
The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking

Revised Edition

Michael D. Swaine

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PREFACE

This report documents one component of a year-long effort to analyze key factors influencing China's national security strategies, policies, and military capabilities, and their potential consequences for longer-term U.S. national security interests. Specifically, this report examines the current and future roles of the Chinese military in China's national security policy process.

The report was produced under the aegis of a project entitled Chinese Global and Regional Strategy and U.S. Policy: Dynamics and Implications. A second document resulting from this project is *Professionalization of the Senior Chinese Officer Corps*, by James C. Mulvenon, MR-901-OSD, 1997.

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SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS

This report identifies and defines the leadership, structures, and processes governing Chinese military involvement in China's national security policy process. It emphasizes the specific mechanisms, both personal and bureaucratic, formal and informal, by which the Chinese military currently participates in national security policymaking, as well as the likely views and interests that the military seeks to advance in the national security arena.

The report reaches the following judgments and conclusions:

China's national security policy arena is composed of four distinct but closely related subarenas, each performing a core set of policy functions: (1) national strategic objectives; (2) foreign policy; (3) defense policy; and (4) strategic research, analysis, and intelligence.¹

China's national security policy leadership, structures, and processes do not function in a highly integrated, systematic, or formalized manner. Parts of the policymaking system (e.g., elements below the senior civilian and military leaderships) display considerable regularity and structure, while others (e.g., interactions among senior leaders) remain highly informal and personalistic. All levels of the system involve both regular and irregular features, however. Moreover, throughout the system, the level of influence in the policy process enjoyed by a specific civilian or military policy organ is often deter-

¹Chinese leaders and strategists do not always employ these terms. The author uses them, however, because they are easily recognizable to Western readers, and because they roughly correspond to identifiable functional areas in the Chinese system.

mined primarily by the personal prestige and power of the individual who heads it.

Linkages among the four policy subarenas vary considerably. No single subarena operates in a completely independent fashion, including the defense policy subarena. Vertical connections between the national strategic objectives subarena and both the foreign and the defense policy subarenas are relatively close and dense, as are linkages between the latter and the strategic research, analysis, and intelligence subarenas that support them. The least formal and arguably weakest linkages are horizontal, between the defense and foreign policy subarenas. Yet even here, interactions are by no means insignificant and are apparently increasing in number and relevance to the overall national security policy process.

Military involvement is evident in all four security policy subarenas, albeit to widely varying degrees, ranging from near total control over defense policy to limited but significant influence over foreign policy. Overall, the dividing line between military and civilian spheres in the formulation and implementation of national security policy is not as clear and absolute as in the past. The military's role in shaping national strategic objectives and in providing strategic analysis and intelligence to civilian leaders is significant and apparently increasing, even though the avenues for military influence over the national strategic objectives subarena remain relatively few. Military influence over foreign policy is also probably on the rise as military views are increasingly expressed and military influence exerted on specific issues in this subarena.

The military does not dictate policy in any one subarena, however. At the top of the system, senior military leaders interact in a generally collaborative, consultative fashion with their civilian counterparts, although military views on certain primarily defense-related issues probably often come close to directives. Senior party leaders undoubtedly play a complex and nuanced game in their policy interactions with the military leadership, seeking to retain the initiative and maintain overall flexibility by alternately placating, resisting, or diluting military views and pressures through a complex mixture of personal persuasion, balancing of bureaucratic interests, and direct control over formal organs and policy channels. The outcome of this effort can vary greatly, depending upon the level of unity or agree-

ment among the senior party elite, the specific external policy issue addressed, and the perceived success or failure of the prevailing policy line under discussion.

The formulation and revision of national strategic policy objectives will become increasingly subject to a leadership system marked by the absence of a paramount leader and hence by the need for greater consultation, coordination, and agreement among senior party and military heads, in order to deal with a growing array of problems and concerns. At the same time, lower-level bureaucratic leaders could exert increasing influence over the entire national security policy agenda, as organizational interests become more influential in the context of a diffuse and fragmented pattern of authority at the top. The emergence of complex, multiple personal and bureaucratic voices in the upper reaches of the policy process could result in constantly shifting, ambiguous, or contradictory policy directives from above.

Such a diffusion (and confusion) of power might provide the Chinese military with increasing leverage over the national strategic objectives subarena. Alternatively, the national security policy process could become more civilianized under a post-elder Chinese regime, given the more professional outlook of the emerging military leadership. In general, the level of military assertiveness at senior policy levels will depend to a great extent on the unity and stability of the top party elite and the outlook, relationships, and intentions of individual members of the emerging senior military leadership. However, the critical importance of national security policy to the military suggests that senior officers will probably not remain entirely aloof from developments in that arena and could be motivated to decisively influence the formulation or revision of certain national strategic objectives.

The absence of a single dominant leader with the authority of Deng Xiaoping suggests that future military challenges to critical elements of China's foreign policy will probably increase in number and significance. This could lead to lengthy deadlocks or messy compromises acceptable to no organization, civilian or military. Over time, such confrontations could precipitate more concerted efforts by the military to control large parts of this subarena. An increasing number of key foreign policy areas (e.g., those territorial issues that involve

foreign powers, such as the Taiwan problem, and other defense-related issues, such as relations with the United States) might become subject to a military veto or to significant revision by the military. Alternatively, the lack of a strong leader or leaders at the top and the absence of a unified and assertive military leadership could result in increased de facto control over many parts of this subarena by the civilian foreign policy bureaucracy, as more and more policy issues are placed on “automatic pilot.”

As in the national strategic objectives and foreign policy subarenas, the absence of strong policy arbiters or enforcers at the top of the defense policy subarena could result in prolonged and more severe bureaucratic disputes and hence weak or confusing defense policies. Such a problem could become very serious over the longer term, as it becomes more urgent for the military to make critical decisions regarding a variety of modernization and force structure issues. Such indecisiveness might also be exacerbated by growing pressures within the military to address a wider range of institutional concerns unrelated to defense policy per se, such as the future role of political commissars and the negative effects of the military’s involvement in business ventures. Ultimately, military policy (and defense policy in particular) could become an important source of leadership strife. Alternatively, weakness, indecision, and conflict within the senior civilian leadership could eventually prompt future military leaders to overcome their internal differences and play a highly assertive role in shaping defense policy. A similar outcome in some policy areas could also occur as a result of the increasingly common interests of a professionalizing officer corps.

Military research, analysis, and intelligence play a far more important role in the overall national security policy process than most observers assume. Moreover, the importance of these activities will likely grow significantly in the future, as a function of the military’s increasing force capabilities, especially if the military’s role in national security policy and elite politics expands greatly. This could produce greater problems of central control over and coordination between the military and civilian sides of the strategic research, analysis, and intelligence subarena.

The uncertainties and potential dangers presented by the above trends have led to repeated calls, by many Chinese strategists and

some political leaders, for the formation of an organization similar to, but even more powerful than, the U.S. President's National Security Council (NSC). Such an organization would presumably clarify vertical and horizontal lines of authority, facilitate communication and interaction throughout the national security policy bureaucracy, and thereby provide better coordination among and control over the different components of national security policy. For a variety of reasons, however, this idea has yet to take hold within the senior leadership and the bureaucracy as a whole.

Over the longer term, the military's role in China's national security policy process will be heavily influenced by the broader changing relationships between the party "core," the senior party leadership, and subordinate government and military leaders and institutions. The relations among these leadership actors will in turn be heavily influenced by the growing challenges to the regime produced by a rapidly changing society and economy. If the senior leadership structure is able to avoid major threats from within or below to its relative unity and stability, political authority in China will likely continue to fragment. Eventually, increasingly open forms of competition will likely evolve, as part of an overall process of rationalization and institutionalization of the political system. As a result, the military could eventually become merely one institution among many vying for influence in a wide range of policy arenas, including national security policy. Yet the military will probably prove to be key to the success or failure of this transition, as the experience of other developing societies suggests.

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The analysis benefited enormously from interviews and informal discussions held in Beijing during summer and fall 1995 and spring 1996 with a wide variety of Chinese civilian and military officials and strategists. Their knowledge and insights, frequently based on direct experience with the often confusing and excessively secretive Chinese decisionmaking process, proved indispensable. These individuals requested that their names not be cited in this report.

Finally, I would like to thank Colonel Karl Eikenberry, formerly Senior Country Director for China in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of International Security Affairs, a key sponsor of this report.

ACRONYMS

ABM	Antiballistic Missile
ACD	Arms Control and Disarmament
AMS	Academy of Military Science
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BISE	Beijing Institute of Systems Engineering
CAEP	China Academy of Engineering Physics
CAIFC	China Association for International Friendly Contact
CASS	Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
CC	Central Committee
CC GO	Central Committee General Office
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CD	U.N. Conference on Disarmament
CDSTIC	China Defense Science and Technology Information Center

CICIR	China Institute for Contemporary International Relations
CIISS	China Institute of International Strategic Studies
CMC	Central Military Commission
CMC GO	Central Military Commission General Office
COSTIND	Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense
CPD	Center for Peace and Development
DRC	Development Research Center
DSS	Department of Strategic Studies
FAC	Foreign Affairs Committee
FALSG	Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group
FISS	Foundation for International Strategic Studies
FPLG	Foreign Propaganda Leading Group
GLD	General Logistics Department
GO	General Office
GPD	General Political Department
GSD	General Staff Department
IAPCM	Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IIS	Institute for International Studies
ISODARCO	International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts
ISRC	International Studies Research Center

ISS	Institute for Strategic Studies
IWEP	Institute of World Economics and Politics
LSG	Leadership Small Group
MIRV	Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle
MND	Ministry of National Defense
MoFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoFTEC	Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation
MR	Military Region
MSS	Ministry of State Security
NDU	National Defense University
NPC	National People's Congress
NSA	National Security Agency
NSC	National Security Council
OFA	Office of Foreign Affairs
PB	Politburo
PBSC	Politburo Standing Committee
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PLAAF	PLA Air Force
PLAN	PLA Navy
R&D	Research and Development
RRU	Rapid Reaction Unit
SIIS	Shanghai Institute for International Studies
SPC	State Planning Commission

SRAI	Strategic Research, Analysis, and Intelligence
SSTC	State Science and Technology Commission
S&T	Science and Technology
TALSG	Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group
TMD	Theater Missile Defense
U.N.	United Nations

China's rise as a major power constitutes one of the most significant strategic events of the post-Cold War period. Many policymakers, strategists, and scholars express significant concern over the implications of China's growing military and economic capabilities for the future security environment in Asia and beyond. Such concern derives in part from an anticipation of the systemic security problems that have historically accompanied the emergence of a new power. In the Chinese case, however, these anxieties are greatly compounded by the rapidity of internal change under way in China, our general lack of knowledge about Chinese strategic ambitions,¹ the existence of many unresolved Chinese territorial claims, the intense suspicion and even hostility toward the West harbored by China's leadership, and China's internal political and social instabilities.

Each of the above factors influencing China's external behavior impinges on the interests or resources of the Chinese military. Indeed, the future role of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in shaping the pace and content of China's economic and defense modernization, strategic posture, territorial claims, relations with the West, and overall leadership composition and outlook could increase markedly in the months and years ahead, as China confronts an array of critical

¹Many observers assume that China is a frustrated power obsessed with past grievances and in search of regional preeminence. For example, see David Shambaugh, "Accommodating a Frustrated Power: The Domestic Sources of China's External Posture," paper prepared for the 24th Sino-American Conference on Contemporary China, 15-17 June 1995a, Washington, D.C.

developmental issues and problems.² Among these areas, perhaps of greatest concern to many political leaders around the world is the PLA's role in shaping Chinese national security policy. This report examines the leadership, structures, and processes governing PLA involvement in this critical policy arena. It emphasizes the specific mechanisms, both personal and bureaucratic, formal and informal, by which the PLA currently participates in national security policy-making, as well as the kinds of views and interests that the military seeks to advance.

The information and analysis presented in this report build on a growing literature on China's external policy process.³ Although

²For a systematic discussion of these factors, see Michael D. Swaine, *China: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, MR-604-OSD, 1995.

³See George Yang, "Mechanisms of Foreign Policy Making and Implementation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs," in Carol Lee Hamrin and Suisheng Zhao (eds.), *Decision-making in Deng's China*, Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1995, pp. 91–100; Shambaugh (1995a); David L. Shambaugh, "Accommodating a Frustrated Power," *World Politics*, September 1995b; David L. Shambaugh, "China's National Security Research Bureaucracy," *China Quarterly*, No. 110, June 1987, pp. 276–304; David Shambaugh, "Elite Politics and Perceptions," in Gerald Segal (ed.), *Chinese Politics and Foreign Policy Reform*, London: Kegan Paul International, 1992, pp. 100–114; Jonathan D. Pollack, "Structure and Process in the Chinese Military System," in Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David M. Lampton (eds.), *Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision-Making in Post-Mao China*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992, pp. 151–180; Nicholas Eftimiades, *Chinese Intelligence Operations*, Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1994; John W. Lewis, Hua Di, and Xue Litai, "Beijing's Defense Establishment: Solving the Arms-Export Enigma," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 4, Spring 1991, pp. 87–109; A. Doak Barnett, *The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process*, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985; Carol Lee Hamrin, "Elite Politics and the Development of China's Foreign Relations," in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh (eds.), *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, pp. 70–109; Carol Lee Hamrin, "The Party Leadership System," in Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David M. Lampton (eds.), *Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision-Making in Post-Mao China*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992, pp. 95–124; Wei Li, *The Chinese Staff System: A Mechanism for Bureaucratic Control and Integration*, Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1994; Samuel S. Kim, "China and the World in Theory and Practice," in Samuel S. Kim (ed.), *China and the World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era*, Third Edition, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994, pp. 3–42; Kenneth G. Lieberthal, *Governing China*, New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1995, especially Chapter Seven; John W. Garver, "China's Push Through the South China Sea: The Interaction of Bureaucratic and National Interests," *China Quarterly*, No. 132, December 1992, pp. 999–1028; Harold K. Jacobson and Michel Oksenberg, *China's Participation in the IMF, the World Bank, and GATT*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990, especially Chapters Three and Four; Tai Ming Cheung, "The Impact of Research Institutes in the Post-Mao Period on Peking's Foreign Policy-Making," *Issues and Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 7, July

largely of very high quality, most of these studies are concerned with the civilian dimensions of China's external behavior, and center on key party and government actors, i.e., they focus primarily on what the Chinese usually refer to as foreign affairs (*waishi*). The PLA's role is often either downplayed greatly or ignored altogether in these works, usually because of severe data limitations or because the Chinese traditionally viewed foreign affairs as differing, both conceptually and structurally, from military affairs (*junshi*). Indeed, foreign affairs has been largely equated, in Chinese thinking, with the nonmilitary realm of diplomatic state relations. Hence, those few studies that focus on the role of the military in external policy limit their analysis mainly to basic features of the defense policy realm, a subset of the larger military affairs arena. Such studies rarely, if ever, include analysis of the PLA's policy interactions with civilian foreign affairs officials or organizations.

This report draws together the often disparate and fragmentary information on the PLA presented in the above literature and combines it with recent, additional information obtained by the author through interviews conducted in Beijing in November–December 1994, July 1995, and February 1996 to present a more complete and updated picture of PLA involvement in the formulation and implementation of national security policy at all levels and across both military and civilian dimensions. Such a comprehensive, integrated analysis is especially needed because the military's role in the national security policy process has been experiencing major change and redefinition in recent years. This ongoing shift has occurred largely in response to a rapid proliferation in the number and type of external policy-related issues and concerns that impinge upon the military's expanding interests in many areas, resulting in a greater blurring of the line between foreign affairs and defense policy.

In presenting this comprehensive picture, the “macro” national security policy arena is divided by the author into four distinct “micro” subarenas:

1987, Taipei, Taiwan, pp. 86–101; Tai Ming Cheung, “Trends in the Research of Chinese Military Strategy,” *Survival*, Vol. 29, No. 3, May–June 1987, pp. 239–259; and Lu Ning, *The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China*, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997.

- National strategic objectives
- Foreign policy
- Defense policy
- Strategic research, analysis, and intelligence

Each subarena encompasses a distinct set of national security policy functions. The first focuses on the broad strategic principles and goals guiding the entire national security policy arena. The second centers on civilian foreign affairs and diplomatic relations. The third includes military defense and security-related activities. The fourth comprises short-, medium-, and long-range strategic research, analysis, and intelligence gathering and related strategic or security assessments provided to the responsible organs and leaders of the other three subarenas.⁴

The basic organizational structure of these four policy subarenas is depicted in Figure 1.⁵ As the figure suggests, each subarena generally reflects a different level or sphere of leadership authority or policy input within the Chinese policy apparatus: The national strategic objectives subarena corresponds to the supreme political and military leadership. The foreign and defense policy subarenas correspond primarily to the leaderships of the major civilian and military organizations responsible for foreign and defense policy. The strategic research, analysis, and intelligence subarena corresponds to

⁴It should be noted that Chinese leaders and strategists do not always employ the terms national strategic objectives, foreign policy, defense policy, and strategic research, analysis, and intelligence to describe these national security policy functions. In many cases, other terms are employed to describe these functions, as discussed in greater detail below. The terms in this report are used because they are easily recognizable to Western readers, and because they roughly correspond to identifiable functional areas in the Chinese system.

⁵This figure does not present all the actors within each subarena. These are found in the more detailed figures below. Moreover, the figures in this report are intended to depict actual authority relationships or reporting channels among key individuals or organizations within or between each of the national security policy subarenas, not formal staff-line relationships among leading actors within the party, government, or military systems as a whole. However, some organizations are simply grouped within a box to show their common function or level of importance within a particular policy subarena. Details on the specific relationships among such organs are provided in the text, to the extent possible.

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


Figure 1—China's National Security Policy Arena

working-level researchers, strategists, and intelligence gatherers, both civilian and military. It thus performs a support (and not a leadership) function for the other subarenas, but it nonetheless plays a critical role in the policy process.

Analysis of each subarena begins with a summary of its general functional elements and corresponding present-day policy features. This is followed by a discussion of the subarena's major institutional and individual actors, their likely interests and responsibilities, their modes of interaction, and their general relationship to the other three subarenas. For each policy subarena, the emphasis is placed on the activities and interests of military actors, although some discussion of civilian actors is also necessary. A concluding chapter summarizes the major features of the national security policy process and presents several implications of the preceding analysis for future PLA involvement.

NATIONAL STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES SUBARENA

According to one very knowledgeable observer, the fundamental purposes of China's national strategy (*guojia zhanlue*) are (1) to safeguard China's national territory and sovereignty, (2) to guide national construction and social development, (3) to strengthen national power, and (4) to ensure continued national prosperity.¹ From this definition, one can see that China's national strategic objectives (*guojia zhanlue mubiao*) constitute those fundamental strategic principles, concepts, and priorities guiding not only foreign and defense policy but also critical domestic realms concerned with national construction and internal order. These objectives include the attainment of great power status in the economic, technological, social, and military realms (with concomitant levels of international prestige and influence), and the development or maintenance of capabilities to defend against any internal or external threats to China's political stability, social order, national sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

These broad strategic purposes and objectives are more explicitly spelled out in the general lines (*zong luxian*) on Chinese domestic policy and external relations established by the senior party leadership. In the domestic realm, China's current general line reflects the contents and priorities of the Four Modernizations, the guiding principle of the reform effort inaugurated by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s. This concept envisions the attainment, by the year 2049

¹Pan Shiyong, *Reflections on Modern Strategy: Post Cold War Strategic Theory*, Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 1993, pp. 125–126.

(the 100th anniversary of the communist takeover of China), of development levels in Chinese agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense equivalent to major powers such as Great Britain, Germany, and Japan. Such development is to occur largely through a sustained program of incremental, market-led economic restructuring and administrative reform, combined with limited amounts of political and social liberalization. It is keyed to a notion of comprehensive national power (*zonghe guoli*), viewed as “the foundation upon which a nation depends for subsistence and development, . . . and upon which the powerful nations of the world establish their international status and exercise their international role and influence.”² According to at least one Chinese source, comprehensive national power is composed of a nation’s natural resources, economic capabilities, external trade and investment capabilities, science and technology capabilities, level of social development, military capabilities, level of governmental efficacy, and diplomatic capabilities.³ Under the Four Modernizations, however, improvements in military capabilities must in most cases depend on the prior establishment of strong economic, technological, political, and social capabilities. Moreover, economic and technological components of national power are viewed as critical instruments of foreign and defense policy, and not solely as prerequisites for domestic growth and stability.⁴

In the external realm, China’s general line defines the major features of China’s political and security environment, including macro-level geopolitical and strategic trends, the resulting balance of forces among the major powers, critical bilateral relationships, major external threats to the above national objectives, the likelihood of war or peace, and the types of conflict or confrontation characteristic of

²“An Analysis of Change in China’s International Status: Preliminary Discussion of Comprehensive National Power in the Last Twenty Years” (Zhongguo Guoji Diwei De Bianhua Fenxi—Zui Jin Ershinian Zonghe Guoli De Chubu Tantaoy), Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Institute of World Economics and Politics Research Group on Comparative Research on the Comprehensive National Power of Primary States, *Pacific Journal (Taipingyang Xuebao)*, No. 1, April 1995, p. 135. The author is grateful to Alastair I. Johnston for bringing this source to his attention.

³Ibid.

⁴This prioritization is spelled out more fully in Swaine (1995), and Michael D. Swaine, “Strategic Appraisal: China,” in Zalmay Khalilzad (ed.), *Strategic Appraisal 1996*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, MR-543-AF, 1996, pp. 185–222.

the current historical period. At present, China's general line in external policy assumes a turbulent international environment associated with the transition from the Cold War bipolar confrontation to a more complex, multipolar configuration; the reduced likelihood of large-scale global or regional conflict; a growing number of limited regional threats and concerns demanding new types of conventional and unconventional military capabilities, including possible conflicts over disputed territories such as Taiwan; and the increasing importance of economic and technological factors to international security calculations. Hence, China's primary strategic objectives in the international arena are (1) to maintain an external environment conducive to the pursuit of economic reform, opening to the outside world, and economic construction, (2) to preserve or expand China's strategic independence and leverage in a complex multipolar environment, (3) to further China's efforts to reunify the nation, and (4) to strengthen China's ability to defend against external pressures or attacks emerging from a highly complex and uncertain yet arguably less immediately threatening security environment.⁵

These definitions of China's internal and external general lines suggest a clear linkage between domestic and foreign security interests and concerns. For example, key issues such as domestic economic modernization, social stability, and national reunification are seen by the Chinese as strongly influenced by external factors (e.g., the major powers and various international economic activities), and vice versa. Hence, in the Chinese view, the division between domestic and external strategic objectives is not as clear and distinct as it is in the West;⁶ moreover, both realms are critical to the interests of the Chinese military. However, this report primarily analyzes the policy process associated with the latter set of concerns and related objectives, which inform both foreign and defense policy. External strategic objectives constitute the core of what the Chinese refer to as their national defense strategy (*guofang zhanlue*). This realm in turn ac-

⁵For details on all these features, see Swaine (1995, 1996).

⁶It should be noted, however, that even in the West, the line between internal social and economic development issues and concerns and external national security concerns is becoming increasingly unclear.

cords most closely with what is usually understood in the West as the national security policy arena.⁷

The national strategic objectives subarena is composed of those individuals who wield supreme power over the party, state, and military apparatus. During the Deng Xiaoping period of the 1980s and early 1990s, three different types of leaders were included in this group: (1) the paramount leader and his personal advisors, (2) the paramount leader's senior associates on the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) or Secretariat, and (3) the most influential retired and semi-retired elder cadres of the revolutionary generation

Under Deng's direction, these individuals, usually numbering some twenty in total,⁸ determined China's fundamental national strategic objectives and/or ensured that those objectives were being followed throughout the policy apparatus. They also solved basic policy conflicts that emerged, and responded to external crises. They did not, however, supervise and/or implement the detailed aspects of national security policy.⁹ As shown below, this responsibility was (and remains) left largely to the civilian and military bureaucracies, which often enjoyed considerable autonomy in carrying out components of foreign and defense policy.

The mode of interaction in this subarena has been (and remains) largely, albeit not entirely, personalistic and informal. During the

⁷Hence, the term "national security policy" is used throughout this report primarily as a synonym for the Chinese term "national defense strategy," referring to the externally oriented dimension of China's broader national strategy.

⁸Shambaugh (1992), p. 104. This number did not include the personal assistants to the senior leadership, comprising both personal secretaries (*mishu*) and personal guards. Such individuals often exerted a decisive influence over the policy perceptions and views of senior leaders, as advisors, ghost writers, personal representatives, etc. They reportedly continue to perform these roles today. For details, see Wei Li and Lucian W. Pye, "The Ubiquitous Role of the *Mishu* in Chinese Politics," *China Quarterly*, No. 132, December 1992, pp. 913–936.

⁹Lieberthal (1995), pp. 187–188. As suggested above, the paramount leader exercised a unique role within this senior policy group, largely having the final word on core strategic issues while also determining the internal makeup and division of authority among the senior party leadership in the PBSC. For further details, also see Shambaugh (1992), pp. 108–109; and Hamrin (1992), pp. 99–100. Hamrin distinguishes between the "top tier" of the leadership, consisting solely of the paramount leader and a "second tier" of PBSC members and key elders. As we shall see below, this distinction has become less significant, if not entirely irrelevant.

Deng period, members met in unstructured groupings convened by the paramount leader as well as in more formal meetings of the PBSC, which gathered on an irregular basis.¹⁰ They also communicated in writing. In addition, members of this subarena below the paramount leader quite frequently interacted with senior bureaucratic officials responsible for foreign and defense policies, both informally and through leadership small groups (LSGs), discussed below.

It is extremely difficult to determine the specific level of influence exerted within the national strategic objectives subarena by the PLA as an institution, much less by individual military leaders. Given the centrality of the military to defense policy, the military's overall concern with national security issues, and the high prestige and party status of the top PLA elite, one can safely assume that senior military views on fundamental national strategic goals and objectives were solicited and offered on a fairly regular basis under Deng. As the above suggests, such PLA influence was exerted through individual leaders, including military elders and senior PLA officers holding high party posts.

In the early and mid 1980s, several very senior PLA leaders likely performed key roles in influencing the formulation and implementation of national strategic objectives. These included Ye Jianying, Xu Xiangqian, Nie Rongzhen, Yang Shangkun, Zhang Aiping, Yang Dezhi, Yu Qiuli, and Hong Xuezhai. Ye, Xu, Nie, and Yang Shangkun were all deputy heads of the party Central Military Commission (CMC), the supreme executive body in charge of the PLA. Yang concurrently served as CMC secretary general and executive vice chairman. Zhang, Yu, Hong, and Yang Dezhi were all CMC deputy general secretaries.¹¹ Wang Zhen, a senior party elder with very close ties to the PLA, and Qin Jiwei, a strong supporter of Deng Xiaoping and Minister of Defense in the late 1980s, were also likely part of this group.

¹⁰Important policy interactions in this subarena also occurred (and continue to occur) during larger, regularly scheduled high-level policy meetings centered on an annual summer conference held at the coastal resort of Beidaihe, and a subsequent fall party plenum, both attended by senior leaders and bureaucrats.

¹¹Barnett (1985), pp. 99–100.

These individuals, perhaps supported by other PLA elders, undoubtedly played important roles as advisors and confidants to Deng Xiaoping in shaping and overseeing major strategic policy decisions and guidelines.¹² In fact, their views were probably more critical than those of formal civilian party leaders such as Zhao Ziyang, Hu Yaobang, and other erstwhile successors of the pre-Tiananmen reform period.¹³ Moreover, PLA elders played at least an equally significant role in this policy arena as their civilian counterparts, e.g., Chen Yun, Peng Zhen, Bo Yibo, and Li Xiannian.¹⁴ Within this entire group, however, Yang Shangkun almost certainly wielded a preponderance of influence over national strategic policy objectives, second only to Deng Xiaoping. It is very likely that, from the mid 1980s until Yang's dismissal at the 14th Party Congress of October 1992, final decisions involving these policy objectives were made by Deng and Yang alone.¹⁵

Hong Kong press reports suggest that retired PLA elders, along with senior active duty PLA officers at the central and regional levels, have behaved as an extremely aggressive interest group in core areas of external policy since at least the early 1990s, and perhaps during much of the latter 1980s as well. Both small and large groups of officers reportedly have held meetings, written letters to the senior

¹²This parallels the role performed by senior PLA leaders such as Ye Jianying and Nie Rongzhen in the late 1960s and early 1970s in advising Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai on international strategy. The author is indebted to Jonathan Pollack for pointing this out to him.

¹³Several Chinese interlocutors have insisted to the author that Zhao and Hu were not privy to deliberations between Deng and senior military leaders during the 1980s, despite their high positions.

¹⁴Many such civilian party elders had extensive military backgrounds, of course. Indeed, their status as policy advocates and senior advisors to Deng derived in part from their links with the PLA.

¹⁵A "quasi-military" figure with significant ties to the PLA, Yang had been placed in charge of the military reform effort in the 1980s by Deng and had served as a critical conduit between the civilian party and professional military leaderships, and between the civilian and military sides of the national security bureaucracy. However, although such responsibilities and experience provided Yang with critical influence over the national strategic objectives subarena as Deng's aide and ally, his overall level of political power was significantly less than that of senior elders such as Chen Yun and Li Xiannian. To a significant extent, Yang's power and authority derived from Deng Xiaoping. For a summary of Yang Shangkun's background and duties, see Michael D. Swaine, *The Military and Political Succession in China*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, R-4254-AF, 1992, pp. 33–35.

party leadership, sent petitions, and passed resolutions as part of a general effort to influence (or dictate) critical aspects of national security policy.¹⁶ These efforts allegedly placed enormous pressure on Deng Xiaoping and, most recently, Jiang Zemin and other successor party leaders. Particular areas of concern to the PLA leadership reportedly included basic policy toward the United States and Taiwan, relations with Russia, and sensitive territorial disputes over areas such as the Spratly Islands.¹⁷

It is virtually impossible to determine the accuracy of such claims, given the limits on information regarding interactions at the most senior levels of the Chinese leadership. However, interviews with well-placed military officers and knowledgeable foreign observers suggest that the above characterization of the decisionmaking structure is essentially inaccurate. According to interviewees, senior PLA officers—both retired and active—did not serve as a unified and forceful lobbying group on broad national strategic (and national defense) policy objectives during the 1980s and early 1990s. This domain remained firmly under the control of Deng Xiaoping, with support from Yang Shangkun and advice from the PBSC and a small group of elders, as suggested above. A small number of senior military officers also served as advisors and consultants. According to interviewees, senior active and retired PLA officers have intervened directly in nonmilitary areas of national security policy arena on only a

¹⁶In addition, one Hong Kong source states that Deng Xiaoping issued orders in 1992 mandating an increased role for the PLA in governmental affairs and various policy organs. As a result, ten generals were allegedly allowed to attend meetings of the Politburo (PB) and PBSC as non-voting members. See *Hsin Pao*, December 11, 1992, p. 26, in *FBIS-CHI-92-240*, 12-14-92, pp. 28–29.

¹⁷For major examples, see *Hsin Pao*, October 15, 1992, p. 22, in *FBIS-CHI-92-202*, 10-19-92, pp. 4–6; *Cheng Ming*, June 1, 1993, pp. 14–16, in *FBIS-CHI-93-104*, 6-2-93, pp. 33–36; *Cheng Ming*, September 1, 1993, pp. 12–13, in *FBIS-CHI-93-171*, 9-7-93, pp. 46–48; *Ching Pao*, October 5, 1993, p. 54, in *FBIS-CHI-93-196*, 10-13-93, pp. 41–42; *Cheng Ming*, January 1, 1994, pp. 16–18, in *FBIS-CHI-94-016*, 1-25-94, pp. 4–6; *Ching Pao*, January 5, 1994, pp. 38–39, in *FBIS-CHI-003*, 1-5-94, p. 3; *South China Morning Post*, June 25, 1994, in *FBIS-CHI-94-123*, 6-27-94, pp. 40–41; *Hsin Pao*, July 8, 1994, p. 23, in *FBIS-CHI-94-134*, pp. 1–2; *Cheng Ming*, July 1, 1994, pp. 6–8, in *FBIS-CHI-94-143*, pp. 33–36; and *Cheng Ming*, September 1, 1994, pp. 22–23, in *FBIS-CHI-94-172*, 9-6-94, pp. 37–38. Many of these articles are summarized in John Garver, “The PLA as an Interest Group in Chinese Foreign Policy,” paper prepared for the Sixth Annual Conference on the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Coollfont, West Virginia, June 1995. They are also cited extensively by Allen S. Whiting in “Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy After Deng,” *China Quarterly*, No. 142, June 1995, especially pp. 309–316.

few occasions. Moreover, such interventions were usually over specific policy decisions or incidents, such as the Yinhe incident of 1993,¹⁸ not over fundamental issues or principles of national strategy or critical bilateral relations.¹⁹

The above pattern of leadership interactions has changed significantly in some, but not all, respects during the past several years, as a result of the retirement, death, or general inactivity of many civilian and military elder leaders (including, most recently, Deng Xiaoping), the removal of Yang Shangkun from power at the 14th Party Congress, and the ascension to high formal positions of power of a small handful of senior party leaders of the successor generation, led by Party Secretary General Jiang Zemin, the putative “core” of the post-Deng Xiaoping leadership. As a result of these changes, ultimate leadership over the entire national security policy agenda has become more diffuse. Although the leadership still adheres to the general national strategic objectives enunciated under Deng Xiaoping, it is probably safe to say that no single individual wields predominant influence over this (or any other) policy subarena.

Ultimate authority over fundamental national strategic objectives does not reside in the PBSC as a body, but rather in an informal national security directorate made up of the most senior civilian and military leaders involved in national security affairs. Until fall 1997, this body consisted of four individuals: Jiang Zemin (as senior PBSC member, party general secretary and head of the CMC), Premier Li Peng (as PBSC member responsible for state affairs and head of the foreign policy system, discussed below), and two powerful PLA elders, Liu Huaqing (as the only PLA member of the PBSC and the senior officer responsible for force modernization) and Zhang Zhen (as the top PLA leader responsible for senior officer staffing and promotion, PLA reorganization, and the PLA’s defense strategy and opera-

¹⁸In 1993, the United States demanded a search of the Chinese ship, *Yinhe*, which was suspected of transporting precursors of chemical weapons to Iran. The Chinese government, at the urging of the Foreign Ministry, eventually agreed to permit the search, but no chemicals were discovered. Senior military officers were reportedly enraged by the Foreign Ministry’s supposedly obsequious behavior in permitting the search, and openly criticized the Ministry in internal leadership meetings.

¹⁹Such irregular and infrequent PLA policy interventions thus relate more to the subarena of foreign policy formulation and implementation, discussed below.

tional doctrine).²⁰ Other PBSC members no doubt express their views on national strategic issues and objectives in PBSC meetings. However, according to most knowledgeable observers, the role of these civilian leaders is largely limited to that of advisors and/or occasional advocates of various views, not key decisionmakers exercising ultimate power in this subarena.²¹

The makeup of the national security directorate changed in late 1997 when Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zhen relinquished their party posts at the 15th Party Congress of September 1997. In their place, two younger generals, Zhang Wannian and Chi Haotian, both in their sixties, were promoted to the PB (but not the PBSC), and Zhang Wannian was placed on the party secretariat. Zhang and Chi had served as deputy CMC heads since the Fifth Plenum of the 14th Central Committee in October 1995²² and had long been expected to replace Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zhen as the PLA's most senior serving officers. Indeed, prior to fall 1997, they had almost certainly served as senior advisors to the national security directorate, perhaps along with one or two other military figures such as Wang Ruilin and Fu Quanyou, discussed below.²³

It should be noted that, despite their formal retirement, Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zhen almost certainly retain considerable influence over national security policy objectives on an informal basis. As discussed in Chapter Four below, both officers, in consultation with Jiang Zemin, for many years made all major decisions on defense policy as leading figures within an informal CMC executive committee.

²⁰Both Admiral Liu Huaqing and General Zhang Zhen were brought out of semi-retirement and placed by Deng in senior leadership positions at the 14th Party Congress in 1992.

²¹The views various PBSC members express in this and other national security policy subarenas in large part reflect their broad responsibilities within the party-state system. Aside from Jiang Zemin and Li Peng, only Zhu Rongji (finance and economic reform) and Li Lanqing (foreign trade) have obvious links to external policy issues.

²²Zhang was previously chief of the PLA general staff and Chi remains as Minister of Defense.

²³Zhang Wannian and Chi Haotian will likely be joined, as replacements for Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zhen, by the CMC Secretary General, when that office is reactivated (it has been inactive since the removal of its last occupant, Yang Baibing, in 1992). This reactivation could occur at a critical meeting of the CMC to be held in December 1997. The post will probably go to General Staff Department (GSD) Director Fu Quanyou, a strong supporter of Jiang Zemin.

Hence, they almost certainly also served as the leading PLA actors influencing national strategic objectives and national security policy in general. This past role and their continuing overall senior status as leading PLA elders suggest that Liu and Zhang will continue to play a major role in the deliberations of the national security directorate.

The current national strategic objectives subarena is depicted in Figure 2.

Many other PLA elders remain relatively healthy and active at present, including Xiao Ke, Zhang Aiping, Hong Xuezhong, Yu Qiuli, Liao Hansheng, Chen Xilian, Yang Chengwu, and possibly Li Desheng. However, by most accounts, the overall policy influence of these formally retired officers has waned considerably in recent years.




Figure 2—National Strategic Objectives Subarena

All elders (both civilian and military) have reportedly been taken off the key routing lists for senior policy documents, and none attends PB or CMC meetings. Moreover, it is very unlikely that military (or civilian) elders exercise the power to organize investigation teams, draft reports and proposals on policy issues, and participate in policy meetings, as claimed by media reports appearing in early 1994.²⁴ This suggests a very different image from the highly interventionist picture of military involvement in foreign affairs depicted in the Hong Kong media. It does not, however, preclude the possibility that individual elders still make their views concerning broad national strategic objectives and national security policy issues known to members of the national security directorate, and perhaps to various PBSC members.²⁵

While it is relatively easy to identify the most senior PLA members of this policy subarena, it is far more difficult to determine whether these individuals play a more assertive decisionmaking role in shaping national strategic policy objectives than did either Yang Shangkun or other PLA elders under Deng Xiaoping; it is equally difficult to determine what views they espouse on more specific national defense issues. Any answer to these questions must remain speculative.²⁶

Nonetheless, it is likely that no senior PLA officer seeks to alter China's national security policy agenda in fundamental ways, and that such officers probably consult with, rather than dictate to, Jiang Zemin in this subarena, for two basic reasons. First, many of the basic strategic principles, formulations and priorities guiding China's foreign and defense policies almost certainly remain unaltered from

²⁴Garver, "The PLA as an Interest Group in Chinese Foreign Policy," p. 5. However, some key military elders reportedly retain offices, provided by the CMC or GSD.

²⁵The absence of Deng Xiaoping and the reduced role played by elder leaders in national security policy suggest that, although *ultimate* power in this subarena is now shared by several individuals and not controlled by a single paramount leader, the total number of top party and military figures exercising power formally and informally has probably shrunk below the twenty or so mentioned above.

²⁶In addition, as of October 1997, it is unclear whether the same division of responsibilities over military affairs exists between Generals Zhang Wannian and Chi Haotian as existed between Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zhen. Some observers believe that Zhang Wannian, the senior officer of the two, has probably taken over many of the formal duties of Zhang Zhen.

the Deng Xiaoping era, given their continued appropriateness to China's internal and external environments, and the leadership's political need to maintain a strong continuity with the Deng reform period.²⁷ As a result, no PLA officer has a strong argument for pressing basic changes in national strategic objectives. Second, by all accounts, no current PLA leader is extremely ambitious or interventionist regarding fundamental issues of political power and policy, as were past senior PLA figures such as Peng Dehuai, Luo Ruiqing or even Yang Shangkun. Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zhen were partly appointed to provide a stable foundation of PLA support to the Jiang Zemin-led successor leadership, not to control their policy deliberations. Zhang Wannian and Chi Haotian reportedly have even less political ambition and personal clout than their two elder predecessors on the national security directorate. Moreover, their presence on the PB, but not in the inner leadership core of the PBSC, marks a continuation of Deng Xiaoping's effort to distance the PLA from involvement in elite politics while preserving its participation in critical policy arenas relevant to its professional interests.²⁸ Thus, although the PLA's ability to influence elite power politics has arguably declined as a result of the 15th Party Congress, it almost certainly retains influence over national security issues, including the setting of national security objectives.

²⁷Both of these factors are discussed in Swaine, 1995.

²⁸From this perspective, the 1992 placement of Liu Huaqing on the PBSC was an exception to this general trend.

What is herein referred to as the foreign policy (*duiwai zhengce*) subarena is usually termed simply foreign affairs (*waiishi*) by most Chinese leaders and strategists. This subarena comprises the entire range of external strategies and activities undertaken by agencies of the State Council and the Chinese Communist Party in support of national security policy.¹ This includes all political and diplomatic relations with other nations as well as a wide range of other governmental or quasi-governmental interactions, such as unofficial multilateral discussions; international cultural and educational contacts; many types of foreign economic, scientific, and technological activities (e.g., trade negotiations, technology transfer agreements, some types of large equipment sales); foreign, nonmilitary information gathering and propaganda activities; and some types of international security activities that involve the military (e.g., the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), military exchange programs formally supervised by the Ministry of National Defense, and various arms control and nuclear disarmament negotiations).² Thus, foreign policy includes a wide spectrum of primarily civilian political, economic, technological, and cultural activities, as opposed to narrower defense concerns associ-

¹Hence, what is known in China as diplomatic policy (*waijiao zhengce*) constitutes only one component of this much larger (and rapidly expanding) foreign policy or foreign affairs subarena.

²External activities that include both civilian and military officials (e.g., the ARF and Sino-Japanese security dialogues) also fall within the defense policy subarena and hence are undoubtedly influenced by the military. Exactly how civilian and military leaders and organs interact to determine and implement policies concerning such activities remains unclear to the author, however.

ated with the military. Indeed, the number and variety of activities included in the foreign policy subarena have increased greatly over the past decade or so, as a result of China's expanding interaction with the international community.³

China's foreign policy line under the reforms has been *largely* cautious and pragmatic, keyed to the long-term need to establish and maintain a placid external environment conducive to continued economic growth and modernization. Such a policy is marked by the maintenance of positive diplomatic, political, and economic relations with virtually every foreign country, especially with nearby Asian states. It involves a recognition of the importance of a comprehensive security strategy that combines political, cultural, and economic means, not just military power, and a belief that China faces no pressing external military threat. China's foreign policy pragmatism also suggests the need to maintain continued good relations with the United States, for several reasons: (1) to assure the continued success of economic reform, which is heavily dependent on U.S. trade, technology, and investment; (2) to avoid excessive external pressures on China's military modernization program; (3) to prevent the possible emergence of a more militarily assertive Japan; (4) to minimize U.S. incentives for providing military assistance to Taiwan; and (5) to resolve critical issues of mutual concern such as arms proliferation in East Asia. China's foreign policy also involves limited support for multilateral initiatives, U.N. peacekeeping efforts, and other regional activities intended to promote more cooperative patterns of behavior in the region.

However, China's foreign policy is also designed to oppose hegemonic behavior by any major power and to preserve China's overall strategic independence. Thus, Beijing's diplomatic approach remains largely keyed to the search for political, economic, and strategic leverage and independence of action through the exploitation of

³As Carol Hamrin states, "As China opened its door wider, there was no single foreign policy, but a proliferation of policies . . . regarding such issues as military trade, science and technology, education and culture, foreign expertise, intelligence and information, foreign publicity, trade, technology transfer, and so on." See Hamrin (1995), p. 89. This article provides a superb analysis of the major changes in institutions and processes that took place within China's foreign policy system between 1949 and the early 1990s. Also see Lu Ning, *The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China*, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997.

rivalries and the balancing and manipulation of relations among both major and emerging powers. From this perspective, the United States is viewed with particular suspicion as the only remaining superpower in an emerging multipolar world, placed in a position of growing competition with major powers such as Germany and Japan, but constrained by its internal economic and political weaknesses. Hence, this viewpoint, when combined with the above factors militating toward the maintenance of positive U.S.-China relations, suggests that China's overall diplomatic and economic relations with the United States consist of a complex mixture of cooperation and competition. This can at times produce less cautious or unpragmatic Chinese foreign policy behavior.⁴

The leadership, structure, and processes of the foreign policy subarena are far more regularized and bureaucratic than those of the national strategic objectives subarena. However, the level of influence in the policy process exerted by any particular leading foreign policy agency or office still depends to a great extent on the overall personal political clout of its leader.

The organizational components and internal processes of the foreign policy subarena have been discussed in various scholarly sources and will not be recapitulated in detail here, except in those instances

⁴For further details on the major features of China's foreign policy line at present, see Swaine (1995), pp. 81–95, from which most material in the previous two paragraphs is drawn. In the past two to three years, China's foreign policy has taken a more competitive, or even antagonistic stance toward the United States. In late 1995 and early 1996, knowledgeable observers in Beijing informed the author that the United States is increasingly viewed, in internal policy circles, as China's primary strategic, long-term threat. This hardline viewpoint, which argues that the United States is intent on restraining or preventing China's emergence as a major power, has gained greater currency in Beijing as a result of a series of adverse developments in U.S.-China bilateral relations during the Clinton Administration. These include intensified disputes over human rights, trade, and proliferation, as well as perceived efforts by the United States to weaken China's position on critical territorial issues such as the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. The Taiwan crisis of June 1995–March 1996, precipitated by the issuance of a visa to Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui to visit the United States, seriously increased the level of tension between Washington and Beijing, resulting in PLA exercises and missile firings in the vicinity of Taiwan and the deployment of two U.S. carrier battle groups, to caution China against any direct use of force against the island. Although U.S.-China relations have improved considerably since the Taiwan crisis, as reflected in the successful state visit of Jiang Zemin to Washington, D.C. in October 1997, the hardline viewpoint remains influential in foreign (and defense) policy circles.

where recent developments or new information merit more extensive discussion. Major actors include a top tier of political leaders, a second tier of leaders of major party and state organs responsible for various aspects of foreign policy, and two critical coordinating and decisionmaking mechanisms: (1) the CCP Central Committee's Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG) (and within the FALSG, the State Council Office of Foreign Affairs (OFA)) and (2) the CCP Central Committee General Office (CC GO). The most important actors of this subarena are depicted in Figure 3.

On the formal level, the PBSC as a body exercises ultimate decision-making authority over foreign policy, as it supposedly does over defense policy. However, in reality, most members of the PBSC do not wield decisive influence in this subarena.⁵ Many initiatives or elements of China's diplomatic or overall foreign policy strategy are either undertaken directly by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) or, in the case of key policy actions, recommended by the MoFA and/or the FALSG (discussed below) and formally approved by the PBSC as a body, often with little deliberation.⁶ Among senior party leaders, primary leadership authority over foreign policy in general is exercised by a single PBSC member: Li Peng. As State Council Premier, Li is responsible for developing policy within the foreign policy subarena, overseeing the activities of the MoFA, coordinating the activities of the bureaucracies relevant to executing foreign policy, and resolving the differences that emerge among them. He exercises

⁵Some analysts of China's foreign affairs claim that each PBSC member is charged with overseeing foreign policy toward a particular country or region. This arrangement might have existed in the past. However, well-placed Chinese interviewees deny that such an informal distribution of leadership responsibilities exists today.

⁶Yet one should not conclude from this statement that the PBSC today serves merely as a rubber stamp in the foreign policy subarena, even though it arguably performed such a role during the Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping periods. As described below, PBSC members usually defer to FALSG Head Li Peng or Foreign Minister (and PB member) Qian Qichen on routine foreign policy issues. However, under China's post-Deng collective leadership structure, *individual* PBSC members could become far more assertive in the foreign policy subarena at certain times, either for political purposes (i.e., to gain an advantage over their political opponents in a power struggle), or because individual members hold strong views about a particular issue. As mentioned above, each PBSC member is responsible for an area of the party-state system, and some areas likely impinge on one or more foreign policy issues (e.g., Zhu Rongji's responsibility for economic issues). In extreme cases, a majority of PBSC members could seek to alter or reverse a key foreign policy decision. This has not yet occurred, however, according to knowledgeable interviewees.

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


Figure 3—Foreign Policy Subarena

this authority primarily as head of the FALSG, the party leadership group responsible for foreign affairs.

The FALSG functions as the key policy coordination, communication, supervision, and consultation mechanism between the PBSC and the foreign affairs system (*xitong*) of associated state and party organs at the commission and ministry levels.⁷ Hence, although formally under the party, the FALSG, as in the case of other leading small groups, straddles the jurisdiction of both government and party structures. It is considered an example of a “squad (*banzi*)-level” leading small group, because it is led by one or more members of the top leadership “squad” consisting of PB members or key leaders. It has a regular membership composed of leading officials of relevant line departments responsible for foreign affairs, plus several ex-officio governmental advisors.⁸

The FALSG conveys policy decisions downward to the various organs of the foreign affairs *xitong* and transmits essential information and perspectives upward to the senior party leadership, primarily via its head. It also coordinates and supervises the implementation of key elements of foreign policy by both senior ministries such as the MoFA and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MoFTEC), as well as working-level leadership groups under the State Council and the Communist Party involved in foreign affairs, such as the Leading Group for Foreign Investment and the Party In-

⁷*Xitongs* are groupings of functionally related bureaucracies that deal with a broad policy area of critical importance to the senior party leadership. A leading small group usually exists for each *xitong*. For more details, see Lieberthal (1995), pp. 194–207.

⁸Wei Li (1994), pp. 32–34; Lieberthal (1995), pp. 193–194; and Hamrin (1992), pp. 104, 116. The formal membership of the FALSG normally includes the Premier (a PBSC member), the Foreign Minister (Vice Chairman of the FALSG), the director of the State Council Office of Foreign Affairs, the head of the CCP International Liaison Department, the Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, the Minister of State Security, a PLA representative, and the head of the Xinhua News Agency. In the past, the FALSG has also included a small number of advisors. In the late 1980s, these were Zhu Muzhi (head of the Association of Cultural Exchanges with Foreign Countries) and Ji Pengfei (head of both the party’s work group on Hong Kong and Macao and its counterpart office in the State Council), according to Hamrin (1995), pp. 111–112. Also see Lu Ning (1997), pp. 11–12.

ternational Liaison Department. Through such activities, the FALSG is thus able to influence and in some cases formulate policy.⁹

As head of the FALSG, Li Peng serves as the foreign policy “bridge leader” within the top leadership.¹⁰ In this capacity, he reportedly dominates the foreign policy subarena, directing the formulation and implementation of critical policy initiatives and thereby limiting the influence over foreign policy wielded by other PBSC members.¹¹ Li reportedly relies heavily on Liu Huaqiu, a Vice Foreign Minister and head of the State Council Office of Foreign Affairs (OFA), to perform a variety of critical administrative, secretarial, and even policy-making functions within the FALSG. Although technically only a governmental body under the State Council, Liu’s OFA also serves as the equivalent of a “supra-”general office (GO) to the FALSG. Specifically, the OFA prepares the agenda for all FALSG meetings (an extremely important function), supervises and coordinates many document flows and bureaucratic interactions among the components of the FALSG (and, to a lesser extent, between the foreign and defense policy subarenas),¹² and occasionally provides analysis and

⁹Leading small groups such as the FALSG are sometimes referred to by the leadership as “advisory bodies” for the PB or Party Secretariat, and their decisions are often issued in the name of those bodies. However, they can also bring finished policy packages to the party leading organs at times and can sometimes issue orders and instructions directly to line departments and units. See Wei Li (1994), pp. 33–34.

¹⁰A bridge leader heads a major functional coordination point or gateway (*kou*) between the PB and various relevant subordinate organs of a given *xitong*, coordinating relations between those bureaucracies and the top elite. Each bridge leader thus heads the leadership small group that directs a particular *xitong*. See Lieberthal (1995), p. 188.

¹¹As with any high-level post in the Chinese bureaucracy, Li Peng’s authority in the foreign policy realm, and hence the importance of the FALSG that he chairs as premier, primarily derive from his personal stature and power as a senior party leader. It is also important to note that Li Peng exercises influence over foreign-policy-related issues that do not formally fall under the jurisdiction of the FALSG. For example, Li reportedly controls an informal PB-level group which deals with Hong Kong and Macao policy. This group presumably supervises the working-level Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council, headed by Lu Ping.

¹²Although Liu’s OFA reportedly attempts to coordinate and supervise working-level policy interactions between the foreign and defense policy subarenas, usually by requesting strategic analysis from the military (in the form of oral or written reports), the effort has not met with much success, according to many interviewees. Also see the analysis below of the strategic research, analysis, and intelligence (SRAI) subarena.

position papers to senior FALSG members, especially Li Peng.¹³ Moreover, according to some interviewees, the OFA, with Li Peng's support, has in recent years taken over various functions of the full FALSG, sometimes convening policy meetings in its place, usually attended by several FALSG members. In many instances, policy positions developed through this OFA-led process are subsequently approved on a largely pro forma basis by the full FALSG, and then by the PBSC. These activities thus give Liu Huaqiu considerable influence over the actual formulation of Chinese foreign policy and have permitted him to greatly expand the authority and power of the OFA. The OFA reportedly now wields significant influence over the entire foreign policy bureaucracy, in some areas rivaling that of Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, who nonetheless remains a key advisor and implementor of the major elements of Chinese foreign policy.¹⁴

The expanded responsibilities of the OFA¹⁵ cause some observers to compare the OFA to the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) staff and hence to view Liu Huaqiu as roughly equivalent to the U.S. National Security Advisor in power and authority.¹⁶ Such a comparison is misleading, however. While the NSC staff serves the supreme executive leader of the U.S. government (i.e., the President), the OFA primarily serves the Chinese Premier (i.e., Li Peng, arguably only the second most powerful political leader in China), and not PRC Presi-

¹³OFA policy documents are largely drawn up on the basis of reports submitted by subordinate research institutes within the SRAI subarena, discussed below. Although involved in a wide range of governmental policy areas, the State Council Research Office also at times produces and commissions analysis relevant to the foreign policy subarena, for use by the FALSG and the PBSC. However, its role and influence are far less than those of the OFA.

¹⁴Given the increasing authority over foreign policy of the OFA, it is not surprising that Liu and Qian reportedly do not get along, and that the resulting struggle between the two figures has led to some confusion over lines of authority within the foreign policy subarena, according to interviewees.

¹⁵The enlarged role in foreign policy played by the OFA, originally and formally a government unit responsible for various administrative and secretarial tasks in the diplomatic realm, provides an excellent example of how personal positions of authority and interpersonal relations among key leaders (in this case Li Peng and Liu Huaqiu) can serve to redefine the power and authority exercised by individual offices within the Chinese bureaucracy.

¹⁶This impression was reinforced by the fact that Liu Huaqiu met for eight hours with his U.S. "counterpart," National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, when he traveled to Washington during the height of the tensions over Taiwan in spring 1996.

dent and Party Secretary General Jiang Zemin.¹⁷ Moreover, the OFA's duties are primarily, if not solely, limited to the civilian foreign policy realm, as a subordinate body to the FALSG. The latter differs in structure and function from the NSC proper, which includes the top figures in both the civilian and military wings of the U.S. national security apparatus.¹⁸

Jiang Zemin's direct involvement in the foreign policy subarena is reportedly limited largely to the enunciation of broad programmatic statements on China's external stance¹⁹ or important bilateral relationships and his participation in summits or meetings with foreign leaders. However, such activities are by no mean inconsequential. As president and formal party leader, Jiang's foreign policy statements and interactions can influence the tenor and direction of China's foreign policy line in significant ways. Jiang is also able to exert significant, albeit indirect, influence over specific foreign policy issues through his leadership of the CCP Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group (TALSG), the senior coordinating mechanism for policy in this area.²⁰ Although technically considered part of the domestic policy

¹⁷However, some interviewees believe that Liu Huaqiu advises Jiang on an informal basis.

¹⁸The closest approximation to the NSC within the Chinese power structure is the PB, which includes the most senior-serving members of the PLA. Yet this organization's responsibilities obviously extend far beyond the national security arena. For a detailed discussion of the U.S. NSC and the NSC staff, see Lieutenant Colonel Christopher C. Shoemaker, *Structure, Function and the NSC Staff: An Officer's Guide to the National Security Council*, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1989. The OFA and the NSC staff also differ in size: The former contains less than twenty full-time members, but the latter has at times included more than fifty professionals. See Chapter Six for a discussion of Chinese proposals for establishing a full-blown, formal NSC-type structure to oversee the entire national security policy arena, at senior civilian and military levels.

¹⁹For recent examples, see Jiang Zemin's address to the United Nations delivered in New York City on October 24, 1995, at the special commemorative meeting of the 50th anniversary of the U.N., and his speech at the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting, delivered on November 21, 1995.

²⁰Jiang's leadership of the TALSG reportedly derives in part from his military position as CMC chairman, and thus provides a point of contact between Taiwan policy and the defense policy subarena. The membership of the TALSG includes Jiang Zemin (as bridge leader), Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, Chen Yunlin, director of the State Council's Taiwan Affairs Office (and the parallel office within the CCP CC), Lieutenant General Xiong Guangkai, Minister of State Security Jia Chunwang, and Wang Daohan, chairman of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait. Jiang Zemin and Qian Qichen reportedly serve as the head and deputy head of the TALSG. For more

arena, this LSG obviously influences policy in areas that impinge upon China's diplomatic and political relations with Asia, Europe, and the United States. The TALSG is playing an increasingly important role in policy toward the United States in particular, given the problems between Washington and Beijing resulting from Taiwan's expanding international presence.²¹

In addition, Jiang might exert significant indirect influence over the foreign policy subarena through a very broad bureaucratic coordinating structure, the above-mentioned CC GO. This party organ serves both the PBSC and the most important leadership groups, including the FALSG. For example, it performs critical liaison and communication functions among the top tier of senior political leaders, between the top leadership as a whole and various bureaucratic *xitong* and constituent agencies, and between the senior executive leaders of these agencies and their subordinate working-level functionaries and analysts. Equally important, it exerts significant influence over daily decisions and processes and at times even takes positions on specific issues in a wide variety of policy areas.²² Although undoubtedly less central to the foreign policy

details, see *Sing Tao Jih Pao*, Hong Kong, February 7, 1996, p. A4, in *FBIS-CHI-96-026*, 2-7-96, p. 23. Jiang Zemin's influence over Taiwan policy is further enhanced by the fact that Wang Daohan, chairman of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait, is his long-time associate and confidant.

²¹Most observers believe that Jiang Zemin was the primary force behind the so-called "eight point" proposal for improved cross-strait relations (entitled, "Continue to Promote the Reunification of the Motherland") that he offered to Taiwan in January 1995. However, Jiang's control over Taiwan policy, and hence the level of indirect influence such control provides him in the foreign policy subarena, are by no means absolute. The Taiwan Affairs Office under the State Council and the subordinate Taiwan Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also play critical roles in analyzing Taiwan affairs and providing key policy recommendations to both the TALSG and the PBSC. Indeed, some Chinese observers assert that many TALSG policy decisions are made in a pro forma manner on the basis of proposals or recommendations submitted by these two offices. Moreover, since both bodies are formally under the State Council, which also directs the OFA under Liu Huaqiu, they are probably closely associated with the FALSG and hence with Li Peng. Exactly how these overlapping lines of authority between Li and Jiang over Taiwan policy play out in practice is unclear to the author.

²²Wei Li (1994), pp. 32-34. The CC GO has a policy research office that performs a small amount of analysis (primarily on domestic issues) and writes speeches for senior party leaders. According to Wei Li, a more important office within the CC GO is the Secretary (*mishu*) Bureau. This organ plays a key role in "processing information, conducting research, providing advice, drafting and editing Central documents, and

process than the State Council OFA under Liu Huaqiu, the CC GO can thus shape this, and other, policy subarenas in subtle yet decisive ways, affecting both bureaucratic and personal interactions.²³ Jiang probably exerts significant influence over the activities of the CC GO, and hence over aspects of foreign policy, because his close aide, Zeng Qinghong, heads that organ.²⁴

Even though Li Peng exercises predominant influence over the foreign policy subarena, the above suggests that he probably consults with Jiang Zemin on many foreign policy issues, to strengthen party control and coordination within the subarena and between the foreign policy, defense policy, and broader national strategic objectives subarenas. Jiang nevertheless defers to Li Peng on most foreign policy issues, according to interviewees. But the potential for competition or conflict within this subarena clearly exists between the two leaders.²⁵

supervising subordinate departments and units. Moreover, the bureau is responsible for providing and managing personal *mishu* for Central leaders" (p. 14). The State Council also contains a General Office. However, this body reportedly performs almost exclusively administrative or secretarial functions, primarily for governmental bureaucracies in the domestic policy arena. Although it occasionally coordinates and supervises document flows and other interactions among organizations responsible for implementing foreign economic policy, most of the relevant bureaucratic policy interactions in this area are conducted by the State Council OFA and the CC GO (or, to a far lesser extent, the State Council Research Office, mentioned above). Thus, although it performs some duties relevant to foreign policy, the State Council GO is not seen as a major player in this subarena.

²³The CC GO obviously has much broader responsibilities and powers than the OFA, performing duties affecting a wide range of domestic and external civilian and military policy arenas. Hence, it is unable to concentrate on any one policy arena. Yet its important "gatekeeper" and administrative roles in mediating contacts and document flows among senior leaders and top party and government organizations, along with its high bureaucratic status as a party organ, give it enormous potential access to and influence over any particular policy arena, including foreign policy.

²⁴Zeng accompanies Jiang Zemin on all of his foreign travels. He is also the political commissar of the Central Guard Unit, responsible for the security of all senior party officials. You Kexi, Jiang's personal chief bodyguard, also accompanies Jiang overseas and reportedly serves as an ex officio advisor on external policy issues. You was selected in fall 1995 to command the Central Guard Unit. A third key advisor who accompanies Jiang overseas is Teng Wensheng, his chief speech writer and the head of the Party Central Policy Research Center. Finally, Liu Huaqiu probably also provides Jiang Zemin with further access to the foreign policy subarena, by supplying him with occasional advice on foreign affairs, as mentioned above.

²⁵Some recent evidence suggests that Deng Xiaoping might have given oversight responsibility for U.S.-China relations to Jiang Zemin 2-3 years ago. This has not been

Two other civilian government organizations not formally represented in the FALSG reportedly play an increasingly important, and conservative, role in the foreign policy subarena: the Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) (*waishi weiyuanhui*) of the National People's Congress and the Foreign Propaganda Leading Group (FPLG) (*duiwai xuanquan lingdao zu*) of the State Council. Historically, the former unit has not played a major role in foreign policy, serving instead primarily as a "talk shop" and retirement home for former diplomats and ministers.²⁶ However, well-placed observers in Beijing believe that the FAC is gaining influence within the foreign policy realm through the efforts of its director, Zhu Liang. Zhu, who served from 1985–1993 as head of the CCP International Liaison Department, reportedly holds very hardline views on many foreign policy issues, especially relations with the United States, and is attempting, with some success, to use the FAC to promote those views within the foreign policy subarena.²⁷ He is probably supported in these efforts by Li Peng, who is widely perceived as a proponent of a tougher stance toward the United States.²⁸

The FPLG was established in the early 1990s to strengthen central control over the media flow between China and the outside world.

confirmed by the author. If true, it would suggest that Jiang enjoys a significantly greater level of influence over Chinese foreign policy than is suggested above. It might also provide the basis for serious conflict between Li and Jiang, given the obvious encroachment upon the former's "turf" that such a responsibility represents.

²⁶For example, David Shambaugh has written that the FAC has no decisionmaking authority (1995a), p. 14. This point is also stressed by a former Chinese MoFA official. See Yang (1995), p. 91.

²⁷Some observers expect that the level of influence on foreign policy of the NPC FAC will continue to increase in the future, regardless of who leads it, as the overall role of the NPC continues to evolve from that of a rubber stamp body under party control to a more autonomous political actor in the policy process. This evolution, which largely began under Zhao Ziyang, experienced a setback after Zhao was removed from power during the Tiananmen incident but has resumed in recent years, albeit to a more limited extent.

²⁸Some well-placed Chinese observers believe that Li Peng uses his leadership of the foreign policy subarena to implement a more negative policy line toward the United States. For example, in the foreign economic policy realm, Li Peng reportedly played a key role in the 1995 and 1996 decisions to grant very lucrative economic contracts in the automobile and aircraft sectors to European companies, despite the often better deals offered by U.S. competitors. Li argues forcefully within party circles that China must reduce its level of dependence upon U.S. business, according to some interviewees.

This control is exerted in both directions, i.e., the FPLG oversees and influences both domestic reporting on international issues by Chinese open media organs such as the Xinhua News Agency and major newspapers, and Chinese press coverage of domestic events provided to foreign countries. Headed by Ma Yuzhen,²⁹ concurrently a deputy head of the State Council Information Office, the FPLG takes a very conservative position on many issues, and often directs Chinese journals and daily media to intensify criticisms of foreign (and particularly U.S.) proponents of allegedly anti-China viewpoints.

The conservative political positions taken by both the NPC FAC and the FPLG, combined with the above-mentioned views of Li Peng, suggest that the general movement toward a more hardline stance increasingly evident within Chinese foreign policy circles has a clear civilian component and is not necessarily led or dominated by the PLA, as some observers believe.³⁰

The PLA does not play a central role in the foreign policy subarena. As indicated above, most elements of Chinese foreign policy are carried out by party and state organs. In the past, this usually occurred without much, if any, regular or in-depth consultations with the PLA.³¹ Indeed, as suggested above, many foreign policy activities received only sporadic guidance from even the FALSG or the PBSC, operating largely on “automatic pilot,” under the control of various relevant subordinate ministries. This still holds true today. However, there is increasing evidence to suggest that the overall level of military involvement in the foreign policy subarena is growing, both formally and informally. Military views are increasingly expressed and military influence exerted on specific foreign policy issues.

Formal contacts between the PLA and the foreign policy subarena occur primarily through the FALSG. As noted above, the PLA has at

²⁹Although headed by Ma and formally under the State Council, the FPLG undoubtedly interacts with, and may receive some supervision from, the CCP's Small Leading Group on Propaganda and Ideology led by PB member Ding Guan'gen. Ding is the senior party leader responsible for the propaganda and ideology *xitong* within the party-state system.

³⁰However, neither organization has a permanent member on the FALSG, although a FPLG representative reportedly attends FALSG meetings occasionally.

³¹Barnett (1985), pp. 102–104.

least one representative on that body. This individual has represented either the Ministry of Defense or the General Staff Department. The inclusion of a PLA representative on the FALSG reportedly began in the mid 1980s under Zhao Ziyang and was intended to strengthen civilian government oversight of the PLA on issues that impinged on foreign relations.³² Defense Minister Qin Jiwei apparently served on the FALSG at that time. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Generals Xu Xin and Xu Huizi served consecutively as PLA representatives to the FALSG, in their capacity as Deputy Chief of the GSD in charge of intelligence and foreign affairs.³³ Lieutenant General and Deputy GSD Chief Xiong Guangkai now holds the intelligence/foreign affairs portfolio and hence serves as the PLA representative to the FALSG.³⁴ Xiong is also reportedly a member of the CCP's TALSG.

It is unlikely, however, that the FALSG serves as the *primary* link between the PLA and the foreign policy subarena. Despite his impressive credentials as a deputy GSD head, Lieutenant General Xiong Guangkai does not hold a post senior enough to perform this function.³⁵ It is more likely, given the primary role of the FALSG as a communication and coordination mechanism for the foreign policy subarena, that PLA representation on that body is intended in large part to ensure a regular degree of information flow between the foreign policy subarena and the military and to ensure coordination between the foreign policy and defense policy subarenas regarding those relatively routine policy issues and areas that might overlap or produce conflict. In other words, the FALSG is not intended to serve as *the* forum for military input into critical foreign policy decisions.

³²Hamrin (1995), p. 90.

³³Currently there are five Deputy Chiefs of the GSD, each responsible for (1) regular troop and militia training and equipment, (2) operations, (3) administration, (4) intelligence and foreign affairs, and (5) political work. The author indebted to Tai Ming Cheung for this information.

³⁴Xiong's role on the FALSG suggests that the FALSG's proceedings are probably conveyed in some detail to Jiang Zemin, since Xiong is reportedly very close to the party secretary general.

³⁵Moreover, Xiong's relatively lower ranking within the senior military leadership contrasts significantly with the ranking of the military representative to the U.S. NSC, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thus indicating another major area of difference between the FALSG and the NSC.

Such input is likely provided at the level of the PB, through contacts between Li Peng, Jiang Zemin (as CMC head), Zhang Wannian and Chi Haotian (as PB members with primary responsibility for defense policy), almost certainly with some ex-officio participation by Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zhen. Such decision-oriented contacts might occur on a purely informal and personal basis, through direct conversations among these leaders. It might also occur, however, on a more routine basis, through the party CC GO.

As noted above, the CC GO plays an important role in facilitating communication among members of the PBSC and the elders and between various bureaucratic *xitong* and party leading small groups, including the FALSG. Beyond these responsibilities, however, the CC GO also reportedly has responsibility for maintaining constant contact and continuously coordinating information between the leading civilian party organs and various party bodies within the military, including the party CMC, various subordinate CMC departments, and party committees within the PLA regional commands.³⁶ Thus, the CC GO probably coordinates and facilitates routine bureaucratic information flows between the defense and foreign policy sectors (i.e., through the CMC and the FALSG *xitong*), as well as higher-level contacts among senior members of both subarenas, in their capacity as PB members. The likely importance of the CC GO to the expression of military views on foreign policy is reinforced by the fact that General Wang Ruilin, deputy director of the General Political Department, member of the CMC, and former senior secretary to Deng Xiaoping, is a deputy head of the CC GO.³⁷

Finally, also on a purely informal level, PLA officers apparently express their views on foreign policy issues through irregular and informal communications with members of the PBSC. As the chief organization responsible for national defense and a strong exponent of a more assertive brand of nationalist views increasingly evident

³⁶See Wei Li (1994), p. 18.

³⁷However, it must again be stressed that, as with other important party, state, and military organs, the precise extent of influence exerted on policy issues by the CC GO will depend primarily upon the personal stature and influence of its top leader. Thus, Wang Ruilin's personal authority might not prove as important, in the workings of the CC GO, as that of Zeng Qinghong.

among both the elite and the populace,³⁸ the PLA is reportedly becoming more and more attentive to actions by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that impinge on its institutional interests and responsibilities or are in general judged to weaken or besmirch China's influence or reputation in the international arena. Many regional and global diplomatic and/or foreign policy issues fall within or affect these areas of concern. These include disputes over the Spratly Islands, the fate of Hong Kong and Taiwan,³⁹ nuclear testing and proliferation policies, certain trade disputes and technology transfer negotiations, multilateral security discussions, and critical bilateral relations that affect these policy issues or aspects of military modernization, such as relations with Russia (an increasingly important source of advanced weaponry) and with the United States and Japan.⁴⁰ The PLA is also reportedly very attentive to policy toward Inner Asia, given its sensitivity to ethnic instability in border areas.

PLA concerns in the above areas have at times produced strong oral or written protests by senior, usually retired, PLA officers over the handling of a particular foreign policy issue by the MoFA. Occasionally, such protests led to prolonged disputes between the PLA leadership and the MoFA; in the 1980s, some of these disputes reportedly became deadlocked and eventually had to be resolved at the most senior level, by Deng Xiaoping and/or Yang Shangkun.⁴¹ Ex-

³⁸For a summary of nationalist views expressed in both the military and society, see Swaine (1995), pp. 7–9, 32–33, and 52–53.

³⁹The Spratlys, Hong Kong, and Taiwan are all viewed by the military as internal issues with external components, and hence combine elements of domestic security, territorial defense, and foreign policy. PLA sentiments toward Taiwan expressed in the CMC would likely exert a particularly strong effect on party leadership views because of Jiang Zemin's concurrent duties as CMC Chair and head of the TALSG.

⁴⁰For a similar listing of such areas of PLA concern, see Shambaugh (1995a), p. 15.

⁴¹Foreign policy organs usually handle an external policy issue if it is defined as being within the foreign affairs (*waishi*) realm, as opposed to the military affairs (*junshi*) (i.e., defense policy) realm. Many of the above issues probably fall within a gray area (i.e., neither purely *waishi* nor *junshi*) and thus require intervention and a formal "ruling" from higher leadership levels. Friction between the foreign and defense policy subarenas is to a great extent unavoidable, however, stemming from the differing priorities and approaches to foreign affairs adopted by MoFA and the PLA. The former is chiefly concerned with maintaining friendly or amicable diplomatic relations with most Asian countries and the major global powers, for the purpose of preserving an external environment conducive to continued economic growth and political stability. The latter wishes, of course, to support such a strategy, which is rooted in China's

actly how many of these bureaucratic disputes occurred, which PLA leaders were involved, and how each dispute was eventually resolved is largely unknown.⁴² As noted above, most knowledgeable observers with whom the author has spoken insist that a relatively small number of such incidents took place, despite contrary impressions conveyed by the Hong Kong media.⁴³ Policy discussions associated with these organizational disputes were probably conducted between the CMC and the PBSC or the FALSG.

Military “positions” on specific foreign policy issues were not determined by the CMC as a body, however, much less by PLA organs below the CMC. In recent years, such “positions” were almost certainly taken informally by Liu Huaqing, Zhang Zhen, and perhaps a few retired PLA elders.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, the PLA did not dictate for-

national strategic objectives. However, as indicated above, the PLA’s primary responsibility is to ensure an effective defense against potential enemies by building a more modern military force and generally to prevent the emergence of threatening behavior among major regional or global powers.

⁴²However, Deng Xiaoping’s role in resolving the most serious disputes was by all accounts absolutely critical. Indeed, many of the protest letters written by elder PLA leaders were usually sent to Deng. Given his extensive and distinguished service as a senior officer of the Red Army before 1949, Deng was regarded by the military as “one of us,” and they would thus generally abide by his decisions (especially after the mid 1980s, when Deng had removed his PLA opponents from power). For an interesting discussion of Deng’s prestige among the senior PLA leadership, see Frederick C. Teiwes, “The Paradoxical Post-Mao Transition: From Obeying the Leader to ‘Normal Politics,’” *China Journal*, No. 34, July 1995, pp. 67–68. Less critical disputes between the military and foreign policy leaderships are probably resolved (or at least kept under control) through a variety of bureaucratic mechanisms, e.g., special interagency committees. Such a committee was formed to handle arms exports, for example, a major gray area of dispute. The author is indebted to Alastair I. Johnston for this information.

⁴³The most recent and highly notable example of PLA criticism of MoFA policy was occasioned by Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui’s visit to Cornell University in June 1995, which precipitated a crisis in U.S.-China relations, as mentioned above. Many in the PLA blamed this event—and the ensuing crisis—on MoFA’s previous overly conciliatory stance toward Washington on Taiwan-related issues.

⁴⁴Moreover, virtually every Chinese interviewee with whom the author has spoken insists that senior *servicing* officers of the PLA did not and still do not write letters or otherwise circumvent the chain of command to voice any form of policy dissent. However, PLA strategists have at times criticized elements of China’s foreign policy in their writings, as well as the specific views of civilian strategists. In addition, military analysts and experts probably express their views on foreign policy issues directly to their counterparts within the MoFA during various expert discussions on external policy issues attended by both civilian and military personnel. These meetings are discussed in Chapter Five.

foreign policy views to Deng Xiaoping or the designated successor leadership as a result of such senior contacts.

The same almost certainly holds true today. However, the overall ability of the civilian party leadership to resist military encroachment on the foreign policy subarena, or to decisively resolve disputes between the foreign and defense policy leaderships is almost certainly declining. As suggested above, now that Deng Xiaoping, the last powerful “arbiter” of power at the top of the system, has passed from the political scene and as PLA interest in issues relevant to the foreign policy subarena increases, we might see future policy disputes between the defense and foreign policy leaderships resulting in prolonged stalemates or increasingly resolved in favor of the military.⁴⁵

⁴⁵Deng’s absence arguably will reduce the “access” of remaining PLA elders to the foreign policy arena, yet at the same time will raise questions about the ability of a less respected civilian successor leadership to resolve future disputes with the PLA. This issue is addressed further in Chapter Six. For a useful discussion of the general importance of elder links to Deng Xiaoping for the expression of their views on a wide range of issues, see Teiwes (1995), pp. 78–80.

DEFENSE POLICY SUBARENA

What is herein referred to as the defense policy subarena is usually termed the military strategy (*junshi zhanlue*) or military policy (*junshi zhengce*) realm by most Chinese leaders and strategists. This subarena comprises the range of *external* defense or security-related activities undertaken by the major agencies of the PLA in support of national security policy and China's broader national strategic objectives.¹ These primarily center upon China's national military strategy and military planning efforts. Key components include China's military (i.e., defense) doctrine, military budget, force structure, force deployments and order of battle, military operational doctrines, force readiness and training, military strategy and tactics, and military threat analysis, as well as policies and activities concerning arms control and nuclear disarmament, proliferation issues, military-related acquisitions, contacts and dialogues with foreign militaries, and major arms sales.

At present, on the broadest level, China is implementing a "two-tier" defense strategy² reflecting Beijing's short- to medium-term desire to increase the efficacy of military power as a more potent and versatile instrument of foreign and defense policy, and its longer-term aspirations for power projection and extended territorial defense capabilities commensurate with the attainment of great-power status.

¹Hence, this subarena does not explicitly include policy regarding internal military affairs, such as the control of minority areas or the handling of civilian unrest, even though the policy process is similar in many respects.

²You Ji, "The Spratly Islands: A Test Case for China's Defense and Foreign Policies," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 16, No. 4, March 1995, p. 378.

The first tier focuses on the modernization of the PLA's nuclear capability through the creation of a small yet more accurate and versatile triad-based strategic and tactical missile force.³ This nuclear modernization program is apparently intended to serve two broad goals: (1) the maintenance of a deterrence capability against both nuclear and conventional threats from the major powers,⁴ and (2) the development of a tactical nuclear weapons capability for possible use in limited conflict scenarios. At the same time, China's official nuclear defense strategy still continues to stress a "no first use" doctrine and prohibits the use by China of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear powers.⁵

³In general, China's nuclear weapons modernization program emphasizes (1) the development of land- and sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with improved range, accuracy, survivability, and penetration against limited missile defense; (2) the development of a new generation of solid-fuel, short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles; (3) the development of smaller warheads, which would theoretically allow a multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capability (Beijing might perceive a need for rapid increases in the number of deployed warheads to overwhelm an Asia-based TMD or U.S.-based antiballistic missile (ABM) system); and (4) an improvement in China's nuclear weapons C3I through the acceleration of space capabilities and the continued importation of advanced communication technologies. The author is indebted to James Mulvenon for providing this summary. For a more detailed overview of China's nuclear modernization program, see John Caldwell and Alexander Lennson, "China's Nuclear Modernization Program," *Strategic Review*, Fall 1995, pp. 27–37.

⁴Deterring potential major conventional threats through nuclear means is viewed as especially important over the short to medium term, as China strives to modernize its largely obsolete conventional forces.

⁵The above two goals suggest that China's nuclear deterrence doctrine may be shifting from an emphasis upon the maintenance of a minimal strategic force sufficient to inflict what is perceived to be unacceptable damage on a handful of enemy cities with a simple, undifferentiated countervalue second strike ("city busting") to the attainment of a limited yet more sophisticated range of strategic and substrategic capabilities to deter any level of nuclear conflict, and in a nuclear war to contain escalatory pressures. The latter doctrine (often termed "limited deterrence") requires a nuclear force capable of hitting a range of countervalue and counterforce targets including enemy strategic nuclear missiles, conventional military bases and troop concentrations, transport hubs and command-and-control centers, etc. For further details, see Alastair I. Johnston, "China's New 'Old Thinking': The Concept of Limited Deterrence," *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 3, Winter 1995/96. For additional interesting discussions of China's nuclear warfare doctrine and strategy, see Colonel Yao Yunzhu, "Differences Between Western and Chinese Deterrence Theories," Academy of Military Science, unpublished manuscript; Holly Porteous, "China's View of Strategic Weapons," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 8, No. 3, March 1996, pp. 134–137; and Ralph A. Hellenbeck et al., "China's Nuclear Weapon's Modernization Program, Nuclear Warfare Doctrine and Strategy, and Prospects for Strategic Arms

The second tier of China's defense strategy stresses the improvement of specific conventional military capabilities to cope with a wide variety of possible land- or sea-based threats originating primarily from within the Asia-Pacific region. Such threats provide the rationale for China's emerging post-Cold War conventional defense doctrine, which is keyed to concepts such as "local war" and "active peripheral defense."⁶ First enunciated by the Chinese leadership in the early and mid 1980s, these concepts assume that regional conventional conflicts of relatively low intensity and short duration could break out virtually anywhere on China's periphery, demanding a rapid and decisive application of force. This defense doctrine employs new or redefined Chinese versions of basic military principles and combat methods, e.g., "strategic frontier," and "strategic initiative through preemptive action."⁷

Control," paper for a workshop sponsored by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1995. It should be pointed out that Chinese leaders and strategists have only begun to explicitly discuss and formulate a nuclear weapons strategy in recent years. For decades, China possessed no coherent, articulated nuclear doctrine. Nuclear weapons development was apparently target- and technology-, and not specifically doctrinally, driven. See Alastair I. Johnston, "Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization: Limited Deterrence Versus Multilateral Arms Control," *China Quarterly*, No. 146, June 1996, pp. 548-576.

⁶According to Paul Godwin, local or limited wars include (1) small-scale conflicts restricted to contested border areas, (2) conflict over territorial seas and islands, (3) surprise air attacks, (4) defense against deliberately limited attacks into Chinese territory, and (5) punitive counterattacks launched by China into enemy territory to "oppose invasion, protect sovereignty, or to uphold justice and dispel threats." For further details, see Paul H.B. Godwin, "Force Projection and China's Military Strategy," paper prepared for the Sixth Annual Conference on the Chinese People's Liberation Army, Coolfont, Virginia, June 1995, p. 4. Active peripheral defense is defined by one PLA analyst as "the defense of territorial and strategic frontiers exercised for anti-attack purposes, [not excluding the possibility of] offensive strikes for self-defense or for offense after a period of defense." See John Downing, "China's Evolving Maritime Strategy: Part One, Restructuring Begins," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 8, No. 3, London, March 1996, p. 130.

⁷The Chinese principle of "strategic frontier" is intended to encompass the full range of competitive areas or boundaries implied by the notion of comprehensive national strength, including land, maritime, and outer space frontiers, as well as more abstract strategic realms related to China's economic and technological development. An increased emphasis on gaining the initiative by striking first (rather than waiting for the enemy to strike) is associated with the notion of active peripheral defense. It reflects the need to act quickly and decisively to preempt an attack, restore lost territories, protect economic resources, or resolve a conflict before it escalates. For further details on these and other less critical principles basic to China's post-Cold War defense doctrine, see Li Nan, "The PLA's Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics, 1985-95: A Chinese Perspective," *China Quarterly*, No. 146, June 1996, pp. 443-463.

China's resulting conventional force planning and deployment strategy thus posits the creation of a smaller, highly trained and motivated, technologically advanced, versatile and well-coordinated military force operating under a modern combined arms tactical operations doctrine. This requires the creation of smaller, more flexible ground forces, especially so-called rapid reaction combat units (RRUs) with airborne drop and amphibious landing capabilities, as well as sophisticated air and naval arms, to perform both support and power projection functions. To improve capabilities in the latter area, the Chinese now place a high priority on the development of air and naval electronic warfare systems, improved missile and aircraft guidance systems, improved surface ships (especially in air defense and fire control), precision-guided munitions, more advanced communications and early warning/battle management systems, long-range transport and lift capability, and midair refueling technology.⁸ Such a diverse set of military capabilities also requires a host of secondary features, including a more robust research and development capability, a more technologically advanced and quality-driven defense industry, and a highly professionalized, merit-based system of officer recruitment, education, promotion, and training.

The PLA is primarily responsible for formulating and implementing policy and strategy in all of the above defense policy areas, under the supervision of the senior party elite responsible for formulating national strategic objectives. Indeed, defense policy is virtually the exclusive domain of the PLA and comprises the core of its involvement in the entire national security arena. As with the foreign policy subarena, the leadership, structure, and processes of the defense policy subarena are fairly regularized and bureaucratic, although the informal influence exercised by leaders of key organs remains critical. Major actors include a top tier composed of the highest-ranking

Also see Paul H.B. Godwin, "Changing Concepts of Doctrine, Strategy, and Operations in the People's Liberation Army 1978-87," *China Quarterly*, No. 112, December 1987, pp. 573-590.

⁸Many analysts believe that China's military acquisitions are increasingly designed to strengthen the credibility of Beijing's military options against Taiwan, and to deter the U.S. from deploying aircraft carriers in an effort to counter such options. Of greatest importance, in this regard, are ballistic and cruise missiles, improved submarine warfare and anti-submarine warfare capabilities, amphibious power projection capabilities, long-range "carrier busting" torpedoes, and advanced long-range strike aircraft.

civilian party leader and senior military officers with high party rank, a second, overlapping tier including the heads of the major military departments and organizations responsible for key aspects of defense policy (itself a subset of a much larger military affairs bureaucracy), and a single important coordinating mechanism: the party CMC and its general office (CMC GO). These actors are depicted in Figure 4.

The uppermost tier of this subarena encompasses the most senior members of the CMC. Since the 14th Party Congress of October 1992, and until very recently, this group has consisted of three figures: Jiang Zemin (as CMC chairman) and Generals Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zhen (as CMC deputy chairmen). These three leaders constituted an *informal* executive committee of the CMC, exercising sole decisionmaking authority over the most critical military (including defense) policy issues, usually with the concurrence of the remaining members of the PBSC.⁹ More recently, the selection of Generals Zhang Wannian and Chi Haotian as additional deputy CMC heads has expanded the size of the informal CMC executive committee to five members.¹⁰ However, the above-outlined leadership changes of the 15th Party Congress of September 1997 suggest that Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zhen will step down from their formal CMC posts at the end of 1997, thus returning the size of the informal CMC executive committee to three persons.

Among senior defense policy leaders, Zhang Wannian and Chi Haotian will almost certainly become the most critical decisionmakers in many defense policy areas, replacing Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zhen, although the latter two generals will likely retain important informal influence. Jiang Zemin has labored mightily since becoming chairman of the CMC to increase his level of control over the PLA and to gain the trust and loyalty of its senior leadership, and has apparently

⁹Prior to his removal from office at the 14th Party Congress, the CMC executive committee undoubtedly also included Yang Shangkun. Yang served as a critical intermediary between the defense policy subarena and the national security objectives subarena, as suggested above.

¹⁰The expected revival of the post of CMC Secretary General, inactive since the removal of Yang Baibing in 1992, would add a sixth figure (possibly Fu Quanyou) to this executive committee.

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


Figure 4—Defense Policy Subarena

met with some success.¹¹ However, in the defense policy subarena, Jiang almost certainly follows the lead of the top PLA elite.¹² His policy role concerning many military issues is probably limited to that of a communicator and occasional advocate of the PLA's defense policy views to his civilian colleagues on the PBSC and within the foreign policy subarena. Generals Zhang Wannian and Chi Haotian clearly stand as "first among equals" among the successor generation of military leaders, especially on defense policy matters.¹³

Within the PLA, each member of the CMC executive committee heads one or more committees or leading groups responsible for developing specific military policies. This process involves regular consultations with the remaining members of the CMC. These figures include the heads of the three PLA central departments (General Staff Department (GSD), General Political Department (GPD), and General Logistics Department (GLD)). These posts are currently held by Generals Fu Quanyou, Yu Yongbo, and Wang Ke, respectively (all three officers are full members of the CCP CC). A fourth regular CMC member is General Wang Ruilin, mentioned above.

In the past, decisions on defense policy issues were also strongly influenced by individual retired or semi-retired PLA elders. Many of these military leaders reportedly attended CMC meetings as ex-officio members. However, as noted above, PLA elders no longer wield power in the policy apparatus on a regular basis, although a few individuals might express their views on specific issues in an informal manner, usually by phone, memo, or letter. In general, PLA elders currently exert influence over critical defense policy issues in a

¹¹For example, see David Shambaugh, "China's Commander-in-Chief: Jiang Zemin and the PLA," in C. Dennison Lane, Mark Weisenbloom, and Dimon Liu, eds., *Chinese Military Modernization*, Washington D.C.: AEI Press, 1997, pp. 209–245.

¹²Jiang Zemin reportedly does not attend many CMC meetings, especially when they deal with routine or technical issues of military development. However, a close aide always attends in his absence, serving as Jiang's "eyes and ears" during CMC deliberations.

¹³Zhang's and Chi's status among senior officers stems from their professional competence and relative emphasis on military matters over factional intrigue, the senior status of the bureaucracies each officer has headed, and, in the case of Chi Haotian, a likely personal tie with Jiang Zemin. Despite Chi's close relations with Jiang Zemin, however, Zhang Wannian, as the most senior serving PLA officer, reportedly exercises predominant authority over many purely military decisions.

largely negative sense, i.e., they can probably veto a policy decision if they are sufficiently aggressive in their protest and relatively unified in their stance.¹⁴ Such cases are reportedly very rare, however.

The above-mentioned heads of the three general departments are key organizational leaders of the PLA. Other senior PLA bureaucratic leaders include the directors of the Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), the National Defense University (NDU), and the Academy of Military Science (AMS), currently Generals Cao Gangchuan, Xing Shizhong, and Xu Huizi, respectively.

These six military agencies constitute the core policy organs of the PLA.¹⁵ Among them, the GSD, GPD, GLD, and COSTIND are considered by some Chinese and foreign observers to be the “four large general headquarters” (*sida zongbu*), because they control the most personnel, subordinate units, and military bases.¹⁶ Secondary PLA organs include the Second Artillery (also known as the Strategic Missile Force), the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), the PLA Navy (PLAN), and the headquarters of China’s seven military regions (MRs). The Strategic Missile Force, PLAAF, and PLAN are currently led by Lieutenant General Yang Guoliang, General Liu Shunyao, and Admiral Shi Yunsheng. In late 1997, the commanders of China’s military regions included Generals Li Laizhu (Beijing MR), Lieutenant General Liao Xilong (Chengdu MR), General Tao Bojun (Guangzhou MR), General Qian Guoliang (Jinan MR), General Liu Jingsong (Lanzhou

¹⁴This statement probably also holds true for civilian elders as well, and in relation to other policy areas.

¹⁵The Ministry of National Defense (MND) is not included in this listing because it is not a true organization. It does not have a large internal structure of bureaus and offices. Its major function is the management of China’s system of military attachés and PLA contacts with foreign militaries. The level of influence exerted by the MND within the PLA as a whole is therefore largely a function of the personal clout of the officer leading it. In other words, although the Minister of Defense is usually an important military figure, he does not lead a major military bureaucracy.

¹⁶Lewis, Hua Di, and Xue Litai (1991), p. 88. AMS and NDU are much smaller organizations in size and scope of duties. They are essentially engaged in strategic analysis and/or officer education, as discussed below, but they are nonetheless led by very senior officers.

MR), General Chen Bingde (Nanjing MR), and Lieutenant General Li Xinliang (Shenyang MR).¹⁷

These sixteen senior organizational leaders of the PLA are roughly equivalent to the civilian “specialized leaders” who exercise control over important party and state bureaucracies at the ministerial and commission levels, such as the MoFA and MoFTEC in foreign policy, although the leaders of some PLA organs (e.g., GLD and COSTIND) are reportedly equivalent to vice-heads of ministries and commissions. Taken together, the organizations they lead form the functional components of the entire military affairs system (*junshi xitong*).¹⁸

These leaders of the PLA bureaucracy are responsible for executing all major operational dimensions of military policy.¹⁹ In this capacity, they undoubtedly champion, in the military policy process, the interests of their organizations on issues of critical institutional concern, and also oversee the implementation of all major policies within their departments and/or regional areas.²⁰ In addition to their role as bureaucratic representatives, the above senior officers also no doubt express their personal views on military security policy to more senior PLA members and party leaders, both formally (for those individuals belonging to the CMC), and probably informally.

In the defense policy subarena, the most influential (and vocal) bureaucratic players in formulating and supervising critical components of policy include, in order of importance, the directors of GSD, PLAN, PLAAF, and COSTIND.

The GSD functions as the headquarters of the PLA and the chief executive arm of the PLA leadership. It conveys policy directives

¹⁷David L. Shambaugh, “China’s Post-Deng Military Leadership,” paper presented at the Seventh Annual Conference on the People’s Liberation Army, Aspen Institute/Wye Woods Conference, Maryland, September 1997.

¹⁸See Lieberthal (1995), pp. 204–207, for a discussion of this system.

¹⁹Other senior PLA officers who do not head major military bureaucracies probably also exert significant influence over aspects of military policy, by virtue of their special status with senior party leaders. This would include officers such as Wang Ruilin and Xiong Guangkai.

²⁰With the exception of AMS, NDU, and the MND, each of the above major PLA organs heads an extensive, vertically structured system of subordinate units.

downward, translates national security and defense policy into specific responsibilities for the various subordinate functional departments of the PLA, oversees policy implementation on behalf of the CMC, and commands China's military force operations in wartime. The GSD also performs important organizational functions such as procurement, operational planning, and intelligence.²¹

As the above suggests, the GSD is primarily an administrative entity with "little direct policy formulation responsibility."²² However, of the three general departments and other executive agencies of the military affairs system, the GSD has by far the greatest input into the national security and defense policy process. In general, GSD defense policy interests center on promoting and implementing the strategic and tactical/operational goals of the PLA leadership. In this effort, however, the GSD reportedly often gives preference to the interests of the PLA ground forces, which have historically dominated the military command system. Moreover, the GSD performs the headquarters function of China's infantry forces and hence most GSD officers have extensive backgrounds in the ground forces. This service preference leads many GSD strategic analysts and senior officers to emphasize defense against potential threats from the Asian mainland. Hence, the GSD reportedly is the major bureaucratic proponent of a continental strategic orientation requiring improved, and relatively large, ground forces along the Russian border and Inner Asia. It also strongly supports the development of the above-mentioned rapid reaction units, which are viewed by many within the PLA as primarily designed for use against threats along China's continental borders, and to quell internal disturbances. They are not viewed primarily as forces for use along China's eastern and southern maritime strategic frontiers.²³

²¹Paul Godwin, *The Chinese Communist Armed Forces*, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1988, p. 41; and Pollack (1992), p. 166. The GSD is a particularly critical source of military strategic analysis and intelligence, as discussed in Chapter Five.

²²Godwin (1988), p. 41.

²³The GSD reportedly receives important support from a few retired PLA elders who served for long periods of time with infantry units and who in general equate military power with massive ground forces. We should note, however, that the GSD's ground forces/continental orientation is shifting, according to some interviewees, to a more balanced strategic approach, as primarily maritime security concerns over Taiwan, Japan, and the Spratly Islands gain greater salience within the leadership.

The PLAN and the PLAAF are formally subordinate to the GSD in the chain of command. However, both services exercise considerable independence in the overall military system. They often report directly to the CMC on many matters, and reportedly possess their own logistics and intelligence networks. In the formulation of critical elements of China's defense policy, the PLAN in particular is increasingly behaving as a quasi-independent bureaucratic actor. In recent years, it has pushed for a greater recognition of its institutional viewpoint in the senior levels of the PLA leadership, with significant success. Not surprisingly, the PLAN takes the lead in arguing for a defense strategy keyed to China's growing maritime strategic interests and therefore places a high priority on naval development. Specifically, the PLAN leadership has been the major (but by no means the sole)²⁴ proponent of the creation of a technologically sophisticated, operationally versatile blue water force, centered on significantly increased numbers of principal surface combatants with greater operational range, fire power, and air defense capabilities, a greatly improved diesel- and nuclear-powered submarine force, a stronger naval air arm, and possibly²⁵ one or more carrier battle groups. China's military modernization efforts have indeed focused in large part on the acquisition of many of these naval capabilities, reflecting the increased importance of maritime defense to Chinese national security.²⁶ However, the overall pace and direction of naval modernization remains a major subject of debate within the PLA leadership. In this debate, the PLAN viewpoint is often challenged by the ground forces orientation of the GSD, which receives significant support from some strategists in the civilian foreign policy sector.²⁷

²⁴Many civilian strategists and some AMS researchers also advocate a much more potent Chinese navy, according to interviewees.

²⁵The funding, training, and technological obstacles to China's acquisition and effective deployment of a carrier battle group are enormous. As a result, some PLAN officers and analysts question the wisdom of moving in this direction, even over the long term. Instead, many favor a greater concentration of resources and energies on developing submarine and land-based naval air capabilities.

²⁶Liu Huaqing, a former PLAN commander and major figure in Chinese naval development, has served as a key advocate within the leadership for a sophisticated, high-seas power projection capability. See Garver (1992), p. 1016. Liu probably continues to play this role at present, although apparently to a lesser extent than in the past.

²⁷For a general discussion of these differences, see Chu Shulong, "China and Strategy: The PRC Girds for Limited, High-Tech War," *Orbis*, Spring 1994, pp. 177-191.

The PLAAF is reportedly a significant yet less vigorous bureaucratic actor in defense policy debates among the senior PLA leadership. In part, this is because the PLAAF experienced a long period of upheaval and decline in the 1960s and 1970s that severely retarded its development. It has apparently maintained a narrow and generally passive approach to strategic issues.²⁸ Of course, the PLAAF has not *needed* to be as assertive on policy matters as the GSD and PLAN because few bureaucratic opponents exist to its core interests. Specifically, the other two services, and presumably the PLA senior leadership, recognize that (a) the PLAAF fighter and bomber force is extremely backward and faces major technological, financial, organizational, and human resource obstacles to its modernization, and (b) a more capable air force is critical to the successful attainment of the increasingly ambitious roles and missions of the other two services.²⁹

COSTIND is formally under the joint control of the State Council and the Central Military Commission. However, in reality, it is largely under military leadership.³⁰ On the broadest level, as China's principal manager of defense industrial policy for technology, COSTIND is formally charged with formulating and overseeing both civilian and military (including dual-use) Science and Technology (S&T) goals and related programs. It thus organizes and oversees most basic science relevant to advanced conventional and nuclear-weapons-related research, testing, development, and technical applications, defense production/conversion, space technology research and development, and satellite launchings and trackings, and is China's main contact for all foreign military technology transfers and other

²⁸Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumeel, and Jonathan D. Pollack, *China's Air Force Enters the 21st Century*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, MR-580-AF, 1995, pp. 181–188. The authors state that “the PLAAF remains reluctant or unwilling to put forward more assertively a set of strategic concepts that would be appropriate to a fuller range of defense responsibilities—even under existing doctrinal constraints. Existing PLAAF doctrine remains keyed to homeland air defense.”

²⁹Because of these factors, the PLAAF has reportedly received the most funding of the services. Such funds are being used to develop an array of improved and some entirely new capabilities, including more modern indigenously produced fighters and fighter bombers, small numbers of advanced foreign-supplied fighters, attack and transport helicopters, aerial refueling capabilities, air-launched cruise missiles, improved ground-based defenses, and an airborne early warning capability. For further details, see Swaine (1996).

³⁰Virtually all leading COSTIND personnel have military rank.

defense industry exchanges. It also has a role in the import and export of military arms and technology and is the primary bureaucracy charged with technical intelligence gathering overseas.³¹ To varying degrees, it is thus involved in virtually all long-range planning regarding the technology and production dimensions of both conventional and nuclear forces, across both military and civilian sectors. Most recently, COSTIND has also taken on primary responsibility for developing Chinese approaches to information warfare and provides significant input on arms control issues.³² In conducting all these activities, COSTIND “presides over a vast, interlocking network of [civilian and military] institutions.”³³

Despite its impressive responsibilities, however, COSTIND is primarily responsible for basic defense research and technology issues, however, not specific weapons programs or security and defense strategy writ large.³⁴ Thus, it is not as influential in determining the fundamentals of weapons systems or broader defense policy as the GSD, PLAN, and PLAAF. In addition, COSTIND’s overall influence on defense-related S&T and research and development (R&D) has declined in recent years, for several major reasons. First, many areas of formerly defense-related S&T and R&D have become entirely civilianized under the market-led reform process, often as part of a widespread effort to commercialize the defense industry sector. Second, other technology-oriented central organizations (such as the civilian State Science and Technology Commission) have become much more involved in the defense area as a result of the reforms. These organizations now compete with COSTIND to control critical aspects of defense or dual-use research and technology develop-

³¹COSTIND reportedly oversees all centrally allocated hard currency accounts used to procure foreign high technology.

³²Pollack (1992), p. 172, and personal correspondence with Bates Gill and Alastair Johnston. Within COSTIND, an informal “wise-men’s group” on arms control composed of about ten or so leading officials and scientists from several of its internal departments plays an important role in developing the commission’s position on arms control issues. The author is indebted to Alastair Johnston for this information.

³³Pollack (1992), p. 172.

³⁴COSTIND does not directly manage most applied military R&D programs or weapons procurement programs. The Equipment Department (*zhuangbeibu*) of the GSD takes the lead in funding and managing most weapons development programs, in cooperation with relevant defense industrial factories and supervisory offices within the government.

ment. Third, past supporters of COSTIND among the senior leadership have either died, taken on other responsibilities, or lost their political clout. COSTIND's level of influence in the broader defense policy realm was historically dependent on the personal stature of its director and on the existence of several key patrons within the PLA senior officer corps. These included Marshal Nie Rongzhen, members of the Nie family, and General Zhang Aiping. Nie died in the early 1990s; General Ding Henggao, Nie's son-in-law and the long-standing head of COSTIND, recently stepped down from his post amidst rumors of scandal; and Ding's wife, Nie Li, also recently retired from her post as a COSTIND deputy director. General Zhang, a leading proponent in the late 1980s of greater funding for defense R&D activities and closer military security ties with the United States,³⁵ has lost considerable influence because of his advanced age and formal retirement from the senior PLA leadership. Finally, COSTIND had reportedly lost out in some critical defense policy debates with the GSD over whether to give priority to indigenous weapons development over "off-the-shelf" foreign purchases. COSTIND has been a major supporter of the development of indigenous weapons systems capabilities through the application of both domestic and foreign technologies.³⁶ The GSD has generally opposed this position, at least over the near to medium term, because its leadership is very dissatisfied with the products of China's defense industry.³⁷

The GPD, GLD, and Second Artillery reportedly do not play a major formative role in the defense policy process. Their policy input is

³⁵Alastair I. Johnston, "China and Arms Control: Emerging Issues and Interests in the 1980s," Aurora Paper No. 3, Ottawa: The Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, 1988, p. 76.

³⁶Shen Rongjun, a vice-minister of COSTIND, was reportedly involved in negotiations concerning the purchase and co-production of Su-27 fighter aircraft from Russia. The author is indebted to Bates Gill for this information.

³⁷It should be noted, however, that some knowledgeable observers believe that Defense Minister Chi Haotian is a strong supporter of COSTIND within the CMC, at least partly because of his past factional contacts with Nie Rongzhen and Zhang Aiping (see Swaine, 1992, pp. 69–70). This fact, plus COSTIND's ongoing importance to the military industrial complex and the influence exerted by individual COSTIND offices (such as the science and technology committee) could provide it with continued influence in the formulation of defense policy in specific areas related to force modernization.

largely limited to providing information and assessments on an operational level, with two important exceptions. The GPD exerts an indirect but potentially major influence over defense policy (as well as over virtually all other military policies) through its role as political and ideological watchdog and proponent of the party line. Even very senior military officers must pay heed, when making major policy decisions, to the basic line and political priorities established by the party center and enforced by the GPD. In some instances, such political imperatives can influence fundamental defense policy decisions.³⁸ Moreover, a far less subtle yet still indirect form of GPD influence over defense policy is exercised through its control over personnel selection at all levels of the PLA. With support from the party leadership, the GPD can replace or reshuffle key leading PLA officers and thereby presumably alter internal PLA defense policy discussions and behavior. The Second Artillery reportedly plays a significant (and apparently increasing) role in the development of China's nuclear defense doctrine, with some (primarily technical) input provided by COSTIND.³⁹ Unfortunately, very little is known about the specific views or level of influence over nuclear defense policy exerted by the Second Artillery, so little else can be said about this organ's role. The contribution of the AMS and NDU to defense policy is largely limited to providing strategic assessments and recommendations and conducting wargaming (see Chapter Five for further details). However, the top leaders of all these central institutes express views on defense policy to their senior colleagues on an informal basis. Similarly, the heads of the seven military regions likely express their views on aspects of defense policy on an informal basis, albeit less frequently and most likely during enlarged meetings of the CMC. In general, the latter's views are reportedly limited to operational dimensions of defense strategy and present a distinctly regional, and

³⁸For example, the GPD reportedly long resisted GSD plans to make further significant cuts in the size of the PLA ground forces beyond those taken in the early 1990s. The GPD was apparently concerned that such reductions would weaken the ability of the PLA to deal with domestic unrest and would excessively lower the number of political commissars within the PLA.

³⁹Other leading PLA defense policy organs also influence the development of China's nuclear doctrine. These include the GSD (through its Operations and Chemical Defense Departments), the AMS (through its Department of Strategic Studies), and the PLAN (through its Naval Military Studies Research Institute, which formulates sea-based nuclear strategies). The author is indebted to Alastair Johnston for this information.

ground force, perspective. Hence, such views most likely feed into or reinforce those of the GSD.⁴⁰

The key mechanism for developing policy inputs for senior military leaders and for facilitating coordination, communication, supervision, and consultation among the above military organs and between these organs and the senior PLA leadership is the party CMC. Several scholars of the Chinese military have described the CMC as the supreme party body for military policy.⁴¹ This may have been the case in earlier years (the CMC has existed in one form or another since the 1930s); however, as suggested above, the CMC *as a body* reportedly does not meet to vote and “make decisions” in the conventional sense. Its primary purpose is to develop policy options, to coordinate relationships among the major organs of the PLA (i.e., as John Lewis has stated, it balances competition among them for manpower, budget and technology, and resources)⁴² and to ratify decisions made by the national security policy leadership and the informal CMC executive committee described above.

The CMC is roughly similar to the FALSG in its coordination policy function, although, unlike the FALSG, it ranks higher than any other commission or any leading small group, enjoying the same general rank as the State Council.⁴³ The full CMC meets at least once per month and several other times during the year on an ad hoc basis in response to a specific need. It also meets in enlarged session at least twice per year to discuss and ratify five- and ten-year defense plans, the defense budget, and other key aspects of defense policy. Those meetings include senior members of the PLA regional commands as well as leaders of the non-core PLA organs at the center. The CMC might also convene on an irregular basis as a “court of last resort” to

⁴⁰There is one possible caveat to this last statement. The commanders of coastal military regions (e.g., the Guangzhou, Nanjing, and Jinan MRs) probably hold a broader perspective toward defense policy, reflecting their concern with defense against maritime-based threats.

⁴¹For example, Godwin (1988), p. 37, describes it as the dominant structure below the PB or PBSC in determining military and defense policy. Shambaugh says it is the “highest-level military policymaking body,” with “considerable input” into the foreign policy process (1987, p. 298).

⁴²Lewis, Hua Di, and Xue Litai (1991), pp. 88–90.

⁴³Lieberthal (1995), p. 205.

resolve disputes occurring within the organs of the military affairs system, although the most serious of such disputes are probably resolved by its executive committee.⁴⁴ Finally, the CMC occasionally forms temporary, ad hoc subcommittees or various functional committees to prepare the five-year defense plan, study specific policy issues or problems, and commission appropriate reports.⁴⁵

The key internal unit responsible for carrying out most of the above CMC activities on a daily basis is the CMC General Office (CMC GO). This small unit (containing about 100 full-time staff) facilitates and supervises personal interactions among the senior members of the PLA leadership, manages the external activities of the MND, coordinates bureaucratic interactions among the core PLA agencies and their subordinate systems, and supervises the daily operations of CMC departments. It is also the key coordination and evaluation point for strategic research and assessments developed within the PLA bureaucracy (see Chapter Five). The CMC GO is headed by a di-

⁴⁴Pollack (1992), p. 167. Some scholars have occasionally referred to the existence of a second coordinating mechanism within the PLA, the Military Affairs Leading Small Group. However, many knowledgeable Chinese and foreign observers of the PLA have never heard of this leading group. Indeed, if it existed, it would largely duplicate the functions of the CMC and hence makes little sense. However, supra-CMC supervisory groups of senior leaders have apparently been formed by the paramount leader under emergency conditions. For example, Byrnes refers to the formation of a temporary leading group on military affairs at the time of the Tiananmen incident. It was organized to advise the CMC and MND on strategy and planning and included Deng Xiaoping, Yang Shangkun, Hong Xuezhong, Wang Zhen, Qin Jiwei, and Li Desheng. See Michael T. Byrnes, "The Death of a People's Army," in George Hicks (ed.), *The Broken Mirror: China After Tiananmen*, Chicago, Ill.: St. James Press, 1990, p. 148.

⁴⁵Interviews; Cheung (1987a), p. 252. China's five-year defense planning process largely parallels the process employed within the government to prepare the five-year economic plan. An ad hoc working-level committee of the CMC made up of representatives of all relevant PLA departments and armed services oversees and guides the formulation and revision of the defense plan. This CMC committee (similar in structure and function to a committee established within the State Planning Commission (SPC) to draw up the five-year economic plan) conducts consultations and negotiations among all relevant PLA agencies, following the general guidelines established by China's overall defense strategy. It then negotiates with relevant government offices within the SPC and the Ministry of Finance to determine the official defense budget. The resulting defense plan is then submitted for approval by the CMC leadership and the State Council. This committee-led planning process is extremely important to the setting of defense priorities and funding levels for the military modernization effort, especially regarding specific weapons programs, although in recent years the importance of the plan has declined because of the growth of extra-budgetary sources of military revenue. The author is indebted to Tai Ming Cheung for this information.

rector and deputy director and staffed by a small working group. Thus, the functions of the CMC GO are similar to those of the CC GO, outlined above. It therefore likely exerts significant, albeit usually indirect, influence on the CMC leadership and over many aspects of military policy, including defense policy.⁴⁶

The level of actual control exerted by the CMC over the major bureaucratic players of the defense policy subarena is probably less than what is suggested above, however. Each core PLA organ supervises a virtually autonomous system, with its own special powers and responsibilities. In many instances, individual PLA organs probably take the lead in devising and implementing specific aspects of defense policy, with little involvement by other organs. For example, the GSD almost certainly has exclusive control over threat assessments, and the formulation of critical components of defense doctrine and strategy central to the ground forces, such as the development of capabilities concerning the rapid reaction forces. As in the foreign policy subarena, many critical policy components of the defense policy subarena are probably implemented on “automatic pilot” without extensive oversight or intervention from senior CMC leaders. Moreover, other policy issues probably receive support from varying alliances of bureaucratic officials and senior leaders that cut across organizational boundaries.

As a result, defense policy is probably worked out, as some scholars have described it, “in bits and pieces,” through interactions among the CMC executive committee, various CMC work committees, and the other members of the CMC most active in defense policy.⁴⁷ This was especially true in the early 1990s. Because Yang Shangkun and Jiang Zemin reportedly did not speak to one another at that time, the CMC GO and the heads of the six major PLA organs apparently worked out a *de facto* system of controls among themselves, relying on their own networks. Lower-level defense specialists also dealt

⁴⁶The influence of the CMC GO, and perhaps of the CMC as an institution, will likely increase considerably after a new CMC secretary general is named. Past secretary generals such as Yang Shangkun have played pivotal roles in directing the daily operation of the CMC, including the General Office. Other internal CMC offices exert decisive influence over specific areas of defense policy. For example, a CMC arms trade office oversees many major foreign weapons deals and technology transfers.

⁴⁷Lewis, Hua Di, and Xue Litai (1991), p. 90.

with components of military and defense policy because no one, in normal practice, oversaw the whole.⁴⁸

As indicated above, the MoFA's role in this subarena is extremely limited. Its functions have been described as essentially "housekeeping" in nature, e.g., arranging negotiations and coordinating public statements relating to defense policy. However, the MoFA has attempted at times to limit the independence of the PLA over critical defense policy issues, including military spending levels and force structure planning and deployments.⁴⁹ MoFA officials have argued that limits must be placed on such activities to avoid unnecessarily provoking regional governments. Yet, absent direct intervention from the top, such efforts have met with very little success, according to interviewees.⁵⁰

⁴⁸Lewis, Hua Di, and Xue Litai (1991), p. 91. The removal of Yang Shangkun from power and the emergence of Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zhen probably increased the level of overall coordination within the defense policy subarena. However, major PLA organizations still enjoy considerable autonomy, and the potential for a significant loosening of controls over this entire subarena clearly exists, as discussed in Chapter Six.

⁴⁹Lewis, Hua Di, and Xue Litai (1991), p. 90. This includes the military's attempt to use disputes with foreign states to strengthen its arguments for improving force projection capabilities, as in the case of the Spratly Islands dispute in the South China Sea and the dispute over Taiwan.

⁵⁰Also see Lewis, Hua Di, and Xue Litai (1991), pp. 88–90. These authors state that specific defense allocations, for example, are influenced only modestly, and in many cases not at all, by decisions of the State Council. However, aggregate official defense budget levels are worked out through interactions between the military and responsible government agencies such as the Ministry of Finance, as mentioned above.

**STRATEGIC RESEARCH, ANALYSIS, AND
INTELLIGENCE SUBARENA**

The strategic research, analysis, and intelligence (SRAI) subarena comprises the full range of specialist research, analysis, recommendations, and intelligence gathering (generally known in China as simply strategic assessment and analysis (*zhanlue pingjia yu fenxi*) used to support the activities of leaders and agencies in both the foreign and defense policy subarenas as well as the senior leadership charged with formulating and revising broader national strategic objectives. In this subarena, strategic research and analysis are undertaken, intelligence gathered, and policy recommendations provided on a wide range of subjects critical to the creation and development of external civilian and military doctrines and strategies. Such subjects include the general strategic and security dimensions of international affairs; major (and minor) power relations; global, regional, or subregional political, economic, social, and military developments; country-specific military issues (including analyses of foreign forces, doctrines, etc.); and other functional topics related to weapons procurement and arms control.¹ Military intelligence

¹For further details, see Shambaugh (1987), pp. 278–280; Cheung (1987a), pp. 240–241; and Alastair I. Johnston, “Learning Versus Adaptation: Explaining Change in Chinese Arms Control Policy in the 1980s and 1990s,” *China Journal*, No. 35, January 1996, pp. 36–46. Historically, the Chinese military did not conduct extensive research and analysis on arms control issues, given its limited exposure to Western ideas and contacts and its greater overall focus on weapons development. Most of this work in the past was undertaken by the civilian institutes mentioned in this report. However, this situation has changed markedly over the past decade or so, as a result of the greater attention given to arms control issues by most major powers and China’s expanding involvement in various major arms control regimes. Approximately half of

gathering focuses on identifying and assessing potential military threats on China's borders, including the order of battle of forces near China, military geography, the military doctrines and intentions of potentially hostile states, military economics, biographical information on key foreign figures, and nuclear targeting information.

The actors of the SRAI subarena constitute what David Shambaugh has referred to as China's "national security research bureaucracy."² They include a wide range of institutes, departments, and related organizations, each attached to major civilian or military organs of the foreign or defense policy subarenas, as indicated in Figure 5.

As the above suggests, these bureaucratic actors perform one or more of the following three basic categories of functions for their parent organization, the leaders of their subarena, or major leaders of the national strategic objectives subarena:

- Analysis and recommendations on fundamental national security strategy issues, military security strategy or doctrine issues, or foreign/diplomatic policy issues
- Operational analysis in support of diplomatic relations with specific countries or key aspects of defense policy, such as military targeting or orders of battle
- Provision of raw intelligence relating to the previous two areas.³

the Chinese delegation to the U.N. Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (CD) is now composed of arms control specialists from military institutions. In addition to attending the CD, experts from the military also participate in other international arms control conferences, such as those sponsored by the Rome-based International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts (ISODARCO), the Union of Concerned Scientists, and the Federation of American Scientists. Moreover, COSTIND now plays a major role in arms control and disarmament research, as discussed below.

²Shambaugh (1987).

³It must be stressed that the agencies of the SRAI subarena did not always play as important a role in the overall national security policy process as they do at present. Their significance has gradually increased since the late 1970s as the more ideological, personalistic, and top-down pattern of decisionmaking typical of the Maoist era gave way to the more pragmatic, bureaucratic, and consensus-oriented pattern of the reform period. As part of this process, Zhao Ziyang established a set of structures and procedures designed to increase leadership use of and reliance upon finished policy analysis by strategists, not just raw news data and foreign opinions provided by the Xinhua News Agency. See Hamrin (1995), pp. 90–91; Barnett (1985), pp. 84–86, 116; and Cheung (1987b), pp. 94–101.




Figure 5—Strategic Research, Analysis, and Intelligence Subarena

The internal structure and functions of the civilian components of the SRAI subarena have been discussed in various scholarly sources and will not be repeated in detail here.⁴ The most significant agencies are attached to the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), and the Xinhua News Agency. They include the China Institute for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR)—the largest civilian strategic research institute under the MSS; the Institute for International Studies (IIS), the International Policy Research Office, and the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS), all under the MoFA; and a foreign news and intelligence gathering and reporting office within Xinhua. Other less significant civilian agencies are attached to the State Council, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), and various major universities in Beijing and other large cities. These include the International Studies Research Center (ISRC), the Development Research Center (DRC), and the State Council Research Office, all under the State Council; the Institute of World Economics and Politics (IWEP), the Institute of American Studies, and the Russia/East European Institute, all under CASS; and various international security affairs or regional studies departments or research institutes at Beijing University, People's University, Nanjing University, and Fudan University.⁵

Among the top civilian agencies, CICIR produces the most long-range and comprehensive strategic studies of the first category of functions mentioned above. In contrast, analysis conducted by units of the MoFA falls primarily within the second category, i.e., focusing essentially on foreign policy issues and short-term strategic or diplomatic problems, often in response to immediate events and the urgent needs of the diplomatic community. Xinhua's news/intelligence operation obviously provides products most relevant to the third category. It deploys hundreds of journalists overseas to

⁴See especially Hamrin (1995), Shambaugh (1987), and Barnett (1985).

⁵In general, strategists and researchers attached to the MoFA, MSS, and Xinhua have access to critical internal policy documents and usually attend the most important internal leadership meetings. In contrast, researchers and strategists associated with CASS or various universities do not have such access and involvement. Hence, the latter's analysis is less influential. However, CASS agencies routinely submit analysis and reports to the MSS, as part of their reporting responsibility on contacts with foreigners. This link to the MSS might serve to increase CASS's importance in the policy process.

collect foreign news and produces several types of classified reports/journals for party officials.⁶ The MSS also conducts a very significant range of foreign intelligence activities. It is especially known for its intelligence work and strategic analysis regarding Taiwan. In the past, the State Council's ISRC reportedly played a critical role within the foreign policy process as a producer, conduit, and central transmission point to the senior leadership of intelligence, research reports, and some policy documents.⁷ However, ISRC's superior status and influence depended on the personal clout of its director at the time, Huan Xiang, a veteran diplomat and international affairs specialist with strong ties to the top leadership, especially to Deng Xiaoping. Since his death, ISRC has lost virtually all of its influence within the national security policy arena and now ranks as a mere bureau within the government hierarchy. In recent years, the State Council's OFA has taken over many of those activities in the civilian strategic research, analysis, and intelligence subarena previously performed by the ISRC. The State Council's DRC was established during the mid 1980s under Zhao Ziyang. Originally directed by the well-known economist Ma Hong (who now serves as its honorary head), the DRC conducts and coordinates research and analysis on economic, technological, and social-development-related policy issues. As a coordination unit, it reportedly can commission reports from both civilian and military research units on topics relating to any of the above areas. It also has its own research offices that produce analysis on a wide range of subjects.⁸ As mentioned above, the

⁶Eftimiades (1994), p. 108. Xinhua's activities in these areas are thus far more relevant to the strategic research, analysis, and intelligence subarena than those of the above mentioned Foreign Propaganda Leading Group. The latter serves mainly as a watchdog on media interactions with the outside, not as a provider of analysis and intelligence.

⁷The ISRC functioned during its heyday as both a policy coordination point (*kou*) and a strategic research institute. See Cheung (1987b), p. 90.

⁸Hence, as with the ISRC in the past, the DRC probably serves as both a policy coordination point and as a producer of economic research and analysis. The DRC was originally called the State Council Research Center for Economic, Technological, and Social Development (*jingji jishu yu shehui fazhan yanjiu zhongxin*). According to Carol Hamrin, it "evolved from the 1979 structural adjustment group, which in 1980 became the technical economic research center and then merged in 1985 with the economic reform and price reform research centers." Under Zhao Ziyang, its leading officials and researchers, many of them recruited from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences by Ma Hong (the former president of CASS), helped shape the development strategy and reform policies of both the 7th Five Year Plan adopted in 1986 and the

State Council Research Office is involved in a broad range of government policy issues and often produces analysis for the FALSG and the PBSC. It is reportedly not a major player in the SRAI subarena, however, as mentioned in Chapter Three.

These civilian actors support the national strategic objectives and foreign policy subarenas in a wide variety of ways. On the formal level, the leading analytical and intelligence units under the MSS, MoFA, Xinhua, the State Council, and CASS are tasked to provide various reports or papers on behalf of their parent organization, for submission to the FALSG and PBSC. The most important such “official” reports or papers are produced for specific policy meetings (e.g., party plenums or congresses, and various work conferences or internal meetings organized by the MoFA, the State Council, or the FALSG), in preparation for major events (e.g., major trips abroad by senior leaders), or in response to a foreign policy “crisis” (e.g., Washington’s issuance of a visa to Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui). Other formal reports on a variety of topics are prepared from time to time by all of the above agencies at the initiative of either the leadership or the producing agency.⁹ One additional type of formal report is a year-end review of the key events of the previous twelve months. This document focuses primarily on the strategic environment and critical foreign policy problems facing China and assesses likely future developments over the coming year and beyond.¹⁰

Most formal reports first pass through the CC GO, which evaluates, summarizes, and distributes them. However, an undetermined (but probably very small) number of formal reports are delivered directly

draft 8th Five Year Plan circulating in 1988. See Carol Lee Hamrin, *China and the Challenge of the Future: Changing Political Patterns*, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990, p. 231. Although less important than during the heyday of the economic reform effort under Zhao, DRC reports still influence leadership views on foreign and domestic economic development strategies.

⁹According to one well-placed interviewee, the majority of CICIR reports are reportedly generated from below and are often intended to tell the top leadership what they should be thinking or doing about a particular national security issue. Only a minority of reports are in response to higher-level requests.

¹⁰Interviews. Also see Yang (1995), p. 97. Virtually all year-end reports are “homogenized” as a result of this screening process, however; in other words, the more extreme views are toned down and moderated to conform more closely with the official line. As a result, they often become very bland documents, similar in tone and content.

to senior leaders or heads of ministries and commissions, bypassing the CC GO entirely.¹¹ A larger number of less formal reports are routed directly to the offices of PBSC members through an irregular reporting channel. These reports (known as *yaobao*) do not pass through the CCP CC GO, and are apparently regarded far more seriously by the leadership than the regular, formal reports discussed above.¹² As a result, agencies compete with one another to establish such channels. At the end of the year, a list of all reports (both formal and informal) is issued, with an asterisk placed next to those actually used by the top leaders. Other relatively informal means of providing input into civilian leadership organs include briefings of top leaders, participation in ad hoc meetings of ministerial-level policymakers, and informal discussions with various bureaucratic leaders.¹³ In addition, since the mid 1980s, civilian strategists from different agencies often meet informally to discuss issues.

Most studies of the specialist or intelligence components of China's national security policy process have concentrated on the above activities of the leading civilian bureaucratic actors. Some scholars have even asserted that national security policy analysis is largely dominated by these actors and is thus "civilianized."¹⁴ This may have been somewhat true during the Zhao Ziyang period of the middle and late 1980s, when civilian research and intelligence agencies became very critical to the national security policy process, as noted above. At that time, the major analytical agencies supporting Zhao included the ISRC under Huan Xiang, the Foreign Affairs section of the Party Secretariat's Policy Research Office, CICIR, and the SIIS. However, such civilian agencies account for only part of the analytical and intelligence contributions to the national strategic objective subarena. Their military counterparts are obviously the

¹¹The criteria or factors that determine whether or not a formal report must pass through the CC GO (and the specific difference between such reports and the less formal *yaobao* reports discussed below) are unclear to the author.

¹²For example, CICIR reportedly has a direct channel to the offices of the FALSG and those of several PBSC members, including Jiang Zemin. These senior leaders often incorporate sections of CICIR analyses directly into their formal policy speeches. Both *yaobao* and more formal reports are classified according to different levels of urgency, usually by the submitting agency.

¹³For example, civilian strategists are often asked to brief the FALSG.

¹⁴Shambaugh (1987), p. 285.

major (indeed the sole) providers of such resources to the defense policy subarena and also provide far more significant inputs into the national strategic objectives and foreign policy subarenas than is usually assumed. In fact, the amount and quality of military analysis, recommendations, and intelligence provided to the entire national security policy arena has reportedly increased considerably during the past decade.¹⁵

The SRAI subarena includes a large and apparently growing (and increasingly capable) number of military and quasi-military actors.¹⁶ The most significant are directly attached or subordinate to the MND (on a purely formal level), the GSD, and COSTIND, as indicated in Figure 5. The GSD's Operations Department (*zuozhanbu*) exercises line authority over all producers of strategic research, analysis, and intelligence for the General Staff Department; these primarily include the GSD's Second, Third, and Fourth Departments. The Operations Department also produces its own strategic analysis, albeit on a relatively small scale.¹⁷ The Second and Third Departments are the premier analytical and intelligence arms of the PLA, however. They perform a variety of support activities relevant to all three of the functional areas of this subarena listed on page 58.

In the view of many knowledgeable observers, the Second Department (military intelligence) is superior to all other organs, civilian and military, as a source of national security and defense intelligence and military-related strategic analysis for the senior leadership.¹⁸

¹⁵This impression is based primarily upon admittedly subjective estimates provided to the author by both civilian and military analysts.

¹⁶Before the reform period, most military research, analysis, and intelligence was highly ideological in approach, overly cautious, internally fragmented, and generally lacking in rigor. Only during the past decade or so has it become more dynamic, creative, pragmatic, and collaborative. See Cheung (1987a), pp. 246–247, for a discussion of the changes that had occurred by the mid 1980s. This trend toward greater professionalism and sophistication of analysis continues today, according to interviewees.

¹⁷The GSD Operations Department is primarily concerned with military deployments and warfighting, and is thus considered the premier GSD department. It is usually supervised by the first-ranking Deputy Chief of Staff. The GSD Equipment Department is arguably the second most important GSD department, with primary responsibility for force structure and weapons procurement, as previously discussed.

¹⁸Established in the 1950s with Soviet assistance, the Second Department has a total staff of at least 1500 analysts and support people, including intelligence gatherers. It uses all forms of intelligence gathering means, including satellites.

Indeed, the strategic analysis capabilities of both the MND's China Institute of International Strategic Studies (CIISS) and NDU's Institute for Strategic Studies (*zhanlue yanjiusuo*, or ISS) (discussed below) were formed primarily by transferring to them, on a temporary or permanent basis, some of the best military analysts from the Second Department. Although formally presented as the MND's major research unit on international security affairs, CIISS is in reality staffed and directed entirely by the Second Department. Reports analyzing China's external threat environment (including the capabilities of foreign militaries and especially the United States military in Asia) are usually produced by Second Department/CIISS strategists. In addition, intelligence collection units at the military region level are also subordinate to the Second Department, which maintains a tactical reconnaissance bureau to foster communication among intelligence division commands in each MR.¹⁹

The Third Department (technical intelligence) conducts various forms of electronic intelligence using satellites and other long-distance wireless-gathering means. Hence, it performs similar functions to the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA). It also carries out a wide range of diplomatic, military, and international communications activities.²⁰

The Fourth Department, established in 1990, is primarily responsible for communications, counter-electronic warfare, and early warning. This office mainly conducts intelligence and research activities and not strategic analysis.²¹

COSTIND's units primarily undertake research and analysis on specific conventional and unconventional-weapons-related issues, using a wide range of primarily technical intelligence and information.²² The Beijing Institute of Systems Engineering (BISE) and the

¹⁹Eftimiades (1994), pp. 78–79.

²⁰Eftimiades (1994), pp. 46, 94. The Third Department has a much longer history than the Second Department, predating the Sino-Soviet alliance of the 1950s.

²¹For further details on the Second, Third, and Fourth Departments, see Eftimiades (1994), and Desmond Ball, "Signals Intelligence in China," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 7, No. 8, August 1995, pp. 365–370.

²²Hence, COSTIND agencies do not collect and analyze intelligence on foreign military forces in the manner of the Second Department. In fact, according to at least one

China Defense Science and Technology Information Center (CDSTIC) attached to COSTIND undertake a variety of strategic studies and generally provide analysis for the COSTIND “wise-men’s group” mentioned previously.²³ These two offices often make recommendations concerning military technology and weapons acquisitions to the CMC GO, in coordination with related offices within the AMS, NDU, GPD, the GSD’s Equipment and Technology Office, and the MoFA.²⁴ Moreover, COSTIND’s agencies usually take the lead in producing analytical studies affecting disarmament, arms control, and weapons development issues.

The strategic research arms of the AMS and NDU are next in importance within this subarena. Although formally under the MND, both are directed and generally tasked by the CMC and the GSD. Their activities are largely limited to both strategic and operational analysis, not intelligence gathering. NDU’s above-mentioned ISS performs two functions: It produces analysis for the CMC and GSD and conducts research and writing on strategic issues in support of the university’s officer instruction programs. In carrying out these duties, the ISS reportedly enjoys considerable flexibility in choosing subjects for study. In contrast, the activities of the AMS’s larger Department of Strategic Studies (*zhanlue yanjiubu*, or DSS)²⁵ do not include an instructional component and are more closely directed by the CMC and the GSD.²⁶ Hence, the resulting strategic analysis usually reflects the more operationally oriented concerns of those

well-informed military analyst, COSTIND has few contacts with the Second and Third Departments.

²³The former office primarily studies various military technologies as part of the nuclear weapons lab system; the latter focuses on disarmament and arms control issues. In addition, several other COSTIND agencies also provide various types of (primarily technical) input on arms control policy. These include the China Academy of Engineering Physics (the CAEP or Ninth Academy), and the Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics (IAPCM). The author is indebted to Alastair Johnston for this information.

²⁴Eftimiades (1994), p. 105.

²⁵The NDU’s ISS includes approximately 50 researchers and support personnel, compared to about 90 within the AMS’s DSS.

²⁶Other key AMS departments study operations and tactics, military systems, Chinese military history, and foreign military systems. The AMS also has a department for maintaining the AMS military encyclopedia, and departments for postgraduate work, military operations, and military simulations.

leading military organs. For example, the DSS performs much of the PLA's analysis relating to the development of its defense doctrine and warfighting capabilities.²⁷ However, according to interviewees, despite their broad responsibilities, the strategic analysis produced by both NDU and AMS often reflects the traditional interests of the ground forces.

Secondary military or military-related agencies in this subarena serve two of the PLA's service arms, the GPD, the Second Artillery, and, loosely, the GSD. They include separate PLAN and PLAAF research institutes, the Center for Peace and Development (CPD) of the China Association for International Friendly Contact (CAIFC, attached to the GPD's Liaison Department), the Foundation for International Strategic Studies (FISS), and the Strategy Department of the Second Artillery.²⁸ This group of secondary agencies also includes the Policy Research Office of the CMC.

The PLAN and PLAAF research institutes largely assess external threat potential relevant to their respective services. This activity primarily entails logistical and tactical analysis rather than broad strategic analysis.²⁹ In other words, these research agencies play a significant role when operational or tactical issues are under examination. They also exert considerable influence over the analysis of military funding issues. Much of the research and intelligence these agencies generate are reportedly also conveyed to the Second and Third Departments.

The GPD's Center for Peace and Development (CPD) under the Liaison Department's CAIFC carries out both intelligence and analysis activities. Historically, the GPD Liaison Department has enjoyed a strong reputation for strategic analysis and intelligence regarding Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao. This reputation originated during the pre- and immediate post-liberation period, when Red Army political operatives and intelligence agents were very active in all three territories, and the GPD has since maintained strong capabilities, es-

²⁷Cheung (1987a), pp. 242–243.

²⁸The role of the Second Artillery's Strategy Department in producing analysis on nuclear doctrine is discussed above.

²⁹Shambaugh (1987), p. 296.

pecially concerning Taiwan. In recent years, CAIFC has been tasked by the GPD to develop broader capabilities within the military analysis community, equal to those of CIISS. However, the CPD under CAIFC is definitely still a second-rank player in this larger subarena. It contains few full-time researchers and thus must often employ specialists from other units, including CASS.

The FISS and CAIFC are recent additions to the military actors in the SRAI subarena. They were reportedly formed as part of an overall effort to expand the level of GSD and GPD contacts with foreigners, diversify the type of policy research produced, and generate supplemental income through various profitmaking activities. Regarding the latter, FISS participates in a wide variety of seminars and conducts various types of policy research for different PRC and some foreign “clients.” Although nominally “independent” and “non-governmental,” it is loosely connected to the GSD Second Department.

The above military actors provide analytical assessments, recommendations, and intelligence in a similar manner to their civilian counterparts, i.e., via formal and informal reports, briefings, and working-level organization meetings and leadership discussions. Of course, the vast majority of these activities are intended to support the major ministry-level organs of the defense policy subarena, as well as the leaders and offices of the CMC. The latter is primarily a coordinator and recipient of analysis and intelligence, not a producer. Its Policy Research Office generates some products but has few analysts. Hence, the CMC usually turns to subordinate PLA units for assessments and recommendations, depending on the subject.³⁰

³⁰However, the CMC GO (discussed in more detail below) has conducted significant research and has independently commissioned strategic analysis on a few occasions in the past. Such activities usually generated strong resistance from strategic analysis units within the GSD, however, which regarded the CMC GO's actions as encroachment on its “turf.” The most notable example of such bureaucratic conflict occurred in the mid 1980s. At that time, the CMC GO under Li Jijun, with support from Yang Shangkun, developed several long-range plans for the modernization and deployment of China's land forces that aroused the wrath of Xu Xin, then deputy GSD head in charge of strategic analysis. This incident again illustrates the extent to which the authority and influence of policy bodies depend on the personal and political clout of individual leaders.

On the formal level, the Second and Third Departments assist the GSD in preparing an annual year-end analytical report similar to those prepared by China's civilian institutes. FISS also reportedly submits such a document.³¹ These reports are provided to the members of the CMC and, through the CMC, to the PBSC. As in the civilian sphere, other formal analytical reports to these leading organs are also provided on occasion by the Second Department, CIISS, various AMS institutes, COSTIND institutes, and the NDU's ISS, at the initiative of either the senior military leadership or the producing agency. The AMS often organizes and channels the submission of these reports.

Most such formal reports produced by PLA research units are routed through the CMC GO before they can be sent to top leaders in the defense policy, foreign policy, and national strategic objectives subarenas.³² As with the CC GO in the civilian sphere, the CMC GO evaluates, summarizes, and distributes these reports. Occasionally, individual PLA institutes will submit less formal analytical reports or *yaobao* directly to the offices of PBSC members, as in the civilian sphere. For example, FISS provides such out-of-channel reports directly to the offices of PBSC members. However, this practice may be less common in the military system as a whole.³³

Other formal products regularly generated by PLA institutes are intelligence reports to the senior military and party leaderships. The Second Department provides, on a regular basis and on request, both long-range and short-term intelligence reports to the GSD and CMC as well as the MND, the services and military region headquarters, key organs of the military-industrial complex, and unit commanders. Of equal significance, the Second Department also produces a daily report of major military events covering the previous

³¹FISS participates in this high-level reporting system because of its informal contacts: Chen Chu (now deceased), formerly the honorary head of FISS, was head of the State Council Foreign Affairs Office before his retirement and served as a foreign policy advisor to the Premier's Office for many years.

³²A (presumably small) number of formal PLA reports bypass the CMC GO.

³³On the other hand, some interviewees have indicated to the author that military and civilian research units vie with one another to get their views expressed directly to leading organs.

twenty-four hours.³⁴ This report is circulated to CMC and PB members and heads of the PLA general departments.³⁵

Finally, aside from the above support activities aimed at both the defense policy and national security leaderships, the military on occasion provides strategic analysis to civilian leaders within the foreign policy subarena via the State Council OFA and the PLA representative of the FALSG as well as through the activities of major military organizations involved in military-civilian issues such as arms control and disarmament.³⁶ In addition, military strategists often attend, on an informal basis, various internal discussion meetings and report preparation conferences convened by civilian research institutes and departments under the major organs of the foreign policy subarena. Finally, research meetings and preliminary expert discussions on specific topics (known as *wuxu hui*) are organized by both military and civilian research units. Such meetings often provide a venue for direct contacts between military and civilian (e.g., MoFA) analysts and officials at the working level. In some instances, military experts are even seconded to civilian institutes, to facilitate policy deliberations and interactions.³⁷ These activities indicate that a significant amount of interaction occurs between military and civilian strategists.³⁸ Thus, it would be incorrect to state

³⁴Eftimiades (1994), p. 75.

³⁵General Xiong Guangkai is reportedly in charge of preparing this report. In addition, he almost certainly produces additional similar reports for Jiang Zemin on an "as-needed" basis. As noted above, General Xiong is very close to Jiang and doubtless serves the secretary general as a key source of both military intelligence and more general information on the state of the PLA.

³⁶For example, Liu Huaqiu's OFA has the authority to request reports on defense-related topics from various military departments and research institutes or even from the CMC. However, some interviewees insist that such requests are rarely made and that OFA's overall level of interaction with the defense policy community is not terribly great, as suggested above. In the arms control and disarmament area, COSTIND directs, within its China Defense Science and Technology Information Center (CDSTIC), an Arms Control and Disarmament Program which sponsors seminars on arms control and conveys technical information to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and various agencies of the defense policy subarena. See Johnston (1996).

³⁷For example, some military officers reportedly work in the Fourth Office of MoFA's International Organizations Department, responsible for multilateral arms control. The author is indebted to Alastair Johnston for this information.

³⁸According to several interviewees, the greatest level of (and most significant) interaction in the strategic realm occurs between strategists of the GSD Second Depart-

that the military and civilian wings of the SRAI subarena operate entirely separately from one another. This should not be surprising, given the fact that there is a considerable overlap between the types of strategic analysis performed by civilian and military specialists.³⁹

The above suggests that military research, analysis, and intelligence agencies play a critical role in China's overall national security policy arena, above and beyond their obvious support function for the defense policy subarena. Indeed, military strategic analysis and intelligence are probably provided to a wider spectrum of influential consumers than similar civilian products. Hence, specialist military views on major national security issues probably exert a greater influence over the perceptions of senior leaders in both the foreign policy subarena and the national strategic objectives subarena than is generally assumed. The importance of military analysis and intelligence to China's leadership could grow significantly in the future, as a function of the broader expansion of the military's role in foreign and national security policy.

ment and CICIR. Each unit often tries to influence the views of the other, in part because their impact on the thinking of senior leaders increases appreciably if they can achieve some level of consensus.

³⁹It should be emphasized, however, that the military does not provide raw intelligence (as opposed to strategic research and analysis) to civilian agencies of the foreign policy subarena.

Several general conclusions can be drawn from the above analysis. As in most countries, China's national security policy leadership, structures, and processes do not function in a highly integrated, systematic, or formalized manner. Parts of the system (e.g., elements below the senior civilian and PLA leaderships) display considerable regularity and structure, while others (e.g., interactions among senior leaders) remain highly informal and personalistic. At the same time, all levels of the system contain both regular and irregular features. Moreover, throughout the system the level of influence in the policy process enjoyed by a specific civilian or military policy organ is often determined primarily by the informal prestige and power of the individual who heads it.

Ultimate national strategic and security decisionmaking authority does not rest with the PBSC as a body. Instead, a collective leadership composed of a small subset of senior party and military leaders determines policy in these areas. Most members of the PBSC, as well as senior leaders of the CMC and FALSG, serve largely as consultants and advisors to this group (and occasionally as advocates on specific issues), while a few remaining retired elders exert sporadic, partial, and largely passive influence. At lower levels, bureaucratic interests play a major role in defining and implementing key components of foreign and defense policy. Indeed, many of the activities in these

policy subarenas are on “automatic pilot,” i.e., conducted without the close supervision of senior bureaucratic or party leaders.¹

Linkages among the four subarenas vary considerably. No single subarena operates in a completely independent fashion, including the defense policy subarena. Vertical connections between the national strategic objectives subarena and both the foreign and the defense policy subarenas are relatively close and dense, centering on the formal and informal activities of the PBSC, the CMC, the FALSG, the State Council OFA, and the CC GO. The least formal and arguably weakest linkages are between the defense and foreign policy subarenas. Yet even here, interactions are by no means insignificant and are apparently increasing in number and relevance to the overall national security policy process.

Military involvement is evident in all four policy subarenas, albeit to widely varying degrees, ranging from almost total control over defense policy to limited but significant influence over foreign policy. Overall, the dividing line between military and civilian spheres in the formulation and implementation of national security policy is not as clear and absolute as in the past. The PLA’s role in shaping national strategic objectives and in providing strategic analysis and intelligence to civilian leaders is particularly significant and apparently increasing, even though the avenues for PLA influence over the national strategic objectives subarena remain relatively few. PLA influence over foreign policy is also probably on the rise, as military views are increasingly expressed and military influence exerted on specific issues in this subarena.

The military does not “dictate” policy in any one subarena, however. At the top of the system, senior PLA leaders generally interact in a collaborative, consultative fashion with their civilian counterparts, although their views on certain primarily defense-related issues probably often come close to directives. Senior party leaders such as Jiang Zemin and Li Peng undoubtedly play a complex and nuanced game in their policy interactions with the PLA leadership in the national security arena, seeking to retain the initiative and maintain

¹As a result, a certain percentage of analytical reports conveyed to senior political leaders probably serves primarily informational purposes, rather than to influence critical decisions.

overall flexibility by alternately placating, resisting, or diluting military views and pressures through a mixture of personal persuasion, balancing of bureaucratic interests, and direct control over key organs and policy channels. The outcome of this effort can vary greatly, depending upon the level of unity or agreement among the senior party elite, the specific external policy issue addressed, and the perceived success or failure of the prevailing policy line under discussion.²

Although the above analysis largely presents the features of the system at one point in time, certain hypotheses regarding major trends can be ascertained. As with the entire Chinese political-military system, the national security policy process is becoming increasingly complex and challenging, both internally (as a result of major increases in the number of bureaucratic and individual players involved) and externally (in response to the rapid proliferation of issues and concerns that impinge upon the national security arena, many of which fall outside the traditional boundaries of the foreign affairs and defense policy areas). This increasing complexity is pushing the Chinese national security policy process toward the development of more regularized roles and procedures, more institutionalized bases of authority, increasing interactions within and across subarenas, and an inevitable diffusion of political authority.

At the top of the system, the character and extent of PLA influence over China's national strategic objectives could change greatly as the last of the elders pass from the scene and the successor generation of post-revolutionary bureaucratic technocrats assumes greater power. As with supreme political power in general, the formulation and revision of national strategy will likely become increasingly subject to a leadership system marked by the absence of a paramount leader and hence the need for greater consultation, coordination, and agree-

²The 1995–1996 mini-crisis over Taiwan provides an example of the civilian leadership's failure to insulate the military from a particular national-security-related event. Most observers believe that the military successfully pressed for a more active role in Taiwan policy in response to the perceived failure of the previous diplomatic strategy toward Taipei crafted by Jiang Zemin and the MoFA. Moreover, the military will likely use the ongoing concern over Taiwan's alleged search for independence to argue for increased funding for a wide array of weapon systems and related capabilities mentioned above. Hence, its stake in Taiwan policy will probably increase beyond its already high level.

ment among senior party and military heads to deal with a growing array of problems and concerns. At the same time, lower-level bureaucratic leaders could exert increasing influence over the national security policy agenda, as organizational interests become more influential in the context of a diffuse and fragmented pattern of authority at the top. The emergence of complex, multiple personal and bureaucratic voices in the upper reaches of the policy process could result in constantly shifting, ambiguous, or contradictory policy directives from above.

Such a diffusion (and confusion) of power might provide the PLA with increasing leverage over the national strategic objectives subarena, as contending civilian leaders seek to curry favor with potential PLA supporters. Some observers speculate that, in such an environment, one or more senior PLA officers (e.g., the heads of the GSD, GPD, or MND) would eventually hold “slots” as regular PBSC members. Such a move would undoubtedly increase greatly PLA influence in this subarena. However, other observers (including many knowledgeable Chinese) insist that control over the national security policy process will become almost totally civilianized under a post-elder regime, given the weak political resources and more professional outlook of the emerging PLA leadership, which is allegedly more concerned, on balance, with internal institutional development than external policy issues.³

In general, the level of PLA assertiveness within the national strategic objectives subarena will depend to a great extent on the unity and stability of the top party elite and the outlook, relationships, and intentions of individual members of the emerging senior PLA leadership. If the party elite is severely divided politically or uncertain in its handling of critical domestic or external problems, the military could feel increasingly compelled to intervene in civilian leadership politics, to preserve regime stability or avert anticipated shifts in policy against its interests. Such political intervention could easily lead to greater PLA involvement in the national strategic objectives subarena. However, the specific features of the senior PLA officer corps will likely prove critical in any scenario of political intervention at the

³The fact that no serving PLA officer was placed on the PBSC at the 15th Party Congress of September 1997 *suggests* movement toward such civilianization of ultimate control over the national security policy process.

top. Unfortunately, little information is available on the political relationships and policy views of these individuals. What can be said is that they seem to be less interested in exercising ultimate power over the entire politico-military system and individually wield much weaker political resources than their predecessors. Such features severely limit the ability of the military elite to organize and act in a concerted fashion, especially if the party elite remains reasonably unified, in command of the party control system within the PLA, and responsive to at least some of the key concerns of a professionalizing officer corps. However, the critical importance of national security policy to the military suggests that senior officers will probably not remain entirely aloof from developments in that arena and could be motivated to decisively influence the formulation or revision of certain national strategic objectives.⁴

As in the case of the national strategic objectives subarena, the foreign policy subarena is undergoing significant changes in its composition and pattern of leadership interaction. The absence of a single dominant leader with the authority of Deng Xiaoping suggests that future military challenges to critical elements of China's foreign policy will probably increase in number and significance. This could lead to lengthy deadlocks or messy compromises acceptable to no organization, civilian or military. Over time, such confrontations could precipitate more concerted efforts by the PLA to control large parts of this subarena. An increasing number of key issues associated with the foreign policy subarena (e.g., those territorial concerns that involve foreign powers, such as the Taiwan issue, and other defense-related issues, such as relations with the United States) might become subject to a PLA veto or to significant revision by the military. Alternatively, the lack of a strong leader at the top and the absence of an assertive PLA leadership could result in increased de facto control over many parts of this subarena by the civilian foreign policy bureaucracy, as more and more policy issues are placed on "automatic pilot." However, if Jiang Zemin is able to consolidate power and appoint a close associate or follower as premier and

⁴Those fundamental national strategic principles and objectives most subject to military influence obviously include the relative priority accorded to the development of military over civilian economic capabilities and related assessments of China's threat environment.

hence the principal leader of the foreign policy subarena, his contacts with the PLA might serve to insulate foreign policy more successfully from direct military influence and provide greater coordination between this subarena and the defense policy subarena.

As with the other subarenas, the defense policy subarena is undergoing significant internal changes in the composition, interactions, and influence of key players. Currently, the continued presence (albeit “behind the scenes”) of senior PLA elders Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zhen provides stability and direction. However, their passing, along with the death of Deng Xiaoping and the other remaining elders, could produce an important leadership vacuum in the PLA, despite the formal ascension of Zhang Wannian and Chi Haotian to top posts. As in the national strategic objectives and foreign policy subarenas, the absence of strong policy arbiters or enforcers at the top of this subarena could result in prolonged and more severe bureaucratic disputes and hence weak or confusing defense policies. Such a problem could become critical over the longer term, as it becomes more urgent for the PLA to make key decisions regarding a variety of modernization and force structure issues, such as the development of one or more aircraft carrier task forces and further reductions in the size of PLA ground forces. Such indecisiveness might also be exacerbated by growing pressures within the PLA to address a wider range of institutional concerns unrelated to defense policy per se, such as the future role of commissars, and the effect of the PLA’s involvement in business ventures.⁵ Ultimately military policy (and defense policy in particular) could become an important source of leadership strife. Alternatively, as in the national strategic objectives and foreign policy subarenas, weakness, indecision, and conflict within the senior civilian leadership could eventually prompt future PLA leaders to overcome their internal differences and play a highly assertive role in shaping defense policy. A similar outcome could also occur as a result of the increasingly common interests of a professionalizing officer corps.⁶

⁵For further details on such institutional concerns, see Swaine (1995), pp. 25–30.

⁶One indication of PLA unanimity on certain defense issues was provided in early 1994. Over one hundred military deputies to the March 1994 meeting of the National People’s Congress signed a proposal requesting that China’s defense budget be fixed as a specific proportion of GNP. See *The Liberation Army Daily*, March 17, 1994, p. 1.

Finally, as noted above, military research, analysis, and intelligence play a far more important role in the overall national security policy process than most observers assume. Moreover, the importance of these activities will likely grow significantly in the future, as a function of the military's increasing force capabilities, especially if the military's role in national security policy and elite politics expands greatly. This could produce greater problems of central control over and coordination between the military and civilian sides of the strategic research, analysis, and intelligence subarena.

The uncertainties and potential dangers presented by the above trends have led to repeated calls, by many Chinese strategists and some political leaders, for the formation of an organization similar to, but even more powerful than, the U.S. President's National Security Council (NSC). The State Council Office of Foreign Affairs (OFA) is increasingly taking on various NSC-type functions, as noted above. However, these functions are primarily, although not exclusively, administrative in nature (e.g., involving the supervision and coordination of document flows and bureaucratic interactions among the components of the FALSG and, to a lesser extent, between the foreign and defense policy subarenas). Hence, the OFA at least partly resembles the NSC *staff*, but not the NSC proper. It certainly does not serve as the premier body charged with leading the foreign and defense policy subarenas in the development and articulation of national security policy and hence as "the primary focal point for all national security planning, coordinating, decisionmaking and supervision," as did the NSC during its heyday under Richard Nixon.⁷

According to its proponents, a Chinese-style NSC would bring together, into a single powerful organization, the political and bureaucratic leaders of the national strategic objectives, foreign policy, and defense policy subarenas and thereby presumably concentrate control over the entire national security apparatus at the top. Such an organization would thus clarify vertical and horizontal lines of authority, facilitate communication and interaction throughout the national security policy bureaucracy, and thereby provide better coordination among and control over the different components of national security policy, both civilian and military. For a variety of rea-

⁷Shoemaker (1989), p. 21.

sons, however, this idea has yet to take hold within the senior leadership and the bureaucracy. For example, by placing virtually all elements of the national security policy process more fully under the control of the supreme political leadership, a U.S. NSC-type organization would likely diminish the existing personal and institutional prerogatives of various individuals and agencies in charge of either foreign or defense policy. It would especially reduce the considerably high level of control over the defense sector currently enjoyed by the military. Moreover, it would also probably greatly diminish, if not eliminate, any influence over national strategy exerted by those PBSC members who were not formally included in any such NSC-type organization.⁸

Overall, in the near to medium term, much will depend on Jiang Zemin's ability to wield more effective authority over the party leadership, and over the PLA. The former will depend on whether Jiang can use his substantial formal positions of power as the official leader of the state, party, and military apparatus, along with the informal influence derived from his selection by Deng as the "core" of the successor leadership, to build up his informal relationships and power throughout the upper levels of the system. If these efforts fail, Jiang will likely be forced to cede increasing amounts of power to other successors. This, in turn, could eventually lead to intense leadership conflict and policy disarray. The latter will depend on Jiang's ability to maintain apparent supporters such as Chi Haotian in top posts in the CMC, and on his success in building his authority within the PLA by successfully handling many of the policy issues and institutional concerns mentioned in this report. His success in these efforts will depend, in turn, on the outlook of the emerging successor

⁸Many Chinese proponents of a NSC-type organization believe such a body should be under the direction of the CCP secretary general and not the Premier, the PBSC or a subset of that body. However, such an arrangement would likely prove unworkable if supreme decisionmaking power in China further fragments, creating a larger collective leadership. The resulting devolution of authority would likely lead to endless struggles among the powerholders at the top for control over such a powerful body. Because of this problem, some proponents argue that a Chinese-style NSC should function largely as a national security policy body for the *entire* PBSC, directly overseeing and coordinating both the CMC and the FALSG. Yet this arrangement could also lead to control problems, especially if the military were not strongly represented on the PBSC.

generation of PLA leaders and their commitment to supporting a more civilianized defense policy process.⁹

Over the longer term, the role of the PLA in China's national security policy process will be heavily influenced by the broader changing relationships between the party "core," the senior party leadership, and subordinate government and military leaders and institutions. The relations among these leading actors will in turn be heavily influenced by the growing challenges to the regime produced by a rapidly changing society and economy. If the senior leadership structure is able to avoid major threats from within or below to its relative unity and stability, political authority in China will likely continue to fragment. Eventually, increasingly open forms of competition will likely emerge, as part of an overall process of rationalization and institutionalization of the political system. The Chinese leadership structure could thus evolve from an open-ended, highly personalistic, secretive, and informal competition for supreme political power to a more formalized, open, and pluralistic political process in which all major players agree to share the reins of power at the top, to preserve the system as a whole. In this transition, informal political groupings would become increasingly oriented "not merely to the maximization of power and the minimization of risk, but to the promotion of policies designed to enhance their bureaucratic interests."¹⁰

Under such a process, the military could eventually become merely one institution among many vying for influence in a wide range of policy arenas, including national security policy. Yet the PLA will probably prove key to the success or failure of this transition. As the example of other developing societies suggests, political maturation

⁹For a more detailed analysis of alternative scenarios of leadership succession and related patterns of military involvement, see Swaine (1992, 1995).

¹⁰Lowell Dittmer, "Chinese Informal Politics," *China Journal*, No. 34, July 1995, p. 34. Dittmer points to at least three basic reasons why political conflict in the Chinese system will likely not be suppressed, but instead increasingly openly aired: (1) The decline of ideology renders more options legitimate, more arguments open to articulation; (2) the growth of the market and the existence of extra-budgetary revenues will provide ample resources to contending forces while focusing factional behavior more exclusively on political transactions; and (3) a national leadership increasingly dependent on international capital, commodity, and service markets will have a growing interest in avoiding international ostracism and sanctions (p. 32).

often occurs (or is indefinitely stalled) through the direct action of the military, often the strongest and most cohesive institution within such societies.¹¹ This is arguably the case in China. Given the relative absence of political interest groups in Chinese society and the increasing interest of the officer corps in promoting a state-centered nationalism to replace the regime's delegitimized socialist ideology,¹² the PLA could be drawn into this process at an early stage and decisively shape its course over the long term. This possibility points to the need for further, more detailed, studies on the role of the PLA in China's policy process, especially in the national security arena.

¹¹See Morris Janowitz, *Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964; and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968.

¹²For details, see Swaine (1995), especially pp. 7–10 and 46–48.

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