some thought was given to creating a command for Middle East operations, but the idea was rejected. During the late 1940s, Western military authorities feared that a Soviet attack in Europe would be accompanied by a thrust aimed at seizing the Suez Canal and Persian Gulf oil fields. But by the early 1950s, this threat estimate had been downgraded to an attack in Central Europe alone, thereby obviating the need for a Middle East command with NATO missions. In the aftermath, the lack of any separate command for OOA missions had a predictable influence on SHAPE’s (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe) priorities by encouraging a focus on the European continent.

Such a focus was apparent during 1950–1952, when NATO conducted a series of studies defining its force requirements for territorial defense in the northern, central, and southern regions. The requirements embraced by the 1952 Lisbon Accords were anchored on the same “European” premise. And although subsequent modifications were made in force goals and strategy, border defense remained the raison d’être for alliance defense policy. Indeed, by the late 1950s, NATO’s Military Committee (MC) embraced the largely nuclear strategy of Massive Retaliation (MC 14/2), which downplayed the importance of conventional defense. The adoption of the strategy of Flexible Response (MC 14/3) in 1967 elevated conventional defense and marked formal endorsement of forward defense and the linear ground concepts associated with it, thereby ruling out earlier reliance on mobile doctrines that ceded territory in order to buy time. As was the case with Massive Retaliation, Flexible Response allowed for military operations (primarily air and sea) against enemy forces on Warsaw Pact territory, but only as an outgrowth of campaign plans to defend NATO’s borders. As a result, protection of alliance borders became the sole standard for judging
NATO’s defenses: Nothing more was allowed, and nothing less was permitted.4

As the years passed, this emphasis on border defense played a growing role in shaping NATO’s force posture, especially when SHAPE grew to the point where it was capable of exerting a powerful influence on member-nation defense policies. Adoption of PPBS and the biennial Force Planning Exercise in the 1960s aided SHAPE’s efforts to forge a close linkage between posture and doctrine, thus further tying national forces to the collective defense mission. The major conventional force improvement effort launched by the Warsaw Pact in the mid-1960s and sustained for fully 20 years gave NATO ample cause for worrying about its physical security, and precluded paying attention to anything else. The mounting importance of fiscal constraints further reinforced this trend. Compelled to make painful reductions, many allies placed overriding priority on defending their borders and chose to sacrifice forces for operating beyond them. As a result, West European nations steadily settled into the rut of being able to protect their territory and little else. For good or ill, the effect was that West European forces gradually became one-dimensional: increasingly capable of handling Cold War missions mandated by Article 5, but ever less capable of operating elsewhere.

In retrospect, Articles 5 and 6 played a critical role in helping NATO defend itself against Warsaw Pact aggression while not posing an offensive threat to the Soviet Bloc to the east. They thus implemented containment without threatening “rollback”; as a result, a stable bipolar structure evolved in Europe, thereby preventing an ever-dangerous confrontation from spiralling downward into nuclear war. Behind its containment screen, meanwhile, the Western alliance pursued economic prosperity and democracy, and the Soviet Bloc fell into economic disrepair and political illegitimacy. The result was the West’s Cold War victory in 1989: in no small part, a tribute to the wisdom behind Articles 5 and 6.

4Kugler, Commitment to Purpose, 1993.
OOA DISILLUSIONMENTS

This emphasis on European security notwithstanding, alliance members were far from uninvolved in developments elsewhere during NATO’s first three decades. Because of conflicting interests and policies among NATO nations, most efforts were mishandled to the point where they not only failed to help OOA operations by various members, but also inflicted damage on NATO’s unity. Such negative experiences were a product of the major changes sweeping over international politics at the time NATO grew into a powerful alliance—changes that interacted in ways that made it difficult for NATO nations to cooperate in areas outside Europe and, in some cases, pitted the nations against each other. Alliance members came away disillusioned, feeling that NATO’s charter was best restricted to defending Western Europe.5

In particular, the early years of the Cold War witnessed the United States embroiled in vigorous efforts to contain communism in Asia and other regions. Although West European nations supported the basic goal, they often questioned specific American policies that, in their view, threatened to indirectly exacerbate East-West tensions in Europe or otherwise damage their interests. This stance led them to refrain from offering military support to the United States, and periodically produced serious diplomatic frictions with Washington. Meanwhile, several West European nations, especially France and Great Britain, were trying to manage still-existing colonial empires in the face of growing pressures for national self-determination. A committed foe of colonialism, the United States often found itself opposed to the “management efforts,” refusing to offer military aid at times when those West European nations badly desired American help. With the United States and Western Europe often at odds in areas outside Europe, the effect of their mutual frustrations was to poison the well for OOA cooperation.

NATO’s first experience with out-of-area operations came during the Korean War. That experience illuminated the problems to be encountered in later situations. When war broke out in mid-1950, the United States led a UN-sponsored effort to push back the North

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5For in-depth historical coverage, see Elizabeth D. Sherwood, Allies in Crisis: Meeting Global Challenges to Western Security, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990.
Korean aggressors. Especially because it was focused on the daunting task of erecting a military deterrent in Central Europe, NATO made no formal commitment to helping in Korea. Five West European nations, however, did send at least token forces: Britain, France, Canada, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

This step marked NATO's initial use of the policy of informal cooperation in OOA missions. At first, cooperation was harmonious. But as the war bogged down into a frustrating stalemate, rumblings of discontent began to be heard from Western Europe. By the time an armistice was signed in 1953, some allies had grown weary of the involvement and were coming to question U.S. strategy in Asia. Moreover, domestic support in the United States had itself faded. While the West Europeans were not blamed for the stalemate, neither were they accorded credit for helping resolve it.

Transatlantic discontent grew when, in 1954, only a year later, France's involvement in the Indochina war came to a disastrous conclusion at Dien Bien Phu. The United States originally had encouraged French efforts to fight the communist guerrillas, but it also was an opponent of France's colonial domination in Southeast Asia. And it was reluctant to escalate the fighting in ways that might provoke another conflict with China. Caught between these competing impulses, it gave the French sizable logistics support but failed to intervene in the major ways that would have been needed to prevent France's defeat. In the Geneva negotiations that followed, the United States set up a pro-American government in South Vietnam and seemed intent on ushering France out. The French came away embittered.

In 1956 came disaster in the Middle East, when France and Great Britain secretly collaborated in an ill-fated military intervention designed to protect their interests in the Suez Canal and Egypt. Mounted during pitched fighting between Israel and Egypt, the intervention was implemented clumsily, failing to achieve its objectives and inflaming world opinion. Disapproving, the Eisenhower Administration exerted diplomatic pressure to help compel the two nations to withdraw. After its forces had left in embarrassing failure,

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the British government fell, and French politics was thrown into convulsions. Although American-British relations were restored, the incident left a residue of bitterness in France. In reaction, both Great Britain and France ceased providing support to Israel and handed over that controversial task to the United States.\textsuperscript{7}

France's anger deepened further when its colonial hold on Algeria gave way to violent civil war in the late 1950s. France argued that it was helping defend against communism, but the United States saw matters differently and failed to provide much military assistance. To compound the difficulty, the French deployed most of their military forces to Algeria, leaving behind only token units committed to NATO's defenses. The United States complained. And when the French sought American help in their efforts to build a national nuclear deterrent, Washington refused. As the Algerian quagmire worsened, France's internal politics became ever more turbulent. De Gaulle's assumption of power stabilized the situation in France, and he withdrew from Algeria. But angered at unsupportive U.S. domination, he also began France's long march out of the NATO integrated military command, and he launched a diplomatic campaign to weaken Washington's position in Europe.\textsuperscript{8}

The 1960s witnessed bitter battles between the United States and France over NATO military strategy, but intra-alliance struggles over colonial policy were less prominent than in the 1950s. The United States, however, did plunge into the Vietnam War, and the West Europeans not only failed to send forces to back their initially lukewarm vocal support, but also began engaging in fault-finding when the war turned sour. Following the damaging Tet offensive in 1968, many West European governments began distancing themselves from the United States, which angered Washington. Meanwhile, Britain, beset by mounting economic troubles, embarked on a withdrawal of its forces east of Suez: a development that left the United States responsible for security management in the vacated areas. With Britain now seeking membership in the European Economic


Community, Western Europe turned inward, leaving the United States to handle the global power balance.

The early 1970s saw more of the same. With American withdrawal from Vietnam under way, the United States and the West Europeans initially cooperated in developing NATO security policies, and no major global disagreements marred their relations. As détente turned sour, however, the United States became alarmed at the Soviet military buildup and began opposing Moscow's assertive diplomacy in several regions outside Europe. Still benefiting from détente on their own continent, however, the West Europeans expressed worry that Washington's global preoccupations would bring back confrontation with the USSR in Europe.⁹

The October 1973 Arab-Israeli War brought a further downslide, when the United States used its military bases and equipment stocks in Western Europe to resupply Israel. Reluctant to offend their Arab allies, a number of NATO allies protested, to America's chagrin. Then came the landmark Arab oil boycott, which left West European governments arguing that American support of Israel was endangering the vital Persian Gulf oil lifeline upon which the West European economy depended. Less needy of Persian Gulf oil, the United States continued to support Israel and argued in favor of standing up to OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) through energy conservation. The West Europeans tried to comply, but they continued to harbor doubts about American diplomacy in the Middle East. Those doubts deepened when Arab terrorist attacks were directed at Europe rather than at the United States. With détente in Europe endangered by mounting U.S.-Soviet global confrontation, relations between the United States and its NATO allies regarding regions outside Europe had reached a new low.

Moreover, alliance defense planning was steadily becoming more Eurocentric. The Eurocentering process had started in the early 1970s, when the United States, then leaving Vietnam and downplaying Asia, refocused its previously global strategy on the defense of

Central Europe. Working through the alliance-wide initiatives of Alliance Defense, 1970 (AD-70) and the Long-Term Defense Program (LTDP), American efforts to promote NATO force improvements had the effect of encouraging the West Europeans to focus ever more inward. By this time, only modest British and French forces were still deployed in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, and almost no American forces were stationed there. This minimization step was deemed danger-free for two reasons. First, Egypt was pursuing stable relations with Israel, and Cairo's pro-Western stance ensured access to the Suez Canal. Second, Iran, under the Shah, was pro-American and was building up a large military posture capable of safeguarding the vital Persian Gulf oil lines. The effect was to relegate the Persian Gulf to the backwaters of alliance military strategy.10

TOWARD A SLOWLY GROWING ACCORD

The pendulum began swinging back toward a greater focus on areas outside Europe as the 1980s approached. The triggering events were the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the collapse of the Shah's regime in Iran. With Iranian politics now controlled by the Ayatollah Khomeini's fundamentalist and unstable regime, the U.S. government grew alarmed that the USSR might use its advantageous position in Afghanistan to launch an invasion to seize the Persian Gulf oil fields. In response, Washington served notice that it would fight to protect the oil fields, and it began reconfiguring the U.S. defense posture to send large forces to Southwest Asia. West European nations harbored worries that the United States was too preoccupied with military security in the Persian Gulf and insufficiently attentive to improving relations with alienated Arab nations. But by this time, they were also growing concerned about the Soviet military buildup. Although they preferred to focus their military strategy on Europe, they were not opposed to a growing U.S. emphasis on the Persian Gulf.

The Carter Administration proposed a division of labor in which the United States would defend the Persian Gulf while the West

Europeans would “take up the rear” by further strengthening NATO’s posture. The allies approved of this approach, including the wartime diversion to the Persian Gulf of some American forces that otherwise would have been sent to Europe as reinforcements. In doing so, the allies acknowledged that security affairs in Europe and Southwest Asia were now intertwined to the point where adjustments had to be made in NATO’s defense priorities. But apart from continuing to station small British and French forces near the Persian Gulf, the other allies expressed no interest in sending their own forces there. Citing budget restrictions, moreover, they failed to fully implement the “Southwest Asia offset measures” in Europe sought by Washington. This disappointing development in Europe left the Carter Administration angry as it departed office, but at least it had succeeded in broadening U.S. military horizons beyond Europe, and in alerting the allies to the need for such broadening.\textsuperscript{11}

The Reagan Administration arrived in Washington determined to lead a Western military resurgence aimed at fashioning a more stable balance of power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. One of its priorities was an improved NATO defense posture. Reagan got off to a troubled start in relations with the West Europeans. But by 1983, conservative governments were in power in London and Bonn, and they reacted favorably to Reagan’s lead in security policy and economics. For London, the Falklands conflict in 1982 underscored the facts that Britain still had interests beyond Europe and that forces might have to be employed to defend them. Moreover, the new Socialist government in Paris, under President François Mitterand, proved amenable to Reagan’s anti-Soviet departures. The result was agreement by NATO to deploy nuclear-tipped Pershing II’s and/or GLCMs (ground-launched cruise missiles) and to improve its conventional posture through qualitative means.\textsuperscript{12}

These NATO measures notwithstanding, Reagan’s military strategy was cast in global terms, which influenced the West Europeans to begin thinking more in those terms themselves. Reagan fashioned a new Central Command with a Persian Gulf mission, and he poured vast sums into programs needed to speed the wartime deployment of

\textsuperscript{11}See Elizabeth Sherwood,\textit{ Allies in Crisis}, 1990.

U.S. forces to the Gulf. None of these steps signified closer U.S.–West European cooperation in OOA missions, but the outbreak of a brutal war between Iran and Iraq, coupled with the spread of Islamic extremism, drew West European attention to the growing instability in the Persian Gulf. In response, most West European nations continued focusing their defense plans on Europe, but Britain and France, the nations with the largest interests outside Europe, began modestly reconfiguring their forces for deployments beyond the NATO region.

Signs of OOA cooperation came in 1986, when the United States launched a bombing raid on Libya in response to President Muammar Khadafi’s radicalism and terrorist actions. Britain permitted the United States to launch attacking aircraft from bases on its soil, and, although overflight rights in Central Europe were denied, protests about the raid were muted. In 1987, cooperation grew closer. That year, the Iran-Iraq War led the United States to dispatch naval forces to escort reflagged Western cargo ships passing through the Persian Gulf. NATO itself made no formal response, but Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands sent warships of their own. The U.S. and West European vessels operated under separate command arrangements, but they informally coordinated their operations, and the effort was successful. The participants came away with enhanced confidence in their ability to cooperate in future OOA military endeavors.

**THE PERSIAN GULF WAR**

U.S.–West European cooperation took a great leap forward during the Persian Gulf War, in which several allied nations decided to send forces to help the coalition, and NATO itself participated in the background.

Many reasons account for this departure from past practice. Most important, many West European governments judged that Iraq’s in-

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vasion of Kuwait posed a severe threat to their vital interests and that a firm Western military response was needed. Also affecting their stance was the strong leadership shown by the U.S. government, the policy and strategy laid down by Washington, and pro-American sentiment in many capitals. At the time, the Bush Administration was playing a major role in crafting a new European security order to accompany the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact, and the grateful West Europeans saw no reason for not supporting American policies in the Persian Gulf. Indeed, the welcoming attitude of most Arab nations gave the West Europeans an incentive to join the coalition to bolster their standing in Arab capitals.\textsuperscript{15}

Also important, key West European capitals were dominated by governments that faced no constraining domestic opposition. Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Party ruled Parliament in London, and the opposition Labor Party was neither inclined nor powerful enough to deter her from supporting the Americans. In Paris, Mitterand was still strong enough to prevail over leftist opposition, and the Gaullist right favored intervention in the Persian Gulf. In Bonn, Helmut Kohl was firmly entrenched in the aftermath of unification, the FDP (\textit{Frei Demokratische Partei}) was led by his own foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and the opposition (\textit{Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands}) SPD, vocally neutralist in the early 1980s, was now mute. Kohl was constrained by strong domestic support for the constitution-mandated practice of not sending German forces abroad, but he raised no complaints to his neighbors’ doing so, and he did send modest forces to help defend Turkey. A similar pattern prevailed elsewhere in Western Europe: Ruling governments favored at least token participation in the Gulf venture, and opposition parties either lent their support or were too weak to be noticed.

For the first time in decades, moreover, the situation in Europe was sufficiently tranquil to permit involvement in a war elsewhere. Not only was the Warsaw Pact no longer a worry, but the Soviet government professed to be on the coalition’s side. With the United Nations’ endorsing coalition policy, virtually nobody supported Iraq. Hence, there were no political costs to be paid for joining the U.S.–

led coalition, and there were powerful reasons for jumping on the bandwagon, one of them being to gain prestige for standing up to aggression and avoid the onus of being seen as a weakling—all the more so since the United States was deploying sufficient forces to overpower Iraq’s army, thereby making coalition membership a winning proposition in which major political gains could be accrued with only small force contributions and low casualties.

Immediately after the U.S. government proclaimed the campaign of building up a defensive military shield to protect Saudi Arabia from Iraqi attack (Desert Shield), most West European nations decided to lend their support. NATO airbases and seaports were made available to help speed the deployment of U.S. forces. Virtually all the large U.S. airlift effort to the Persian Gulf stopped at airbases in Germany and Western Europe to refuel, and a huge portion of the massive U.S. sealift passed through the Mediterranean Sea and the Suez Canal: all with West European support. Most American combat forces initially came from the continental United States (CONUS). But when Washington decided to deploy the FRG-based U.S. VII Corps, other units, and equipment stocks, few objections were raised. Although Desert Shield was not a NATO campaign, NATO became involved by helping plan the deployment and by providing 45 naval escorts, 29 surveillance aircraft, and 10 AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft to support the sealift deployments through the Mediterranean Sea. NATO also dispatched Allied Command Europe (ACE) mobile force units, especially air interceptors and ground-based air defenses, to help defend member-nation Turkey if it came under attack.

In deciding which West European nations would deploy combat forces to the Persian Gulf, NATO resorted to the ad hoc procedures long ago developed under Article 4, an approach that was successful. In essence, NATO officially proclaimed Desert Shield a worthwhile effort consistent with alliance values, congratulated all nations that wanted to contribute forces, and excused any that elected to stay on the sidelines. Some frictions were encountered: Germany, which excused itself by citing constitutional restrictions against participation, was especially criticized. Nonetheless, the Gulf deployment did nothing to severely damage NATO’s unity. Indeed, it helped strengthen alliance cohesion.
Out-of-Area Operations in Historical and Analytical Perspective 23

Britain led the way in force contributions, deploying 1 armored division, 5 air squadrons (70 combat aircraft), and Nimrod C2I aircraft. France provided 1 light armored division and 3 air squadrons (58 aircraft), and Italy and Canada each sent 1 air squadron. Apart from the United States, 10 NATO members sent naval vessels; with Australia and Argentina also contributing, fully 66 vessels were sent to the Gulf region. Conspicuously absent was Germany, but it did offer large financial assistance, helped the U.S. VII Corps deploy, and sent aircraft and air defense units to Turkey. The Turkish government was preoccupied with defending its own borders. Its large deployments there compelled the Iraqis to deploy sizable ground forces to the Kurdistan area, and those forces consequently were not available for Kuwait. In addition, Turkey contributed to the economic sanctions by restricting the flow of Tigris-Euphrates water into Iraq. Even Greece, long critical of the United States, contributed by sending a vessel to help patrol the Red Sea.16

The decision to transfer from border defense to the Desert Storm offensive carried the potential to fracture the coalition and to damage U.S.-West European cohesion. The U.S. government, however, handled the transition with considerable diplomatic skill by consulting closely with its allies, building UN support, and giving Iraq the opportunity to negotiate. As a result, President Bush encountered more trouble persuading the U.S. Senate to approve the war than persuading the West Europeans to participate in it. Care also was taken in establishing a workable military command structure that respected national leadership preferences. For example, whereas British forces operated under U.S. command, French forces remained under national command; the forces from the various Arab countries were grouped together under one Arab command. All these countries were given roles and missions suited to their military capabilities and national priorities.

Also important, the situation permitted the coalition partners to agree on a clear goal that made political and military sense: the ejection of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. As a result, development of a coordinated campaign plan became possible. Under U.S. leadership, coalition commanders designed an offensive campaign that reflected

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16See DoD's Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 1992, Section I.
sound military doctrine and seemed capable of defeating the heavily armed Iraqis. Although the Iraqis had deployed a large army in Kuwait, their air force was weak, and their ground-based air defenses were vulnerable to defeat. Because the coalition enjoyed a massive superiority in air power, U.S. and allied commanders judged that a sustained bombardment campaign could debilitate the Iraqi Army so that U.S. and allied ground forces could take advantage of their superior mobility to launch a "hammer and anvil" flanking attack aimed at shattering the cohesion of the Iraqi defense, then defeating it in parts. The prospect of a quick and decisive victory, with small friendly losses, satisfied the partners and reduced strains on the coalition.

When Desert Storm was launched, American forces carried the load, but West European forces contributed importantly. Participating in the massive multinational air campaign were British, French, Italian, and Canadian forces. In the ground campaign, mounted by a multinational force totaling 17 division-equivalents, the British 1st Armored Division joined the U.S. VII Corps, and the French 6th Light Armored Division operated on the left flank of the U.S. XVIII Corps. (See Figure 2.1.)

In both the air and ground campaigns, the West European forces relied on their American partners for C4I, logistics, and other support. They also encountered some troubles in weapons, munitions, aircraft survivability, maintenance, readiness, and doctrine. Although the West Europeans could not have mounted this operation on their own, their forces, nonetheless, performed effectively on the whole. The decisive victory achieved by Desert Storm, with miraculously few casualties, was in no small way a product of the many years of practice at coalition warfare and combined operations provided by the NATO experience in Central Europe. Their prestige enhanced and vital interests protected, the West Europeans came away from Desert Storm satisfied with both this OOA operation and their long participation in NATO under U.S. leadership.

Given its results, the Persian Gulf War broke a long pattern of frustration with major OOA operations. It suggested that the experience could be repeated again. Yet, closer inspection reveals that the conditions surrounding this conflict were uniquely favorable to success: The coalition partners were confronted with both a mortal threat to
In Desert Storm, a multipronged offensive fractured enemy's cohesion and led to his defeat in detail:

- Pinning and flanking maneuvers employed in interaction with air- and ground-delivered firepower.
- Threat of amphibious assault helped pin enemy.
- Multiple offensive options helped deceive and paralyze enemy.

Figure 2.1—Desert Storm Ground Campaign

their vital interests and an adversary led by a dictator who combined ruthless belligerence and inflexible diplomacy with gross military incompetence. The United States and its NATO partners saw the situation alike, Washington led with diplomatic and military skill, West European governments took part, the Arab world mostly applauded, Europe was peaceful, Russia did not interfere, and the rest of the world approved. Also important, U.S. and allied forces were geared up for the task, were given the time to prepare, and enjoyed military advantages in technology and other areas that made them superior to the enemy.

Do such conditions occur more than once in a lifetime or, for that matter, more than once in a century? The sobering answer to this question provides reservations about generalizing from the Persian Gulf experience. Desert Storm showed that, when conditions are perfect, major OOA operations can work. But had the political or military equations been different, perhaps only marginally so, the
Persian Gulf coalition might have been difficult to assemble, and Desert Storm, politically difficult to carry out with anything approaching comparable effectiveness. The negative but still valid lessons of prior experiences are worrisome reminders of how easily things can go wrong. The Gulf experience thus may have opened the door to future OOA operations, but not to automatically resorting to such operations when circumstances are less than ideal, as the next section illustrates.

THE BALKANS CRISIS

At this writing, the war in Yugoslavia is still being waged. Although the endgame is not yet known and evaluations of Western policy are premature, the Balkans crisis cannot be ignored: Many observers speculate that it might serve as a model not only for future European conflicts but also for Western interventions in OOA conflicts. The question appropriate for this study is: Why have the Western nations thus far failed to intervene with the military power and purpose shown in the Persian Gulf?

Western nations have (in fact) intervened in important ways. Under the UN flag, they undertook a peacekeeping mission aimed at preventing further violence in Croatia; several sent troops into Bosnia to bring humanitarian assistance to the Muslim population. The UN and the European Community adopted the Vance-Owen plan aimed at brokering a political settlement on the basis of a federated, multi-ethnic Bosnian state. To support this diplomatic effort, economic sanctions were imposed on Serbia and efforts were launched to impede the flow of military equipment into the region. Naval ships and aircraft were deployed to monitor, then enforce, those sanctions. A "no-fly zone" was proclaimed over Bosnia, then enforced. Airdrops delivered supplies to beleaguered cities and towns. Determination was expressed to use force to protect Western peacekeepers. Troops were sent to patrol the Macedonian border so that the spread of fighting there would be prevented, and NATO's nations offered to send sizable contingents to help enforce a peace settlement in Bosnia.

But these gestures notwithstanding, the Western military intervention has been modest relative to that launched in Desert Shield and
Desert Storm. It has not been sufficient to halt Serbian aggression and achieve other Western goals.

Many reasons account for the West’s cautious military response, but an unfavorable military balance is not one of them. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, he did so with an imposing military establishment of 45 ground divisions and 500 combat aircraft. When the Balkans crisis erupted, Serbian forces benefited from inheriting a large military legacy from the Cold War: most of the 1,600 tanks, 800 armored personnel carriers, 2,000 artillery tubes, 3,000 mortars, 4,000 recoilless rifles, 430 combat aircraft, countless small arms, and sizable war reserves. To be sure, this inventory left Serbian forces well-armed in relation to the Bosnian Muslims. Rugged terrain posed a constraint on Western operations against these forces. Even so, the Serb forces paled by comparison with the Iraqi Army, and Yugoslavia is far closer to NATO bases than is the Persian Gulf. Had the Western powers chosen to assemble overpowering force against the Serbs, they could have done so.

The posing of a clear threat to vital Western interests is the main difference. Whereas Iraq’s invasion posed such a threat, the Balkans crisis is far murkier. When the civil war erupted, it grew out of the collapse of the Yugoslavian state, a development that many Western powers viewed with misgivings. At the time, Serbia was the primary proponent of keeping Yugoslavia together, and the presence of a large Serbian population in Croatia and Bosnia seemed to give the Serbs a plausible justification for concern about their safety. By mid-1992, Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia all had been granted recognition, and Serbia’s status as an aggressor was becoming clear. Moreover, fear was mounting that “ethnic cleansing” would spread to Kosovo, Macedonia, and elsewhere. The case for Western intervention was now more compelling, but most nations hesitated, owing to doubt that Bosnia was vital to their geopolitical interests, to historical caution about becoming entangled in the Balkans, and to hope that the crisis could be solved—or at least contained—with instruments short of military power.

Western diplomacy also argued against overpowering military intervention. The past three years had witnessed growing emphasis on the use of multilateral institutions—preferably the United Nations—and the sheer difficulty of forging a consensus among many nations
inhibited action. Moreover, the diplomatic and economic interventions adopted by the West showed promise of eventual success. Indeed, Western negotiators expressed fear that military intervention would escalate the violence and dampen prospects for a peaceful accord based on the Vance-Owen formula. Playing upon this fear, Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic and other officials skillfully employed diplomatic maneuvers, including agreement to short-lived cease fires, to suggest that peace was in the offing, provided the West exercised restraint. These maneuvers, coupled with lingering recognition that Croatia and even the Bosnian Muslims were not blame-free, further blunted Western support for intervention.

As prospects for a diplomatic settlement faded, interest in military intervention grew. But, again, political judgment intervened to allow for nothing more than a slow increase in pressures against Serbia. In early 1993, the U.S. government expressed interest in greater intervention, possibly in the form of providing military aid to the Bosnian Muslims and conducting air strikes against Serbian positions. But whereas the U.S. government led decisively in the Persian Gulf conflict in ways that exerted pressure on Western governments to follow, it now stressed the importance of consensus-building and multilateral conduct—soon finding itself confronted by opposition from key allies.

Although Britain, France, and Germany all had grown more alarmed about the Balkans situation, none was yet prepared to intervene decisively. Weighted down by history, Germany was embroiled in a debate over whether its constitution permitted its forces to be used outside NATO's borders for anything beyond peacekeeping. Influenced by their own historical misadventures in the Balkans and by domestic complexities, Britain and France expressed fear that intervention would undercut Western diplomacy and expose to retribution the several thousand peacekeepers that they had sent to Bosnia. They also expressed doubt that arming the Muslims could be successful or would achieve anything more than an intensification of the fighting. For similar reasons, many other NATO nations objected, including Turkey and Greece, both of which feared escalation in ways that might involve them. Moreover, Russia, an important
player and long-time friend of Serbia, announced its opposition to powerful military pressure.\textsuperscript{17}

Beyond these political factors, purely military considerations acted to dampen Western enthusiasm. Although the West can assemble overpowering force, no clear way beckoned to apply such force decisively and effectively. The Persian Gulf War had offered an ideal situation: the clear goal of restoring Iraq’s sovereignty and an enemy force massed on open terrain.

The Balkans situation created the opposite conditions: The source of trouble was the Serbian government, but the Western nations showed no interest in the major military campaign—e.g., massive air bombardment or outright invasion—needed to bring Serbia to heel. The task would have been one of protecting Muslim settlements scattered across Bosnia, amid entangled ethnic communities threatened by local Serb forces operating in rugged terrain. Tactical air strikes could suppress Serb artillery fires, but their effect against mortars and infantry attacks would be limited. Consequently, large ground deployments would be needed, and these forces would be compelled to deploy to many spots across Bosnia, possibly undertaking offensive operations aimed at routing out Serbian forces. Owing to the rugged terrain, such operations promised to inflict large casualties on Western soldiers. Unwilling to pay this price, the Western nations demurred.\textsuperscript{18}


DYNAMICS OF COALITION-FORMATION FOR OOA OPERATIONS

In assessing prospects for the West’s ability to mount OOA military operations, the future matters far more than the past—and it is difficult to foresee. Moreover, the West’s experience with OOA operations in the post–Cold War era is quite limited, and it may not be representative of what lies ahead. The various small-scale operations that have been launched recently—e.g., humanitarian aid in Somalia and sanction-enforcement against Iraq—may suggest a growing willingness to act together beyond NATO’s borders. Yet, the Persian Gulf War and the Balkans crisis provide the main source of experience with major OOA operations. In addition to providing a small sample, these two experiences are not only polar opposites but also lie at the outer extremes of likely events. Whereas the West encountered ideal conditions in the Persian Gulf and thus chose to intervene massively, it faced almost impossible conditions in the Balkans and chose to stay out almost entirely. Consequently, neither experience may be the model for the future.

Recognizing the limits on generalization and crystal-ball-gazing, it is, nonetheless, possible to draw on these and other experiences to offer analytical insights on the dynamics of coalition-formation for OOA operations.

Formation of Coalition Agreement

Analysis can best begin by noting that the act of forming a coalition agreement to collectively defend the borders of several nations is itself a dramatic step for most governments. During the Cold War, NATO was able to bring 16 nations together to make this commitment, an achievement that relied heavily on the military threat posed by the Warsaw Pact. Recognizing that they would be vulnerable to being picked off one by one if they stood alone, the NATO nations had ample incentives to join together in a pact. Moreover, creation of an alliance offered the promise of assembling enough military strength to achieve deterrence across all of Western Europe, and this step was made safe because the NATO Treaty mandated a collective response only when member borders were crossed. Individual
nations, therefore, did not have to sign up to automatically support the external agendas of any partners.

**Capability to Respond to Urgent Non–Border Threats**

Especially because most future OOA situations will not pose immediate threats to NATO’s borders, NATO’s ability—or that of any alliance—to forge a binding collective defense agreement for handling them will be inhibited. In essence, most nations will want to retain the flexibility to act in accordance with their own judgments at the time of a crisis, rather than sacrifice their sovereignty to commitments made in advance, before an actual crisis can be judged on its own merits. This reality, however, does not mean that OOA operations will be impossible to mount, especially by a subcoalition of NATO members that see urgency in a specific crisis. Nor does it mean that all attempts to prepare plans and programs in advance are doomed to failure. To the extent that NATO members come to believe that OOA conflicts are the wave of the future, they are likely to provide growing support for actions that increase their capability to respond, provided these steps do not circumscribe their ability to choose.

**Factors Determining the West’s Responsiveness**

To be sure, the Balkans crisis has exposed the vulnerability of NATO members’ inability to act, but the Persian Gulf War illustrates the conditions under which they can be motivated to bond together, act with alacrity, and employ military forces effectively. Based on these two crises, the following list identifies many of the factors that seem especially important in determining the West’s responsiveness. To the extent that all these factors must argue in favor of intervention, OOA operations will be difficult to launch. As will be argued below, however, the impediments posed by one or more of these factors often can be overcome when the United States shows leadership and the alliance benefits from a strategic policy that defines the importance of a crisis in broader terms than the local event itself.

**National Interests.** Do the vital interests of the participants argue in favor of an OOA operation, and do those interests overlap to the point of permitting joint military collaboration?
Goals. Are the goals of the OOA operation clearly understood? When there are potential conflicts among multiple goals, are priorities clearly established? Is there a coherent relationship between ends and means? Is there coalition-wide agreement in this area?

Common Policy and Strategy. Do the potential participants embrace common approaches to policy and strategy for the OOA operation? Do they agree on how the use of military force is to be blended with diplomacy, economic sanctions, and other instruments? Do they agree on timing and sequencing? To the extent that they do not, are there grounds for compromise and consensus-formation?

Feasibility of Success. Is the path to victory clear and credible? Are the chances of success sufficiently good, and the benefits attractive enough, to justify the risks and costs for all participants?

Externalities. For each nation, does the situation elsewhere encourage participation, or at least not prevent it? Is there another crisis that must be addressed, and will participation offend important countries with whom good relations are necessary? What does world opinion say?

Risks of Escalation. Can the crisis be contained if an OOA operation is mounted, or is there a serious risk of escalation, thereby drawing in other countries and spreading the operation to other regions?

Downstream Consequences. If the OOA operation is a local success, what will be the long-term consequences? If the operation fails, what is likely to happen?

Intra-Coalition Relations. Are political relationships among the participants sufficiently amicable to allow for close collaboration, or do prohibitive tensions or incompatibilities exist? Is there agreement on who is to lead and who is to follow? Does accord exist on roles and missions?

Domestic Politics. Within each nation, is the ruling government strong enough to deploy forces to an OOA crisis amid uncertainty about the outcome?
Mutual Reliability. Can the coalition partners rely on each other to persevere, or are there reasons for fearing that some will withdraw when the going gets tough?

Need to Use Military Force. Have events deteriorated, and other options been exhausted, to the point where use of military force is clearly needed?

Adequate Forces. Are the military forces being assembled by the OOA coalition strong enough to win the conflict at acceptable cost?

Common Doctrine and Interoperability. Can the forces of the coalition partners work well enough together to achieve the goals?

Command Relationships. Can competing requirements be reconciled to permit creation of an effective combined military command?

The Adversary. Can the adversary be isolated and outwitted, or is he sufficiently adept to outmaneuver the coalition, thereby breaking it apart?

The elucidation of these 15 factors suggests that coalition-formation will remain a complex enterprise, but it also helps explain the vast difference between the West's behavior in the Persian Gulf conflict and that in the Balkans crisis. Table 2.1 illustrates how these variables took shape in the two situations. In this table, "F" means the situation for that variable favored a decisive response, "U" means unfavorable, and "N" means neutral. Because the grading system is subjective, questions can be raised about individual scores, but the overall pattern is clear enough and is unlikely to change even if different judgments are reached in some cases. In the Persian Gulf crisis virtually all factors favored a strong response; in the Balkans crisis, nearly all argued against it. As a result, the very different forms of behavior exhibited by the West are understandable.

Because governments are capable of decisive policies even when circumstances are less than ideal, Table 2.1 does not imply that a favorable (or at least neutral) judgment for all factors is needed for a response to be mounted. What matters is the overall distribution: where the center of gravity lies, and whether any single barrier itself is prohibitive. As a result, Table 2.1 permits neither positive nor negative conclusions about the future of Western cooperation in OOA.
operations, but rather calls for an open-minded stance that is sensitive to the specific crisis.

In all likelihood, future crises will fall somewhere in the middle of these two extremes, thereby presenting a mix of incentives, some favoring intervention, others arguing against it. The West's response will be determined, in each case, by how its various members appraise the balance sheet. This appraisal offers the reassurance that the West is unlikely to be paralyzed by OOA challenges: Indeed, many of them will be handled with the decisiveness demanded by the moment. But this appraisal also leaves the worrisome conclusion that—as matters now stand—the United States and its allies might fail to respond in more than a few cases. In international politics, unfortunately, even a relatively high response score might not be enough, because even one bungled crisis, or a few failures compressed into a narrow time frame, might result in serious defeats with cascading consequences.
The West’s behavior, however, will be determined by two additional determinants that in many ways override all 15 factors listed here, determinants in which lie hope for a far better performance at OOA crisis management.

**U.S. Leadership**

The first determinant is U.S. leadership. As the world’s only superpower, the United States has a strong capacity to shape how future crises unfold, and how each situation is defined by potential partners. The Persian Gulf crisis showed how well this leadership can be exercised; the Balkans crisis suggests how American detachment can help induce multilateral paralysis.

The core reason behind the need for U.S. leadership is that the West European nations—and most other countries that might participate in OOA operations—are at best medium-sized military powers that normally are hard-pressed to develop a common stance on their own. This is a near-permanent feature of coalition dynamics that will not be changed until, many years from now, the European Community builds a true security identity. Throughout the Cold War, it was U.S. leadership that enabled the West European nations to join together on behalf of a common endeavor. By exerting similar leadership in the future, the United States will be able in many cases to shape the goals, policies, strategies, force relationships, costs, benefits, and risks so that powerful incentives are created for other potential partners to favor a combined response. But for this leadership to be effective, it must be exercised.

**Overall Alliance Strategic Policy**

The second determinant is overall alliance strategic policy, which defines the framework of values, visions, goals, fears, and expectations within which individual crises are judged. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, the United States and its allies were able to surmount all the ambiguities and difficulties of the situation because they had a strategic policy of utmost clarity: that the Persian Gulf oil fields could not be allowed to fall under the control of a threatening adversary. By contrast, a key reason for the Western alliance’s hesitant and confused stance on Bosnia is that it currently does not
possess a fully elaborated strategic policy for East Central Europe and the Balkans. As a result, it lacks a frame of reference for determining Bosnia's larger implications; therefore, it tends to see the Bosnian crisis in isolation rather than as part of a larger strategic mosaic.

A coherent strategic policy does not automatically beget military intervention for every OOA crisis, but it provides a better basis for farsighted judgment, and it can sharply tip the scales in favor of intervention when that step is appropriate but is rendered difficult by secondary obstacles. In the absence of a strategic policy, individual crises will tend to be viewed as purely local events whose consequences neither affect other places nor stretch outward in time. Equally important, Western nations will be prone to view each crisis primarily through the lens of their national interests, defined in narrow Palmerstonian terms (i.e., "there are no permanent friends, just permanent interests"), rather than as a challenge to larger common values shared with many nations. For both reasons, the lack of a strategic policy creates a powerful bias against involvement: Why intervene if the event is purely local and one's own interests are not immediately threatened? Indeed, its ultimate logic is one of re-nationalization—a tendency to develop policies and plans on a purely national basis, as opposed to multilateralism—across the entire Western alliance: Why look outward together if we are pursuing our separate destinies, and if the challenges being faced beyond our borders are fragmented and compartmentalized?

Questions for the Future

The issue of NATO's strategic policy is especially important with regard to East Central Europe and the Balkans. NATO seemingly has a firm, if informal, strategic policy toward the Persian Gulf, albeit less so for the Middle East. Because other regions are so distant and less than vital to Western Europe, a strategic policy is not needed, nor are NATO forces likely to be committed there. Owing to their proximity to Western Europe and the drama of post-communist reform taking place in them, however, the regions of Central Europe and the Balkans are a different matter.
To achieve a true strategic policy for these regions, important questions need to be answered if the West is to surmount its present ambivalence:

- Are the dangers emerging from these regions irrelevant to NATO's security, or at least events that can be kept at bay by a defense shield built along NATO's borders?
- Or do the combination of xenophobic nationalism, nuclear proliferation, power vacuums, fluid borders, economic turmoil, and political chaos pose a grave threat to Europe as a whole, a threat from which Western Europe cannot be insulated?
- To the extent these problems must be solved for reasons that go beyond the West's physical security, is the purpose to protect the narrow geopolitical interests of NATO's nations?
- Or is the purpose to promote the common values of lawful international conduct, democracy, civic society, free enterprise, and peaceful community?
- To the extent that military power projection into these regions is NATO's defense strategy, is the purpose to resolve local regional conflicts that might arise in East Central Europe and the Balkans?
- Or is the purpose to provide the foundation of collective security that democracy requires in order to grow?

The answers to these questions have important implications for Western interventions in OOA operations east of NATO's borders. If Bosnia is perceived as a local crisis that engages only the narrow interests of individual Western nations, then detachment may have been the best course. But if Bosnia is seen as part of a larger sickness that threatens to engulf Europe and to damage larger Western values and vision, then a different stance might be appropriate. What applies to Bosnia, in all likelihood will apply to many OOA crises of the future. In an age of ambiguity, the key issue will not be the crisis itself but, rather, its larger implications. These implications will be understandable only if the Western nations see Europe and its surrounding regions as a whole, and themselves know where they are headed, as reflected in their policies toward out-of-area operations, discussed in Chapter Three.
Now that the Persian Gulf conflict has set a new precedent but the Balkans crisis has illuminated the impediments that remain strong, prospects for regular U.S.–allied cooperation on OOA operations will depend on how potential participants define their future interests and policies. This chapter assesses prospects for future convergence according to the answers to the following questions:

- What political judgments are likely to hold sway among the United States, West European allies, and other potential partners in the years ahead?
- What is implied for the type, size, and location of OOA operations likely to be launched?
- In particular, what are the prospects that the Western alliance will adopt a new outward-looking strategic policy under U.S. leadership?

NEAR TERM VERSUS LONG TERM

In answering these questions, a distinction must be made between the near term and the long term. Near-term policies will remain dominated by the inward-looking political and economic imperatives now confronting governments across the alliance, including the United States. Long-term policies will be dictated more by the enduring interests and strategic goals of these nations, and by the turbulent international environment confronting them.
For the near term (1–2 years), the picture that emerges is one of growing policy acceptance of OOA cooperation, but in slow and uneven ways. To date, the United States is the most forthcoming, but in many respects, even its attitude is cautious. Trailing behind are the West European nations, with some more willing to become involved than others. For all, willingness to use institutional structures (including NATO) is growing, but chariness remains about making formal commitments prior to the occurrence of actual situations. Consensus is strongest for OOA operations in the Persian Gulf (where NATO is least relevant) and, as yet, far weaker for operations in the Balkans and East Central Europe. Humanitarian aid and peacemaking are accepted military missions, but more demanding missions—peace enforcement and the extension of collective security guarantees—do not yet enjoy support.

In the mid-term (2–4 years), the trend toward greater acceptance of OOA operations seems destined to grow stronger, but at an uncertain pace. Assessments must be anchored on the premise that, although current developments can be observed and forecasts can be offered, conclusions are tentative. For most nations, OOA operations fall into the gray area between vital interests and peripheral interests: an area where military intervention can be neither guaranteed nor ruled out. Growing requirements for these operations are emerging at a time of rapid international changes that are reshaping the ways in which national interests are defined and threats are evaluated. These factors work together to defy any attempt to forge a clear doctrine, thereby confronting all nations with the difficult task of grappling with an amorphous policy calculus, one affected by subjective evaluation. This calculus is being addressed mostly by democratic governments, whose policies emerge from the interplay of pluralist institutions and ever-shifting political crosscurrents. Especially because old dogmas are giving way to new stances that themselves are conditional, analysis here confronts a variety of “moving trains,” traveling at variable speeds, in changeable directions, toward unknown destinations.

For the long term (5 years and beyond), a clearer strategic picture emerges, one that points national policies outward. By this time, the United States and its West European allies probably will have surmounted their current inward-looking stance, and will come to embrace security policies that reflect their emerging interests and strategic goals. Pulling their security policies eastward, into East
Central Europe and even the Balkans, will be their own efforts to foster democracy, free-market prosperity, and membership in the Western community. Indeed, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and other nations may gain entry into the European Community (EC). With EC membership will come the opportunity to join the West European Union (WEU), a collective defense alliance that is embedded in NATO. This development alone will compel NATO nations to look eastward.

Supporting these positive goals will be the need to export security to help quell the forces of turbulence and chaos that threaten to sweep over East Central Europe, the Balkans, and surrounding regions. The specter of resurgent nationalism, power vacuums, military imbalances, nuclear proliferation, flawed borders, diaspora, economic upheaval, and political instability threatens not only to weaken democracy but also to produce a dangerous era of shifting alliances, rivalry, chronic violence, and war. What applies to Europe applies also to the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, regions that face dangerous upheavals of their own. Unless the Western alliance believes that it can isolate itself from these trends in an era of growing interdependence, it will have no alternative but to look beyond its borders and be prepared to act there.

The great question is whether and how the Western alliance will surmount its current internal orientation fast enough to forge policies that allow it to support its expanding interests and to quell mounting dangers before they have gone too far. Because of the rapidity with which change is taking place in those turbulent regions, a delay of five to ten years will be too long. The West’s responsiveness is uncertain, but awareness of the need to look outward and into the future appears to be growing in important sectors on both sides of the Atlantic. The outcome will depend upon whether the United States shows leadership, and whether the West Europeans display the strategic vision to look outward themselves. The following sections examine the national policies toward OOA operations that have been, or are being, formulated in the United States and Western Europe.
THE UNITED STATES

At the time of this writing, the Clinton Administration's foreign policy and defense strategy have not yet been fully crafted. Hence, the best that can be offered is an assessment that combines the Bush Administration's legacy, Clinton's early actions, and contemporary trends in the United States. This assessment unavoidably has a short-term perspective that is dominated by the inward-looking attitudes now prevailing in many quarters. For the mid- to long term, American policy will be influenced by the fact that the United States remains a global superpower with growing interests abroad, and that the more multipolar international system ahead already is showing signs of more instability than was originally anticipated. These factors will pull in the direction of greater U.S. support for multilateral cooperation with allies in out-of-area operations.

An appraisal of current U.S. policy can best begin with an assessment of the American military strategy bequeathed by the Bush Administration. The Persian Gulf War drove home the lessons that American interests can still be threatened in the post–Cold War era, and that U.S. military forces and coalition operations provide effective instruments for dealing with threats. The outcome has been to elevate awareness of potential regional conflicts, and to clear away reluctance, growing out of the post-Vietnam syndrome, to become involved in them. This outcome was embraced in the "regional military strategy" laid down by the Bush Administration, a strategy that called upon the Pentagon to focus defense preparations on the Desert Storms of the future.1

The year 1992 witnessed small U.S. military involvements in humanitarian and peacekeeping missions in several places. Press reports, meanwhile, suggested that DoD planners were addressing three hypothetical major regional contingencies (MRCs): in Korea, East Central Europe, and the Persian Gulf. The Korean contingency involves defense of the Republic of Korea (ROK) against attack by the

demilitarized zone (DMZ): a long-standing U.S. commitment. A good deal more controversial was the idea of a joint U.S.–West European defense of Poland and Lithuania against a large invading Russian Army. This concept signaled official acceptance of the idea that major force operations in Europe might have to be carried out east of NATO’s borders. Public outcry led to a decision to de-emphasize the specific location of this MRC; no special military programs were launched to enhance DoD capabilities for it. The basic decision to develop military plans for a major U.S.–allied intervention somewhere in East Central Europe was not abandoned, and in a general way remains on the Pentagon’s books.²

The need to be prepared for another major war in the Persian Gulf was more widely accepted in the public domain. As of mid-1992, press reports held that Iraq was reassembling a military force about 40 percent as large as that present when the Gulf War occurred: 28 divisions, 2,500 tanks, 1,500 artillery tubes, and 350 aircraft—enough to launch a smaller but still potent invasion of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Iran was also emerging as a potential military threat. Its efforts to buy Russian military equipment, including submarines, pointed to a growing capability to impede Western access to Persian Gulf waters. In addition, Saddam Hussein’s diminished political role in regional affairs has opened the way for a more assertive Iranian profile aimed at wielding influence in the Persian Gulf.³

To help deter these threats and reassure friendly nations, sizable American forces remained in the region: 24,000 troops, 150 aircraft, 8 Patriot missile batteries, 1 carrier task force, and 26 ships. In addition, U.S. ground forces were periodically deploying for training exercises with Kuwait and other friendly nations. Meanwhile, the United States signed 10-year bilateral security agreements with Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain, and renewed a long-standing agreement with Oman. U.S. security relations with Saudi Arabia remained less


formal but still close. A principal purpose of these measures was to provide for prepositioning of U.S. equipment, access to naval facilities, and bilateral training exercises.4

Even so, continuing American hesitancy about involvement in OOA operations was manifested in a variety of ways. Most obviously, the U.S. government studiously refrained from committing American forces to major military intervention in the former Yugoslavia. The steps finally taken were small, reluctant, short of any major involvement, and less than those made by other countries. This stance reflected traditional American reluctance to become involved in peacekeeping operations, which Washington has preferred would be implemented by allied nations less encumbered by global commitments. This stance also reflected doubts that the Balkans are a vital geographic region to U.S. interests and worry that military intervention there could succeed at acceptable cost. The effect was to make clear that sharp constraints still existed on American willingness to commit forces for murky purposes in secondary regions.

These constraints were further reinforced by the “Decisive Force” doctrine laid down by the Pentagon. Embraced by the White House, this doctrine envisions future regional conflicts being fought along Desert Storm lines. For each crisis, it mandates development of clear national goals, a coherent relationship between military means and political ends, and a sound military strategy aimed at employing forces. It outlines a quick military buildup, followed by application of overpowering forces to destroy the adversary and achieve national goals, and culminating in a prompt withdrawal. Its intent is to avoid any repeat of the disastrous gradualism and weak strategy of the Vietnam War.

In laying down these guidelines, the Decisive Force doctrine also makes clear the Pentagon’s distaste for becoming involved in wars that fail to provide Desert Storm’s clarity, Bosnia being a good example. By calling for a coherent policy and strategy, this doctrine argues against participation in conflicts whose goals are hard to determine in advance. By asserting that U.S. forces should remain aloof until conditions permit massive intervention, it argues against

graduated buildups. By calling for overpowering force, it argues against the restrained application of combat power in response to complex diplomatic settings. By calling for prompt withdrawal, it rules out the kind of lingering presence that can be demanded by crises that wind down slowly. To be sure, the Decisive Force doctrine provides a preferred model, not a rigid script; even so, it sets limits on the conflicts in which U.S. forces would become involved.

The future of these Bush Administration policies will be determined by the departures embarked upon by the Clinton Administration. During his campaign in 1992, Bill Clinton broadly endorsed the national policy and strategy followed by President George Bush. But he was critical of Bush’s failure either to promote democracy in former communist countries in Europe or to intervene in Yugoslavia. Also, he expressed regret at Bush’s decision to halt Desert Storm before the Iraq Army was destroyed. These criticisms suggested a tendency to define U.S. interests more expansively and a greater willingness to use force for crisis-management purposes. This proactive stance on force employment was reinforced by then-Congressman Les Aspin’s similar-minded critique of the Decisive Force doctrine. Aspin’s appointment as Secretary of Defense presumably signaled Clinton’s agreement with this critique.5

Weighing against any wholesale shift to a more activist stance on foreign policy is President Clinton’s intent to focus on domestic economic problems. Although Clinton stated that he would pursue assertive policies in both spheres, preoccupation with domestic policy could yield a restrained approach to foreign policy. Also, Clinton’s emphasis on international economic competitiveness, revised burden-sharing, and altered trade practices could blunt the edge of security cooperation with the West European nations, including cooperation in OOA operations. Moreover, Clinton has called for reduced defense spending and a revamped U.S. military strategy focused on power projection rather than forward presence. At a minimum, fewer forces will be available for regional conflicts—a development reflected in the emerging debate over whether the force

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5Clinton’s campaign positions were presented in foreign policy speeches delivered at Georgetown University, New York, Los Angeles, and Milwaukee. In 1991, Aspin issued several House Armed Services Committee papers that criticized the Base Force and the Decisive Force doctrine.
posture will be large enough for two concurrent contingencies. Beyond this, Clinton's caution about intervening in Bosnia in the absence of multilateral consensus indicates that his actions will be less assertive than was suggested during the campaign.

Quite apart from how Clinton forges his policies, the stance of the U.S. Congress remains to be determined. The decision to initiate Desert Storm, taken after the UN had approved the action, passed the Senate and House by only narrow margins. The subsequent victory temporarily blunted calls against involvements in similar wars, and Clinton's election spells at least a temporary end to a divided government. As the Carter years showed, however, single-party control of the executive and legislative branches does not guarantee harmony.

A key issue is whether congressional support will be forthcoming for involvements in such crises as the civil war in Bosnia. Although isolationist sentiment is not yet widespread, preference for a reduced international profile could grow in response to mounting economic and fiscal problems.\(^6\) Even peacekeeping operations are not cheap: The expense is one reason for congressional obduracy on an American role in UN operations. Even though Desert Storm was heavily funded by allies, future operations might not be similarly endowed. The federal coffers probably will remain open to military operations that have a clear-cut purpose and are successful, but murky operations may be a different matter.

Future policies toward OOA operations will be affected heavily by how official Washington defines American interests in areas where such operations might take place. As long as NATO exists, the United States will continue to regard defense of alliance borders in Europe as a vital interest. It also will continue to regard defense of the Persian Gulf oil fields as vital. If confronted with threats to these interests, a powerful American military response can be expected, regardless of allied participation. Defense of the Gulf oil fields aside,

however, many future OOA operations seem destined to be conducted in regions long considered less than vital.

In the years ahead, international changes now under way seem destined to lead the United States to upgrade its assessment of its interests in East Central Europe, the Balkans, and the western areas of the former USSR. Most probably, these areas will fall into a new category of "major interests," that is, somewhere between vital and peripheral, in ways opening the door to commitments of forces when the conditions are right, but not mandating commitment in all circumstances. Many nations in these regions will be pursuing democracy and free enterprise, and drawing closer to the European Community and NATO. Their economic involvement with Western nations also will be growing in response to mounting trade and investment. Any major spread of violence, instability, and malevolent conduct could create local crises that escalate in ways threatening the physical security and vital interests of NATO's members. For all these reasons, it is hard to escape the conclusion that West European interests are marching eastward, pulling along with them the interests of the United States.

A similar judgment applies to the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, and various Western interventions are possible. For example, defense of pro-Western governments against Islamic extremism is one possibility: Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia are obvious candidates. Counterterrorism is another possibility. Indeed, angry North African nations might come to pose conventional air and missile threats to Western commerce in the Mediterranean, or to NATO's southern borders. Yet another possibility is prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction, or the enforcement of UN-endorsed codes of conduct, as currently being enforced against Iraq. The emergence of threats to these interests could influence the United States to consider the use of military forces in many more situations than before. Beyond that, developments in Europe and the Middle East-Persian Gulf confront the United States with a strategic dilemma that will have to be addressed at least in the long-term: To what degree would the Western alliance export security outward.

Over the coming decade and beyond, U.S. policy toward OOA operations will depend on which of three strategic options is embraced by
Washington. The first option calls for the United States to disengage from entangling-alliance commitments. In this case, responsibility for security management would be transferred to the West Europeans. The second option calls for the status quo, in which NATO would remain focused on border defense. In this case, Americans and West Europeans would jointly conduct OOA operations through ad hoc mechanisms, but these operations would be undertaken quite selectively: only when the West’s geostrategic interests are directly threatened. The third option calls for NATO to undergo strategic transformation by exporting security outward as part of an effort to promote democratic values. In this case, OOA operations would be determined in response to broader criteria than narrow interests, and they would be carried out through formal multilateral mechanisms. Because each of these options responds to a unique logic, each would require the United States to exercise leadership in very different ways.

WEST EUROPEAN NATIONS

This assessment of these nations begins with short-term imperatives, then transitions into long-term trends. Like the United States, West European nations came away from the Desert Storm success with a greater willingness to participate in multilateral OOA operations. As a result, 1992 saw forces from several of these nations appear in UN-sponsored peacekeeping missions in the former Yugoslavia, the Persian Gulf, and Somalia. Indeed, German forces began taking part in peacekeeping missions for the first time by helping to deliver humanitarian assistance to, and to monitor sanctions in, the Balkans. With wariness about major involvement in the Balkans pervading nearly all capitals, however, most West European governments continue to have strong reservations about any open-ended commitment to OOA enterprises.

Dominating the agenda today is a strenuous debate over the European Community’s future that has left the Continent self-absorbed, inward-looking, and doubtful about the future. The signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1991, which charted the path toward economic and political union, produced an upsurge of optimism, but the embarrassing aftermath left participants downcast. Shortly after the treaty was sent to EC members for ratification,
Denish voters stunned the Community by rejecting it. The treaty was defeated by a narrow margin, but polls showed that public opinion in other countries was far less enamored of Maastricht than were the EC elite. British negativism led the way, but governments in other nations grew worried about the prospects for public approval. Even France, long a nation of pro-EC sentiment, emerged as an uncertain ratifier.\footnote{See William Drozdiak, “EC Staggers Under Weight of Unity Bill,” \textit{Washington Post}, February 15, 1992; “A Sea of Change,” \textit{The Economist}, March 14, 1992, and “New Doubts Surface Over EC Unity Plan,” \textit{Washington Post}, April 11, 1992, and Walter Goldstein, “Europe After Maastricht,” \textit{Foreign Affairs}, Winter 1992/93, pp. 117–132.}

Common complaints held that Maastricht went too far toward transferring power to the EC bureaucracy in Brussels, thereby sacrificing national sovereignty. The distribution of power among EC institutions was cause for dispute, with France favoring executive authority and Germany endorsing stronger parliamentary control. Likewise, the Community fell into disagreement over how many new members to admit, and how fast. Further contributing to growing strife was the collapse of the Community’s Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), brought about by Germany’s refusal to lower interest rates. Driven by a desire to prevent inflation, Germany’s action produced recession-enhancing effects in Britain and Italy. To adopt the lower interest rates needed to stimulate their stagnant economies, both nations were compelled to withdraw their currencies from the ERM.

By late fall 1992, the EC had passed through the worst and was slowly recovering. Following efforts to provide reassurances that the EC would not sap members of their national identities, an election in France ratified the treaty. With Ireland also approving, hope grew that a second vote in Denmark might endorse Maastricht, thereby allowing the British Parliament to acquiesce. Afterwards, an EC summit in Scotland reaffirmed Maastricht’s goals, and produced tacit acceptance of a two-tiered approach that would allow the most eager partners to pursue unity faster than the more doubtful. Continued progress toward economic and monetary policy thus seemed back on track, and planning resumed to open negotiations aimed at admitting wealthy European nations capable of enhancing the EC’s prosperity. By mid-1993, Denmark had approved Maastricht in a second vote, and the treaty seemed destined to es-
cape challenges in Britain and Germany. Even so, the Maastricht Treaty had been dealt a staggering setback, and with many observers now doubting that the EC would become more than a customs union anytime soon, the idea of a common foreign policy seemed farther removed than ever.\(^8\)

For the years ahead, the EC's travails leave the West European nations with the sovereignty to decide on foreign policy, thereby casting a bright spotlight on their individual roles. Reacting to Maastricht's dimming prospects, some observers speculated that re-nationalization—the vigorous pursuit of national diplomatic agendas—would be the consequence. The dominant trend, however, has been different: the onset of turbulent domestic changes that have weakened the once-strong governments of key countries. Especially affected have been Britain, Germany, and France—the powers that shape Western Europe's approach to regional security affairs. The result has been the emergence of uncertain foreign policy agendas that, for the immediate future, at least, cloud prospects for participation in OOA operations.

**Great Britain**

In Great Britain, Prime Minister John Major's government won a surprise reelection victory over a Labor Party that had begun tacking in a centrist (i.e., combining liberal and conservative policies) direction but pursued a flawed campaign strategy. Presiding over a rebellious Parliament and a divided cabinet, Major found himself confronting a sluggish economy, currency troubles, complaints about the Maastricht Treaty, and budgetary squabbles. Unable to juggle all these balls at once and lacking Margaret Thatcher's panache, Major was criticized for confusion about his priorities and

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weak leadership in the face of adversity. In addition to his domestic troubles, the prime minister came under attack for an allegedly anemic performance during Britain’s six-month stint as rotational head of the EC. Only a few months after his electoral victory, Major’s position had been seriously eroded.9

Although the Conservative Party retains a reduced majority in the House of Commons, Major’s hold on power seems secure for the immediate future. His ability to pursue an assertive foreign policy, however, is a question mark. With the defense budget under attack, the British stance on OOA operations is vulnerable to political vicissitudes in London. Britain reaped the rewards of enhanced prestige for its role in Desert Storm, but this gain has not translated into eager willingness to plunge into Yugoslavia. Major dispatched several thousand troops and some naval vessels to participate in peacekeeping there, and he authorized diplomat David Owen to represent the EC in trying to find a diplomatic solution. But with British forces spread thin by also being present in the Persian Gulf and Ireland, Major’s personal doubts about further military intervention in the Balkans were reinforced by strong opposition not only from Labor but also from within his own party. Both Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd and Defense Minister Malcolm Rifkind downplayed any British role beyond peacekeeping, and the House of Commons did not disagree.10

Germany

In Germany, the once-vigorous Helmut Kohl government is showing signs of political indecision. Although the German economy remains Europe’s strongest, recession has blunted growth, leaving unease about the future. Unemployment is high in the eastern Laender (regional states), and the exorbitant costs of rebuilding the Eastern economy have produced a growing deficit and inflationary pressures.


Meanwhile, an upsurge in refugees from Eastern Europe and the Balkans has produced domestic protests, ethnic violence, and a troubling reappearance of right-wing extremism. Amid these strains, Kohl’s CDU (Christian Democratic Union) has suffered embarrassing setbacks in local elections, and the SPD opposition, formerly quiescent, is again asserting itself.¹¹

The negative effect on German foreign policy has been exacerbated by the departure of Genscher, who in 1983 broke ranks with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt when the ruling SPD drifted leftward, thereby ushering the CDU into power. Genscher’s latest leave-taking suggests a possible SPD-FDP realignment that would remove Kohl from office. Even short of this, the new FDP foreign minister, Klaus Kinkel, has not shown Genscher’s mastery of diplomacy, and he presides over a diplomatic corps with a reputation for hostility toward using German forces abroad. With the ambitious CDU politician Volker Ruehe presiding over the more conservative defense ministry, a struggle over German foreign policy broke out in mid-1992. OOA operations was the focus of contentious debate, which erupted against the background of a German population that has long grown accustomed to thinking only about its own security, is glad to dispense with all worries about military planning, and is little inclined to support any hint of imperial pretensions elsewhere.

In the aftermath of sharp criticism levied at Germany for its low profile during the Gulf War, Kohl in 1991 launched an effort to broaden his latitude for future involvements. Opposing him were the SPD and other groups that cited the constitutional prohibition against using German forces outside the NATO area. The explosive developments in the Balkans during 1992, brought about by mounting Western outrage over Serbian “ethnic cleansing” of Bosnian Muslims, added fuel to the long-simmering OOA debate in Germany. Kohl initially elected to allow German troops to help UN forces deliver food in besieged Sarajevo, a step that enjoyed broad support. Bitter controversy erupted, however, when Kohl decided in July to send the German destroyer Bayern and three reconnaissance planes to help NATO and WEU forces monitor enforcement of sanctions.

Controversy mounted further when it became known that reconnaissance missions over the Adriatic would be mounted from airbases in Germany, and that a German officer was in command of NATO AWACS flights patrolling the Adriatic.12

Pointing to pressure from the United States and other European nations, Kinkel justified the action as an effort by Germany to drop its "shirker" role and quit behaving like an "international dwarf" in these situations. Asserting that they "will not permit a sneaking movement toward combat missions by the German military around the world," SPD politicians accused Kohl of violating the German constitution. Kohl dropped his earlier acknowledgment of this argument by pointing to a constitutional clause permitting Germany to "enter a system of mutual collective security." Because this clause was the original justification for entering NATO, not operating outside it, legal experts raised their eyebrows, with some agreeing with Kohl but others dissenting. Kinkel himself adopted a position opposed to Kohl's when he asserted that Germany should participate in OOA missions, but only after the constitution has been changed to allow for this course.

Meanwhile, public opinion polls showed that nearly 65 percent of respondents were opposed to combat involvement in Yugoslavia, and 54 percent were opposed to any German military missions outside NATO territory. Faced with this reluctance, Kohl and Ruehe remained steadfast in their determination to participate in UN duties and to reconfigure German foreign policy for the new era. As a practical matter, however, they confronted the prospect that SPD approval would be needed for any enduring policy departure beyond humanitarian gestures. Kohl elected to keep German warships and aircraft on station in the Adriatic, but he ruled out any step-by-step expansion of Germany's role, and Ruehe voiced his preference to revise the constitution before further involvements were accepted.

By November, the gap between the CDU–FDP coalition and the SPD had narrowed, but only slightly. Overcoming left-wing opposition, a special SPD party congress agreed to endorse a constitutional amendment allowing the Bundestag to approve, case by case, German military participation in UN-sponsored peacekeeping missions. The SPD congress, however, rejected any role in peacemaking or related combat missions. Kohl reacted by welcoming the SPD concessions but demanding a more sweeping amendment allowing for fighting missions. During the following weeks, the situation in Bosnia worsened and the UN coalition drew closer to intervening militarily, thereby throwing German politics into further turbulence.

As of late January, firm solutions were not in sight. Kohl continued to insist on greater authority to commit German forces. But although the SPD was now willing to support participation in formal UN combat operations, it still opposed any role alongside allies in non-UN operations, even if blessed by the UN (e.g., Yugoslavia). In response, Kinkel asserted that German crews would have to be withdrawn from NATO reconnaissance aircraft if the UN decided to enforce flight restrictions on Serbian aircraft. He further threatened to lead the FDP out of the government if combat operations were launched without amending the constitution. Amid this legal wrangling, politicians awaited a ruling by the constitutional court in Karlsruhe on whether airborne German soldiers could help direct combat from the rear. Moreover, Kohl unveiled a defense budget calling for deep manpower cuts, reduced procurement, and even lower force levels than were endorsed only a year earlier. Preoccupied with legalities and budgets at the expense of making external policy, the German political system entered 1993 in a way that raised questions about its ability to cope with the new era.13

France

In contrast to Germany, France has emerged as the West European nation most willing to contemplate OOA operations, albeit in less

formally coordinated ways than are favored by Washington and London. This development owes heaviy to President François Mitterand, but also reflects a strategic assessment of the French government and political elite. During 1992, Mitterand not only sent French vessels and peacekeeping troops to the Balkans, he also made a dangerous personal pilgrimage to Sarajevo. Mitterand has been neither an advocate of reckless adventures nor an enthusiastic backer of NATO’s integrated command. Nonetheless, he has made clear France’s intent to interpret its interests in terms stretching well beyond NATO’s borders. The result has been an assertive French diplomacy that has improved prospects for joint collaboration in carrying out OOA missions.

The looming question is Mitterand’s staying power in office. Despite his success at elevating France’s diplomatic profile, Mitterand in early 1993 found himself battling cancer and an eroding political position at home. His political troubles were caused by high unemployment, large budget deficits, high interest rates, and recent losses in local elections. He had shepherded the Maastricht Treaty through a tough national referendum; but, with the EC pressuring France to accept lower agricultural subsidies to achieve a GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) accord, he found himself under attack by outraged farmers. Within the General Assembly, his most immediate challenge was to fend off efforts to weaken presidential control over foreign and defense policies. Ahead in early 1993 were parliamentary elections that seemed destined to deprive the Socialist Party of majority control, thereby producing a conservative prime minister. In the elections, conservative Edouard Balladur became prime minister, thereby leaving France with a divided government.

President Mitterand’s critics were now calling on him to resign before 1995, the next scheduled presidential election. Mitterand vowed to serve out his full term, but his declining health and eroding political influence raised questions about his ability to carry out his policies. Waiting to succeed him as leader of the Socialist Party were Michel Rocard and EC head Jacques Delors, but neither seemed to

elicit enthusiasm from the French electorate. Indeed, Socialists contemplated the possibility that their party was on the downslide, headed toward an era of being on the fringes of French politics.

Such reversals reinforced Mitterand’s caution about getting bogged down in the Balkans. As a result, he continued to support the Owen-Vance peace initiative and to back get-tough signals emanating from Washington. However, he displayed no enthusiasm for committing French forces to combat. Balladur’s assumption to power left an unclear picture of future French policy, because the conservative movement is split into two parties: the neo-Gaullist Rassemblement pour la République led by Jacques Chirac and the more moderate Union pour la Démocratie Française led by Valery Giscard d’Estaing. Each party shuns both isolationism and headstrong involvement in East European affairs. But, since both parties are less supportive of multilateralism than Mitterand, their stance toward cooperative OOA endeavors is uncertain.\textsuperscript{15}

Other West European Countries

In Italy, an upsurge of regionalism and an anti-corruption campaign have further divided an already-fragmented political system, thereby leaving the Socialists and Christian Democrats still in power but facing even greater internal debate than usual. Elsewhere, national politics are being dominated by the sluggish recession that earlier swept over the United States, and by inward-looking societies critical of existing governments and policies. Italy, Greece, the Netherlands, Spain, and Turkey all contributed peacekeeping contingents to Yugoslavia, but their commitment was accompanied by strong reservations about major combat involvement. Indeed, growing concern that fighting would spread to the Kosovo and Macedonia raised the prospect that Greece and Turkey might be drawn in, against each other. Beyond doubt, this development would add a new twist to the difficult task of forging a common agenda for OOA operations.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{15}“The French Right: Divided,” \textit{The Economist}, October 31, 1992.

The Outlook for Western Europe

Across all of Western Europe, the effect of mounting domestic troubles has been to restrict the ability of governments to launch new foreign policy departures. For the most part, existing governments have an internationalist outlook. Pluralism’s dynamics are causing this stance to be challenged by opposition parties that are growing stronger. Equally important, the public is wearied from the long Cold War struggle and wants to address domestic problems, not foreign adventures: a trend that is exacerbated by the re-emergence of right-wing parties. At a minimum, these impediments will remain strong until general elections in 1993–1995 determine the future leadership of Germany and France. At that juncture, Bonn, Paris, and London might pursue an energetic diplomacy, pulling Western Europe along with them. However, if Kohl is swept out of power and Mitterand is replaced by a less foreign policy–minded president, both nations might display the opposite behavior. In this event, the rest of Western Europe could also follow in their footsteps.

These short-term political uncertainties notwithstanding, long-term prospects for OOA cooperation will largely depend upon how the West European nations judge their growing interests and goals beyond their borders. The nation with by far the greatest interests at stake in East Central Europe and the Balkans is Germany, and these interests are destined to grow in future years. Although its population today remains inward-looking, Germany is a powerful nation that already is coming under strong pressure from its allies to play a more weighty and constructive role in European security affairs. For these reasons, the eventual emergence of an outward-looking diplomacy is inevitable. At that juncture, hostility to militarism conceivably could give way to a more accepting stance toward OOA cooperation there, but Germany’s history will remain a powerful impediment to activism’s being accepted elsewhere in Europe.

By comparison, most other West European nations will not feel a similar eastward tug from their geostrategic interests. Growing economic and political relations with nations in East Central Europe and the Balkans may elevate their horizons somewhat, but whether such elevation will translate into support for cooperative OOA endeavors is another matter. Participation in humanitarian and peacekeeping missions is one thing, but as Yugoslavia shows, major combat is
something else again. The important exception to this pattern may be Britain and France, which have histories of eastward-looking policies. But even for these nations, the incentives for major military entanglements will have to be quite powerful to lure them into decisive action.

A quite different West European calculus applies when the Middle East and the Persian Gulf are considered. For all nations, the vital interest is access to Persian Gulf oil. For the foreseeable future, the emergence of any threat to this interest can be counted on to influence most nations to consider military involvement. Yet, the West European nations will bring differing attitudes toward future Gulf interventions. Britain and France will be the nations most willing to join OOA operations there, with Italy and several smaller powers joining more reluctantly. The great imponderable is whether Germany will broaden its horizons to the Persian Gulf. Only time will tell.
Chapter Four

MULTILATERAL POLICIES TOWARD OOA OPERATIONS

The future of OOA operations will depend on the degree to which they can be carried out through existing multilateral institutions. This chapter analyzes the ability of the UN, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the WEU/EC, and NATO to conduct these operations.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND CSCE

Because the UN and CSCE are large collective security bodies that operate on the basis of similar principles, they will be discussed together here.

United Nations

In the aftermath of Desert Storm, optimism grew that the long-dormant UN could be transformed into a robust institution for addressing security problems around the world, and even for mounting military operations. During early 1992, this optimism seemed justified as the UN acted to deal with security tensions in Europe, Africa, and Asia. Over 20,000 peacekeepers were sent to Cambodia, and similar numbers were sent to the former Yugoslavia and to Somalia, where they helped clear the way for delivery of humanitarian aid aimed at relieving widespread famine caused by civil war. These deployments added to the smaller and long-standing UN presences in the Middle East, Cyprus, and other areas. What is especially noteworthy about
the Somalia operation is that U.S. forces served as the vanguard, to be replaced later when a multinational contingent was formed.¹

These experiences imply that the UN might be involved more often in the years ahead, and that policies should be adopted to better configure it for this role. If the goal is not only to provide political approval but also to mount military operations, however, important impediments will stand in the way of any wholesale resort to the UN as it is currently constituted. One problem is that the UN lacks the assets to mount and sustain large operations. Its budget is small and underfunded, and its small staff is overloaded and lacks skills in planning complex missions. When military operations are launched, selection of commanding officers is often governed by political criteria that can lead to dubious military effectiveness. Equally impor-

¹Current UN peacekeeping operations include the following:

• UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in Middle East; 300 observers drawn from 30 nations
• UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP); 35 observers from 8 nations
• UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP); 2,200 troops from four nations, with staff officers and civil police detachments from four other nations
• UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), separating Israeli and Syrian forces; includes 1,300 troops from four nations
• UN Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), in Sinai; includes 2,680 troops from 11 nations
• UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (UNUSAL); includes 291 observers from nine nations
• UN Iraq/Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM); units from four nations and observers from 30 nations
• UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO); includes 343 troops from three nations
• UN Angola Verification Mission II; includes 440 military and police observers from 23 nations
• UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC); includes 14,300 troops from 11 nations
• UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Croatia and Bosnia; includes 23,780 military and police personnel from 18 nations
• UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM); includes 28,000 U.S. troops, to be replaced by comparable force drawn from multiple nations.

tant, the UN lacks military forces, a command staff, and a logistics structure of its own. It must draw on national contributions that are made on a voluntary basis, and it thus is subject to the constraints imposed by members who choose to participate.

Looming over these technical issues is the matter of gaining the political assent of Security Council members, all of whom enjoy the freedom to impose vetoes if a proposed operation does not suit their tastes. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union was the primary barrier to UN activity, but other members sometimes stood in the way as well. And when Communist China replaced the nationalist regime in Taipei, the problem grew worse. During 1992, the Security Council showed surprising unanimity that allowed the UN to act. Whether this unanimity will be preserved is uncertain. If Germany and Japan are added, the mathematical improbabilities will increase further. Even if Security Council unanimity is preserved, the UN cannot act regularly without the broad consent of the General Assembly. Therefore, the UN’s capacity will depend on whether global consensus is retained.

The United States has endorsed the idea of developing a better UN military capacity for peacekeeping operations. Speaking to the UN General Assembly in mid-1992, President Bush called for support of a proposal by Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to create a UN standing army for these missions. Bush said that a multinational force should be available on short notice, and that its forces should train together, and be backed up by adequate stockpiles of military equipment. Bush offered U.S. support in such areas as lift, logistics, communications, and intelligence. Asserting that the United States was prepared to make its own bases available for multinational training and field exercises, he further said that U.S. armed forces would devote greater effort to training for peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.2 The Clinton Administration has supported these ideas.

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Perhaps the UN will grow in stature in the years ahead, but this outcome is not ensured even if the United States and key allies fully support it. Present trends suggest that the UN will continue to serve as an invaluable forum for airing political grievances and for mobilizing international opinion on behalf of shared values. Moreover, it will remain a viable institution for mounting peacekeeping operations (as in Somalia), albeit operations subject to budgetary and other constraints. Another matter entirely, however, is peacemaking and actual warfighting. Korea and the Persian Gulf conflict showed that when circumstances are ideal, major military operations can be mounted under UN political auspices. But the Balkans illuminates the imposing constraints placed when familiar impediments are present. There, the UN has been able to set broad policy, to deploy peacekeepers, and to pursue sanction-backed diplomacy, but it has waved a weak military "wand." To the extent that future crises resemble Yugoslavia rather than Desert Storm, the UN will not be a stand-alone solution for OOA problems.

CSCE

A similar conclusion must be offered with regard to the CSCE. An outgrowth of European détente dialogue during the Cold War, the CSCE has been trying to create for itself an enduring role in the new era. Adoption of the Helsinki Document (an important CSCE agreement calling for further CSCE involvement in the following areas) in 1992 points the way toward a growing capacity in such areas as arms control negotiations, conflict prevention, crisis management, and peaceful settlement of disputes. Compared with the UN, this body has the advantage of being composed only of European nations. It thus is able to focus on regional troubles without global problems standing in the way. Also important, CSCE is developing an institutional apparatus through creation of a parliamentary assembly, a committee of senior officials, a high commissioner on minorities, and other organs.

Like the UN, however, CSCE suffers from an unwieldy size, deriving from a membership body composed of 53 nations. Moreover, it has no security council capable of decisive action in the event consensus is not widespread. At present, CSCE can act even with a single veto, but not if more than one nation objects. Even when it chooses to act,
it lacks the military forces and command staff to carry out its mandates in peacekeeping and more demanding military missions. Consequently, it depends on the willingness of participants to contribute. During 1992, NATO offered to become a military arm of the CSCE when appropriate, but mounting violence across East Central Europe notwithstanding, no requests have been forthcoming.

Measures to strengthen the CSCE make sense and may be pursued in the years ahead. The CSCE offers the potential capacity to help mobilize opinion against aggression, and to establish broad consensus for policy departures. In time, it might become a valuable adjunct to humanitarian, peacekeeping, and other limited missions. The CSCE's failure to play a leadership role in the Balkans crisis, however, says a great deal about its limited prospects for acting as an effective vehicle for mounting major military operations for peace-making or warfighting. For regions outside Europe, the CSCE will be largely irrelevant; within Europe, its performance is likely to remain uncertain.

Indeed, there are reasonable grounds for concern that any effort to invest CSCE with too much decision authority and veto power could erect a powerful roadblock to constructive action, because near-unanimous consensus is required. Such "roadblocks" will be encountered if Europe's major powers fail to preserve agreement on how emerging security problems are best managed, if smaller powers prove unwilling to take instructions from their larger neighbors, and if the nation-state itself fails to contain conflict within its borders.

In the final analysis, collective security institutions are hard-pressed to work effectively if they are built on the shaky foundations of multipolarity, an ever-shifting military balance of power, endemic historical rivalries, and growing regional stresses.

WEU AND EC

The idea of using the WEU and/or the EC as multilateral institutions for OOA operations has emerged from the growing interest in establishing a separate West European security identity. Both institutions entered the post-Cold War era with only germinal capabilities in this area, but measures have been taken to bring improvements. WEU contributions have been made in both the Persian Gulf War and the
Balkans crisis. Powerful barriers, however, stand in the way of either institution emerging as a full-blown military coalition equivalent to NATO. The commitment of participants is uncertain, fear that a European security pillar might weaken NATO is a powerful constraint, and, in any event, the WEU and EC are competing with each other in ways that could leave both neutralized. Perhaps these impediments eventually will be overcome. For the moment, neither the WEU nor the EC provides a confident mechanism for replacing either NATO or reliance on ad hoc approaches for OOA operations.

The WEU is composed of nine West European nations: Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Luxembourg, Italy, and Portugal. An interesting feature of the WEU is that its founding document, the Brussels Treaty, calls on its members to cooperate together not only to protect members' borders but also to protect their common interests outside Europe.3 Like the NATO Treaty, however, the Brussels Treaty mandates collective defense only for direct attacks against members, and imposes only the obligation to consult in dealing with OOA threats. The WEU was superseded by NATO in the mid-1950s and lay dormant for the next 30 years. As the drive to European unity accelerated in the mid-1980s, however, the WEU was slowly resurrected as a vehicle for achieving a common West European security identity within NATO. Progress initially was slow, but began accelerating during the Persian Gulf War and its aftermath.

Shortly after several West European nations participated in the Persian Gulf naval escort missions of 1987–1988, WEU members met to discuss the need for regular consultations on emerging OOA threats. Although the idea of engaging in integrated defense planning was considered, the WEU decided to rely on ad hoc mechanisms to address crises on a case-by-case basis. This approach was employed when the Persian Gulf crisis broke out two years later. With encouragement from the United States, the WEU participated in UN-sponsored efforts to restore Kuwait's independence. As discussed earlier, seven WEU members deployed military forces to the Persian Gulf, but no separate WEU military command was estab-

3Signed in 1948, before NATO was created, the Brussels Treaty joined West European members together in a collective security pact. It acted as a forerunner of NATO, then faded into the background as NATO, under U.S. leadership, became stronger.
lished. Back in Western Europe, the WEU created formal committees to help coordinate the deployment of forces to the Gulf and their subsequent commitment to battle when Desert Storm was launched.4

WEU members came away from the Persian Gulf conflict pleased with their contributions, aware of the potential for similar crises in future years, and willing to breathe greater life into their institution. Steps toward this goal soon encountered resistance from NATO supporters, who feared that the WEU might supplant the existing alliance. Several months of stormy debate ensued, pitting not only the United States against some West European allies, but also WEU members against each other. The United States argued against any WEU pillar that might dilute NATO’s integrated military command, create thorny problems in exercising control over West European forces, and produce duplication of effort. Within the WEU, three factions emerged. Britain and the Netherlands argued for a WEU that would fit within NATO and thereby mollify the United States. France, Spain, and Belgium argued for a WEU that would stand apart from NATO and provide West European nations an independent pillar in designing forces and employing them. Straddling both sides of the fence, and willing to let events take their course, were Germany and other WEU partners.

The compromise formula adopted by NATO at the Copenhagen ministerial meeting in June 1991 embodied the British-Dutch proposal. Although its language was ambiguous, the Copenhagen Declaration endorsed the goal of building a European security identity. It mandated, however, that this goal be pursued within the framework of policies aimed at strengthening NATO and transatlantic relations. It also proclaimed that the NATO integrated military command must not be weakened, that NATO’s force posture must remain adequate, and that clear lines of authority must be retained in exercising operational control over NATO forces in peace, crisis, and war. Since the defense establishments of all WEU members (minus France) are al-

ready integrated into NATO defense planning, these strictures left the WEU little room to emerge as a wholly separate alliance structure.

The practical steps to be taken reflect this reality. Out of the Copenhagen accord came agreement that WEU plans would be coordinated with NATO, and that WEU forces would act on their own only if NATO had first chosen not to participate in a crisis. Although regular ministerial meetings of WEU members would be conducted, WEU institution-building efforts were to be modest and crafted to avoid duplication. According to current plans, the WEU will not have a supreme commander. A WEU military staff is being built, but it is small (only 30–40 officers), is led by a major general, and is collocated in Brussels, near NATO Headquarters. It is expected to maintain close relations with NATO Headquarters and SHAPE, in particular the SHAPE staff charged with planning for the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps. Its functions currently are limited: to monitor the status of forces available for WEU missions, to establish operating procedures, and to coordinate exercise schedules. Evidently it will not become involved in the development of operational military doctrine, a task that will be left to individual members and NATO. No peacetime headquarters for WEU forces is to be built, the WEU is not expected to conduct major military exercises or training programs, and the WEU will not be assigned operational control over forces in peacetime.

Although these provisions highlight the degree to which the WEU will be tied to NATO, they do not mean that the WEU is to have no life of its own. The WEU's separate identity was evidenced in mid-1992, when the WEU dispatched five combat vessels to operate alongside NATO ships in patrolling the Adriatic and monitoring sanctions against Serbia. At about the same time, the WEU met in Bonn and agreed to assemble (at least on paper) a WEU force for use in a variety of missions. The Bonn decision evidently calls for a combat force of 50,000 troops—roughly corps-sized—but exact plans were left unclear, and the force could grow larger in future years. According to WEU officials, the force will come from existing units, it will not be created anew. Candidate units will be an Anglo-Dutch amphibious force; a NATO multinational division composed of German, British, Dutch, and Belgian troops; and perhaps the Franco-German corps (discussed below). If so, the WEU force will total about four divi-
sions, with supporting air and naval forces. Manpower requirements could be higher than was discussed in Bonn: about 90,000 combat troops, and 150,000 to 175,000 troops when support units are included.

Because most of these forces are also assigned to NATO, observers raised questions about the relationship to be struck with the NATO integrated command. Spokesmen for WEU governments stressed that the forces would retain their NATO affiliations and would be used by the WEU only for crisis situations in which NATO first demurs from participating. Cited were such missions as humanitarian aid and peacekeeping, but also mentioned were crisis-management situations. Evidently the Bonn meeting had in mind not only Yugoslavia but also possible intervention in Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh). Some WEU officials said that a WEU force would be employed only when a request has been made by the UN or the CSCE, but the Bonn declaration left ambiguity on this point. Indeed, the Bonn declaration also left open the possibility that WEU forces might be sent to a crisis even if the United States and NATO disapprove. As a practical matter, however, WEU officials discounted this step by pointing out that those forces would be hard to deploy outside alliance borders in the absence of support from the United States and NATO in such key areas as command and control, logistics, and mobility.

The WEU can be expected to evolve into a more impressive military organization in the years ahead. In all likelihood, the WEU staff in Brussels will acquire an expanded set of civil-military functions, and the WEU may develop a capacity to deploy forces under its own command in crises, rather than function as a political clearinghouse for operations launched by individual members. During the Persian Gulf conflict, the WEU provided political endorsement of force deployments, but the forces did not operate under the WEU flag. The Adriatic deployment came closer to an organized WEU operation and may set a precedent for the future. Moreover, the WEU’s geographic focus will expand now that Greece has been admitted and associate-membership status has been extended to Norway and Turkey. Actual employment of WEU forces, of course, will depend on the crises encountered and on NATO’s willingness to come to terms with them.
The larger issue is the degree to which the WEU will become a military pillar separate from NATO, and the pace at which such development will occur. The Maastricht Treaty committed the EC to development of a “Common Foreign Policy and Defense Identity,” with the WEU to become the institutional vehicle for achieving the defense identity part of the formulation. The derailing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 raises questions about whether full economic and monetary union will be achieved on schedule, and the idea of a common foreign policy seems even more remote. As for creation of a full-fledged defense identity, this goal seems more remote still. In any event, the WEU’s future will be influenced by how the competing concepts left in the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty are to be reconciled.

The British government favors a steady growth in the WEU’s stature, but it continues to see the WEU as an organization that will operate within a still-existing NATO under American leadership. By contrast, the French government is fully committed to achievement of political union by the EC, and it therefore embraces the more ambitious vision of a WEU that will become organically linked to the EC and eventually will replace NATO. From Mitterand down, the French government has said that it wants the United States to retain a military presence in Europe, but that it anticipates America’s departure within a few years. Therefore, Western Europe will need a military alliance to replace NATO.

A common perception held by many observers is that, at least until late 1992 when the Balkans crisis began having a sobering impact in Paris, the French actually wanted the United States to depart so that they and their West European partners could take full control over their destiny in security affairs. A less grandiose theory is that the French were aiming to marginalize the United States and NATO: Whereas the United States and NATO could carry out long-standing treaty commitments, they would be prevented from exerting leadership on newly emerging security challenges, which are to be handled by France and Germany under the banners of the EC and CSCE. Regardless of their motives, the French cooperated with the pragmatic steps undertaken to build a WEU military staff that could work with NATO, but they also criticized Britain’s limited horizons, and they tried to invest the WEU with more expansive long-range goals.
Frustrated in their efforts to shape the WEU, the French during early 1992 turned their attention to creation of the Franco-German corps (or "Eurocorps," as it later came to be called), an outgrowth of the Franco-German brigade. Agreement was reached between Bonn and Paris to activate the command elements of this corps in 1992, with headquarters in Strasbourg, and to achieve full operational status in 1995. The military details are discussed in Chapter Seven; the complex political calculations underlying this step deserve mention here. Evidently the French hope that this corps not only will better embody EC visions than the British-influenced WEU but also will lay the foundation for the eventual building of a full-fledged West European and/or EC army and defense establishment. Key to this plan is success at gaining German cooperation in ways that will pull Germany away from NATO and the United States and lure that nation into a close partnership with France under the EC flag. Looking beyond Bonn, the French further hope to persuade other EC members to join the corps, thereby expanding it to become a larger, more multinational force.\(^5\)

Reflecting Chancellor Kohl's commitment to the Maastricht Treaty, Germany elected to join this enterprise. But apparently it harbors more pragmatic visions. Most important, the Kohl government wants to promote European security integration beyond the limited goals embraced by Britain, but it does not want to push out the United States or dismantle NATO. Indeed, it evidently hopes that creation of the corps will lure the French into becoming more closely affiliated with NATO. This stance has led it to cooperate with the French in launching the corps but to refrain from commitment to the fully structured corps preferred by France. Whereas the French preferred an elaborate command staff and assignment of specific units, the Germans opted for a leaner staff and designation of combat forces only on paper. As for other nations, their stance has reflected their policies on larger WEU/EC issues. The British and Dutch criticized the corps and have declined to join, as have the Italians. Belgium, Spain, and Luxembourg have expressed greater interest as

long as the Eurocorps becomes part of the WEU, but future roles for
them have not yet been worked out.

The debates between France and Germany have left the corps with
ambiguous military missions suspended between NATO and inde-
pendence. Announcement of the corps' creation was followed by
intense pressure from the United States and others to define its re-
sationship to NATO and the WEU. Although offering interpretations
that differed somewhat in nuance, the Germans and French both
stressed the flexible nature of future assignments. Key missions, they
said, were common defense under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty,
peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance. All or part of the Euro-
corps, they said, could be assigned under SACEUR's control in the
event NATO launches combat operations. Further, the corps would
be available for assignment to the WEU for contingencies in which
NATO does not participate, and close liaison would be established
with the WEU military staff. At the same time, both nations reserved
the right to employ the corps to meet national requirements in
situations not involving NATO or the WEU. Presumably, this stance
opened the door to OOA missions, yet Germany's constitutional
prohibition made these missions unlikely.

Creation of this corps leaves two institutions upon which a European
security identity can be built, and these bodies reflect the quite dif-
ferent long-range concepts that animate West European strategic
thinking today. As a result, the WEU corps and the Eurocorps are
somewhat in competition with each other.

In the long run, much will depend on Maastricht's fate, the American
role, and the stability of Europe. If Maastricht regains momentum
and the United States withdraws, then creation of a European de-
fense identity will receive added impetus, and a WEU/Eurocorps
synthesis will be reached, perhaps leading to the kind of integration
favored by France. Prospects for this outcome will be further en-
hanced if Europe makes progress in its quest for community-build-
ing from the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU)—a distant possibility, but
one anchored on an improbable sequence of events and vulnerable
to many different types of reversals. In the environment of early
1993, few West Europeans embraced this scenario as a realistic basis
for policy in the years immediately ahead. With Maastricht faltering
and the Balkans descending into a chaos that might spread outward,
the French defense ministry has come to see greater wisdom not only in retaining NATO under U.S. leadership but also in refurbishing it for the security challenges ahead. What is now becoming more widely accepted in Paris enjoys even stronger consensus in many other allied capitals, especially London and Bonn.

These nations continue to pay lip service to the idea of eventually achieving a European security identity, but not anytime soon; and when it is achieved, it will most probably be as a complement to a still-existing NATO, not a substitute. Near-term expectations for the WEU and the Eurocorps, and for their relationships to NATO, reflect this perspective, which is magnified by the weakening of Maastricht. Proponents of a West European security identity are coming to accept that neither the WEU corps nor the Eurocorps will be practicable unless it receives military support from NATO in a variety of indispensable areas.

From NATO’s perspective, the emergence of a separate WEU/EC defense pillar may pose a distant threat; for the moment, the greater risk is that ongoing drawdowns and declining budgets may leave Western Europe insufficiently defended. For all the thorny problems created by their emergence, the WEU and the Eurocorps provide a pool of forces to draw on in crises, they give West European nations an incentive to remain in the defense game, and they help buffer against the risks of renationalization.

Although the debates of 1991–1992 are far from resolved, a search for sensible solutions anchored on restored institutional harmony and effective policy coordination is under way. Growing emphasis is being placed on measures to reduce the frictions between the WEU and Eurocorps, and to fit the WEU/Eurocorps into the framework of NATO’s own emerging defense plans. The beginnings of a good working relationship between NATO and the WEU are being established. At present, NATO and the Eurocorps are not formally linked together, but indirect coordination is made possible by virtue of the Eurocorps’ growing ties with the WEU.

Even if the WEU and the Eurocorps make impressive strides in the coming years, their development will not necessarily translate into a far greater capacity to conduct OOA missions. To be sure, better forces will be the result if sound plans and programs are carried out.
But continuing to block the way will be political barriers deriving from the lack of collective defense commitments to anything more than border defense. In the absence of a major change to their charters, both the WEU and the Eurocorps will continue to rely on the time-honored but checkered ad hoc approach to OOA operations.

**NATO**

The NATO Alliance continues to provide the strongest institution for conducting multilateral military operations, but will it survive and remain vital? The answer to this question is uncertain. While many factors are at work, the answer will depend heavily on whether NATO can reconfigure itself to remain relevant to the European security issues ahead. In important ways, the stance adopted toward OOA operations will determine whether NATO proves successful at such reconfiguration.

With great fanfare, alliance leaders in mid-1990 issued the London Summit Declaration. It called on NATO to survive the Cold War by recasting itself as a more political alliance capable of dealing with the new era, and by crafting a new military strategy and force posture to replace the legacy of flexible response. Six months later, the Persian Gulf success displayed NATO's capacity to help handle the regional threats now arising. In the aftermath, NATO settled down to a period of internal study and debate aimed at carrying out the London Summit's call for new military thinking.

In late 1991, NATO's leaders met at Rome to articulate a new strategic concept that both acknowledged the end of the Cold War and argued that new security risks lay ahead. In the Rome Summit Declaration, the resulting concept mentioned direct attack on NATO's territory as one possibility and reaffirmed the primacy of Article 5. But it also cited threats to Western interests beyond its borders, crises brought about by ethnic rivalries, and other factors that could escalate into attacks on NATO. Reaffirming NATO's continuing importance, it called on the alliance to promote a stable and democratic security environment in Europe, to consult and then take coordinated action to protect common interests, to defend NATO's borders, and to preserve a strategic balance in Europe. It emphasized the continuing importance of collective defense, but also called on NATO to serve as a forum for managing crises and promoting dia-
logue with former adversaries. Endorsing a defensive military strategy, the declaration called on NATO to maintain reduced but still-adequate forces anchored on mobile multinational formations, a balanced mix of ready and mobilizable units, fair burden-sharing, and support for the West European security identity.\(^6\)

The Rome Summit witnessed an important exchange about future U.S.-allied relations. Both France and Germany emphasized the importance of a greater role for West European nations in alliance affairs. In response to a query from President Bush, they also stressed the importance of U.S. leadership and a continuing American force presence. The Rome Summit also saw the unveiling of the North Atlantic Cooperative Council (NACC), a vehicle for providing formal consultations with former Warsaw Pact adversaries. A successful event, the Rome Summit left NATO upbeat about the future, feeling that the alliance had surmounted a threat to its survival by assigning itself an important security mission in the new era.

During the early months of 1992, a worrisome downturn dashed some of Rome’s optimism. Negotiations in 1991 leading to the Rome Summit Declaration revealed the extent to which the United States and France embraced different visions for the alliance. A compromise solution had been fashioned, but the collapse of the Soviet state in December overturned some of the premises on which it had been built. Preoccupied with its own agenda, France called for NATO to react to the altered security environment by remaining focused on old and eroding border-defense missions, a stance regarded by many observers as a prescription for NATO’s death. Faced with this challenge from Paris, the United States was accused of showing uncharacteristic passivity about adopting the alliance.

These months were not without accomplishments, and the United States took some of the credit. NATO took steps to adopt a new and streamlined command structure that pared back the elaborate hierarchy inherited from the Cold War and drew new command boundaries in Central and Northern Europe. Plans to create multinational forces were firmed up, and new NATO force goals and

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an altered infrastructure program were adopted. With *crisis management* becoming the new watchword, a reaction forces planning staff was created at SHAPE, the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) under British leadership began to come to life, air reaction forces were placed under German command, a mobile operating command was launched, and an on-call Mediterranean naval force (NAVOCFORMED) was created. Major withdrawals of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons were carried out. The United States made force commitments to the ARRC, and reconfirmed its intent to leave sizable forces in Europe, backed by a strong reinforcement posture.7

By mid-late 1992, NATO seemed on the rebound. One success was the launching of NACC, at whose initial meeting agreement was reached to hold regular consultations on political and military issues. A meeting of NACC defense ministers addressed implementation of Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and the first Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty (START I) and the task of helping democratizing nations build civilian controls over their defense establishments. Arrangements were made for former Warsaw Pact military officers to start attending NATO military schools, and for increased defense cooperation to be pursued through other means. The idea that East European nations might join NATO was not formally addressed, but informal reassurances were given that their security situations would be taken into account by the alliance. Reacting to this positive start, Presidents Bush and Yeltsin agreed in mid-June that NACC would play a growing role in promoting Euro-Atlantic peacekeeping.

Equally important, NATO began extending its military reach into East Central Europe. Meeting at Oslo on June 4, alliance foreign ministers decided that NATO’s forces could be used for peacekeeping functions in support of the CSCE and the United Nations. No automatic or sweeping guarantees were provided, but the foreign ministers made clear that CSCE requests would be reviewed case by case, and, when a positive decision was reached, prompt action

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would be forthcoming. To this end, the ministers authorized the beginning of staff discussion to address specific requirements. Shortly after the Oslo meeting came the decision to deploy NATO and WEU naval forces to the Adriatic, and West European peacekeeping forces into Bosnia-Herzegovina. By fall, NATO military staffs were preparing specific contingency plans, not only for enhanced peacekeeping roles but also for a variety of outright military interventions aimed at exerting military pressure on Serbia.

The year 1992 thus came to an end with NATO asserting a role on OOA issues, and with a mounting sense that greater involvement in East-Central European security affairs would come in succeeding months. Even so, doubts remained about NATO’s ability to come to grips with the new era.

For all its efforts to be forward-looking, the new strategic concept carried forth the traditional distinction between Article 5 and Article 4. As a result, NATO’s defense strategy and force planning still remained focused on border-defense missions. The Oslo meeting’s conditional willingness to perform peacekeeping on behalf of the CSCE and UN did not amount to a robust OOA charter. In particular, the Oslo charter said nothing about situations in which a CSCE or UN invitation was not forthcoming, the likely setting of serious crises. Moreover, it said nothing about major combat operations, NATO’s strong suit.

NATO’s future will be influenced not only by U.S. policies but also by how the West European nations evaluate NATO’s performance in shaping the European security architecture. Although NATO’s relevance is being questioned in many quarters, most West European nations are unlikely to want the United States to depart anytime soon or to see the alliance fade away. Britain and Germany especially share this view, as do most other alliance partners. These nations appreciate the need to maintain a strong U.S. political role in Europe, and they are worried about mounting stresses in transatlantic economic relations and growing calls for deeper force reductions than have been envisioned by either President Bush or President Clinton. Beyond such factors, these nations appreciate the important leadership that the United States gives to the alliance and that, in Washington’s absence, an alliance of 15 small-to-medium powers might have trouble collaborating. Indeed, American leadership and
NATO play important roles in creating the firm security foundations that enable West European unity to be pursued at a sensible pace. Premature removal of these foundations could compel an acceleration of the Maastricht process in ways that might overload Western Europe's capacities.

Britain, Germany, and other nations also are fully aware that, behind the contentious political debates sweeping over the alliance, the United States funds a large portion of Western Europe's defense costs. If the United States were to withdraw, the West European nations would have to accept either unaffordable increases in defense spending or a weakened defense posture. The United States also still provides extended-deterrence coverage to Germany and other nations that lack an independent nuclear posture. With Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States still possessing nuclear weapons, American withdrawal and dismantlement of NATO could create a troubling security vacuum, and, rather than promoting a West European security pillar, it might trigger a destabilizing re-nationalization. Fear of this consequence is one powerful reason, among many, for keeping NATO alive.

Commitment to retaining the alliance, however, does not mean that solutions have been found to the problems confronting multilateral OOA operations. Article 5 remains the bellwether for collective defense planning, and it means that, even without the growing political attention being paid to security affairs beyond NATO’s borders, ad hoc cooperation under Article 4 still remains the vehicle for OOA missions. Neither the Oslo decision nor President Bush's public criticism of ad hoc mechanisms changes this reality nor makes the task of forming multilateral consensus any easier when it is needed.

NATO provides an already-existing military structure, one that can be employed to launch more effective OOA operations than would otherwise be the case. Even as they focus on border-defense missions, NATO's forces conduct joint training, and develop common doctrine, weapon systems, and procedures in ways that allow them to work together when used for non-border-defense purposes. Moreover, NATO provides a framework of C3I assets, military bases, and support forces that permits the projection of power on relatively short notice. As a result, NATO far outclasses the WEU and CSCE in these important dimensions of military power.
NATO's superiority over these institutions, however, does not mean that its capacity for handling OOA challenges is fully matured. The Cold War left a huge imprint on NATO's forces, because it compelled them to focus for years on a narrow set of defense missions conducted only in nearby geographic areas, requiring limited transportation resources. As a result, NATO's combat forces may be transportable to other regions, but whether adequate lift assets are available is another matter. Moreover, the bulk of NATO's logistics support infrastructure is embedded in West European soil and cannot easily be uprooted. (These and related constraints are discussed in more detail in Chapter Five.) Such background factors can lead to a sluggish and ineffective response when an attempt is made to launch OOA operations. Fortunately, the Persian Gulf War unfolded at a leisurely pace under ideal conditions that obscured NATO's infrastructural deficiencies. But will future conflicts be so accommodating?

Eradication of these constraints is needed if NATO is to become proficient at projecting power well beyond its borders. As long as the alliance continues to anchor its defense plans on Article 5 tasks, however, it will be unable to fully eliminate barriers to performing OOA missions. To be sure, partial remedies can be pursued, but because coalition planning is a difficult enterprise, insufficient funds and inertia will stand in the way of a coordinated approach. In this event, NATO will remain superior to its institutional rivals but, nonetheless, unable to meet emerging security requirements in the years ahead. Continued reliance on Article 4's ad hoc mechanisms may ease NATO's political dilemmas but will leave unsolved military problems. If these problems are to be remedied, a major policy departure aimed at enhancing NATO's military capability for OOA operations will be needed. What such a capability would be is identified in Chapter Five.
Political willingness will play a major role in determining participation in multilateral OOA operations. The military forces of potential partners is also an important element in the OOA equation. They will determine what is physically possible, regardless of political intent. Desert Storm was launched at a time when the United States and its West European allies still possessed most of the imposing force posture that was built for the Cold War. As a result, a major deployment to the Persian Gulf was possible without imprudently denuding forces for defending NATO's interests in Western Europe. Since Desert Storm, NATO nations, including the United States, have been engaged in a military drawdown in response to the collapse of the Warsaw Pact threat and to Iraq's diminished military status. These nations aspire to retain adequate forces for the coming era, a goal shared by NATO Headquarters and SHAPE. Whether this goal will be achieved, however, is an uncertainty, and doubly so for the new area—OOA operations—which poses requirements not experienced before.

This chapter assesses the ability of currently planned forces to meet future requirements for OOA operations. It begins with a summary evaluation of future forces in relation to requirements. The evaluation raises questions about whether these forces will be adequate. It then provides supporting analysis by examining—in sequential order—future OOA requirements, U.S. force contributions, and West European forces. Thus, the conclusions are presented first, and the analysis follows.
SUMMARY EVALUATION

At first glance, NATO’s future forces appear more than adequate to meet emerging OOA challenges. Even after the drawdowns that are now under way, the United States and its Central European allies (AFCENT) alone will maintain 35 to 40 ground divisions, 2,600 to 3,000 combat aircraft, and about 350 naval combatants that could be mobilized for future conflicts in Europe. Sizable additional forces will be maintained in the northern and southern regions: 25 to 30 divisions, several hundred aircraft, and modest navies. All told, this will be enough force to fight a major war against a large adversary; therefore, it should be ample to perform any future OOA missions that might arise.

Primary Constraints

When the analysis takes into account the multiple constraints that could prohibit the alliance from applying this combat power to OOA conflicts, a less confident conclusion emerges. A sizable portion of this posture is not available for OOA missions for three reasons: (1) Forces are intended purely for defense of NATO’s borders, (2) cannot readily deploy beyond those borders even if they are needed, and (3) will be maintained in reserve status and thus are insufficiently ready to be deployed on short notice. Table 5.1 illustrates

Table 5.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Divisions(^a)</th>
<th>Combat Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States(^b)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO allies(^c)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1,486</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)This category includes division flags and “division-equivalents.” A division is normally composed of 11,000 to 16,500 soldiers; French divisions (3 of the total) are smaller: about 9,000 soldiers. A “division-equivalent” is composed of three independent brigades or regiments.

\(^b\)The table lists only the portion of the future U.S. posture that might be oriented to Europe. Another 4 to 6 active divisions and 9 to 15 fighter wings will be available, but earmarked for other regions.

\(^c\)Includes not only the small forces currently earmarked for OOA missions, but also rapid-reaction forces that could be employed for these missions.
for U.S. and West European ground and air forces the potential pool of forces available for OOA missions.

**Political and Military Constraints**

Various additional constraints—political and military—enter into the calculus to further reduce the pool of available forces. An exact estimate would depend on circumstances, but the effect is potentially large. One constraint is that, owing to global commitments, far fewer U.S. forces might be available. For example, if enough U.S. forces must be withheld to deter war in the Persian Gulf and Korea, only 2 divisions and 144 combat aircraft might be available for OOA operations in Europe. Also because of global commitments, small allied forces (e.g., 1 division and air wing apiece contributed by Britain and France) might also be unavailable for Europe. The effect is to provide large forces for OOA operations in the Persian Gulf but to reduce the pool of forces available for OOA use in Europe. Hence, the need to deal with two regions concurrently is a crucial factor in evaluating NATO’s posture.

The remaining forces theoretically available for OOA missions in Europe are reduced by two factors: physical constraints on deployability (e.g., lack of support structures and transport assets) and government reluctance to commit them. Of these two factors, physical constraints are at least as important as political hesitancy: West European forces lack the C3I, mobile logistics, and transport assets to project large forces beyond their borders. Many uncertainties abound in an analysis of these two constraints, but, plausibly, the pool of available forces could be reduced to 7 divisions and 450 combat aircraft—assuming the United States, Britain, France, and Germany are all willing participants. Failure to participate by one or more of these four governments, or additional physical limitations, could reduce the number even further. For example, this calculus assumes a German contribution of 1 division and 54 aircraft; yet, German forces currently lack transport assets and logistics support systems for OOA missions.

Table 5.2 illustrates the potential (notional) combined impact of all the above constraints, focusing for simplicity’s sake only on ground forces. The number of available forces could be somewhat higher or lower, depending on warning time, political willingness, and the ca-
Table 5.2
Impact of Constraints on Force Availability for OOA Operations in Europe (divisions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Original Posture</th>
<th>Persian Gulf Offset</th>
<th>Not Deployable</th>
<th>Politically Unavailable</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO allies</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-4-1/3</td>
<td>-3-2/3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>-4-1/3</td>
<td>-3-2/3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.A. = not available.

Pacity of West European nations to mobilize reserve forces and civilian transport assets. Also, different national combinations from the one portrayed here are possible. For example, Germany might not participate, but Italy, Spain, and Turkey might contribute enough forces to make up the difference. If political constraints are entirely discounted, the pool of available forces grows to about 10 divisions and 600 aircraft.

Assuming 7 divisions and 450 combat aircraft is a reasonable upper estimate when potential political hesitancy is taken into account, would this number be adequate to meet requirements? The answer depends on the OOA missions to be performed and whether more than one operation must be launched at any one time. If the task is a single and brief peacekeeping mission (e.g., requiring 2–3 divisions), these forces probably would exceed requirements. If a lengthy peacekeeping operation must be launched, however, the need to maintain a rotational base at home could elevate requirements to include about one-half of the posture. If two or more peacekeeping missions would be required at once, this posture might be stretched thin, and especially so if lengthy commitments are needed. If the task is to conduct combat operations against a powerful opponent, this force might be barely adequate.

The combination of peacekeeping and combat operations could definitely confront NATO’s posture with overwhelming requirements. For example, NATO might require 10 to 12 divisions for these two concurrent contingencies, but only 5 to 7 divisions might be available. Thus, NATO seemingly will have enough forces for a single, modest OOA contingency; if the goal is to be prepared for two such contingencies concurrently, NATO’s forces might well be inadequate, especially if several nations stay on the sidelines.
Ancillary Factors

In addition to the preceding major constraints, many secondary factors will constrain the force size.

The Exact Nature of the OOA Operation. The NATO ground posture outlined here provides an evenly balanced mix of “light” forces (i.e., infantry, airborne, and airmobile [helicopter]) and “heavy” forces (i.e., armored and mechanized), a mix that is advantageous because of its flexibility. However, the posture could encounter trouble if a greater concentration of light or heavy forces is required. Moreover, OOA operations might vary greatly in the specific types of missions and the training required to mount them, ranging from humanitarian aid, to peacekeeping, to full-fledged combat operations with modern weapons on diverse terrains. The need to be trained for all such missions could inhibit the ability of a small force posture to achieve adequate proficiency in any of them. To be sure, the base postures maintained in Western Europe and the United States provide some flexibility for determining the exact units to be committed to OOA operations. Even so, force mix, weapon suites, and training will be important factors in assessing adequacy.

The Multinational Nature of Future OOA Operations. Future OOA operations will be multinational partly because contributing nations will be able to provide only small forces (i.e., no more than 1–2 divisions), and, equally important, multilateral commitments will be needed to make most OOA operations politically feasible. Although multinational operations make political sense, they can strain military effectiveness, especially when several nations contribute and none dominates.

Sustainability. U.S. forces are typically backed up by large war reserves capable of sustaining intense combat for several weeks against serious opposition. As discussed below, West European forces currently earmarked for OOA operations are not intended for use in demanding combat situations; they are not equipped with large war reserves, or with the logistics units needed to deliver such stocks. Moreover, most West European nations do not buy large war reserves even for homeland defense forces that are not intended for outside deployment. The effect is to raise questions about the capac-
ity of West European forces to wage intense combat for any lengthy period.

The Time Available to Deploy NATO Forces to the Site of an OOA Conflict. Assuming adequate forces are available, a period of several weeks or months would allow NATO ample time to deploy. A response requirement measured in days or a few weeks could leave NATO hard-pressed to react fast enough, because strategic airlift and sealift assets are lacking in Western Europe, and, if railroads cannot be used, a slow deployment rate would be the result. Even if substantial U.S. lift assets are committed, for example, nearly a month could be needed to deploy 3 divisions and 150 to 200 aircraft to the eastern Mediterranean and nearby areas; deployment of larger forces could take longer. The time for deployment to other areas would vary as a function of distance, lift assets, and reception facilities.

In summary, the adequacy of NATO’s currently planned forces for OOA operations is uncertain and is subject to many factors: combat force levels, C3I and logistics support systems, lift assets, political willingness to commit, competing military requirements, and the nature and number of OOA contingencies to be encountered. That NATO’s forces will be less impressive than estimated at first does not mean that they will be impotent. Indeed, they will be adequate to cover a broad class of OOA contingencies: those requiring relatively small commitments and allowing time to deploy. Such contingencies might well constitute the vast majority of future OOA situations. Yet, more dangerous situations might occur. For such cases, NATO’s forces do not inspire high confidence.

The central issue here is whether NATO should be prepared for only minor OOA conflicts or major conflicts, as well. By major is meant any conflict or combination of concurrent conflicts that could demand sizable force commitments, especially against significant opposition for sustained periods. This issue turns not only on expectations about the future but also on desired confidence levels (i.e., expected probability of success) and insurance (i.e., capacity to deal with worse-than-expected events) in the face of uncertainty. If additional insurance is demanded, it can be gained by building larger West European forces. Short of this expensive step, however, important strides can be made by improving the forces that already exist, and by strengthening political support for OOA multilateral opera-
tions within NATO. As discussed in Chapter Seven, total NATO combat power can be increased by a factor of 2 or more by making better use of these assets.

FUTURE OOA REQUIREMENTS

A wide variety of OOA missions apparently lies ahead and will create a diverse set of military requirements. As the matrix in Table 5.3 suggests, taking into account the different functional categories of operations and the possible geographic settings, future planning will need to consider fully 24 types of OOA mission. Six functional categories are identified, and each category comprises various subcategories. The four different geographic settings identified encompass a large number of different countries with vast areas. Operations in Europe plausibly could extend into parts of the former Soviet Union, and operations in the Middle East could extend into parts of North Africa if instability and hostility toward the West spread there. Nor can other areas be ruled out, as is suggested by the UN operation in Somalia. This analysis cannot cover all possibilities. The main functional categories are briefly described in the following subsections, along with their general military requirements.

Table 5.3
Matrix of Future OOA Mission Types and Locations

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<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peacetime security reassurance</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Humanitarian aid</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peacemaking</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peace enforcement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crisis management</td>
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<tr>
<td>Warfighting</td>
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</table>

Future U.S. and West European Forces for OOA Operations 85
Peacetime Security Reassurance

The first category, “Peacetime security reassurance,” reflects the likelihood that one of the West’s most important OOA functions in future years will be to provide credible guarantees to nations that do not enjoy the benefits of collective defense. For many reasons, it is conceivable that NATO membership will be extended to new members (e.g., Poland); if it is, alliance defense planning under Article 4 or Article 5 will have to be extended beyond current borders. Even short of broadened alliance membership, powerful political reasons—the West’s own interests and values, and the need to encourage stability and peaceful conduct—could compel the extension of informal security guarantees.

Already, Western security reassurances have been given to friendly Arab powers in the Persian Gulf, and to other friendly powers in the Middle East. A key issue will be the extent to which reassurances are offered to East Central Europe and the Balkans. Although the specific outcome is hard to foresee, present trends point to a significant expansion of such reassurances in this region as well. Obvious candidates are Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and possibly Slovakia. Counterproliferation goals also may lead the West to offer some form of assurances to Ukraine. As for the Balkans, security reassurances may be needed as an important part of Western efforts to prevent the spread of violence. Indeed, the Western powers have already stated that a military response will be launched if “ethnic cleansing” spreads outward from Bosnia.

Security reassurances will not be credible unless they are backed up by the capability to project Western military power to the targeted nations, that is, by sufficient military power to help such nations defend themselves. At a minimum, this reality will compel NATO nations to broaden their peacetime military involvements with the targeted nations. Beyond this, it will require that the Western nations build adequate forces for major power-projection missions in an actual emergency. To the extent that such missions are planned for nations that do not belong to NATO, they will be OOA operations.

In order to perform power-projection missions, the Western powers will need to be capable of joint operations: be capable of projecting a combination of ground, air, and naval forces. Western airpower
alone will be able to offer strong assurances. The growing ability of air forces to inflict major damage on aggressors was demonstrated in the Persian Gulf conflict. Yet, in many situations, airpower alone will not be enough, especially when the ground forces of recipient nations are insufficient. Strong ground forces are often needed to create the military circumstances that enable air forces to operate effectively: secure rear areas and sufficient time to allow the cumulative effects of air operations to build. Ground forces also are needed to defend key terrain features, to address targets not susceptible to air attack, and to conduct decisive counteroffensives needed to swiftly eject entrenched adversary armies from occupied terrain. Similarly for naval forces, there will be circumstances in which maritime power will be critical but others in which it alone will not be decisive.

The need for joint operations will apply not only to the manner in which peacetime security assurances are offered but also to the full range of actual OOA operations that may be launched in crisis and war. The exact mix of forces will vary from situation to situation. But because so many different OOA missions might have to be launched, joint operations will be the proper guideline for shaping Western force requirements and associated plans.

**Humanitarian Aid**

*Humanitarian aid* refers to the use of military forces to deliver food, medical support, and supplies to areas suffering from natural or man-made disasters, including civil war. Typically, mobility forces are employed; however, in dangerous situations, mobility forces must be accompanied by combat escorts, including ground troops. Normally, several dozen aircraft and ships are involved, requiring commitments ranging from a few hundred to several thousand soldiers. *Counterterrorism*, a subcategory of humanitarian aid, involves the use of military forces to rescue hostages and deal with terrorist groups; in a similar vein, military forces sometimes must be used to rescue citizens from civil disorder in foreign countries. Normally, force requirements are fairly small—not more than a few dozen troops—but specialized training and equipment are needed. In extreme cases, however, force needs can grow large. For example, the Israelis probably would classify many of their air and ground excursions into Lebanon and the West Bank as counterterrorism.
Peacekeeping and Peacemaking

Peacekeeping refers to the commitment of military forces to a war-torn area to monitor and guide a peace agreement already signed by combatants. Normally, peacekeeping troops interpose themselves between belligerents, protect the innocent, occupy key terrain features (e.g., the Golan Heights), monitor lines of communication, and patrol disputed areas. Peacemaking and its subcategory peace enforcement refer to the use of forces to intervene in an ongoing military conflict for the purpose of halting the fighting, seeing that it stays halted, and thereby permitting a cease-fire to be signed and honored. Whereas peacekeeping normally does not involve organized combat operations, peacemaking and peace enforcement do. In theory, the two main categories are driven by neutral policies, but the act of intervention can take the form of military operations against one of the belligerents.

For both mission types, requirements can range from a few thousand troops upward to much larger forces (e.g., 100,000 ground troops). The UN-sponsored peacekeeping missions in both Somalia and Cambodia have required nearly 30,000 troops, and speculation about a peacekeeping mission in Bosnia has envisioned higher numbers. Analysis of requirements for peacemaking and enforcement is rendered difficult by the vagueness surrounding their definition, how they would be carried out, and against whom. Because of their emphasis on achieving or preserving peace, these missions typically would involve less overt military conflict than would be encountered in full-scale war: Operations could involve only modest military pressure against one or more belligerents. But if the belligerents fail to acquiesce, larger combat missions could be needed. At some point, the distinction between peacemaking and/or enforcement and warfighting can become academic.

In any event, force needs would stem from the exact situation, the missions to be carried out, and the opposition. Future contingencies and missions are unclear. What can be said is that East Central Europe and the Balkans are an armed camp. Even small nations there will have the weapon inventories to field armies of 5 divisions or more, and commensurate air forces; at the outer extreme, Ukraine will have 10 to 15 divisions and Russia, 40 to 50 mobilizable divisions. In the Middle East and Persian Gulf, moreover, conventional
weapons are proliferating. The effect is manifested most directly on U.S. and allied warfighting missions, but it could also influence requirements for peacemaking and peace enforcement.

**Crisis Management**

*Crisis management* is the use of military force against an adversary to attain political goals beyond cessation of hostilities for its own sake. Also, the destruction of enemy forces is deemed secondary to compelling adversaries to change political course. It covers a wide range of OOA missions—principally, show-of-force, containment, leverage, and resolution. Crisis management can require a one-time show of force, as occurred in El Dorado Canyon, when U.S. forces bombed targets in Libya. It also can take the form of ongoing military operations aimed at containing a crisis or war. An example is the Western use of naval and air forces to escort ships through the Persian Gulf in the mid-1980s, when Iran and Iraq were at war. A more ambitious form of crisis management involves the use of military forces to exert leverage on a crisis itself. An example is the UN-authorized and U.S.-led coalition’s threat to enforce economic sanctions on Iraq and to compel destruction of its nuclear facilities after Desert Storm. In a similar spirit, and even more interventionist, was the imposition of no-fly zones in Iraq to help protect Kurds and Shiite Muslims. A subcategory, *crisis resolution*, involves the use of military forces to decisively settle a crisis. An example is Operation Just Cause, when U.S. troops intervened in Panama to topple a corrupt government.

Force requirements for crisis management normally range from small to medium in size, and the operation can last from a few days to several months. El Dorado Canyon was a small operation conducted in one day, but it involved elements of several U.S. Air Force and Navy (USAF and USN) wings, and hundreds of C3I personnel. Operation Just Cause required commitment of about 25,000 U.S. military personnel, and the coalition’s efforts to coerce Saddam Hussein, still ongoing after two years, has required 25,000 to 50,000 U.S. and allied troops. In the extreme case, an outright military invasion and occupation of a country, requiring commitment of thousands of troops to resolve a crisis by imposing a new political order, might have to be launched. This step could be portrayed as an act of
crisis resolution, but, again, the military distinction between this mission and warfighting can be academic.

**Warfighting**

If the preceding categories define how military forces are used in small-to-medium ways, the final category, warfighting, defines large-scale use of such forces. Although warfighting operations are pursued on behalf of political goals, they are distinguished by the importance attached to attaining battlefield objectives as a prelude to crisis resolution. Whereas crisis-management operations aim at using military force to wield psychological influence over the political behavior of adversary governments, warfighting operations aim at destroying enemy forces and achieving other concrete military objectives, from which crisis-resolution can later flow. Thus, warfighting seeks a decisive military outcome as its main focus and measures success by military criteria.

Warfighting operations can be defensive or offensive. Defensive operations aim at preventing attacking enemy forces from attaining their assertive goals (e.g., territorial conquest); offensive operations aim at achieving assertive goals at the expense of the adversary (e.g., conquest of his territory, his ejection from territory occupied by him, or destruction of his forces). While offensive operations tend to impose the higher requirements, specific force needs for both types are dictated by the adversary force and U.S. and/or allied military goals. In general, however, warfighting creates higher requirements than crisis management or peacemaking and enforcement. Desert Shield, a defensive operation, required over 300,000 troops. Desert Storm, a theaterwide offensive, required the assembling of a full army group of 17 divisions, nearly 2,000 combat aircraft, and large naval forces. Over 500,000 troops were assembled.

Current U.S. planning for major regional contingencies (MRCs) reflects the upper limits of future warfighting operations expected to be conducted over the coming decade. For the Persian Gulf and Europe, adversary force levels for anticipated MRCs are 20–25 divisions and 500–1,300 combat aircraft. Although these adversary force levels are far less than were anticipated in Europe during the Cold War, they still reflect sizable commitments and impose large requirements on U.S./allied force requirements. Other warfighting op-
erations, however, could be launched against different opponents. To the extent that their forces are less than anticipated in the above MRCs, U.S. and allied force requirements would be smaller. The key point is that requirements will stem from military calculations taking into account the terrain, the missions to be performed, the battlefield goals being sought, and the adversary threat.

At the moment, such calculations are in a state of flux, and the ultimate outcome cannot be foreseen. During the Cold War, a common rule of thumb held that, in Central Europe at least, an attacker needed to marshall a quantitative ground advantage of at least 1.5:1 over that of the defender to have confidence of victory. This rule meant that NATO could fight outnumbered by a modest margin and still plan to defend, but could not plan on launching an effective counterattack. Some military authorities questioned anything less demanding than a 1:1 ratio, but NATO’s official force goals embraced the 1.5:1 ratio: About 60 divisions were deemed necessary to contend with a 90-division Warsaw Pact threat.

The Desert Storm experience evidently has rendered this rule invalid. There, the victorious coalition fought outnumbered on the ground by about 2:1 and still went on the attack and achieved a decisive victory. Contributing to this victory were major coalition advantages in readiness, technology, doctrine, operational skill, C3I and logistics support, a numerical air advantage of 2:1, and total air supremacy brought about by the early collapse of Iraqi air defenses.

If the Persian Gulf experience is taken at face value, it suggests that, provided air supremacy is attained, NATO’s ground forces can fight outnumbered by 2:1 and still plan not only on defending, but also on launching, a decisive counteroffensive. Indeed, some critics have argued that the coalition committed too many forces, and that a 3:1 ratio favoring Iraq still would have permitted overwhelming victory. They further argue that emerging technology will enhance the West’s already decisive qualitative advantages. Several factors, however, caution against a strict interpretation of the 2:1 ratio for future conflicts, and caution even more strongly against more optimistic interpretations, the most obvious being that air supremacy might be less total than during the Gulf conflict, as might many other qualitative advantages—extending well beyond technology—that contributed so
heavily to the outcome. Also, the next enemy might fight better than Iraq.

Moreover, political goals matter: The presence of urban areas and other valuable assets near the battlefield can lead to greater caution about force ratios. For example, the force ratio in Korea is only about 1.5:1 in favor of North Korea. But even though the large South Korean Army is heavily entrenched on defensible terrain, there is worry about its capacity to stop an enemy assault north of Seoul.

Beyond this, ground requirements can be elevated by the need to cover the battlefield terrain in adequate density, to maintain manageable local ratios, and to perform the multiple missions needed in a theaterwide campaign. Consequently, the desired force ratio is a variable, not a constant. Sometimes, it can be as high as 2:1, but on other occasions, it can be far lower—even 1:1.

For these reasons, today there is uncertainty about what ratio should be embraced. Generalization is impossible, and each situation must be addressed on its own merits. If ratios must be assigned, prudent conservatism is likely to be applied even if the idea of fighting outnumbered and winning is embraced as a permanent feature of defense planning. Provided this is the case, Western force requirements for future warfighting operations are likely to be sizable for conflicts against large and well-armed opponents. Table 5.4 displays Western ground requirements for a range of future threats when a ratio of somewhere between 1:25:1 and 2:6:1 in favor of the opponent is deemed tolerable.

To the extent this table bounds the range of uncertainty, commitment of a ground corps with commensurate air support seems pru-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Desired Force Ratio</th>
<th>Size of Adversary Force (divisions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:0:1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.75:1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.50:1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.25:1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
dent even for conflicts against small military powers. For operations against better-armed opponents that populate regions where OOA operations are launched, especially when more stressful conditions apply, commitment of two corps—6 divisions and 350 combat aircraft—may be necessary. MRCs against powerful regional opponents (e.g., Iraq) will require a joint “field army” of at least 12 divisions and 900 aircraft.

In the event of either a larger military threat or demanding conditions (or both), a larger commitment could be needed. Requirements could increase to 20 divisions and 1,500 or more aircraft: as large as or larger than Desert Storm. When indigenous friendly forces are available, fewer NATO forces would be needed.

To summarize, Table 5.5 illustrates the force requirements that normally will be needed for a single OOA operation in each functional category. For most, a joint operation employing ground, air, and naval forces is necessary. Force requirements can range from small to quite large.

Future force requirements for OOA missions will be determined not only by individual conflicts but also by the number of conflicts to be guarded against concurrently. A case can be made that NATO nations will be secure only if sufficient mobilizable forces are available to fight two concurrent MRCs: one in the Persian Gulf and the other in Europe. Indeed, this philosophy is likely to be applied to sizing NATO’s main defense forces, regardless of whether they defend on NATO’s borders or somewhat beyond them. For sizing NATO’s OOA forces, a less demanding standard is likely to be embraced because worry is diminishing about a European OOA operation of MRC dimensions anytime soon. Even so, the need for prudence argues in favor of employing concurrent OOA conflicts as a basis for planning.

In particular, the United States and its West European allies will need sufficient forces to confidently deter a Persian Gulf MRC even as they attend to smaller OOA conflicts in Europe and on its periphery. The number of forces required for European OOA conflicts will depend on the number and nature of situations to be guarded against; the estimate will be a product of risk-management standards and quantitative analysis. Arguably, adequacy can be achieved if Western
Table 5.5

Force Requirements for Single OOA Operations
(illustrative)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation Category</th>
<th>Force Requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peacetime security reassurance</td>
<td>Combined-arms forces that can come to the aid of friends and allies, should they be attacked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian aid</td>
<td>Mobility forces plus combat escorts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterterrorism</td>
<td>Small, specialized forces, except in extreme cases requiring larger forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>Combat forces up to 2 divisions, 2–3 fighter wings (100,000 troops), plus 1 CVBG and other naval combatants, supported by a rotational base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacemaking and/or enforcement</td>
<td>Small-to-medium combat forces against minor opposition; but against major adversary, up to 6 divisions and 8 fighter wings (275,000 troops), plus 2 CVBGs and other combatants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis management</td>
<td>Combat forces up to 1 division and 3 fighter wings (60,000 troops), plus 1–2 CVBGs and other combatants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warfighting</td>
<td>Combat forces of 3–6 divisions and 4–8 fighter wings against modest threat; normally 12 divisions and 15 fighter wings against MRC threat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CVBG = Carrier Battle Group

forces can perform a single operation: for example, a sustained peacekeeping mission or a large peace-enforcement mission. Nevertheless, circumstances could arise in which a second sizable OOA operation might have to be launched in one place even as peacekeeping is pursued in another. Beyond this, NATO nations might require sufficient forces to deter aggression in East Central Europe even as they pursue peacekeeping in the Balkans (or vice versa).

These considerations argue for the capacity to perform two moderately large OOA missions east of NATO’s borders even as MRC deterrence is maintained in the Persian Gulf. Such a capacity would not safeguard against more pessimistic events, e.g., three sizable OOA
operations, but it would provide sufficient military forces to deal with the vast majority of plausible circumstances.

Table 5.6 illustrates total requirements for ground and air forces that assume that Western planning standards will include forces for two moderately large OOA missions. Appropriate naval forces also would be needed. The first OOA mission in Europe is that of a warfighting or peace-enforcement operation against an adversary that is militarily strong but not capable of MRC aggression (20 divisions or more). The second OOA mission is a sustained peacekeeping operation that requires commitment of 2 divisions and 210 combat aircraft backed by a rotational base. Table 5.6 also provides a small contingency reserve force and specialized units that would be needed for minor events: e.g., counterterrorism or hostage rescue. These estimates, it must be emphasized, are not predictive of specific events but rather are broadly suggestive of the overall force levels needed for planning purposes. They also are midpoints in a range. In each case, requirements could be modestly higher or lower.

Assuming that the requirement for a Persian Gulf MRC could be met through commitment of U.S. forces, friendly Arab forces, and two West European divisions and fighter wings, the remaining requirement for 12 divisions and 668 combat aircraft for OOA missions in Europe could fully consume, and potentially surpass, the number of U.S. and West European forces that will be available for such missions. Fewer OOA conflicts or smaller requirements for each conflict, of course, would lessen the stress on NATO’s OOA posture. Conversely, greater requirements would increase the stress.

Table 5.6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Type</th>
<th>Divisions</th>
<th>Combat Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. MRC in Persian Gulf</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Warfighting or peace enforcement in Europe</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Sustained peacekeeping in Europe</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Reserve force and specialized units</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1,568</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*aAir estimates based on a combination of USAF fighter wings (72 aircraft apiece) and West European fighter wings (54 aircraft apiece).*
U.S. FORCES FOR FUTURE OOA OPERATIONS

Despite the drawdown now under way, the United States will retain the capacity to deploy sizable military forces for a European conflict. Present plans call for a permanent presence of 100,000 troops, which would allow for a dual-based Army corps with 2 divisions, about 2 fighter wings, and a support infrastructure for rapid reinforcement. Plans for reinforcement in a contingency have not been finalized but are likely to include active forces of 2 large Army corps, Marine forces, several fighter wings, and a 1 to 2 carrier task force. An illustrative force commitment would be 9 divisions (counting independent brigades), 750 USAF combat aircraft, and 4 to 6 CVBGs. In the event of national mobilization, Reserve Component forces, e.g., 3 to 4 Army divisions and 400 to 500 combat aircraft, also could be deployed over a period of weeks and months. Forces of this magnitude would be committed in the event of a major aggression that threatens NATO's borders and the survival of its members, and that therefore triggers Article 5 obligations.

A more complex issue is how to assess potential U.S. contributions to OOA missions under Article 4. For such operations, the U.S. government would have the prerogative to make whatever commitments are mandated by the situation, and it might decide to send sizable forces, including major reinforcements from CONUS. Yet, there likely would be constraints on total U.S. commitments in many cases. One constraint is burden-sharing, the insistence that the West Europeans also play major roles in OOA operations. Another constraint is the need for the U.S. force posture to meet global commitments elsewhere, beyond Europe.

Consequently, for designing NATO OOA forces, it can safely be assumed that U.S. contributions for many OOA missions will be limited to the dual-based Army corps and associated air and naval units that will form the permanent American presence in Europe. This approach might underestimate U.S. commitments in an actual OOA conflict. But, recognizing the importance of planning prudently, it does not rely on forces that might not be available in some situations. It thus calls attention to the importance of building adequate West European forces for OOA missions, rather than relying on the United States always to carry the lion’s share of the burden.
Effect of Global Commitments

For the foreseeable future, the United States will continue to have major security commitments in the Far East and the Persian Gulf, and it will need to plan to commit sizable forces in the event of major conflicts there. In the Far East, defense of Korea especially requires not only a peacetime presence but plans for deploying reinforcements to enhance ROK forces in the event of a North Korean invasion. In the Persian Gulf, friendly Arab nations are not building large forces, and the protection of the vital Gulf oil fields therefore will continue to reside heavily in U.S. hands. An actual war in either theater would require heavy U.S. force commitments; even in peacetime, the need for deterrence requires that sizable U.S. forces remain uninvolved from other conflicts so that they are seen as clearly capable of deploying in a hurry.

Especially because the U.S. conventional posture is being reduced, these competing global requirements—in peace, as well as in war—could place constraints on the forces available for OOA missions in Europe. Table 5.7 portrays the conventional force posture estimated to be retained in the mid- to late 1990s along with the Cold War posture and the Base Force. The posture estimated for later this decade reflects an approximately 15 percent cut in Base Force total assets.

Table 5.7
Trends in U.S. Conventional Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Cold War Posture</th>
<th>Base Force</th>
<th>Mid- to Late 1990s&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army/Marine divisions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF fighter wings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN ships</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVBGs</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ships</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Estimate pending final decisions.
key strategy goal of the Bush Administration's Regional Defense Strategy and the Base Force was to retain the capacity to fight two roughly concurrent MRCs in the Persian Gulf and Korea. According to present indications, the Clinton Administration will embrace a two-MRC philosophy and will carry it out with somewhat smaller forces than are provided by the Base Force.

For the foreseeable future, U.S. forces for OOA missions will come from the active posture; reserve component forces are not likely to be used for ground missions. The availability of active forces for OOA contingencies will be shaped somewhat by the number of forces left after requirements for other global missions are subtracted. Table 5.8 shows the effects for ground and air forces, including the impact of planned reductions below the Base Force. It postulates large withholdings for the Persian Gulf and Korea of the sort needed to fight MRCs there or to deter intense situations: 11 divisions and wings, with most for the Persian Gulf. Also included is a small strategic reserve. In an actual crisis in Europe, conditions in the Persian Gulf and Korea might permit smaller allocations to those regions, thus enabling greater OOA commitments. Nonetheless, Table 5.8 provides a prudent estimate for planning. To the extent it is correct, it suggests that U.S. forces for OOA operations will be principally limited to those dual-based units planned for the peacetime presence there.

Table 5.8
U.S. Forces for OOA Operations in Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Allocation</th>
<th>Base Force</th>
<th>Mid-to-Late 1990s Posture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total forces</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withholdings for global missions</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wings</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available for OOA missions in Europe</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wings</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
WEST EUROPEAN FORCES FOR OOA OPERATIONS

For many years, the West European approach to OOA missions has been dominated by a single philosophy. Acting on guidance from NATO, the West Europeans have focused on border-defense missions; they have entrusted responsibility for major OOA operations to the United States. As a result, they have maintained OOA forces only for the limited contingencies that might be dictated by their individual national interests. Because most West Europeans did not have major interests to defend outside Europe, their OOA force needs were small. The only exceptions to this rule were Britain and France, which did have overseas interests. But with their overseas involvement and defense budgets shrinking over the past two decades, both nations have focused their defense strategies on Europe and have defined their OOA requirements in limited terms.

Ground and Air Forces

The following figure, Figure 5.1, lists the current OOA-oriented ground forces of the principal West European allies. A total pool of about 350 combat aircraft would normally accompany these units, assuming a squadron of 18 aircraft per ground brigade. This list clearly is dominated by the French *Force d'Action Rapide* (FFAR), a posture of 5 small divisions containing a mix of airborne, amphibious, airmobile, and specialized units for missions abroad. The FFAR has a dual mission: border defense and OOA operations. The British maintain approximately 1 division-equivalent, as do the Spanish. Other forces arguably could be listed here. The Germans, for example, have 3 airborne brigades that could be sent abroad; Greece, Turkey, and Norway also have light infantry and paratroop units that might be used. These other forces, however, all have border-defense missions. The forces listed in the figure are the units primarily maintained for intervention missions beyond national borders. Today, they represent about 10 to 15 percent of the mobilizable strength of their parent nations.

Figure 5.1 has as its main message that OOA missions have played only a small role in the defense strategies of the NATO allies. France
Total Deployable Assets: 4 divisions, 220 combat aircraft, 6 small carriers, and other naval assets.

- Britain: 3 brigades, 1 fighter wing, 2 carriers, small lift.
- France: FFAR of 5 divisions but only 1 deployable, 1 fighter wing, 2 carriers, small lift.
- Brigade-sized forces and lift assets from the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Italy, and others.

Overall Appraisal: Nations have prepared lightly equipped forces for small OOA operations, low-intensity combat, and short durations.

- These forces are intended for national use and do not operate together.
- British used these forces for Falklands; for Desert Storm, Britain and France sent heavier forces normally used for border defense.
- Modest improvements are being made, including for air forces.

Figure 5.1—Allied OOA Forces Used for National Purposes

and Britain aside, the four other European nations have thought of OOA operations in battalion- and brigade-sized terms, assisted by 6 to 18 combat aircraft: limited interventions for modest purposes rather than major combat operations. Their mobility forces, composed of ships and small air transports, are adequate to this task but to nothing more. Britain, with 54 combat aircraft, has sized its forces and mobility assets for, at most, division-sized operations. As for France, its strength is more apparent than real: The FFAR presents a large pool of ground units backed by 250 combat aircraft, but mobility assets are capable of deploying only 1 division and 54 to 108 aircraft at a time.

The combat capabilities of these forces are modest. Apart from France, the other five nations currently configure their OOA ground forces as light-infantry units that lack tanks, armored fighting vehicles, heavy artillery, attack helicopters, and large support units. These forces thus are not configured for intense combat against major opposition, and they lack the staying power for sustained combat. For France, the FFAR includes a light armored division that has tanks and heavy artillery, and an airborne division with 275 helicopters.
But these and other FFAR units lack the support structures that provide staying power, and only one division is deployable at a time, thereby inhibiting the French from bringing together the FFAR's diverse assets. For all six nations, OOA-oriented air forces lack sustainment assets, modern C3I systems, and the mobile logistics support that allows large USAF forces to deploy worldwide on short notice.

**Readiness**

As for readiness, the West European nations try to keep their OOA units at a high state, with adequate manpower, training, and weapons. Recent constraints are limiting this capability, however. Across Western Europe, tours of duty are being reduced, a change that could erode unit cohesion and readiness. Also, most of these units are heavily manned by conscripts, and the idea of sending conscripts to fight abroad is resisted in many places. Indeed, French and Spanish law prohibits sending conscripts abroad against their will: The effect is to produce a hasty scramble to assemble volunteers from many units when a crisis occurs. Only Britain has a professional army that is readily deployable for OOA missions.

**Naval Forces**

As for naval forces, the West European powers mostly maintain small- or medium-sized navies that perform coastal defense and nearby maritime missions. The blue-water mission, including wide-area sea control and power projection, is primarily entrusted to the U.S. Navy. Such division of labor constrains the capacity of most West European navies to operate in strength far beyond home waters.

In addition to lacking enough powerful combatants for high-threat environments, the West Europeans also lack the logistics support ships, C3I assets, air defense systems, and amphibious ships that play a large role in maritime power projection. They primarily offer naval assets, particularly large numbers of frigates and minesweepers, that can augment the U.S. Navy in power-projection missions.
Important exceptions are the British and French navies, which reflect a greater emphasis on projection missions. Britain currently deploys two Invincible-class carriers, each of which carries 8 vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) Sea Harrier (AV-8) aircraft and 12 helicopters. France deploys two Clemenceau-class carriers (33,000 tons) that carry up to 40 aircraft apiece, including 16 Super Etendard fighters. These carriers, supported by submarines, surface combatants, and logistics ships, provide a capacity for modest power projection but not for major operations in high-threat situations. In essence, both navies can launch operations similar to the Falkland’s deployment in 1982, but they cannot deploy the large carrier task forces or amphibious assets of the U.S. Navy.

Total Force Structure

If the forces of all six nations are added together, they add up to impressive numbers: about 90,000 ground troops distributed among 6 small divisions and 10 brigades, 350 combat aircraft, 4 small carriers, and other naval assets. Because OOA missions are planned on a national basis, however, these forces do not operate together. They provide each nation a capacity for small OOA missions, but not a capability for massing together to undertake large missions of the Desert Storm variety. Over the long term, this situation might change if the West Europeans engage in combined planning under the WEU; for the near to mid-term, it is a constraining fact of life.

This paucity of large OOA assets played a major role in limiting the contributions that the West Europeans made to Desert Storm. A sizable number of allied ships were deployed, but ground and air contributions were limited. Britain and France contributed one ground division and one air wing apiece; apart from them, other deployments were incidental. Deployment of these forces took time, owing to the lack of mobility assets. Moreover, although these British and French forces fought well, they relied heavily on U.S. support in C3I, logistics, and tactical mobility. Had the West Europeans wanted to deploy more forces, the absence of adequate OOA assets might have prohibited them from doing so.

In many capitals, steps are being taken to broaden existing OOA capabilities. Already-existing forces are being upgraded with better equipment and training. But sharp budgetary constraints are limit-
ing the degree to which investments can be made. No programs have been implemented to expand the size of OOA forces, to greatly enlarge the spectrum of missions that can be performed, or to greatly increase existing lift assets. The future thus promises a slow rate of progress, which itself could fall victim to declining budgets.

The West European nations, of course, deploy additional forces that are intended for border defense. In theory, those forces, which are more heavily equipped than their OOA counterparts, could be diverted to OOA missions. However, the drawdowns now under way across Western Europe are reducing these forces, especially active ground forces. Table 5.9 illustrates this downward trend for AFCENT/NW (Central and Northern Europe) and for AFSOUTH (southern region). This list excludes ground and air forces for OOA missions. Counting OOA forces, the AFCENT/NW nations are reducing their active ground forces by 45 percent, mobilizable ground forces (counting reserves) by 25 percent, air forces by 25 percent, and

Table 5.9
Trends in West European Military Forces (estimates)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Component by Area</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>Mid-1990s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFCENT/NWa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisionsb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat aircraft</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>1,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major ships</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFSOUTH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat aircraft</td>
<td>1,770</td>
<td>1,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major ships</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aAFCENT/NW includes Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway. AFSOUTH includes Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece and Turkey.
bIncludes separate brigades, which are counted as 3 brigades per division.
naval forces by 15 percent. Similar trends are being experienced in the south. Additional reductions may be forthcoming as part of ongoing efforts to reduce defense budgets and military manpower.

Despite the similarity in numbers between forces in AFCENT/NW and in AFSOUTH, the AFCENT/NW forces are by far the stronger and better prepared for OOA operations. The difference owes to better equipment, higher readiness, greater sustainability, and more modern doctrines. With some exceptions, most AFSOUTH forces today are not good candidates for OOA operations. Of the forces in AFCENT/NW, the air forces are best prepared for use in OOA operations. These forces are mostly equipped with modern combat aircraft (e.g., Tornado, F-16, and recent-vintage Mirage), and can perform either air defense or ground attack operations. They are easier to deploy than ground forces, and their combat radius (between 300 and 500 nmi) gives them a capacity to project power into many OOA regions from existing NATO airbases. Especially with support from AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System), JSTARS (Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System), and modern munitions, they are capable of projecting substantial combat power, as was shown in Desert Storm. Constraints on their effectiveness can come from command arrangements that inhibit their flexible employment, specific equipment shortfalls in allied inventories (including logistics support), and a lack of prepared airbases and munitions stocks when redeployment is needed. Perhaps most important, many OOA crises will not be solvable by air operations alone.

The ground forces of AFCENT/NW nations present a mixed picture for OOA operations. They are large and well-equipped for major combat operations. But they increasingly are dominated by reserve formations that are not available on short notice. Most of them have not been designed for missions outside Central Europe; owing to a lack of transport assets, they could not be readily deployed even if they were designed for OOA operations. For these reasons, the AFCENT/NW nations face powerful constraints on any effort to quickly deploy large ground forces abroad.
Constraints on OOA Missions

Such physical constraints merit fuller elaboration here. To retain effectiveness, the forces just described require adequate readiness, modernization; and sustainability. In the emerging political environment, adequate funds may be lacking to fulfill all three requirements. To buy new equipment, most West European nations today are emphasizing modernization; as a result, readiness and sustainability may suffer. If so, the capacity of these forces to perform all missions, including OOA operations, will erode.

Border defense must remain safeguarded even as OOA missions are conducted. As a result, only a portion of these forces could be deployed outside Central Europe at one time. Another constraint is that, even if laws restricting use of conscripts can be surmounted, only active units are normally available for OOA missions, because OOA operations commonly are mounted on short notice to deal with quick-breaking crises, and reserve forces tend to lack adequate training. The effect of this constraint is especially noteworthy for ground forces in Central Europe, of which only 17 active divisions will be available in the mid-1990s. Seven of the 17 will be small French divisions; the remainder will be distributed among the other nations in small increments. In particular, Germany will have only 7 active brigades, and Britain, only 5 brigades aside from those already assigned to OOA missions.

Especially for major deployments, a focus on border-defense missions will inhibit training for OOA missions in which a different climate, geography, and military environment might be encountered. Altered training practices can help compensate, but, as a general rule, combat formations that focus on a main mission cannot perform a secondary mission with high skill on short notice. Consequently, even active combat formations will not achieve high proficiency for OOA missions—a drawback to their availability. Even if their preparation is adequate, such combat units must rely heavily on support units. For most West European armies, support units are heavily populated by reservists whose readiness is normally lower than that of the active units to which they are assigned. This deficiency weakens their capacity to support even a primary border-defense mission on short notice. It is compounded when secondary OOA missions must be performed.
Another constraint is the legacy of these forces' long-standing preoccupation with defending the inter-German border against a massive Warsaw Pact invasion. That mission imposed unique demands, and West European forces were optimized to carry it out in ways that left them less prepared to respond flexibly to other environments. Each of the six West European corps that formed the backbone of NATO's layer-cake array was assigned to defend a specific sector of terrain that imposed special requirements on their force structures. Moreover, the threat of a Warsaw Pact armor-heavy invasion and a short, violent war had consequences of its own: national armies oriented to corps-sized linear forward defense. Some allied forces came away with large artillery forces, others with many tanks, and others with large infantry assets. All had highly specialized doctrines emphasizing tactical maneuver, firepower, and shock action in a confined space against a concentrated opponent attempting to advance over known terrain. Few were designed for sustained operations beyond a few days, for offensive campaigns, or for the sweeping operational maneuvers conducted in Desert Storm. Few resembled the balanced combined-arms philosophy of U.S. Army units, which were designed for flexibility. Moreover, allied air forces were designed to perform air intercept and deep-strike missions rather than the close air support and interdiction missions emphasized by the U.S. Air Force in response to the need for flexibility. Consequently, the allied army and air units that were to fight the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe are not well-prepared for OOA operations, for which a different battlefield might be encountered.

Equally important, almost no allied forces came away with large support establishments of the sort fielded by the U.S. Army, the U.S. Air Force, or the U.S. Navy. Because the U.S. Army's support structure is intended for many environments, it is both sizable and multifaceted. By contrast, West European support systems were designed for NATO's strategy of forward defense and flexible response during the Cold War. For example, German ground forces were expressly tailored to be able to march to the inter-German border, but not far beyond, a design philosophy adopted by other allied forces. As a consequence, they lack C3I units that can perform in austere environments, combat engineers capable of major construction, maintenance units that can make major repairs, truck transport units that can move ammunition and supplies over long distances, and war re-
serve stocks for a long war. All these assets—possessed by the U.S. Army and USAF because Central Europe was not the only concern—can be critical to the success of OOA operations.

Logistics Constraints

The logistics constraints on West European power projection run deeper yet. In sharp contrast to the United States, which has constantly been preparing for power projection for the past 50 years, most West European nations have not been compelled to face the unique challenges of mounting major military interventions at long distances. As a result, their military logistics infrastructure is heavily tied into their civilian economies, a reliance that grew out of preoccupation with defense of nearby borders and the lack of funds to pay for expensive mobile military assets. Moreover, NATO did little to reduce the negative consequences of such reliance. Since NATO's inception, logistics support has been a national responsibility. Consequently, NATO Headquarters and SHAPE have not focused on developing an integrated logistics structure, especially one for projection missions. When NATO was confronted during the 1970s with the Warsaw Pact military buildup, conscious efforts were made by most nations to increase reliance on inexpensive civilian assets, thereby allowing for more investment in modernization and training. The effort was successful, but it left behind the civilian-anchored structure that exists today, one that defies easy change.

German forces are most affected. But most Belgian, Dutch, and French forces are also implanted into the intertwined civilian-military logistics infrastructure created during the Cold War. For example, West European forces rely heavily on civilian networks to communicate, and they receive fuel from the civilian pipeline system. They receive much of their food, ammunition, and supplies from civilian trucks. They have their heavy maintenance performed by civilian mechanics, they rely on civilian engineers to maintain roads and installations, and they receive medical help from civilian hospitals. All these nations have plans to mobilize these civilian assets during a war in which their national survival is at stake. But how many are willing to pay the high political cost of mobilization for an OOA contingency? Even if they did mobilize, what portion of these civilian assets could be uprooted and transposed elsewhere? How
effectively could they perform once they arrived? The troublesome answers to these questions provide insights into the limited degree to which OOA operations are physically possible with today's forces.

**Strategic Mobility Constraints**

Finally, there is the constraint of strategic mobility. Light infantry forces require few air transports, but armored forces need many. A typical infantry division weighs only about 50,000 tons, but a heavy division weighs well over 100,000 tons and comes with equipment items that can be carried only by wide-bodied transports. Current West European cargo aircraft are too small and too few to project heavy forces to long distances. This task can be done by rail on the European continent and by sea, but West European rail and sea assets are not organized for this purpose. The effect is a sluggish ability to project power outward, especially with heavy forces prepared for intense combat.

The above constraints do not relegate West European forces to impotence in OOA missions, especially on a permanent basis. If time is ample and the threat is not severe, even forces that are imperfectly prepared can deploy to new missions and perform reasonably well. Also, allied air and naval forces can deploy more rapidly and effectively than ground forces. Moreover, U.S. ground, air, and naval forces can help provide the specialized assets lacking in West European forces. Although budget constraints will limit opportunities for new departures, greater flexibility can be built into West European forces over a period of years. The constraints thus are subject to remedial action. Nonetheless, the West Europeans for some time will have fewer assets for OOA missions than appearances suggest.

**NATO's Rapid Reaction Force**

The upper limits of West European forces that today are planned for commitment to OOA missions are probably defined by the assets assigned to NATO's Rapid Reaction Force (NRRF). As Figure 5.2 indicates, the assets are a ground force of 8 division-equivalents, along with which would come about 380 combat aircraft—itself an im-
Forces—Large and diverse, but not fully supported:

- ARRC of 1 U.S. division plus 8 allied divisions from 10 different nations:
  40 percent light and 60 percent heavy
- 20 air squadrons (380 aircraft) and associated naval units
- Logistics support assets for corps-sized deployment only
- Not backed up by adequate mobility forces
- 2 British divisions (heavy)
- 1 U.S. division (heavy)
- 1 German division (heavy)
- 2 multinational divisions (AFCENT and AFSOUTH, light)
- 1 Italian division (heavy)
- 1 Turkish division (heavy)
- 1 Spanish division (FAR, light, informally assigned)
- 10 corps support brigades (about 50,000 troops)

Figure 5.2—Allied Ground Forces Assigned to NATO Rapid Reaction Force

pressive force—but its ability to function as a cohesive unit is sus-
pect. At present rates, that ability will improve only slowly. Moreover, an open issue is whether there would be mobility assets to
lift these forces, a C3I system to control them, a logistics support
structure to supply them, and war reserves to sustain them. If not,
even the NRRF may create an illusion of greater strength, cohesion,
and deployability than actually exists. The ground component of this
posture is capable of mounting brigade- and division-sized opera-
tions with a mix of light and heavy forces that can be adjusted to
meet the situation. It possesses the support assets to mount a single
corps-sized operation of 3 to 4 divisions but lacks the mobility assets
to deploy this force quickly. It lacks both the logistics support and
transport assets to project more than one ground corps at a time.
Thus, it is a force for one medium-sized contingency at a time, but
no more.

Figure 5.3 provides a breakdown of future allied air forces by mission
orientation. As it suggests, only about 20 percent of the posture is
planned for either national OOA missions or the NRRF. Figure 5.4
provides a similar breakdown for allied naval forces.
Finally, Figure 5.5 lists allied mobility forces. As it suggests, allied military airlift capacity is only one-fourth that of the United States, and a far smaller fraction is heavy airlift capable of carrying bulky items. Allied military sealift capacity is also far less. The allies, in theory, can mobilize sizable civilian cargo ships. But these assets, because they are not organized into a naval reserve, are not readily available.
Status: AFCENT/NW are mostly modern and ready; AFSOUTH are older and less ready.

Issues: Large total assets. Apart from UK and France, are oriented to coastal defense.

- Power projection constrained by lack of offensive weapons, air defense, and under-way logistics support.
- Can help augment U.S. Navy in power-projection missions.
- Frigates and mine warfare ships are especially valuable.

Figure 5.4—Future Allied Naval Forces for OOA Missions (estimated)

- U.S. lift capacity exceeds West European assets by at least 4–5:1 and has greater range.
- Both assets can draw on civilian assets, but West European airlift and sealift are not well-organized.
  - Civilian air cargo transports normally cannot carry outsized military equipment.
  - During Cold War, West Europeans planned to use 400–600 cargo ships for North Atlantic convoys, but none was held as a ready reserve.

Figure 5.5—Mobility Forces
Chapter Six

FORCE TRENDS FOR INDIVIDUAL WEST EUROPEAN NATIONS

Providing further detail for the generalizations advanced in Chapter Five on allied forces, this chapter analyzes military developments in individual West European nations. It focuses mainly on Britain, France, and Germany but also discusses other nations. Although specialists will want to read this chapter, readers less interested in these details may want to go directly to Chapter Seven, which discusses force improvement measures.

Listed on Table 6.1 are Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) limits for West European forces. Most nations will field forces well below these limits. Thus, national drawdown plans matter more than arms control accords. This chapter addresses these plans.

BRITAIN

Owing partly to its colonial traditions, Britain has been a leader in receptivity to OOA missions. Since 1967, Britain has been engaged in a withdrawal from colonial involvements and has focused its military strategy on Europe, but it has kept small forces and bases abroad backed up by units in England capable of OOA missions. The Falklands campaign of 1982 demonstrated Britain’s ability to project power to long distances; it also illuminated the drawbacks of not having large aircraft carriers and other capabilities. Britain led other West European nations in contributing forces to Desert Storm by deploying an armored division, an air wing, and sizable naval forces, all of which played significant roles in the campaign. To display its willingness to play a role in peacekeeping, Britain in 1992 sent 2,500 troops to participate in the UN presence in Bosnia.
Britain can be expected to pursue a similar policy in the future. Moderating its stance are compelling budgetary constraints that could erode its defense posture for both traditional missions and OOA operations. The “Statement on the Defense Estimates 1992” released by the British government points to annual defense budgets averaging about 24 billion pounds through the mid-1990s. Inflation will result in a gradual reduction in real spending by about 2 to 3 percent per year, and the defense budget’s share of gross national product (GNP) is expected to shrink from 3.9 percent now to 3.5 percent by 1995.

Within the Defense Ministry, budgetary allocations will remain approximately constant, with about 42 percent spent on personnel and 40 percent spent on equipment. The high cost of maintaining a strategic nuclear posture and buying a fourth Trident SSBN (subsurface ballistic nuclear) will place constraints on conventional force spending. Planned cutbacks in force levels reflect these realities; however, during 1992, complaints began surfacing in Parliament that the drawdown was going too far. Britain’s economic plight and
the ongoing recession place limits on deploying larger forces than are now envisioned.

Indeed, budgetary realities could compel further cutbacks. The Thatcher-Major governments have unveiled plans for a roughly 40 percent cut in ground maneuver units, a 20 percent cut in air units, and about a 10 percent reduction to the Royal Navy. Early reports in 1993 suggest a possible cut in nuclear forces, as well. Principally targeted for reductions are forces that performed Cold War missions, including the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR). British light forces assigned OOA missions probably will not be reduced a great deal. But cutbacks in ground and air forces that performed Continental missions could erode Britain's capacity to divert these forces for OOA tasks, as was done during the Persian Gulf conflict. Most of Britain's combat power has resided in these forces, and reductions to them will leave Britain less well-armed than before.

Prior to the reductions that are now under way, the British fielded a ground posture of the BAOR and deployable combat units based primarily in England. A corps-sized unit, the BAOR was dominated by three armored divisions (1st, 3rd, and 4th) of about 11,000 troops each, with 9 brigades in total, counting the unit in Berlin. Each division fielded about 200 Challenger tanks, 600 infantry fighting vehicles, and 40 self-propelled artillery tubes. Also assigned to the BAOR were an artillery division and 2 small armored cavalry regiments. In England were a Reserve Component (RC) infantry division (2d), two infantry brigades (19th and 1st), an airborne brigade (5th), a Royal Marine Commando brigade (3rd), and several separate infantry battalions. This posture totaled nearly 19 separate brigades or regiments. The active units were maintained in a ready status and were regarded as among NATO's best-prepared forces. The BAOR had a mobilizable strength about equal to a U.S. Army heavy corps of 3 to 4 divisions, and it embraced doctrinal concepts similar to those of the U.S. Army.

Britain's air forces totaled some 36 squadrons: 10 interceptor, 20 strike/attack, 2 training, and 4 reconnaissance squadrons. Of the roughly 550 combat aircraft assigned to operational units, about 375 were modern Tornados and 60 were Harriers. The Royal Air Force met NATO standards for training and sustainability and, despite some deficiencies in equipment and modern munitions, was re-
garded as a capable force. As for the Royal Navy, it deployed 4 SSBNs assigned strategic missions, 3 small carriers (V/STOL), 45 destroyers and frigates, and 13 nuclear attack submarines. Counting small combatants and support ships, the British navy deployed 185 ships: one-third the number of the U.S. Navy, but among the world's largest flotillas. Reflecting Britain's long tradition as a maritime power with worldwide interests, Royal Navy doctrine stressed blue-water missions, including defense of the North Atlantic and power projection elsewhere.

Britain's forces for OOA missions were a small subset of this total, and were focused on low-intensity combat of limited duration. Principal ground forces included the 5th Airborne Brigade, the 3rd Marine Commando Brigade, and a small battalion of special forces. Arguably, the 1st Infantry Brigade could be counted, but its status as a SACEUR strategic reserve constrained its availability. Normally allocated to a 2-brigade ground force would be 43 combat aircraft, including 18 interceptors, 19 attack/strike fighter bombers, and 6 reconnaissance aircraft. Evidently, the British do not possess the equivalent of a CRAF (Civil Reserve Air Fleet) or civilian cargo ships that readily can be drawn upon, but they do have airlift and sealift assets for ground and air forces of 2-brigade size, along with a modest logistics support package. Earmarked are 12 VC-10 and 50 C-130 transports, and 8 amphibious ships. Accompanying overseas deployment of this force normally would be a V/STOL carrier and 15 to 20 escort combatants and a similar number of support ships.

The British also have maintained small forces overseas that count as part of their OOA capability. Those forces have included an infantry brigade in Hong Kong, two infantry battalions on Cyprus, single battalions in Central America and Gibraltar, and a detachment on the Falklands. In addition to periodic deployment of a carrier, overseas naval deployments have included small numbers of frigates and destroyers in the Indian Ocean–Persian Gulf area, the South Atlantic, and the Caribbean. Supporting these deployments have been naval bases in the Indian Ocean (Diego Garcia) and the South Atlantic (Falklands and Ascension Island). In addition, about 20,000 British troops are deployed in Northern Ireland.

Thus, the British have maintained a military capability for OOA missions, but their ambitions have been modest. The guiding concept
has been to have a capacity for deploying 1 to 2 light brigades (or at most a division) on behalf of limited goals, not sustained combat operations. Apparently, this capability is not being reduced in the budgetary cutback, but neither is it being enhanced in response to official proclamations that missions beyond NATO's borders will occur in the future. Any serious effort to launch larger, more potent, and better-supported interventions must continue to come from the forces normally intended for Continental missions.

Britain's forces performed well in the Falklands conflict, when they overpowered a larger Argentine force fighting close to its homeland. British operational skill and training showed in the Falklands conflict, but the lack of a large aircraft carrier came close to being a serious liability. Air defense deficiencies resulted in both the loss of several ships from Argentine air attack and higher casualties than if air defense were better. During the mid-1980s, British naval forces played important roles in the escort operation in the Persian Gulf. When Desert Shield was launched, the British deployed a heavy armored division, along with air and naval assets. These forces were heavily involved in Desert Storm. British air units performed a number of air missions in the bombardment campaign of the first month, and during the 100-hour ground campaign, the heavy division worked with the U.S. VII Corps in launching flanking attacks against Iraqi ground forces. Overall, the performance of these forces was satisfactory, but they had to draw on U.S. forces for logistics and technical support, and some of their equipment was not well suited for desert operations.

Britain can be expected to try to remedy the problems encountered in Desert Storm. Improvements likely will be made in air tactics, armored tactical mobility, logistics support, specialized equipment, C2/C4I assets, and, perhaps, strategic mobility forces. Britain's defense establishment, nonetheless, is being subjected to cutbacks that will threaten its capacity to perform OOA operations in any strength. Least affected will be the navy, which will retain its V/STOL carriers and a sizable force of surface combatants, submarines, and support ships. Despite the loss of 6 to 7 squadrons, the air force will keep
about 470 combat aircraft, including its modern Tornado and Harrier models.¹

The army, however, is destined to drop from the present 4 divisions to only 2 divisions, and from a total of 17 to 18 brigades to only 10 to 11 brigades: a 40 percent cutback. Remaining in Germany will be the 1st Armored Division, with 3 armored brigades. Based in England will be the 2d Infantry Division, with 2 mechanized brigades and 1 airborne brigade. Remaining brigades include airborne, infantry, and Royal Marine units. The 2 divisions will form the backbone of NATO’s Rapid Reaction Corps, and the entire British army will make important contributions to NATO’s main defense force and to emerging WEU plans. British units will be fully active, will be manned by professional soldiers and volunteers, and they can be expected to meet Britain’s traditional standards of high effectiveness. Also, they will be equipped with modern tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery, and attack helicopters. British divisions will remain about 70 percent as large as their U.S. counterparts, which will leave them equal to or better than any adversary likely to be encountered.

If these reductions are fully implemented, they will, nonetheless, have a significant impact on British strategic options. In theory, the British will still have sufficient ground and air forces to mount a sizable OOA mission: up to 2 divisions, 2 light brigades, 150 combat aircraft, and large naval forces. However, these forces will be fully deployable only if border-defense missions in Central Europe can be discounted. To the extent border defense is a constraint, a smaller portion will be deployable. In essence, the reduction of Britain’s army constrains its ability to meet two concurrent requirements. Moreover, the ongoing deployment in Northern Ireland requires a large rotational base, thereby further constraining Britain’s ability to participate in other operations.

If Britain is to become capable of using its heavy forces for time-urgent OOA missions, it will need to acquire a force of large air transports and military cargo ships. Britain’s strategic mobility forces are

sized only to lift the 2 light brigades and associated air units; they could not transport the extra 2 divisions, accompanying aircraft, and associated logistics support units. During the Persian Gulf conflict, the British were compelled to jury-rig a flotilla of civilian cargo ships to transport only 1 heavy division to the Gulf, and the effort was time-consuming. An effort more than twice this large would be more than twice as difficult, and perhaps impossible short of full mobilization of civilian assets. Moreover, the combat forces themselves will have to be altered. Currently, these forces are tailored to fight in Central Europe, and they lack the logistics units and specialized support equipment needed to fight at long distances and in remote areas. During the Persian Gulf War, U.S. forces provided the necessary support in these areas, but British forces will not be fully deployable until they can operate on their own.

FRANCE

Although insistent on preserving its sovereignty, France has shown a willingness to participate in OOA coalition operations when its interests so dictate. It retains military forces for OOA missions that look imposing on paper. When the details are examined, a less impressive picture emerges. France did play a constructive role in Desert Storm, and it has deployed 4,500 troops to Bosnia as part of the UN peacekeeping force. But it also has become engaged in a dispute with the United States over security policy in Europe, and it continues to show a standoffish attitude toward NATO's integrated command. Efforts are under way to find an enduring compromise, but, unless the rupture in U.S.-French relations can be healed, the future of cooperative OOA policies may be bleak.

The early months of 1993 have witnessed important signs of an emerging shift in French policy. Senior French officials have given speeches calling attention to the need for multinational cooperation, including cooperation with the United States, in dealing with OOA problems. In the wake of an improving dialogue came a French decision to allow temporary subordination of French units to the NATO integrated command in the event that combat operations are launched in Bosnia. France continues to stand outside the integrated command for most purposes, but it is moving toward greater military cooperation with NATO and the United States.
Similar to all West European nations, France's military posture reflects the legacy of the Cold War. In the early 1950s, France promised to field a large army of 15 to 20 full-sized divisions that would form the backbone of NATO's defense posture. But events conspired to prevent this pledge from being carried out. In the mid- to late 1950s, France waged major OOA wars in Southeast Asia and Algeria, and also participated with Britain in the invasion of Suez in 1956. This behavior reflected France's long-standing colonial policies, policies that often ran up against opposition from the United States. When Charles de Gaulle took over, he largely withdrew France from overseas endeavors and embarked on the path of weakening NATO and the U.S. role in Europe. France's military forces soon came to reflect de Gaulle's design: to fight primarily in Europe, outside the NATO integrated command. But they did retain some assets for OOA operations, especially in Africa, where France continued to have a colonial legacy.

The force posture inherited from the Cold War reflected France's military strategy for the past 25 years. Essentially, French strategy was anchored on the concept of an independent nuclear deterrent, and as a result, predominant emphasis was placed on France's small but expensive force of SSBNs, intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), and strike aircraft. As the years passed, the French government gradually placed greater emphasis on building a conventional posture that could supplement its nuclear deterrent, one that could work more closely with NATO. France, however, shied away from the ambitious defense goals embraced by NATO's strategy of flexible response. Moreover, the lack of a large defense budget exerted powerful constraints on the degree to which force improvement efforts could be pursued. The result was a force posture suspended between a nuclear trip wire and viable conventional defense.

Whereas NATO military strategy called for a forward defense of West Germany, French doctrine emphasized the protection of France's borders. That protection was to be accomplished by committing French ground and air forces in the event that NATO's frontal war buckled and Warsaw Pact forces advanced deep into West Germany. At that juncture, French forces were to conduct a brief conventional defense, and were then to use nuclear weapons to deter a further enemy advance. As a result, French conventional forces lacked staying power, their ground weapons were less sophisticated than those
fielded by many NATO nations, and, by being outside the NATO integrated command, they showed less mastery of the combined-arms doctrines that had come to dominate NATO military thinking.

By the late 1980s, France deployed a field army of 15 divisions organized into corps-sized formations. These divisions, however, were much smaller than U.S. and German counterparts, which fielded 16,500 soldiers apiece. With only 4,000 to 11,000 soldiers apiece and modest logistics support assets, these French units lacked combat power equivalent to their American counterparts, and they were intended for brief conventional combat followed by nuclear escalation. Dominating the field army were 8 light armored divisions, each of which included only 8,000 soldiers, 150 tanks, 132 armored fighting vehicles, 50 anti-tank weapons, and 24 artillery tubes. As a result, the field army had a limited capacity to defend terrain and to deliver the combination of fire and maneuver needed for offensive maneuvers. Critics charged that the entire French ground posture was no stronger than a good-sized U.S. Army corps. Even if this harsh judgment went too far, the field army was an "army" in name only.\(^2\)

Supporting these ground forces was a large air posture of about 650 combat aircraft oriented to homeland air defense and support of the ground forces. The French Air Force fielded high-technology aircraft, but preoccupied with nuclear strike doctrines, it did not emphasize conventional operations. As a result, it did not fully develop the C3I assets, avionics, weapons, training regimens, and support structures required for mastery of close air support and battlefield interdiction. The French Navy, although fairly large, was not structured for sustained conventional fighting. It included 2 small aircraft carriers, 44 surface combatants, 20 attack submarines, and about 135 support ships of various types. This force patrolled the eastern Atlantic and western Mediterranean, but also carried out periodic deployments to more distant waters.

\(^2\)The French Army of 1989 was composed of 6 armored divisions, 1 light armored division, 2 infantry divisions, 1 air-mobile division, 1 alpine division, 1 parachute division, 1 marine division, and 2 training divisions. See Amadee-Marc Monchal, "Flexibility, Mobility, Experience: The Transformation of the French Army," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, Vol. 37, No. 3, 1992, pp. 23–26.
The French Army included 3 corps with 10 divisions that were oriented to operations in Central Europe. It also fielded a wholly separate force oriented toward OOA missions, the FFAR, which included 5 French-style divisions: 4th Airmobile, 6th Light Armored, 9th Overseas Infantry (Marines), 11th Airborne, and 27th Alpine. All told, this force included about 50,000 combat troops and another 50,000 support troops. Accompanying it into battle would have been about 250 combat aircraft of varying types. The FFAR originally was created for missions outside Europe, but during the 1980s it acquired a secondary responsibility for performing reserve missions in Central Europe. It thus became a force for all seasons.

Importantly, rather than being a unified force, the FFAR was a collection of disparate units organized under one tent. It lacked a fully developed command system, and it fielded few logistics support units beyond those assigned to the various divisions. Nor did it have a common doctrine. The FFAR’s divisions, moreover, were lightly equipped. With only about 250 tanks and an equal number of infantry fighting vehicles, the FFAR’s primary strength was infantry units, anti-tank weapons, and about 150 attack helicopters. This weapons suite left the FFAR capable of limited interventions, classic infantry operations, and possibly antiarmor defense, but not capable of swift mobile maneuvers with mechanized forces. Moreover, the FFAR suffered from a lack of mobility assets capable of moving it abroad in a timely fashion. Indeed, France had only 50 medium transports and 8 small amphibious ships—enough to carry a brigade, and perhaps a division, but not 5 divisions. This lack of mobility assets suggested that the FFAR was not an integrated posture but rather a “grab bag” of units from which could be extracted and deployed 1 appropriately tailored division, but no more.

Rounding out France’s OOA assets was the French Foreign Legion (8,500 mostly infantry troops) and a variety of small forces and installations deployed overseas. Deployed across the Pacific at various locations were 2 infantry regiments; deployed in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf were 2 more light regiments; based at various spots in sub-Saharan Africa were fully 4 infantry regiments. These forces were mostly intended for local defense missions, and they were not trained or equipped for major combat operations. Their main purpose seemed to be to support France’s overseas involvements and to
provide limited options for purely local situations, rather than to provide an infrastructure for major power projection.

Over the years, small French units have been periodically deployed abroad to deal with low-intensity conflicts (e.g., company- and battalion-sized operations in sub-Saharan Africa), and they have performed well. When the Persian Gulf conflict erupted, small infantry units were deployed. But the major contribution was provided by a French light armored division, air units, and naval forces, forces that fought well but displayed operational shortcomings in desert combat. The French division was given the important task of protecting the left flank of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf’s flanking maneuver, and it got the job done. But its lack of familiarity with NATO doctrine and procedures diminished its effectiveness, as did its lack of adequate equipment for mobile operations in the desert.

During 1992, France contributed peacekeeping troops and naval vessels to help support the UN and WEU in the Balkans, and it remains a vocal advocate of activist involvements in that region as well as in the Persian Gulf.

Similar to other Western nations, France is now struggling to define its future military requirements. Present trends suggest that France will reduce its military posture, but less extensively than Britain and Germany. Evidently, the field army is being reduced to 2 corps (2d and 3rd) and 7 divisions, 4 of which will be configured as armored units with about 10,000 soldiers and equipped with 140 to 150 tanks, 140 IFVs (infantry fighting vehicles), 54 Milan/HOT anti-tank systems, 48 artillery tubes, and 12 mortars. The chief weapon of these divisions will be the new Leclerc tank, of which about 800 will be produced. Of the other 3 divisions, 2 will be mechanized infantry and 1 will be an infantry unit.3

The field army will remain focused on defense of French borders and on support for the Eurocorps and the WEU. It will continue to lack the logistics systems for large projection missions outside France. Although the FFAR apparently is not being reduced, neither is it being upgraded: It will continue to deploy its current 5 divisions in the same configuration. The air force is being cut by about 50 combat aircraft, and older models are being phased out—a pattern followed by most nations. The navy is scarcely being cut. Declining budgets can be anticipated to cut into readiness, modernization, and sustainability. At present, French equipment is not standardized with NATO and U.S. models; on the whole, it is modern and competitive with adversary threats. However, whether sufficient funds will be available to replace or upgrade old models as they wear out will be an issue.

Support for the Eurocorps is France’s primary manifestation of multilateral involvement. However, French defense officials recently have been displaying greater interest in cooperating with NATO. Most likely, France will take steps to help remedy the deficiencies encountered in Desert Storm, and it will become somewhat more capable of conducting OOA operations. But with national defense receiving diminished support, major transformation of France’s defense establishment appears unlikely. Most probably, France will remain largely what it was before: a country with forces to support its national interests but that are not integrated into multilateral institutions and lack the capacity to wage major OOA wars on their own.

France will continue to provide forces for international peacekeeping missions, and it will be able to mount limited interventions abroad (i.e., battalion- and brigade-sized) in situations requiring low-intensity operations of limited duration. In major crises, it will retain the ability demonstrated in Desert Storm to provide a ground division, an air wing, and a naval task force capable of joining a larger coalition that provides support in such critical areas as C3I, mobility, logistics, and naval air defense.

Apart from its involvement in the Eurocorps, France will not acquire the ability anytime soon to promptly project corps-sized or larger formations capable of operational maneuvers. In theory, the field army and the FFAR provide sizable forces for helping defend Germany’s new eastern borders and for dealing with security threats in
Poland and surrounding areas. But the practical impediments (e.g., support needs) faced by these forces make them uncertain instruments for supporting an eastward-looking NATO or WEU military strategy.

GERMANY

This nation currently is embroiled in a major debate over its future defense policy. The debate is pitting the CDU against the SPD, and the FDP is caught in the middle. As discussed in Chapter Three, the debate partly is focused on OOA operations, but it includes other fundamental issues: Should Germany be a military power in the new era? What role should it play in East Central European security affairs? Should German military strategy focus only on defense of Germany’s borders, or should it aspire to protect larger national interests? What threats should animate Germany defense planning? How much military strength is needed to defend German borders, meet NATO and WEU commitments, and protect Germany’s larger interests? How large a defense budget is required? What should be active manpower levels, and how much reliance should be placed on mobilizable reserve forces? Until these questions are answered, forecasts of future German military forces will be tentative.

Recent legal decisions, ruling against a constitutional ban, have partly cleared the way for Germany to think about using military forces beyond its borders. One important decision was that of allowing German troops to defend other NATO nations, including Turkey. In addition, German troops are now allowed to participate in UN-sponsored peacekeeping missions. The current debate focuses on participation in peacemaking and peace-enforcement (e.g., combat operations in Bosnia). The outcome is unclear, but German courts are signaling that the issue is one of state policy rather than constitutional restrictions. If so, the outcome will depend on how the political debate in Germany unfolds.

Regardless of how Germany resolves its debates, changing conditions in Europe are moving the OOA problem closer to its borders. Today, the OOA problem is situated in the Balkans. If political turmoil spreads northward, Germany’s interests could be engaged to the point of demanding this nation to make a contribution to peacekeeping missions there, or to crisis management. More eyebrow-
raising is the prospect that, if NATO is ever required to fight a major war in East Central Europe, German forces not only would have to be committed but also would have to carry the load—especially if a major conflict were to be fought in Poland, which directly adjoins Germany. To be sure, the United States, Britain, and others would help, but NATO would not be able to generate and deploy the large multinational posture of the Cold War. Because this contingency could pose an immediate threat to Germany’s borders, NATO and German planners will need to consider it in developing their force postures, regardless of how the debate about distant OOA operations plays out in Bonn.

The FRG’s defense posture during the Cold War was restricted to levels established by NATO in 1954, when West Germany was admitted into the alliance as part of a complex accord that ensured its military security. Even so, the FRG deployed 500,000 active troops and a sizable force posture that made it a military powerhouse in Central Europe. Well-equipped and highly trained, the German active field army included 11 armored and armored infantry divisions and 1 airborne division. Those divisions deployed manpower and weapons comparable to U.S. Army divisions, and they embraced doctrinal concepts oriented to forward linear defense. Supporting the field army was a 1-million-man reserve territorial army dominated by 6 mobilizable heavy brigades capable of major combat missions, and logistics support units. Additional reserve regiments, all lightly equipped, performed rear-area security missions. The territorial army also provided a large pool of trained soldiers as individual replacements.

The German Air Force of 1989 deployed 660 combat aircraft in operational units, including about 270 modern Tornados, 230 F-4s, 160 Alpha Jets, and 24 MiG-29s bequeathed from the defunct GDR. Organized into 29 squadrons, this posture was responsible for defense of FRG airspace and for a variety of missions aimed at aiding NATO’s ground defenses. It differed from the U.S. Air Force in that it focused on deep-strike missions (e.g., interdiction) and placed less emphasis on close air support. The small German Navy, oriented to coastal defense but with a modest blue-water capability, deployed 16 combatants, 24 small submarines, 45 patrol boats, and support ships. For all three services, the German military received high marks from
NATO for readiness and modernization, and it was regarded as a well-led and effective force.

German forces were not oriented to OOA missions, for reasons that went beyond the FRG’s constitution. The nearby presence of a massive Soviet-Warsaw Pact threat demanded constant attention to defense of the FRG’s borders. Accordingly, all West German active forces were assigned to NATO command, and their sole purpose was to defend FRG territory. Their missions focused exclusively on supporting NATO’s forward-defense concept and layer-cake array. By design, German ground forces were equipped with relatively small logistics structures, which prohibited projection of power far beyond the FRG’s borders. Many key support functions were performed by assets drawn from the local civilian economy. The German Navy lacked the capacity for major power projection, and the German Air Force was tied by logistics structures to home bases. On paper, the airborne division seemed to provide an OOA option, but its lack of support units and troop-transport aircraft tied it to FRG soil. Indeed, its brigades were parceled out to the German Army’s three forward corps, where they functioned as tactical reserves. Such physical characteristics made OOA missions almost impossible to carry out even had there been political interest, and nowhere was interest present, including in the FRG itself.

More than for any other NATO nation, German military strategy has been thrown into upheaval by the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the forward areas, and the dissolution of the USSR. Whereas the military forces of other nations predate the Cold War and are intended to serve wider national interests, the FRG defense establishment owes its origins to the threat of communist aggression in Central Europe. Had this threat not been present, widespread support for German rearmament would not have surfaced in the 1950s. Indeed, the German government itself would not have favored that step. The decision to create the Bundeswehr was made only after a stressful parliamentary debate, and only because NATO’s nations were incapable of protecting the FRG’s borders in the absence of a large German army.

Now that the Cold War threat is defunct, this raison d’etre is gone. Although the outlines of a new rationale have been laid down by the
NATO strategic concept adopted at the Rome Summit, Germany has not yet fashioned an elaborated military strategy and defense planning framework that enjoys consensual support at home. At the moment, German defense projections are pointed downward, but how far remains to be determined. As of mid-1992, the German Ministry of Defense was asserting that an active posture of 370,000 troops would be maintained; in early 1993, that figure was reduced to 300,000. Press reports suggested that the number might eventually drop to 200,000 troops, and that a commensurately sized defense budget would focus on keeping a small but modernized posture.

Current plans call for a major drawdown of combat units. For ground forces, the Field Army and the Territorial Army are being amalgamated. The new army will be organized into 3 territorial or corps headquarters and 8 district or division headquarters, plus 2 separate division headquarters for short-notice contingency tasks. The army is being reduced by 33 percent, from 42 mobilizable brigades to 28 brigades. Additional cuts could reduce the posture to 24 brigades. The old Homeland Defense Brigades of the Territorial Army are being eliminated, but 8 lightly equipped regiments for rear-area security are being retained.4

Along with this downsizing is coming a major reduction in army readiness. Whereas the FRG previously fielded 36 active brigades, the future posture will deploy only about 7 active brigades. Included are to be 3 mechanized brigades, 2 airborne brigades, 1 infantry brigade, and the Franco-German brigade. Absent mobilization, the active German Army thus will field only about 2 to 3 division-equivalents: about the same as Britain. The remaining 21 brigades will be configured as mixed active and reserve units, with nearly all manned by an active cadre of 50 percent that will preserve a fairly high degree of readiness. Because these units are committed to NATO's plans for forming main defense forces organized into multinational formations, they are intended to be mobilizable within a few days or weeks.

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Additional money reductions could reduce the active cadre below 50 percent, thus further lowering readiness. In essence, the German Army is becoming a reserve force.

This downsizing is being accompanied by steps to maintain combat power at as high a level as possible. A balanced combination of armored and mechanized brigades is being planned. The German Army thus will remain a predominantly heavy force oriented to modern battlefield doctrine. Each brigade will have 3 battalions of 4 companies apiece, and will provide the balanced combination of armor, infantry, and artillery associated with the German Army. As a result, the mobilizable German Army will remain a powerful force assigned to the NATO integrated command.

The operational concept behind Germany’s force plans has not been announced. Note, however, that 8 divisions would be enough to form a frontal defense wall along Germany’s eastern border, providing a screen behind which other NATO forces could be mobilized.

Plans call for the most modern equipment to be retained and for obsolete models to be retired. Future inventories will reflect unit requirements and CFE constraints. The German Army evidently will field about 3,300 tanks, including 2,000 Leopard II’s. Modernization plans call for upgrading 700 Leopard II’s and 1,200 Leopard I’s. The army also will field nearly 3,000 infantry fighting vehicles, including 2,000 Marders that are being upgraded to the A3 version; 200 attack helicopters with Track-on-Wire (TOW) missiles; and about 500 ground vehicles with TOW or HOT missiles. Artillery battalions will be increased from 18 to 24 tubes apiece, and will be equipped with self-propelled 155mm howitzers and MLRS (Multilateral Radar Strike) systems. With this equipment, German divisions will be approximately as strong as American counterparts.

The air force evidently is to be reduced by about 30 percent and will deploy about 20 squadrons and 450 combat aircraft, counting training aircraft, spares, and maintenance floats. Remaining squadrons will be able to focus on air defense and deep-strike and/or interdiction missions: There will be 8 interceptor squadrons and 12 fighter-bomber squadrons. The air force also will include an undiminished ground-based air defense posture of 6 HAWK/Patriot regiments and 3 SHORAD (Short Range Air Defense) ROLAND groups. Being re-
tired are the Alpha Jets and some of the aging F-4s. Loss of the Alpha Jets will further diminish the air force's assets for close air support. The "new" air force will be equipped primarily with modern Tornados and F-4Es, and will be provided modern ordnance and other equipment. The navy is to be reduced by about 15 percent, and will remain a coastal patrol force with a capacity to deploy a few destroyers and frigates to distant areas (e.g., the Persian Gulf).

Outward appearances suggest that this drawdown plan is driven by a combination of strategic design and budgetary realities. By retaining sizable air forces and a modest navy, Germany ensures peacetime protection of its airspace and offshore waters. Moreover, costs for these forces are driven by procurement requirements, and little money is to be saved by placing these forces on reserve status. By retaining a small, active ground force, Germany ensures that commitments to NATO, the WEU, and the Eurocorps are fulfilled, and that a response can be mounted to quick-breaking crises. Retirement of most ground forces to reserve status reflects an assumption that several weeks and months of warning will precede a major war. Because costs for ground units are driven heavily by expenses for personnel and operations, this step also yields sizable savings. The savings, in turn, can be devoted to investment and procurement, thereby permitting German forces to be equipped with modern weapons.

Interest is growing within the German Ministry of Defense in the idea of developing an improved capability for OOA missions as part of UN, WEU, or NATO forces. Procurement of transport aircraft and specialized assets would broaden German capabilities for humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, and for limited combat operations. Infantry units can be moved by air transports, and tactical air and naval units can deploy under their own power. Although heavy army units could not be easily airlifted, they could be moved by sea or rail. The number of forces that Germany could deploy to an OOA crisis would be constrained by competing peacetime requirements for homeland defense and by the lack of logistics support units. Nonetheless, it is likely that, with only minor modifications, Germany could deploy 1 brigade or division, 1 air wing of 54 combat aircraft, and a small naval task force—about equal to that provided by Britain and France during Desert Storm.
A willingness to contemplate use of forces in operations beyond German borders is reflected in the steps being taken to assign German forces to multinational formations that will perform OOA missions. Evidently, small German combat support units are being earmarked for possible roles in NATO’s immediate-reaction force. One German division, 4 total brigades, and air defense units are being earmarked for the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps, and German combat aircraft have been assigned to the air reaction force, which is commanded by a German officer. Also, German personnel are assigned to NATO’s AWACS aircraft, which are used for alliance-wide surveillance and monitoring. Two German brigades have been assigned to the Eurocorps, and units have been earmarked for a WEU force. A German destroyer has been assigned to the STANAVFORMED naval task force operating in the Mediterranean. Germany’s active forces thus will not be lacking roles to play in emerging Western defense plans that look beyond Germany’s borders. The question is whether these forces will be made available to participate in OOA missions beyond NATO’s borders. The answer has yet to be determined.

The steps being taken to preserve a modern defense establishment notwithstanding, a key issue is whether the future German Army will be capable of meeting NATO’s requirements for a major regional war in East Central Europe, especially for a conflict fought eastward of Germany’s borders. At issue here is whether Germany will be able to mobilize adequate forces in a timely fashion, deploy them to a long distance east of their present bases, and engage in operational maneuvers against a major adversary. Under current plans, the lower readiness standards being set by the German Army raise questions on this score for any short-warning contingency. Can units with an active cadre of only 50 percent manpower or less truly fight well on short notice that does not provide much time for lengthy refresher training?

Much depends on the quality of reserve training. Most West European armies do not invest large sums in this enterprise, and German defense funds will be far from plentiful. The experience of U.S. National Guard brigades in preparing for Desert Storm shows that 2 to 3 months of training are required when preparations must start at the platoon and company level. The time can be shortened when a decision is made to accept less-than-complete readiness for all mis-
sions. Even so, the German Army could find itself hard-pressed to respond if a short-warning contingency were to occur.

Equally important, the German Army remains tied to its logistics support base near the Rhine River and, absent major changes, might have trouble projecting itself to the Oder-Neisse River Line, much less deep into Poland. With redesign, the German Army could become capable of performing this mission, but the act would require development of mobile logistics assets and use of Germany’s impressive road-rail system—a task that is well within Germany’s capacity.

At present, there is little political enthusiasm for this step. One constraint is reluctance to raise alarm across Europe by suggesting an expansionist or irredentist agenda. A second and equally powerful constraint is Germany’s declining defense budget. Germany has the capacity to spend more on national defense than the roughly 2.5 percent of annual GNP that seems a likely planning target, but the resource demands posed by the need to rebuild eastern Germany are draining Bonn’s financial flexibility.

For the near to mid-term, Germany’s discretionary defense assets seem likely to be consumed by modernization requirements, preventing any major shift toward redesigned forces. Similar to U.S. forces, German forces today are operating equipment procured in the 1970s and 1980s. In the coming years, this equipment will approach obsolescence, and new models will be needed to retain adequate technological sophistication in relation to potential threats. New or upgraded tanks, aircraft, and ships will have to be acquired. The prolonged debate in Bonn about whether to procure the European Fighter Aircraft suggests that an adequate modernization program might be unaffordable.

OTHER NATO NATIONS

Among other NATO nations, a similar pattern can be expected. Overall, forces are being reduced by about 25 to 33 percent. The greatest cuts will be made in ground forces. Traditional defense missions and participation in NATO multinational formations will remain the focal point of their defense planning. Because of Desert Storm and the Balkans crisis, most nations are now more aware of
OOA requirements than before. Therefore, they can be expected to upgrade their capabilities modestly, with peacekeeping missions being the focal point of planning. Their forces for larger OOA operations currently are small, and they are unlikely to grow in size or become vastly more capable.

**Belgium, the Netherlands, and Denmark**

The combined forces of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Denmark are being reduced from 6 divisions and 24 brigades to 4 divisions and 19 brigades, with a greater emphasis on mobilizable reserves than before. Their air forces are being reduced from about 500 combat aircraft to 450 aircraft, and their naval forces will remain roughly constant at about 35 surface combatants and submarines. Modernization can be expected to proceed at a slow but steady pace, subject to growing budgetary constraints. Declining manpower may produce lower readiness than is now planned.\(^5\)

Long-standing NATO participants, all three nations will continue to provide small units to NATO's immediate-reaction forces. Belgium and the Netherlands each are contributing a brigade to the Rapid Reaction Corps, and their mobilizable forces are committed to NATO's main defense forces. Both nations will contribute to the WEU, and Belgium may eventually join the Eurocorps.

For all three countries, however, major questions remain about defense strategy. During the Cold War, the Warsaw Pact posed a direct threat to their borders, and their forces played important roles in NATO's general defense plan along the inner-German border. Even

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then, parliamentary pressures often led to reduced defense budgets, military shortfalls, and accusations that these nations pursued "free-rider" tactics. In the new era, their borders are no longer threatened and, despite their insistence on being included in NATO multinational formations, their staying power remains to be tested.

All three nations have voiced willingness to participate in OOA operations on an ad hoc basis, or under NATO command if unanimous consensus is reached. All three sent small naval forces to participate in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and the Netherlands committed a vessel to the NATO blockade of Yugoslavia. None of these nations, however, regards itself as an OOA power. Both Belgium and the Netherlands possess special commando and light infantry units that are assigned OOA roles. These forces could be accompanied by air and naval assets. The scope of possible OOA missions, however, is limited by their small size. Their main defense forces in theory could be uprooted and sent abroad, but any major deployment would require them to surmount the same logistics constraints faced by Germany. In the best of circumstances, each nation perhaps could generate 1 brigade, 1 air wing, and a few naval vessels. But even these forces would lack sustainability and would require outside support. Short of such support, all three countries are best configured for peacekeeping missions, low-intensity conflict for brief durations, and token contributions to coalition operations led by larger powers.

Norway and Canada

Like the Lowland countries, Norway also is reducing its forces. The Norwegian army is being reduced from 13 to only 6 mobilized brigades, and the navy is being reduced from 49 to 38 ships of various types. The air force will retain its present size of 81 aircraft. As for Canada, it is withdrawing entirely from Europe. Only AWACS crews will remain. Canada will retain 3 army brigades (1 rapidly deployable), 1 air wing, and a navy of 40 vessels, including 18 principal surface combatants.
Spain and Italy

Mention should also be made of the OOA policies of Spain and Italy. Both nations contributed small forces to Desert Storm, both sent surface combatants to join NATO and the WEU in the Yugoslavia blockade, and Spain has provided soldiers for peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. Each has provided 3 brigades to NATO’s Rapid Reaction Force. Largely because of its interests in North Africa, Spain has a reaction force (FIR) composed of 4 light regiments that are oriented to OOA missions. Those regiments provide airmobile, amphibious, and light mechanized capabilities for operations of small size. In the mid-1980s, Italy established a force (FIR) composed of two airborne brigades for OOA missions, with a primary focus on the Mediterranean.

Both countries have the airlift and sealift assets to transport brigade-sized formations, but they could not readily deploy or sustain larger formations abroad. Despite planned reductions, these two nations also will have larger main defense forces than is commonly realized. Italy evidently will deploy about 6 division-equivalents organized into separate brigades, 450 combat aircraft, 1 small aircraft carrier, and 35 naval combatants. Spain will have about 5 divisions, 450 to 550 combat aircraft, and 25 to 35 combatants. These forces, however, are oriented to border-defense missions, and they lack the capacity to deploy abroad in strength.

Greece and Turkey

Both Greece and Turkey have offered a brigade to the NATO Rapid Reaction Force, and each has sent a surface combatant to support the NATO/WEU blockade of Yugoslavia. Both have small light forces that can be used for OOA missions: Greece has 1 commando regiment and 1 marine brigade; Turkey has 2 commando brigades. Although now reducing their military establishments, both nations also will continue deploying large main defense forces: about 15 division-equivalents, 450 to 550 combat aircraft, and 25 to 35 naval combatants apiece. These forces, however, are heavily committed to border-defense missions that have greater urgency than in Central Europe. They also suffer from deficiencies in readiness, training, command
and control, support structures, and mobility assets that make them questionable candidates for any major OOA missions.  

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Complex trends are now evident in Europe and the Middle East–Persian Gulf. The events of 1992 alone suggest continuing tumult in East Central Europe, the Balkans, and the former Soviet Union, and possible chaos; gloomy consequences are magnified by the presence of still-large military inventories. In the Middle East, the Arab-Israeli peace process provides reason for guarded optimism, but the region remains economically backward and afflicted with deep hatreds. Equally important, anti-Western fundamentalism is spreading, and several radical Arab nations seem destined to continue acquiring modern conventional weapons and, possibly, to develop nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Added on top is growing Western economic and commercial involvement in this region, and the increasing flow of Islamic immigrants northward to Europe.

This situation elevates the importance of coming to grips with cooperative defense planning for OOA missions. However, the decline of threats to NATO's borders has weakened support for adequate defense budgets among Western parliaments, which will be reluctant to spend large sums on behalf of less-than-vital interests threatened by uncertain contingencies. Even if sufficient forces are maintained, the problem of forging multilateral political agreement to launch OOA operations will remain. The task will be far from easy.

What can the United States do? Because no single alternative provides a satisfactory vehicle for handling the OOA problem, a multi-pronged approach, one embodying unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral initiatives, makes the best sense:
Work with the West Europeans to forge security policies aimed at managing the turbulent situations emerging in the Middle East–Persian Gulf, East Central Europe, and surrounding areas.

Act unilaterally to ensure that U.S. forces are capable of performing OOA operations in the event that only modest allied contributions are forthcoming.

Act bilaterally with selective West European allies to enhance cooperation, thereby encouraging their own OOA forces and programs and developing U.S. capabilities that can complement allied forces.

Broaden NATO's charter to include planning for OOA operations beyond peacekeeping under the UN and CSCE flags, and upgrade NATO's rapid-reaction forces.

Encourage the WEU and EC to move in constructive directions on OOA operations and capabilities, within the framework of NATO policy and strategy.

These points are enlarged upon in the following sections.

**COMMON SECURITY POLICIES**

Although this study deals with defense planning, an analysis of future military initiatives can best begin with a brief discussion of the security policies needed to provide a framework for such initiatives. Future OOA challenges cannot be met unless the United States and its West European allies decide that their interests and goals extend beyond NATO’s borders, and that those interests are best protected through joint collaboration and activist policies. Arguably, a revised NATO strategic concept—one anchored on greater OOA awareness and resolve—should be adopted.

Regardless of whether a new strategic concept is adopted, steps should be taken to refashion NATO so that, working with other European security institutions, it can play a constructive role in carrying out OOA-oriented policies. This process already has begun, but much remains to be accomplished. Unless additional measures are taken to refurbish NATO, it will die from lack of use, and European security will suffer.
The main reason for adopting a new strategic concept is that strategic policy plays a major role in spelling out the long-term interests, values, visions, and goals of the alliance. It is the vehicle by which multilateral cooperation can be built and sustained even as the governments of NATO’s members change with time. The Rome Summit concept, for all its accomplishments, left NATO suspended between the past and the future. It anchored NATO on defending its borders against a threat still potent enough to be taken seriously, and it called attention to the challenges emerging beyond alliance borders. But it stopped short of laying down a clear agenda for managing the problems of galvanizing the alliance to mobilize its resources for meeting such challenges. A new strategic concept could define the role to be played by East Central Europe and surrounding areas in Western geostrategic interests and also in the West’s visions for promoting democracy and community. In addition, it could specify policy and strategy to be pursued, the roles and missions to be played, and the resources to be committed.

A core issue to be decided is whether, and in what ways, NATO security commitments and involvements are to be extended eastward. The current strategic concept is unclear in this regard, and the changes under way in Europe suggest that, unless greater clarity is achieved, an era of turmoil will follow. A spectrum of alternatives is available:

- First, short of admitting new members, NATO could issue a statement of purpose underscoring the importance of East Central Europe and nearby areas, and declaring its intent to act decisively to defend its interests and promote its goals in the framework of collaboration with other security institutions.
- Alternatively, NATO could extend associate membership in some form to nations that qualify, thereby offering them collective security guarantees under Articles 1 through 4. The “Partnership for Peace” proposal falls into this category.
- A third alternative is to offer full membership for a few nations that would provide collective defense guarantees under Article 5.

Arguments can be made for and against each of these alternatives. A key purpose of a new strategic concept would be to debate these
arguments and reach a firm decision, thereby allowing NATO to chart its destiny for the years ahead.

In any event, NATO must preserve the capacity to carry out Article 5 missions by defending against residual threats to member borders. But it also needs to become better at projecting security and military power beyond its borders under Article 4. Even if this change does not translate into collective defense planning for Article 4 missions, the alliance needs to become a stronger vehicle for coordinating member-nation security policies and defense strategies for such missions. In this way, the benefits of coalition planning can help energize continued reliance on the ad hoc approach and help ensure that, if future OOA wars are fought, Western forces will be adequate to the task.

Need for a New Transatlantic Bargain

The alliance needs to put aside current frictions over secondary issues so that more attention can be devoted to primary security problems. Central to this goal is crafting a better relationship between the United States and France. Contrary to French fears, the problem is not that Washington seeks an imperial realm in Europe, but that Washington might fail to continue leading. Contrary to American fears, the problem is not that an independent West European pillar will emerge anytime soon, but that the West Europeans will disarm and remain inward-looking. Contrary to impressions in both Washington and Paris, the key issue today is not whether NATO retains institutional supremacy over the WEU/EC and CSCE, but whether Europe will plunge into an abyss.

Accompanying a better U.S.–French relationship must come productive roles for Britain and Germany. Britain will remain key to transatlantic harmony, and to leading the alliance into a new era. The strategic emancipation of Germany will also be vital, because the alliance cannot look outward if that nation looks inward.

In essence, a new partnership is needed, one joining the United States, Britain, Germany, and France in the task of exporting security and defense to regions that are critical to Western interests and values. To help restore partnership, the alliance needs to forge a new transatlantic "bargain"—an agreement that assigns members con-
structive and satisfying roles within the framework of fair burden-sharing and effective policies. This bargain needs to transcend any dysfunctional slide—emerging in recent years—into a region-based role specialization that would produce paralysis and could fracture NATO’s unity. Just as the United States cannot expect the West Europeans alone to handle security troubles in East Central Europe, the West Europeans cannot expect the United States to continue bearing the vast bulk of the security burden in the Middle East and Persian Gulf.

Simply stated, the two sides of the Atlantic must work together in both regions, with each carrying a fair share of the load. Because of its status as a superpower, the United States must lead, and it must have the authority to do so. For their part, the West Europeans must not only contribute a fair portion of the resources but must also be given influence commensurate with their contributions. Joint policies must seek to look both outward and inward: They must respond to security challenges and also maintain alliance unity by safeguarding the interests of NATO’s members. This formula sustained NATO during the Cold War, and it provides a still-valid basis for dealing with the new era.

Need for Cooperative Security

Western policy in both regions must be anchored on the military capacity to deter and defend against threats. It must also aim to create a larger security structure that dampens political conflict and encourages cooperative community-building. In the Middle East and Persian Gulf, this approach implies continuing emphasis on defending the Gulf oil fields and other interests, but it also requires concerted efforts to negotiate an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In East Central Europe, the Western nations will need to develop the capacity for military intervention, but they also need to defuse the political tensions that threaten to make the new era unstable. The emerging agenda requires Western efforts aimed at resolving local conflicts (e.g., the Balkans crisis). Perhaps more important, it also requires policies aimed at providing security so that democracy can grow and at achieving a stable equilibrium with Russia and Ukraine, one that responds to the legitimate interests of these two nations while also safeguarding their neighbors.
In other words, a new "Concert of Europe" is needed for handling the multipolar complexities ahead. Implied here is not fixed agreement on any static security concept but rather basic consensus to pursue balance and legitimacy, and accord on the procedures to be followed for resolving problems. Arguably, NACC and the CSCE provide forums for negotiation. But because these bodies are large and cumbersome, they deny the major powers a setting to deal effectively with each other. Accordingly, a case can be made for creation of a security G-7 in Europe (or a security council for the CSCE) that would operate as does its economic counterpart in seeking cooperative solutions to managing the world economy. Membership might include the United States, Britain, Germany, France, Russia, Ukraine, and a rotating participant (e.g., Poland or Italy). A security G-7 might help create the framework of constructive relations among the major powers, enabling them to cooperate in search of solutions to local frictions.

UNILATERAL U.S. ACTIONS

Future U.S. military forces and strategy will have to be anchored on the premise that a wide variety of OOA operations may have to be mounted in both the Middle East–Persian Gulf and Europe. The exact contingencies are difficult to predict. Therefore, plans will need to be generic, flexible, and take into account uncertainty about both future threats and the allied forces that will be fighting alongside U.S. units.

During the Cold War, U.S. military planning for NATO and Europe was aided by firm knowledge of allied forces that would be available to defend allied borders. As a result, U.S. military requirements could be calculated with some precision, cost-effective programs could be designed, and marginal returns could be gauged. By contrast, an especially troublesome feature of OOA operations is that they lie beyond the framework of alliance collective-defense commitments. Because potential partners are free to delay their decisions until an actual crisis occurs, U.S. planners are left with chronic uncertainty about how much participation will be forthcoming. This uncertainty can lead to decisions that misinterpret U.S. force requirements by a wide margin.
The United States, consequently, finds itself in a dilemma brought about by the need to take actions today that will shape its military capabilities for tomorrow. If allied contributions are underestimated, too many U.S. forces will be planned, and resources will thereby be wasted; if plans overestimate allied contributions, insufficient U.S. forces will be committed. The result could be an inability to react effectively, and even military reversals if U.S. forces are committed and then find themselves lacking partners in adequate strength.

To be sure, plans can be altered when the crisis breaks if original assumptions prove invalid. During the Falklands crisis, for example, Prime Minister Thatcher was confronted with the loss of more British ships than was originally expected. Her response was simple: Send more ships. The Thatcher formula, however, requires that there are more ships to be sent. It also requires that the ships can deploy fast enough and that, once they arrive, they can perform the missions assigned them. The British navy was able to carry out Thatcher’s dictum, but it was fortunate that the Falklands crisis took place in 1982, not two years later. Owing to budgetary problems, Defense Minister Sir Jonathan Frederic Nott in 1981 had ordered major naval cutbacks to take effect in 1984. Precisely for this reason, defense planners normally do not like to rely on the Thatcher fallback for either gauging their own requirements or determining whether allies can be relied upon. After all, when the British fought in the Falklands, they fought virtually alone.

Situations such as the one facing U.S. planners today normally caution prudence, even at the expense of what otherwise might be regarded as excess conservatism. Weighing against any narrow-minded embracing of unilateral planning is the likelihood that nearly all OOA operations will attract some partners; such operations may be politically impossible to mount if partners are not present. A responsive attitude to multilateralism and burden-sharing, however, does not equate to a willingness to assume that partners always will be available. A sensible rule of thumb is to plan on specific allied contributions only when there is high confidence—based on credible assurances—that earmarked allied forces will be both willing and able to participate. Otherwise, U.S. plans should be anchored on the assumption that key missions will be performed by American forces.
COOPERATION WITH THE WEST EUROPEAN ALLIES

To the extent that multilateral cooperation for OOA missions is destined to become more important, the United States will need a clear sense of the military capabilities that each of its allies is to provide. Although improved training and organization are needed, most of the West European nations already have impressive assets for humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, and for small OOA combat operations of at least brigade size. Their shortcomings are in the area of military capability for larger OOA combat missions: division-sized or greater operations requiring speedy movement to a distant area and sustained combat against a strong opponent. For practical reasons, Britain and France will be the nations most likely to cooperate with the United States and most able to do so. Ambitious but sensible OOA force goals for these two nations, and for other relevant nations, are as follows:

- Britain should retain the capacity to deploy 2 to 3 light brigades to OOA missions, but it should also be called upon to develop a capability to commit a 2-division force, with 1 heavy division—considerably more than the single heavy division deployed to Desert Storm. This force should be oriented to OOA operations in the Persian Gulf, as well as in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. To maintain this capability while also keeping a strategic reserve, Britain’s ground posture might need to be expanded beyond the 10 to 11 brigades now planned.

- This British force would need to be capable of deploying in a timely fashion and to be able to conduct independent operations without relying heavily on U.S. support. Achievement of this goal would require Britain to develop an organized sealift capacity drawing on mobilizable civilian assets. Also, these forces would have to be provided the mobile logistics, specialized equipment, and war reserve stocks (30-60 days) needed for OOA operations. Another requirement would be a proper training regimen for both light and heavy forces committed to OOA missions: Readiness in this important area is a must.

- Currently, France has a large pool of light and heavy forces that might be committed to OOA missions. Realistically, it can deploy these forces only in small increments. A proper force goal would be the capacity to generate 2 to 3 divisions: with either light
forces from the FFAR or heavy forces drawn from the field army. This force should be capable of deploying to the Persian Gulf, but it also should have the capacity to promptly move across country into East Central Europe and to fight a maneuver war there. To achieve this goal, France would have to develop organized sealift assets, and to procure the appropriate quantities of mobile logistics, war reserves, and specialized equipment. Also important would be altered conscription laws, and accelerated training for French forces to absorb modern doctrine and NATO procedures.

- Germany should be called upon to have available a 2-division force, with 2 to 3 air wings, that could conduct OOA missions in East Central Europe and elsewhere. This goal would require Germany to selectively expand its strategic airlift forces and develop organized sealift forces. Equally important, NATO’s defense planning requires that Germany be able to promptly mobilize an 8- to 9-division Field Army that not only is able to defend the Oder-Neisse borders but also can move into Poland and conduct defensive operations there. This goal would require a major effort—over five to ten years—to reorient the German Army away from its home-based concept and toward mobile logistics and cross-country movement. German forces would be required to develop appropriate programs to ensure that training, readiness, modernization, and sustainability force goals are met.

- Belgium and the Netherlands should be called upon to be capable of providing 1 to 2 brigades to OOA missions outside Europe. As part of NATO’s main defense forces that could be called upon to fight in East Central Europe, Belgian and Dutch forces also will need to acquire the capability to project themselves eastward as reinforcements for U.S., German, British, and French forces.

- Currently, Italy can provide 2 light brigades for OOA missions, but it does not possess the mobility forces needed to transport them. To the extent affordable, Italy should be encouraged to develop better sealift assets for deploying these forces. Also, it should be called upon to develop the capacity to deploy a heavy brigade or division as part of a multinational operation. For their
part, Greece and Turkey should each be able to provide a light brigade for OOA missions, as should Spain and Portugal.

Air and Naval Forces

These force goals have dealt exclusively with allied ground forces. Commensurate force goals for air and naval forces would need to be developed as well. As a rule, each allied brigade should be accompanied by an air squadron (18 combat aircraft), and each division, by a wing (54 aircraft). Also, ground forces require appropriate cargo ships and naval escorts. As a rule, each brigade requires about 5 break-bulk or Ro-Ro cargo ships, and each division requires about 15 cargo ships. Each large convoy, in turn, normally requires 5 to 10 escorts of surface combatants in order to provide antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and anti-air warfare (AAW) capabilities.

Beyond this association with ground forces, plans and programs should be developed to employ allied air and naval forces independently. The commitment of ground forces normally is subjected to the greatest political constraints. Air and naval forces often are committed more willingly, and, for some OOA crises, allied air and naval commitments might be enough. In any event, current allied plans aspire to scale back ground forces but to keep still-large air and naval forces. Future OOA plans should take advantage of these capabilities.

U.S. Military Presence

The United States can set an example by maintaining a large military presence in Europe (e.g., 100,000 troops) and by retaining a capacity to rapidly deploy reinforcements in a crisis. The United States can contribute to achievement of West European force goals by placing political pressure on the respective nations to fund and implement those goals. It can also help by developing vigorous bilateral training and exercise programs for OOA missions, to be carried out in both Europe and the United States. U.S. forces based in Europe, and forces sent from CONUS for annual exercises, should work with the key nations.
Currently, allied air forces often deploy to the United States for training and exercises, but normally not allied ground forces. It might make sense to broaden this practice by inviting allied ground forces to participate in maneuvers with U.S. forces at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. Such broadening has already been implemented: Two German companies are to train at Fort Irwin in 1993. Space at Fort Irwin permits an expansion of this program to brigade-sized maneuvers, a measure that might help not only to strengthen joint training but also to firm up cooperative defense relationships with these nations. A logical first step would be commitment of a British brigade, followed by German and French brigades, perhaps drawn from the Eurocorps.

Finally, the United States can contribute to allied OOA capabilities by organizing its own military and civilian sealift assets for helping to move allied forces to a crisis region. The allies, in theory, have plenty of their own civilian sealift assets. As a practical matter, they might not take the steps needed to organize those assets. By forming sealift assets of its own, the United States would be better able to help allied forces deploy in a timely fashion. Additionally, it would make sense for the United States to expand its war reserve stocks to include specialized equipment items (e.g., navigation aids, night goggles, adapters for desert warfare) that could be given to allied forces for cooperative OOA missions.

**TOWARD IMPROVED NATO PLANNING**

The preference of the NATO staffs and most member nations is to handle the OOA challenge by continuing to use NATO's existing and well-oiled planning mechanisms. In this approach, NATO would continue developing and training forces for classic missions. When an OOA requirement arises, these forces would be diverted to perform the job under an ad hoc command structure. The chief justification for this approach is that it worked satisfactorily in the Persian Gulf War. Because NATO forces had been so thoroughly prepared to defend Central Europe, they proved adept at waging a modern air campaign and mechanized war in Desert Storm.
Force Planning Exercise

Any attempt to rely on NATO's existing mechanisms for OOA missions, however, needs to be anchored on recognition of what those mechanisms can produce and what they do not currently achieve. The existing NATO Force Planning Exercise (FPE), conducted under ministerial auspices but implemented largely by SHAPE, produces biennial resource guidance and force goals that play a large role in achieving coordinated alliance defense planning. The drawback of the FPE is that SHAPE is allowed to examine only Article 5 threats to NATO's borders. The result is forces and programs crafted to perform classical defense missions, but not necessarily OOA missions.

In theory, the forces that emerge from the FPE can be redirected to conduct OOA missions when crises arise, but there is no guarantee that these forces will be committed by their parent nations or that the forces will possess those capabilities uniquely required by OOA operations. Two obvious examples of possible program deficiencies are strategic lift forces and mobile logistics. The FPE thus can be relied upon to produce a solid foundation of rapid reaction, main defense, and augmentation forces, but, to a worrisome degree, it leaves NATO lacking resources for OOA operations.

The best way to reform the FPE would be to broaden its focus to permit formal planning for OOA missions. SHAPE thereby would be able to generate resource requirements and then work with member nations to ensure that those requirements are fulfilled in national programs. NATO military commanders could then train the forces for OOA operations likely to arise. Unfortunately, however, France and other West European allies hesitate to support this reform, preferring to leave the FPE focused on classic missions that are receding in importance.

Alternative to FPE

A halfway solution needs to be found that is politically acceptable and yet permits sound military planning that builds on the work already undertaken to prepare for a Balkans commitment. The best innovation is one in which NATO would craft "informal" plans for OOA missions. That is, NATO would perform a planning exercise that could identify candidate scenarios, develop a military strategy
and operational scheme, and determine required force levels and program priorities. NATO’s members would make no formal commitments to the resulting plans, force goals, and resource guidance; however, they would provide a broad indication of likely commitments. NATO thus would be given a tentative but reasonably accurate picture of force availability for actual OOA operations. The NATO staffs and national defense ministries would then be better able to form operational plans, campaign plans, and programmatic investment strategies. When an OOA crisis occurs, many of the essential building blocks for coherent military action would already be present.

A good model is France’s behavior in the 1970s and 1980s. Refraining from participation in NATO’s integrated military command, the French government insisted that any formal commitments would be made only at the moment of a crisis and would be subjected to France’s policy judgments. But the French defense ministry privately made clear the forces that probably would be committed and how those forces would operate. As a result, NATO was compelled to rely on informal commitments from France, but they were commitments strong enough to permit sound defense planning. NATO was given a usable picture of the role that French forces would play in the defense of Central Europe, and was able to build its combined military posture with this role in mind.

To be sure, this approach worked during the Cold War because every other nation made formal commitments, thereby leaving NATO’s staff facing many constants and only one variable. A fully informal approach to OOA planning would create a situation of many variables and few constants. But such an approach at least would help bound the current major uncertainties, thus permitting a modicum of coordinated planning. The result would be less than perfect, but far better than flying blind.

Informal OOA planning would have to be conducted under the flag of Article 4, not Article 5. Ideally, SHAPE would perform OOA planning. If France and others objected, perhaps official responsibility could be entrusted to the NATO Military Committee and International Military Staff in Brussels, with SHAPE providing technical support. In any event, informal planning would require a more specific functional focus than is now employed by the FPE. The best model is
not the Conventional Defense Initiative (CDI) of the 1970s, but rather the Long-Term Defense Program (LTDP) of the 1970s. Bypassing the FPE’s emphasis on country plans and regional commands, the LTDP focused on functional and programmatic categories (e.g., air defense), thereby allowing for an integrated, cross-national perspective. A new initiative based on this model would need to focus on specific OOA contingencies, concepts, multinational forces, and program priorities.

Regardless of which model is chosen, the U.S. DoD would need to exert strong, albeit informal, leadership of the effort. An appropriate U.S. stance would fall somewhere between the aggressive leadership shown under the LTDP and the more hands-off style followed under CDI. This stance would require DoD to develop improved internal coordinating mechanisms within the Pentagon. The goal would be to bring together the OSD staffs, the Joint Staff, the services, and the intelligence agencies to help foster better joint planning that is responsive to national policy guidance for OOA missions and operations.

Whether NATO’s existing institutions can conduct OOA planning will be an important issue in the years ahead. An important innovation for mounting actual OOA operations will be the increasingly emphasized combined joint task forces (CJTFs), which will allow for prompt formation of ad hoc command arrangements. Such arrangements will enable WEU forces or “coalitions of the willing” to act separately while employing common NATO assets. However, CJTFs will not function in peacetime, and they will not be able to engage in the advanced planning often needed for successful OOA operations. Perhaps NATO’s current approach will prove adequate, but, if not, steps can be taken to improve upon the situation. Innovation at NATO Headquarters could begin by combining the Defense Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group into a new “Defense Policy Committee,” with a charter that extends beyond Article 5 and NATO’s borders. Meanwhile, an entirely new committee could be created, a “Preventive Diplomacy and Crisis Management Committee,” that would develop policies and procedures for managing the OOA situations ahead. Enhanced use of political-military simulation exercises could help achieve this goal. To aid this effort, a crisis-management division could be created for the civilian International Staff, and the charter of the International Military Staff
could be expanded to include defense policies for OOA preventive diplomacy and crisis management.

Institutional reform could be expanded to also include creation of an entirely new ACE military command oriented to OOA operations. Entitled "Force Projection Command," it would be assigned to SACEUR, led by a four-star general or admiral, and granted coequal status with other ACE commands. It would have three responsibilities:

1. To develop the mobility and infrastructure assets needed for power projection in OOA missions
2. To guide the peacetime preparation of NATO forces for OOA missions
3. To assume operational control of NATO forces when OOA missions arise. An alliance response is deemed appropriate, and other ACE commands are not employed. This command would have two subcomponents. One would be charged with mobility and infrastructure; the other would command the combat forces, which would be made up of NATO rapid-reaction forces for OOA missions.

The combat forces would themselves undergo organizational change. The current NRRF would be reorganized by creating a ground posture composed of multiple multinational corps backed by the C3I, logistics, infrastructure, and mobility assets to perform OOA missions. Today's ground posture is intended to perform border-defense missions but also is potentially available for OOA missions. At present, this force contains units drawn from ten nations, and it totals fully 8 divisions, with possible expansion to 9 divisions (Figure 7.1). About one-half of the units come from Central Europe, one-third from the southern region, and the remainder from the United States. About one-half of the ground posture is "heavy" (equipped for mechanized war), and the remainder is an assortment of infantry divisions, paratroopers, and commando units.

If this force is a product of a coherent design, the guiding rationale is not apparent. A posture of this size would be respectable for a medium-sized nation. It is far larger than can be led by a single corps
commander, supported by normal corps logistics, and employed on behalf of normal corps missions. Simply stated, the NRRF has grown to be almost the size of a field army, but it lacks the command structure, logistics assets, and internal balance to fight like a field army. The NRRF’s internal configuration indeed provides a rich mix of capabilities, but it does not provide the integrated assets for a dominant emergency. Its support structure will permit only a corps-sized commitment to a single contingency, yet it has enough combat forces for three corps. But all those forces cannot be supported at once. Moreover, many of the NRRF’s units are of uncertain commitment and deployability, especially for OOA missions. Also lacking is a mobility force that could transport the NRRF to distant areas.

What has happened here can be readily explained. The original idea was to create a single multinational corps led by the British that would always be ready and could serve as the vanguard of NATO’s far larger but less responsive main defense forces in Central Europe and the southern region. With the main defense mission in both regions losing political appeal because the Soviet threat had faded, a rush began to jump on the rapid-reaction bandwagon. As a result, the original idea was lost. Growing like Topsy and rapidly becoming all things to all participants, the NRRF’s composition is now being

Figure 7.1—Current ACE Rapid-Reaction Ground Force (Illustrative)
driven more by political and budgetary imperatives than by a clear strategy and mission. Is the NRRF to be nothing more than a shelter from political storms, or—somewhat better—a pool of forces from which units can be extracted and combined together (à la carte) to meet the demands of a particular situation? Or is the NRRF to be a cohesive force that can fight a serious war?

Conceptual Retooling

If cohesion is the goal, a conceptual retooling is in order, one driven by a clear sense of military requirements. What NATO requires is a better capacity to help bridge the ever-widening gap between the original modest NRRF concept and the larger but fading main defense force. This bridging function, moreover, must work in three regions: East Central Europe, the southern region, and the Persian Gulf. It could be acquired by setting aside the now-outmoded concept of an NRRF and creating four separate multinational corps:

- A corps for missions in Central Europe, perhaps the Eurocorps or a WEU corps
- A corps for the southern region, led by Italy
- A flexible corps for the Middle East–Persian Gulf or Europe, led by the United States
- A second flexible corps that could deploy to all regions, led by Britain.

These corps would build on the national contributions discussed above and would include a proper number of forces from other nations to achieve true multinationality without losing coherence. Each corps would have a primary mission, but it would also have secondary missions for other regions. The result would be a reorganized NRRF composed of several separate corps, each capable of fighting as a corps, while combining the mix of forces and flexibility needed to make NATO a potent power in OOA operations as well as border defense.

In this design, the NRRF could operate in three different formations: as a single corps for four concurrent intervention missions, as a two-corps force for medium-sized missions, and as a field army for a
Theater-level campaign. NATO would have, as a building block, a separate corps for each region, led by a nation that would be likely to respond to crises there, including OOA situations. Backing up this vanguard force would be the capacity to send a second corps led by the British: a nation with interests in all three regions. Thus, NATO would have a confident capacity to quickly generate a two-corps force (normally enough for a serious defense effort) in all three regions.

To provide additional forces for either theater-level defensive or offensive missions, the NRRF could be provided the added capability to deploy as a full field army, with three corps. For East Central Europe, a field army could be composed of the WEU Corps and/or Eurocorps and the American and British corps. For the southern region, the field army would include the Italian, British, and American corps. For the Middle East, the American and British corps could lead the force, with either the Italian or WEU/Eurocorps filling it out. Multinational contributions to each corps would help ensure that all nations are provided appropriate roles and missions for each region.

As a result of this reconfiguration, the NRRF would be capable of responding effectively in all three regions with corps-sized forces that are likely to be available for OOA missions there. Total NRRF assets would include 13 divisions. For missions in Central and/or Eastern Europe and the Balkans, these RRF forces could be supplemented by nearby main defense forces to achieve whatever level of total force is needed. For the Persian Gulf, RRF forces could be supplemented by additional U.S. forces, indigenous forces, and other West European units. For all three regions, the combination of RRF and main defense forces would provide the capacity to generate a large army group: enough to defend the top-line threats of 25 to 30 adversary divisions anticipated there. The new RRF might be composed along the lines set forth in Table 7.1.

In addition to reorganizing NRRF ground forces, this change would expand the size of the posture from 9 to 13 divisions, a 45 percent increase. A parallel, but even greater, increase in air assets is also envisioned for the NRRF—from the 20 air squadrons (380 combat aircraft) it now includes to 40 air squadrons, or 760 combat aircraft.
Table 7.1

NATO Rapid Reaction Force
(Illustrative)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>British-Led MNC</th>
<th>U.S.-Led MNC</th>
<th>WEU Corps or Eurocorps</th>
<th>Italian-Led MNC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK division</td>
<td>U.S. division</td>
<td>2 German divisions</td>
<td>Italian division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK division</td>
<td>U.S. division</td>
<td>2 French divisions</td>
<td>NATO MND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO MND</td>
<td>German brigade</td>
<td>Belgian brigade</td>
<td>Greek division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands brigade</td>
<td>French brigade</td>
<td>UK brigade</td>
<td>Turkish division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. brigade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Spanish brigades (2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MNC = Multinational corps
MND = Multinational division

Such an increase will not only provide additional aircraft that normally would accompany the larger ground posture but will also take advantage of the imposing combat power present in NATO’s air forces.

The combined effect of these air and ground expansions would be to increase the NRDF’s combat power by about 50 percent. If these enhancements were accompanied by the transport and support assets needed for greater deployability, however, NATO’s capacity to quickly project combat power for OOA missions would roughly triple during the critical initial weeks. As a result, NATO would have enough forces to respond to two OOA contingencies (rather than only one now) in a timely fashion.

The act of designing this NRDF and launching the member-nation improvement programs to bring it to life would require appropriate budgetary investments. That is, because no new combat forces would have to be added to member-nation’s postures, the task would be one of improving forces that already exist, thereby obviating massive spending increases. Improvement measures would have to be launched to provide the C2I systems, mobile logistics units, and war reserve stocks to enable these forces and their parent NRDF to deploy outside NATO’s borders and engage in major combat missions. In addition, mobility forces would need to be improved by the addition of more transport aircraft, an organized NATO sealift force, and a responsive rail system. As an estimate, expenditures of $5 to $7 billion annually for 10 years would permit these acquisitions;
expenditure at one-half this level would allow the most important programs to be pursued.

**WEU/EC CAPABILITIES**

The idea of using a WEU Corps or Eurocorps as one contributor to assembling a NATO RRF reflects a judgment that construction of a European security identity can be made compatible with reform of NATO. The United States is wisely insisting that West European military pillar-building efforts be conducted within the framework of NATO policy. But its support for those efforts is only lip service. For at least the immediate future, the underlying risk is not that the West European nations will band together and drift away from NATO, but rather that they will react to fading Cold War tensions by renationalizing their defense policies and disarming too far. If the latter were to occur, the West Europeans could be left without sufficient military capabilities for the challenges ahead—whether traditional defense or OOA missions—and the issue of what flag is flown, NATO or WEU/EC, would be moot.

Unless the United States is prepared to carry an even larger portion of the alliance defense burden than in the past, it needs to focus policy efforts on encouraging its allies to continue doing enough in the defense arena. Throughout the Cold War, NATO's core security problem was not that the allies were too independent but that they did not build sufficient forces to carry out MC 14/3's (NATO's military strategy for the Cold War) call for adequate conventional defense strength.

This failure partly owed to the lack of political unity in Western Europe, which NATO was not powerful enough to overcome. This lack stems from the early 1950s, when an ambitious effort was launched to build an integrated West European defense force (EDC). Although the United States supported the idea, the French—driven by unilateralist imperatives—scuttled it. From that point forward, West European countries fashioned their defense plans according to national predilections. And although NATO helped foster a collectivist attitude, the result was less-than-adequate forces and budgets, and a vulnerable NATO posture and strategy.
The main attraction of the WEU/EC pillar is that the West European nations find this idea appealing enough to act on. In pursuing it, they might be willing to devote greater effort and energy to defense preparedness than otherwise, thus helping buffer against a free fall into military impotency. Also, security pillar-building gives West European defense ministries a useful role to play in EC integration, thus helping maintain domestic and parliamentary support for the ministries. In addition, a WEU/EC security pillar might help these nations achieve better integrated planning in multinational logistics and armaments cooperation, the lack of which has posed long-chronic barriers to getting the most military mileage out of limited allied defense resources.

Because of the United States' lukewarm support for a WEU/EC security pillar, the United States is often portrayed across Europe as pursuing a self-serving and shortsighted agenda that is undercutting the legitimate interests and aspirations of its closest allies.

To be sure, there are valid American reasons for concern that a WEU/EC pillar might weaken NATO, potentially create military entanglements beyond the scope of U.S. interests, or even pave the way to eventual U.S.-West European security rivalry. Perversely, there also is a risk that a WEU/EC requirement for unanimous consent could paralyze its members from acting individually, a problem that NATO also faces. But, conversely, there is the risk that if pillar-building fails, Western Europe might assume a self-involved and militarily weak stance aimed at isolating itself from larger responsibilities, especially OOA missions. Even worse, renationalization might appear and take a malevolent course. For all these compelling reasons, the task at hand is not to undermine the WEU/EC security pillar but to orient it in the right direction. The United States will be best able to achieve this goal if it actively cooperates in helping build this pillar.

What can be done? West European military pillar-building has just begun and is taking an unclear course. Therefore, prospects for combined West European military capabilities will derive from the Franco-German Eurocorps and the 9-member WEU. The Eurocorps is to emerge over the next three years, guided by a plan to expand upon the existing but not very effective Franco-German brigade of 4,200 soldiers. Current plans for additional units evidently call for
commitment of 1 French armored division and 2 German mechanized brigades. This commitment would yield a small corps of 35,000 combat troops with nearly 2 division-equivalents, configured for armored and/or mechanized missions. CS/CSS (combat support and/or combat service support) units and 1 to 2 attached air wings would bring the total manpower to about 60,000 troops.

Apparently, the French want firm commitment of these forces, but the Germans are less enthusiastic and prefer a looser arrangement: a command staff that will receive combat units only as the situation demands. The German approach is partly driven by the fact that, with only about 8 active brigades, the German Army will not have units to meet all the following requirements: Eurocorps, the WEU force, NATO’s RRF, other NATO multinational formations for main defense, and Germany’s own needs. To the extent that the French view carries the day, the Eurocorps will have real teeth; to the extent that it does not, the corps will be more of a paper tiger. If other nations join, the corps probably will expand to about 50,000 combat troops (90,000 total) of uncertain origins, and about 3 division-equivalents. The more nations that join, the greater is the likelihood that this corps will have a far-ranging security focus; so, too, is the likelihood greater that its actual use will be stymied by the difficult task of achieving unanimous consent.

Press reports have said that the missions of this corps are to be defense of allied territory, humanitarian aid, and international peacekeeping. If so, this charter falls short of any firm commitment to performing demanding OOA operations: a predictable result because of Germany’s dominant presence and the continuing reluctance of the German government to commit its troops to combat operations beyond its borders. Nonetheless, this charter is not blind to OOA missions.

The other pillar-building initiative is the WEU’s decision to assemble a WEU force for use in a variety of missions. This decision evidently calls for a combat force of about 50,000 troops—roughly corps-sized. Exact plans are unclear, and the force could grow larger. In any event, the force will be built from existing units. Like the Eurocorps, the WEU force is to be assignable to either NATO or the WEU: NATO is to be given first priority, but if it demurs, the WEU will then be free to act on its own.
The exact mission of this force is unclear. Apparently, it is fairly visionary with regard to OOA missions—more so than the Eurocorps. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the WEU is heavily influenced by the British, who are OOA-aware. Participants have said that the WEU force will not compete with NATO but will complement it by attending to crises in which NATO is not prepared to act: humanitarian aid and peacekeeping, as well as crisis management. Some WEU officials said that the WEU force will be employed only in cases where a request has been made by the UN or the CSCE, but the official declaration left this policy ambiguous.

The WEU's future plans and programs are uncertain, and budget realities will dictate an incrementalist expansion at best. But the bottom line is that the WEU force may become a credible instrument for OOA missions. Nonetheless, having a directorate of nine nations means that this force will be available for OOA use only when the need is sufficiently urgent, and the goals sufficiently clear cut, to command a powerful internal WEU consensus. This constraint notwithstanding, the WEU seems destined to be the multilateral mechanism most likely to be activated by West Europeans for OOA missions, assuming NATO is not used.

The WEU is trying to assemble forces for this mission. But regardless of what progress is achieved, for many years the WEU will lack sizable mobility forces, C3I assets, logistics infrastructure, and war reserve stocks. Moreover, even all the WEU nations together will lack the strong naval forces—and large CVBGs capable of providing air defense—needed to sail into regions populated by adversaries with strong air forces, cruise missiles, torpedo-carrying patrol boats and submarines, and mine-laying capabilities. As a result, the WEU will be too hard-pressed to deploy its forces to dangerous distant areas, operate them effectively, and sustain them.

It is in these areas that the United States could offer valuable military support to the WEU. Indeed, even if a political consensus is reached, West European shortfalls are so serious that, if the United States does not provide support, the WEU will not be physically capable of performing major OOA missions against serious opposition. By receiving U.S. support, the WEU could be transformed into a viable military entity for OOA missions.
Owing to its own expanding interests and goals, and to the turbulent era ahead, the Western alliance is likely to be confronted with numerous OOA challenges, many of which will defy easy solutions. These challenges are an outgrowth of the fluid, multipolar politics and festering regional hotspots rapidly replacing the bipolar system of the Cold War. Born in the Middle East–Persian Gulf, and still thriving there, the OOA era may already be migrating to the Balkans and East Central Europe, which lie on NATO’s doorstep.

Exactly what OOA challenges lie ahead are unknowable. However, the need to prepare for them is a critical item on NATO’s security agenda. If the Western alliance expects to remain secure and to achieve its high-priority goals for the transformation of Europe into a peaceful and democratic continent, it will need to expand its planning beyond the protection of its own borders. In essence, it will need to become strongly capable of projecting security and military power outward in peace, crisis, and war.

Although NATO is quite capable of defending its borders, today it is not well-prepared to meet OOA challenges. The problem is partly political: The alliance does not yet have a well-articulated strategic policy for regions beyond its borders, its members today are inward-looking, and it relies imprudently on ad hoc mechanisms that may not perform well in stressful situations. The problem is also partly military: Whereas NATO is far from militarily impotent beyond its borders, for many reasons, it does not have adequately prepared conventional forces for performing the more demanding OOA military operations that might have to be launched. Although military
power is far from the sole instrument for solving OOA problems and, in many cases, may not be involved at all, in some situations it could be critical. With most members reducing their forces, moreover, NATO has not yet designed an improvement program for remedying the deficiency.

These political and military problems can be solved, but only if the United States and the West European nations commit themselves to the enterprise and resolve to work together. The reform of NATO is NATO’s key to success. No other multilateral security institution can match NATO’s present strength, much less its future potential. Moreover, reform is needed if NATO is to survive and remain relevant to European security affairs; otherwise, it will erode from internal frictions and mounting irrelevance. NATO must go out of area or it will go out of business, and Europe will suffer.

In essence, NATO needs to become an alliance better able to carry out Article 4 of its treaty, which allows for NATO to address security issues other than protection of its own territory. To achieve this goal, the alliance needs to fashion a new transatlantic partnership that would permit NATO to act beyond its borders with greater political resolve and military strength. This new partnership would need to be built not only on continued leadership by the United States but also on important roles for the West European allies and the emergence of a European security identity that strengthens NATO.

This study has outlined a series of measures that could help strengthen the ability of the alliance to project military power outward: adoption of a new strategic concept, creation of new planning institutions and command structures, upgrading of NATO’s rapid-reaction forces, and pursuit of meaningful force improvement programs. Even if other measures can be identified, the key point is that policy declarations alone will not suffice if the goal is to materially strengthen the alliance’s capacity to project military power outside NATO’s borders. Coordinated, concrete steps for such strengthening are also required—indeed, are essential.
Appendix

PROSPECTS FOR COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA AND UKRAINE IN OUT-OF-AREA MISSIONS

RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

The aftermath of the Cold War makes Russia and Ukraine not only key players in the new European security system, but also potential participants in OOA operations. By mutual proclamation, the United States and Russia are no longer adversaries, and they seek a genuine partnership. Both Russia and Ukraine have attended sessions of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), and Boris Yeltsin has raised the prospect of Russia’s eventually joining NATO. During 1992, Russia and Ukraine made small but symbolic contributions to UN peacekeeping missions in the former Yugoslavia, and Russian ships sailed into the Persian Gulf, thereby signaling support for UN peacekeeping there. With both nations undergoing tumultuous upheaval at home, the great question is whether their foreign policies will evolve in ways that permit further cooperation. This appendix addresses the issue of Russian and Ukrainian cooperation in OOA missions and discusses the military forces that will be available to Russia and Ukraine.

THE PERILS OF DOMESTIC TRANSFORMATION

Russia

For any nation, foreign policy is shaped not only by interests derived from geostrategic considerations but also by the domestic political order. Throughout its long history, Russia has been ruled by an authoritarian government, and it has alternated between periods of internal absorption and external assertiveness. In the four years since
1989, Russia has retreated from its domineering presence in Eastern Europe and has lost its hold over the empire that once made up the Soviet Union. Having turned inward, today it is consumed by its disruptive internal affairs to the point where it does not have a foreign policy representative of its rich traditions or vast resources. It is pursuing a forthright diplomacy toward the West, but to a degree, this stance reflects its domestic turbulence rather than a new and firmly cast definition of its enduring national interests. This tentative state of affairs does not imply that a return to bellicose conduct is inevitable once Russia re-establishes its bearings, but it does mean that a steady increase in cooperation is not foreordained.

Can Russia overcome the legacy of its own past? The monumental transformation taking place today represents an effort to simultaneously fashion a new government, a new economy, and a new society. The task of building a new domestic order in Russia is uniquely difficult. Western nations had the advantage of building their governments, economies, and societies in an evolutionary fashion that allowed for coordination of changes in these three domains. Moreover, they started before the industrial, technological, and communications revolutions had produced the complications of the modern era.

Standing on the edge of the twenty-first century, Russia faces the daunting task of orchestrating a threefold revolution with insufficient infrastructure: Democracy is best pursued when a prosperous market economy and a stable middle class already exist. A market economy is most readily built when the effort is presided over by effective democratic government and is supported by a society that embraces capitalist values. A social revolution is best undertaken only within the framework of a legitimate government and a functioning economy. The vastness of the enterprise prevents planning, and yet incrementalism and experimentation run the risk of triggering overpowering side effects. Just as success breeds success, moreover, failure can have a cascading impact. For all these reasons, democracy, free enterprise, and social stability may be the desired goals, but they are not the inevitable outcome.

The months following the downfall of the Soviet state and the Communist Party witnessed ambitious efforts to erect a new government, but by late 1992 even the most faithful were left in doubt about the
enterprise. During the past year, Yeltsin has endeavored to promote democracy, but, saddled with corrupt and inefficient bureaucracies, he was compelled to embrace quasi-authoritarian methods to carry out his program. Key to success will be the emergence of a functioning parliament, healthy political parties, and a productive relationship between central government and outlying regions.

Underpinning Russia's troubled political system has been an out-dated constitution forged during the Stalinist era. A political showdown in late 1992 culminated with Yeltsin still in office, but with a shaky mandate and deep opposition among the military and other executive agencies. In the aftermath, Yeltsin opened negotiations with his chief parliamentary opponent, Ruslan Khasbulatov, on steps to write a new constitution and to hold elections on the balance to be struck between executive and legislative government. The new year ended with a government more pluralistic than before, but with sharp disagreements not only over reformist policies but also over the nature of political authority in Russia. Accompanying this turmoil were a weakened Yeltsin clinging to power, an absence of alternatives, wrenching debate, and signs that reactionary forces were gaining strength.¹ Yeltsin's referendum victory in early 1993 added impetus to his reform agenda, but still left him facing an uncertain future. His actions in September 1993 weakened hard-line opposition, but the future is unclear. Much will depend on whether a truly democratic government and constitution emerge during 1994 and beyond.

The economic picture is no less chaotic. The basic problem facing Russia is one of transforming a command economy into free-enterprise capitalism without sacrificing minimal standards of living. The task is made all the harder by a lack of a clear blueprint, contradictory priorities, and the pressures of competing interests. Yeltsin entered 1992 with an ambitious reformist program led by the radical Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, a believer in "shock therapy" as advo-

cated by a host of Western advisers. The year ended with Gaidar gone, replaced by conservative industrialist Viktor Chernomyrdin, who found himself presiding over a still-progressive cabinet amid mounting calls for a slowdown of reforms.

In the process, impressive strides had been made toward price liberalization, privatization, and other manifestations of a market economy. The much-feared famine had failed to materialize, food was now appearing on the shelves, outdated industries were being converted to new production lines, and Western investments were beginning to materialize. Yet, the gross national product was plummeting, unemployment was rising, the battered ruble stood poised on the brink of hyperinflation, and angry debates raged over the proper mix of state and private ownership. All together, this was an ambiguous legacy that left genuine uncertainty about Russia’s ability to reform fast enough to avoid collapse.

This economic turmoil has left Russian society caught between hope and despair. Disdain for communism, traditional Slavic stoicism, and appreciation for new-found freedoms are acting as buffers against any immediate plunge into turmoil. Yet, government is losing legitimacy, the economy is faltering, corruption is spreading, civic norms are breaking down, class and status distinctions are rapidly changing, and Russia’s deep social cleavages are worsening. Equally important, the Russian population has grown accustomed to the securities of socialist collectivism. The building blocks for a productive society are present, but stumbling blocks are also present: The current situation is a breeding ground for instability and violent upheaval.

Inevitably, future Russian foreign policy will be affected by the outcome of this internal struggle. In the abstract, Russian interests seemingly call for the development of warm relations with the West. In particular, Russia requires heavy Western investments, trade, and assistance if its economy is to recover. As history suggests, nonetheless, Russia is a country with a Slavic culture that traditionally has eyed Western Europe with suspicion, and regards the United States with mixed feelings. Especially because the European Community has shown no interest in admitting Russia to the fold. NATO feels likewise, and Western economic aid to Russia has been smaller than Yeltsin’s government once hoped. This American and West Euro-
pean stance is a natural reaction to the situation, but it helps ensure that Russian foreign policy, including cooperation in OOA operations, will be influenced by internal events.

At the moment, Yeltsin is maintaining his hold on power, and he is steering Russia toward reform in a fashion that, while inconsistent, has shown greater successes than skeptics had thought possible. His actions are triggering controversy, but the past has been discredited; his opponents are not yet offering a credible vision capable of mustering enough political backing to replace him. Amid these shaky surroundings, Yeltsin is pursuing a cooperative policy toward the West, as manifested by his forthright stance in negotiating the START I and II accords. Yet, Yeltsin is running the same political risks as Gorbachev, and his survival is far from guaranteed. His foreign policy stance is coming under attack at home from conservatives resentful of the loss of empire, and signs of this discord have appeared in some aspects of his diplomacy. Driven by economic imperatives, Russia has resumed the selling of military hardware abroad, to clients including potential adversaries of the United States. As of early 1993, Russian officials were becoming critical of Western military activities in the Balkans and the Persian Gulf, thereby suggesting potential support for Serbia and Iraq. Speaking to the UN in September 1993, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev delivered a speech asserting that Russia aims to cooperate with the West but will pursue its own interests in the years ahead.

Yeltsin faces an array of internal problems that consume his attention, and the Afghanistan experience has left the Russian people unenthused about foreign military adventures. Moreover, Yeltsin’s tenuous hold on power is likely to lead him to evaluate OOA commitments in terms of their impact on his staying power in office. If participation in Western-led OOA operations once brought him enhanced stature in Moscow, that no longer is the case. Indeed, conservative opponents can be expected to take advantage of the opportunity to criticize him, especially if the OOA operation is directed at long-standing allies of Russia. These calculations all argue for a cautious stance toward OOA participation.

Various domestic outcomes are feasible, and they have very different implications for Russian foreign policy, including security relationships with the West. Plausibly, Russia will emerge from the current
turmoil as a stable, prosperous democracy eager to cooperate with new partners. Equally plausibly, it might plunge into civil war and for many years be incapable of conducting a foreign policy. Also possible is some form of conservative authoritarianism, reminiscent of Chile’s Augusto Pinochet and characterized by reactionary politics, a mixed economy led by state-ownership of major industries, and perhaps domineering relations with neighbors. From the West’s vantage point, the most troubling outcome would be the appearance of a fascist regime, one energized by nationalist impulses, a desire for a restored imperial realm, and abject hostility to the democratic powers. At present, each of these outcomes is feasible enough to be taken seriously and to render difficult any confident appraisal of Russia’s role in OOA operations.

Ukraine

A similar set of observations can be offered about Ukraine. What is important to recognize is that this nation is no longer synonymous with Russia. As large as France and endowed with enormous resources but huge problems, Ukraine has the potential to transform the European security equation. At issue is whether this transformation will be for good or ill. At the moment, Ukraine is immersed in internal struggles, and, especially because it is led by conservative leaders, it is even less likely than Russia to participate in OOA operations that do not directly serve its vital interests. Moreover, Ukraine regards Russia as a potential enemy, and it therefore is a consumer of security, not a producer or exporter. Especially if it is to yield the nuclear weapons still based on its soil, Ukraine’s highest priority is to gain Western assurances of security support. This requirement for outside support might give Western nations some influence in eliciting Ukrainian cooperation in OOA missions, but not decisive leverage.

In the long run, Ukraine’s stance will be shaped by the outcome of internal reforms. A democratic Ukraine will pursue cooperative relations with the West; a turbulent Ukraine will look inward; and a fascist and nationalist Ukraine would be a source of chronic troubles. At present, earlier disputes between Moscow and Kiev over the Crimea and control of military forces have abated, but Ukraine is seeking a divorce from Russia and the Commonwealth of Indepen-
dent States (CIS). If these two nations can surmount their current disputes, they will be able to present a united front to Europe, for good or ill. If they lapse into permanent rivalry, the result will be a deep fault line in the new European security system.

Even if their governments are willing to participate in OOA operations, their ability to do so will be hampered for some time not only by declining force readiness, but also by spreading violence within the commonwealth. The past year has seen an explosion of ethnic violence and civil war across the great Central Asian arc stretching from the Black Sea to the Chinese border. Casualties in Tajikistan alone evidently run in the thousands, and heavy fighting is taking place in Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and elsewhere.

At some juncture, Russia and Ukraine probably will overcome their internal preoccupations and will then begin pursuing outward-looking foreign policies. If both emerge as stable democracies, they likely will pursue neighborly relations with the EC and the United States, and this stance might translate into a cooperative attitude toward joint OOA operations that might enable them to contribute importantly to Western efforts to contain surging ethnic rivalries, nationalist animosities, economic tensions, refugee upheavals, and border disputes in Central and/or Eastern Europe and the Balkans. A similar cooperative stance might be adopted toward OOA missions in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. UN- and CSCE-sponsored OOA operations might become the order of the day, with American and West European forces acting hand in hand with their Russian and Ukrainian allies.

This favorable outcome is far from ensured, however. The most nightmarish and least plausible outcome, of course, would be emergence of a Russian-Ukrainian military axis led by fascist governments with deeply antagonistic agendas toward the West. A new Cold War might then erupt between NATO and the Russia-Ukraine axis, with control over the power vacuum between them being the centerpiece of conflict. A major war could be the outcome. At a minimum, NATO would be required to develop its military strategy and forces assuming that Russia and Ukraine are adversaries, not cooperative partners.
A more plausible yet still worrisome result is the emergence of a stressful multipolar “balance of power” system in East Central Europe in which Russia and Ukraine would pursue agendas animated by traditional conceptions of their national interests. Such agendas would not make for widespread cooperation; indeed, Russia and Ukraine would find themselves at odds. Meanwhile, they would pursue domineering policies toward their immediate western neighbors: the Baltic states, Poland, Belarus, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Moldova. This situation could leave the Western nations pursuing mixed policies toward Russia and Ukraine, policies reminiscent of Bismarck’s era that aim for a combination of containment, equilibrium, and accommodation. In some situations, Russian and Ukrainian OOA cooperation with NATO in Europe and the Middle East–Persian Gulf might be possible, but it would not be the norm.

RUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN MILITARY FORCES

To what extent will these two nations have conventional forces capable of major combat operations, in cooperation with the West or otherwise? The profound upheaval their military establishments are undergoing make difficult any attempt to answer this question. What can be said is that Russia likely will re-emerge from its present travails to again become an imposing military power, and that Ukraine likely will emerge with large forces of its own. Both nations currently espouse military strategies aimed at protecting their borders. Owing to modern doctrine and technology alone, they probably will build conventional forces capable of mobile operations and offensive missions. To a degree yet unknown, these forces will be capable of projecting power beyond their national borders. The question is, To what ends?

To the extent that Russia and Ukraine embrace cooperative policies with the West, their military arsenals will allow them to participate in multilateral peacekeeping operations, a capability that already has been demonstrated by the presence of Russian and Ukrainian peacekeepers in Croatia and Serbia. As for cooperation in larger peacekeeping and warfighting missions, both nations will have ample combat forces, but they will labor under many of the practical constraints facing the West Europeans: Deficiencies in such areas as C3I, logistics support, mobility assets, doctrine, and training will place
limits on the extent to which both nations can project more than just modest military power outside Europe, including to the Persian Gulf. Both nations, however, will be far more capable of projecting military power into the nearby areas of East Central Europe and the Balkans. Their capability to cooperate with Western forces can be enhanced through development of similar doctrines, force structures, and logistics systems.

Future force levels in Russia, Ukraine, and nearby nations will be shaped partly by Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) entitlements, which are displayed in Table A.1. The effect of CFE is to sharply scale back the mammoth conventional forces deployed by Warsaw Pact nations during the Cold War. Even so, the CFE accord leaves ample room for East Central Europe to remain an armed camp if all nations take full advantage of their entitlements. Moreover, it helps lay the foundation for an enduring military imbalance of power in this region. In particular, Russia is allowed to retain ground and air forces that are three times larger than Ukraine’s. The entitlements of Ukraine, in turn, allow its forces to be two to four times larger than those of the East European nations on its border: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Belarus, Romania, and Moldova.

Table A.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Manpower (thousands)</th>
<th>Tanks and Armored Command Vehicles</th>
<th>Artillery</th>
<th>Attack Helicopters</th>
<th>Combat Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russiaa</td>
<td>1,450</td>
<td>6,400/11,480</td>
<td>6,415</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>3,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>4,080/5,050</td>
<td>4,040</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>1,090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>1,730/2,150</td>
<td>1,610</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>835/1,700</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>1,435/2,050</td>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,860/2,650</td>
<td>1,615</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>1,375/2,100</td>
<td>1,475</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>210/210</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>1,475/2,000</td>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aRussian figures include entitlements for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova. Subtraction of these entitlements would reduce Russia’s limits by 10 to 15 percent for most categories. CFE limits, of course, apply only to the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU) region and do not constrain Russian inventories in Asia.

bMoldova’s manpower limits have not yet been declared.
In all likelihood, none of those bordering nations will take full advantage of its CFE entitlements. The act of downsizing, however, probably will unfold in a way that perpetuates this imbalance. This imbalance is important not because it inevitably points toward war but because it will help put pressure on the West to project security guarantees eastward, thus removing incentives for any nation to engage in unhealthy measures.

During the weeks following dissolution of the Soviet Union in late 1991, Boris Yeltsin hoped that a 12-member Commonwealth of Independent States could be created, one that would leave the member nations with close security ties. To this end, negotiations were begun at Minsk in early 1992, but Ukraine, Moldova, and other actors posed opposition, seeking a more distant relationship with Russia. Greatest unity was achieved in disposing of the USSR’s strategic nuclear weapons. Provided that the START accords are fully carried out by early next decade, the remaining 1,000 launchers and 3,000 warheads will be based on Russian soil, and Russia will provide nuclear security to its commonwealth partners. Whether Ukraine will emerge as a committed member of the non-nuclear club, however, was left uncertain. Although it professed willingness to join the non-proliferation treaty, Leonid Kravchuk’s government implied that security guarantees and financial aid would have to be forthcoming from the West.2

As for larger commonwealth security visions, the Minsk negotiations were less successful. At the outset, Yeltsin sought agreement on the concept that commonwealth conventional forces would be viewed as joint assets on behalf of a collective security pact. He encountered resistance from members who were less enamored of jointness and wanted to establish sovereign control over forces on their own soil. During the first six months of 1992, the Minsk participants signed

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fully 15 accords governing the disposition of conventional forces and future security relationships. Those accords, however, failed to preserve unity among the commonwealth. Particularly at odds were Ukraine and Russia. With Ukraine seeking a near-total divorce from Russia, the outcome was a bitterly contested agreement to divide the Black Sea fleet and other Crimean military assets between the two nations. Meanwhile, other CIS members voiced growing concern that the commonwealth would become a vehicle for perpetuating Russian domination. In May, Yeltsin presented a collective security pact at a Tashkent summit, but only six nations signed it: Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

By late 1992, frictions had grown and continued existence of the commonwealth seemed uncertain. The Baltic nations, Georgia, and Azerbaijan refused to participate in negotiations aimed at creating a commonwealth charter. When the charter was presented at a ten-nation CIS summit in January 1993, Ukraine, Moldova, and Turkmenistan refused to sign. Although they left open the possibility of future membership or observer status, their refusal effectively created a truncated commonwealth of only seven nations. Russia continued to enjoy the allegiance of only Belarus and five Central Asian republics. Moreover, delegations from Uzbekistan and neighboring states implied that they might withdraw if effective institutions are not built. On the basis of this shaky support, the charter was sent to national parliaments for ratification, where the outcome seemed in doubt. By mid-1993, a consensus had been reached to all but abandon the idea of an integrated commonwealth defense establishment, thereby leaving the nations free to chart their own futures.

Confronted by the unfolding collapse of the commonwealth, Russia embarked on the path of creating a unilateral defense policy. In May 1992, Yeltsin issued a presidential decree establishing national Russian armed forces, with himself as commander in chief. Army General Pavel Grachev was appointed Minister of Defense, civilian strategist Andrei Kokoshin became First Deputy Defense Minister, and Colonel General Viktor Dubynin became Chief of the General Staff. This leadership was instructed to prepare plans for building an appropriate military strategy, force posture, and budget. In the remaining months of 1992, their review got under way, amid
mounting controversy in Moscow over larger political issues that detracted from Yeltsin’s ability to focus on defense policy.\(^3\)

Firm plans apparently have not yet been adopted, but Russian spokesmen have suggested some broad outlines for the future. From what can be discerned, the Russian armed forces will include about 1.2 to 1.3 million personnel—down from the 2.7 million level of early 1992. A professional-officer–noncommissioned-officer corps will be retained, and conscription will be cut from 24 months to 18 months. Emphasis will be placed on a defensive strategy aimed at protecting Russia’s borders, fulfilling joint commitments within the commonwealth, and preserving internal order. Russian air forces will form the core of an integrated commonwealth air defense system, but aircraft performing offensive missions will not be stationed close to the borders of neighboring states. Russian naval forces will continue operating from existing ports and will have coastal defense missions, but they will deploy to distant waters when necessary. As for ground strategy, Russia’s military districts are being redrawn to emphasize defense along traditional invasion routes. An all-azimuth defense will be established, but the Western approaches to Moscow will receive special emphasis.

Accompanying this defensive strategy, however, is to be a modern army: one endowed with the cross-country mobility, combined-arms features, and other characteristics that permit operational-level maneuvers, including offensive capabilities. Most probably, the old structure of fronts, armies, and divisions will be replaced by a new structure dominated by Western-style corps and brigades. Russian military doctrine will continue to stress armor, artillery, and mechanized infantry, but greater emphasis will be placed on high-technology, air-ground interaction, airmobile assets, and advanced recon-

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naissance systems. Most probably, army combat units will have fewer tanks but better capabilities in C3I, indirect fire, and logistics support. In all likelihood, efforts will be made to learn from Iraq’s failures and Western successes in Desert Storm. That conflict pointed out the liabilities of a weak air defense system and stationary ground defense schemes. It also highlighted the importance of high readiness, technological supremacy, and good campaign plans that blend maneuver and firepower to fracture the enemy’s cohesion.

This new doctrine will be carried out by a smaller but still-potent army sized to rebuff any attacker. Although basing arrangements are being redesigned, the well-armed forces returning from Germany evidently will become the foundation of the new Russian Army. The total size of the army will depend on many factors, including budgetary affordability and the disposition of jointly owned forces now on the soil of other commonwealth nations (e.g., the 14th Army in Moldova). Most probably, 10 to 20 active divisions will be retained, and some of them will be designated as rapid-reaction forces. Most divisions will be armored or mechanized, but a sizable airborne contingent will be retained, and a few airborne units might be created. Although the USSR’s massive mobilization system will be de-emphasized, sufficient reserve manpower and equipment probably will be retained for about 30 reserve divisions. As a result, Russia probably will be able to generate a total of 40 to 50 divisions upon full mobilization, backed up by 2,000 to 2,500 tactical combat aircraft.

Basing patterns will reflect CFE limitations, the existing infrastructure, and economic conditions. Also, ground and air units will have to be distributed in ways that provide forces across the full extent of the country, from Europe to Siberia and Pacific Russia. These realities will inhibit concentrating forces at any single point. The Russians, however, will be able to turn to a well-developed railroad network to permit a fairly rapid concentration in wartime. Modest improvements to this network—better tracks, more rolling stock, improved rail traffic control, better loading and offloading—could tangibly speed the capacity to concentrate.

To the extent plans of this sort are seriously embraced in Moscow, they reflect future visions rather than present realities. At the moment, the Russian military seems to be unraveling. With funds drying up, training is declining, maintenance backlogs are piling up,
conscription is falling far short of quotas, and morale is eroding. Today the Russian Army would have trouble fighting any war; indeed, it may be hard-pressed to cope with a civil war. However, it does have a proud tradition; it has bounced back from crippling reversals before; and throughout history, it has played an important role as an integrating force in Russian society. If the Russian state recovers its bearings, perhaps the army will recover its cohesion and effectiveness within a few years.

Future Russian Force Posture

Even if it does recover, the future Russian Army will be far smaller than the 220 divisions maintained by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. But if employed properly, a posture of 40 to 50 mobilizable divisions is easily large enough to wage a single major regional conflict. To some degree, moreover, Russia might be able to draw upon the forces of at least a few commonwealth partners. Belarus, which may have 5 to 7 divisions, is an obvious candidate, but the Central Asian republics might provide modest reinforcements as well. If so, the pool of forces available to Russian commanders will be somewhat enlarged.

Russia itself will retain sizable forces for peacekeeping operations. Good candidates are its 5 airborne divisions, at least 2 to 3 of which will remain in the force structure. During 1992, an airborne battalion was deployed to Croatia as part of the UN peacekeeping effort there. Moreover, Russia is cooperating with some commonwealth partners to create regional peacekeeping forces to help establish buffer zones between warring factions. During 1992, 6 battalions were deployed to help separate Moldova from the breakaway province of Dnestr, and 2 battalions were deployed to separate Georgia from South Ossetia. These experiences are illuminating the extent to which Russian forces lack appropriate training, doctrine, and equipment. If they continue to perform peacemaking missions, however, Russian forces can be expected to become more skilled at them.

Because Russia will, on paper, retain conventional forces similar in size to those of the United States, it is a potential candidate for participation in coalition operations in the Persian Gulf, should a repeat of Desert Storm ever become necessary. The physical capacity to deploy large forces is provided by Russia's 600 large air
transports, 80 amphibious ships, and 125 Ro-Ro cargo vessels, many of which will be retained even after downsizing. Nonetheless, Russian ground and air forces have no experience in major expeditionary missions, and they lack the specialized equipment and mobile logistics assets needed for them. Most probably, Russia will have the capability to make at least modest contributions of the sort offered by Britain and France: i.e., 1 brigade or 1 division, 50 to 100 combat aircraft, and a small naval task force.

Assuming it recovers its military bearings, Russia will be able to offer forces to peacemaking and related operations in Europe. At a minimum, it should be able to generate a few ground units, with tactical air and naval support. A fully mobilized Russian Army could probably commit 20 to 25 divisions, along with 1,200 to 1,500 combat aircraft. As a result, Russia would be able to wage a "Desert Storm equivalent" of its own in Central and/or Eastern Europe, conceivably in partnership with Western nations to help guard against malevolent behavior, much as the Russian Army helped underwrite the Concert of Europe in the early 1800s. But, depending on the policies of the Russian government, it also could be used for less constructive purposes.

**Future Ukrainian Force Posture**

A similar judgment can be offered about Ukraine's future defense policies and forces. Ukraine is unlikely to take full advantage of its CFE entitlements, but present signals emanating from Kiev point to retention of a mobilizable posture of 10 to 15 ground divisions and 500 to 600 tactical combat aircraft. Evidently, Ukrainian officials worry that Russia is a military threat, and that a force of this size is needed to underscore deterrence. Moreover, Ukraine has a 900-mile-long border with Russia, many key urban areas are located close to the northeastern border, and the rolling terrain there is conducive to invasion. These geographic features require a powerful conventional defense capable of mobile operations anchored on tactical air strikes and offensive counterthrusts by armored ground forces. To the extent Ukraine responds to these requirements, it will have forces capable of cooperating with the West in peacekeeping operations
and other OOA missions. But it also will be capable of waging modern conventional warfare, both within its borders and outside them.⁴

COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

United States

To the extent appropriate, the United States should act to broaden cooperation with Russia and Ukraine for OOA missions, through accelerated military collaboration in training, exercises, doctrinal exchanges, and other areas. The pursuit of this endeavor should also be accompanied by awareness of the larger strategic picture in Europe.⁵

As matters now stand, both Russia and Ukraine seem pointed toward the building of large military forces that can perform major combat operations. This development opens up possibilities for joint cooperation with the United States, but it also creates the prospect that these forces can be used for other purposes. If Ukraine’s design philosophy reflects legitimate defense requirements, it also poses a potential threat to the small and vulnerable nations along Ukraine’s western borders. The same conclusion holds true for Russia, whose large forces will threaten not only Eastern Europe but Ukraine, as well.

East Central Europe

What seems destined to emerge in East Central Europe is a multipolar security system, with a military power vacuum in the middle separating the NATO allies from the two dominant powers to the east. Constrained by CFE limits and their own dwindling economic resources, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary will lack sufficient forces to defend their borders against powerful enemies, they will not possess nuclear weapons, and they will not


enjoy formal guarantees from NATO. Whether political conflict ensues will depend on factors far beyond force relationships; to the degree that military power is influential, the emerging security system in East Central Europe is structurally unstable. Although diplomats today issue hopeful treatises that endorse cooperation, defense ministries everywhere—mindful of the past and uncertain about the future—are beginning to eye each other warily.

West European press reports in early 1993 indicated that Russia recently had approached Germany with the idea of establishing a security alliance, and that Polish President Lech Walesa was interested in the idea of buying nuclear weapons from Ukraine. More recent accounts tell of a growing security dialogue between Poland and Ukraine, and among Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. The accuracy of these accounts is uncertain; in any event, major changes are unlikely to take hold anytime soon. The mere surfacing of such a dialogue, however, suggests that multipolar security politics are returning. If bad things happen—e.g., nuclear proliferation or creation of new and destabilizing security alliances—they will partly be caused by fears of military imbalances in an atmosphere of mounting political distrust. Because deep-seated animosities have been released by the Cold War’s end, the Balkans crisis is symptomatic, and it may be a prelude of worse things to come. Germany and Russia may find themselves drawn into growing rivalry with each other over influence in East Central Europe. If so, Poland, Ukraine, and other nations will begin taking steps to protect themselves. They will first turn toward multilateral solutions; if that step fails, unilateral actions will be more feasible.

The positive lesson left by history is still valid: Stability will emerge only when nations are reassured by, and their security is anchored on, a stable military balance of power. To this end, the goal of building cooperative security relations with Russia and Ukraine has become an important feature of U.S. foreign policy. Thus far, attention has focused only on denuclearization. To be sure, nuclear weapons are important. But conventional weapons are normally the first instrument of choice when diplomacy fails. If confrontation returns to East Central Europe, it will be a product of clashing political agendas. But whether war breaks out and escalation occurs will be governed by the conventional force balance—or imbalance. The risk is that political instability will grow, and that conventional
military imbalances will serve as a link between that instability and nuclear weapons that, START notwithstanding, will remain on European soil.

Conventional-weapon imbalances provide strong nations a powerful temptation to pursue illegitimate agendas, to intimidate their neighbors, and even to commit aggression when diplomacy fails to attain their goals. For weaker nations, the risk is less that nuclear weapons will be used against them than that their sovereignty will be encroached upon and that their borders will be violated by conventional attack. Until such a risk is brought under control, these nations will not be fully comfortable with their status as non-nuclear powers. Nor would they be fully secure if they were to acquire nuclear guarantees or even their own nuclear weapons. They would still be vulnerable to aggression by nations that employ superior conventional forces under the mantle of their own nuclear-deterrent postures.

For all these reasons, denuclearization policies should be accompanied by attention to the evolving conventional force postures of Russia and Ukraine. The challenge facing the Western nations is twofold: (1) to promote democratic reforms, defensive military agendas, denuclearization, and cooperative conduct by Russia and Ukraine; and (2) to act in ways that help preserve a military balance of power in this volatile region, ways that reassure nations of their security needs and discourage any resort to intimidating conduct. To the extent that history is any guide, both challenges may have to be pursued at once; neither is likely to be handled independently of the other.

The situation calls for the Western nations to help guide Russian and Ukrainian force developments in constructive directions. Pursuing this agenda, however, will require more than military exchange programs, joint exercises, and collaboration in UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations and other missions. Clear vision and a sense of priorities are also needed. The cause of stability in East Central Europe will not be served if Russia and Ukraine build modern forces capable of swift offensive campaigns. Even if stability is not sought as an expression of foreign policy, it may emerge from the purely military considerations now at work in each nation, including modern doctrine and emerging technology. This trend will further
be reinforced if these nations are encouraged to emulate the model laid down by Desert Storm and by U.S. military forces.

It is doubtful that any purpose will be served by delivering lectures on the virtues of "defensive defense" and associated concepts calling for infantry forces chained to concrete fortifications. For both Russia and Ukraine, their terrain is too open and too large for defensive defense with the forces that will be available. Their military planners are well aware that an armor-heavy invader could outflank their forces and destroy them. Perhaps a fine-tuned balance can be found, one that leaves these two nations able to defend themselves but without the wherewithal to attack each other or their neighbors. If so, the answer will lie in a doctrine suspended halfway between mobility and fixed positions, and in a force structure that blends armor and infantry. The famous German Field Marshall von Manstein crafted this kind of defense—a "strongpoint defense"—on the Russian front during World War II. Perhaps this model can be applied to Russia and Ukraine. In any event, a coherent vision anchored on a credible concept for creating a stable military balance is needed.