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The American Armies: 1993

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Arryo Center

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Preface

This report was prepared for the U.S. Army. The objective of this report is to examine, from a strategic point of view, the processes and results of recent international change and the resulting implications for Western Hemisphere militaries, including their reserve forces. It focuses on what the United States is aspiring to and its national objectives in pursuing change, and concentrates on the implications of these changes for national sovereignty, identity, and security. Additionally, the study considers how proposed military reductions will affect the reserve forces in their national security role; which types of technologies are required to maintain adequate security; and how international organizations can affect political and military stability within the inter-American setting.

The research supporting this report was conducted in the Strategy and Doctrine Program of the Arroyo Center under a project to provide special assistance to the Policy, Plans, and Strategy Division of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans on the Army Staff.

The Arroyo Center

The Arroyo Center is the U.S. Army's federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) for studies and analysis operated by RAND. The Arroyo Center provides the Army with objective, independent analytic research on major policy and organizational concerns, emphasizing mid- and long-term problems. Its research is carried out in four programs: Strategy and Doctrine, Force Development and Technology, Military Logistics, and Manpower and Training.

Army Regulation 5-21 contains basic policy for the conduct of the Arroyo Center. The Army provides continuing guidance and oversight through the Arroyo Center Policy Committee (ACPC), which is co-chaired by the Vice Chief of Staff and by the Assistant Secretary for Research, Development, and Acquisition. Arroyo Center work is performed under contract MDA903-91-C-0006.

The Arroyo Center is housed in RAND's Army Research Division. RAND is a private, nonprofit institution that conducts analytic research on a wide range of public policy matters affecting the nation's security and welfare.
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# Contents

Preface .............................................................. iii  
Tables .............................................................. vii  
Summary ............................................................. ix  
Acronyms and Abbreviations ................................... xi  

1. INTRODUCTION .................................................. 1  
2. A CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT .................... 3  
   The New World Order .......................................... 3  
   The Changing U.S. International Role ...................... 3  
   The Changing U.S. Relationship with Latin America .... 4  
   Role of Regional Organizations and Arrangements ....... 6  

3. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER FOR THE U.S. MILITARY ..................................... 9  
   Decreasing Budgets ........................................... 9  
   Changing Threats ............................................. 10  
   Changing Roles and Missions ................................ 11  
   Service Competition .......................................... 12  
   New Directions ................................................ 13  

4. U.S. ARMY RESPONSES ......................................... 16  
   The Army's Comparative Advantages ...................... 16  
   Budget Reductions and the Army ........................... 18  
   Summary ....................................................... 19  

5. IMPLICATIONS FOR COMBINED EFFORTS AND OPERATIONS ..................................................... 20  

Appendix: THE CANADIAN AND LATIN AMERICAN ARMIES ....................................................... 23  

Bibliography ......................................................... 41
## Tables

| A.1. | Argentinean Armed Forces | 27 |
| A.2. | Bolivian Armed Forces | 28 |
| A.3. | Brazilian Armed Forces | 29 |
| A.4. | Chilean Armed Forces | 30 |
| A.5. | Colombian Armed Forces | 31 |
| A.6. | Dominican Armed Forces | 32 |
| A.7. | Ecuadorian Armed Forces | 33 |
| A.8. | El Salvadorian Armed Forces | 34 |
| A.9. | Guatemalan Armed Forces | 35 |
| A.10. | Honduran Armed Forces | 36 |
| A.11. | Paraguayan Armed Forces | 37 |
| A.12. | Peruvian Armed Forces | 37 |
| A.13. | Uruguayan Armed Forces | 38 |
| A.14. | Venezuelan Armed Forces | 39 |
Summary

In the aftermath of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the combat scenario for which the U.S. military spent fifty years preparing—a large-scale, unlimited war in Europe—is no longer likely to occur. Far from representing the end of international conflict, however, the end of the Cold War appears to have ushered in an era of regional and internal conflicts based on long-standing ethnic, national, and religious divisions. Around the world, ethnic groups are seeking homelands, federations are dissolving, and governments are embroiled in counterinsurgencies or, having failed completely, are leaving their territories to the anarchy of factional warfare. Widespread arms proliferation and growing populations of refugees and internally displaced persons are contributing to this volatile atmosphere. As if this were not enough, the international economy is emerging as a primary arena for worldwide competition, and countries are finding that they must develop new economic relationships if they are to remain players.

As in other regions, the countries of the Western Hemisphere—Canada, the United States, Mexico, and the nations in Central and South America—are in the process of adjusting to the changed international environment. They are faced with new threats, shifting international relationships, and, in many cases, declining budgets. Each must respond by developing new strategies and priorities. However, within this process of change and adjustment exists an opportunity not only for individual countries to reconsider their goals and capabilities, but for greater regional cooperation on economic, political, and security issues. Although the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) represents a step in this direction, the possibility exists of much broader cooperation across all the American countries and in the security and political arenas as well as the economic.

Faced with significant economic competition from Europe and Japan, substantial cuts in its military and defense budgets, and growing demand for greater government services, the United States could probably benefit from greater regional cooperation. The security and economic threats posed to it in the wake of the Cold War require maintenance of its military and industrial capabilities despite reduced budgets. Stronger regional security arrangements and greater economic cooperation could offset some costs while helping to promote a more stable regional environment.
As it stands, tension caused by the combination of changing threats and the dramatically reduced U.S. defense budget has led to a reappraisal of how the U.S. military can most efficiently accomplish its goals. Specifically, the kinds of forces, training, equipment, and doctrine that will be required are being assessed. For example, even as the number of forces and bases is reduced, both overseas and within the continental United States, the United States is contemplating a proportionally larger military role in regional conflicts. Such operations can require a significant amount of manpower as well as the logistical capability to rapidly deploy troops and equipment anywhere in the world. Furthermore, the United States must be prepared for both combat missions and peace support operations.

The dilemma facing the U.S. armed forces in general is particularly acute for the Army. It must broaden its capabilities, adjust its roles and missions, and compete with the other services, all in the face of manpower and budget cuts. It will respond in part with a greater reliance on technology; it will also have to reconsider the use of the reserve forces, and, relatedly, their training and preparation. It will have to work more closely with the other services to ensure that each preserves its comparative advantage as well as its interoperability. It will have to further develop its doctrine and training for military operations other than war and the special requirements of regional contingency operations. These challenges are just beginning to be met, but they will require careful consideration and significant adjustments.

Cooperation between the American armies has the potential to counteract some of the effects of the drawdown and decreasing defense budget. Such relatively benign steps as sharing, rather than duplicating, disaster relief equipment and training could help optimize limited resources. Efforts such as combined counterdrug operations facilitate complementary, rather than contradictory, actions. Other potential areas for cooperation are opening up in the post–Cold War years as well. With a new U.S. emphasis on international peacekeeping and other peace support operations, for example, the U.S. Army could benefit from the expertise of the Canadian Army, which has a long-standing tradition of involvement in peacekeeping operations. Weapons proliferation could be addressed at a regional level. More optimistically, the region could strengthen or reconfigure existing cooperative security organizations. Yet before any of these efforts are undertaken, the countries of the region will need to redefine their political and military relationships so that imaginative and resourceful means of cooperation can be jointly developed without being constrained by the residual fears of imperialism that have, until now, prevented closer relations.
## Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C4I</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>EAI</td>
<td>Enterprise for the Americas Initiative</td>
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<td>IADC</td>
<td>Inter-American Defense College</td>
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<td>IAPF</td>
<td>Inter-American Peace Force</td>
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<td>IATRA</td>
<td>Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>JBUSDC</td>
<td>Joint Brazilian-U.S. Defense Commission</td>
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<td>JMUUSDC</td>
<td>Joint Mexican-U.S. Defense Commission</td>
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<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>NWO</td>
<td>New World Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
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<td>ODECA</td>
<td>Organization of Central American States</td>
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<td>OECS</td>
<td>Organization of Eastern Caribbean States</td>
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1. Introduction

Deterring nuclear attack and containing communism—the cornerstones of our military strategy and planning for more than 45 years—have given way to a more diverse, flexible strategy which is regionally oriented and designed to respond decisively to the challenges of this decade.

—General Colin L. Powell,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 1993

The United States is in the process of drawing down its armed forces, pruning its defense budget, and redefining its national strategy. Increased civil oversight of the assignment of roles and missions is exacerbating the existing tension between the military services that are competing for fewer defense resources. At the same time, despite the drawdowns, there is discussion of expanding the roles and missions of the armed forces to include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, broader humanitarian assistance and disaster relief responsibilities, and, perhaps, domestic engagement.

Yet the United States is not the only country in the region confronted with economic and security challenges in the wake of the Cold War. Central America is emerging from the effects of Soviet-American competition in the region; drug cartels, insurgent movements, and authoritarianism all continue to threaten Latin American and the Caribbean nations; and all the countries of the region recognize the increased importance of competing effectively in the international economic arena. This universal need to adjust and adapt to the changed world environment provides an excellent opportunity for regional cooperation. Such cooperation has been damped in the past by concerns about U.S. interventionism, but the United States is unlikely today to pursue such a policy.\(^1\)

The time is therefore ripe for imaginative and constructive cooperative ventures in the economic, political, and security spheres.

This report examines the effects of the changing international environment on the United States, its military, and the U.S. Army in particular. Among the issues considered are the budgetary, procurement, force structure, and roles and missions concerns of the military in general; the specific concerns of the Army;

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and the potential for mutually advantageous cooperative security arrangements with other militaries in the region—either bilaterally or through more formal institutions.

This report is divided into five sections and an appendix: Section 2 briefly examines the effects of the New World Order on U.S. national interests, the role of the United States in the region, and the nature of regional political and security organizations. Section 3 identifies some of the challenges facing the U.S. military as well as some of the steps the military is taking to deal with them. Section 4 concentrates on the U.S. Army, and assesses how that service is adjusting both to the drawdown in funds and manpower and to the debate about expanded roles and missions. Section 5 makes some observations and recommendations for regional cooperation. Finally, condensed synopses of the current security situations in other countries in the region may be found in the appendix.

The New World Order

In the wake of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the combat scenario for which the U.S. military spent fifty years preparing—a large-scale, unlimited war in Europe—is no longer likely to occur. Far from representing the end of international conflict, however, the end of the Cold War appears to have ushered in an era of regional and internal conflicts based on long-standing ethnic, national, and religious divisions. Worldwide, ethnic groups are seeking homelands, federations are dissolving, and governments are embroiled in counterinsurgencies or, having failed completely, are leaving their territories to the anarchy of factional warfare. Widespread arms proliferation and growing populations of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP)\(^1\) are contributing to this volatile atmosphere.

Additionally, the “global economy” has arrived. With the communist threat gone, economic power is viewed by many as being the most important measure of national power, or at least coequal with military power. Economic relationships have therefore taken on increased importance, as nations\(^2\) vie for markets, labor, and resources. Issues of weapons production, sales, and purchases link economic power even more directly to national security.

The Changing U.S. International Role

While some have argued that regional crises hold little significance for the United States, issues such as weapons proliferation, massive refugee flows, and environmental and health considerations will be compounded by U.S. concerns about the effects of regional stability on U.S. economic and political interests, and guarantee continued U.S. international interest and involvement. Indeed, since

\(^1\)Currently, there are approximately 15 to 18 million refugees and 24 million internally displaced persons worldwide.

\(^2\)It is understood that the term “nation” is often thought to be ambiguous by political scientists. The term is used throughout this report as synonymous with “country,” “state,” and “nation-state,” unless otherwise stated.
1989, American troops have been committed in over two dozen crises, ranging from combat in Panama and the Persian Gulf to peace enforcement and humanitarian assistance missions in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, to disaster relief operations at home and abroad. Clearly, the U.S. military must continue the process of adjusting its strategies and capabilities to reflect the new and diverse requirements of the post Cold War.

The United States must also come to terms with its role as the world’s sole remaining superpower. It must reconcile its international and domestic responsibilities while somehow assuring other nations that it does not pose a threat to their sovereign interests. Some U.S. leaders say that the United States is "obligated to lead" the world toward peace, human rights, and relief from suffering; others disagree and instead point to the many pressing domestic issues facing the United States.

This debate is intrinsically related to the U.S. military’s future. Indeed, some have suggested that the U.S. military become “domestically engaged,” and use its vast resources and excellent organization to resolve some of the problems facing the United States at home. There are also those who, seeing the likelihood of large-scale conventional wars recede, advocate a greater role for the U.S. military in peacemaking, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and promotion of democracy and human rights.

Inimical to these expanded roles and missions, however, is the declining military budget caused, in part, by the pressure to focus U.S. government resources on domestic issues. The United States’ sluggish economy, illegal drug trade, violent crime, poor educational standards and performance, health care crisis, and deficit reduction have already directly affected the military in the form of significant budget reductions, as discussed later in this report.

The Changing U.S. Relationship with Latin America

Although the end of Soviet support for communism in the Western Hemisphere might have created some temptation, and indeed, some pressure, to disengage the United States completely from Latin America, other factors suggest the need

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4General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently discussed this leadership obligation in "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1992/93, p. 33.

5For example, LTG Hatch clearly articulated this point of view at the Symposium on Non-Traditional Roles for the U.S. Military in the Post-Cold War Era, National Defense University, December 1-2, 1992.
for a continued U.S. presence. On the one hand, the United States is involved in negotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)—which many Latin American countries hope will sprout supplementary or complementary economic agreements throughout Central and South America. On the other hand, regional stability continues to be threatened by a variety of factors, including economic disparities throughout the region, continued international debt problems, unresolved territorial and boundary disputes, severe environmental destruction, ongoing insurgencies, and, of course, the narcotics industry and the terrorism and crime that accompany it.

The dynamic of the U.S. relationship with Latin American countries has also changed. This is most evident in Central America, where the elimination of Soviet support to insurgent groups and client states has allowed the United States to begin to distribute aid in a more discriminate manner. Under the new administration, governments and groups that in the past received U.S. assistance and support simply because of their opposition to communism can now expect closer U.S. scrutiny prior to receiving U.S. funds, training, and equipment. For Latin American nations, human rights, appropriate civil-military relations resembling the U.S. model, and adherence to democratic, representative government will be prerequisites for—or goals of—U.S. aid and assistance.

In this context, tensions could arise from U.S. concerns about what it views as inappropriate military roles in some countries’ economies or governments. The strict subordination of the military to the civilian government is deeply embedded in U.S. political culture. Different national views of civil-military relationships and military support for development could prove to be sticking points in U.S. aid and regional security relationships.

Despite these potential problems, the value of good regional relations cannot be overestimated. In 1982, then-President Ronald Reagan, in an address before the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, pointed out that Mexico is closer to Texas than Massachusetts is, and that half the U.S. trade, two-thirds of its imported oil, and over half of its imported strategic minerals pass through the Panama Canal. He used these numbers to demonstrate that the well-being and security of the countries of Latin America are in the United States’ own vital interest. The northward flow of drugs and immigrants, the hemispheric effects of environmental damage in the region, the need for economic integration and growth, the costly and dangerous proliferation of weapons of mass

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destruction, and the potential failure of democratic reforms have since proven equally important concerns, the resolution of which requires close cooperation between all the American countries.

Role of Regional Organizations and Arrangements

We of this hemisphere have no need to seek a new international order; we have already found it. . . . The inter-American order was not built by hatred and terror. It has been paved by the endless and effective work of men of good will. We have built a foundation for the lives of hundreds of millions. We have unified these lives by a common devotion to a moral order.

—President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Pan American Day Address, 15 April 1940

There is an international trend toward greater reliance on multilateral efforts. The U.S.-led multinational operations under United Nations auspices in Iraq and Somalia and the UN expanded peacekeeping mission in the former Yugoslavia are only the most dramatic examples. Others include the West African peacekeeping force’s (ECOMOG) operations in Liberia, and, in the Americas, the Organization of American States’ (OAS) wide-ranging efforts in Haiti, including the distribution of humanitarian aid, investigations of the allegations of human rights abuses, and efforts to mediate a compromise between the Army and the ousted government-in-exile.

These regional multinational efforts hold great promise for the future. The United Nations is finding itself overwhelmed by the demand for peacekeeping and expanded peacekeeping (or, “peace support”) activities. The more that regional organizations can take upon themselves—either alone or in cooperation with the United Nations—the more likely that sufficient resources will be allocated to regional concerns such as disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and resolution of inter- or intrastate conflicts.

Like most other regions, however, with the exception of Western Europe, the Americas have not been very successful in building strong regional organizations. Although regional political and security organizations proliferate—such as the above-mentioned OAS, the Inter-American Military System (IAMS),7 the Organization of Central American States (ODECA), the

7Subsumed within the IAMS are the following: “the Inter-American Defense Board (founded in 1941 and the oldest multilateral military organization the United States participates in); the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance; security assistance programs; the Inter-American Defense College; U.S. military Latin Americanists; the Central American Defense Council; the U.S. Southern Command; hemispheric conferences of service chiefs [such as this one]; joint maneuvers and
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), the Contadora Group, the Contadora Support Group and Group of Eight, and the Central American Defense Council (CONDECA)—most relations are nonetheless conducted on a bilateral or subregional basis such as those between Argentina and Brazil with their South Atlantic Maritime Regional Command (CAMAS) and the Eastern Caribbean's Regional Security System. This is most often explained in terms of the uneven distribution of power between the United States and the countries of Latin America, wherein organizations such as the OAS are seen less as alliances against external threats and more as "elaborate juridical and moral structure[s] to limit U.S. intervention in the hemisphere."10

With the end of the Cold War, however, the dynamic of relations between the United States and Latin American countries may have changed sufficiently to allow improved cooperation through multinational organizations and arrangements. The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) and the North American Free Trade Agreement, for example, would have been unheard of ten or fifteen years earlier. In the mid-1970s, the United States resoundingly rejected any form of collective economic security, despite the growing belief in the region that economic development was an integral part of national security.11

Military security relations will also be affected, as the distortions of the former U.S.-Soviet competition recede and the United States demonstrates renewed respect for the sovereignty of each country in the region. The United States should make clear, however, that it remains committed to supporting development, democracy, and collaborative solutions to regional security

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8For descriptions of these organizations and lists of their member states, please see Congressional Research Service, Inter-American Relations: A Collection of Documents, Legislation, Descriptions of Inter-American Organizations, and Other Material Pertaining to Inter-American Affairs, report prepared for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations (United States Senate) and the Committee on Foreign Affairs (U.S. House of Representatives), Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., December 1988, pp. 330-333.


issues. President James Monroe's 1823 promise to the governments of Europe should be applied today to Latin America:

Our policy . . . is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government *de facto* as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm . . . policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none.\(^\text{12}\)

If the countries of Latin America feel secure that the United States poses no threat of intervention, it is more likely that the now moribund regional organizations will develop into useful fora for cooperation on peacekeeping, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and counterdrug operations. Indeed, declining defense budgets and smaller militaries will require greater regional cooperation on the full range of issues concerning American governments and militaries.

3. Implications of the New World Order for the U.S. Military

Decreasing Budgets

The end of the Cold War, domestic problems, and the burgeoning national debt will continue to reduce Department of Defense funding and will result in a continuing military force reduction. For example, President Clinton wants to reduce military outlays by $129 billion over the next five years. Troop levels will drop from 2 million in 1990 to 1.4 million by 1997. And the full scope of the budget reductions is not yet clear. Secretary Aspin ordered a "Bottom Up Review" that has begun to play a key role in determining future defense needs and, hence, budget requirements. The Bottom Up process reflects the Secretary’s view that traditional force reduction methods of subtracting "top down" from Cold War force structures is insufficient. Instead, he believes the United States should add forces from the bottom up that reflect the capabilities required for post-Cold War threats. It is his “vehicle for defining those capabilities and the budgets required to fund them.”

The budget for Fiscal Year (FY) 1994 is a “caretaker budget,” with most cuts to come in the future (by 1997). As of this writing, the total defense request for FY94 is $263.4 billion, a reduction of about $12 billion, or about 4.5 percent from the Bush budget. The projected FY97 budget represents a real decline of 5 percent below the FY93 budget, 24 percent below the FY90 budget, and more than 41 percent below the FY85 budget. The reduction in military personnel from FY85 to FY97 is projected to be approximately 30 percent.

The United States continues to face substantial budget pressures, and reductions in force structure and troop strength beyond those described above are certainly possible. Research and development will continue to be well funded, especially given their relatively low cost and the potential to develop dual-use technologies. Procurement (including modernization of older or worn-out systems), on the

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other hand, is a real concern for the military, as it will most certainly be curtailed. Indeed, a large part of the competition between the services revolves around procurement of the key technologies each service has targeted as critical in its own post–Cold War evolution.

Changing Threats

In addition to declining budgets, the United States is faced with changing threats. Secretary Aspin identifies four different possible threats to U.S. national security in the post Cold War. The number one danger is from regional, ethnic, and religious conflicts. Although these conflicts will not affect the survival of the United States, they do affect its vital interests. The Secretary prefers to fight these conflicts with allies (preferably under UN authorization), but insists that the United States must be prepared to “handle them by ourselves, if we must.”

However, it appears that the U.S. decision to act unilaterally will depend on the specific circumstances of the conflict. President Clinton, for example, recently rejected U.S. unilateral military involvement in Bosnia, stating that the United States would act only with the authorization of the UN Security Council.

The second threat is the nuclear danger. Although the Russian arsenal remains large, the major threat is from “nuclear warheads in the hands of terrorists, terrorist states, and other organizations.”

The third danger, “reversal of reform,” reflects the shift from “conventional” U.S. definitions of defense strategy. This concern centers around the potential reemergence of dictatorships and authoritarian regimes, especially in the countries of the former Soviet Union.

The fourth danger is the threat that the U.S. economy will not perform well. “In the short run,” says the Secretary, “the national security of the United States is protected by military power. In the long run, it’s protected by economic power.” Secretary Aspin views economic well-being as vital to U.S. national security. This has implications for the Army in that the Defense Department will be expected to play a role in deficit reduction, conversion of defense industries, reinvestment, and dual-use technology sharing, transfer, and development.

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3As a matter of policy and principle, the United States has never subjugated its vital interests to that of a coalition. See Memorandum for Record: Symposium on Non-traditional Roles for the U.S. Military in the Post–Cold War Era, Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Secretary, Washington, D.C., 30 December 1992, p. 8.

Changing Roles and Missions

The tension caused by the combination of the aforementioned changes in threats and the dramatically reduced defense budget has led to a reappraisal of how the U.S. military can most efficiently accomplish its goals. Specifically, assessments are being made as to the kinds of forces, training, equipment, and doctrine that will be required. For example, even as the number of forces and bases is reduced, both overseas and within the continental United States, the United States is contemplating a much larger military role in regional conflicts. Such operations can require a significant amount of manpower as well as the logistical capability to rapidly deploy troops and equipment anywhere in the world. Furthermore, the United States must be prepared for both combat missions and peace support operations.⁵

The Clinton administration is also concerned about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and is undertaking a new generation of "counterproliferation" measures including assisting the former Soviet Union in dismantling weapons and developing improved ballistic missile defenses, as well as continuing the more traditional policies of export control, technology security, research, and maintenance of deterrent U.S. nuclear forces. The military determined that these counterproliferation measures required adjustments in the command and control of the nation's strategic nuclear forces. All of the U.S. strategic nuclear weapons are therefore now consolidated under one combatant commander in chief (CINC) at the U.S. Stratcom Command (USSTRATCOM), and the Army and Marine Corps have been divested of their nuclear roles. The creation of USSTRATCOM reduced costs, centralized command and control, and represented a fundamental change in the assignment of roles and missions among the U.S. armed services.⁶

The U.S. military will also continue to have a role in promoting democracy through security assistance (particularly the related international military education and training) and the development of military-to-military contacts.

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⁵"Peace support operations" is an umbrella term developed by John MacKinlay of Brown University to refer to peacekeeping, peace enforcement, support for humanitarian assistance, and any other military operation undertaken in support of peacemaking (where peacemaking refers to the broader diplomatic efforts to achieve peace). U.S. involvement in such activities has costly implications. During peacekeeping, disaster relief, or humanitarian assistance operations, troops' combat skills atrophy. Following such deployments, therefore, troops must be trained back up to combat readiness. Relatedly, some military and political leaders argue that if a peacekeeping operation fails and combat becomes necessary, the peacekeepers in place must be pulled out and replaced by combat-ready troops. This could represent a significant cost in terms of readiness, training, and manpower.

⁶Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States, 1993, pp. II-3 to II-4.
Specific initiatives proposed by the Clinton administration include forging security partnerships with the states of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and helping them demilitarize their economies. Fifty million dollars has been requested to support efforts to institutionalize and expand military-to-military relationships with other states, as part of the effort to spread the political culture of civilian control of the military.7

As profound as any of the above changes in roles and missions, however, is the contemplated involvement of U.S. military forces in “domestic engagement.” Above and beyond the positive economic effects of cutting defense spending and redirecting redundant defense assets to domestic needs, the proactive domestic role being considered for the U.S. military could include such activities as sharing military vocational training with the civilian sector, organizing youth development programs, providing medical services in inner cities and rural areas, and supporting other agencies’ disaster relief efforts. Although still in the conceptual stages, such a domestic role would represent a substantive change of emphasis from the past and would require serious consideration of issues ranging from training to readiness.

Service Competition

Not only are roles and missions changing, but legislators are increasingly becoming involved in defining them. For example, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 requires that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff “periodically recommend such changes [to the Secretary of Defense] in the functions (or roles and missions) as the Chairman considers necessary.”8 More recently, Senator Nunn, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, inserted a provision in the legislation requiring that the reports, which come out every three years, be forwarded to Congress, in response to congressional concern about what legislators view as redundancy among the services.

In the face of these dual pressures to adapt to changing circumstances and simultaneously defend their very existence to Congress, the four U.S. military services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps) are scrambling to justify

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8 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States, 1993, defines roles as the broad and enduring purposes for which the services were established by Congress. Missions are tasks assigned by the President or Secretary of Defense to the combatant CINCs, and functions are specific responsibilities assigned by the President or Secretary of Defense to enable the services to fulfill their legally established roles.
their funding levels and, indeed, their specific roles and missions. Tensions have arisen between the Air Force and the Navy, for example, over jurisdiction for certain air missions, and the Army and Marine Corps have each been striving to prove their superiority in military operations other than war.

The most frequently cited “redundancy” is that in addition to the Air Force, each other service also has an air arm. This is widely perceived as being equivalent to four separate air forces, each with redundant roles, missions, and capabilities. Yet, while General Powell includes many recommendations for consolidation of roles and missions in his 1993 roles and missions report (including suggestions for greater involvement of the services in close air support and consolidated fixed-wing training), he also recognizes that “redundancy can be a good thing” and that the services have many complementary functions. Indeed, General Powell specifically defends the need for “four separate air forces.” 9 Nonetheless, in addition to General Powell’s report, Secretary Aspin has directed that further possibilities for consolidation be examined during the Bottom Up Review. 10

**New Directions**

Decreasing budgets, changing threats, and the development of a range of diverse roles and missions cumulatively translate into new requirements for force structure, technology, doctrine, and training.

Force structure considerations include the mix of heavy and light forces and the balance between active and reserve forces. Although the military has developed a Base Force ideal intended to be highly adaptable and rapidly responsive, the likelihood is that the armed forces will be drawn down further than even the proposed Base Force foresees. If such a small force is to suffice, careful thought must be given to the likelihood of various kinds of contingencies. For example, a conflict requiring an effort on the scale of Operation Desert Storm is likely only in the Middle East, South Asia, or Korea. The United States must therefore ensure that it has the kinds of forces and equipment appropriate to the types of challenges (in terms of terrain and opposing forces, for example) that it may face in those regions. On the other hand, the United States must also prepare for regional contingencies, which usually require more light forces over a longer period of time. A balance must be struck between these two requirements and the drawdown of the total number of forces.

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One way to achieve this is to adjust the mix of active and reserve forces. A recent RAND study assesses the structure and mix of future active and reserve forces. That study concluded that a more integrated and internally cooperative total force must be built, expanding the role of reserve combat service support and combat support units at the outset of military operations, and further developing concepts such as the Air Force’s associate unit idea,\(^{\text{11}}\) which involves close integration of active and reserve units for training, maintenance, and exercises as well as during mobilization. Developing more highly ready and integrated reserve units can compensate to some extent for the smaller total force. If these forces, moreover, represent an appropriate balance between heavy and light forces, the military can remain prepared for a variety of contingencies ranging from regional peace support operations to conventional warfighting on a larger scale.

Technology is also an important force multiplier and is a decisive factor in determining success. Technology relates not only to combat itself, but to intelligence, logistical capabilities, command and control, surveillance, and navigation. Many weapons used by the military are slated for modernization, with funds provided toward that end in the proposed FY94 budget. Specific systems include the M1 tank and an upgrade of the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle, upgrading of the Blackhawk Army helicopter, improvements in the Air Force’s F-16s, modernization of the DDG-51 AEGIS-equipped destroyers, the F-14 fighters, and the C-17 airlift aircraft.\(^{\text{12}}\) The changing threat environment, with regional conflict replacing global conflict as the most likely future scenario, suggests that new and different technologies appropriate for low intensity conflict (LIC) environments and urban warfare should also be developed.

Force structure and technology are the tools, but training and doctrine determine how effectively and successfully they are wielded. The changes in threats, budgets, force structure, and technology are outpacing the adjustments in training and doctrine. Most training and doctrine are still directed toward what Andrew Krepinevich called the “concept”: “an ineradicable fixation of the Army on European-type war—a prodigious consumption of resources to avoid the spillage of American blood, and a strong preference for firepower and

\(^{\text{11}}\) An associate unit is a hybrid that combines active and reserve personnel into a single unit when mobilized. An Air Force Reserve associate unit trains on its affiliated active unit’s equipment; its air crew personnel are commonly mixed with active personnel for peacetime missions; and its maintenance personnel help maintain the equipment.” Bernard D. Rosker et al., Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Final Report to the Secretary of Defense, Executive Summary, RAND, MR-140/2-OSD, 1993, p. 5.

attrition."\textsuperscript{13} Even the newest draft of the Army's standard warfighting manual, FM 100-5, \textit{Operations}, which is being revised to incorporate lessons learned from such operations as Operation Just Cause and Operation Desert Shield/Storm, emphasizes massive coordinated attacks and increased lethality. Yet future training and doctrine will require greater emphasis on operations such as low intensity conflict operations, military operations on urban terrain (MOUT), and military operations other than war (MOOTW) if U.S. military capabilities are to adjust adequately to the shift from global to regional warfare and the increased likelihood of U.S. involvement in peace support operations and other nonwarfighting efforts around the world.

4. U.S. Army Responses

The Army’s Comparative Advantages

Each service, of course, has its own agenda, entrenched bureaucracy, and view of its place in the larger scheme of the Department of Defense. Although the Goldwater-Nichols Act has considerably improved the relationships between the services, especially in the areas of joint doctrine, training, and operations, the heated competition for missions and dollars combined with the congressional involvement in defining roles and missions make it incumbent upon each service to be able to identify where its comparative advantages lie.

The U.S. Army is a strategic force. Its primary mission is to “organize, train, and equip forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land—to achieve and sustain the capability to deter and when necessary to win America’s wars.”¹ Unlike the Navy and Air Force, the Army seizes and holds terrain. It is the primary land force in the U.S. military arsenal. Conflict deterrence is critical to the Army, as is crisis response from the continental United States (CONUS), a forward presence (especially in Korea and Europe), and reconstitution of forces.

The Army is in the process of developing into a “capabilities-based”² rather than a “threat-based”³ organization, a substantial change from the Army’s Cold War focus. To effectively respond to the new strategic challenges and the interservice competition, the Army is stressing key areas: training (to fight as a joint and combined force); versatility (to respond to multiple contingencies across the continuum of military operations); deployability (ability to project combat power); and expansibility (ability to constitute new forces rapidly through the use of reserve components). These should help the Army compete with the other services and ensure it a role in future U.S. military operations.

²Capabilities-based organizations are able to respond across a continuum of military operations. The continuum of military operations is defined in the Posture Statement as encompassing operations during peace, hostilities short of war, and war.
³Threat-based refers to an organization whose force structure, doctrine, equipment, and training are driven by a major identifiable threat.
For example, the Army and the Navy are the two largest services, and each wields significant political clout. Yet the two are relatively distinct entities with clearly differentiated roles. Whereas the Navy’s lift and strategic air capabilities are critical in many warfighting scenarios, the Army has the dominant role in contingencies such as regional warfare and military operations other than war (including peacekeeping and humanitarian relief). Indeed, in From the Sea, the Navy’s post–Cold War strategy paper, the Navy describes its process of adjusting its roles and missions to the requirements of regional and contingency operations. It foresees acting more as an enabling force (like the Marines) in support of land operations while retaining the capability to project massive firepower from the sea if the need arises.\(^4\) Given this divergence of capabilities, the competition between the Army and the Navy is thus more for dollars than for missions.

In contrast, the Marine Corps, which is subordinate to the Department of the Navy, is often viewed by the Army as a direct competitor. The Marines are a “light force,” yet the Army has “light divisions.” Between the two services, there are eight light divisions, each costing nearly $2 billion annually.\(^5\) The Marines also have some heavier forces, including four tank battalions (two of which are much smaller than Army tank battalions), and are contemplating purchasing the Multiple Launch Rocket System (the Army already has 500 of these).\(^6\) Forward deployed Army forces are being reduced, while Marines remain forward deployed. The new naval strategy “power from the sea” characterizes the Marine Corps as an “enabling force” that will be used to secure an initial entry area. This mission has the potential to conflict with that of Army light forces, including, for example, the 82d Airborne Division. Recently, the Marines played a prominent role in Somalia, a possible precedent for future missions in operations short of war.

Ronald O'Rourke, a Congressional Research Service naval analyst, said in an interview for the Government Executive that the Marines and the Army “are in agreement that the Army will retain the very light and very heavy forces, with the Marine Corps somewhere in between. And that's in terms of arrival, combat punch, and sustainability.” While other analysts generally agree that such synergism is possible—and indeed proved effective during Operation Desert Storm—they warn that the Marines must not be stripped of their ability to

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\(^4\) Kitfield, 1993.

\(^5\) Three years ago, the Army had seven light divisions, bringing the total in the armed services to ten.

\(^6\) Kitfield, 1993.

Although there has been some tension over close air support issues, and there is the constant battle for a bigger share of defense dollars, the Army's relationship with the Air Force has always been strong. The two forces interact regularly and are generally mutually supportive. Indeed, the Air Force's greatest competitors are the Navy and the Marines.

**Budget Reductions and the Army**

Even as it strives to prove its flexibility across the operational continuum, the Army is faced with substantial budget and manpower cuts. It is funded for $60.7 billion in FY94. It will reduce its 1991 active force of 703,114 to 540,000 soldiers, and will reduce force structure by deactivating two divisions (bringing the total to 12 active divisions). It has already taken bigger hits than any of the other services.

Continued emphasis on technology will in part compensate for the smaller force. “The Army modernization strategy,” according to General Sullivan, “places priority on five areas of technological superiority where the Army must maintain its technological edge”: The Army must win the information war, deliver precise strikes, project and sustain combat power, protect the force, and dominate maneuver.\footnote{General Gordon R. Sullivan, “On the Fiscal Year 1994 Budget Proposals and the Posture of the United States Army,” statement before the Committee on Armed Services, United States House of Representatives, 1st Session, 103rd Congress, 31 March 1993.} Thus, for the FY94 budget, key weapon modernization efforts will continue.\footnote{RDTE Programs (R-1), Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., 13 April 1993. The booklet outlines the Army research, development, test, and evaluation requests for FY94. According to the Army's budget director, BG Jose Robles, the Army will embark on only a few new procurement programs, called “Silver Bullets.” According to BG Robles, a Silver Bullet is a new system that counters a specific threat, is affordable, and offers a unique capability. The Comanche is considered a Silver Bullet. See Sean D. Naylor, “Operations, Training Shortfalls Spur Worries About Readiness,” *Army Times*, 12 April 1995, p. 8. The current Army procurement strategy can be compared to that just two years ago. See Christopher F. Foss, “U.S. Army: The Next Century,” *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 12 October 1991, pp. 669–675.}

For example, although the M1 tank upgrade to the M1A2 tank has dropped from $162.5 million in 1993 to $94.3 million in 1994, the funding will still cover the upgrading of 72 tanks. The Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle increased from $123 million to $238 million, allowing 131 upgrades to the M2A2 version.

Blackhawk helicopter funding remains the same, enough to purchase 60 new
helicopters. Although funding for an advanced artillery system was significantly reduced, funding for a Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System was increased. The Army's premier new weapon system, the Comanche attack helicopter, continues to be funded, but was reduced from $395.2 million to $367.1 million. Funds for a new tactical truck were severely slashed.\textsuperscript{10} Also important to the Army were cuts made in the Air Force C-130H transport aircraft. The troubled C-17 transport aircraft was funded, but is far behind schedule and could be canceled or significantly scaled back.

Summary

The dilemma facing the U.S. armed forces in general is particularly acute for the Army. The Army must broaden its capabilities, adjust its roles and missions, and compete with the other services, all in the face of significant manpower and budget cuts. It will respond in part with a greater reliance on technology; it will also have to reconsider the use of the reserves and their training and preparation. It will have to work more closely with the other services to ensure that each preserves its comparative advantage as well as its interoperability. It will have to further develop its doctrine and training for military operations other than war and the special requirements of regional contingency operations. These challenges are just beginning to be met, but they will require careful consideration and significant adjustments.\textsuperscript{11}


5. Implications for Combined Efforts and Operations

Cooperation between the American armies could counteract the effects of drawdowns and decreasing defense budgets. Such relatively benign steps as sharing, rather than duplicating, disaster relief equipment and training could help optimize limited resources. Efforts such as the combined counterdrug operations facilitate complementary, rather than contradictory, actions. Other forms of combined training and operations also ensure mutual understanding, maximum efficiency, and interoperability.

Much of this is already done, of course, in U.S. security relationships with Latin American countries. For example, the U.S. military's greatest international military training efforts focus specifically on Latin America. The U.S. Army's School of the Americas (SOA) provides training in Spanish and emphasizes skills and subjects relevant to Latin American countries. No other region receives such specialized U.S. military training. In addition, the United States assists training through the OAS and the U.S. instructors assigned, in joint billets, to the Inter-American Defense College (IADC).

Beyond training, U.S. Army South (USARSO) engages in a variety of activities intended to improve military-to-military relationships and interoperability between the American countries, including the deployment of mobile training teams (MTT), small unit exchanges, and support for counterdrug operations.1 For example, the United States recently exchanged an infantry platoon and a military police platoon with Honduras. There is also a Distinguished Visitor Program in which senior military officers from throughout Latin America visit U.S. Army forces in Panama.2 In addition, combined exercises such as Fuerzas Unidas help ensure mutual understanding and cooperation between nations while also refining combined military operations and capabilities. These exercises and unit exchanges are viewed by the Army as forming "the bonds of friendship that assure the [U.S.] Army a role in promoting democracy in the region."3 Despite all these efforts, however, there is room for more cooperation.

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3Timmons, p. 176.
Loathe to involve itself in other countries’ internal unrest, the United States limits the amounts of aid (of any kind) that it will provide to many Latin American countries facing insurgencies, often resulting in suboptimal cooperation in other efforts such as counterdrug operations. Issues such as the defense of the Panama Canal remain unresolved, and are potentially good opportunities for regional cooperation.

The range of inter-American efforts on the drug problem is a good example of what works and what needs work in the realm of cooperation. The U.S. Army currently provides Planning Assistance and Tactical Assistance Teams (PATs and TATs) to host nation drug enforcement agencies. These teams assist in counterdrug “training, coordination and planning,” including counterdrug intelligence support, geography, and so forth. The United States also supplies equipment, such as the helicopters to Mexico’s Northern Border Response Teams and $65 million worth of military equipment to Colombia in FY90. Combined operations are unusual, though, and even such U.S. support as training is limited by U.S. laws and the need to protect Latin American countries’ sovereignty.

Moreover, both the scope and effectiveness of U.S. involvement are severely restricted by corruption in host nation armed forces and U.S. Congress hostility to support for undemocratic regimes. The disagreement between the United States and Latin American countries about whether the drug problem is caused by the high demands of U.S. consumers or the ineffectiveness of Latin American counterdrug efforts also continues to create tension and inhibit cooperation. Nonetheless, the drug issue remains important to the United States, and dwindling budget resources will force future counterdrug efforts to be more focused and efficient, with greater consolidation of American resources.

Other potential areas for cooperation are opening up in the post Cold War. With a new U.S. emphasis on international peacekeeping and other peace support operations, for example, the U.S. Army could benefit from the expertise of the Canadian Army, which has a long-standing tradition of involvement in peacekeeping operations. Uruguay and Argentina also have Battalion Task Forces that have contributed to UN operations in places as diverse as

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4Timmons, p. 174.
5Brown, pp. 52, 58.
6See Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “The Battle in ‘Cocaine Valley’,” Washington Post, 25 November 1992, p. 17. Evans and Novak point out that the “drug cartels have corrupted substantial elements of Peru’s armed forces.” They also discuss the collapsed talks between former President Bush and Mr. Fujimori over attempts to get coca farmers to grow other crops.
Mozambique, Croatia, and Cambodia, and other Latin American armies have demonstrated peacekeeping abilities. American armies could also increase their level of cooperation on equipment procurement for disaster relief. The issue of weapons proliferation could be addressed at a regional level. More optimistically, the region could strengthen or reconfigure existing cooperative security organizations. Before any of these efforts is undertaken, however, the countries of the region will need to redefine their political and military relationships so that imaginative and resourceful means of cooperation can be jointly developed without being constrained by residual fears of imperialism.
Appendix

The Canadian and Latin American Armies

Canada

In response to the end of the Cold War and increasing budget pressures, the Canadian Army is undergoing significant changes. Canadian forces are transitioning to a "Total Force" concept in which "two mutually supporting and complementary components (Regular and Reserve) . . . provide one integral operational army," a concept very similar to U.S. Total Force planning.\(^1\) As the U.S. Army presence in Europe continues to decline, Canada is also disbanding its units there. Canada's focus mirrors that of the United States in its shift to contingency operations and domestic tasks.\(^2\) Additionally, the Canadian Army has to balance this new focus with significant budget reduction. The February 1992 Canadian Federal Budget, for example, eliminated the Stationed Task Force in Europe, canceled the multi-role combat vehicle (delayed replacing tank and armored personnel carrier [APC] fleets), and basically maintained the reserve force end-strength (at 30,000) but reduced growth rate.\(^3\) Finally, just as in the U.S. Army, there is an increased emphasis on tough, realistic training and the use of Combat Training Centers (called "battle schools").\(^4\)

Differences include a greater emphasis on peacekeeping involvement, a greater mix of militia and regular soldiers in units than in the United States, decentralized regional commands (as opposed to the U.S. emphasis on centralization), and a distinction between "operational effectiveness" and "combat readiness": a distinction that U.S. officers would find difficult to agree with.\(^5\)

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\(^3\) Gervais, 1992, p. 2.

\(^4\) Gervais, 1991, p. 11.

\(^5\) Gervais, 1991, pp. 8, 11. Lieutenant-General Gervais states that the "implementation of the total force concept will ultimately improve operational effectiveness . . . At the same time, and somewhat ironically, it will reduce combat readiness because of the reduced scope of training response times of the Reserve."
Latin America

Over the coming decade, economic development, strategic trade, drug trafficking, and domestic political instability will dominate the landscape of Latin America. These trends signify conflicting demands on Latin American armies. On the one hand, limited resources, skewed income distribution, and the need for economic development constrain the potential for military expansion. Also, the collapse of Cold War tensions has eased regional tensions, further undermining the rationale for large military expenditures. At the same time, drug trafficking and continued guerrilla insurgencies have led to expanded military missions throughout Latin America. Consequently, strategies, tactics, and capabilities must evolve to meet these challenges. The subsections below outline the influence these broad trends will have on Latin American military forces.

Cold War Tensions

The collapse of the Soviet empire and resolution of the conflict in Nicaragua have eased tensions throughout Latin America. Russia no longer possesses the ideology or the resources to support insurgencies. Similarly, Cuba’s ability to support radical groups is extremely limited. The collapse of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua has impaired their ability to funnel arms to fellow revolutionaries. As a result, radical organizations throughout the region have lost their access to weapons and money. For example, foreign support for the FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front) in El Salvador has evaporated, paving the way for resolution of El Salvador’s civil conflict. A minor “reverse domino” effect is being felt throughout Latin America. As the conflict in El Salvador subsided, Honduran fears about the size of El Salvadoran forces have eased, resulting in promise of military reductions. Guatemala may react similarly, although at this point there are few indications that Guatemala is ready to scale back its military forces.

International organizations emerged as potentially important forces in the 1980s. The Arias plan (August 1987) led to invitations to the OAS and the UN to assist with negotiated solutions to the region’s civil wars. This marks an evolution of

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OAS activities, since the organization's original purpose was to prevent wars between members through collective security. Still, further opportunities for expanding these organizations' influence exist. For example, the Santiago Commitment to Democracy, approved by OAS in June 1991, has few operational goals. Establishment of explicit operational goals marks one potential area of cooperation. Additionally, aside from OAS's Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, no groups exist to monitor democratization. Strengthening of democratization organizations marks another area for deepening cooperation. More generally, issues such as elections, transfer of power, civilian authority over military forces, and continuation of democratic process provide opportunities for hemispheric cooperation.

**Economic Development and Trade**

By 1993, almost all Latin American nations embraced policies to tame inflation, reduce public spending, privatize markets, and promote exports. In many cases, this translated into reduced military spending, a development that has created some resentment among the military.

Trade, particularly with the United States, looms large on the economic horizon. In many Latin American nations, the armed forces provide protection for both domestic and international commerce. In general, protecting commerce will become more important, perhaps increasing the potential for revival of border disputes and territorial claims where valuable resources are at stake. Nevertheless, the lack of identifiable external threats will increase pressure for military reductions. Already, prominent international affairs officials, such as Robert McNamara, are recommending reductions in arms purchases for developing countries.\(^{10}\) Conditioning loan approval on such reductions has been mentioned. The region's military leaders might oppose this thinking, but the pressure will be hard to resist. If such reductions come to pass, collective security would likely become more important.\(^{11}\)

Finally, the need to provide defense for the Panama Canal after the year 2000 bears watching. Much of the region's commerce flows through the canal, and the nations engaging in international trade will have a strong interest in protecting the flow of goods. Panama will be unable to provide sufficient defense, and leaving the task to the United States might prove politically difficult. Thus,


\(^{11}\)Pastor, 1992.
defense of the Canal might provide an opportunity to solidify military cooperation on a regional goal.

**Domestic Instability**

Two sources of domestic instability, drug trafficking and insurgencies, will continue to plague many Latin America nations. These problems place intense demands on military forces. Counternarcotics and counterinsurgency operations, for example, require both urban and rural operations capability, vast amounts of intelligence and reconnaissance, and efforts to combat corruption. While there has been tremendous progress in these areas over the past decade, the Latin American armies' ability to face these challenges is far from complete.

The need to address drug trafficking and domestic strife places increasing demands on security assistance from the United States. Yet, while the assistance may be necessary, it also has the ability to exacerbate domestic problems because of the weak control many civilian regimes have over their military forces. Providing arms and training is rarely an apolitical act, and transferring nations, such as the United States, often have little control over the political consequences of security assistance. Thus, efforts to control end use and to ensure protection of human rights will remain paramount.

**Argentina**

Argentina is undergoing a period of declining defense spending and downsizing of military forces (see Table A.1), exemplified by the cancellation of the Condor II ballistic missile program. These reductions are dictated by both fiscal constraints and the expense of replacing the equipment losses Argentina suffered in the Falklands War with Great Britain. For example, an estimated 30 to 40 percent of Argentina's land-based naval aircraft are out of service because of parts shortages. Resolution of the Falklands War has left Argentina facing few external threats. External security matters currently are marked by border disputes with Chile and competition with Brazil for hemispheric influence.

Argentina does confront potentially serious internal security issues. From the right, restive military officers advocate the reestablishment of military dictatorship, while from the left the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), thought to have been eliminated in the 1970s, has reemerged. In the recent past, chronic

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inflation, high unemployment, cutbacks in social services, and fiscal austerity have sparked public protests against the government.

Argentina has a strong capacity to arm itself, and thus is not extensively reliant on imports. Fiscal austerity has led to pressure to reduce subsidies to arms manufacturers, and future production capability may be affected by these fiscal constraints. Argentina has the capacity to produce nuclear weapons, but recently joined with Brazil in accepting international inspection. Argentina has yet to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

### Table A.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Argentinean Armed Forces</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1987</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>55,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Navy(^a)</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** *The Military Balance.*

\(^a\)Including 5000 Marines in 1987 and 3000 in 1991.

**Bolivia**

Aside from drug trafficking, Bolivia faces few domestic or foreign threats.\(^{13}\) Nevertheless, the drug trafficking’s impact on Bolivia is immense, and the armed forces will continue to struggle with the problem. The past decade has witnessed increased military involvement in counternarcotics campaigns.\(^{14}\) Air Force pilots fly counternarcotics officers on their missions. Since 1988, the Bolivian Navy has been tasked with patrolling rivers in coca and cocaine producing regions. The Army’s involvement in General Meza’s 1980 “drug coup” resulted in the Army confining its involvement to manning border posts until recently. In 1991, the United States began to instruct Army forces in counternarcotics operations.

In general, the Bolivian military lacks the resources to address counternarcotics missions. Transportation and logistics remain problematic, even after substantial U.S. efforts to augment Bolivian capabilities.\(^{15}\) Authority for drug operations has been divided among numerous organizations, including civil police institutions. As a result, tensions between the various organizations charged with narcotics

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\(^{14}\) *International Narcotics Strategy Report*, various years.

missions remain high. Corruption is a sensitive issue. While Bolivian military personnel are relatively well paid compared with wages in the private sector, their compensation does not approach that offered by the drug industry. As a result, military assignments to counternarcotics missions are viewed by some as a chance to make the fortune of a lifetime. The Bolivian military's efforts against narcotics trafficking are likely to grow over the next few years, if only because the level of violence associated with the traffic in Bolivia is still increasing. See Table A.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1987</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Brazil**

Low wages and an austere military budget remain key concerns for the Brazilian armed forces.\(^{16}\) The military ministers, concerned about the growing tension caused by low salaries, have lobbied for wage increases.\(^{17}\) Economic conditions, including privatization reform, have led to large cutbacks in subsidies for domestic military production. Brazil also lost an important arms export market in 1990 when the United Nations imposed an embargo on the sale of military equipment to Iraq.

Despite budget constraints and cutbacks, civil-military relations remain stable in Brazil. Brazilian security concerns are oriented around continental matters, including borders with Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, and the Amazon region. Good relations with Argentina and a series of bilateral and multilateral arms agreements in 1991 enhance regional political stability.

Like Argentina, Brazil has the capacity to produce nuclear weapons. In November 1990, Brazil joined an accord renouncing the manufacture of nuclear weapons and in December 1991 signed a treaty to open nuclear plants to inspection. Brazil has been the target of tighter U.S. regulations regarding missile

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\(^{16}\) *The Military Balance.*

\(^{17}\) *Periscope/USNI Military Database, October 1992.*
technology because of its role as an arms producer and an exporter to nations such as Iran.\textsuperscript{18}

The Brazilian military has traditionally played a role in internal, as well as external, security.\textsuperscript{19} Thus, domestic confrontations can become military matters through a request from the National Security Council.

Drug trafficking in rural regions is of growing importance, although its effects on security institutions such as the military are not yet clear. See Table A.3.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Brazilian Armed Forces}
\begin{tabular}{lcc}
\hline
 & 1991 & 1987 \\
\hline
Army & 196,000 & 223,000 \\
Navy\textsuperscript{a} & 65,000 & 65,300 \\
Air Force & 50,700 & 50,700 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{a}Including 15,000 Marines in both 1987 and 1991.}
\end{table}

\textbf{Chile}

Chile has been undertaking extensive economic reforms at the national level for over two decades. Economic reform combined with the military dictatorship of the 1970s and 1980s have left the nation facing primarily domestic problems. Chile’s primary task at this point is to consolidate the political gains made when voters rejected the extension of Pinochet’s military rule in 1988, and the subsequent transition to civilian authority in 1990. Military subordination to civilian control, which evaporated with the coup in 1973, has tentatively been reestablished. Continued pressure to reduce public sector expenditures will likely cause more friction between the military and civilian authorities over the next several years. However, Chile’s status as an arms exporter has generated some revenue, which is funneled to the military budget. The military budget is further protected because the constitution does not allow civilian authorities to cut the budget and because 10 percent of Chile’s copper revenues (up to $400 million) are earmarked for the military’s use.\textsuperscript{20} Relations with the United States have typically been strained in comparison to U.S. relations with other Latin

\textsuperscript{18}Periscope/USNI Military Database, October 1992.
\textsuperscript{19}Periscope/USNI Military Database, October 1992.
\textsuperscript{20}Periscope/USNI Military Database, October 1992.
American nations, especially since U.S. participation in the overthrow of Allende in 1973.21

Bolivia's aspirations for direct access to the Pacific, as well as Peruvian and Argentinian territorial claims and desires, require that Chile maintain capable ground forces. Chilean naval concerns are limited primarily to protecting Chile's long coastline and island dependencies. See Table A.4.

Table A.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chilean Armed Forces</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
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<tr>
<td>Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>54,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>57,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Navy(^a)</td>
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<tr>
<td>29,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>34,200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>12,800</td>
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<tr>
<td>15,000</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


\(^a\)Including 5200 Marines in 1987 and 4000 in 1991.

**Colombia**

Drug trafficking, guerrilla insurgency, and right-wing death squads continue to pose substantial problems for Colombia and the Colombian military.\(^{22}\) Increasingly, these problems are interrelated, resulting in increased demands on military resources. Despite these demands, and the consequent prominent role the military plays in Colombia, civilian authorities maintain good command over military forces.

Drug trafficking remains a prominent concern in Colombia despite the recent death of Medellin Cartel chief Pablo Escobar.\(^{23}\) Colombian military forces have been called against processing labs, growing sites, and trafficking personnel. In exchange for its commitment against drugs, Colombia has received millions of dollars of U.S. assistance. This assistance has been used to upgrade equipment, provide training, and fund counternarcotics programs. Particular attention has been given to improving intelligence and communications capabilities.

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Efforts to control Colombia’s drug trade spill over efforts to control Colombia’s guerrilla movements. Colombia’s armed forces remain active against Colombian guerrilla forces. The United States is hesitant to directly support Colombia’s counterinsurgency programs, although in practice it has proven impossible to ensure that counternarcotics assistance is not used against guerrillas. In an effort to ensure that human rights are not abused, the U.S. military has implemented end-use monitoring programs.

Despite U.S. and Colombian efforts, there are increasing concerns about military complicity in human rights abuses. Right-wing death squads operate in rural regions, “cleansing” the countryside of undesirable influences. Military officials are accused of indirectly supporting these activities by ignoring them, and, much more rarely, of directly supporting death squad operations. As a result, Colombian officials have taken steps to improve the military’s judicial processes.

In addition to the guerrilla and counternarcotics duties described, Colombian military forces have been mobilized in response to two other events in recent years. In 1987, a naval border dispute with Venezuela prompted a military alert, and, more generally, has led to a concentration of military resources in the Gulf of Venezuela.24 Second, civil unrest during the 1990 presidential election cycle resulted in the use of army troops for riot control. See Table A.5.

**Table A.5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colombian Armed Forces</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1987</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>111,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** *The Military Balance.*

<sup>a</sup>Including 6000 Marines in 1987 and 6000 in 1991.

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**Dominican Republic**

Dominican security concerns are dominated by the consequences of the political upheaval in neighboring Haiti. While it is unlikely that the Dominican Republic will face the type of political unrest experienced in Haiti, the Republic’s proximity to Haiti causes it to absorb the consequences of Haitian unrest. The most serious consequences include increased flows of refugees and the impact of

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violence on public and investor confidence. Although the Dominican Republic’s
government has remained under civilian control since 1966, the country’s history
of domestic unrest and the military’s history of interference with the civilian
leadership have combined to make the government wary of Haitian
developments. Consequently, Dominican Army forces are concentrated on the
border with Haiti.

The Dominican Republic also serves as an important transshipment point for the
cocaine trade. In particular, the Dominican Republic is home to numerous
abandoned airstrips that serve as ideal refueling sites. Generally, the Dominican
government has provided ample cooperation with the United States against
narcotics trafficking. Despite the cooperation, however, Dominican forces
remain inadequate to the counternarcotics task not only because the United
States provides the Republic with little direct assistance, but because the nation
remains overwhelmed with other economic and social concerns.

Other than its concerns about its neighbor Haiti and its developing role in the
drug trade, the Dominican Republic has few external concerns. In one of the few
potential roles for the Dominican military in recent years, the leadership offered
to assist the government of Trinidad and Tobago in 1990 when Moslem
insurrectionists attempted a coup. Dominican forces were alerted but not
deployed. See Table A.6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dominant Armed Forces</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1987</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>3,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Ecuador

Ecuador continues to have a territorial dispute with Peru, although at the
present time it appears unlikely to spill over into armed conflict. Economic
matters are a high priority, as are defending fishing rights and boundaries.

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26 International Narcotics Strategy Report, various years.
Ecuador has resorted to seizing foreign fishing boats in the past, and likely will continue to do so in an effort to defend its economic interests. In addition, Ecuador finds it necessary to guard its southern and northern borders against Peruvian and Colombian guerrillas who make occasional attempts to establish safe zones inside Ecuador’s borders.

Low oil prices and the big earthquake in late 1980s led to curtailed military expenditures in 1986–1987.29 Despite enduring military rule from 1972–1979, Ecuador faces no serious threats to internal order. The country is experiencing increasing involvement in drug trafficking.30 The military’s ability to address this problem lags behind that of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru partly because the drug traffic has been slow to move into Ecuador. See Table A.7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1987</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navya</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**El Salvador**

Until recently, El Salvador faced the ongoing problems of civil war.31 The guerrilla group FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front) came to the table after the collapse of the USSR, the waning of Cuban support, and dissolution of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. A peace accord signed on February 3, 1992, ended the civil war.32

Armed forces increased dramatically in number between 1980 and 1985. The terms of the peace accord were concerned largely with reducing the size of the army, and in particular the elimination of the fanatical BIRL or Immediate Reaction Battalions. Planned cuts will reduce armed forces to around 20,000.

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29 *The Military Balance* (various years); English, 1984.
32 Klepak, 1992.
The military had no history of obedience to civil authority, and there is concern
the civilian government cannot hold military loyalty in the face of cuts. In rural
areas hard hit by rebel insurrection, military forces often act as a surrogate
government.33

El Salvadoran military forces have frequently had to defend against Nicaraguan
Sandinista incursions into El Salvador in search of Nicaraguan contras.
Similarly, El Salvadoran forces have been employed in an effort to halt the flow
of arms from Nicaragua to El Salvadoran rebels.

The United States provided extensive support for the armed forces. U.S. military
assistance was conditioned on maintaining respect for human rights, civilian
control over the military, and political and economic reform. The Kissinger
Commission was instrumental in securing aid that allowed expansion of armed
forces to a number sufficient enough to defeat rebels. By the late 1980s, the
military demonstrated a strong improvement in human rights compared with the
early 1980s.

U.S. assistance was instrumental in modernizing El Salvadoran Army tactics.
The Army initially used conventional warfare tactics against the insurgents. U.S.
assistance helped transform the Army into an institution capable of fighting the
guerrillas through the use of small mobile units, night patrols, and military
sweeps followed by civic action. A substantial portion of U.S. military assistance
is devoted to military reform.34 See Table A.8.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>El Salvadoran Armed Forces</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1987</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>1,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>2,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Guatemala

Guatemala faces the region’s oldest insurgency (the Guatemalan Revolutionary
National Union). Armed forces grew substantially between 1980 and 1989 (see
Table A.9). As a result of the inability to control the insurgency, Guatemala is not

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downsizing the military.\textsuperscript{35} There are frequent conflicts between the military and guerrillas, leading to thousands of deaths and numerous human rights abuses. Within Central America, Guatemala maintains the largest military in terms of personnel.

Guatemala also faces a series of complicated external issues that the military might eventually be called in to address. Relations with Nicaragua are tense because of the Nicaraguan left's support for Guatemalan rebels. To the east, Guatemala regards Belize, an independent nation, as a Guatemalan dependency.\textsuperscript{36} To the south, Guatemala does not regard its border with El Salvador as settled.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Guatemalan Armed Forces}
\begin{tabular}{lcc}
 & 1991 & 1987 \\
\hline
Army & 42,000 & 40,000 \\
Navy\textsuperscript{a} & 1,200 & 1,200 \\
Air Force & 1,400 & 1,000 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\textsuperscript{a}Including 700 Marines in 1987 and 700 in 1991.
\textsuperscript{source: The Military Balance.}
\end{table}

Honduras

Honduran armed forces increased substantially between 1980 and 1985,\textsuperscript{37} primarily in response to unrest in countries around Honduras and the potential threat posed by El Salvador's military. See Table A.10. U.S. pressure to reduce force size and democratize has caused friction.\textsuperscript{38} The Honduran Army, however, still exerts tremendous influence over the civilian government.

One small rebel group, reputedly supported by Nicaraguan leftists, operates in Honduras.\textsuperscript{39} The group is not thought to pose a threat to the government.

\textsuperscript{36}Periscope/USNI Military Database, October 1992.
\textsuperscript{37}The Military Balance, various years; English, 1984.
\textsuperscript{39}Periscope/USNI Military Database, October 1992.
Honduras has similarly increased tensions with Nicaragua by allowing Nicaraguan contras to use Honduran soil as staging grounds in recent years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1987</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>16,800</td>
<td>15,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy(^a)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>2,100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** *The Military Balance.*
\(^a\)Including 600 Marines in 1987 and 400 in 1991.

**Paraguay**

Paraguay enjoyed unprecedented internal security under former strongman President Stroessner largely because of the government’s willingness to use force.\(^{40}\) Stroessner resigned in February 1989, several hours after a coup attempt. The military has traditionally been the most powerful institution in the country, and always a political force. See Table A.11. Little distinction between political and military affairs exists in Paraguay, leading to instability and disagreements within the military that have posed threats to domestic tranquility. Currently, Paraguay faces few external threats, although the potential internal unrest remains.

Security issues are oriented around trade. Because Paraguay is landlocked, the country is heavily reliant on foreign ports for trade. For most of the period after World War II, Argentina provided most of Paraguay’s sea access. Stroessner cultivated good relations with Brazil, securing port access there as well.

Reports indicate that some of Stroessner’s cabinet members were involved in narcotics trafficking,\(^{41}\) and there is evidence of military complicity in trafficking as well. Although U.S. authorities are concerned about the spread of the drug trade to Paraguay, direct cooperation between the nations over the issue remains limited at this point. Nevertheless, Paraguayan Army border activities are increasingly devoted to counternarcotics efforts.


\(^{41}\) *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*, various years.
Table A.11
Paraguayan Armed Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1987</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>12,500</td>
<td>12,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy(^a)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)Including 500 Marines in 1987 and 1991.

Peru

Peru faces immense challenges to its security from the guerrilla group the Shining Path and the cocaine trade. Even the recent capture of Abimael Guzman, leader of the Shining Path (or Sendero Luminoso), has not eliminated the terrorist threat. Logistics of the battle have changed over time. Formerly a rural campaign of terror, the battle now extends to urban areas. Peruvian forces remain ill-equipped to combat the guerrilla organization. Military preparedness is further limited by the expense and difficulty of training troops to operate in the diverse terrain, including the jungles, mountains, and deserts, found in Peru. See Table A.12.

Counterdrug operations are hampered by the dangerous conditions in the countryside as well as by poor coordination and communication between Peruvian police and military forces. The United States remains reluctant to contribute military aid to Peru out of fear it would mean entanglement in the domestic guerrilla problem.

Table A.12
Peruvian Armed Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1987</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy(^a)</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)Including 2500 Marines in 1987 and 3000 in 1991.
Uruguay

In 1971, Uruguayan armed forces were put in charge of defeating the Tupamaros, a militant guerrilla labor organization. Since the defeat of the Tupamaros six months later, Uruguay has faced no organized guerrilla problem.\textsuperscript{42} The military’s defeat of the guerrillas, however, opened the way for greater military involvement in politics, and Uruguay endured a repressive military dictatorship from 1973 to 1985. Full democracy was not restored until 1990. A referendum calling for ratification of dictatorship was defeated in 1980, paving the way for eventual transfer of authority to civilians.

Currently, Uruguay faces no external threats. In geostrategic terms, Uruguay is a buffer state between the continent’s powers, Brazil and Argentina. This position does not place large demands on the military. As a result, the armed forces accepted a 20 percent reduction in forces in the late 1980s in acknowledgment of the low threat.\textsuperscript{43} See Table A.13.

Because Uruguay maintains no domestic arms production capability, all of its equipment needs must be met by foreign suppliers. The United States is one of Uruguay’s primary sources of arms. Inflation and a weak economy precluded substantial military imports after 1986.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|}
\hline
 & 1991 & 1987 \\
\hline
Army & 17,200 & 17,200 \\
Navy & 4,500 & 4,500 \\
Air Force & 3,000 & 3,000 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Uruguayan Armed Forces}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{42}The Military Balance, various years.

Venezuela

The 1990s have proven to be a turbulent decade in Venezuela.\textsuperscript{44} The country has endured numerous domestic disturbances among the civilian population over price increases and other economic matters. Additionally, in February 1992 and
again in November, dissident military forces attempted a coup. Although the majority of military forces remained loyal to the president, the coup attempts highlighted the weaknesses of political institutions against widespread unrest.

Defense budgets typically remain beyond public scrutiny, so it is difficult to determine with any certainty what is happening to the defense posture.\footnote{The Military Balance, various years.} Certainly, the economic climate has increased calls for fiscal austerity. The distressed economic climate, combined with the fact that Venezuela lacks a viable arms industry and is forced to import its military equipment, could complicate procurement and modernization. However, given that the armed forces are charged with various aspects of domestic security, such as protecting basic industries and controlling national highways, and given the climate of domestic distress, the military will likely maintain a prominent role in Venezuelan society. See Table A.14.

Venezuelan armed forces will also continue efforts to maintain stability in the Caribbean Basin, Venezuela's traditional sphere of influence, for the foreseeable future. Venezuela's role as a leading oil exporter, the need to protect the industry, and the country's history of using energy revenues to augment military capacity provide some stability in the face of an uncertain military need. Since a confrontation over naval territory in 1987, both Colombia and Venezuela have engaged in an arms buildup in the Gulf of Venezuela region.\footnote{Periscope/USNI Military Database, January 1992.}

Finally, the 1990s have witnessed a tremendous expansion in drug trafficking and processing in Venezuela.\footnote{International Narcotics Strategy Report.} If Venezuela chooses to address this problem, it will likely increase demands on military forces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Venezuelan Armed Forces</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1987</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>34,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy*</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>6,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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