Interagency Coordination in Military Operations Other Than War

Implications for the U.S. Army

Jennifer Morrison Taw
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Preface

This monograph describes the final results of case studies, interviews, and surveys about U.S. Army participation at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of the interagency process. This monograph was prepared as a final report for the project "Interagency Coordination in Operations Other Than War," being conducted for the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations.

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Summary

We know how to do joint operations with all the services, we know how to do combined operations with our allies, but how do we do interagency operations?

—General Joulwan

Introduction

The confluence of a variety of factors—especially exponential population growth, rapidly escalating population migration, and an unprecedented pace of urbanization—has increased the likelihood that each U.S. military operation will have a humanitarian or nation-assistance component. In the conduct of humanitarian or nation-assistance missions, be they free-standing or part of bigger operations, the military will usually encounter—and often support—civilians. They may be representatives from various U.S. government departments and offices, United Nations (UN) agencies’ representatives, and/or personnel from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) who have established their own aid operations.

This growing nexus of civilian and military efforts requires increased coordination to maximize each player’s contribution and to avoid both redundancies and contradictory efforts. While all the services will contribute to humanitarian and nation-assistance missions, the Army brings unique scope, capacity, and resources to these missions and thus will bear more of the responsibility for interacting with civilian agencies and organizations.

This research focused on identifying how the interagency process—at the policy, operational, and field levels—can both complicate and enhance U.S. Army forces’ contributions to military operations other than war (MOOTW).

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1Cited in Richard H. Schultz, Jr., In the Aftermath of War: U.S. Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building in Panama Following JUST CAUSE, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, August 1993, p. 64.
Policy-Level Problems

Although the Army, along with the other services, has at most a peripheral role in policy-level interagency interactions, coordination problems at the strategic level nonetheless have implications for the Army. Specifically, civilian agencies have insufficient authority and accountability when it comes to performing given humanitarian and nation-assistance tasks. There is also a tendency to consider crises separate and distinct from long-term concerns—a problem exacerbated by the fact that two of the largest and most powerful civilian agencies—the State and Defense Departments—tend to take charge in crises, while the smaller long-term providers—e.g., the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and its parent agency, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)—become less influential.²

Operational-Level Problems

There are two distinct issues at the operational level affecting Army participation. The first is that U.S. government agencies’ shortcomings frequently lead them to renege on their commitments, even though they have comparative advantages at certain MOOTW tasks. Specifically, such civilian agencies often lack available funding and have insufficient contingency staffs to be excursive. In addition, many also lack doctrine or standard operating procedures for such efforts.

The second issue is the unique position of the commanders-in-chief (CINCs) in the interagency process as operational-level entities that can participate at the policy level. Despite this right to participate, CINCs have mostly declined involvement. In addition, CINCs do not really have direct civilian agency counterparts who hold analogous rank in the civilian world. Finally, the very nature of many MOOTW muddies the distinctions between civilian and military control.

²However, at the operational level in crises, OFDA’s Disaster Assistance Response Team (DARTs) often become extremely influential through their crucial role in recommending and implementing U.S. government policy. Indeed, John G. Sommer cites Assistance Secretary Cohen’s remark, in which he remarked on OFDA’s influential role: “Whereas the flag used to follow trade, it now follows humanitarian intervention.” John G. Sommer, Hope Restored? Humanitarian Aid in Somalia 1990–1994, Washington, D.C.: Refugee Policy Group (RPG), under a contract with the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), November 1994, p. 94.
Field-Level Problems

At the field level, a key issue is that the military is hierarchically organized while civilian agencies and relief organizations make up a loosely comprised organism in which no one organization has authority over the others. Another complicating factor is that the military and civilian agencies may view the requirements for a successful operation very differently, in part because of their different organizations and cultures. In addition, civilian agencies have in the past been reluctant to work with the military because they are unfamiliar with the military's capabilities, objectives, and limitations. Likewise, the military often has problems working with civilian agencies because military personnel are used to acting and making decisions independently of other players.

Conclusions

Many of these problems are beyond the Army's ability to address (e.g., policy-level issues of insufficient authority and accountability). Nonetheless, there are steps Army leadership and personnel can take to improve Army-interagency interactions and maximize the Army's efforts in humanitarian assistance and nation-assistance operations. Such efforts fall into two substantive categories, education and operations. In each, there are some steps that the Army can take independently and others that, given the Goldwater-Nichols mandated limitations, it can only facilitate or suggest. The first category includes methods of educating Army personnel and civilians about each other's capabilities, limitations, expectations, requirements, organization, objectives, and methods. This can be done in service schools, through exercises and training, at joint schools, through pamphlets and doctrine, and so forth. The second category includes Army efforts to help clarify who has authority at field level, anticipate expanding requirements in interagency efforts, overcome organizational differences, ensure that the civil-military operations center (CMOC) performs effectively (if it is in charge of the CMOC), and facilitate the transfer of operations.
Acknowledgments

Many of the people interviewed for this project declined direct attribution. Although we cannot thank them individually, we would like to express our gratitude to all of them for their insightful and informative contributions, as well as for their generosity in sharing both time and data. During this research, project staff spoke with personnel from each of the military services, the State Department, the Department of Defense, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, the Justice Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, some of the unified commands, the National Guard, the U.S. Agency for International Development and its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, various NGOs, the Center for Naval Analyses, and many other organizations. The authors are also very grateful to John E. Peters for his valuable assistance in developing questions and issue areas in the project’s initial stages and to Paul Steinberg and Nikki Shacklett for their help conceptualizing the issues and presenting them clearly. Tom Frey and Tom Leney each contributed immensely to this monograph; the former in his critiques of final drafts, and the latter in his early conceptualization of the project. Finally, Tom McNaugher’s insistence that the concluding section offer substantive and imaginative suggestions to the Army—and his assistance in making it so—ensured that the monograph would not only catalogue problems but ultimately provide some constructive recommendations. Despite such tremendous assistance, any mistakes in fact or interpretation are, of course, the authors’ own.
# Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACOM</td>
<td>U.S. Atlantic command</td>
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<td>ARSTAFF</td>
<td>Army Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Civil affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander-in-chief</td>
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<td>CINCCENT</td>
<td>Commander-in-chief, Central Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMOC</td>
<td>Civil-military operations center</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Community Relations Service (of the Justice Department)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CS/CSS</td>
<td>Combat support/combat service support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>Chief of Staff of the Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>DART</td>
<td>Disaster Assistance Response Team</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>European Command</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
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<td>GTMO</td>
<td>Guantanamo</td>
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<td>HA</td>
<td>Humanitarian assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>HACC</td>
<td>Humanitarian assistance coordinating center; humanitarian activities coordinating center</td>
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<td>HOC</td>
<td>Humanitarian operations center</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee for the Red Cross</td>
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<td>INS</td>
<td>Immigration and Naturalization Service</td>
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<td>IWG</td>
<td>Interagency working group</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>JRTC</td>
<td>Joint Readiness Training Center</td>
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JS Joint Staff
JTF Joint task force
MOOTW Military operations other than war
NCA National command authority
NGO Nongovernmental organization
NSC National Security Council
NTC National Training Center
OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OJC Operation Just Cause
OPBAT Operation BAT
OPC Operation Provide Comfort
ORH Operation Restore Hope
OSA Operation Sea Angel
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSH Operation Support Hope
OUD Operation Uphold/Restore Democracy
PACOM Pacific Command
POLMIL Political-military
PSYOP Psychological operations
SF Special forces
SOF Special operations forces
TTP Tactics, techniques, and procedures
UN United Nations
UNAMIR United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund
UNITAF United Task Force
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIH</td>
<td>UN Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>USACOM</td>
<td>U.S. Atlantic Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USIA</td>
<td>U.S. Information Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>USLO</td>
<td>U.S. Liaison Office</td>
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1. Introduction

U.S. objectives are not accomplished unilaterally by any Government entity. They are accomplished by the cooperative efforts of all departments and agencies. These agencies work together to support the Ambassadors' and their Country Teams' efforts to assist host nation governments. Identifying shared U.S. objectives and developing mutually supportive strategies and programs are necessary for us to attain national objectives.

—General Barry R. McCaffrey

Background

The confluence of a variety of factors—especially exponential population growth, rapidly escalating population migration, and an unprecedented pace of urbanization—has increased the likelihood that each U.S. military operation will have a humanitarian component, be it passive (e.g., the preservation rather than destruction of infrastructure) or active (e.g., the provision of food, water, sanitation, and shelter to a refugee or migrant population). Conventional military operations will have such requirements (witness the restoration of Kuwait City in the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm, or the care to preserve infrastructure during Operation Just Cause in Panama and the nation assistance following combat there), but many military operations other than war (MOOTW),2 by their very nature, are even more likely to entail or require humanitarian efforts.

The Army provides an unmatched scope and volume of resources, manpower, organization, and skills to humanitarian and nation-assistance efforts. It has rapid access to funding, rapid deployability, sustainability, a large light ground force, a huge resource stockpile, access to intelligence, the largest number of military police among the services, command and control, its special operations

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2Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1994, lists all the operations other than war: noncombatant evacuation operations, arms control, support to domestic civil authorities, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, security assistance, nation assistance, support to counterdrug operations, combating terrorism, peacekeeping operations, peace enforcement, shows of force, support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, and attacks and raids. Although the term OOTW is currently employed in Army doctrine, there is debate about its merit, and it is likely to be replaced.
forces (including Special Forces, civil affairs, and psychological operations personnel), and unparalleled numbers and capabilities in its combat support and combat service support (CS/CSS) elements. Although many of these skills and resources also reside in the other services, and within many civilian agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private contractors, those actors cannot match the Army’s unique combination of assets and organization.

However, while there will be circumstances under which only military personnel will be able to respond to a humanitarian crisis, in most cases the military will encounter civilians—representatives from various U.S. government departments and offices, United Nations (UN) agencies’ representatives, and personnel from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—who have established their own aid operations. Such civilian efforts may be short-term responses to the same crisis for which military personnel have been deployed, or they may be longer-term development efforts addressing the underlying causes of the crisis.

Civilian agencies such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the State Department, and the Justice Department deal on a day-to-day basis with many of the issues involved in humanitarian assistance and nation assistance, including the nuts-and-bolts requirements of operating judiciaries, local governments, police forces, water and food distribution efforts, self-sufficiency programs, and so forth. Many of them have established relationships with foreign civilians, UN agencies, and NGOs. Moreover, they have experience running humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and development programs and know the requirements of each and the differences between them.

In an ideal world, it would be possible (given the growing nexus of civilian and military humanitarian and nation-assistance efforts), to maximize each group’s comparative advantages. This is what Lieutenant General Schroeder referred to in Rwanda as “retail versus wholesale efforts,” where the military would provide the general capabilities (pumping water from a lake to an OXFAM holding tank, for example), while the civilians would ensure that individual needs were met (i.e., determining where the water should be distributed and then getting it there). The military capabilities engaged would most likely be security, lift, logistics, and communications. Moreover, in an ideal world, the appropriate distribution of tasks would be both obvious and simple to achieve, and transition from the military to civilians or vice versa would take place at obvious points in an operation and would also be a simple process.

In the real world, of course, none of this holds true. First, military missions are often unclear and flexible; it may not even be clear, for example, precisely what military support to civilians entails. Is it strictly the military provision of security
to civilians conducting humanitarian assistance or nation-assistance operations? Or does it also entail the military’s conduct of its own humanitarian assistance or nation-assistance operations either independently of, or in conjunction with, civilian relief providers?

Other factors besides mission confusion can prevent the ideal distribution of tasks between civilians and the military. For example, the military may have to assume typically civilian tasks if civilians are understaffed, underfunded, or otherwise nonexpeditionary. The same would hold true if there were a hostile environment (or the remnants of one, e.g., landmines) in which civilians could not function safely. Finally, efforts to allocate tasks and transfer them from civilians to the military and vice versa are complicated by the plethora of players, especially on the civilian side. Each civilian relief provider (including U.S. government agencies, UN agencies, and NGOs) has unique geographical areas of interest, expertise, and objectives. Furthermore, civilian relief providers are far from sufficiently coordinated among themselves to facilitate the optimal civilian assumption of tasks from the military.

Even among U.S. agencies alone, such coordination is difficult to achieve. The U.S. interagency process remains fraught with competition and confusion. It lacks authority and accountability. The civilian agencies most suited by mission to assume humanitarian and nation-assistance responsibilities (such as the Justice Department, the State Department, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, USAID) are not adequately funded, staffed, or prepared for expeditionary operations. Neither the military nor the civilian agencies are sufficiently familiar with each others’ capabilities, objectives, or limitations to effectively coordinate their activities. Moreover, there is mutual institutional resistance to such coordination.

As might be expected of an organization designed to sustain itself on the ground for long periods, the Army is the most likely of all U.S. military services to pay the price for failings in interagency coordination. Army units often end up providing resources civilian agencies promise but fail to deliver. Tasked to provide security and support to civilian personnel, Army units share with them the day-to-day frustrations of inadequate coordination and confusion. In past operations, for example, civilian plans were delayed when the Army could not provide escorts for individual relief workers, and Army plans were thwarted when civilians could not meet Army timetables for convoy departures. Even Army withdrawal from an operation can be complicated by the lack of interagency coordination; if it is not clear which task is to be transferred to which agency when, it is difficult to determine at what point the Army has completed its mission and met its commitment.
That the Army staff (ARSTAFF) itself does not control Army units engaged in MOOTW adds another dimension to the coordination process. Charged by Title X of the U.S. Code to “organize, train, and equip” units for MOOTW and other contingencies, the Army provides units to regional commanders who generally deploy them within joint task forces (JTFs) containing elements from other services. Both the regional and JTF commanders may be Army officers, yet in those jobs they are part of a chain of command from which the Army is excluded. In fact, ARSTAFF members frequently play in the policy formulation process, while major Army commands must respond to the organizational and material needs of field commanders as these are shaped by, among other things, the interagency coordination process. Inevitably, the need to foresee and respond to surprises at the policy as well as the operational levels introduces another layer of coordination in that process.

Seeking to understand the Army’s role in the interagency coordination process and to enhance Army participation, ARSTAFF officials asked us to examine the process at the policy, operational, and field levels.

**Approach and Scope**

We began collecting data by consulting the academic and professional literature on interagency coordination and on our selected case studies (discussed below). We then created a written questionnaire (reproduced as an appendix to this document) and distributed it to civilian and military individuals who had participated either in the interagency policy process or in the operations we had chosen to examine. Finally, we conducted in-depth interviews with both the survey respondents and with other participants in interagency MOOTW efforts.

The primary case studies undertaken for this report were Operation Restore Hope (ORH) in Somalia, Operation Support Hope (OSH) in Rwanda, and Operation Uphold Democracy (OUD) in Haiti. U.S. military efforts in each operation included humanitarian assistance, some nation assistance, and, in ORH, peace enforcement. We also examined other MOOTW, including counternarcotics operations, noncombatant evacuation operations, disaster relief efforts, and migrant operations. Except for migrant operations, these other MOOTW often differ from the primary case studies in that they benefit (at least to some extent) from standing institutional relationships and standard operating procedures.\(^3\) Moreover, the U.S. military has had more experience with such

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\(^3\)Even among these, of course, there are problems that require redressing. One soldier examining the issue cited the proliferation of ineffectual think tanks on arms control and drug control
operations. Nonetheless, examining these, as well as migrant operations, yielded many of the same lessons as did examining the three primary cases, lessons that are documented here.

Although the term “interagency process” is often used in reference to interactions between U.S. officials, UN agencies, and NGOs, in this report we use the term in reference to U.S. government departments and offices and the U.S. military. We treat UN agencies and NGOs as complicating factors and examine them only insofar as they interact directly with players in the U.S. interagency process. This allows us to focus on issues related specifically to U.S. decisionmaking processes.

Organization of This Report

Section 2 of this report lays out the problems afflicting the interagency process and their implications for both the ARSTAFF and deployed Army forces. The final section offers recommendations for enhancing Army-agency coordination and cooperation in MOOTW.

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that are funded without any coordinated strategy by a plethora of U.S. government agencies, including DoD and the Department of Energy.
2. Issues and Implications

Deficiencies in interagency coordination are obvious in the schism between long-term development efforts and crisis responses. They are evident in the nonexpeditionary nature of many key U.S. departments and agencies and the corresponding employment of military forces in many of the traditionally civilian tasks associated with humanitarian relief and nation-assistance efforts. They are also demonstrated by the fact that, far from maximizing each actor’s comparative advantage in humanitarian operations, the current interagency process often undercuts contributors’ efforts.

These problems are neither new nor entirely solvable. In the broadest sense, they spring from the fragmentation of power and authority built into the nation’s political process from the very start. In theory, the president could bring order to activities among executive branch agencies, but in practice presidents rarely have time to spend managing minor operational details. And in the end, presidents share power over such activities with the Congress. With generic limits on anyone’s ability to completely control the interagency process, the real issue is how agencies like the Army can operate effectively within it.

The Interagency Process

Figure 2.1 depicts the interagency process as a rough continuum from the policy end (the far left side of the figure) to the tactical end (the far right side).
Policy Level

Coordination at the policy level is the most deliberate, where the national command authority (NCA), Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), commanders-in-chief (CINCs) of the various regional commands, Joint Staff (JS), National Security Council (NSC), and various other agencies, depending on the issue, coordinate their efforts through a hierarchy of NSC working groups, from the Principals' Committee (department secretaries, National Security Advisor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and equivalents), to the Deputies Committee (undersecretaries, Joint Chiefs of Staff Vice-Chairman, and equivalents), on down to issue-specific, lower-level policy coordinating committees (assistant secretaries and equivalents) and coordinating subgroups (NSC staff and agency/department action officers).\(^1\) In total, these interagency working groups (IWGs) constitute the principal mechanism for developing policy advice and recommendations for Presidential consideration. ... Often a government department such as the Department of State or Defense will take the lead or chair of an interagency group. If not, the group will be chaired by a member of the NSC staff. Typically, these are organized in a hierarchy that affords flexibility and invites several tiers of the national leadership and their staff to participate in the consensus process.\(^2\)

Operational Level

The operational level is where the CINCs, the component commanders, the various government departments, and the Joint Staff make plans to implement the strategy developed at the policy level and then communicate those to their representatives in the field.

Field Level

At field level, the JTF, U.S. agency representatives (both in the ambassador's country team and outside it), and UN and NGO field personnel must coordinate among themselves—sometimes through coordinating centers such as the civil-military operations center (CMOC) and the humanitarian assistance coordinating center (HACC)—as they implement the plans handed down to them from their headquarters.

\(^1\) Mendel and Bradford, chart 1A; Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, p. II-7.
Policy-Level Issues and Implications

As illustrated in the diagram, U.S. military services do not play a key role in policy-level interagency interactions. Indeed, their exclusion from the strategic planning process by the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act leaves them dependent on OSD, the JS, and the CINCs for representation in IWGs. Some critics argue that under such circumstances, the Army cannot exploit its unique capabilities in MOOTW to bring about other agencies' cooperation. Yet the services’ exclusion from the process is somewhat mitigated by the indirect representation they enjoy through the JS, the CINCs' staffs, and OSD. While there are joint issues to be ironed out (e.g., preferential selection of one service over another for a given mission), there is little evidence that the services require direct participation in the interagency process. Army personnel fill key JS, OSD, and CINC positions, are familiar with their service's capabilities, and are fully able to bring Army perspectives to the interagency debate.

This is not to say, however, that there are not policy-level coordination problems with implications for the Army. Indeed, the dearth of authority or accountability, and a tendency to emphasize crisis response over long-term efforts, both characterize the interagency policy process and directly affect Army efforts and requirements.

Insufficient Authority and Accountability

An agency can volunteer to take on any given task in a humanitarian or nation-assistance operation, but the task cannot be assigned to the agency except directly by the president. The system has no way to ensure that agencies (much less NGOs or the UN) assume those responsibilities that most logically fall to them. Agencies can therefore choose to contribute to operations on a case-by-case basis. U.S. Customs officials, for instance, participated in sanctions against Bosnia but declined to participate in either Iraq or Serbia. Such ad hoc civilian

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3Questions of authority and responsibility are further complicated by the presence of NGOs and UN agencies. Although U.S. government agencies and the military services do ultimately answer to the president of the United States, the UN and NGOs do not. They may not coordinate among themselves, much less with the U.S. civilian and military agencies. Indeed, in many operations, NGOs have competed among themselves for U.S. military assistance, creating a difficult set of issues for U.S. forces, including how to coordinate and prioritize support to these organizations.

4An exception is the Federal Emergency Management Association’s Federal Response Plan (for Public Law 295-288), under which federal agencies have agreed to accept assignments and responsibilities for their function areas under the direction of FEMA. Author’s phone interview with OFDA personnel, February 1996.

5In Serbia, the State Department hired a civilian contractor, rather than the military, to take on the responsibilities that would have fallen to Customs. The use of contractors in lieu of either agencies or military personnel is on the rise. Author’s interview with U.S. State Department personnel, Washington, D.C., June 1995.
responses make it difficult for the CINCs to predict which requirements will be filled and which requirements the services will have to shoulder.

Furthermore, agencies are well aware that even if they volunteer for certain tasks, the interagency process does not have the wherewithal to hold them to their promises. There is no provision for centralized oversight or for punitive sanctions if an agency does not honor its commitments. In recent operations, driven by competition for resources and a desire to demonstrate their continued relevance, U.S. civilian agencies have initially agreed to shoulder certain tasks that clearly fell into their purview but then, for a variety of reasons, failed to do so.

Inability to predict in advance which tasks will fall to the military can lead to surprises for deployed troops. Tasks left undone by civilian agencies have often become the responsibility of the deployed troops, who have not always been prepared to assume the additional responsibilities. In Haiti, for example, the Justice Department initially agreed to assume responsibility for helping to rebuild that country’s judicial system. When the Justice Department failed to follow through on its commitment, the task fell to U.S. Army civil affairs (CA) personnel.7 Thus, policy-level issues affect tactical-level Army involvement in ways that will be discussed further below.

**Crisis Response Versus Long-Term Goals**

There is also a tendency at the policy level to consider crises separate and distinct from long-term concerns—a problem compounded by the fact that two of the largest and most powerful civilian agencies—the State Department and DoD—tend to take charge once they become involved in crises, while the long-term providers (e.g., OFDA and its parent organization, USAID) are smaller and less influential.8 Thus, the requirements of crisis response are frequently given priority over the requirements of long-term development and assistance.9

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6In the case of disaster assistance, the president has centralized oversight by designating the administrator of USAID as his Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance.

7Ironically, the press criticized the Army rather than the Justice Department for not acting fast enough to resolve the problems within Haiti’s judiciary. Author’s interview with DoD personnel, Washington, D.C., June 1995.


9This is exacerbated by decisionmaking tendencies in times of crisis. As Olli R. Holsti wrote in 1972, crisis-induced stress leads to perceived time pressure, which leads to concern for the immediate rather than the distant future, which results in tendencies to act quickly and less effectively. Olli R. Holsti, *Crisis, Escalation, War*, Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1972, pp. 121–123.
This tension between short-term and long-term concerns can lead to disagreement about soldiers’ appropriate roles in such operations. Agencies with long-term goals and ongoing programs have objected to some military efforts to provide immediate humanitarian relief. Agencies primarily concerned with crisis response, however, expect the military to use all possible means to satisfy their mission requirements.

For the Army, this tension between short-term and long-term goals is mirrored in the internal debate over how much humanitarian assistance the Army should provide. On the one hand, civil-military and civic action operations are often considered implied tasks, required for establishing a stable and secure environment as well as valuable for force protection.\(^\text{10}\) On the other hand, U.S. military commanders have also attempted since Operation Restore Hope to limit the extent of their involvement in such activities to the absolute minimum required. In both Haiti and Bosnia, U.S. commanders restricted their forces’ interactions with the local population (in Haiti, for example, General Meade sent very few U.S. forces to assist following Hurricane Gordon).

Coordination among the agencies at the outset—determining which tasks should fall to whom—has helped alleviate some of this tension between security priorities and development concerns. Whereas such lines were not drawn prior to Somalia, an attempt was made in Haiti to apportion tasks before the operation (as represented by the political-military, POLMIL, plan). For IFOR in Bosnia, the roles were even more clearly defined (for example, prohibited from distributing U.S. Meals-Ready-to-Eat—MREs—on their own, U.S. Army civil affairs personnel gave them to NGOs who then delivered them to the local population).

**Operational-Level Issues and Implications**

Some of the difficulties in interagency coordination are related to the actors’ structures rather than to breakdowns in the process itself, and most of these show up at the operational level. Indeed, the problems noted in NSR 27 relate directly to the organization, capacities, and capabilities of the various civilian and military agencies.

The case studies highlight two distinct issues at the operational level. First, many civilian agencies are simply nonexpedientary, limiting their ability to respond to

\(^{10}\)Author’s interview with OFDA personnel, Washington, D.C., June 1995. See also Jonathan T. Dworken, *Improving Maritime Coordination with Relief Organizations in Humanitarian Operations*, Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, CQR 95-12, April 1995, p. 18; this is an interim report, and the data, analysis, and findings are from a quick-response analysis and are subject to change.
humanitarian crises. The second, very different issue involves the CINC's unique role in the planning and implementation of humanitarian and nation-assistance operations.

**Civilian Agencies’ Shortfalls**

As mentioned above, civilian agencies have frequently been unable to make good on their commitments in interagency humanitarian and nation-assistance efforts. This discrepancy that can arise between agency commitments and agency actions derives from the fact that although agencies have comparative advantages at certain MOOTW tasks and compete for missions and funds, most of them are not designed to deploy personnel in response to crises and have little flexibility in their budgets or staffs (OFDA is the notable exception).

**Inaccessible funds.** The lack of rapidly available funding is generally cited as the reason humanitarian tasks are not performed by the agencies with relevant core competencies. Prior to OUD in Haiti, for example, USAID agreed to perform a number of functions. Among them was establishing a jobs program in Haiti; however, it did not establish the jobs program, so the task fell to the U.S. Army Special Forces (SF). The Department of Justice and USAID were to set up the Haitian justice department. Instead, U.S. Army CA reserve judges did that. As mentioned above, USAID was to provide fuel to Port-au-Prince and Haiti’s power plants. Instead, DoD ended up doing it. In each case, USAID’s inability to move funds was a major factor in its failure to follow through on its commitments.11

**Insufficient staff.** Unlike the U.S. military, which has ample personnel to meet most rapidly emerging requirements, civilian agencies do not maintain large contingency staffs and are not set up to be expeditionary. In Somalia, for example, neither the State Department nor USAID had sufficient staff in theater to assist in ORH. While Ambassador Robert Oakley and his staff remained fully involved and worked closely with the military, there simply were not enough State Department personnel available to conduct all the required negotiations with factions or to help village elders establish councils and organize security forces. U.S. Army CA teams thus assumed these responsibilities to the point of issuing ultimatums to recalcitrant factions. This was problematic insofar as such

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11USAID’s funding difficulties are an acknowledged problem within the agency. There would have been no reason to believe, prior to operations in Haiti, that USAID could move money quickly enough. Indeed, one of the reasons for the creation of OFDA was to have an arm of USAID that could respond quickly in crisis situations. It appears that USAID, as well as other civilian agencies such as the Justice Department, felt compelled for a number of reasons to assume responsibilities in the planning stages of OUD that they knew would be difficult to fulfill, especially in a timely manner.
close political involvement by the military threatened the neutral image the civilian agencies and organizations wanted to project to the factions. 12

Nor was there sufficient State Department staff for the operations in either Rwanda or Haiti. Indeed, during OSH, there were more people from the various involved departments and offices in the State Department video-teleconference room than there were assigned to the embassy, including the Marine security guards. 13 Most of the civilian agencies simply do not have enough personnel to fulfill both their daily functions and the requirements of MOOTW expeditions.

Cuban and Haitian migrant operations offer numerous examples of these kinds of difficulties. One case involved the provision of medical services to the refugee population. During Operation GTMO (Guantanamo), a number of Cuban refugee psychiatric cases hid their medications from parole authorities, fearing that their access to the United States would be in jeopardy if their conditions were known. When these individuals abruptly ran out of their medications, a crisis ensued; the Army was the only organization quickly able to deploy psychiatric services, but only at the expense of U.S. active duty personnel and their dependents in the United States. 14

The State Department was also unable to follow through on some of its commitments during Operation SAFE HAVEN, which involved the establishment and operation of a temporary camp for Cuban migrants in U.S. military facilities in Panama. It was to use private contractors to recruit a police force for migrant operations but could not assemble a large enough force. The military, as a result, found that it needed to deploy 21 out of 26 companies from its own force structure to perform that function.

Nor is this a new problem. In 1989, similar problems occurred during the postcombat phase of Operation Just Cause in Panama. Specifically, when agencies proved unable to respond on short notice, the military had to assume

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13 Author’s interview with State Department personnel, Washington, D.C., June 1995.

14 Author’s phone interview with Forces Command (FORSCOM) staff member, August 1995. Similarly, during the Haitian migrant operations, there were inadequate numbers of Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) personnel to process migrants applying for refugee status, which led to the overloading of U.S. Coast Guard responsibilities. This overload placed the Coast Guard over planned budgetary expenditures and extended many of its sea and air resources beyond planned operational hours. See Joseph Kramek, “Crowded Deck,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 119, No. 12, December 1993, p. 52. In another instance, when Cuban migrants were to be moved from camps in Panama to those on Guantanamo, the State Department promised to contract for six aircraft per day until the transfer was completed. It provided only two. Fearing that delays could cause renewed rioting among refugees in camps in Panama, the U.S. Air Force filled in with four additional aircraft. Author’s phone interview with SOUTHCOM personnel, May 1995.
humanitarian responsibilities for which units were not adequately staffed or resourced. Fearing more looting in Panama City, U.S. officials pulled soldiers from combat units to provide security. In the countryside, in the absence of other agencies, U.S. military personnel, mostly Army SOF, helped villages elect new leaders, jail members of Noriega’s paramilitary police force, assess requirements for food and water assistance, and begin to rebuild infrastructure.\footnote{Richard H Shultz, Jr., In the Aftermath of War: U.S. Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building in Panama Following JUST CAUSE, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, August 1993, p. 38; author’s interviews with U.S. Army troops who participated in Just Cause, USSOCOM, Tampa, FL, June 1994.}

Even in noncrisis cases, nonmilitary agency personnel can be hard to get and keep for continuity in distant operations. For example, during operations at GTMO, the State Department found it difficult to recruit a representative willing to deploy to Cuba. Those who did go stayed only a few months at a time. The same was true for ORH: USAID had difficulty finding personnel willing to go to Somalia, and no one was willing to be based in Mogadishu. Ultimately, USAID personnel set up their operations in Nairobi, Kenya.\footnote{Author’s interview with OFDA personnel, Washington, D.C., June 1995.}

No standard operation procedures. In addition to problems staffing and funding expeditionary operations, many U.S. government agencies also lack doctrine or standard procedures for such efforts. This means that their responses will be ad hoc, slow, and changeable, and thus difficult for the military to anticipate in its own planning. The situation is exacerbated in crisis situations. In OSH, for example, many civilian agencies were slow in deciding what they would contribute, making it difficult for European Command (EUCOM) to determine which military resources would be needed to augment the civilian response.\footnote{The slow civilian response can bite the military in other ways, too. In the same operation, the EUCOM J-3 was unable to get much input from the State Department or USAID during the planning stages. Later, a DART member criticized the military for planning its force and its range of tasks without taking other players’ contributions into account, although another DART member thought the military personnel had done the best they could under the circumstances. Author’s interview with a DART member, Washington, D.C., August 1995.}

Lack of cooperation with the military. Finally, the agencies are not always willing to cooperate with the military. Some friction arose between DoD and USAID during ORH and OUD, for example, when the Secretary of Defense’s Office of Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs assigned personnel to respond to USAID’s requests but found that USAID did not reciprocate and, in fact, refused military requests for assistance that could have tied up USAID personnel.\footnote{Author’s interviews with agency and Department personnel, Washington, D.C., June 1995. Some NGOs and UN agencies may operate similarly. Limited funds and insufficient staff can result in some agencies trying to piggyback on military efforts.}
A related problem is "stovepiping": most U.S. agencies require their field personnel to report back to agency headquarters in Washington, D.C., thus precluding efficient field-level coordination or cooperation and slowing decisionmaking and responses to requests from other agencies' or military services' field-level representatives. For the military, the fact that U.S. agency decisionmaking authority usually is not dispersed—i.e., that there are no "general officers," as in the military—can lead to personal frustration and operational delays. During Haitian migrant operations, for example, if a request was made of the Justice Department's Community Relations Service (CRS) to provide written guidance as to elements of their mission in the camp, this could not be done without consultation with headquarters in Washington, D.C. As a result, such a request might require 30 to 40 days to process, rather than a few hours, as needed by the military.

Implications for the Army. Such agency shortcomings, combined with the aforementioned policy-level problems (lack of authority and accountability) have field-level implications for the Army, whose efforts under such circumstances will be suboptimal. Unanticipated requirements to undertake typically civilian responsibilities, or to prolong missions while waiting for civilians, will strain resources and manpower. While the Army's flexibility under such circumstances is enhanced by SOF (whose diversity of skills and capabilities, regional expertise, and experience operating in peacetime and in war suit them ideally for such challenges), they cannot make up for shortages in such resources as medical supplies, engineering capacity, water-purification or sanitation equipment, or military police. Furthermore, extrication of Army forces from humanitarian and nation-assistance operations requires a means of identifying satisfactory mission completion or, at the least, the determination of a firm withdrawal date. Both of these are much more difficult in circumstances where the Army can continue to assume responsibilities on an ad hoc basis, where its missions can change to accommodate other agencies' limitations, and where transition from the Army to civilians is necessary to successfully achieve broader U.S. strategy but is neither automatic nor systematic.

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19 CRS's mission is to integrate foreigners into U.S. society. The office was supposed to build the cases for the INS to interview the Cubans and to then help get them sponsorship.

20 Author's phone interview with GTMO personnel, May 1995.

The CINCs' Unique Position

The second operational-level issue with implications for the Army is the unique position of CINCs in the interagency process. Though they are basically an operational-level entity, CINCs may participate in interagency strategic planning. Indeed, the CINCs are one of the conduits by which Army planners—both in DoD and on the CINCs’ staffs—express their priorities and capabilities to the policymakers. CINCs are also tied into the field level, directly through the JTFs which report to them, and indirectly through U.S. ambassadors, agency personnel, and NGO field representatives. This unique position enables CINCs to make military plans that reflect the various actors’ (civilian and military) capabilities and comparative advantages, insofar as those are made known to them.

Limited CINC participation. Despite their right to participate in the interagency planning process, CINCs have mostly declined such involvement and instead left the JS to represent their interests in IWGs. Even Atlantic Command’s (ACOM’s) role in planning for OSH was limited. In that case, moreover, after civilian agencies failed to assume tasks to which they had committed in meetings at ACOM prior to the operation, a widely held point of view developed within the command that civilian agencies simply are not exportable or deployable and that the military will end up assuming interagency tasks regardless of how good interagency coordination is in the planning stages.

This lack of CINC confidence and participation in the interagency process effectively limits service involvement in strategic planning.

No civilian counterparts. Furthermore, unified commanders’ interactions tend to be upward and downward, not lateral. CINCs do not really have direct agency counterparts who hold analogous rank in the civilian world. There are, of course, regionally oriented assistant secretaries, but they are neither deployed nor responsible as the CINCs are for operations on the ground. Conversely, there are the ambassadors, who are both deployed and responsible for field-level operations, but they are responsible for individual countries rather than regions.

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22 Although CINCs can participate directly in the IWGs (USACOM was involved in planning and running Operation Restore/Uphold Democracy from the outset), they may also be represented at the IWGs by the Joint Staff representative, as took place frequently for Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. “Near-continuous communication between the Joint Staff and U.SCENTCOM served as the primary means of ensuring the unified commander’s position received consideration in interagency policy discussions.” Waldo D. Freeman, Robert B. Lampert, and Jason D. Mims, “Operation Restore Hope: A U.S. CENTCOM Perspective,” Military Review, September 1993, p. 68.

23 Author’s phone interview with Atlantic Command staff member, June 1995.
The unified commanders are thus the only U.S. regional actors. "As such, the CINC's can continue to provide regional leadership—even while in a supporting role."\textsuperscript{24} This is complicated, however, since the State Department runs country teams while the Defense Department operates the regional commands. Moreover, the global operating areas of DoD, the Department of State, USAID, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), have different boundaries.\textsuperscript{25} This complicates both planning and operations and exacerbates efforts to identify counterparts across agencies and to develop comprehensive regional efforts.

The lack of civilian counterparts at the CINC level is more critical in MOOTW than in conventional warfare because MOOTW may be conducted in direct support of civilian agencies or organizations and because they always have humanitarian and political components. The CINC must be adequately knowledgeable of local conditions and leaders within his region to establish guidelines for the political preparation of the battlefield.

If the operation is contained within a single country and a U.S. ambassador is present, the CINC can turn to the ambassador for guidance and cooperation. For example, when USCENTCOM was faced with opposition from some clans to certain countries' participation in the U.S.-led United Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia, both the State Department's U.S. Liaison Office (USLO) and UNITAF provided early feedback to the CINC to help guide his response. In turn, "CINCCENT ensured that SOF were available to support USLO and UNITAF initiatives to allay Somali concerns... The SOF worked with USLO and liaised [sic] with local clan and factional representatives before the arrival of UNITAF forces as the operation expanded its areas of operation."\textsuperscript{26} If, however, there is no U.S. ambassador in an affected country, or if the operation crosses states' borders, the CINC has no equivalent civilian counterpart to turn to for assistance and direction.

For the Army, it makes little difference that the CINC is the only regional actor. What does have implications for the Army, however, is that in MOOTW, the designation of authority between the CINC and the ambassador is neither automatic nor obvious. In either war or peace, authority is clearly designated: in war to the CINC and in peace to his civilian counterpart, the U.S. ambassador. In

\textsuperscript{24}Mendel and Bradford, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{25}Mendel and Bradford, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{26}USCENTCOM also worked closely with the State Department's Government Interagency Task Force Somalia. In addition, USCENTCOM was well prepared for humanitarian and natural disasters, having developed, published, and tested a plan for the central region in early 1992. The plan took into account not only purely military considerations, but the requirements of working with the relief community as well. Freeman et al., pp. 62-63, 70.
MOOTW, however, the determination of which individual has authority is as likely to be the result of personality and individual initiative as of deliberate policy or logic. Moreover, such authority is limited: whether civilian or military, the designated authority can only convene the various participants in order to try to coordinate their efforts.

COL Bob Barnes addresses this question in a 1993 essay:

It may surprise many to learn . . . that unity of command over such mixed military-civilian operations is prohibited by law if forces under the command of a CINC are engaged. Under section 207 of the Foreign Service Act, all U.S. governmental personnel (both military and civilian) in a foreign country, except for “personnel employed,” i.e., assigned, to a CINC, are by law under the authority, direction and control of the “Chief of Mission,” ordinarily the ambassador. Ironically, this statute, enacted to ensure “unity of command” of the country team under the ambassador, in effect precludes unity of command when CINC-commanded forces are present or are inserted into a country with a sitting ambassador and an extant mixed-civilian and military country team. . . .

For the Army, this lack of clear lines of authority can lead to confusion and frustration during an operation. For example, during UNMIH in Haiti, the embassy tried to task soldiers to conduct certain operations. Major General Kinzer resisted such efforts, with the support of ACOM, arguing that the soldiers under his command were participating in a UN, not a U.S., effort. The question of authority also arose in Operation GTMO, since the naval base used to house Cuban and Haitian migrants does not fall under the jurisdiction of a U.S. ambassador. At that facility, the military was in charge of the operation—nonetheless, military personnel had no authority over the many civilian agencies involved in the operation.

Field-Level Issues and Implications

Whereas policy-level and operational problems in interagency coordination affect the guidance given to the Army and can impose unanticipated burdens on deployed Army forces, obstacles to cooperation in the field can be equally challenging and counterproductive. It is at field level that the involvement of nongovernmental organizations and UN agencies has the most confounding effects on the Army, since that is where Army personnel will first directly encounter the multiplicity of independent civilian players, each of which has

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28 Author’s interview with U.S. Army personnel involved in UNMIH, Carlisle Barracks, PA, May 3, 1996.
different goals, reporting relationships, organizing principles, capabilities, and criteria for success than the military. It is at field level that agencies’ ignorance of each other’s capabilities, limitations, objectives, and structures can lead to miscommunication, frustrated expectations, and missed opportunities. And it is at field level that imprecision about the Army’s appropriate role in humanitarian assistance and nation assistance can create unanticipated tasks for soldiers and/or impinge upon other agencies’ efforts.

**Different Organizational Structures**

A huge problem for field-level coordination is that the relief community and the military have completely different kinds of structures: the military is hierarchical, whereas civilian agencies and relief organizations make up a loosely constituted organism in which no one organization has authority over the others.29

The CMOC is intended to help span this gap between civilian and military structures, as are the HACCs. Yet both of these organizations are hierarchically organized, “hard-wired” military entities, trying to deal with a much more amorphous, horizontally organized group of actors. Frustrations will therefore arise as the U.S. military, used to an authority-based command structure, attempts to coordinate its efforts with the consensus-based collectivity that makes up the civilian relief community.30

Tom Frey, an OFDA staff member, depicts this organizational tension between the military and civilian agencies very clearly, using an illustration of the conflict between C3I and, as he puts it, C3A (Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence versus Coordination, Cooperation, Consensus, and Assessment). (See Figure 2.2)

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29 Although UNHCR may be designated the lead agent in a relief effort, it has no authority to control the actions of the other relief players operating within the theater, including other UN entities.

30 Currently, CMOCs’ structures are dependent upon the service setting them up and the specific requirements of the operation. In northern Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti, the numbers and kinds of people involved, the responsibilities the CMOCs assumed, and the CMOCs’ relationships with their JTFs and CINCs varied substantially.

Nor, despite their tailoring, have the CMOCs met all the requirements of each operation. For example, because CMOCs are military entities, some NGOs are reluctant to coordinate directly with them. The military therefore set up HACCs in recent operations (Rwanda and Haiti) in an attempt to create coordinating centers outside military compounds to sort and then forward requests to the CMOC or JTF. The development of Joint Pub 3-08 demonstrates some of this frustration. The military, on the one hand, would like to organize the UN humanitarian operations centers (HOCs) to be more vertical in nature and easier for military organizations (JTFs and CMOCs) to work with. On the other hand, OFDA and NGO personnel have expressed irritation precisely because of these attempts by the military, which are perceived as efforts to assume more control over the HOCs. *Intergency Coordination During Joint Operations*, pp. III-8 to III-9 and III-22 to III-24; author’s interviews with OFDA and NGO personnel in Washington, D.C., June 1995; LTC Stephen O. Wallace, “Joint Task Force Support Hope: The Role of the CMOC in Humanitarian Operations,” *Special Warfare*, January 1996, pp. 36–41.
For the military, dealing with the multiplicity of independent civilian actors, from U.S. government representatives to UN agency personnel to NGOs’ staffs, can be a frustrating and confusing experience. During Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) in northern Iraq, for example, numerous international relief organizations and NGOs showed up in theater from a variety of different entry points. There was little coordination with the other civilian relief agencies working within the theater or with the U.S. or other coalition forces in terms of where they would set up or what their priorities or objectives should be. Moreover, relief agency missions ranged from well-defined, limited goals (such as UNICEF’s immunization program) to much broader, less well-defined goals (“to do whatever is necessary to save the Kurdish refugees”). Similarly, during OSH in Rwanda, requests to the military for support came in from multiple channels, covered a multiplicity of needs, and spanned a large area, which made tracking, prioritizing, and filling such requests difficult.

The military response is sometimes a reluctance to coordinate with the civilian relief community at all, especially with the most independent actors: the NGOs. NGO personnel expressed frustration, for example, that ACOM, which manages...
the Cuban migrant camps in Guantanamo, did not encourage much NGO participation in running the camps, nor their involvement in camp maintenance.\textsuperscript{35} And in Somalia, one general simply rejected the NGOs altogether, saying "I can't stand the [double expletive] NGOs."\textsuperscript{36} As one analyst describes it in the context of Somalia, the military had difficulty relying on the NGOs because "by military standards, [NGOs in Somalia] seemed unbelievably freewheeling and acquiescent to relief supply diversions, excessive Somali staff payscales, and guard misbehavior (for example, unauthorized nighttime use of official vehicles)."\textsuperscript{37}

On the other hand, some military personnel believe that coordination can only take place at the field level, among operators. A Special Forces team leader who participated in UNMIH, for example, organized a meeting following the elections with the host nation police, the U.S. and foreign civilian police deployed to Haiti, and others in order to discuss the UN plan and each other's roles and missions. U.S. Army translators assisted the group.\textsuperscript{38}

\textbf{Different Criteria for Success}

Another complicating factor at field level is that participating agencies may take very different views of the requirements for a successful operation. They may be responsible for different aspects of operations, there may be differences in the duration of their commitment, or there may be interagency rivalry for credit for success.

In counternarcotics operations, for example, one traditional measure of success for the Drug Enforcement Agency is "dope on the table." Many perceive that the law enforcement budget is influenced by the amount of drugs seized. (As a result, there may be resentment if DoD "counts" the same drug seizure to its credit.)\textsuperscript{39} For the military, on the other hand, the size of the drug seizure is usually of little consequence in its own evaluation of an operation.

Agencies and organizations may also have different criteria for success because of their different experiences and organizational cultures. For example, soldiers are used to relatively harsh conditions, and what they consider sufficient


\textsuperscript{36}Sommer, p. 36.

\textsuperscript{37}Sommer, pp. 36–37.

\textsuperscript{38}Author's interview with U.S. Army Special Forces commander, Carlisle Barracks, PA, May 2, 1996.

\textsuperscript{39}Response to RAND questionnaire by FORSCOM staff member.
emergency provisions may be less than what humanitarian organizations consider adequate. In Rwanda, for example, there was confusion and frustration caused when U.S. military personnel considered their effort successful when they could provide the same amount of water per person per day to Rwandans as the U.S. soldiers themselves were allocated. They were not aware, however, that the civilian relief workers expected them to provide the UNHCR’s standard amount of water per person per day (nearly six times what the soldiers were providing).40

In a similar vein, it is not always understood that military operational success may not lead to a humanitarian success if there is not a sufficiently coordinated effort or if the military effort ultimately takes precedence over other agencies’ programs. Observers note that a military intervention is simply so overwhelming that it can wipe out whatever civilian aid structures are in place before the military arrives. Once the military deployed to Somalia, the demands of that operation arguably subsumed the longer-term humanitarian efforts and interests.41 In contrast, in Rwanda, the military intentionally supported continued civilian structures, at least in Kigali, where the UN managed things and also was able to incorporate the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) effort (and the small CMOC) in the interests of security for the NGOs operating in the region.42

In some cases, however, military and agency criteria for success can coincide. With its CA personnel, SF, and recent experience in MOOTW, Army forces have lately demonstrated an improved understanding of the requirements of long-term relief and development efforts. Many U.S. Army forces in both Somalia and Haiti, for example, were intent upon bringing towns and villages back to self-sufficiency.43 Nor is the Army the only service capable of operating with sensitivity to the requirements for sustained growth. In Operation Sea Angel (OSA), the 1991 disaster relief operation in Bangladesh, the Marines who led the operation very deliberately avoided repairing anything that had not been devastated by the cyclone and, moreover, restored things to Bangladeshi rather than American standards.44 Similarly, in Rwanda, Lieutenant General Schroeder worked hard to minimize duplication of effort between the military and the relief

40Author’s interviews with OFDA staff members, in Washington, D.C. and by phone, March and April 1995.
41Dworken, p. 36; Sommer and Collins, pp. 5–6; author’s interview with OFDA personnel, Washington, D.C., June 1995.
42Author’s interview with OFDA personnel, Washington, D.C., June 1995.
43U.S. Army Forces—Somalia, p. 77.
community, and he insisted that his personnel work closely with the UN’s humanitarian operations center (HOC) and the OFDA Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to agree on objectives, priorities, and material commitments.45

**Civilians’ Lack of Familiarity With the Military**

A third complicating factor at field level has been civilian agencies’ reluctance to work with the military, although the military has begun to overcome such civilian apprehension. Some NGOs, in particular, have been concerned about being associated with, or overwhelmed by, a military operation. For example, during OPC in northern Iraq, the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) had sent complete hospitals into the theater but no medical personnel to staff them. The U.S. military put other foreign-contingent medical personnel in these hospitals to get them up and running. But when ICRC arrived in theater, it immediately shut down the hospitals upon learning that foreign military medical personnel were operating them, since it did not wish to have any military affiliation.46 Similarly, during OSH, when an NGO controlled one key part of the water distribution system and the U.S. military held another, the NGO representative nonetheless refused to meet with an OSD representative to coordinate their efforts, for fear that he would lose legitimacy in the eyes of the local population.47

Nor are U.S. agencies immune from such concerns. In OSA in Bangladesh and OPC in northern Iraq, for example, USAID representatives actually were more averse to working with the U.S. military than were NGOs operating locally.48 Lieutenant General Stackpole, commander of the contingency JTF for OSA, said

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45 Author’s phone interview with OFDA personnel, April 10, 1995.
46 Author’s interview with U.S. Army medical logistician, Office of the U.S. Army Surgeon General, Washington, D.C., November 1993. Since OPC, OFDA has found that NGOs, UN agencies, and even ICRC have been more willing to consider the U.S. military as a supporting agency during humanitarian assistance operations. Author’s interview with OFDA representative, September 1995.
47 Author’s phone interview with William McCoy, OSD (Office of Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs), April 1995. This tension could also stem from other factors. For example, many NGOs rely on private donations, so press coverage of their efforts is critical for their long-term survival. During Operation Restore Hope, civilian relief agencies and NGOs were upset that the military accomplishments overshadowed their own in the press coverage. During Operation Support Hope, press coverage of the military effort left Rwandan relief workers with a general feeling of resentment that the military had taken credit for many of the NGOs’ accomplishments (e.g., the water distribution operation).
that the CJTF had “one hell of a time” selling itself to USAID, “which thought we would come in ham-fisted and destroy everything they had set up.”

In many instances, the reluctance of civilians to work with the military is a product of their unfamiliarity with the military’s capabilities, objectives, and limitations. (Indeed, for many civilians, a given operation may be a first-time experience.) Thus, one cause of civilian frustration with the military is unrealistically high—and, hence, easily disappointed—expectations. Another is that civilians tend not to understand the often conflicting requirements of security and humanitarian operations. These two sources of frustration, moreover, can exacerbate each other. In Somalia, NGO personnel and civilian agency representatives were frustrated that the military disarmed their Somali security guards yet was unprepared to provide military escorts. The civilians understood the rationale behind the disarmament, but did not realize that the military would not be able to afford the massive expenditure in manpower, resources, and coordination that a military escort service would entail.

In an earlier instance, some NGOs and U.S. agencies involved in OPC in northern Iraq considered the military unresponsive at those times when the security operation took precedence over the humanitarian operation. They were particularly frustrated when the movement of security equipment, ammunition, and forces took priority over the delivery of relief supplies and humanitarian personnel.

Furthermore, both government representatives and NGO personnel have reported some difficulty in understanding the military chain of command. Interagency representatives from both the State Department and the Justice Department found the military to be a “difficult bureaucratic maze” during Cuban and Haitian migrant operations, with too many players and layers at both the policy and implementation levels. They suggest it was generally hard for outsiders to figure out who really was responsible or who really had authority.

Finally, with the exception of OFDA, agencies have not shown much eagerness to participate in exercises with the military, although that would ostensibly improve coordination capabilities and remedy their lack of familiarity with

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52. Author’s interviews with Langdon Williams, Department of State/ARA, and Phyllis Covan, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., June 1995.
military procedures. In the context of counterdrug operations, for example, it is difficult for the military to generate much interest from law enforcement for exercises, despite the fact that counterdrug exercises would provide an opportunity to test concepts, connectivity, and reaction responses to suspected drug trafficking aircraft and vessels.

**Military Unfamiliar with Supporting Role**

The burden of poor field-level coordination does not lie solely with civilians. The U.S. military is also culpable, for a number of reasons. Key among them is that U.S. military personnel are used to acting and making decisions independently of other players in theater. In missions with humanitarian components, this can create a number of problems. For example, during the initial phase of OSH, the U.S. military did an assessment of the Goma airfield when deciding where to establish its main logistics hub. Although Goma airfield has a long runway, its limited taxiways and aprons, plus concerns that relief flights might wear down the runway surface, quickly led to a decision to use Entebbe as the main logistics hub for flying in large aircraft. However, this decision was made without consulting either UNHCR or the French contingent, who were using the Goma airfield as their base. The decision greatly angered the French contingent, created confusion abroad as word spread that the U.S. military had declared the Goma airfield unsafe, and temporarily disrupted relief flights into the theater as NGOs and other countries tried to locate alternative airfields. Eventually, the French and UNHCR decided to ignore the U.S. military on this “call” and continue flying planes into Goma.54

In another instance during OSH, the United States had agreed to provide UNHCR with an airhead in Entebbe. Due to miscommunication, UNHCR representatives also expected assistance in terms of lodging, office space, communications equipment, transportation assets, etc.—in other words, the “Cadillac” version of support. The U.S. military responded that it could assist only with specific requests. The State Department witnessed this chain of events and concluded that the U.S. military did not adequately support the UNHCR team, which led to a political battle between the JS and the State Department within the interagency network in Washington, D.C.55

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53 Author’s interview with Army participants in OPBAT, Washington, D.C., March 1995.
54 Author’s phone interview with OFDA personnel, April 1995.
55 Author’s phone interview with OSD personnel, Office of Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs, May 1995.
A related problem is that the U.S. forces are not accustomed to transferring operations to civilian relief workers. During OSH, the military commander failed to understand the importance of communicating his forces’ departure date well in advance to UNHCR, DART members, and the NGOs. Instead, when the decision was made to withdraw, the military did so with little advance warning, at least from the NGOs’ perspective. The relief workers were taken by surprise and, to keep relief efforts from stalling, had to quickly replace some essential equipment that had been redeployed with the military forces (such as tractors and lift equipment).

Another issue that arises regarding military support to civilian agencies is that military forces and civilian relief workers tend to have a different suspense in responding to a crisis. Indeed, while military personnel may be frustrated with the civilian agencies’ and NGOs’ slow response time, the military’s focus on rapid response can contribute to misguided actions and misunderstood requirements in an interagency operation. For example, during OSH, the first cases of cholera were discovered early. At that point it became clear that water production and distribution would be a high priority. The CINC decided it was critical to move water equipment into the theater as soon as possible, with the idea being to send whatever was initially available from EUCOM and refine those assets later on. EUCOM initially sent reverse-osmosis water purification units (ROPUs) to be set up at Lake Kivu. However, these sophisticated units took time to process the water, produced a much lower volume than what was needed given the immediate and overwhelming demand, and resulted in much purer water than the refugees’ gastrointestinal systems were accustomed to. Further, Lake Kivu itself had naturally such high-quality water that all that was required was pumping, not purification. In other words, the U.S. military efforts actually contributed to a delay in the distribution of water to the various camps. This problem was exacerbated by the delayed arrival of UNHCR’s expert into the theater and by the inability of military personnel on the ground to cease their operation until commanded to do so by higher authority.56

As summarized by one DART member, her experience in general has been that the military is an inflexible and unwieldy organization that tends to bring in many assets (some of which do not appear to be needed), to act as if it is the only outfit in the theater, and to be secretive and uncommunicative with the other players about its activities. Moreover, it seemed to her that support from the military cost more in extra work for the civilian relief community than the return

56 Author’s phone interview with OFDA personnel, April 1995.
was worth. She thought that although the military has gotten better with each new operation, the improvement has tended to be marginal.57

Broad Missions

Another problem complicating field-level interactions—one that is not commonly associated with interagency coordination—is that military missions tend to have implicit, as well as explicit, tasks. In MOOTW, where the mission may be as general as “create a secure and stable environment,” commanders have to use their own discretion as to what tasks are appropriate. In ORH, for example, U.S. soldiers felt they had completed their mandate long before the handoff to UNOSOM II. And because they were participating in a humanitarian effort, they considered it their implicit mandate to seek opportunities to conduct civic action.58 So units rebuilt some schoolhouses and set up medical clinics on a small scale and as the occasion arose. Such efforts can also provide some force-protection benefits and help stabilize a locality in the short term, thus further helping to meet the mission’s requirements.

Yet if commanders seek these kinds of security benefits without taking into account the full context of political and economic efforts, their actions can unintentionally damage civilian agencies’ long-term development or humanitarian assistance efforts. Relief workers point out, for example, that the military’s actions are often misconstrued as part of a larger U.S. strategy and lead to unrealistic expectations of U.S. beneficence.59 There may or may not be teachers to work in the schoolhouses, for example, and the medical clinics may only be able to function for as long as the initial supplies given to them by the soldiers last. Frequently, relief workers will be expected to maintain otherwise unsustainable projects begun by the military, but such projects may not fit into their own agendas or may require too great an infusion of resources. Likewise, long-term civilian development efforts can be threatened if the local population develops higher expectations of what Americans will provide or if they believe their needs can be met more quickly. Military projects can also create unexpected burdens and costs for NGOs or civilian agencies that try to sustain them.

In order to ensure that the mission in Rwanda remained strictly circumscribed, General Schroeder deliberately limited the number of troops in theater. When, for example, a psychological operations (PSYOP) unit was deployed to OSH,

57 Author’s phone interview with DART team member, April 10, 1995.
58 Author’s informal interviews with personnel from 10th Mountain Division (LI), Defense Science Board conference, Virginia, August 1994.
59 Author’s interview with OFDA personnel, Washington, D.C., June 1995.
General Schroeder turned the men back, citing an absence of demand for their skills and the risk that they would "create" work.\textsuperscript{60}

\textit{Requirements for Concrete Results}

There is also downward pressure from higher headquarters for demonstrable achievements and tangible results; military units must have concrete evidence of their efforts. Such requirements are counterproductive in an environment where doing less may be more. In Haiti, for example, the U.S. Marines deployed to Cap Haitien with the objective of undertaking food distribution projects and went ahead with them despite suggestions from OFDA to postpone or forgo them. OFDA's concerns, and those of the relief community more generally, were that while the Marines could credit themselves with a successful logistical food distribution effort, it did nothing to support the long-term humanitarian relief NGOs were attempting to establish. Again, by raising unrealistic expectations among the Haitians of what the NGOs and the Americans could provide on a sustainable basis, the Marines' efforts actually made the broader American strategy look bad.\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{60}Author's interview with OFDA personnel, Washington, D.C., June 1995; author's interview with former member of 10th Special Forces Group, Santa Monica, CA, August 1995.

\textsuperscript{61}Author's interviews with OFDA personnel, by phone and in Washington, D.C., May and June 1995. Ironically, U.S. Army Special Forces personnel felt that the NGOs did a similar disservice in Haiti, by raising local populations' expectations and then failing to follow through on their promises due to a "slow, ponderous, and unaggressive" approach. Remarks by a presenter at the U.S. Army Special Forces Worldwide Conference, Fort Bragg, NC, April 7, 1995.
3. Recommendations

The Army is in some sense the principal "billpayer" for inadequate interagency coordination. Because Army forces are on usually on the ground in relatively large numbers, deploy diverse nonmilitary as well as military capabilities, and enjoy well-oiled logistics support, they fall naturally into gaps left by civilian agencies unable to fulfill commitments, or created when new support commitments arise unexpectedly during operations. This in turn places Army personnel at the nexus of the civil-military coordination process in the field—in the CMOC or HACC, for example, and at higher levels in the operational chain of command. And it makes it likely that the Army budget will, at least temporarily, pay for problems in interagency coordination.

The more efficiently the Army pays these "bills," the less they show up at the level of national policy. In fact, national policymakers and the American public can take some pride in the nation's overall performance in recent MOOTW, from Operation Just Cause in Panama to Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti and current operations in Bosnia. To the extent that each of these operations has seen its share of interagency coordination problems, however, success has been purchased at a higher-than-expected price mainly in terms of Army readiness. Additional troops and equipment have been needed for longer periods than planned, interrupting peacetime training, extending the time required to "recover" from deployment to MOOTW, and making it more difficult to assemble a full force should other national requirements demand it.

This makes interagency coordination a cogent Army problem—more generally a military service problem—that does not register prominently at the level of national policy. Worse, the Army as an institution is poorly positioned to deal with it. To the extent that coordination problems spring from the pluralism of U.S. government, of course, they are difficult for anyone to solve. Calls for a civilian Goldwater-Nichols Act to improve interagency coordination overlook the fact that Goldwater-Nichols increased central control over elements within a single agency, the Department of Defense. Coordination across different cabinet agencies is a substantially different problem. Arguably the National Security Council, established by the National Security Act of 1947, was established to do precisely this. Yet this report makes clear that interagency coordination problems still exist, testifying to the limits of even major national security legislation to engender real coordination at that level. In the end there is no
substitute for presidential involvement, yet the president inevitably has many other pressing duties to perform.

Within this broader context, ad hoc coordinating bodies have had only limited success in enforcing full agency cooperation in MOOTW. The Executive Committee, assembled in advance of Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti, brought high-level (assistant secretary and equivalent) policymakers together in a very visible way. Committee members were made personally responsible for performing key tasks, and these assignments were conveyed to the Deputies Committee to put teeth into such directives. The body also nourished esprit de corps among participants, resulting in some solid teamwork. Yet interviews suggest that even here some agencies were unable to follow through on their commitments.

At the level of the military services, meanwhile, the Goldwater-Nichols Act reduced direct service involvement in joint and interagency planning for and execution of military operations. As Title X of the U.S. Code puts it, the Army and its sister services “organize, train, and equip” forces whose deployment is planned and executed by the Joint Staff and regional commands. The Army Chief of Staff can influence operational planning through his position on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but the Goldwater-Nichols Act reduced service power by making the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs the “principal military advisor” to the president, thereby reducing the influence of military institutions that ultimately supply capabilities to regional commanders.

The services thus must find more subtle and indirect ways to link their needs with national military policy. In fact, some elements of a service strategy for ameliorating interagency coordination problems still fall completely within service control. In these cases the issue is one of institutional priorities more than lack of influence. But large portions of the coordination problem lie in areas where the Army as an institution can at best provide advice informally, or lobby within the bureaucracy for a solution sensitive to Army needs and constraints. While Army officials have begun to exploit some of these mechanisms, they could do so more aggressively, and over a wider range of issues.

Education

Educating Army personnel is crucial, since by and large the Army’s unique institutional concerns about MOOTW and interagency coordination are carried to the national and joint levels through Army personnel assigned to the Joint Staff, the staffs of the regional commands, and the various Army units involved in a given deployment. By the strictures of Goldwater-Nichols, at least, the Army as an institution connects to the process formally only at the very top, through the Chief
of Staff’s position on the JCS. Given the extent to which interagency coordination problems affect the Army perhaps more than other services, the Chief of Staff’s role here should be emphasized and given full Army Staff support. The Chief, above all others, is best positioned to ensure that policy guidance in MOOTW clearly recognizes the Army’s roles, missions, and special needs.

In fact, notwithstanding the organization imposed by the GNA, members of the Army Staff are frequently consulted by elements of OSD and the Joint Staff for advice on Army capabilities and needs. This may reflect the extent to which the JTF and regional CINC have their hands full planning actual day-to-day operations in a specific MOOTW, making them less available for policy planning at the DoD and national level. The Army Staff must recognize that whatever its origins, the fact of frequent consultation imposes a planning burden on the staff itself.

Soldiers in the field, however, are no less in need of education and training on the challenges of interagency coordination than are those posted to the Pentagon. Unit leaders will need to be able to make reasoned and informed decisions, for example, about which agencies and organizations should receive assistance and even precedence, which can assume responsibilities initially intended for the military, which can assume responsibilities as the military begins to withdraw from an operation, which require operational information sharing, and so forth. Soldiers in the field need to be able to distinguish between organizations, recognize their limitations and advantages, develop mutually beneficial relationships where feasible, and ensure that all efforts—military and civilian—are as complementary as possible.

Education must cut both ways, however. As much as the military requires education about the various civilian agencies and organizations, both field-level civilians and policymakers need to learn about the military’s organization, priorities, protocols, and personnel so that they know to whom to direct questions and requests, where decisions will ultimately be made, what limitations and capabilities they can expect to encounter in the field, and how best to ensure effective communication and coordination.

Soldier Education

The Army and the military more generally have begun to recognize the need to prepare soldiers for the interagency environment. The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana and the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) in Hohenfels, Germany, for example, now actively involve civilians from both government agencies and NGOs in their MOOTW exercises. Interagency issues are also being included in MOOTW courses at the Army
Peacekeeping Institute, the Army War College, the National Defense University, and other senior service schools. Additionally, both Joint Pub 3-08 (Draft) and the *Joint Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations* explicitly address the requirements of interagency coordination.

Army personnel more specifically have long benefited from the civilian education program, which offers selected officers and enlisted men and women the opportunity to study for advanced degrees at civilian institutions such as the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and the Department of State Foreign Service Institute. Such schooling has prepared many soldiers for the challenges of interagency coordination while also providing an opportunity for civilians and military personnel to exchange views.

In addition to the existing educational and training opportunities, units like the 10th Mountain Light Infantry Division could theoretically capitalize on their multiple experiences in MOOTW by developing their own unit training programs. Although such units acquire a host of “lessons learned” with each successive operation, the actual skills acquired are slowly lost as people—including unit leaders—are reassigned to other units in the normal flow of career progression. Creating a unit training curriculum that imbeds new lessons in a more permanent form would be useful. Ironically, the 10th Mountain Division does not have MOOTW on its mission-essential task list (METL), the standard to which it trains as a unit; creating a unit-level MOOTW training program might require actually changing the unit’s METL.

While courses and exercise opportunities relevant to interagency coordination remain limited, soldiers preparing for deployments can nonetheless benefit from predeployment briefings that list and describe those U.S. government agencies, UN agencies, and NGOs expected to participate in any given operation. Such briefings can be provided by—singly or in combination—agency representatives and specialized military training teams (MTTs). The latter could be led, perhaps, by civil affairs or special forces personnel familiar with—or specially educated on—various civilian organizations’ capabilities, requirements, and objectives.

Soldiers are also introduced to new concepts through the many professional Army journals—and through military literature more generally. Unfortunately, these thus far have limited much of their examination of interagency coordination to UN agencies and NGOs and have not included U.S. government agencies. Such journals could provide an enormous service by portraying in very clear and specific terms the complexity of potential civilian involvement in any given MOOTW. For example, such journals can examine how U.S. civilian
government representatives—like the DART personnel—may be in a position to facilitate Army efforts.

The Army has also begun to modify its own doctrine to reflect the requirements of interagency coordination: the forthcoming Army doctrine on domestic support operations and humanitarian assistance operations should help inform soldiers about their civilian counterparts' capabilities, limitations, expectations, requirements, organization, objectives, and methods. Such doctrine can serve as a useful heuristic tool in both the classroom and exercises. Nonetheless, the Army could take a much more proactive approach to modifying both Army and joint doctrine than it currently does. For example, although the Army's extensive involvement in interagency operations in the field gives it strong incentives to influence the formulation of joint doctrine, this institutional interest is not reflected in actual Army behavior. The U.S. Navy was the proponent service for writing Joint Pub 3-08 (Draft), Interagency Coordination in Joint Operations, even though the Army would appear to be substantially more engaged than the Navy in actual coordination.

Overall, it is too soon to tell whether the steps already taken toward preparing soldiers for the interagency arena will suffice: the relevant Army and joint doctrine are still in the draft stages, the courses are new, and the exercises are infrequent and may not continue to draw high-level civilian participation. For its part, the Army should help ensure that these efforts continue and expand. For example, the Army needs to approach doctrinal issues strategically, determining which publications are most relevant to its own institutional needs and reaching for proponency, or at least seeking substantial influence, in those cases. The Army Staff should certainly seek proponence for writing both CMOC doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), since Army civil affairs personnel are the primary military representatives in CMOCs. And, in terms of its own doctrine, the Army Staff needs to ensure that issues of interagency coordination are included wherever relevant in future Army doctrine. Revisions of the current civil affairs manual, FM 41-10, should include substantial guidance on the role of CMOCs, the value and limitations of staffing them with Army civil affairs personnel, and the relationship of the CMOC to the JTF and the country team.

In addition to modifying doctrine, the Army Staff should fully support the continued development of interagency coordination modules for courses at Army schools. Civilian participation should also be more systematically sought in appropriate courses. Indeed, the Army should consider setting aside some funds to bring civilians to such courses and to exercises like those held at JRTO, since agencies such as OFDA cannot always afford to participate in such efforts when they would like to.
Finally, the Army must recognize opportunities where they arise. Army representation at interagency conferences on MOOTW, for example, has been woefully limited (whereas the Marines have recognized the value of such exposure, and attend—and participate—in large numbers). Indeed, one such conference was held at the National Defense University by the U.S. Institute of Peace in June 1996. The topic was interagency communications in humanitarian relief operations in Africa. The Army was represented by a single signals officer and by an officer from the 96th CA Battalion who explained that he had heard about the conference at the last minute and thought it was an interesting topic. The Marines, in comparison, were represented not only by several officers in the audience, but by two officers who participated actively in panel discussions. At the end of the conference, the civilian participants had a very clear idea of the Marines’ communications capabilities and concerns in MOOTW, and the Marines had made several contacts among representatives of U.S. government agencies and NGOs. These kinds of conferences, including the better-known Emerald Express (also lightly attended by the Army) and several others held by the State Department, provide a venue in which the Army definitely has something to offer and from which it stands to gain quite a bit if it can muster more—and more active—participation.

**Civilian Education**

The Chief of Staff of the Army must both represent the Army in the interagency process and educate the National Security Council, the National Command Authority, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff about the Army’s preferences and concerns in MOOTW. The CSA can also help ensure that policy guidance clearly articulates the Army’s roles and missions in a given operation.

The Army Staff must fully support the CSA by providing him regularly with up-to-date information pertaining to Army capabilities and concerns in MOOTW. Such efforts will allow the CSA to fairly represent the Army’s position and support his points with timely and relevant real-life examples. After-action reports (AARs), unit histories of operations, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) papers, and other means of documenting and disseminating field-level operators’ experiences and lessons learned are therefore crucial activities and valuable resources.

There is admittedly a tension between these kinds of activities and the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. By educating policymakers and attempting to guide policy, the Army is in effect overstepping its Title X responsibilities and boundaries. Nonetheless, until policymakers are fully aware of the scope of the capabilities they have available to them, they will not make best nor most efficient use of them.
Nor should education stop at the policymakers. Field-level civilian agency representatives—from U.S. government agencies, the United Nations, and NGOs—also would benefit from a greater understanding of, and knowledge about, the military and its role in any given MOOTW. To this end, deployed Army forces can provide both the civilian relief community and the press with handouts and briefings about U.S. policy, the Army’s mission, the local Army chain of command, and appropriate channels of communication. If Army personnel are manning the CMOCs, they can also make sure that those centers are both accessible and responsive to civilians. Additionally, deployed Army personnel—especially those manning the CMOC—should ensure that OFDA DART members, who are likely to be aware of civilians’ concerns or problems, are also aware of the Army’s objectives, capabilities, and intentions.

The Army should also consider developing a military training team capability for civilians. Such a team could provide predeployment briefings to civilians or deploy to an agency or organization’s field location to provide information about the organization, mission, and plans of the Army forces in a specific operation.

**Operations**

In addition to educating soldiers and civilians, concrete steps remain to be taken to ensure effective coordination and cooperation during operations. Admittedly, many of the problems with coordination lie outside the Army’s purview and even its influence. Yet there are some problems that the Army can take the initiative in addressing.

**Clarifying Operational Authority**

Although the Army will not be able to resolve this problem on its own, it could take steps toward improving the situation by initiating efforts with the other services and U.S. civilian agencies to determine how best to designate authority in the field. Potential options might include designating authority by phase in an operation, by sector, or by task.

The Army can also run interagency simulations or games (similar to the Emerald Express exercise run jointly by the I Marine Expeditionary Force, FMF, and the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research) in order to identify overlaps in authority and points of negotiation. CALL documents, AARs, and other documentation of recent MOOTW experiences can also shed some light on where tension and confusion about the designation of authority might arise.
Anticipating Expanding Requirements

It is to be expected that the Army will fill in when civilian agencies fall through on commitments in both humanitarian assistance and nation-assistance efforts. Given this, the Army must prepare in advance for such circumstances. For example, civil affairs personnel, special forces, linguists, logisticians, engineers, medical units, and truck companies are likely to be required in larger ratios than would be needed were the Army merely to fulfill its original assigned mission. Engineering equipment, trucks, sanitation equipment, water purifiers, medical facilities, and other materiel should be either deployed in anticipation of such requirements or prepared in push packages for quick deployment when the need for them arises. Finally, the Army should assume that it will be required to pick up the tab for some of these efforts, at least initially, and budget accordingly.

Overcoming Organizational Differences

The Army staff must make a concerted effort to identify and then maintain contact with counterparts in key agencies. Army staff personnel could also initiate the development of interagency task-based working groups, exercises, and training (e.g., an engineering working group or a water-distribution group).

The Army must also make its chain of command as understandable and accessible as possible to civilian agencies. Civilians should know who their own counterparts are and to whom they should speak should they have concerns or need to coordinate a given effort. Understanding the chain of command also allows civilians to compensate for personnel turnover. If they know which position is equivalent to their own, they will not sever relations if a given individual leaves but can instead turn to his or her replacement or even to the next person up the chain of command.

Additionally, civilians must be able to recognize when an Army representative is exogenous to the chain of command. This could help prevent the kind of confusion that sometimes arises when visiting generals or military personnel make promises that the deployed forces will not be able to keep.

Better Utilizing Coordinating Structures

The CMOCs can still be built and used to better effect. Ideally, CMOCs are supposed to provide a place where the military can systematically field and prioritize civilian agency (especially NGO and UN agency) requests for military assistance while also providing information about its own organization,
capabilities, and operations. But CMOCs are a relatively new effort (since Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq in 1991), and there has been a steep learning curve. The CMOC in Somalia, for example, had difficulty coordinating civilians’ requests and determining how best to respond to the volatile local situation. Civilians criticized the CMOC, saying that the military used it to keep civilians at arm’s length; that the CMOC’s rigid structure completely failed to connect with the much more amorphous nature of the civilian relief community; and that the military was using the CMOC to take over coordination and organization of the humanitarian assistance effort so that it could impose its own sense of order on it. Yet by the time CMOCs were set up in Rwanda, the military already had a better sense of how to run them, better integrate them into civilian structures, and tailor them to the specific requirements of their locations.

One of the key lessons learned thus far about CMOCs is that their roles vis-à-vis UN HOCs and similar structures need to be clarified. First, CMOCs should join existing civilian structures rather than replace them. Second, the HOC or its equivalent should be making the decisions about which NGOs and civilian efforts get priority, while the CMOC should make clear what the military can provide in terms of security, logistics, and so forth. Third, the CMOC should serve as a briefing location (unless one has been established prior to its introduction) where the military can keep civilians current on its efforts and informed about situations that might affect humanitarian assistance planning. Fourth, OFDA DART personnel must be actively associated with the CMOCs. Soldiers operate effectively with DART personnel; DART personnel, in turn, operate effectively with the civilian relief community and with the local population. Fifth, CA personnel should probably continue to run the CMOCs, but PSYOP personnel should be on hand from the outset to help manage civilians’ expectations. Sixth, S3/U3s and S4/U4s, respectively the military commander’s lead operations and logistics officers, could also use the CMOC as a venue for briefing civilians on the status of operations.¹

There were also some charges in past operations that the CMOCs were micromanaged by the CINCs, which slowed and complicated operations. For example, in Haiti the chain of command for the CMOCs went from General Meade to the S3 to the S5 to the CMOC. This very convoluted chain of command was repeated in Bosnia.² Future CMOCs need to have enough autonomy and authority to coordinate with the civilian relief community but sufficiently close

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¹ Additionally, it might be valuable to have MI personnel present at the CMOCs to informally meet with NGO personnel requesting assistance, since NGOs have proven to be good sources of strategic information. This would have to be considered on a case-by-case basis, though, given civilian sensitivities to intelligence-gathering.

² Author’s interview with Colonel Mark Walsh (ret.), Carlisle Barracks, PA, May 2, 1996.
and timely communication with the JTF and CINC to ensure that CMOC promises made are both realistic and kept. Indeed, the JTF commander and the CINC both have to make it clear that the CMOC represents them and their decisions, so that there are not attempts to end-run the CMOC and go straight to these leaders, further confusing coordination efforts.

Of course, these are general lessons. For the purposes of this report, more specifically, it is clear that the CMOC really serves more as an interface for the military, the UN, and NGOs than for U.S. civilian government agencies (OFDA being the important exception). The State Department and the Justice Department, for example, tend to meet with local military representatives at the embassy’s country team meetings rather than through the CMOC. In large part, this is because the CMOC is a military structure intended to serve the purpose of allocating military resources to a specific community, and the only U.S. agency that falls directly within that community is OFDA. Indeed, OFDA has served as the link between the CMOC and U.S. government agencies, though it might also make sense to have CMOC liaison officers attend country team meetings and brief there on CMOC activities.

The Army should be at the forefront of promoting such changes. The Army Staff should request proponency for writing joint CMOC doctrine and TTPs. The Army should also help develop standard guidelines and criteria for building, manning, and sizing CMOCs. Some soldiers should probably be specifically trained to man CMOCs. They should be familiar with OFDA’s and the UN’s structures, personnel, and objectives and, as much as possible, with the diversity of NGOs and civilian agencies involved in any specific operation. Additionally, Army CA doctrine should specifically prepare soldiers for CMOC duties, and CA training and exercises should include practice standing up and operating CMOCs. Finally, Army officers more generally should be made familiar through their professional education with the concept of the CMOC and its invaluable role in a JTF.

**Clarifying Missions**

Army commanders must recognize the need to involve agency and NGO representatives in planning and preparing for HA and NA missions and tasks. Also, Army doctrine and training should make it clear than inaction may actually be the best policy in interagency efforts—and that units’ performance assessments will recognize that and the subtleties of interagency cooperation. Indeed, the Army should institute a process whereby agencies and NGOs are consulted when evaluating units’ contributions to an interagency operation.
Transferring Operations

Finally, the issue of when and how to transfer tasks to civilians will be key, especially for CA, SF, and CS/CSS personnel. This requires that the Army identify early in an operation which civilian agencies and individuals will assume which tasks from which Army units. Also, interagency standard operating procedures for transitioning tasks need to be established, especially among the Army, key agencies, and NGOs. For example, CA and SF personnel should work in advance with Justice Department personnel and ICITAP to determine what the criteria will be for transferring police-training responsibilities from Army to civilian personnel.

More generally, the Army needs to work with the relevant civilian agencies to establish criteria for identifying conditions for transition and/or mission completion. The Army should also develop a set of measures of effectiveness (MOE) to circulate among the agencies as the first step in creating an official interagency set.

Finally, to mitigate some of the confusion about financial responsibility in MOOTW, the Army should take the lead in establishing interagency accounting procedures for HA and NA efforts.

Conclusions

In the end, following these recommendations can be expected to do little more than mitigate some of the effects of what, inevitably, is a by-product of the U.S. political system. Coordination in MOOTW is likely to remain a highly ad hoc, voluntary, and problematic enterprise. And the Army is likely to continue to carry some excess—and often unanticipated—burden, simply by virtue of its capabilities. But the effects of this on the Army’s performance in a given MOOTW, and on its overall resources and preparation, can nonetheless be somewhat moderated by undertaking the educational and operational steps outlined above.
Appendix

RAND Interagency Coordination Questionnaire (Agency Version)

I. Overall

1. What is your agency’s charter or mandate?

2. Has your agency experienced significant constraints in undertaking overseas operations?

3. What resources/capabilities can your agency bring to an operation?
   - educational assistance
   - agricultural assistance
   - technical assistance
   - emergency medical services
   - disease control
   - financial services
   - transport of supplies/personnel
   - other

4. By what mechanisms do requests for assistance typically come in? (formal/informal channels)

5. After the initial request is made, how is planning undertaken?

A. Coordination with U.S. Government Agencies

6a. Which other U.S. government agencies does your agency coordinate with?
   - State
   - National Intelligence Agency
   - Department of Defense
   - Drug Enforcement Agency
   - Other
   - USAID
   - U.S. Information Agency
6b. At what level does coordination typically occur?

- National (policy coordinating committee or equivalent)
- Agency (U.S. government, UN)
- Headquarters
- in country (country team, CMOC)

6c. By what mechanisms? (formal/informal)

B. Coordination with the U.S. military

7. Does your organization have any formal policies regarding coordination with the U.S. military?

8. What kinds of military assistance does your agency typically request, if any?

- security
- transportation assistance
- communications
- intelligence
- other

- distribution assistance
- lift
- information
- medical

9. What kinds of assistance does the military typically request from your agency, if any?

- area expertise
- information on local customs
- liaison with local civilian community
- specialized personnel (e.g., public health)
- translators/linguists
- information on local/regional politics (situation)
- information on location of NGOs
- points of contact
- assistance in dealing with foreign nationals
- other
10. What service has your organization dealt with most often in these types of operations?

   _Army    _Coast Guard    _Navy    _Marines    _Air Force

II. Operation Specific
(Operation________________________)

11. What was your agency’s mission?

A. Coordination with U.S. Government Agencies

12. What coordination, if any, was required with in-country U.S. government agencies?

13. Was there redundancy between your efforts and these agencies?

14a. Did you receive support or assistance from these agencies?

14b. Was it sufficient? Why/why not?

15. Were any requests to these agencies unfulfilled? (examples)

16. Was the interagency process complicated by the presence of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or requirements to coordinate with regional or international organizations? (NATO, UN)

B. Coordination with the U.S. Military

17a. What coordination with the U.S. military, if any, was required?

17b. At what level did coordination take place? (strategic, operational, field)

C. Coordination with the U.S. Army

18a. Did your activities require coordination with U.S. Army elements?
18b. If so, what type of Army forces (elements) did you deal with?

- headquarters
- liaison party
- NCOs
- unit commanders
- peacekeeping troops
- special forces personnel
- military police
- enlisted personnel/patrols
- civil affairs personnel
- PSYOP personnel
- medical personnel

19. In what areas did U.S. Army forces assist with:

- security
- engineering assets
- cultural information
- transportation
- access to local officials
- access to resources
- additional personnel
- provided support information (e.g., location of minefields, contaminated areas, etc.)
- logistical support
- communications support
- other

20. What additional U.S. Army assistance or support would have been helpful?

21. What additional assistance or support could your agency have provided to the U.S. Army?

22. Were any requests for support to the U.S. Army unfulfilled?

23. Were any requests for support from the U.S. Army to your agency unfulfilled?

24. Was the contact with U.S. Army forces or personnel in any way harmful or disruptive to your activities?
25. Was there any redundancy between your agency’s and the U.S. Army’s efforts?

26. How could coordination with the U.S. Army be improved?

27. In general, how could interagency coordination be improved?
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