USFK Strategy-to-Task Resource Management

A Framework for Resource Decisionmaking

The research described in this report was sponsored by the Commander, United States Forces Korea. The research was conducted in RAND's National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center supported by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the defense agencies, Contract No. MDA903-90-C-0004.


© Copyright 1996 RAND

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND.

RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve public policy through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of its research sponsors.

Published 1996 by RAND
1700 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
RAND URL: http://www.rand.org/
To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Internet: order@rand.org
USFK Strategy-to-Task Resource Management

A Framework for Resource Decisionmaking


Prepared for the Commander, U.S. Forces Korea

National Defense Research Institute

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
PREFACE

This report documents Phase 1 of a RAND project to provide an analytic capability to assist USFK (United States Forces, Korea) in its Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) deliberations and decisions. The goal of the study was to focus on broad strategic issues facing the command, yet to be sufficiently detailed to address specific resource allocation and program decisions. Phase 1 required the development of an analytic framework for dealing with resource issues and the identification of key USFK military and nonmilitary activities that affect USFK’s resource planning and programming. The process is described in this report. Subsequent phases will develop alternative strategies for the utilization of the USFK’s resources. Eventually, the analytic tools and methodologies will be instituted in the command.

This work was performed within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of RAND’s National Defense Research Institute (NDRI), a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the defense agencies. Comments should be directed to the authors or to Dr. Gregory Treverton, director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center.

This research was conducted in 1992 and 1993. It was an important link in the evolution of a new approach to resource allocation decision support. The objectives and strategies reflect national security objectives of the Bush administration and the geopolitical environment vis-à-vis North Korea in 1992–1993.

The report should be of interest to policymakers and students concerned with the development and application of a discipline for defense resource decisionmaking—particularly a framework for strategy-to-tasks resource management.
CONTENTS

Preface ............................................................... iii
Figures ............................................................. vii
Tables ................................................................ ix
Summary ................................................................ xi
Acknowledgments ...................................................... xxi
Glossary ................................................................ xxiii

1. RESEARCH APPROACH ........................................... 1
   Background ........................................................ 1
   Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) .......... 3
      The Critical Elements of the PPBS .......................... 4
      Planning Phase ................................................ 5
      Programming Phase ......................................... 6
      Budget Phase ................................................ 7
      CINC Involvement in the Process ......................... 7
   PPBS and the CINCS ........................................... 8
   The Problem ...................................................... 12
   First Steps to a Solution ....................................... 14
      Generic Framework ......................................... 14
      Develop Alternative Viewpoints ......................... 15

2. STRATEGY-TO-TASKS RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (STRM) FOR USFK .... 17
   National Security Objectives .................................. 19
   National Military Objectives .................................. 21
   Regional Security Objectives ................................ 23
   Theater Operational Objectives ............................. 25
   Operational Tasks .............................................. 29
   Force Elements to Accomplish Tasks ..................... 33
   Capabilities ...................................................... 36
   Issue Paper ...................................................... 39

3. USFK RESOURCE MANAGEMENT DATABASE .............................. 42
   USFK STRM Workbook ........................................ 42
   Maintaining the STRM Database ......................... 46
      Are Relevant Programs Included? ....................... 46
      Are Links in Place? ........................................ 49
      Have Experts Reviewed Assessments? ................... 51
      What About Configuration Control? ..................... 52
   Using the STRM Database for PTRS Support ............ 53

4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ......................... 56
   Common Reference Point ...................................... 57
   Regional Plan ................................................... 58
Appendix
A. STRM WORKBOOK CONCEPTS ........................................ 61
B. USFK STRM WORKBOOK CONTENTS .............................. 65
C. SAMPLE RESOURCE WORKSHEET ................................. 80
Bibliography ................................................................. 85
FIGURES

S.1. Strategy-to-Tasks Framework for Korea ........................................ xii
S.2. Theater Operational Objectives and Subobjectives for USFK ................ xiv
S.3. Operational Task Breakdown for Combined Forward Defense ................. xv
S.4. Structure of USFK Resource Issue Paper .................................. xvi
S.5. Spreadsheet View of USFK Theater Operational Objectives (1993) ........ xvii
1.1. Resource Decision Process As Shaped by the PPBS ........................... 5
1.2. Functional Alignment Prior to 1986 ........................................... 10
1.3. Functional Alignment Today .................................................. 11
1.4. Generic Strategy-to-Tasks Framework ................................... 14
2.1. Strategy-to-Tasks Framework for Korea ................................... 18
2.2. National Military Objectives ................................................. 22
2.3. A Two-Level Perspective of Capabilities and Requirements ............. 23
2.4. A Three-Level Objectives and Assessments Tree .......................... 25
2.5. Theater Operational Objectives and Subobjectives for USFK (1993) ... 28
2.6. Objectives Hierarchy Tree for USFK ..................................... 30
2.7. Operational Concept for Accomplishing a Stated Military Operational Task 31
2.8. Sequencing of Operational Tasks for Combined Forward Defense ........ 33
2.9. Operational Task Breakdown for Combined Forward Defense (1993) .... 34
2.10. Structure of USFK Resource Issue Paper ................................. 40
3.1. USFK Viewpoint Workbook .................................................. 43
3.2. Spreadsheet View of USFK Theater Operational Objectives (1993) .... 44
3.3. Spreadsheet View of USFK Tasks for Combined Forward Defense .......... 45
3.4. Force Element Database (C-17 Program) ................................ 47
3.5. Data Form (C-17 Example) .................................................. 48
3.6. Operational Tasks Database (Search Criteria) ............................ 49
3.7. Operational Tasks Database (C-17 Links) .................................. 50
3.8. Extracted Force Elements Supporting Deployment of Forces ............. 51
3.9. Sample Issue Paper Worksheet ............................................. 54
4.1. Notional Concept of a Regional Plan ...................................... 59
A.1. Sample Spreadsheet Extract ............................................... 61
A.2. Workbook Index ............................................................ 62
A.3. Partial STRM Hierarchy Tree .............................................. 63
A.4. Theater Operational Objectives Worksheet ............................... 64
2.1. Selected Programs Reviewed by COMUSFK .......................... 35
SUMMARY

The Goldwater-Nichols legislation of 1986 placed new emphasis on the role of Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) in defense planning, particularly in the integration of their requirements into the resource allocation process. This report describes the application of a discipline called strategy-to-tasks resource management (STRM) to the command responsible for planning and, if necessary, defending the Republic of Korea in a coalition environment. The STRM framework develops a formal linkage from national objectives through intermediate objectives and operational tasks to force elements or programs. This analysis identifies the five steps that need to be taken by the USFK staff to implement the STRM methodology. It also concludes that the techniques are not a panacea but that they can provide a common reference point for internal and external discussions of resource issues.

The objective of STRM in its application to USFK is to provide the commander with a basis for evaluating alternative programs that potentially could meet the command’s warfighting needs and then for establishing and justifying the command’s resource priorities within the context of the national security strategy. The CINC’s plans establish requirements for military forces and provide a basis for evaluating alternative ways to achieve operational objectives. They also provide structure to the demand side of the defense planning process.

Although the strategy-to-tasks methodology has been applied to the Air Force and USSOCOM (U.S. Special Operations Command), it was not developed for application to a warfighting CINC, the demander of resources. This fact necessitated some new and innovative applications of the concept. First, a framework for linkages between objectives and programs was developed. The framework consists of six levels ranging from broad national goals\(^1\) down to programs or groups of programs that are at issue in PPBS deliberations. The basic hierarchy is shown in Figure S.1. Next, an initial set of elements was developed for each level in the hierarchy, which provided the basis for an initial set of links between elements on different levels.

We then described how the framework might be used to support resource management by the staff. And finally, we assessed how the framework could help the CINC explain to USCINCPAC (Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command) and OSD (office of the Secretary of Defense) why his requirements were necessary for the defense of Korea or for the

\(^1\)Specific documents such as the National Security Strategy of the United States provide insights on the President’s interpretation of enduring national imperatives.
Figure S.1—Strategy-to-Tasks Framework for Korea

achievement of broader U.S. objectives in the region. Timing must also be considered. When CINCs are actually commanding, focus tends to be on the two- to three-year horizon. Their advice to the CJCS (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff) on the potential need for new capabilities is essential; however, a warfighting staff cannot be overly focused on PPBS-type issues. Rather, operational commands need a way to systematically address these issues so that they can participate in the resource debate without diminishing their essential role as warfighters.

The middle of the hierarchy provides a good starting point. Theater operational objectives are the most important level for building a CINC's STRM framework. Building
these objectives requires an understanding of national priorities, but it matches this understanding with operational realities and specific threats that involve more than just defensive operations. Theater operational objectives also include deterrence, alternative concepts for defense, and political and economic objectives. Figure S.2 shows the initial set of theater operational objectives and subobjectives for the Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea (COMUSFK). The diagram provides a concise roadmap for explaining what the command is trying to accomplish and illustrates the source of conflicting pressures. For example, implementing congressionally mandated Nunn-Warner initiatives may conflict with maintaining the strongest possible deterrence posture or having the best mix of U.S. forces for fighting a war should it occur. The figure shows a hierarchy of objectives and supporting subobjectives. It also shows the application of an assessment process whereby each objective is assigned a status of Adequate, Questionable, or Inadequate based on a concept of operations for achieving the objective and an assumed time-period and set of resource decisions. This intertemporal dimension of STRM analysis is particularly important and has never been attempted before. Intertemporal considerations are key to thinking through a command’s resource needs, because investments made now generally lead to future capabilities. Assessments of expected performance must make clear what time frame is being addressed.

Moving down the hierarchy, operational tasks are specific actions that must be performed to accomplish an operational objective. Defining them requires the development of a concept of operations. For COMUSFK, the principal task is preparation for defense of the peninsula against attack by North Korea, but it must be performed with an awareness of other objectives. Figure S.3 shows the breakdown of tasks and subtasks required for a conventional combined defense of Korea. The STRM methodology helps the command link force elements with the tasks and subtasks that they support. When a new planning force is established, the USFK staff can examine the resources provided (and subsequently allocated to the theater) and assess their adequacy for accomplishing tasks. The initial assessment of overall adequacy is Adequate for today’s forces because we believe the initial thrust can be stopped by ROK (Republic of Korea) ground forces supported with U.S. firepower. Nevertheless, the detailed breakdown shows that problems are expected in our ability to counter weapons of mass destruction (primarily carried by Scuds), to control the rear area threat from North Korean SOF (Special Operations Forces), and to sustain the augmentation flow as stocks are used up.

---

2This work was completed in 1993 and thus the assessments made herein reflect our evaluation as of that time.
Figure S.2—Theater Operational Objectives and Subobjectives for USFK (1993)
Figure S.3—Operational Task Breakdown for Combined Forward Defense (1993)
Resource management staff members are required to coordinate command positions on programs that affect the CINC's ability to perform his responsibilities. The STRM methodology provides a common framework for examining programs and possible changes in programs related to command objectives. Figure S.4 suggests the structure of a proposed issue paper that provides USFK priorities to USCINCPAC for use in building CINCPAC's Integrated Priority List (IPL). The IPL is CINCPAC's primary written input to the PPBS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USFK Resource Issue Paper (Illustrative)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUBJECT:</strong> C-17 Objective Inventory Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BRIEF SUMMARY:</strong> Recent program management and program cost concerns have led to a proposal to limit the C-17 aircraft program to 40 aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FUNDING:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BUDGET YEAR</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsible Service/Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USFK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRINCIPAL THEATER OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE SUPPORTED:</strong> Fight and Win (if necessary on Korean peninsula).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RELATED HIGHER LEVEL OBJECTIVES:</strong> Strategic agility; technological superiority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OTHER THEATER OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES SUPPORTED:</strong> Contribute to regional stability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TASKS SUPPORTED BY RESOURCE AT ISSUE:</strong> Deploy forces; sustain augmentation flow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT AND FUTURE ADEQUACY:</strong> Questionable, based on two primary considerations: lift and defense against TBM with WMD warheads.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ALTERNATIVES FOR ACHIEVING AFFECTED OBJECTIVES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PROPOSED ACTIONS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DECISION</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure S.4—Structure of USFK Resource Issue Paper
process and is used in Washington during the planning and programming phases of PPBS deliberations. Two characteristics of this suggested format are particularly important. First, it identifies the principal operational objectives supported by the program; second, it specifically addresses alternative ways to achieve the objective. The format also includes an assessment of the adequacy of programmed forces as a whole in achieving objectives.

Applying the STRM framework is facilitated by incorporating all of its information in a database that can easily be manipulated on a personal computer. A Microsoft Excel® workbook contains several data files of different types that can be used to examine linkages and to produce resource issue papers. Figure S.5 shows how operational objectives and assessments are stored. Subobjectives are arranged in outline format and lower levels can be collapsed to show only aggregated categories.

Strategies-to-tasks resource management formalizes procedures that effective leaders have always used to some extent. Goals cannot be achieved without plans of action.

Figure S.5—Spreadsheet View of USFK Theater Operational Objectives (1993)
Resources are not ends in themselves, but the resources must be provided if our forces are to accomplish specific tasks. The uncertainty of when and where we will need to fight may mean that we cannot allocate resources with pinpoint precision, but we can examine numerous alternatives and identify resources that have utility in more than one context. STRM provides a framework for systematically addressing resource issues by stating what others expect us to do with our assigned forces and how we plan to meet those expectations.

The prototype system developed to support USFK resource management decisions has generated interest at other commands. USFK experience in expanding the initial set of objectives and tasks developed by the project team to a USFK-modified architecture should make implementation of STRM by others easier and less time-consuming. The prototype workbook incorporates a few features to simplify finding items, identifying linked data elements, and extracting data; but much more can be done as the system becomes operational. When a set of objectives with a clear COMUSFK imprimatur has been developed in Korea, it should be reviewed jointly with USCINCPAC planners, both to ensure understanding of concerns from a USFK viewpoint and to force integration with USCINCPAC objectives.

Translating the concepts introduced in this research into a workable decisionmaking tool for USFK requires five steps:

1. Theater operational objectives and operational tasks for the conventional defense of the Korean peninsula must be reviewed by appropriate staff elements (J-3, J-5, resource management (RM), the political advisor, the deputy CINC, CINC) to ensure completeness and to provide agreement on their utility and applicability.
2. The master database must be installed on local area networks, and configuration control procedures must be adopted to ensure that CINC-approved objectives are not changed without authorization. The necessary configuration control should not be elaborate and should only limit changes to the command master version of the database.
3. Procedures for resource issue review must be modified to require specific treatment of objectives and tasks that resources at issue are intended to support. The procedures should also require identification of the assumed concept of operation for accomplishing tasks and alternative concepts that may include different sets of resources.
4. A systematic assessment of current and future (perhaps using the year 2005) ability of programmed forces and equipment to achieve operational objectives and
accomplish operational tasks should be performed under J-5 or Deputy CINC sponsorship. The initial assessment (Inadequate, Questionable, Adequate) should be conducted based entirely on the expert judgment of staff members. After these assessments have been added to the database (replacing the research team’s preliminary estimates), analytic tools should be reviewed by participants in the assessment process to determine ways to improve the next round of assessments. The CINC’s review of services’ POMs (program objectives memorandums) would provide an appropriate baseline for USFK assessments.

(5) Over the longer term, COMUSFK should begin dialogs with USCINCPAC and CJCS using the STRM framework to support CINC concerns about both resources and guidance. Guidance is expected to change rapidly as budget reductions are implemented, so the process of providing CINC’s inputs must be flexible. The framework must be dynamic. It is not sufficient to simply acknowledge that the suggested structure is “about right.” Objectives must be modified by command staff in Korea as major decisions are made and as command viewpoints change.

The concept of a framework leading to a discipline for resource decisionmaking has evolved considerably over the course of this research. The unique viewpoint of a commander such as COMUSFK needs to be adequately represented in Washington policy and strategy debates, but it will be effectively represented only if issues raised from Korea can be seen in the broader context of national and regional security objectives. Our methodology will continue to evolve, and we hope COMUSFK experience will help to refine our model as we work with other participants in the PPBS process. The procedures we recommend are not a panacea, but they should contribute to a more informed debate.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This report could not have been prepared without the extremely cooperative collaboration of the USFK staff. Colonel Dennis Savage (Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management) and Mr. Joe Jeffris sponsored the effort and established the purpose of our research with the rest of the staff. Colonel Anthony Moreno provided insights into operational concepts. The Theater Decision Support System (TDSS) developed by Colonel Moreno and his staff motivated the design of our assessment displays. Mr. Trevor Park provided valuable administrative support. Most significantly, the personal involvement and guidance of General Robert RisCassi made it possible for us to understand the needs of the CINC and how a new discipline for resource management decisionmaking might be used. RAND colleagues Glenn Kent and David Thaler, as well as former RAND colleagues Edward Warner and David Ochmanek, shaped our thinking as we extended their early work on strategy-to-tasks analysis. Bruce Bennett and Katherine Webb provided insightful reviews.

The authors, of course, are responsible for any shortcomings in the research.
# Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BES</td>
<td>Budget Estimate Submission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Close air support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFC</td>
<td>Combined Forces Command, Korea (U.S.-ROK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIM</td>
<td>Corporate information management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCCFC</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief, Combined Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCUNC</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUSFK</td>
<td>Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps SAM</td>
<td>Corps surface-to-air missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Chairman’s Program Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSBM</td>
<td>Confidence and security building measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPSECDEF</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Defense Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPG</td>
<td>Defense Planning Guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRB</td>
<td>Defense Resources Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSA</td>
<td>Eighth U.S. Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FKRM</td>
<td>Resource Management Staff (USFK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYDP</td>
<td>Future Years Defense Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>Ground Component Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>Human Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOC</td>
<td>Initial operational capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPL</td>
<td>Integrated Priority List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JROC</td>
<td>Joint Requirements Oversight Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSCP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSTARS</td>
<td>Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KISS</td>
<td>Korean Intelligence Support System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>Line of communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFP</td>
<td>Major Force Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMSD</td>
<td>National Military Strategy Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSDD</td>
<td>National Security Decision Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSD</td>
<td>National Security Study Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMB</td>
<td>Office of Management and Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PB</td>
<td>President’s Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBD</td>
<td>Program Budget Decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDM</td>
<td>Program Decision Memorandum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POM</td>
<td>Program Objectives Memorandum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPBS</td>
<td>Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRG</td>
<td>Program Review Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTRS</td>
<td>Pacific Theater Requirements System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RM</td>
<td>Resource Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>Surface-to-air missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECDEF</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRM</td>
<td>Strategy-to-tasks resource management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STT</td>
<td>Strategy-to-tasks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWA</td>
<td>Southwest Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBM</td>
<td>Theater Ballistic Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDSS</td>
<td>Theater Decision Support System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCINCPAC</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCP</td>
<td>Unified Command Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USFK</td>
<td>United States Forces, Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of mass destruction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. RESEARCH APPROACH

BACKGROUND

This report discusses the RAND project to develop a resource management framework for the Commander, United States Forces, Korea (COMUSFK) based on force planning concepts developed at RAND but tailored to the needs of operational commanders.

COMUSFK needs a framework for expressing his concerns and the progress being made in his theater so that others (Commander-in-Chief, the office of the Secretary of Defense, Congress) can better understand why a problem is important or why a recent success is significant. A linkage from national objectives down to resources would help to place events in context. For example, if burdensharing is a high-priority national objective, a new initiative by the ROK (Republic of Korea) government to accept responsibility for additional infrastructure support, even though the warfighting value of the support is relatively insignificant, could be given its proper (high) importance. On the other hand, a hierarchical linkage might show that, although a specific force modernization issue is particularly important to the Army in Washington, there is no significant impact on the theater commander’s ability to accomplish the tasks he sees as important. COMUSFK’s influence may vary from issue to issue. The STRM (strategy-to-tasks resource management) framework will only help to keep competing objectives in view and to provide a summary of assessments of capabilities and risks.

An evolving framework for defense planning has developed at RAND. The approach is intended to make defense planning a more rational process. It involves linking national

---

3For clarity, we will use the acronym COMUSFK when referring to the Commander (General Robert W. RisCassi, USA, who sponsored this research, and his successor) or to his responsibilities as a combatant commander, and USFK when referring to his command and to the functions of his staff. General RisCassi and his successor, General Luck, also serve as Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC) and Commander-in-Chief, Combined Forces Command (CINCCFC).

strategy to the tasks that our military forces perform—hence, the common name, strategy-to-tasks (STT).

A strategy is a plan for using available resources to achieve specified objectives. . . . They exist in the form of budgets. However, these spending plans usually lack a coherent audit trail showing how allocating resources in this manner achieves recognized national security objectives. Or if an audit trail is evident, the allocation may not be what the critic would prefer. So part of the defense planning problem centers on the perception that public budget statements do not reflect an underlying rationale for the allocation of resources reflected in the documents.5

A major attempt to improve the effectiveness of military operations and military resource planning was the Goldwater-Nichols legislation.6 Among other organizational and procedural changes, it directed increased participation by the operational commanders of U.S. forces in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). Unified commanders (CINCs) testify before Congress on their perspectives for implementing the National Military Strategy and the adequacy of resources assigned to them, in addition to fulfilling the statutory requirement to provide the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (CJCS) with information and advice on the operational requirements of their commands. The strategy-to-tasks framework can provide the basis for more clearly expressing the perspective of a subunified commander, such as the Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea.

The original strategy-to-tasks approach was used to place program decisions in the context of how forces would be used. Recent RAND analysis7 extended the initial framework to resource management and tradeoff issues at U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), the unified command with end-to-end program responsibility for special operations missions. Although USSOCOM is unique in having control of program development for most of its assets through Major Force Program (MFP) 11, other unified and specified commands must integrate and coordinate resource issues to influence programs developed by the services. It appears that some extension and restructuring of the concepts pioneered by Kent and Warner would greatly enhance resource management.

---
5 See pp. 8–9, Kent and Simons, op. cit.
7 Lewis et al., 1994.
PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, AND BUDGETING SYSTEM (PPBS)

The PPBS is the Department of Defense's (DoD's) primary system for planning and managing its resources.\(^8\) It is a process intended to link national security strategy to specific programs. It was designed to facilitate fiscally constrained planning, programming, and budgeting in terms of complete programs (i.e., forces and systems), rather than through artificial budget categories.\(^9\) The goal is to determine force, system, and program costs; the PPBS is designed to elicit options and provide for an evaluation of these options in terms of costs and benefits. The output of the process, the Defense Program (DP), is the official record of major resource allocation decisions made by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF).

The PPBS is one of the SECDEF's key management tools. The process provides the SECDEF with the means to set and control the Department's agenda. The goal is to frame issues in national rather than service terms. As a functioning ongoing process it is supposed to capture all important decisions affecting current and future defense budgets. The process, therefore, also includes documentation and databases; these items are intended to capture all important formal decisions.

The process is not linear, either during a phase (planning, programming, or budgeting) or in a transition from one phase to the next. Rather than being a "lock step" system, it is designed to be highly interactive. The interactions take on a number of different attributes. In some cases, formal responses to standing committees are required from military leaders. These responses include net assessments and program appraisals. In other instances the SECDEF will ask for informal assessments or for recommendations from military advisors and the service secretaries.

Another dimension of the PPBS that is rarely discussed but that is critical to its purpose is that the structure provides the "forum" for both the informal and formal debate of the issues and options at all levels of the Department. In order to prepare for the formal debates, the decisionmakers and their staffs interact with one another on an informal basis to share information, develop options, and even to define a particular participant's strategy in the debate for resources.


\(^{9}\)Although it provides the basis for developing the annual budget request and the analytic framework for budget defense and Congressional testimony.
The PPBS is an evolving process; it has undergone many changes since its implementation in the 1960s. The most recent change to the process was instituted with the implementation in 1986 of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation.\(^{10}\)

The Goldwater-Nichols legislation has had many effects on the DoD resource allocation process. It (and the earlier study done by the Packard Commission) suggested the existence of serious deficiencies in decisionmaking and the utilization of resources, as well as inordinate "service" influence in the planning and budgetary process. The legislation directed that (to increase civilian participation) the roles of the service secretary, the office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff would have to be changed.

The legislation gives the CJCS both the authority and the resources for a new and expanded role in the resource allocation process. With the addition of the position of the Vice Chairman—who is the second-ranking military officer with authority to act for the Chairman in his absence—the Chairman and his expanded staff are directly responsible for providing the SECDEF with fiscally constrained\(^ {11}\) military strategies and net assessments. The strengthened Chairman now provides the SECDEF with independent advice from a cross-service perspective that heretofore had been available only in private. This brings the Chairman and the SECDEF together as partners in developing plans and programs. Another dimension to the changing environment is that the CINCs are now involved in the resource-decision process. In particular, they participate in the planning and programming phases (as will be discussed later in this report).

**The Critical Elements of the PPBS**

There is a hierarchy to the PPBS process. Figure 1.1 illustrates that the planning phase starts with broad decisions involving the senior decisionmakers in the Department and

---

\(^{10}\)The centralization and consolidation of DoD resources began early in the 1980s with the Taft and Carlucci initiatives. The process was codified in 1986 with the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation.

\(^ {11}\)Fiscally constrained planning is shorthand for a number of activities that should generate and evaluate the broad outlines and options inherent in 15- to 20-year sets of programs/budgets. The guidance around which it is shaped is defined by OSD and the Chairman. They also define the program baseline. Fiscally constrained planning then considers multiple states of the world (threats, technology, and resources) from which a plan is created for desired capabilities that are then fiscally feasible. This framework provides for the evaluation of programs submitted by services and defense agencies and ultimately results in the analytic framework for POM (program objectives memorandum) defense and congressional testimony.
progresses to the budgeting phase where previously made decisions are reviewed in detail to determine how they can best be implemented.

Issues are proposed during the planning phase, developed during the programming phase, and reviewed for execution feasibility during the budgeting phase.\(^{12}\)

**Planning Phase**

A new PPBS cycle begins immediately after the budget is submitted to Congress. During the first phase, the planning phase, with a horizon that may extend 15 years into the future, the existing military posture of the United States is assessed against various concerns including national security objectives and resource limitations, available military strategies, and national security objectives contained in National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs) and National Security Study Directives (NSSDs).

The output of the process, the strategic plan for developing and employing future forces, is defined in the SECDEF's Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), which may be published in the fall or early winter. The DPG contains the SECDEF's top-level guidance for producing the defense program. It is responsive to the President's national security strategy from which the national military strategy is derived, and fiscal realities as set out by the

---

\(^{12}\)Details of the PPBS may be found in *The Defense Resource Allocation Process, 1990*, or *Army Command, Leadership, and Management: Theory and Practice, 1994–1995*.
President through the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). It may also contain very explicit program guidance in the Program Objectives Memorandums (POMs) regarding core programs that the SECDEF wants the services and DoD agencies to fund.

Beginning in 1984, the CINCs’ roles in resource planning were significantly enhanced. Secretary of Defense Carlucci determined that the warfighters (or operating forces) needed to participate in the resource planning process. They needed to participate in all phases of planning, particularly through their Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs), which were directly submitted to the SECDEF. They were also asked to provide inputs through the programming and budgeting phases, but their involvement in the planning phase—defining the resource agenda within the context of fiscally constrained military planning—was paramount.

Programming Phase

The transition from the planning phase to the programming phase (from the OSD perspective) falls somewhere between the issuance of the DPG and the submittal of the POMs by the military departments and defense agencies in the spring. The POMs are the resource program of the military departments and the defense agencies that reflects the DPG and the fiscal guidance. The POMs are reviewed by the Joint Staff and OSD to determine whether the programs meet the Secretary’s guidance. The programming phase projects five to six years into the future.

The Chairman’s evaluation of the POM, based on input provided by the Joint Staff, is contained in an internal document, the Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA). The services and defense agencies propose a total force in their respective POMs. The CPA assesses the risks in those POMs. Included in the assessment is an evaluation of how well the POMs satisfy the requirements identified by the CINCs of the unified and specified commands.

OSD reviews the departments’ POMs and the CPA. Based on these analyses, the various OSD offices raise “issues” if there are problems perceived during the review. At one time, these issues were sorted into three tiers:

- Tier 1 issues are major defense issues that are discussed and debated within the Defense Resources Board (DRB). The DRB is chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as vice-chair. The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology), the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and
Readiness), the DoD Comptroller, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the secretaries of the military departments serve as members. Frequently, other senior staff (usually assistant secretaries and service chiefs) who are involved in a particular issue will be asked to attend a specific session.

- Tier II issues are analyzed in issue papers written by OSD, staffed to the services, and decided upon by the DEPSECDEF. These issues are addressed by the Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation in his role as chair of the Program Review Group (PRG).
- Tier III issues are handled by OSD (Comptroller) for resolution prior to submission of the President’s Budget (PB).

The decisions taken regarding Tier I and II issues were to be published in the DEPSECDEF’s Program Decision Memorandum (PDM). The current format simply raises major issues to the DRB level.

**Budget Phase**

The PDM marks the end of the programming phase and provides a starting point for the budget phase. The reality is that the services and defense agencies have started to build detailed budgets when they submit their POMs in the spring. After they receive the DEPSECDEF’s program decisions in late July, they must adjust their programs and budgets to bring them in line with program decisions. Their programs and budgets are submitted to the OSD Comptroller in early September (called the Budget Estimate Submission (BES)). Several months of budget hearings follow the BES submission. Major budget issues may be heard in a DRB Budget Review with final decisions announced in a series of Program Budget Decisions (PBDs). The totality of the final PBDs, when used to revise the BES, becomes the President’s Budget, which is submitted to Congress.

**CINC Involvement in the Process**

In an environment in which the threat and operational demands are defining DoD requirements, the CINCs’ input into the resource allocation process is critical. CINC input assists in building consistency between planning guidance for the resource allocation decision process and CINC operational plans. CINC participation also enhances the credibility of resource decisions and how adequately they are funded. This is done through congressional testimony as well as through informal discussions within the context of PPBS decisionmaking.
A natural tension, however, emerges between the CINCs’ focus on present warfighting capabilities and the longer-term investment strategy that everyone must be sensitive to in an environment of declining resources. Recently, with the decline in resources and redefinition of our national military strategy from a global perspective to a regional one, CINCs are being forced to reconsider their short-term requirements within the context of their long-term warfighting needs. They must be able to clearly articulate these needs to the services (the supplier of resources); the Chairman, who helps determine the warfighting priorities; the Office of the Secretary of Defense; and the Congress, which approves the funding.

**PPBS AND THE CINCs**

The emerging role of CINCs in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System began in the 1980s with several initiatives that led to the centralization and consolidation of DoD resources. The Carlucci and Taft initiatives specifically addressed the role of the CINCs in the resource-decision process and stressed that more centralization was needed. The process was codified in 1986 with the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation.

In addition to the previously discussed changes in the relationship between the Chairman and the SECDEF, Goldwater-Nichols defined new roles for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition. Both offices were entrusted with linking CINC warfighting requirements to the PPBS and using fiscally constrained planning across defense resources.

The CINCs’ roles in the resource management area were also changed. To enhance military input to resource identification, CINC involvement was increased. The concern was that operating forces did not sufficiently participate in all phases of planning. The goal was to have CINCs participate in all phases of planning, programming, and budgeting, linking them through the Integrated Priority Lists begun by Deputy Secretary of Defense Taft in 1984. This change provided a mechanism by which the SECDEF could identify DoD’s resource needs across theaters. The CINCs also were to participate in the Defense Resource Boards and to provide evaluations and various inputs during the planning, programming, and implementation review phases. Since 1984, CINC involvement in many of these activities has increased.

A number of “events” have further expanded the roles of CINCs in the resource identification and allocation process. Events of the past few years—the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and, as a consequence, the disappearance of a clearly defined threat; the shift in emphasis from Europe to other regions of the globe; the Operation Desert Shield/Storm experience; and the decline of the defense budget—have contributed and continue to contribute to the increased role of the CINCs in resource planning.
Recent efforts at redefining the CINC's roles are reflected in the Chairman's Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States. The thrust is that the CINC playing field is becoming more level in how the importance of theaters is viewed. This factor is particularly borne out in the discussions of the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and its strong geographical orientation.13

One way to evaluate the CINC's changing roles in the area of resource management is to assess how the functional responsibilities of CINCs in the PPBS process have changed over time. We chose the PPBS process as the framework for this evaluation because it is one of the SECDEF's key management tools. The PPBS is the only mechanism available for linking strategy-to-forces elements with budget. It is the functioning process and structure that include documentation and databases and capture all important decisions affecting current or future defense budgets.

Figure 1.2 is an assessment of the CINCs' role in the PPBS process. The evaluation is subjective in that it does not consider the variances among theaters in terms of relative importance and the role of the individual CINCs in affecting resource outcomes within the DoD and congressional environments. The figure is structured by major PPBS functions. A number of points may be observed from this figure. Prior to 1986, the military departments—and, in particular, the service chiefs—owned and exercised direct control over most of their respective resources. They were responsible for deciding an individual service's program, what systems would be acquired, and how the overall budget would be executed. The number of players in the playing field were relatively few—primarily the service chiefs and the OSD.

Examining the playing field today shows that several things have changed since the implementation of Goldwater-Nichols. Figure 1.3 shows our judgment on how it has changed. First, the intent of Goldwater-Nichols has been fulfilled in that the service chiefs' power has been diminished. Secondly, the playing field has become much more complex; there are not only many more players, but they are influencing the process and how decisions are made. Whereas prior to 1986 the military departments exercised the greatest control over resources, civilian input into the process is now much greater—as is the participation of the Chairman. What the exact balance is going to be between civilian and military participation continues to remain undefined.

Figure 1.2—Functional Alignment Prior to 1996

RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION

CINCs

SERV. Sect.

CINCS

OSD

ACTIVITIES

STRATEGY
Adviser National Strategy
Define Military Objective
Recommend Military Strategy

PLANNING
Develop Budget Options
Fiscally Constrained Planning

PROGRAMMING
Trade-off Analyses
Builds Options: $-Modernization
Posts Actn Program
Recommends Program Changes
Coord w/CINCs-Resource Alloc.

BUDGET & EXECUTION
Directs Changes
Executes Program
Monitors Program
Justifies Appropriations
### Figure 1.3—Functional Alignment Today

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITIES</th>
<th>OSD</th>
<th>CJCS</th>
<th>CINCs</th>
<th>Serv Sec't</th>
<th>Serv Chiefs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STRATEGY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advise National Strategy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Define Military Threat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Define Military Objective</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommend Military Strategy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLANNING</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop IPI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop Budget Options</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscally Constrained Planning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROGRAMMING</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade-off Analyses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Builds Options: $-Modernization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posits Acq'n Strategy &amp; Follow-up</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommends Program</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommends Program Changes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coord w/CINCs-Resource Alloc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUDGET &amp; EXECUTION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directs Changes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executes Program</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitors Program</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justifies Appropriations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role: Nonplayer</th>
<th>Participates</th>
<th>Influences</th>
<th>Responsible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action: None</th>
<th>Review/Comment</th>
<th>Shape</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1.3, when compared to the prior figure, indicates those areas in which CINC influence has increased. Importantly, these roles are evolving, and we are not quite sure what they are going to look like in the future. We believe, however, that the CINCs’ role in the PPBS will only increase. We also acknowledge that currently the increased participation of CINCs is process-oriented because the CINCs (except USSOCOM), as well as the Joint Staff, do not have control over any major funding sites. The services still own the key resources.

The issue that we are addressing with USFK is how the CINCs might better participate in the resource allocation and management process. For COMUSFK, this is through the IPL process, since for PPBS interactions he is not a CINC but reports through the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (USCINCPAC). Priorities of the CINCs are important in OSD PPBS activities, but they must be based on an understanding of the strategic and political environment. U.S. troop levels in the Pacific are the result of agreements between the executive and legislative branches of government. The so-called “Nunn-Warner” initiatives, in which OSD policy was driven by congressional concerns as well as warfighting analysis, are particularly relevant for the Pacific Rim.

THE PROBLEM

Our national military strategy\textsuperscript{14} reflects the changes in the world, particularly the collapse of Soviet communism as an ideology, the collapse of the Soviet Union as the central military threat to the survival of the United States, and the economic restructuring in Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union. The strategy now focuses on regional threats and regional interests with a substantial economic and political component. Our military presence in Northeast Asia contributes to deterrence of North Korean aggression against the Republic of Korea, to continued U.S. participation in the growing economies of the region, and to increasing the strength of democratic regimes in the region. Resources committed to the support of our forces in Korea, Japan, and offshore in the western Pacific need to be evaluated with military criteria as well as nonmilitary criteria.

The Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command (CINUNC), is responsible for maintaining the armistice until a permanent peace treaty is in place. He would also command UN forces in the event of a renewal of hostilities. Planning for future military operations requires an understanding of the capabilities of forces earmarked for defense in

\textsuperscript{14}The National Military Strategy of the United States, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., January, 1992, was used for this analysis. This document is routinely updated. Therefore the STRM objectives need to be reviewed with each new edition.
Korea and the maintenance of a long-term commitment of both U.S. and ROK forces. The focus of CINCUNC is necessarily narrow because the U.N. resolutions enfranchising his job are specific and limited. Broader regional security issues are outside the responsibilities of CINCUNC. However, this does not mean that the changes in the global security environment do not affect CINCUNC. The removal of the Soviet threat is expected to result in fewer U.S. forces in Asia in general and specifically in Korea. Although U.S. troop withdrawals are currently on hold because of North Korean refusal to permit IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) nuclear inspections (in 1993), the trend is clear and the initial defense of Korea will depend more and more on ROK capabilities.

CINCCFC (Commander-in-Chief, Combined Forces), the commander of combined U.S. and ROK forces, develops plans for coordinated defense of the Korean peninsula. Only ROK forces are routinely assigned to CFC (Combined Forces Command, Korea) in peacetime, but combined training (U.S. and ROK) is necessary to ensure readiness. Command arrangements are changing to reflect the major role that ROK ground forces play in defense plans. Resource decisions made by both governments affect the real and the perceived capabilities of committed forces and, hence, indirectly affect North Korea's perceptions of the risks of aggression. The CINC must be able to demonstrate linkages between resource decisions and defensive operations.

COMUSFK has responsibilities that include preparation of U.S. forces for the defense of South Korea, with the combined forces of the Republic of Korea and those U.S. forces fighting together as elements of CFC after hostilities commence. In terms of the U.S. Department of Defense organization for command and control and resource planning, COMUSFK is a subordinate commander under the USCINCPAC. Because COMUSFK's primary reporting channel for resource and plan development is through USCINCPAC, it is important that both COMUSFK and USCINCPAC understand the needs and the perspectives of each other. The clear common thread is the linkage from the national security strategy through the national military strategy, both public and clearly defined, to regional (Pacific) security objectives and theater (Korea) objectives that COMUSFK needs to support. These latter two categories are less clearly defined and possibly not shared as much as they could be between USCINCPAC and COMUSFK.

In all three roles (CINCUNC, CINCCFC, and COMUSFK), the senior U.S. commander in Korea needs to participate in the tough decisions that will be made in Washington. A first step in effective participation is being able to clearly articulate how the defense of Korea fits into the bigger picture of national security objectives and how resource choices affect the commander's ability to achieve U.S. objectives in the region.
FIRST STEPS TO A SOLUTION

This research is intended to provide a means to systematically develop and articulate the operational objectives and the resource requirements necessary to support USFK. This goal required us to examine relevant policy directives and policy statements of responsible authorities to more clearly specify the objectives—what needs to be accomplished in and around the Korean peninsula. The solution was to develop a process that provides resource decisionmakers a common language and tableau of objectives and the means to achieve those objectives. We believe that this process can best be carried out within the strategy-to-tasks framework. The following three steps were used to develop a methodology to support resource management decisions in USFK. A similar approach might be applicable for other commands.

Generic Framework

The generic strategy-to-tasks framework shown in Figure 1.4 focuses on military campaigns to achieve military objectives. National goals are linked to tasks for operating forces through a hierarchy of objectives. The framework requires specifying objectives, a necessary condition for any evaluation of the adequacy of resources. The framework can be used by many organizations after tailoring the generic structure to a specific viewpoint. USFK as a subunified command must consider several viewpoints regarding its objectives before constructing a strategy-to-tasks resource management framework for Korea.

![Figure 1.4—Generic Strategy-to-Tasks Framework](image-url)
Develop Alternative Viewpoints

Resource management for COMUSFK is the focus of this analysis, so his perspective will be developed in the greatest detail. Nevertheless, we must be aware of alternative viewpoints. USCINCPAC is the primary representative of COMUSFK's resource concerns. USCINCPAC's perspective is broader for it must consider the entire Asia-Pacific region; however, USCINCPAC staff also needs to understand the specific nature of USFK's resource demands in the defense of Korea. At the same time planners in Korea must understand USCINCPAC's priorities (USCINCPAC's perspective must be understood at USFK).

It is easy for military staffs to focus on operational considerations and to overlook economic and political objectives. The strengthening democratic forces in South Korea need encouragement and support from the United States and its military forces, which provide the most visible American presence in the country. Their presence supports more than one objective. Economic growth for both the United States and the Republic of Korea will also further our national objectives by promoting regional stability. There may not be specific operational plans nor even military operational tasks that directly support economic and political objectives but the effect of operational plans on economic and political goals can and should be considered.

Even within the U.S.-led staffs in Korea, there are alternative viewpoints that need to be considered. The combined command, CFCK, uses both U.S. and ROK resources to meet objectives that may be somewhat different from those of a U.S. commander. To the extent that they are in fact different, these differences need to be understood. Clearly the national security objectives of the Republic of Korea exist, even though they may not be promulgated as formally as those of the United States.\textsuperscript{15} It would be useful for all those involved in U.S. resource management decisions to understand the viewpoint of the Koreans. The strategy-to-tasks framework provides a starting point for understanding alternative perspectives because writing down a set of presumed objectives will help to improve the list and to insert appropriate non-U.S. concerns in resource decision papers. The United Nations' perspective on global and regional security also needs to be examined.

Initially, it will be sufficient for the USFK staff to refine the STRM database to reflect the U.S. viewpoints, acknowledging that some objectives may be in conflict with ROK preferences. Over the longer term, there should be a combined effort to identify some of the more important Korean objectives and to integrate them into the STRM database. Even without explicit treatment of ROK objectives, it is necessary to consider ROK force elements.

\textsuperscript{15}The Republic of Korea does produce periodic "White Papers" on defense policy.
and their impact in accomplishing operational tasks. U.S. airpower plays a major role in
combined defense plans, but ROK ground forces are also of major importance. The
operational and tactical consequences of changes in U.S. Eighth Army capabilities are less
important than their symbolic value, as long as many ROK divisions are in place and ready.

All of these viewpoints must be considered when building a STRM framework for
USFK. Responsibilities on the peninsula properly play a dominant role, but the way in
which objectives are achieved and their relative priorities are influenced by the viewpoint of
USCINCPAC and other audiences in the United States. The Joint Staff, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, and the Congress all have viewpoints that sometimes support USFK
objectives and sometimes conflict with them.

In Section 2 of this report, we detail the STRM methodology for USFK, including the
starting set of objectives, tasks, and linkages; in Section 3, we set forth a concept for
incorporating the STRM elements into a database for use by resource management staff in
Korea. Finally, we explain how the COMUSFK might use STRM, and we present
conclusions regarding this specific extension of the strategy-to-tasks framework to resource
management and recommendations for more-general applications. The framework and the
interrelationship among elements are incorporated in a Microsoft Excel® workbook that can
be used (and modified) on either a Macintosh- or Windows-based personal computer. A
description of program operation is included in Appendix A.
2. STRATEGY-TO-TASKS RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (STRM) FOR USFK

The decisionmaking framework for Korea is constructed from linked building blocks so that resource issues can be examined in the context of what capabilities the selected resources provide and what we intend to accomplish with those forces or capabilities. In this section, we provide a description of the hierarchy. In the next section, we discuss how the framework was automated. The USFK framework reflects a national viewpoint on the range of military activities that lead to operational objectives. Our hierarchy, shown in Figure 2.1, includes national security objectives, national military objectives, regional military objectives, theater operational objectives, operational tasks, and force elements. At the highest level, we consider national security objectives as set forth in documents such as The National Security Strategy of the United States. The national military objectives are derivative and include political and economic objectives that can be supported by military forces. The sources of the military objectives include the national military strategy document of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the annual reports of the Secretary of Defense and the CJCS to Congress. Regional objectives for the Asia-Pacific region were found in a variety of sources that included the Bush administration submissions to Congress known collectively as the Nunn-Warner initiatives. Although a number of formal documents contain these objectives, their linkages and interdependencies are not normally included and instead are treated as stand-alone sources of requirements. As we proceed from broad goals to specific actions that a commander can be expected to perform, we need to address theater operational objectives for Korea and the tasks that are necessary to support those objectives.

Defining an appropriate set of objectives and tasks will go a long way toward providing coherence in reporting on theater problems and in placing resource issues in an appropriate context. We will propose an initial set of objectives and tasks and expect that they will continue to be refined through interactions with key participants in Korea, Hawaii, and Washington.

The differences between the generic model and the new STRM framework are important because resources are explicitly included and the regional and theater viewpoints

---

\(^{16}\)As previously noted, the Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea also serves as CINCUNC and CINCCFC. A more mature application of these concepts would include an examination of operational objectives and tasks for these other roles.
Figure 2.1—Strategy-to-Tasks Framework for Korea

of a specific CINC are addressed. In some cases, existing guidance documents can be used directly. In other cases, some synthesis of public statements, congressional testimony, and internal policy documents is required to construct lists that span an appropriate range of objectives and are also sufficiently concise to be useful. (As a goal there should be about 10 to 15 major categories and subcategories of objectives at each level. Force elements and programs will necessarily form much larger sets.)

Our concept for linking resource issues with objectives so that implications of alternatives can be better understood is based on a specified set of simply stated objectives. Constructing the “right” set of objectives is a continual process because as the world changes
so do U.S. objectives in the large and in the small details. Some principles, such as national
survival and the maintenance of democracy at home, are constant even though our definition
of threats to security will change. We begin this section with a description of the starting set
of relevant objectives for USFK.

National Security Objectives

The easiest task is to list national security objectives because they are clearly specified
in the National Security Strategy of the United States, which calls them “interests and
objectives that even in a new era are enduring.”¹⁷ (Even with a new administration, the
general nature of these aims is not expected to change, although they will probably be
reorganized and reworded to emphasize President Clinton’s priorities.) These objectives are
so global that everyone would agree with their importance.

The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation,
with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people
secure.

The United States seeks, whenever possible in concert with its allies, to

- deter any aggression that could threaten the security of the United States
  and its allies and—should deterrence fail—repel or defeat military attack
  and end conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its interests, and
  its allies;
- effectively counter threats to the security of the United States and its
citizens and interests, short of armed conflict, including the threat of
  international terrorism;
- improve stability by pursuing equitable and verifiable arms control
  agreements, modernizing our strategic deterrent, developing systems
  capable of defending against limited ballistic-missile strikes, and
  enhancing appropriate conventional capabilities;
- promote democratic change in the [former] Soviet Union, while
  maintaining firm policies that discourage any temptation to new quests for
  military advantage;
- foster restraint in global military spending and discourage military
  adventurism;
- prevent the transfer of militarily critical technologies and resources to
  hostile countries or groups, especially the spread of chemical, biological,
  and nuclear weapons and associated high-technology means of delivery; and
- reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States by encouraging
  reduction in foreign production, combating international traffickers, and
  reducing demand at home.

A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad.

National security and economic strength are indivisible. We seek to

- promote a strong, prosperous, and competitive U.S. economy;
- ensure access to foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, the oceans, and space;
- promote an open and expanding international economic system, based on market principles with minimal distortions to trade and investment, stable currencies, and broadly respected rules for managing and resolving economic disputes; and
- achieve cooperative international solutions to key environmental challenges, assuring sustainability and environmental security of the planet as well as growth and opportunity for all.

Healthy, cooperative, and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.

To build and sustain such relationships, we seek to

- strengthen and enlarge the commonwealth of free nations that share a commitment to democracy and individual rights;
- establish a more balanced partnership with our allies and a greater sharing of global leadership and responsibilities;
- strengthen international institutions like the United Nations to make them more effective in promoting peace, world order, and political, economic, and social progress;
- support Western Europe’s historic march toward greater economic and political unity, including a European security identity within the Atlantic Alliance, and nurture a closer relationship between the United States and the European Community; and
- work with our North Atlantic allies to help develop the processes of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to bring about reconciliation, security, and democracy in a Europe whole and free.

A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions flourish.

Our interests are best served in a world in which democracy and its ideals are widespread and secure. We seek to

- maintain stable regional military balances to deter those powers that might seek regional dominance;
- promote diplomatic solutions to regional disputes;
- promote the growth of free, democratic political institutions as the surest guarantors of both human rights and economic and social progress;
- aid in combating threats to democratic institutions from aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism, and illicit drug trafficking; and
support aid, trade, and investment policies that promote economic development and social and political progress.

These objectives show the interlinking of economic and political elements in maintaining our "national security." Military planners and military programs cannot be developed in isolation using purely military or "warfighting" criteria. Some decisions and some programs could enhance our military capabilities at the expense of strained relations with key friends and allies. By specifying objectives in military and nonmilitary terms, it is possible to identify those goals that resources support and those other goals that are weakened.

National Military Objectives

Similarly, The National Military Strategy of the United States restates the preceding national interests and selected objectives and then recasts the "fundamental objective of America's armed forces . . . to deter aggression and, should deterrence fail, to defend the nation's vital interests against any potential foe." General Powell goes on to elaborate the basis of our warfighting capability using four "foundations": strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution. Eight supporting strategic principles underpin our warfighting capabilities. They are readiness, collective security, arms control, maritime and aerospace superiority, strategic agility, power projection, technological superiority, and decisive force. In addition to the inherent capabilities of our forces, the strategy imposes an objective of forward presence operations utilizing our forces in peacetime for a variety of missions that include operational training and deployments, security assistance, protecting U.S. citizens abroad, combating drugs, and humanitarian assistance. Our view of the hierarchical nature of these objectives is shown in Figure 2.2. This hierarchical representation is useful in identifying areas in which capabilities are strong or weak, but there are many interactions that cannot be easily shown in this kind of figure. The STRM database contains many more dependencies between major levels in the hierarchy. In particular, a single task can contribute to the achievement of many objectives.

As we build a hierarchy of objectives to show linkages to resources and the effect of changes in resourcing on our ability to accomplish objectives, we will use tree diagrams, such as in Figure 2.2, which show the high-level groupings of warfighting capability and supporting principles. To view more than one major level of the STRM hierarchy at a time (i.e., national security objectives and national military objectives), we will collapse lower-
Figure 2.2—National Military Objectives

* Nonmilitary objectives are treated explicitly only at level 1 (National Security Objectives)
level breakdowns such as the four components of warfighting capability into simplified pictures (Figure 2.3). Assessments (adequate, questionable, or inadequate) of our ability to meet objectives will be based on a fusion of assessments for all components (sub-objectives or sub-tasks) supporting a higher-level grouping. (Figure 2.2 could include an assessment for warfighting capability based on assessments of our ability to perform all four of the supporting subobjectives: strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution.) Initially, assessments would be based on judgment, but some parts could subsequently be tied to models and simulations.

Regional Security Objectives
The third major category in our hierarchy is regional security objectives. In this expansion of the generic strategy-to-tasks framework, we enlarge national security objectives to be more specific about regional concerns. At this point, our methodology forces the choice of a specific region. In this case, we are interested in the responsibility of a Unified Commander, USCINCPAC, in the Asia-Pacific region. Guidance documents for regional policy are less formal than the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy documents we

![Diagram of National Security Objectives and Assessments]

Figure 2.3—A Two-Level Perspective of Capabilities and Requirements
used for the first two levels, but good sources nevertheless exist. (Because of the political and economic importance of the Pacific Rim, our military policy is strongly influenced by non-military factors.) Concern about regional misperceptions about our actions as military forces were reduced worldwide led to a dialog between the Department of Defense and the Congress. The regional strategy that emerged was known collectively as the Nunn-Warner initiatives. They were specified in a series of reports to Congress that included "A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim," Report to Congress 1992, prepared by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (East Asia and Pacific Region). Our initial set of regional security objectives are based on that report.

Regional objectives are based on higher-level guidance and may simply be rewording of those objectives with a regional emphasis. We have selected eight objectives that attempt to span the major activities that concern a regional CINC. They are

- protect the United States and its allies from attack
- maintain regional peace and stability
- preserve our political and economic access
- contribute to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapon deterrence
- foster the growth of democracy and human rights
- control proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and missile technology
- ensure freedom of navigation
- reduce illicit drug trafficking.

Although these objectives were based on strategy guidance for the Pacific, they have been worded so that they should be applicable for other regions. It is only at the next level, theater operational objectives, that we add more-specific language pertaining to countries and threats that are unique to the region and from which we can identify tasks that need to be performed. Figure 2.4 shows the developing hierarchy for our first three levels.

When this methodology is adopted, it will reflect the judgment of USCINCPAC and provide a basis for communicating concerns inside and outside the Department of Defense. (The current assessments are illustrative pending review and refinement in the Pacific theater.) The specific entries in our lists of objectives are expected to change but, for clarity, we believe that groupings of no more than ten objectives at any level force prioritization and increase clarity (although there will always be some activities that are not treated explicitly).
Theater Operational Objectives

The final level of objectives that we considered is theater operational objectives. They are the most specific, and this is the level we break down into tasks that require specific military capabilities.

We constructed an initial list based on testimony of General RisCassi before Congress, \(^{19}\) reviews of USFK command documents, and discussions with USFK staff.

\(^{19}\)Prepared statement of General Robert W. RisCassi, Commander, United States Forces Korea; Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; Commander-in-Chief, Combined Forces Command; Before the Armed Services Committee, United States Senate, April 21, 1993.
members. This initial listing is our “best estimate” of a set of theater operational objectives for Korea that will be useful for resource management decisionmaking. Subsequent interactions with staffs in Korea, Hawaii, and Washington should lead to refinements and improvements in the list.\textsuperscript{20} If this analysis were focused on the Asia Pacific as whole, instead of just Korea, a similar list of USCINCPAC theater operational objectives would be required. They include the following first- and second-level objectives (objectives and subobjectives):

- Lure North Korea out of its belligerent Cold-War stance (COMUSFK, CINCUNC, CINCCFC).
  - Encourage North-South talks.
  - Discourage proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.
- Fight and win (if necessary) on the Korean peninsula.
  - Deter North Korean aggression and defend if necessary.
  - Defend using combined forward defense.\textsuperscript{21}
  - Defend using U.S. nuclear weapons as necessary.
  - Deter attack through arms control and confidence and security building measures (CSBMs).
  - Support increased burdensharing with the ROK government.
  - Maintain Korean War Armistice.
- Implement Nunn-Warner initiatives (COMUSFK).
  - Transition to ROK leadership of Korean peninsula defense.
  - Reduce U.S. forces based in Korea.
  - Maintain U.S. presence in Korea.
- Contribute to regional stability (COMUSFK).
  - Encourage development of the ROK economy.
  - Encourage stable democracy.
  - Promote reunification under favorable terms.
  - Reduce illicit drug trafficking.

\textsuperscript{20}The STRM framework has continued to evolve as members of the project team have used the methodology for the Army staff, the Joint Staff, and USSOCOM.
\textsuperscript{21}This operational concept may include a counteroffensive phase.
These theater operational objectives reflect nonmilitary considerations that cannot be overlooked. National security objectives of a healthy economy and a stable world are reflected in burdensharing, North-South talks, development of the ROK economy, and encouragement of reunification. The importance of these political and economic elements was previously discussed; these concerns cannot be overlooked even though focusing on them is difficult and requires new thinking by some military officers who have a preference for dealing with "military" objectives. Whereas COMUSFK may not have a major responsibility in achieving nonmilitary goals, COMUSFK must consider these goals.

The theater operational objectives are shown hierarchically in Figure 2.5. Illustrative assessments would show Questionable status for North-South talks, arms control, ROK leadership of Korean defense, and reunification. One Inadequate assessment might be shown for our nonproliferation goals that are being thwarted by North Korea. Consolidating lower-level assessments leads to an overall assessment of Adequate for USFK’s current capability to meet theater operational objectives. (Weighting schemes for consolidation of lower-level components will eventually be required.)

Theater operational objectives for the Pacific have also been constructed from the viewpoint of USCINCPAC. They include the following first- and second-level objectives:

- Maintain forward presence in the Pacific.
  - Maintain forces in Japan.
  - Maintain forces in Korea.
  - Conduct rotational deployments of ships and aircraft to Asia.
  - Develop access, maintenance, storage, and support capabilities throughout Asia.
  - Provide humanitarian and security assistance.
  - Conduct port visits.
  - Participate in combined exercises.

---

22Weighting schemes were considered in this early application of STRM but were subsequently dropped. A failure to achieve one of ten supporting objectives may lead to failure or it may not. The scoring approach has been retained, but assessments are required at each level based on an examination of lower-level assessments and a specific concept of operations.

Figure 2.5—Theater Operational Objectives and Subobjectives for USFK (1993)
- 29 -

- Maintain strong alliances.
  - Share stationing costs in Korea and Japan.
  - Support existing alliances.
  - Examine existing alliance opportunities and establish new alliances.
- Be prepared for crisis response.
  - Train all operational forces not forward deployed.
  - Develop force packages to support adaptive presence (respond to cuts).
  - Develop U.S. role as leader and military nucleus for coalition response.

Putting all the pieces together into one picture from the COMUSFK vantage point is possible if we show only major objectives at each level. Figure 2.6 shows the path from national security objectives through USFK specific operational objectives. This single representation of the complex and interacting political, economic, and military objectives that a commander faces is still not simple, but it should be useful in identifying where specific resource issues have an impact. And conversely, if resource issues arise that cannot be tied to these objectives, we may better understand why that is the case.

**Operational Tasks**

Operational tasks are formulated by the CINCs. They are the specific actions that must be performed in order to accomplish an operational objective. Each task is defined by an operational concept. An operational concept weaves together the various systems, organizations, and tactics needed to accomplish a particular task in an end-to-end manner. Figure 2.7 is a schematic diagram identifying the key functional elements of an operational concept, specific to Korea to accomplish a task (in this case the task is stop initial thrust and the subtask is destroy weapons of mass destruction, which supports achieving the theater operational objective, fight and win (if necessary). The operational concept is disaggregated into five elements: surveillance, assessment, battle control/dynamic control, mission preparation, and mission execution. Surveillance assets collect raw data on the object(s) of the task and relay the data—sometimes indirectly—to assessment centers, often called intelligence fusion centers. Such centers turn the raw data into information that can be easily used by various command elements and, in some cases, by operational units as they prepare for and carry out their missions. Command elements assign specific targets to attack platforms and may provide dynamic control—that is, additional real-time assistance in directing the platforms to their targets. Operational units engage in detailed mission planning and prepare the attack platforms and munitions. Finally, the dedicated force
Figure 2.6—Objectives Hierarchy Tree for USFK

elements, sometimes with the aid of dynamic control elements, execute the mission with attack platforms and weapons. Mission execution is the “business” end of the operational concept and generally involves three phases: move to engagement, engage, and return to base.

**Figure 2.7—Operational Concept for Accomplishing a Stated Military Operational Task**

The development of a hierarchy of objectives permits us to consider operational tasks that military forces can perform in support of important objectives. Tasks and subtasks can be developed by thinking of a particular objective, **defend South Korea from North Korean attack using a combined forward defense**, as a military operation with an end-to-end concept of how to achieve the objective. As this strategy-to-tasks resource management for USFK is developed in theater, more and more objectives will be decomposed by experts who can identify important relationships and necessary steps. For now we will develop one set of tasks and subtasks that is the focus of military planning on the peninsula: **combined forward defense**.

The defense of the Korean peninsula with conventional weapons involving U.S. and ROK forces working together to prevent the loss of Seoul before stopping and reversing a North Korean invasion will be called **combined forward defense**. Other concepts of defense such as giving ground to stretch lines of communications (LOCs) to maximize the effect of U.S. airpower or early use of nuclear weapons on military targets are possible alternatives (conceptually if not politically) but will not be considered in detail. The **combined forward defense** is represented by three phases: **stopping the initial thrust**, building up U.S. forces in preparation for a counteroffensive (reinforcing Korea),
and conducting counteroffensive operations. Our structuring of these operational tasks and their supporting subtasks is

- Stop initial thrust.
  - Prepare to employ forces on short warning.
  - Provide close air support (CAS) for Ground Component Commander (GCC).
  - Interdict invader's support and reinforcement.
  - Destroy weapons of mass destruction.
  - Attain local air superiority.
- Reinforce Korea.
  - Deploy forces.
  - Establish logistics hubs.
  - Conduct strategic bombing.
  - Destroy weapons of mass destruction.
  - Establish theater air superiority.
  - Contain rear area threat.
- Conduct counteroffensive operations.
  - Employ combat forces.
  - Provide CAS for GCC.
  - Interdict invader's support and reinforcement.
  - Sustain augmentation flow.
  - Isolate North Korea politically.

The general sequencing of these tasks is shown in Figure 2.8. These tasks are also shown hierarchically in Figure 2.9 and can easily be “colored” or labeled with an assessment of current forces' capabilities to perform these tasks. In fact, some tasks continue in more than one phase. A single assessment may not be sufficient. If so, tasks can be identified by phase, although it is preferable to have a single task linked to more than one objective to understand where the required capabilities are needed.

Tasks are means to achieve objectives. Every theater objective must have at least one operational task associated with it. A listing of tasks in our initial USFK database is included in Appendix B. We broke down individual tasks and subtasks considering
alternative ways to achieve objectives, thus building an end-to-end picture of the critical activities necessary to accomplish a task.

An end-to-end concept of operations describes capabilities required to accomplish tasks and permits association of force elements (programs) with achieving operational objectives. The task of reinforcing Korea contains a subtask of deploying forces. Two possible concepts of operation are (1) rapid deployment of light forces using only airlift and forces with prepositioned equipment and (2) robust deployment using fast sealift shipping in addition to airlift. Assessments of our ability to accomplish the tasks depend on the concepts of operation considered (and their required capabilities) as well as the resourcing of program elements. A task cannot be performed unless all of the required capabilities are provided at an acceptable level. An illustrative set of capabilities will be discussed after describing the final level in our hierarchy—force elements.

**Force Elements to Accomplish Tasks**

The final category we will consider is **force elements**, most of which may also be called programs. In our model, a task is accomplished using force elements in the context of a concept of operations. Within a concept of operations is a sequenced application of capabilities (collect data on opposing forces, neutralize opposing mine threats, land forces ship-to-shore by surface, defeat opposing forces on the amphibious task force objective, destroy forces out of contact by indirect fires). The capabilities can be performed by one or more force elements alone or in combination. For instance, the capability **collect data on**
Figure 2.9—Operational Task Breakdown for Combined Forward Defense (1993)
friendly and opposing assets can be accomplished using a system like JSTARS, through HUMINT (human intelligence), and by SOF units—each of which is a force element that may be available to the theater commander. A specific task such as destroy weapons of mass destruction can be accomplished by identifying targets, using the capability collect data on friendly and opposing assets; and destroying the targets after they have been located, using the capability destroy and suppress tactical ballistic and cruise missiles. If the force element JSTARS is available, we may be able to satisfactorily collect data on missile locations. On the other hand, if JSTARS is not available and we are forced to rely on another tactical reconnaissance program, we may not have adequate location data and we would not be able to perform the task.

Table 2.1 lists force elements considered in recent resource prioritization analysis at USFK. The potential list of programs to consider is very large, so a command's resource management database would routinely drop programs that are no longer at issue and add

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programs of Interest to COMUSFK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) Remote Radios (USAF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDIP Offshore Materiel Procurement and Design (Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composite Medical/Dental Facility, Kunsan (USAF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EF-111 Forward Deployment (USAF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercise Programs (Simulation Hardware/Software</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement, Model Integration, Distributed Wargaming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System, Joint Modeling After Action Review System,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theater Transition and Sustainment Model (Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) (Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical War Reserve Materiel (WRM) Storage (USAF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILSTAR (Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern Munitions (Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rescue Helicopters (USAF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Searchlights to Counter SOF Insertion Activities (USAF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Airborne RECCE Assets (U-2R, Advanced Tactical Reconnaissance System)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Cryptologic Collection (GUARDRAIL Common</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sensor, Ground Based HFDF (high frequency direction finding) Capability) (Intelligence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theater Automated Command and Control (TACCIMS) (Army)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
new programs (and their linkages to capabilities and tasks). An audit trail would be
developed as programs are linked to capabilities and the ability to perform tasks using the
new capabilities is assessed.

Force elements are the specific, fundable resources most visible to the Congress and to
the general public. Lacking a framework to relate new programs to operational shortfalls in
theater, USFK review of programs (Table 2.1) may not include important new systems whose
future is uncertain. V-22 Osprey aircraft, C-17 Globemaster III aircraft, and the AX
attack aircraft are programs that are under constant scrutiny, but where do they fit in a
combat commander’s perspective? What effect will their addition to the force structure make
and what effect would their cancellation have? A framework linking these programs through
aggregated capabilities will provide a better context for resource decisionmaking. We will
not attempt to include a comprehensive list of programs but will instead use a few programs
of different types as examples of how they fit into our methodology.

Capabilities

Aside from defining the elements of this USFK-focused set of objectives and tasks, our
approach is very consistent with the earlier work on STT concepts by Kent and Warner. The
extension that makes this strategy-to-tasks resource management (STRM) unique is a focus
on the interface between force elements (programs) and the tasks and objectives they
support. We propose that resource issues be addressed by explicitly using linkages of
resources to supported objectives in decision papers and in program development forums.
This means that when an issue such as canceling Corps SAM (surface-to-air missile)
development arises in the budget review process, COMUSFK would quickly be able to
identify tasks and theater operational objectives influenced by improved air defenses,
evaluate the role that Corps SAM would play in defense of the Korean peninsula, and
identify other objectives that the program influenced.

Capabilities24 are the building blocks of operational concepts that we use to explain
how tasks can be accomplished. They are allocated to CINCs through the Joint Strategic

---

24 The JCS Pub 1 definition of military capability is: “the ability to achieve a specified
wartime objective (win a war or battle, destroy a target set). It includes four major
components: force structure modernization, readiness, and sustainability.

a. Force structure [is the] numbers, size, and composition of the units that comprise
our defense forces, divisions, ships, air wings.

b. Modernization [is the] technical sophistication of forces, units, weapon systems, and
equipments.

c. Readiness [is] the ability of forces, units, weapon systems, or equipments to deliver
the outputs for which they were designed (including the ability to deploy and employ without
unacceptable delays).
Capabilities Plan (JSCP). Combat commanders build plans based on the resources allocated for their use in the JSCP. In the case of COMUSFK, some force elements that provide capabilities reside in theater on the Korean peninsula and other planned support forces reside outside the theater controlled by USCINCPAC or other CINCs until hostilities commence. In assessing his ability to carry out his responsibilities, COMUSFK must consider the adequacy of capabilities and force elements directly under his control and also those that he will be gaining. For our purposes, capabilities are provided by using force elements, such as carrier battle groups or composite wings, and we are not concerned with specific unit identification at this level of aggregation. Theater capabilities are not unique to Korea, but their relative importance and the size of supporting force elements can be assessed only in terms of theater specific tasks. The following list includes most warfighting capabilities relevant to USFK resource issues. The complete list is used to ensure that operational task lists are complete.\(^{25}\)

**Prepare and deploy forces.**

- Deploy air forces.
- Deploy naval forces.
- Alert, call up, mobilize, train, and position forces.
- Provide airlift.
- Provide sealift.
- Deploy support forces.
- Deploy munitions stocks.
- Deploy sustaining supplies.
- Deploy special operations forces.
- Deploy light maneuver forces.
- Deploy heavy maneuver forces.

**Attain aerospace supremacy.**

- Deploy friendly space assets.
- Deny opposing use of space.
- Defeat air attacks on naval forces at sea.
- Defeat air attacks on land targets.
- Destroy and suppress tactical ballistic and cruise missiles.
- Suppress opposing air defense.
- Degrade opposing sortie generation.

---

\(^{25}\)Subsequent development of the STRM framework has led to the merger of operational tasks and capabilities into a single set of joint operational tasks. See Schwabe et al., *Analytic Architecture for Joint Staff Decision Support Activities: Final Report* (forthcoming).
Gain sea control.

- Destroy and suppress opposing submarines.
- Destroy and suppress opposing surface combatants.
- Neutralize opposing mine threat.
- Secure use of sealanes and seaports.
- Interdict and control maritime traffic.

Manage information war.

- Collect data on friendly and opposing assets.
- Disrupt and distort opponent’s collection against friendly assets.
- Disseminate information and intelligence.
- Disrupt and degrade opponent’s dissemination.
- Make decisions within an estimated situation.
- Disrupt opponent’s decisionmaking.

 Degrade opposing capability to wage war.

- Suppress leadership and higher command.
- Destroy and disrupt communications.
- Destroy and suppress weapons of mass destruction.
- Destroy and disrupt power generation.
- Destroy and disrupt transportation.
- Destroy military related stocks.
- Destroy and disrupt military-related production facilities.

Force entry into the region.

- Destroy and suppress opposing forces in the objective area.
- Land forces ship-to-shore by surface.
- Land forces ship-to-shore by air.
- Airdrop forces (airborne operation).
- Defeat opposing forces on the amphibious task force objective.
- Defeat opposing forces on the airborne objective.
- Destroy opposing forces in contact by naval gunfire and air forces.
- Build up friendly forces in the amphibious task force objective area.
- Build up forces in the airborne objective area.

Defeat opposing maneuver forces.

- Provide munitions and sustaining supplies to support maneuver.
- Maneuver to place opponent at a disadvantage.
- Defeat air attacks on maneuver forces.
- Destroy forces out of contact by air attack and deep fires.
- Destroy forces in contact by indirect fires.
- Destroy forces in contact by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft.
- Destroy ground-gaining arms in contact by direct fire.
- Defeat opposing maneuver forces, exploit success, and recover.

Sustain forces: Provide logistic support to forces operating in the theater.

These warfighting capabilities have been introduced by Sam Gardiner and Bruce Pirnie in their current RAND research to develop a framework for theater analysis. Although these are not integral parts of the STRM hierarchy of tasks and objectives, they are
useful in clarifying how tasks are expected to be accomplished. Political and economic objectives are also achieved by applying capabilities to accomplish tasks.

**Issue Paper**

After we constructed a database of objectives, tasks, and force elements, it was necessary to extract relevant parts to provide a basis for discussing resource tradeoffs and the implications of changes in programs. In some cases, the result of an issue-focused review will be to lobby for increased funding. In other cases, the review may indicate that the program at issue would not provide sufficient capability to satisfy a theater objective, and the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee (JROC) may need to review the deficiency. In all cases, the issue paper review will provide a focused USFK command perspective of the program at issue so that CINC testimony and other command representations can be current and internally consistent. Because USCINCPAC may have different objectives to satisfy, there may be disagreement on the importance of a particular program. A COMUSFK issue paper, with the regional and national objectives supported by the program identified and COMUSFK’s assessment of command capability to meet objectives specified, would be a good starting point for discussions with USCINCPAC, and a related USCINCPAC issue paper reflecting alternative objectives would be useful in transmitting concerns up to the CJCS and back down to COMUSFK. The actual form of an issue paper will evolve as the staff becomes familiar with it and the role it can play internally in developing command positions and externally in explaining those positions. The general structure of an issue paper for COMUSFK is shown in Figure 2.10.

The purpose of the issue paper is to provide a single, consistent form for reviewing issues and obtaining COMUSFK guidance on resource problems. A funding summary, upfront, is necessary. More detail may be required, such as breaking command or program funding into budget categories—O&M (operations and maintenance), MP (military personnel), RDT&E (research, development, testing, and evaluation), OP (other procurement), etc.—but the intent is to identify the general magnitude of the issue, USFK financial involvement, and any non-U.S. funding implications, and to provide a perspective on out-year costs. Strategy-to-tasks linkages are keyed to the principal theater operational objective supported by the resources in question. Related higher-level objectives and other theater operational objectives would be listed simply to show the implications of changes in

---

26 The focus of resource tradeoff analysis was the annual COMUSFK input to CINCPAC’s Integrated Priority List (IPL).
**USFK Resource Issue Paper (Illustrative)**

**SUBJECT:** C-17 Objective Inventory Level

**BRIEF SUMMARY:** Recent program management and program cost concerns have led to a proposal to limit the C-17 aircraft program to 40 aircraft.

**FUNDING:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BUDGET YEAR</th>
<th>FYDP TOTAL</th>
<th>TO COMPLETE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Responsible Service/Agency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>XXXX</td>
<td>XXXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USFK</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>XX</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PRINCIPAL THEATER OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE SUPPORTED:** Fight and Win (if necessary on Korean peninsula).

**RELATED HIGHER LEVEL OBJECTIVES:** Strategic agility; technological superiority.

**OTHER THEATER OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES SUPPORTED:** Contribute to regional stability.

**TASKS SUPPORTED BY RESOURCE AT ISSUE:** Deploy forces; sustain augmentation flow.

**ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT AND FUTURE ADEQUACY:** Questionable, based on two primary considerations: lift and defense against TBMs with WMD warheads.

**ALTERNATIVES FOR ACHIEVING AFFECTED OBJECTIVES**

**PROPOSED ACTIONS**
- Alternative 1
- Alternative 2

**DECISION**

---

**Figure 2.10—Structure of USFK Resource Issue Paper**

resourcing. Since theater operational objectives are somewhat general, e.g., **defend peninsula using combined forward defense**, it is also necessary to list specific tasks (when the STRM database has been expanded in theater to include more than one task for all objectives). In our example of proposed cancellation of Corps SAM development, the affected tasks would be **provide CAS for GCC, attain local air superiority, establish**
logistics hubs, and employ combat forces. A concept of operations for each task is necessary to understand the role of the resource at issue in providing required capabilities. Brief descriptions of concepts of operation could be added to the STRM database and attached as appendices to issue papers.

The “meat” of the issue paper is the assessment of the adequacy of current and future force elements. Such an assessment would explain the role the resource at issue plays in the bigger picture of national, regional, and theater objectives. Of particular interest are cases in which a resource has no identifiable impact on objectives. In such cases, it may be that, although a capability is improved, our ability to achieve an objective or accomplish a task does not change. For example, if Corps SAM improved our air defense capability against high performance North Korean attack aircraft but had no real capability against Scuds with submunitions, we might see minimal impact on our ability to protect the force. Other capabilities, such as air-to-air destruction of North Korean attack aircraft or destruction of North Korean airfields, may be the primary way that the threat of attack on air hubs by aircraft is achieved, and we still are left with no effective counter to the Scud attack.

Alternatives for achieving objectives are identified to emphasize the need to consider tradeoffs at all levels. For instances, if Corps SAMs were able to significantly increase our ability to defend large forces on the move, as in counteroffensive operations—if only there were no threat from Scuds—we might identify complementary programs to identify Scud locations and kill them before launch. By facilitating their destruction before launch, we remove the effect of the deficiency in missile defense capability.

Finally, an issue paper should include staff-generated alternatives, including the rationale for considering the alternative and a decision box to record disposition of the issue. The role of the issue paper and the structure of the STRM database will be described in Sections 3 and 4 as we address the use of STRM.
3. USFK RESOURCE MANAGEMENT DATABASE

Resource management decisions require interactions among many staff members. Our goal is to provide a baseline framework for addressing resource issues. The objectives and tasks should be useful as a starting point, but we anticipate the need for coordination and refinement. In particular, the language used to describe objectives and tasks should be changed to be consistent with command usage and the emerging “buzzwords” of the Clinton/Aspin team. The framework is a tool for the command, serving as a backdrop for decisionmaking. To be a useful tool, the terminology should be familiar. We constructed the model during the transition from the Bush/Cheney guidance to the Clinton/Aspin directions. It will take months of interaction between the administration and the Congress before all the details of the new strategy emerge, but general directions are clear: The reduced threat and increased deficit will result in fewer resources for defense. The resources that are committed will be chosen based on their relevance to regional conflicts and operations other than war (peacekeeping and peacemaking).

Our concept of operations for using strategy-to-tasks resource management methodology centers on the USFK resource management staff. A computer database including listings of objectives, tasks, and resource data will provide the source for descriptions and a capability to generate diagrams showing linkages among objectives as well as a simplified way of displaying assessments. The lists themselves would be generated or approved by the relevant staff components and updated as guidance changed. We will now describe the resource management database and then address each of its principal functions with examples of displays or the initial data elements. We will also suggest how the database would be used.

USFK STRM WORKBOOK

The data for strategy-to-tasks descriptions was initially maintained in one very large spreadsheet. We wanted to produce a support methodology for STRM that would not require special software or extensive training for system operators. We chose Microsoft

---

27A printout of the spreadsheet developed for USSOCOM was more than twenty feet long in its initial implementation. The workbook procedures developed for this research were subsequently applied to SOCOM's database and made working with the database and maintaining it much more manageable. See Lewis et al., The United States Special Operations Command Resource Management Process: An Application of the Strategy-to-Tasks Framework, 1994.
Excel® as the database program. We did this for two reasons. First, there are both Macintosh and DOS versions of the program that permit easy movement between the two operating systems. And second, we wanted a support program that might have more than one use in the command. There are limitations to the database capability of Excel, but its general ease of use outweighed the utility of other enhancements we might find in special-purpose database programs.

Excel® 4 introduced the concept of a “workbook.” Because our model includes many lists of objectives that we want the user to be able to modify, it is useful to keep lists in separate files. The workbook concept permits many files to be “bound” or attached to a single integrating file called a workbook. Figure 3.1 shows the initial workbook structure for the model described in this report. A brief description of the STRM workbook and how it can be used is found in Appendix A.

The workbook contains separate files for each level of the framework shown in Figure 1.4. In addition to brief summary descriptions of objectives, the listings in the files include data on linkages among objectives and assessments of command capabilities. (We have included illustrative assessments that would be validated by USFK staff as the STRM procedures are implemented.) Figure 3.2 shows a partial listing of theater operational objectives for USFK. A complete listing of the initial set of objectives is included in Appendix B.

The figure shows that the principal theater objective Fight and Win (if necessary) can be accomplished by Maintaining Deterrence in one of five ways. They include the

![Figure 3.1—USFK Viewpoint Workbook](image-url)
concept that forms the basis of current plans, **Defend using combined forward defense**, as well as alternative concepts for **defense using nuclear weapons** and **deterrence through arms control and confidence and security building measures** (CSBMs). Both current and future assessments of our ability to achieve the principal objective and each of the supporting objectives are included. The six black dots (••••••) indicate that we project difficulty in **conducting an effective forward defense** in 2000. The three dots (•••) show a questionable assessment of the success of **deterrence through arms control**. In spite of deficiencies in particular supporting objectives, the figure illustrates a judgment that overall we are sanguine (OK) about the prospects of **deterrence**. A detailed breakdown of the tasks for **combined forward defense** has been constructed based on discussions with USFK staff members. Part of the task breakdown spreadsheet is shown in Figure 3.3. Additional task breakdowns are included in Appendix B.
Figure 3.3—Spreadsheet View of USFK Tasks for Combined Forward Defense

The dependence of higher-level assessments on specific supporting tasks is shown in the figure. Our concept of operations for combined forward defense consists of three warfighting phases: **Stop the Initial Thrust**, **Build Up U.S. Forces in Theater**, and **Conduct Counteroffensive Operations**. Individual judgments on subtask prospects are combined to arrive at judgments about the achievability of higher-level tasks. For example, after A-10s are retired, even though we project major shortfalls in our ability to provide **Close Air Support** and serious problems in locating and killing weapons of mass destruction, our **local air superiority** and readiness of ground forces lead to an overall assessment that we would be successful in **stopping the initial thrust** (OK). (Assessments are based on judgment that is informed, where possible, by analysis. Simple averaging techniques overlook the impact of some key tasks.) As individual force elements or programs are examined in USFK resource management directed reviews, a more complete library of operational concepts should be developed and added to the workbook data tables.
MAINTAINING THE STRM DATABASE

The initial database contains a set of descriptions—derived from unclassified sources by the project team—of objectives, tasks, and force elements, as well as a list of capabilities for describing operational concepts. The database descriptions should provide sufficient detail to permit immediate use of the STRM database and procedures by the USFK RM staff. The following subsections describe how the database can grow in utility and relevance. None of the procedures requires a computer programmer or a new support analyst on staff. Instead, the database should be a tool that helps analysts frame resource issues in new ways that will build understanding within the entire command of why a particular issue is worthy of the staff's time and why other issues are not worth the time they have demanded in the past. This approach is not a panacea, nor is it a substitute for human judgment and common sense. Rather, it relies on outside models and analysis to inform judgments and assessments displayed in the database. It will not do tradeoffs automatically, but it will easily provide a way to systematically address resource tradeoffs.

This tour of database maintenance operations will use as an illustrative resource issue the C-17 aircraft program. Questions of management problems and cost growth have increased the risk that the program for new intertheater and intratheater lift may be canceled or terminated at much lower levels than anticipated. CINC inputs on the importance of the C-17 are appropriate as Congress and OSD deal with this issue. The STRM framework provides a mechanism for USFK to internally review how the capability provided by C-17s would be used to perform operational tasks and how the accomplishment of those tasks support national objectives.

Are Relevant Programs Included?

From the perspective of the resource management staff, we start at the bottom of the STRM hierarchy. This level is level 6 and it contains organized listings of programs and groups of programs that are collectively called Force Elements. The level of aggregation is arbitrary, but if too low a level is used, the size of the listing will be unmanageable, and redundant assessments and linkages will increase overall complexity and decrease clarity. The Force Elements file, a bound file in the USFK workbook, is divided into four sections. Each section has a common organization based on the categories used by USCINCPAC in the Pacific Command Master Requirements List (MRL). This may not be the most logical grouping of resources, but it is familiar and will serve our purposes for now. Eventually, a new aggregation structure, based on higher-level theater or national objectives, could be
incorporated without requiring new linkages or new assessments, because the categories are used only to organize the disparate set of issues faced by USFK.

Since COMUSFK controls only a small part of the resources that he will use to implement U.S. policy, there are four sections in the Force Element file reflecting each of the important classes of resources. They include (1) Force Elements Controlled by COMUSFK, (2) Force Elements Controlled by USCINCPAC, (3) Force Elements Controlled by OSD/Services—including forces of CINCs other than USCINCPAC, and (4) Force Elements Controlled by the Republic of Korea. A numbering scheme is used to facilitate describing linkages and dependencies. For the Force Elements data file, all entries have an identification number beginning with 6. Force Elements Controlled by COMUSFK have a second-level identifier of 1. Third-level identifiers are associated with the categories of the CINCPAC Master Requirements List, in which strategic mobility is category 10. The C-17 aircraft program is listed under Force Elements Controlled by OSD/Services and has STRM identifier 6.3.9.1. Figure 3.4 shows the relevant part of the Force Elements database.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ref. No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Current Assessment</th>
<th>2000 Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>Army Aviation Modernization Plan (OH-5D)</td>
<td>⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯</td>
<td>⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>Bases/Facilities</td>
<td>⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯</td>
<td>⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td>BOS - Korea (Army, Air Force, SOF)</td>
<td>⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯</td>
<td>⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>Strategic Mobility</td>
<td>⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯</td>
<td>⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96</td>
<td>C-17 Airlift Aircraft</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97</td>
<td>Sustainment</td>
<td>⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯</td>
<td>⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>Prepositioned War Reserve Stocks</td>
<td>⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯</td>
<td>⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>Modern Munitions</td>
<td>⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯</td>
<td>⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>Personnel Readiness</td>
<td>⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯</td>
<td>⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>Command, Control and Communications Systems</td>
<td>⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯</td>
<td>⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3.4—Force Element Database (C-17 Program)**
current set of force elements is not too large to quickly browse through to find a program of interest, but a database tool in Microsoft Excel® makes searching (and finding) much easier. Figure 3.5 shows the database tool (accessed from the data menu) with the C-17 record. Searches require the user to enter search criteria such as a key word or identifier.

Obviously, there are many ways to get forces and equipment to theaters of operation. The C-17 provides a unique combination of capabilities that can support many operational tasks. Whether or not it is required is a function of which other forces are available and how big the task is. Our illustration (Figure 3.4) shows that the current assessment of C-17 airlift effectiveness is N/A (not applicable because the system had reached IOC [initial operational capability] in 1993). The year 2000 assessment of program status is ••••• (Inadequate) based on expected continuation of current problems (i.e., without sufficient C-17s, airlift would be inadequate for the Korean operational plans). The STRM methodology permits investigation of the impact of that status by identifying the links to tasks potentially supported by C-17s. The next step is to investigate links.

![Force Elements](image)

Figure 3.5—Data Form (C-17 Example)
Are Links In Place?

The initial USFK database contains a beginning set of links based on unclassified sources. The linkages are included only once for ease of database maintenance. Each of the first five levels of the USFK STRM hierarchy includes a data field, Links Down, and a button that will automatically extract all the associated linkages for the next level down. For our example of the C-17 program, we would first investigate tasks potentially supported by C-17 aircraft. In the previous step, we found C-17 aircraft in the Force Elements database with identifier 6.3.9.1. Figure 3.6 shows the search criteria used to find related tasks. The first record found by the search is shown in Figure 3.7. The assessment shown for this first supported task is OK (1) for the year 2000. We applied this judgment in building the database, because air forces are largely self-deploying with only small numbers of intertheater lift aircraft necessary to deploy their support forces. (Deploying munitions and sustaining equipment are treated as separate concepts.) This illustrative judgment is that airlift is sufficient to support the task of establishing local air superiority.

![Figure 3.6—Operational Tasks Database (Search Criteria)](image-url)
The second search for tasks potentially supported by the C-17 yields 5.1.2.2 Establish logistics hubs. This task is assessed as •••••• Inadequate for the year 2000 because the alternative airlift aircraft are aging and are not capable of supporting sustained ground and air operations. Subsequent searches for tasks dependent on C-17 aircraft yields: 5.1.2.1 Deploy forces; 5.1.3.2 Sustain augmentation flow; 5.2.1 Attack tactical targets with nuclear weapons; and 5.2.2 Attack strategic targets with nuclear weapons.

Judgments about how adequately the assumed resources support each of these tasks will vary depending on available alternatives for accomplishing the task. A single assessment may require detailed analysis or simply discussion among experts. Other judgments may be easily applied if the resource in question is the only way to satisfactorily accomplish a task.

If an extracted list of supported tasks does not include all of the elements that it should, a new linkage can be established by inserting the reference number (6.3.9.1 for the C-17 program) in the list of Force Elements supporting the capability in the Data Form display or directly in the Links Down cell in the database. Incorrect linkages can be removed in a similar manner by deleting appropriate links. Adding a new task is slightly more
involved, since a new record must be created using the Data Form or by directly inserting a row in the database. (It is necessary to use caution in numbering new capabilities to avoid having reference numbers used more than once.

A similar process of reviewing linkages at different levels can be performed using the Microsoft Excel® database tools. We have also incorporated a tool to extract lists of linked items. Figure 3.8 shows an extracted list of Force Elements previously addressed by COMUSFK supporting the task 5.1.2 Build Up U.S. Forces in Theater, and the subtask 5.1.2.1 Deploy Forces. The list was constructed by using the Extract Links button on the Tasks worksheet.

Have Experts Reviewed Assessments?

Once the basic STRM structure and linkages are in place, it is necessary to assign assessments reflecting expert judgments on how well objectives and capabilities can be supported for an assumed set of resources. The process of assigning and reviewing assessments is a continuing one. We believe that the STRM methodology will be most useful if annual (or more frequent) reviews, keyed to an important PPBS event, are used to develop

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ref. No.</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Current Assessment</th>
<th>2000 Assessment</th>
<th>Links Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1.2.1</td>
<td>Deploy forces</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>'6.1.3.2', '6.1.7.4',</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.3.2</td>
<td>Exercise Program</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.7.4</td>
<td>Eighth USA Hq</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.7.5</td>
<td>Seventh Air Force Hq</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.7.6</td>
<td>USN Korea Hq</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.8.1</td>
<td>Combined Defense Improvement Projects (CDIP) Offshore</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3.8.1</td>
<td>BOS - Korea (Army, Air Force, SOF)</td>
<td>******</td>
<td>******</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3.9.1</td>
<td>C-17 Airlift Aircraft</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>******</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3.123</td>
<td>NAVSTAR Global Positioning System</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.8—Extracted Force Elements Supporting Deployment of Forces
a command assessment for a baseline program that is then frozen as a master database from which program alternatives can developed and analyzed.

**Baseline Assessments.** The initial database contains assessments assigned by the project team based on RAND analysis of future combat scenarios and the likely impact of new systems on total force capabilities. As the prototype STRM database is installed and tested in Korea, project team judgments will be replaced with USFK staff judgments. The database program provides the capability to insert notes in database cells so that judgments and their sources can be identified. Users are encouraged to make frequent use of notes, particularly for the master database, so that users outside the resource management staff can better understand why and how an assessment value was chosen.

**Program Alternative Assessments.** After a comprehensive review of assessments based a complete set of program choices (a new POM, the President’s Budget, etc.), a single resource or a set of resources may be changed and its impact assessed. To accomplish this review, a staff component would make a copy of the master database and adjust assessments based on the changes being considered. Since parts of the STRM hierarchy that do not depend on changed force elements will not be affected by these changes, only a subset of the total database needs to be considered. However, for affected objectives and capabilities, it will be necessary to review changes to all supporting elements at each of the levels of the hierarchy. (Program changes will determine changes at Level 6, e.g., adequate funding of C-17 at the expense of Modern Munitions might change the 2000 assessment for C-17 from Inadequate to OK Adequate while the Modern Munitions element moved from Questionable to Inadequate. How this changes USFK perceptions of how well conventional defense of Korea can be performed will depend on a reassessment of linked programs, capabilities, and tasks up to the theater objective 4.1.1 Defend using combined forward defense. Each program alternative considered will require modifications to a working copy of the master database. Experience with the STRM methodology will identify how many copies to retain and how frequently master databases are updated.

**What About Configuration Control?**

After thorough review within a command by staff and commanders, the master database and its assessments provide a concise picture of what the command is trying to do, what higher-level objectives are supported by those actions, and how well the commander feels he will be able to achieve his objectives. The review will highlight problem areas and show why there are problems. As a result, it will be necessary to make sure that “what if” exercises do not displace agreed positions until it is appropriate. A single staff element
(initially the FKRM Resource Management Staff [USFK]), should therefore maintain the master version and advise other users when significant changes have been made.

**USING THE STRM DATABASE FOR PTRS SUPPORT**

One recurring staff activity that should provide a mechanism for building familiarity with STRM procedures and permit senior staff to better prioritize command inputs to CINCPAC is the review/updating of the USCINCPAC-approved Master Requirements List (MRL). The Pacific Theater Requirements System (PTRS), described in USCINCPACINST 3000.8A of July 9, 1992, is intended to serve as “the only system that identifies, integrates, and prioritizes all theater requirements that may require USCINCPAC support.” Requirements are defined as “an existing capability, deficiency, or ongoing program identified by USCINCPAC subordinate commands or the USCINCPAC staff that may require the personal attention of USCINCPAC to ensure allocation of resources.” Because this definition includes a mixture of both capabilities and programs, it is less precise than it could be. We believe that using the STRM model to generate inputs to the PTRS will make a stronger case for action by USCINCPAC and will provide a clearer basis for advocacy of COMUSFK concerns.

The STRM approach makes a clear distinction between tasks (means of achieving objectives) and force elements or programs (alternative choices for accomplishing a task). Priorities for programs can be established correctly only if decisionmakers understand the tasks and subtasks the programs are intended to accomplish—i.e., linkages need to be shown to higher-level objectives and tasks. The most recent COMUSFK PTRS update, in early 1993, was based on inputs from affected command components. The Eighth Army inputs included program summary sheets with program description, program justification, program alternatives, and Future Years Defense Plan funding profiles. The inputs represent a good start toward permitting prioritization based on objectives and the marginal contribution of programs at issue. The resource issue paper (Figure 2.10) is the tool that can integrate existing program information with command-approved USFK theater operational objectives and the objectives of higher authority. Issue papers can be built using a workbook spreadsheet as a template and copying data elements and assessments from other parts of the workbook. Figure 3.9 shows part of a worksheet constructed by examining the linkages upward from the force element **C-17 Airlift Aircraft** and by copying descriptions of objectives supported and the assessment for the year 2000 under the assumption that the C-17 program is inadequately resourced. The importance of the C-17 in achieving the
USFK Resource Module  
Subject: C-17 Aircraft  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Security Objectives Supported (Level 1)</th>
<th>2000 Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1 SURVIVAL OF THE UNITED STATES</td>
<td>OK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.1 Deter aggression that could threaten US and allies; if deterrence fails, repel or defeat military attack and end conflict on favorable terms to US</td>
<td>OK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.2 Effectively counter threats to security of US citizens and interests short of war, including terrorism</td>
<td>●●●●●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.3 Improve stability by ... arms control agreements, modernized strategic deterrent, limited ballistic missile defense, and enhancing appropriate conventional capabilities</td>
<td>●●●●●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.4 Promote democratic change in the former Soviet Union</td>
<td>OK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.5 Foster restraint in global military spending</td>
<td>●●●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.7 Reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the US by reduction of foreign production, combatting int'l traffickers and reduction of US demand</td>
<td>●●●●●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 HEALTHY, GROWING U.S. ECONOMY</td>
<td>OK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.1 Ensure access to foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, the oceans, and space</td>
<td>OK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 HEALTHY, COOPERATIVE RELATIONS WITH ALLIES AND FRIENDLY NATIONS</td>
<td>OK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.1 Strengthen, enlarge the commonwealth of free nations that share commitment to democracy and individual rights</td>
<td>OK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.2 Strengthen international institutions like the United Nations to make them more effective</td>
<td>OK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 STABLE, SECURE WORLD</td>
<td>OK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4.1 Maintain stable regional military balances to deter those powers that might seek regional dominance</td>
<td>●●●</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: OK = Adequate; ●●● = Questionable; ●●●●● = Inadequate

Figure 3.9—Sample Issue Paper Worksheet

affected objectives can then be determined by analysis of concepts of operation for achieving objectives. A complete listing of linkages and assessments for this example is included as Appendix C and is a part of the prototype workbook (file resource WKS C-17 2000).

Changes in a single program may not have a noticeable effect on all higher-level objectives, but their effect should be identifiable for one or two levels up the hierarchy. By this we mean, for example, that the C-17 problems may cause our ability to deploy munitions stocks to be inadequately supported; the principal related tasks Establish logistics hubs
and Sustain augmentation flow may be inadequately supported; and the principal related theater objective Defend using combined forward defense may be a problem. A set of assessments is required for each alternative level of resourcing and for each time period of concern. The utility of the STRM approach should be most apparent in comparing assessments for two alternatives. For our example, the tasks that show up as important when looking at the C-17 program, Establish logistics hubs and Sustain augmentation flow, may be inadequate for other reasons than simply lack of sufficient airlift. In the former case, ballistic missile attack may be the main reason that hubs cannot be established, and adding C-17s without adequate theater missile defense systems would not help much. Similarly, augmentation flow may be inadequate more because of sealift concerns than because of airlift deficiencies.
4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Strategies-to-tasks resource management formalizes procedures that effective leaders have always used to some extent. Goals cannot be achieved without plans of action. Resources are not ends in themselves; rather, the resources must be provided if our forces are expected to accomplish specific tasks. The uncertainty of when and where we will need to fight may mean that we cannot allocate resources with pinpoint precision, but we can examine numerous alternatives and identify resources that have utility in more than one context. STRM provides a framework for systematically addressing resource issues by stating what others expect us to do with our assigned forces and how we plan to meet those expectations.

The prototype system developed to support USFK resource management decisions has generated interest at other commands. USFK experience in expanding the initial set of objectives and tasks to a USFK-modified architecture should make implementation of STRM by others easier and less time-consuming. The prototype workbook incorporates a few features to simplify moving from spreadsheet to spreadsheet, identifying linked data elements, and extracting data; but much more can be done as the system becomes operational. When a set of objectives with a clear COMUSFK imprimatur has been developed in Korea, it should be reviewed jointly with USCINCPAC planners, both to ensure an understanding of concerns from a USFK viewpoint and to force integration with USCINCPAC objectives.

Translating the concepts introduced in this research into a workable decisionmaking tool for USFK requires five steps:

(1) Theater operational objectives and operational tasks for the conventional defense of the Korean peninsula must be reviewed by appropriate staff elements (J-3, J-5, RM, the Political Advisor, DCINC, CINC) to ensure completeness and to provide agreement on their utility and applicability.

(2) The master database must be installed on local area networks, and configuration control procedures must be adopted to ensure that CINC-approved objectives are not changed without authorization. The necessary configuration control should not be elaborate but should provide a mechanism for making changes only to the command master version of the database.
(3) Procedures for resource issue review must be modified to require specific identification of objectives and tasks that resources at issue are intended to support. The procedures should also require identification of the assumed concept of operation for accomplishing tasks and alternative concepts that may include different sets of resources.

(4) A systematic assessment of current and future (perhaps using the year 2001 or 2005) ability of programmed forces and equipment to achieve operational objectives and accomplish operational tasks should be performed under J-5 or Deputy CINC sponsorship. The initial assessment (Inadequate, Questionable, Adequate) should be conducted based entirely on the expert judgment of staff members. After these assessments have been added to the database (replacing the preliminary estimates), analytic tools should be reviewed by participants in the assessment process to determine ways to improve the next round of assessments. The CINC’s review of services’ POMs would provide an appropriate baseline for USFK assessments.

(5) Over the longer term, COMUSFK should begin dialogs with USCINCPAC and CJCS using the STRM framework to support CINC concerns about both resources and guidance. Guidance is expected to change rapidly as budget reductions are implemented, so the process of providing CINCs’ inputs must be flexible. This means that the framework must be dynamic. It is not sufficient to simply acknowledge that the team-developed structure is “about right.” Objectives must be modified by command staff in Korea as major decisions are made and as command viewpoints change.

COMMON REFERENCE POINT

The principal value of the STRM approach for the commander may turn out to be having a concise definition of theater operational objectives and sets of tasks to accomplish those objectives. Once the commander has interacted with the staff members who produced the definitions, the definitions are marked with his approval and can serve as a common reference point for many purposes in addition to resource management. By identifying economic and political objectives as well as warfighting objectives, the commander immediately raises the priority of associated supporting activities. If no tasks can be identified to support an objective, it will be impossible to take actions within the command to achieve the objective. Diagrams such as Figure 2.5 (Theater Operational Objectives and Sub-objectives for USFK) should become starting points for policy and planning discussions.
internally and externally. It should be emphasized that this is not a static process. This initial implementation contains national security objectives and national military objectives that will need to be changed to match Clinton administration priorities. This process may lead to new objectives for the Korean theater but it may not generate new tasks (it will still be necessary to plan to stop a North Korean attack with in-place forces and rapidly deploying air forces before such an advance reaches Seoul). Certainly, basic warfighting capabilities should remain relatively constant, but “how much is enough” can be answered only in the context of higher-level objectives.28

Planning would be improved if all commands were forced to concisely specify how they interpreted national objectives and how they translated national objectives into tasks that could be analyzed to assess performance. If USCINCPAC specified his objectives, those objectives could be matched with those of COMUSFK and, where they appeared to differ in content or emphasis, a dialog could begin. For example, it is natural for COMUSFK to place most of his planning efforts on refining the concept of operations for defending the peninsula. If CINCPAC’s objectives put high priority on developing logistics hubs in Northeast Asia outside of Japan, joint U.S.–ROK construction planning would be influenced. Obviously, a regional CINC has a broader set of concerns than does a theater commander, but the theater commander can both influence the viewpoint of the regional commander and respond to his priorities. The whole process would be enhanced by the development of a regional plan for the Pacific as a whole.

REGIONAL PLAN

In the discussion of CINCs and their roles, the issue emerges: Who exactly is a CINC? For instance, in Korea the “CINC,” functioning as the U.S. provider of forces for a combined defense of the peninsula, is actually a subunified command. Although he has responsibility for the Korean peninsula in his capacity of Commander, United Forces Korea, he reports to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Command (CINCPAC) on all resource issues.29

A number of changes in the Korean peninsula, as well as in the Pacific Basin, necessitate that there be a more integrated Pacific regional plan. Within the peninsula, the

---

28 In particular, the “Bottom-Up” review conducted by Secretary Aspin considered but dropped a new “Win-Hold-Win” strategy where plans for the defense of Korea would have needed to provide for a holding phase if the United States were already committed to a major regional conflict in some other area. See Michael R. Gordon, “Cuts Force Review of War Strategies,” New York Times, May 30, 1993. p. 1/16.
29 As previously noted, the same office is a CINC both in the role of CINC U.N. Command Korea, fulfilling responsibilities assigned to the U.S. by the U.N. Security Council, and as CINC ROK/US Combined Forces Command.
United States' decision to make the Republic of Korea (ROK) increasingly responsible for its own defense, concurrent with the reduction in U.S. presence and funding to the peninsula, necessitates that the U.S. role on the peninsula be reexamined. This reexamination, however, should consider several emerging issues both within and outside of the peninsula: the role of the United States on the peninsula given the growing instability of the People’s Republic of Korea; the operational transfer of some command responsibilities between the United States and the ROK; and the role of the U.S. with a reduced presence on the peninsula. Within the context of the U.S. presence in the Pacific, several questions emerge: Should Korea function as a hub for forward presence for U.S. forces in the Pacific, given the closing of our bases in the Philippines? If so, how might this role work? What would be the implications for U.S. forces in Japan and Hawaii? How would U.S. command relations be affected?

Figure 4.1 shows a notional conception of a regional plan. Inter- and intratheater issues must be considered within the context of an integrated regional plan. The plan needs to consider a total view of the Pacific Basin that thinks through near-, mid-, and long-term issues. With such a plan, one could begin to articulate CINCPAC's preferences on OSD and service investment strategies, as well as those of USFK—and, to a certain extent, begin to
have a clearer view of what the ROK's and Japan's investment strategies should be from the viewpoint of the United States.

We also argue that a strong regional plan provides a CINCPAC methodology by which the total resource demands for the Pacific can be defined and then articulated to the OSD, the Chairman, and finally, Congress. Such a plan would also provide a mechanism for the COMUSFK and CINCPAC to justify their resource needs to the services who must provide the funding.

The concept of a framework leading to a discipline for resource decisionmaking has evolved considerably over the course of this research. The unique viewpoint of a commander such as COMUSFK/CINCCFC/CINCUNC needs to be adequately represented in Washington policy and strategy debates, but it will be effectively represented only if issues raised from Korea can be seen in the broader context of national and regional security objectives. Our methodology will continue to evolve, and we hope COMUSFK experience will help to refine our model as we work with other participants in the PPBS process. The procedures are not a panacea, but they should lead to more-informed debate.
Appendix

A. STRM WORKBOOK CONCEPTS

The database used to support the application of STRM at the headquarters of the Commander U.S. Forces, Korea was constructed using Microsoft Excel 4.0®. Excel is a spreadsheet program with two powerful additional capabilities that make it suitable for STRM support: a simple database management capability and build-by-example macros (a macro is a simple program that permits frequently used procedures to be automated). Spreadsheets individually are lists of information organized by rows and columns. Mathematical or logical functions can be used to summarize or combine information in spreadsheet cells. (Cells are the organizing principle of a spreadsheet. Every data element is contained in a cell.) Excel 4.0 extends the spreadsheet paradigm to a new set of files named a workbook. A workbook is a collection of spreadsheets that are linked either physically (bound) or logically (unbound). Figure A.1 shows part of a spreadsheet containing data on

![Figure A.1—Sample Spreadsheet Extract](image-url)
programs of potential interest to COMUSFK. Figure A.2 shows the index of the workbook of which the spreadsheet in Figure A.1 is a part.\textsuperscript{30}

In part, Excel was chosen as the environment for automating STRM concepts because it can easily be transferred between Macintosh\textsuperscript{TM} and MS-DOS\textsuperscript{TM} operating systems. There are still a few features unique to a particular operating system, but we have avoided using them so that the team-developed prototype can be used as-is in Korea. This prototype will continue to evolve as related research on PPBS support is extended, but we will continue to emphasize keeping the program as simple to use as possible and readily transferable to MS-DOS systems.

A feature of Excel that is used extensively in the STRM workbook is buttons that control macros. Using the workbook requires moving around from one spreadsheet to another. In particular, we believe that users will find the Master Diagram spreadsheet that

\textbf{Figure A.2—Workbook Index}

\textsuperscript{30}Microsoft Excel 5\textsuperscript{®} replaces the index with tabs at the bottom of the worksheet. USFK STRM files will work with both versions of Excel.
graphically portrays the STRM hierarchy and current assessments useful. As a result, we have included a button labeled "Go to Tree" to take a user from a list of objectives to the Master Diagram. Figure A.3 shows an extract of the Master Diagram spreadsheet.

The hierarchy tree in the Master Diagram spreadsheet of the USFK workbook at full size is a diagram that is about two feet wide and four feet long. Computer screens can show only a part of the tree if the diagram is shown at full size (100 percent scaling). The computer screen is like a searchlight illuminating a part of the whole at any given time. The entire tree can be viewed at one time by zooming out (using the Window Zoom pull-down menu). As the figure is scaled, the text gets proportionally smaller until eventually it is illegible. Since each box in the hierarchy tree is linked to a specific objective, task, or program on another spreadsheet, the user can double-click on any box and be taken to the associated worksheet with complete statements, assessments, and linkages. Figure A.4 shows the results of double-clicking on the box labeled **Encourage North-South talks** in Figure A.3. After reviewing the basis for the assessment reflected in the hierarchy tree, the
Figure A.4—Theater Operational Objectives Worksheet

User can click the Go to STRM Tree button found at the bottom of all worksheets with lists and return to the Master Diagram. Other buttons shown in Figure A.4 are used to identify lower-level links and to clear marks that were applied during previous link identification.

Many tasks are decomposed to include several levels of detail to assist in specifying which activities are included, so that assessments of status can be made. Depending on how much information is required by the analyst, it may be desirable to suppress lower-level breakdowns. Excel contains an outlining capability that works well with nested data elements. Figure A.4 shows the outlining controls on the left side of the spreadsheet. When outlining has been applied to a worksheet, the + symbol indicates that a lower-level breakdown has been collapsed. Clicking on the + symbol causes expansion (display) of the previously collapsed rows of data. In Figure A.4 the data rows are expanded and a – symbol is shown at the top of a line linking all associated lower-level tasks. Clicking on the – symbol will cause the associated rows to collapse.
Appendix

B. USFK STRM WORKBOOK CONTENTS

This appendix includes the descriptions of objectives, tasks, and the force elements in the initial workbook prepared for staff interactions with USFK. Subsections are extracted from Microsoft Excel® files bound to an Excel workbook named USFK STRM on the Macintosh and USFKSTRM.XLW on a DOS system.

NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES

Source: National Security Strategy of the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ref. No.</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>SURVIVAL OF THE UNITED STATES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.1</td>
<td>Deter aggression that could threaten U.S. and allies; if deterrence fails, repel or defeat military attack and end conflict on favorable terms to U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.2</td>
<td>Effectively counter threats short of war, to security of U.S. citizens and interests, including the threat of terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.3</td>
<td>Improve stability by . . . arms control agreements, modernized strategic deterrent, limited ballistic missile defense, and enhancing appropriate conventional capabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.4</td>
<td>Promote democratic change in the Soviet Union.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.5</td>
<td>Foster restraint in global military spending.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.6</td>
<td>Prevent the transfer of militarily critical technologies and the spread of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and high-technology means of delivery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.7</td>
<td>Reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the U.S. by reduction of foreign production, combating international traffickers, and reduction of U.S. demand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>HEALTHY, GROWING U.S. ECONOMY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.1</td>
<td>Ensure access to foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, the oceans, and space.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>HEALTHY, COOPERATIVE RELATIONS WITH ALLIES AND FRIENDLY NATIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.1</td>
<td>Strengthen, enlarge the commonwealth of free nations that share commitment to democracy and individual rights.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.3.2 Strengthen international institutions like the United Nations to make them more effective.

1.4 **STABLE, SECURE WORLD**
1.4.1 Maintain stable regional military balances to deter those powers that might seek regional dominance.
1.4.2 Promote diplomatic solutions to regional disputes.
1.4.3 Promote growth of free, democratic political institutions . . . (for) human rights and economic and social progress
1.4.4 Aid in combating threats to democratic institutions from aggression, coercion, insurrections, subversion, terrorism, and illicit drug trafficking.

**NATIONAL MILITARY OBJECTIVES**

Source: *The National Military Strategy of the United States, 1992*

2.1 **WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY**

2.1.1 **DETERRENCE** - Maintain global capabilities sufficient to convince adversaries that the cost of aggression will exceed any possible gain.

2.1.2 **FORWARD PRESENCE** - Deploy forces throughout the world to show our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis response capability while promoting U.S. influence and access.

2.1.2.1 Operational Training and Deployments - show commitment to alliances, contribute to regional stability, preserve access agreements and basing rights.

2.1.2.2 Security Assistance - demonstrate commitment, reinforce alliance cohesion, build on bilateral relationships, provide moderating influence on regional stability.

2.1.2.3 Protecting U.S. Citizens Abroad - provide responsive and capable evacuation lift in the midst of armed conflicts, deter terrorism.

2.1.2.4 Combating Drugs - detection and significant reduction of the production and trafficking of illegal drugs is a high priority national security mission.

2.1.2.5 Humanitarian Assistance - includes disaster relief, may require engagement in conflict in order to assist and protect those in need.

2.1.3 **CRISIS RESPONSE/POWER PROJECTION** - Maintain the capability to respond rapidly to deter and, if necessary, to fight unilaterally or as part of a combined effort.
2.1.4 RECONSTITUTION - Achieve and maintain a credible capability to build wholly new forces should a resurgent global threat appear; maintain the ability to reestablish a global warfighting capability.

2.2 SUPPORTING PRINCIPLES

2.2.1 READINESS - maintain a force that can respond quickly, be prepared to fight on arrival, and that requires realistic, demanding, and objectively measured training and exercises.

2.2.2 COLLECTIVE SECURITY - strengthen world response to crises through multilateral operations; burdens and responsibilities are shared by many nations; be prepared to fight as part of an ad hoc coalition.

2.2.3 ARMS CONTROL - means to enhance our national security, inject greater predictability into military relationships, channel force posture in more stabilizing directions.

2.2.4 MARITIME AND AEROSPACE SUPERIORITY - preeminence in air, in space, and at sea is key to our continued success as a global leader.

2.2.5 STRATEGIC AGILITY - force needed to win is assembled by rapid movement of forces from wherever they are to wherever they are needed.

2.2.6 POWER PROJECTION - day in and day out contributor to deterrence, regional security, and collective security, more important as overseas presence is reduced.

2.2.7 TECHNOLOGICAL SUPERIORITY - offsets quantitative advantages, minimizes risk to U.S. forces, enhances potential for swift, decisive termination of conflict.

2.2.8 DECISIVE FORCE - the ability to rapidly assemble the forces needed to win, overwhelm our adversaries, and terminate conflicts swiftly with a minimum loss of life.

REGIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES (USCINCPAC)

Source: Taken from list of “U.S. security interests” in Asia, cited in Nunn-Warner II, p. 9.

3.1 Protect the United States and its allies from attack.

3.2 Maintain regional peace and stability.

3.3 Preserve our political and economic access.

3.4 Contribute to nuclear deterrence.

3.5 Foster the growth of democracy and human rights.
3.6 Stop proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and ballistic missile systems.

3.7 Ensure freedom of navigation.

3.8 Reduce illicit drug trafficking.

THEATER OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES (USFK)

Source: Derived from CINC testimony and command documents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ref. No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Lure North Korea out of Cold War stance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.1</td>
<td>Maintain deterrence posture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.1.1</td>
<td>Defend using combined forward defense.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.1.2</td>
<td>Defend using U.S. nuclear weapons as necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.1.3</td>
<td>Deter attack through arms control and CSBMs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.1.4</td>
<td>Burdensharing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.1.5</td>
<td>Maintain Korean War Armistice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.2</td>
<td>Encourage North-South talks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.3</td>
<td>Discourage proliferation of WMD and missiles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.4</td>
<td>Develop ROK economy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Implement Nunn-Warner Initiatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.1</td>
<td>ROK leadership of Korean defense.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.2</td>
<td>Reduce U.S. forces in Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.3</td>
<td>Maintain U.S. presence in Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Contribute to regional stability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.1</td>
<td>Encourage stable democracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.2</td>
<td>Promote reunification under favorable terms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.3</td>
<td>Reduce illicit drug trafficking.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
OPERATIONAL TASKS

5.1 Defend Using Combined Forward Defense

5.1.1 Stop initial thrust.
5.1.1.1 Prepare to employ forces on short warning.
5.1.1.2 Provide CAS for GCC.
5.1.1.3 Interdict invader's support and reinforcement.
5.1.1.4 Destroy weapons of mass destruction.
5.1.1.5 Attain local air superiority.
5.1.2 Build up U.S. forces in theater.
5.1.2.1 Deploy forces.
5.1.2.2 Establish logistics hubs.
5.1.2.3 Conduct strategic bombing.
5.1.2.4 Establish theater air superiority.
5.1.2.5 Contain rear area threat.
5.1.3 Conduct counteroffensive operations.
5.1.3.1 Employ combat forces.
5.1.3.2 Sustain augmentation flow.
5.1.4 Isolate North Korea politically.

5.2 Defend with nuclear weapons.
5.2.1 Attack tactical targets with nuclear weapons.
5.2.2 Attack strategic targets with nuclear weapons.

5.3 Deter attack through arms control and CSBMs.

5.4 Maintain U.S. military presence.
5.4.1 Maintain bases and facilities.
5.4.1.1 Construct U.S. facilities supporting warfighting.
5.4.1.2 Construct U.S. quality-of-life facilities.
5.4.1.3 Operate and maintain U.S. facilities.
5.4.2 Station forces.
5.4.3 Plan operations.
5.4.4 Maintain readiness of forces.

5.5 Discourage arms proliferation by North Korea.
5.5.1 Discourage nuclear proliferation in North Korea.
5.5.1.1 Monitor North Korean nuclear facilities.
5.5.1.2 Assess the data on North Korean nuclear capabilities.
5.5.1.3 Inspect suspected nuclear sites.
5.5.1.4 Publicize the findings from inspections and analysis.
5.5.1.5 Respond to illegal or inappropriate activities.
5.5.2 Discourage proliferation of WMD including ballistic missiles from North Korea.
5.5.2.1 Monitor North Korean arms sales.
5.5.2.2 Assess data on North Korean arms sales and shipments.
5.5.2.3 Publicize the findings from observations and analysis.
5.5.2.4 Respond to illegal or inappropriate activities.

5.6 Reduce illicit drug trafficking.
5.6.1 Conduct counterdrug operational planning.
5.6.2 Conduct joint and combined counterdrug operations.

FORCE ELEMENTS (PROGRAMS)

Source: USFK Integrated Priority Lists Reviews and RAND analysis of operating concepts.

6.1 Force Elements Controlled by USFK
6.1.1 Counterdrug
6.1.2 Intelligence

6.1.3 Readiness
6.1.3.1 Modern US Munitions Korea
6.1.3.2 Exercise Program
6.1.3.3 Simulation and Modeling Programs
6.1.4 Air Defense
6.1.5 Special Operations
6.1.5.1 SOC Korea HQ
6.1.5.2 353th Special Operations Wing
6.1.5.3 Special Forces Det K
6.1.6 Sea Control
6.1.7 Contingency Response
6.1.7.1 2nd Infantry Division
6.1.7.2 7th Cav Forward

6.1.7.3 51st Wing - Osan
6.1.7.4 Eighth USA HQ
6.1.7.5 Seventh Air Force HQ
6.1.7.6 USN Korea HQ
6.1.7.7 8th Fighter Wing - Kunsan
5.1.8 Bases/Facilities
5.1.8.1 Combined Defense Improvement Projects (CDIP)
Offshore Material Procurement and Design
5.1.9 Strategic Mobility
5.1.10 Sustainment
5.1.11 Personnel Readiness
6.1.12 Command, Control, and Communications Systems

6.1.12.1 Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) Remote Radios
(USAF)
6.1.12.2 Theater Automated C2 Information Management System
6.1.12.3 Korean Intelligence Support System (KISS)

6.1.13 Medical
6.1.13.1 Composite Medical/Dental Facility, Kunsan
6.1.13.2 Medical War Reserve Material Storage (USAF)
6.2 Force Elements Controlled by USCINCPAC
6.2.1 Counterdrug

6.2.2 Intelligence

6.2.2.1 PASS Concept (Intelligence)

6.2.2.2 Tactical Airborne RECCE

6.2.2.3 Tactical Cryptological Collection

6.2.3 Readiness

6.2.4 Air Defense

6.2.5 Special Operations

6.2.5.1 353th Special Operations Wing

6.2.5.2 NSWTG 1

6.2.5.3 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group

6.2.6 Sea Control

6.2.6.1 Seventh Fleet CVBGs (2)

6.2.6.2 Marine Patrol Aircraft Squadron (2)

6.2.7 Contingency Response

6.2.7.1 KC135 Tanker Squadron

6.2.7.2 E3A Det, AWACS Fwd Kadena

6.2.7.3 USAF Tactical Fighter Wings (2)

6.2.7.4 MEF and Amphibious Task Force (includes Marine Division and Marine Air Wing)

6.2.7.5 MECH Division (1)

6.2.7.6 Light Infantry Division (1)

6.2.8 Bases/Facilities
6.2.9 Strategic Mobility
6.2.10 Sustainment
6.2.10.1 Theater Tactical Airlift (C130s)
6.2.11 Personnel Readiness
6.2.12 Command, Control, and Communications Systems
6.2.13 Medical

6.3 Force Elements Controlled by OSD/Services
6.3.1 Counterdrug
6.3.2 Intelligence
6.3.2.1 GDIP - Reef Point (EP3)
6.3.2.2 GDIP - Senior Span (U-2)
6.3.2.3 GDIP - JNIDS-K, Korea I&W
6.3.2.4 GDIP - U-2R Program
6.3.2.5 GDIP - RC-12 (Guardrail/Common Sensor Program)
6.3.2.6 GDIP - OV-1D SLAR Program
6.3.2.7 GDIP - Rivet Joint (EC-135)
6.3.2.8 GDIP-Long Range Aerial Exploitation (ARL) Program
6.3.3 Readiness
6.3.3.1 DBOF - Korea (Services and SOF)
6.3.4 Air Defense
6.3.4.1 Corps SAM
6.3.4.2 Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC) III
6.3.5 Special Operations
6.3.6 Sea Control
6.3.6.1 CVBGs
6.3.7 Contingency Response
6.3.7.1 EF-111 Forward Deployment
6.3.7.2 Searchlights to Counter SOF Insertion
6.3.7.3 Armed Scout Helicopter
6.3.7.4 Man-portable anti-tank weapon
6.3.7.5 Rescue Helicopter (AF/SOF)
6.3.7.6 Army Aviation Modernization Plan (OH-5D)
6.3.8 Bases/Facilities
6.3.8.1 BOS - Korea (Army, Air Force, SOF)
6.3.9 Strategic Mobility
6.3.9.1 C-17 Airlift Aircraft
6.3.10' Sustainment
6.3.10.1 Prepositioned War Reserve Stocks
6.3.10.2 Modern Munitions
6.3.11 Personnel Readiness
6.3.12 Command, Control, and Communications Systems
6.3.12.1 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) (Army)
6.3.12.2 MILSTAR (Army)
6.3.12.3 NAVSTAR Global Positioning System
6.3.12.4 Advanced Tactical Airborne RECCCE System (ATARS)

6.3.13 Medical

6.4 Force Elements Controlled by ROK

6.4.1 Counterdrug

6.4.2 Intelligence

6.4.3 Readiness

6.4.4 Air Defense

6.4.5 Special Operations

6.4.6 Sea Control

6.4.7 Contingency Response

6.4.8 Bases/Facilities

6.4.9 Strategic Mobility

6.4.10 Sustainment

6.4.11 Personnel Readiness

6.4.12 Command, Control, and Communications Systems

6.4.13 Medical

CAPABILITIES NEEDED TO BUILD CONCEPTS OF OPERATION

Prepare and deploy forces.

Deploy air forces.
  - Gain use of enroute staging bases.
  - Provide in-flight refueling as required.
  - Deploy airlift control elements.
  - Deploy tactical air units.

Deploy naval forces.
  - Deploy naval forces.
  - Deploy submarines.
  - Deploy surface action groups (SAG).
  - Deploy carrier battle groups (CVBG).

Alert, call up, mobilize, train, and position forces.
  - Alert active forces.
  - Call up
    - Reserve forces.
    - National Guard.
  - Mobilize war related industry.
  - Conduct intensified training.
  - Position forces for deployment.
Provide airlift.
  Alert and position military aircraft.
  Call up Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF).

Provide sealift.
Deploy support forces.
Deploy munitions stocks.
Deploy sustaining supplies.
Deploy special operations forces.
Deploy light maneuver forces.
Deploy heavy maneuver forces.
  Deploy active Army heavy divisions.
  Deploy National Guard heavy divisions.

**Attain aerospace supremacy.**

Deploy friendly space assets.
  Reposition existing assets.
  Launch additional platforms.
  Communications: DSCS, AFSATCOM, SDS, FLTSATCOM, LEASAT.
  Environmental monitoring: DMSP.
  Surveillance: various programs.
  Warning: DSP, NDS.
  Navigation and positioning: GPS.

Deny opposing use of space.
  Deny access to commercial systems, including GPS.
  Jam downlinks.
  Destroy receiving stations.
  Conduct anti-satellite operations.

Defeat air attacks on naval forces at sea.
  Collect data on friendly and opposing assets.
  Defeat opposing attacks on naval forces at sea.
  Degrade opposing sortie generation.
  Suppress opposing air defenses.

Defeat air attacks on land targets.
  Collect data on friendly and opposing assets.
  Defeat opposing attacks on land targets.
  Disrupt and distort opponent's collection against friendly assets.
  Suppress opposing air defenses.
  Degrade opposing sortie generation.

Destroy and suppress tactical ballistic and cruise missiles.
  Identify missile locations and support infrastructure.
  Destroy and suppress tactical ballistic and cruise missiles.
  Suppress opposing air defense.

Suppress opposing air defense.
  Collect data on friendly and opposing assets.
  Jam EW/GCI radars and air-defense-related communications.
  Destroy radar sites.
  Destroy missile launchers.
  Destroy fighter aircraft in aerial combat.
Degrade opposing sortie generation.
  Collect data on friendly and opposing assets.
  Suppress opposing air defense.
  Crater launch surface.
  Mine launch surfaces.
  Destroy support facilities.
  Destroy unsheltered aircraft.
  Destroy sheltered aircraft.

Gain sea control.
  Destroy and suppress opposing submarines.
  Collect data on friendly and opposing assets.
  Destroy and suppress by sea mines.
  Destroy by attack submarines.
  Destroy by maritime patrol aircraft.
  Destroy by surface ships.

Destroy and suppress opposing surface combatants.
  Collect data on friendly and opposing assets.
  Destroy and suppress by sea mines.
  Destroy by attack submarine.
  Destroy by surface ship.
  Destroy by rotary-wing aircraft.
  Destroy by fixed-wing aircraft.

Neutralize opposing mine threat.
  Collect data on friendly and opposing assets.
  Detect and mark or destroy mines.

Secure use of sealanes and seaports.

Interdict and control maritime traffic.
  Collect data on friendly and opposing assets.
  Interdict and control maritime traffic.

Manage information war.
  Collect data on friendly and opposing assets.
  Collect data on friendly assets.
  —Services, higher commands, formations, and units within national forces.
  —Combined command relationships.
  —liaison.
  Fuse data into information.
  Collect data on opposing assets:
  —National, theater level means.
  —Aggregations of tactical collection means.
  —Contact reports from friendly forces.
  Fuse data into intelligence.

Disrupt and distort opponent’s collection against friendly assets.

Disseminate information and intelligence.
  Create and maintain communications that are
    —Survivable.
— Redundant.
— Secure.

Disrupt and degrade opponent’s dissemination.

Make decisions within an estimated situation.
   Estimate situation based on
      — Information on friendly assets.
      — Intelligence on opposing assets.
   Weigh alternative courses of action:
      — Suitability to attain objective.
      — Feasibility.
      — Acceptability considering expected losses.
   Make decisions:
      — Recommendations up.
      — Orders and directives down.
      — Coordination with other forces.

Disrupt opponent’s decisionmaking.

**Degrade opposing capability to wage war.**

   Suppress leadership and higher command.
   Destroy and disrupt communications.
   Destroy and suppress weapons of mass destruction.
   Destroy and disrupt power generation.
   Destroy and disrupt transportation.
   Destroy military-related stocks.
   Destroy and disrupt military-related production facilities.

**Force entry into the region.**

   Destroy and suppress opposing forces in the objective area.
   Land forces ship to shore by surface.
   Land forces ship to shore by air.
   Airdrop forces (airborne operation).
   Defeat opposing forces on the amphibious task force objective.
   Defeat opposing forces on the airborne objective.
   Destroy opposing forces in contact by naval gunfire and air forces.
   Build up friendly forces in the amphibious task force objective area.
   Build up forces in the airborne objective area.

**Defeat opposing maneuver forces.**

   Provide munitions and sustaining supplies to support maneuver.
   Calculate supply requirements during an operation or campaign based upon
      — Plan of maneuver.
      — Combat consumption.
      — Size and composition of forces.
      — Regionally available supplies.
      — Transportation infrastructure.
      — Distances from deployment airfields and seaports.

   Maneuver to place opponent at a disadvantage.
      — Feints and other deception.
      — Massing friendly forces.
      — Breakthrough operations.
Turning movements.
Heliborne assault.
Pursuit.
Single and double envelopments.
Maneuver may be combined with forced entry into an overall concept of operations.
Destroy forces in contact by indirect fire.
Destroy ground gaining arms in contact by direct fires.

Defeat air attacks on maneuver forces.
  Collect data on friendly and opposing assets.
  Destroy and suppress attacks by fixed-wing aircraft below 15,000 feet.
  Destroy and suppress rotary-wing aircraft.

Destroy forces out of contact by air attack and deep fires.
  Collect data on friendly and opposing assets.
  Destroy and disrupt by air attacks.
  Destroy and disrupt by deep fire.

Destroy forces in contact by indirect fires.
  Collect data on friendly and opposing assets.
  Destroy and suppress opposing rocket and artillery systems.
  Destroy and suppress opposing heavy forces.
  Destroy and suppress opposing light forces.

Destroy forces in contact by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft.
  Collect data on friendly and opposing forces.
  Destroy rocket and artillery systems.
  Destroy heavy forces.
  Destroy light forces.

Destroy ground-gaining arms in contact by direct fire.
  Collect data on friendly and opposing assets.
  Destroy heavy forces with tank main guns.
  Destroy heavy forces with anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM).
  Destroy light forces with machine guns and small arms.

Defeat opposing maneuver forces, exploit success, and recover.
  Defeat opposing maneuver forces.
    — Destruction.
    — Surrender.
    — Retreat or withdrawal.
  Exploit success.
    — Occupy key terrain.
    — Secure political and industrial centers.
    — Establish friendly governments.
  Recover.
    — Consolidate and regroup forces.
    — Replace combat losses.
    — Prepare for subsequent operations.
### C. SAMPLE RESOURCE WORKSHEET

**USFK Resource Module**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>2000 Assessment</th>
<th>Major Factor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>Force Elements Controlled by OSD/Services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3.9</td>
<td>Strategic Mobility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3.9.1</td>
<td>C-17 Airlift Aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Operational Tasks Supported (Level 5)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Task Description</th>
<th>2000 Assessment</th>
<th>Major Factor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Defend Using Combined Forward Defense.</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1.2</td>
<td>Build Up U.S. forces in theater.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1.2.1</td>
<td>Deploy forces.</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1.2.2</td>
<td>Establish logistics hubs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1.2.4</td>
<td>Establish theater air superiority.</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1.3</td>
<td>Conduct counteroffensive operations.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1.3.2</td>
<td>Sustain augmentation flow.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td><strong>Defend with nuclear weapons.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.1</td>
<td>Attack tactical targets with nuclear weapons.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.2</td>
<td>Attack strategic targets with nuclear weapons.</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Theater Operational Objectives Supported (Level 4)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Task Description</th>
<th>2000 Assessment</th>
<th>Major Factor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Lure North Korea out of Cold War stance.</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.1</td>
<td>Maintain deterrence posture.</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.1.1</td>
<td>Defend using combined forward defense.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.1.2</td>
<td>Defend using U.S. nuclear weapons as necessary.</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.1.5</td>
<td>Maintain Korean War Armistice.</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.3</td>
<td>Discourage proliferation of WMD and missiles.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td><strong>Implement Nunn-Warner Initiatives.</strong></td>
<td>OK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.1</td>
<td>ROK leadership of Korean defense.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.3</td>
<td>Maintain U.S. Presence in Korea.</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.3 Contribute to regional stability.
4.3.1 Encourage stable democracy.
4.3.2 Promote reunification under favorable terms.

Regional Security Objectives Supported (Level 3)
3.1 Protect the United States and its allies from attack.
3.2 Maintain regional peace and stability.
3.3 Preserve our political and economic access.
3.4 Contribute to nuclear deterrence.
3.5 Foster the growth of democracy and human rights.
3.6 Discourage proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and ballistic missile systems.
3.7 Ensure freedom of navigation.

National Military Objectives Supported (Level 2)
2.1 Warfighting capability
2.1.1 STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE - maintain global capabilities sufficient to convince adversaries that the cost of aggression will exceed any possible gain.
2.1.1.1 Flexible nuclear response options including a reliable warning system.
2.1.1.2 Defensive system for global protection against limited strikes.
2.1.2 FORWARD PRESENCE - deploy forces throughout the world to show our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis response capability while promoting U.S. influence and access.
2.1.2.1 Forces stationed overseas and afloat.
2.1.2.2 Collective defense system reducing burdens of defense spending and unnecessary arms competition.
2.1.2.3 Operational Training and Deployments - show commitment to alliances, contribute to regional stability, preserve access agreements and basing rights.
2.1.2.4 Security Assistance - demonstrate commitment, reinforce alliance cohesion, build on bilateral relationships, provide moderating influence on regional stability.

2.1.2.5 Protecting U.S. Citizens Abroad - provide responsive and capable evacuation lift in the midst of armed conflicts, deter terrorism.

2.1.2.6 Combating Drugs - detection and significant reduction of the production and trafficking of illegal drugs is a high priority national security mission.

2.1.2.7 Humanitarian Assistance - includes disaster relief, may require engagement in conflict in order to assist and protect those in need.

2.1.3 CRISIS RESPONSE/POWER PROJECTION - maintain the capability to respond rapidly to deter and, if necessary, to fight unilaterally or as part of a combined effort.

2.1.4 RECONSTITUTION - achieve and maintain a credible capability to build wholly new forces should a resurgent global threat appear; maintain the ability to reestablish a global warfighting capability.

2.2 Supporting Principles

2.2.1 READINESS - maintain a force that can respond quickly, be prepared to fight on arrival, and that requires realistic, demanding, and objectively measured training and exercises.

2.2.2 COLLECTIVE SECURITY - strengthen world response to crises through multilateral operations; burdens and responsibilities are shared by many nations; be prepared to fight as part of an ad hoc coalition.

2.2.3 ARMS CONTROL - means to enhance our national security, inject greater predictability into military relationships, channel force posture in more stabilizing directions.

2.2.4 MARITIME AND AEROSPACE SUPERIORITY - preeminence in air, in space, and at sea is key to our continued success as a global leader.

2.2.5 STRATEGIC AGILITY - force needed to win is assembled by rapid movement of forces from wherever they are to wherever they are needed.

2.2.6 POWER PROJECTION - day in and day out contributor to deterrence, regional security, and collective security; more important as overseas presence is reduced.
2.2.7 TECHNOLOGICAL SUPERIORITY - offsets quantitative advantages, minimizes risk to U.S. forces, enhances potential for swift, decisive termination of conflict.

2.2.8 DECISIVE FORCE - the ability to rapidly assemble the forces needed to win, overwhelm our adversaries, and terminate conflicts swiftly with a minimum loss of life.

National Security Objectives Supported (Level 1)

1.1 Survival of the United States

1.1.1 Deter aggression that could threaten United States and allies; if deterrence fails, repel or defeat military attack and end conflict on favorable terms to United States.

1.1.2 Effectively counter threats short of war, to security of U.S. citizens and interests, including the threat of terrorism.

1.1.3 Improve stability by ... arms control agreements, modernized strategic deterrent, limited ballistic missile defense, and enhancing appropriate conventional capabilities.

1.1.4 Promote democratic change in the former Soviet Union.

1.1.5 Foster restraint in global military spending.

1.1.7 Reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States by reduction of foreign production, combating international traffickers, and reducing U.S. demand.

1.2 Healthy, Growing U.S. Economy

1.2.1 Ensure access to foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, the oceans, and space.

1.3 Healthy, Cooperative Relations with Allies and Friendly Nations

1.3.1 Strengthen, enlarge the commonwealth of free nations that share commitment to democracy and individual rights.

1.3.2 Strengthen international institutions like the United Nations to make them more effective.

1.4 Stable, Secure World

1.4.1 Maintain stable regional military balances to deter those powers that might seek regional dominance.

1.4.3 Promote growth of free, democratic political institutions ... (for) human rights and economic and social progress.
1.4.4 Aid in combating threats to democratic institutions from aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism, and illicit drug trafficking.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


