Outside the Fleet

External Requirements for Naval Officers

Margaret C. Harrell • Harry J. Thie
Jefferson P. Marquis • Kevin Brancato
Roland J. Yardley • Clifford M. Graff II
Jerry Sollinger

RAND

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Organizations outside the Navy will continue to require naval officers. Understanding the processes for determining the military manpower requirements for these organizations is a positive step toward developing an integrated recruitment, development, and retention strategy for naval personnel. A common perception is that external billets, particularly officer billets for joint organizations, are growing and that the Navy will have difficulty in filling such billets.

The Manpower, Personnel, and Training section of the Assessments Division of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessments tasked RAND to examine processes for determining and validating external requirements and the Navy's ability to meet present and future requirements. This report describes the results of the research and should be of interest to the defense manpower and personnel community. In particular, the data included within this document should be a resource for military manpower planners.

This research was conducted for the United States Navy within the Forces and Resources Policy Center of RAND's National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the unified commands, and the defense agencies.
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BACKGROUND

In addition to filling their own ranks, the military services must assign people to outside organizations, such as the Joint Staff, unified commands, the Department of State, and the White House. While external billets require both officer and enlisted personnel, the officer billets tend to garner the most attention, both because of the cost and because of the management required to ensure that they are filled appropriately—i.e., with officers of the correct experience or capabilities. Many in the services believe that these external requirements, particularly those in the joint arena, are increasing.

This perception has been fueled in part by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which directed a broad range of organizational and functional changes with an eye to improving the services’ ability to carry out joint operations. This act directed the Secretary of Defense to establish a list of joint duty billets and imposed requirements for who is eligible to serve in such billets. The act also requires the services to make joint duty a prerequisite for flag rank. The law’s goal is the improvement of joint operations, largely by ensuring that quality officers serve in joint billets and are not disadvantaged by doing so.

RESEARCH

The overall objective of the work reported on here was to examine the effects these changes have had on external Navy staffing. Of particular interest were the number and types of officer external billets the Navy must staff, as well as the process for determining and vali-
dating these external requirements. Focusing on joint duty assignments (JDAs), we analyzed the Navy’s ability to meet present and expanded requirements. Finally, we developed some suggestions for ways the Navy could meet additional external requirements.

RESULTS

External Requirements

Table S.1 shows the number of external billets the Navy must fill, whether they are inside or outside of DoD, and whether they are permanent billets or details, as explained below.

Determination and Validation

External billets vary widely in type and location, and the documents that govern them vary equally. However, by and large, the requirements processes appear to be relatively well defined, understood, and followed. Indeed, the procedures that the joint manpower program (JMP) outlines govern most of the external positions.¹ The

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<td>Inside DoD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Permanent billets</td>
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<td>Outside DoD</td>
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NOTE: Rounded estimates based on 2001 data and interviews.

¹Each joint activity has its own JMP. Unless stated otherwise, this report refers to the JMP procedures specified in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum 1600.01 (1998), which contains the guidelines for preparing all JMs.
requirements for joint manpower have been established and vetted with the Joint Staff and relevant services. Once established, the billet is filled as part of the service’s normal assignment process. Joint activities periodically revalidate their requirements, and new ones are established through a well-defined process in which the services have a voice.

A primary weakness of the current system is the lack of an objective validation mechanism, other than appealing to a meeting of the Joint Strategic Planning System, a high-level forum that does not easily lend itself to addressing detailed personnel issues. In recognition of this shortcoming, the joint community is developing a joint manpower survey team system that would validate requirements based on a common set of criteria.

About one-third of the Navy’s external requirements do not fall under JMP procedures. External agencies control these assignments with relatively little input from the unified commands and services. For example, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency controls the National Foreign Intelligence Program.

About 1,200 Navy personnel serve in billets outside the Department of Defense (DoD). Some billets are permanent, in that officers rotate in and out of these positions. Examples include assignments in the Department of State or in the forces of foreign governments. Such billets account for about 900 people. Another 300 personnel serve in details, which are considered temporary in that, although the assignments are full length, they may not be revalidated and filled with another officer. Some of the processes, such as those assigning an officer to a billet in NATO, are well defined. Others, such as White House assignments, are largely ad hoc.

**Joint Duty Assignments**

Goldwater-Nichols directed a broad range of organizational and functional changes. The law directed the Secretary of Defense to define and list JDAs by establishing the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL). The original implementation of Goldwater-Nichols, and the one that is used today to determine joint billets, applied a broad-brush approach. Joint duty consideration was limited to pay grades of O-4 or higher. All such positions in some organizations (the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the unified commands) and half the positions in each defense agency were placed on the JDAL. The law specifically prohibited positions in service organizations from receiving joint duty credit. The original implementation led to the designation of approximately 8,300 positions as JDAs.\footnote{This explanation excerpted largely from Schank (1996).}

The law also imposed various educational requirements, promotion objectives, and assignment constraints. For example, the law directed that 50 percent of the billets on the JDAL above the grade of O-3 must be filled by those who are joint specialty officers (JSOs)\footnote{DoD (2002) defines JSO on p. 230 as an "officer on the active duty list who is particularly trained in, and oriented toward, joint matters." Generally, officers require specific joint education and a joint assignment before they can serve in a second joint assignment as a JSO.} or who are nominated to be JSOs. Also, some billets have been designated as critical, and a JSO, not a nominee, must fill these.

Of the initial list of about 8,300 positions, about 1,750 required Navy officers. This number has fluctuated over the years but stabilized in 1993 at 2,050 and has varied little since then. Today, the Navy fills about 80 percent of these. However, within the aggregate number, greater percentages of some billets are filled than of others.

Those who perceive that JDAL billets are increasing are right in the sense that such billets have increased as a percentage of all naval officer billets, rising from 2.4 to 3.6 percent, as the number of naval officers declined. However, that increase has leveled off, and the number of billets has held relatively constant since 1995. The grade mix has changed, with fewer billets designated for O-6s and more for O-4s. About two-thirds of the billets are coded to reflect a specialty, and about one-third are undesignated. The latter portion divides about evenly between billets coded 1000 (any warfare officer) and those coded 1050 (any unrestricted line officer), with about 390 and 350 officers serving in each, respectively.

Under current policies, the Navy can fill between 80 and 90 percent of the JDAL billets. Should the requirements for JDAL billets change, the Navy appears to be in a reasonable position to support some expansion. It can do so in part because it has greater capacity than
the other services to provide officers Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), a requirement for JSO designation.

The Navy can also expand its capacity to support joint billets by applying different policy solutions. Under current law and assignment policies (75 percent of those graduating from JPME going to joint duty), the Navy can fill about 2,134 positions. However, the Navy could increase this by assigning JSOs to noncritical positions or increasing the tour length. For example, increasing the tour length to three years and three months would allow the Navy to support 2,276 billets. Increasing the tour to four years and filling at an 83 percent rate (about what the other services do) would enable the Navy to fill almost 3,000 JDAL billets. Because of the difficulty of fitting joint tours into careers, a more practical alternative would be to maintain shorter tours for unrestricted line officers and other officers perceived to be likely future flag officers. Meanwhile, non-warfighting officers serving in joint tours might serve longer to decrease the effects of joint requirements on the overall population of naval officers.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

Standardize the determination and validation processes; pursue expansion of the JDAL; and simplify the management processes for external assignments.

All external requirements should be determined and validated with one consistent process transparent to all. We recommend applying the JMP guidelines or a similar process to all external billets, and this is apparently under consideration. Adding existing external billets to the JDAL will grant officers serving in such billets joint credit. This change will not mean additional requirements for the Navy but will increase the benefits individual officers derive from serving in such billets. Simplifying the management of JDAs, to include the promotion calculations and comparisons required by Goldwater-Nichols, will reduce any management burden inherent in adding all external billets to the JDAL. Because the services fill JDAs at approximately the same rate as internal billets and because the services are currently pursuing legislative relief for some elements of Goldwater-Nichols (such as the requirement for JSOs to serve in critical billets),
increasing the JDAL will not necessarily impede the management of these billets.

**Determine the Navy perspective on joint duty billets and other external assignments.**

There is currently an “us versus them” perspective on joint duty for naval officers. Joint assignments are considered “time away” from the officer’s warfare specialty and career path, and officers are advised to “stay Navy” until selected and screened for command.

We acknowledge that the benefits to the individual and to the Navy differ depending on whether the Navy sends officers to JDAs or to other external billets. This recognition is inherent in the suggestion above to increase the number of external billets on the JDAL. Nonetheless, the Navy leadership needs to determine the official perspective on joint and other external billets. This perspective should be consistently expressed and acknowledged throughout the Navy manpower and personnel system. If the Navy chooses to support joint opportunities positively, it should readress its current assignment policies. The Navy currently risks losing key influential joint positions because performance in assigning officers to these positions has been indifferent. Regardless, the Navy perspective should determine how assignment to joint billets will affect naval officers, as discussed in the next recommendation.

**Reconcile the Navy perspective on joint and other external assignments with officer career paths.**

There are multiple approaches to assigning officers to joint and other external billets. These approaches can either minimize or maximize the number of officers assigned outside the Navy, given a constant number of authorizations. Exposing fewer officers to joint and other external billets would require longer tours for each officer and likely repetitive tours for those who do serve externally. This would minimize the disruption to most officers’ Navy-only career paths. Officers who go to external billets would be perceived more as specialists in this environment.

A middle ground would affect officers who are likely to achieve flag rank and either would require carefully selecting likely future flag officers for a single joint tour or would increase the Navy’s depen-
dence on waivers for promotion to flag rank without joint duty. If well managed, the system could provide joint experience for likely future flag officers yet still minimize the effects on the majority of naval officers. This approach would support a general reexamination of the types of officers assigned to outside billets, especially when a given billet does not require a specific designator. For example, aviators currently fill a disproportionate number of 1000 and 1050 billets. Yet aviators are among the highest-cost officers; assigning them to such billets is thus not fiscally sound.

In contrast, a different approach would increase the number of officers exposed to joint and external duty for minimum tours, thus minimizing the effects on any single officer’s Navy assignments. This approach would require fairly significant changes in current personnel processes, such as longer careers for most officers, to permit the external opportunities. For JDAs, this approach may also require relief from the current constraints on tour length, to reduce the tour length and allow more officers to serve.

As long as the joint billets that specify aviation and submarine designators provide enough of these kinds of officers with joint experience, and all other things remain equal, fill 1000 and 1050 billets mainly with surface warfare officers and officers with other less-expensive designators.

Our research indicates varying development and compensation costs for officers of different designators. Given that the Navy can determine what kinds of officers to send to billets coded 1000 and 1050, cost should be a factor, all other things being equal. This would reduce the number of requirements for officers with more expensive designators and thus, if the Navy manages its officer force to match requirements, would reduce the number of officers in the more expensive occupations and, ultimately, the cost of the officer corps.
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ABBREVIATIONS

ADSW  active duty for special work
AMD  activity manpower document
ASD(FMP)  Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy)
BMDO  Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
CINC  commander in chief
CJCS  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSM  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum
COS  critical occupational specialty
COMET  Cost of Manpower Estimating Tool [Naval Center for Cost Analysis]
DHP  Defense Health Program
DMDC  Defense Manpower Data Center
DoD  Department of Defense
DoDD  Department of Defense Directive
DSA  DoD support activity
GURL  general unrestricted line officer
ICAF  Industrial College of the Armed Forces
J-1  Joint Staff Directorate for Manpower and Personnel
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDA</td>
<td>joint duty assignment</td>
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<td>JDAL</td>
<td>Joint Duty Assignment List</td>
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<td>JDAMIS</td>
<td>Joint Duty Assignment Management Information System</td>
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<td>JFCOM</td>
<td>Joint Forces Command</td>
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<td>JFSC</td>
<td>Joint Forces Service College</td>
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<td>JMAPS</td>
<td>Joint Manpower and Personnel System</td>
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<td>JMP</td>
<td>Joint Manpower Program</td>
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<td>JMROP</td>
<td>Joint Manpower Resource Offset Process</td>
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<td>JPME</td>
<td>Joint Professional Military Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSO</td>
<td>joint specialty officer</td>
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<td>JTD</td>
<td>Joint Table of Distribution</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
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<td>LDO</td>
<td>limited duty officer</td>
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<td>MPN</td>
<td>Military Personnel, Navy</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NAVCENT</td>
<td>Navy Component of Central Command</td>
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<td>NAVMAC</td>
<td>Navy Manpower Analysis Center</td>
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<td>NFO</td>
<td>naval flight officer</td>
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<td>nom</td>
<td>nominee</td>
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<td>OPA</td>
<td>Officer Programmed Authorization</td>
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<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>Pacific Command</td>
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<td>PBD</td>
<td>program budget decision</td>
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<td>PERS 4</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of Navy Personnel Command for Distribution</td>
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<td>PJE</td>
<td>program of joint education</td>
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<td>POM</td>
<td>program objectives memorandum</td>
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<td>U.S. Marine Corps</td>
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BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE

Many in the military perceive that requirements for officers to serve outside their services are increasing, despite a general environment of shrinking resources and reduced military manpower. This perception is particularly strong for joint manpower requirements, which are seen as continually growing as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DoD) Reorganization Act of 1986.

Officers can serve in many different kinds of external billets. These include serving on the Joint Staff, serving in unified and combatant commands, temporarily participating in a joint task force (JTF), being assigned to a U.S. senator's office, or serving as a service representative for the "National Moment of Remembrance." External billets can vary in duration, location, and the extent to which they are perceived valuable experiences for an individual's career.

This report addresses such external officer requirements for the Navy. Specifically, it identifies the number and types of external officer billets the Navy must staff and describes the process for determining and validating these external requirements. Focusing on joint duty assignments (JDAs), the report analyzes the Navy's ability

\[1\] DoD (2002) defines JDA on p. 230:

An assignment to a designated position in a multi-Service, joint or multinational command or activity that is involved in the integrated employment or support of the land, sea, and air forces of at least two of the three Military Departments. Such involvement includes, but is not limited to, matters relating to national military strategy, joint doctrine and policy, strategic planning, contingency planning, and command and control of combat operations under a unified or specified command.
to meet present and expanded requirements and, finally, suggests some ways that the Navy could meet additional external requirements.

**FRAMEWORK FOR CONSIDERING EXTERNAL REQUIREMENTS**

To aid discussion of Navy external officer requirements, we established the following framework to identify various kinds and locations of external requirements. Figure 1.1 is a schematic that depicts the various organizations that include external naval officer billets. The following discussion refers to these organizations when describing the requirement determination and validation process.

The majority (about 75 percent) of the billets external to the Navy are still inside DoD. Inside DoD, there are a few temporary duty assignments (less than 1 percent of billets), which can be filled by active duty officers or by reserve component officers on active duty for special work (ADS W), but most are permanent billets to which offi-
cers are assigned on a repetitive basis. Billets external to the Navy but inside DoD include those in such organizations as the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and the unified commands. The Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL), which we will discuss in more detail later, includes all these billets. The JDAL does not, however, include all the billets in two other categories, which we labeled Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)–controlled and OSD-controlled. “Externally controlled” manpower is controlled by a specialized provider and is tracked through special accounts. This category includes certain intelligence, theater special operations, Security Assistance Organization (SAO), and Defense Health Program positions. Positions also exist in which naval officers serve with other services.

Slightly over 25 percent of all billets outside the Navy are outside DoD and include permanent billets, to which officers are repetitively assigned (for example, with the U.S. Coast Guard, the Department of State, or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]), and details, in which individual officers serve a full-length assignment

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2DoD (2002) defines the JDAL on p. 230:

Positions designated as joint duty assignments are reflected in a list approved by the Secretary of Defense and maintained by the Joint Staff. The Joint Duty Assignment List is reflected in the Joint Duty Management System.

3Figure 1.1 also lists activities that OSD and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) control. Of the two, the CJCS–controlled activities are more precisely defined. In general CJCS controls the multiservice activities that fall into the gray area of “not OSD, not Joint Staff, not CINC, not Defense Agency, not DoD Field Activity.” Currently, there are four of them: Joint Theater Air Missle Defense Office, Joint Spectrum Center, National Defense University, and Inter-American Defense Board. Others migrated to the CINC level as part of the Defense Reform Initiative. The OSD-controlled activities are less precise, and we use this term to refer to DoD field activities (e.g., Washington Headquarters Services, American Forces Information Service, Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office, DoD Education Activity, DoD Human Resource Activity, Office of Economic Adjustment), and the defense agencies (e.g., the Defense Logistics Agency, the Defense Information Systems Agency, and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service). Certain defense agencies are also designated as combat support agencies.

4DoD, 1998, pp. 2–3, defines a detail as

The assignment of a military member or DoD civilian employee, whose compensation is funded from Defense appropriations, to perform duties in an Agency outside the Department of Defense with the intent of returning to the Department of Defense upon completion of those duties. Details exclude fellowships, scholarships and grants as provided by DoD Directive 1322.6.
but in which the billet is not supposed to be revalidated or filled successively. Each time an officer concludes one of these assignments, a new request must be made and validated if the billet is to continue.

In the process of this research, we found data difficulties quantifying billets external to the Navy. Communications with the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) revealed that historical data are available only for JDAL billets, which we estimate to be about 45 percent of all outside Navy billets. DMDC is developing a new database—the Joint Manpower Management System—to record all future military and civilian billets outside of the four military services. However, this system will not contain any data recorded before its inception, and DMDC has no plans to develop a historical database. Thus, the historical data analysis here is limited to JDAL billets, and our current analyses of non-JDAL billets are approximations based on available data.

**RESEARCH APPROACH**

We used the following primary tools to pursue the work documented here:

- in-person and telephone interviews of military personnel whose experience in and knowledge of military manpower and joint issues were of benefit, including personnel from various joint and naval manpower offices and representatives from external organizations with naval officers assigned
- reviews of relevant published guidance and instructions
- data analysis that included examining the billet structure and inventory composition of the JDAL and calculating historical trends, such as fill rates, by pay grade, community, and command
- quantitative modeling to determine the future ability of the Navy to satisfy the legal constraints for manning JDAs, given current Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) quotas and variations on laws and policies regarding assignment length, percent-
ages of officers in critical occupational specialties (COSs), exceptions permitted, etc.\textsuperscript{5}

\textbf{ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT}

Chapter Two describes the number of external billets and discusses how different kinds of external officer requirements are determined and validated. Chapter Three addresses how billets included on the JDAL are designated. Chapter Four describes how JDAL billets are filled with naval officers, describes the characteristics of the officers assigned to the JDAL, and discusses the Navy’s ability to fill a larger number of joint (JDAL) billets. The final chapter provides concluding observations.

\textsuperscript{5}Special allowances, such as shorter required assignments, are permitted for a limited number of COS officers serving in JDAs.
Chapter Two

DETERMINING AND VALIDATING EXTERNAL NAVAL OFFICER REQUIREMENTS

EXTERNAL OFFICER REQUIREMENTS

For purposes of contrasting levels of outside Navy billets and change over time, we chose to use data consistent with the FY 2002 Navy submission to the President’s budget.\(^1\) There were 3,445 external officer billets in FY 2000, which was a slight decrease from the peak of just over 3,500 in FY 1997.\(^2\) Despite the overall decrease, the number of billets in unified commands has increased (from approximately 1,200 in FY 1994 to over 1,300 in FY 2000) and is the largest portion of the Navy’s external officer requirements.

Neither DoD nor the Navy has a consistent way to count or aggregate external billets. Some of the discrepancies result from the dynamic nature of the systems.\(^3\) However, many of the differences are definitional. For example, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (2000) provides a table of manpower in defense-level activities or accounts, which shows service military manpower committed to a variety of functions, such as treaty enforcement, other federal agency support, and DoD management.

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1. We are indebted to Tom Tannery and MathTech for deriving these data.
2. We do not include Navy officers serving with the Marine Corps in this category.
3. Several data systems and several reports and documents provided counts (and sub-counts) of how many external billets the Navy is required to fill. It is not uncommon to obtain different answers to what appears to be the same question when querying these systems and/or reports. One reason is that data from a real-time system are compared with a report (or data system) that is based on a historical “snapshot.” Manpower and personnel data systems are dynamic: Change is constant, and the changes affect diverse data elements.
However, organizations in this list are different from organizations listed in other sources of data, such as the Navy’s budget submission. Moreover, if one uses internal Navy databases to generate such lists, there is a need to be precise about which units to include in which category of “outside Navy” positions. For example, about 1,250 units are categorized as being in some form of “joint” (outside Navy) organization, of which over 100 are listed as outside DoD. It is not clear that DoD characterizes all these units in the same way. Also, these units can frequently change over time, which makes time trends problematical. Absent a common counting mechanism across DoD, specific data sets can be accurate at a particular time but differ widely over time and from one other. The JDAL is probably the most precise and consistent because it is the most rigorously defined.

HOW NAVY BILLETS ARE DETERMINED, VALIDATED, AND MANAGED

Before reviewing the processes for external billets, we will briefly review the Navy’s processes for internal billets. Five processes are associated with internal officer assignments.

In the manpower determination process, the Navy Manpower Analysis Center and major manpower claimants examine an activity and its mission to determine its need for officers with particular sets of skills. The process for determining officer billets in Navy ships and aviation squadrons (Navy fleet) is top-down and has formalized procedures, yet is heavily influenced by tradition, rules of thumb, and hierarchical considerations. The billets are determined for a class of unit, so that all ships (such as the Aegis cruiser) or all squadrons (say, F/A-18 squadrons) of a particular type will have the same requirements. Determination of Navy shore billets is a bottom-up process in that a claimant (a Navy major command or activity) establishes the need for the billet. The second process consists of the

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Manpower claimants base manpower requirements on an activity’s missions, functions, and tasks. Claimants are responsible for the accuracy of the requirement and vary in how they accomplish this process (e.g., establishing teams, contracting the function out, delegating further). Manpower requirements are supposed to be reviewed and updated as tasking and/or workload change.
ongoing validation of the continuing need for a billet through periodic reviews.

The third element is formal documentation of the requirement in the manpower system through an activity manpower document (AMD). Next, resource sponsors and manpower claimants conduct the Navy's authorization process, in which an office that can allocate appropriate resources must decide whether it can provide an officer.

Finally, because the military "grows" officers, the Navy must manage its inventory of officers to ensure that appropriate numbers of officers with the requisite skills and experience are available. This process actually consists of two distinct management actions: community management (the shaping of the inventory to meet the aggregate needs of all activities) and the assignment (or distribution) of individual officers to fill billets. The Bureau of Naval Personnel performs both management functions for the Navy with the support of a variety of documents and data systems.

In summary, there must be a requirement for an officer, there must be an authorization for an officer, and there must be successful management both of the overall inventory of officers and of individual officers to ensure that all of the Navy's manpower needs, internal and external, are met.

Systemic shortfalls occur for diverse reasons between the determination, validation, and management processes. Simplistically, a

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5By growing officers, we mean to highlight the fact that officers enter the system from the bottom and receive training, education, and experience through duty assignments (or a "career path") that qualify them to fill these kinds of billets.

6For example, for a Navy ship, the mission statement document is the Required Operational Capability/Projected Operational Environment, and the determination document is a Ship Manpower Document, which is entered into the Total Force Manpower Management System (TFMMS). During the authorization process, resource sponsors use the Resource Allocation Display in the Windows Program Analyst's Toolkit system to program the ship's allocation of the total Navy end strength. Major manpower claimants use this display and the Navy Headquarters Budget System to update, in TFMMS, officer billet authorizations in the ship's AMD. During the management process, TFMMS feeds activity authorizations data to the Navy Military Personnel Distribution System, which is used to order officers to the ship. Community managers (and others) also use this system, along with TFMMS and the Officer Programmed Authorizations (OPA) document (which is a snapshot of the total Navy officer authorizations for the current, budget, and Future Years Defense Program years) to manage the inventory of officers.
requirement for officer manpower is a ceiling; the subsequent systems are 100-percent efficient if they meet (man to) the requirement. The authorization process has historically tended to provide approximately 90 percent of requirements on average. The military personnel system also has constraints that inhibit its ability to change the officer workforce as rapidly as changes to the manpower databases can be made.

The rest of this chapter explores the processes for determining external requirements and the validation method and periodicity and generally evaluates the extent to which current processes are perceived as operating in accordance with formal guidance or instruction documents. Some processes are more precise and transparent than others. We focus on the processes for individual billet requirements. Our assessment reviews five types of processes, as illustrated in Figure 2.1. These processes can be contrasted with similar processes outlined earlier for internal Navy officer billets, which are also summarized in Figure 2.1.

We stress that billets are determined and validated, then managed. We consider these processes separately, to emphasize the point that

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7 Among other reasons, legislative and policy constraints by themselves make 100-percent efficiency difficult. There are greater penalties for exceeding the target in the aggregate than for missing it. Moreover, most dynamic systems allow tolerance on both sides of a standard. This system does not; as a result, it seldom meets 100 percent of need.

8 Large-scale change, such as the establishment of new organizations or the eradication of old ones, is infrequent and follows a different but structured process. CJCS Memorandum (CJCSM) 1600.01 describes a process to accommodate large-scale change in the joint environment, which generally results from changes in technology, missions, or the world situation. Joint activities present the proposed changes to the Joint Staff Directorate for Manpower and Personnel (J-1), at which point the services have the opportunity to review the proposed changes and evaluate their ability to support the requirements. The services are expected to support joint requirements and work any such large-scale increases through their Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System processes. If the additional manpower necessary to satisfy the new joint requirements fails to compete successfully in the program objectives memorandum (POM) process, the resource decision process may be implemented. In these instances, the Joint Manpower Validation Board reviews the requesting organizations justifications position by position and starts exploration of alternative resourcing options. Such options might include reallocating existing joint requirements or changing the service mix among joint activities. One option that can be recommended is that the service offset the manpower from other-than-joint requirements.
designating a billet for specialized management (e.g., whether a billet is included on the JDAL) does not necessarily affect its determination and validation. So, a billet that had previously existed and had been filled by an officer might either be added to the JDAL, or a billet could be removed from the list but continue to exist. That change would affect the management of officers assigned to the billet, but the actual existence of the billet does not depend on being recognized on the JDAL.

**STANDARD PROCEDURES APPLY TO MOST EXTERNAL POSITIONS**

We estimate that about two-thirds of all external billets fall under the joint manpower program (JMP), which J-1 administers for the CJCS.9

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9Each joint activity has a JMP, a "document that reflects an activity's mission, functions, organization, current and projected manpower needs and, when applicable, its required mobilization augmentation. A recommended JMP also identifies and justifies any changes proposed by the commander or director of a joint activity for the next five fiscal years." (JP 1-02, as amended through October 15, 2001, p. 231). Unless
CJCS Memorandum 1600.01, Joint Manpower Program Procedures, outlines the standard military manpower requirements determination and validation process used inside the DoD by the unified commands, many of the defense agencies (i.e., those categorized as combat support agencies, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, and the Defense Information Systems Agency), and such CICS-controlled activities as the National Defense University. The process followed is not unlike the Navy shore process discussed above, at least for Navy activities that conduct their own manpower requirements determinations.

The JMP process begins with the Secretary of Defense and the commanders in chief (CINC)s defining the missions, tasks, and functions each joint activity is to perform. From that, the joint activities themselves determine the minimum manpower necessary to accomplish the missions and workload, taking into consideration inter alia the appropriate (1) mix of military and civilian personnel; (2) level of peacetime, wartime, and contingency augmentation; and (3) numbers of active and reserve military personnel, non-U.S. military personnel, and contractors. Joint military requirements should be based on the average workload expected to continue for at least 36 months. Short-term taskings should be supported through augmentation or temporary duty assignments (see below).

In performing an external validation process, J-1 first attempts to meet changes by reallocating resources already included under the JMP and coordinates with the services. Disagreements between joint activities and services on proposed changes that J-1 cannot resolve are handled within the context of meetings of the Joint Strategic Planning System. To support a new or emerging function, joint activities may submit proposed manpower changes to J-1 for approval and coordination with the services, if necessary. Given that the services need sufficient time to undertake personnel or program-

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10 These procedures apply only to portions of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and U.S. Transportation Command. We will discuss jurisdictional issues later, including use of procedures that all must follow. Neither Navy nor CJCS directives apply to certain organizations. Some follow OSD procedures, and some set their own (not unlike the Navy shore process). In this case, the JMP procedures do not apply to theater special operations commands, which SOCOM determines, or to activities funded through transportation working capital.
ming actions, only highly critical changes are permitted during the year of execution. Unified commands may submit proposed changes semiannually, according to a schedule in CJCSM 1600.01, which divides commands into four groups. Defense agencies, however, are permitted to submit change packages once a year, generally in April, and only after any budget issues have been decided.

The current JMP guidelines for these processes are under review. Joint activities and the services have their own procedures for determining requirements, which can engender either mistrust or misunderstanding. The current process lacks the capability to be truly objective in validating joint billets, aside from the possibility of an appeal to a Joint Strategic Planning System meeting. On the one hand, the joint activities perceive that the services are reluctant to agree to additional requirements that they would have to fund. On the other hand, the services contend that the joint activities do not seriously revalidate their requirements and that they move billets within their organizations rather than surrender them when no longer needed.\textsuperscript{11} (The manpower pool for reallocation includes the combatant commands, CJCS-controlled activities, and the Joint Staff, but not the defense agencies.) Normally driven by external directives, such as Secretary of Defense or CJCS decisions, requests for additional joint manpower are incorporated into the affected service’s POM cycle (generally in early December).

Authorized and programmed manpower requirements are documented in the Joint Table of Distribution (JTD), a key component of

\textsuperscript{11}Each joint activity is supposed to revalidate its joint manpower requirements periodically, using a manpower validation board; benchmarking and best practices; or manpower surveys that identify specific organizational tasks, assess the manpower required to accomplish them, analyze the workload distribution, and recommend possible requirements changes. In recognition of the need for a validation mechanism that all major participants consider fair and impartial, the joint manpower community is in the process of developing a system of joint manpower survey teams that would validate the requirements of all the JMP joint activities (and possibly such non-JMP activities as OSD and the Joint Staff) according to a common set of standards. Ideally, these teams would include representatives from OSD, the Joint Staff, the services, and the joint activities. So far, OSD has directed the defense agencies to participate in establishing survey teams, which would probably be incorporated within the existing Combat Support Agency Review Team process, which takes place every four years. For their part, the unified commands have not yet agreed to join the survey team effort. The Navy office involved (N123) expects that the new validation system will begin to operate, at least in part, by fall 2002.
the Joint Manpower and Personnel System (JMPS). JMPS feeds other manpower-related systems, such as the JDAL (described later) and also creates an AMD within the Navy system.

This standard process will be augmented soon with the implementation of the Joint Manpower Resource Offset Process (JMROP), which will associate requirements with the CINCs' missions and, ideally, institute an offset process. The JMROP has been modeled, but it is not clear the extent to which implementation will indeed compel CINCs to obtain their needed manpower from within their own organizations. The JMROP model offers a secondary approach to manpower requirements: A CINC who cannot satisfy manpower needs internally can request and acquire the needed manpower from another CINC before making further requests from the service. Whether JMROP will succeed in institutionalizing a zero-sum approach to joint manpower authorizations will not be apparent until the system is implemented.

STANDARD JMP PROCEDURES DO NOT APPLY TO OTHER EXTERNAL POSITIONS

For approximately one-third of the Navy's external positions—largely in OSD, the defense agencies, and the Joint Staff—standard JMP procedures do not apply. There are a variety of processes for determining billets, not all of which are reviewed here. Some of these processes fall within the JMP framework but are not governed by its specific rules. Generally speaking, the processes are diverse, ranging from straightforward requests to full-blown manpower studies. The processes are not unlike those found within the Navy when looking across the wide diversity of manpower claimants.

For example, manpower for certain specialized programs and defense organizations is allocated, funded, and controlled by resource providers from outside the Navy with limited input from the unified commands and the services. An example of this is National Foreign Intelligence Program positions that are controlled by the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and budgeted by the

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12A sometimes confusing subset of manpower involves reimbursable billets. There are a large number of reimbursable billets, which the Navy cannot usually reallocate but for which its Military Personnel, Navy (MPN) costs are reimbursed.
Director of Central Intelligence. Manpower in SAOs is funded by various foreign nations with which the United States has engaged in treaties of mutual security assistance. CINCs may submit SAO change requests that must be approved by the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Manpower in the Theater Special Operations Commands is funded and determined by SOCOM in coordination with the services. Defense Health Program positions are funded, controlled, and managed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs).\textsuperscript{13}

Other organizations—including OSD, the Joint Staff, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, and the DoD Human Resources Activity—have varying determination and validating processes that are not part of the JMP. An example is the determination and validation processes for OSD. The Director, Administration and Management, OSD reviews all requests for increases in staffing levels and recommends either approval or disapproval to the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The same official also serves as the requirements manager for the Defense Field Activities. The larger defense agencies that are not also combat support agencies have their own manpower manager and processes for billet determination and validation. The next section gives an example of how one of these processes works.

Changes in officer manpower requirements for the Joint Staff are addressed as follows. If CJCS determines that an additional requirement is needed on the Joint Staff, the requirement is forwarded via a letter to the Secretary of Defense. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy (ASDFMP) then evaluates and approves or disapproves the requirement. Upon approval, a program budget decision (PBD) is generated, in or out of cycle, to reflect this new requirement for resourcing by the services. However, a 1996 CJCS memorandum to SECDEF stipulated a zero-growth policy in

\textsuperscript{13}Although the Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) manages the acquisition workforce within DoD, it is not externally controlled or funded. Normal JMP procedures are employed to make changes to acquisition positions, but the services and defense agencies are expected to coordinate proposed acquisition changes with their respective directors of acquisition career management to ensure that their workforces have appropriate opportunities for education, training, and career development (see DoD, 1991a).
Joint Staff billets, and this process has not changed. Internal redistribution of officers on the Joint Staff is based on the needs of CJCS. Each month J-1 develops a Joint Staff distribution plan, which reflects internal changes, and transmits it to the services to update their billet files and AMDs.

Another way DoD components (e.g., OSD, the Joint Staff, CJCS, unified and specified commands, and the Inspector General of the DoD) can increase their requirements for service personnel is by establishing, according to DoD Directive (DoDD) 5100.81, DoD support activities (DSAs), which are organizational components including any number of officer billets to which the services are required to provide support (DoD, 1991b). The responsibility for the initial approval of DSAs, as well as periodic review to evaluate any continuing requirement for the DSAs, rests within OSD. The Defense Reform Initiative eliminated existing activities of this type, but the provisions to create them still remain.

Different requirements processes exist for the Navy personnel assigned to many permanent positions outside DoD. Permanent outside-DoD billets include those with other departments or agencies of the U.S. government, such as the departments of State, Justice, and Energy. In other cases, U.S. officers are serving in permanent billets with the armed forces or governments of other nations, with the United Nations, or on Capitol Hill.\footnote{Some permanent external assignments could be considered interagency and international assignments, as defined and discussed in Thie, Harrell, and Emmerichs (1999).}

One example of permanent, outside-DoD billets is the Navy’s Personnel Exchange Program, which is a one-to-one exchange program involving U.S. Navy personnel (officers and career-designated petty officers), foreign military personnel, and other U.S. service personnel.\footnote{Though the Navy billet (and officer) is in an external activity, an officer from the other nation or service is assigned in a Navy activity. For example, by flying Royal Navy aircraft, a U.S. Navy pilot is filling a Royal Navy billet; concurrently, a Royal Navy pilot is assigned to a U.S. Navy squadron, thus filling the corresponding U.S. Navy billet.} According to Naval Operations Instruction 5700.7G, each exchange position is established after a service study, and a service-to-service agreement normally defines the concept, details of administration, and quality of personnel for the exchange positions. To the
extent possible, Personnel Exchange Program personnel are assigned billets within authorized manpower requirements. The program objective is to integrate participating personnel into the host organization as though they belonged to the service to which they are assigned. Negotiations with foreign military services and other U.S. military services and the completion of agreements defining the concepts and details of each exchange position are the responsibility of the Chief of Naval Personnel.

Another example of officers serving in permanent positions outside the Navy are those assigned to NATO. A regularized process, described in CJCSM 1600.01, governs the majority of personnel permanently assigned to NATO military commands and agencies. Overall national manpower requirements—including duty title, service, and grade—are reflected in NATO’s Peacetime Establishment, Emergency Establishment, and Memoranda of Understanding for Multinational Force Headquarters and Principal Subordinate Commands. These documents require CJCS approval, after coordination with the CINCs and the services. Once accepted, the resulting personnel authorizations are incorporated in the services’ manpower documents and funded by them. The Joint Staff must review changes to the total number of officers or changes that migrate officers from one service to another, as well as changes involving manpower from more than one service or high-ranking officer positions.

Another type of process is the support provided to organizations managed by other services, such as the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences and the Military Postal Service Agency. The demand for billets in this non-JMP category is rather limited.

In general, for these non-JMP processes, as we show in Figure 2.1, the activity head determines the need for a billet. Unless the Navy challenges the billet, it will not usually be subject to an external validation process. Most of these billets will be documented on AMDs; some will not because no permanent requirement exists. Neither will some be recognized in the Officer Personnel Authorization, for the same reason. If not documented, the billet might still be resourced through custom, long-standing practice or consistently with direction from senior personnel.
OTHER MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS PROCESSES

This section briefly reviews three other processes: (1) details outside DoD, (2) temporary assignments to JTFs, and (3) informal assignments. Positions in the last group can be inside or outside DoD and are usually under the purview of a senior officer who agrees to the arrangement. These three processes, especially the latter two, are more about management of officers than about formal determination and validation. Additional processes, which represent small numbers of billets and are not discussed here, include Intergovernmental Personnel Act personnel; classified external requirements; various fellowship programs, such as the Secretary of Defense Fellows; and assorted exchange programs, such as those with the Department of State, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, with other services, or with foreign militaries.

Outside-DoD Details

Outside-DoD details result from external requests for the Navy to fill individual positions and are revalidated with each request for an officer to fulfill that opportunity. A largely ad hoc requirements process exists for the relatively small number of Navy personnel (estimated at 300) detailed to non-DoD agencies, such as the White House, Department of Energy, Department of State, and the Coast Guard. According to DoDD 1000.17 (DoD, 1998b), three basic criteria must be met before non-DoD personnel requests can be filled. First, the request must pertain to a specific project of predetermined duration. Second, DoD personnel must be uniquely qualified for the project. Third, the detail must further the interests of the DoD.

All requests (either new positions or extensions) to detail DoD personnel to a non-DoD agency must be staffed through the OSD for an approval decision. The Navy also considers the best interest of the individual and of the Navy when considering whether to man a detail request. Approximately half the requests are rejected. In some small number of cases, pragmatic considerations ensure that some requests are filled even when it is not clear whether the request is in the best interests of the individual and the service. Upon the completion of an officer’s tour of duty in these temporary details, the receiving organization must reinitiate the request process to revalidate the billet and receive another officer. Many billets are not
revalidated, but some details are so consistently renewed that they could almost be considered "permanent" positions. While the directive pertaining to details (DoDD 1000.17) states that DoD compensates personnel serving in a detail, in practice, the requesting agency must pay for most details (DoD, 1998b). Nonreimbursable details are permitted only when the greatest benefit of the detail rests with the DoD or when the officer is formally assigned to a Navy organization. Essentially, this is a short-term manpower request that cannot be addressed in future programs. As such, the validation process does not include the resource sponsor. The short-term nature of the authorization meets distribution management but is normally too short to affect the management of the inventory of (applicable) officers of this type.

**JTFs and Other Temporary Duty**

Temporary duty requirements for directed operations are mostly, but not entirely, JTF operations. These temporary requirements are determined and filled by the Individual Augmentation Process outlined in CJCS Instruction 1301.01B (CJCS, 2001a). The process begins when a mission is assigned to a supported CINC, who, in turn, determines force requirements for that mission and tasks service component commands (or SOCOM via the Theater Special Operations Command) to identify and assign individuals to meet the requirements. The supported unified command J-1 and its service component counterpart both validate temporary duty requirements.

If the service component lacks sufficient individuals to fill the requirements, the service headquarters is tasked to do so. The service headquarters will first attempt to meet the requirement with internal service assets, whether they be active duty, reserve, or DoD civilian personnel. In the Navy's case, N-123 works with Naval Reserve Forces (N-095) to divide requirements fairly and to ensure

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16 DoD (2002) defines JTF on p. 240 as a "joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing JTF commander."

17 According to Naval Operations staff (N-123), European Command and Central Command are the biggest requesters of personnel for temporary duty assignments from the Navy, but this may be because Pacific Command (PACOM) has a larger service component to absorb such requests.
that they are filled. These organizations first attempt to find volunteers. If that does not work, N-123 attempts to determine which Navy component command is best manned to support the requirement and then task it.

If the service headquarters cannot fill a requirement from internal service assets, it will identify the organization (combatant command service components, CINC staffs, defense agency) best able to fill the requirement. The service will then notify the organization (supported or supporting CINC’s service component or defense agency) of the requirement to fill the position; if necessary, these organizations may reclama to CJCS. CJCS will then work with the service and the organization assigned to fill the position to resolve the issue. In reality, such a reclama is rarely, if ever, made, and the services almost always honor CINC requirements for temporary duty personnel.

How many of these requirements does the Navy have to fill? Over the last two years, the Navy has filled between 30 and 50 such officer billets monthly. Data indicate that reservists fill the majority of these billets. Of those positions filled by active duty personnel, about half are volunteers while the other half have been designated to perform duty by the tasked command.

Procedures for filling United Nations or NATO temporary duty requirements of the combatant commands are the same as above. However, the Secretary of Defense or his designee must approve augmentation support before individuals are assigned.

**Informal**

While the process for outside-DoD details formally applies to all temporary details outside the DoD, an unquantified number of outside-DoD details appear not to be subject to this process, for unclear reasons. This assertion is supportable with anecdotes about particular officers serving outside DoD but not appearing on the list of outside-DoD details. While we cannot identify the specific process, it appears likely that these officers are probably formally assigned to an internal organization but are informally “detached” to such organizations as the OSD and other staffs for short or long periods. Navy officials estimate that there are at most several hundred such billets, but the total ebbs and flows over time. It is also likely
that similar practices exist internal to the Navy whereby one activity assigns, or is directed to assign, an officer (or several) for a short period of time to another activity.
INTRODUCTION TO GOLDWATER-NICHOLS

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 directed a broad range of organizational and functional changes to improve the ability of the services to carry out joint military operations. The main objectives of the law were to

1. increase the quality of officers in joint assignments
2. ensure that officers are not disadvantaged by joint service
3. ensure that general and flag officers are well-rounded in joint matters
4. enhance the stability and increase the joint experience of officers in joint assignments
5. enhance the education of officers in joint matters and strengthen the focus of professional military education in preparing officers for JDAs.

These objectives play an important role in assessing how many officers can be joint because they set the boundaries for assessing sup-

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1This background section has been excerpted, in large part, from the authors' previous work, Harrell et al. (1996).

2Title IV of the act contains the personnel-related provisions, including management policies, promotion objectives, and education and experience requirements for officers in JDAs. The major provisions of Title IV are contained in Chapter 38 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code.
portability within current law and policy. Any suggested changes to law and policy must be within the framework of the Goldwater-Nichols objectives.

Key provisions in the act directed the Secretary of Defense to develop a definition of a JDA and to publish a JDAL. This list includes the positions at organizations outside the individual services that address issues involving multiple services or other nations and in which an assigned officer will gain “significant experience in joint matters.” The existence of this list underlies the requirements and objectives of the law: If such a list did not exist to identify joint positions, there would be no way to measure or ensure that the objectives were being met.

To achieve the first two objectives, the law included certain “protections,” which took the form of promotion-rate comparisons. The law specified that the promotion rate be as follows:

- Officers holding the designation of joint specialty officer (JSO) should average at least as high as the average of officers in the same service and competitive group who were serving or had served on the service headquarters staff.\(^3\)
- Officers who were serving on, or had served on, the Joint Staff should meet the same standard.\(^4\)
- Officers who were serving in, or had served in, other JDAs should average at least as high as the servicewide average for officers in the same service and competitive group.

The law requires that the Secretary of Defense provide a report to Congress, at least semiannually, on the promotion rates of officers in the various categories outlined above. If the promotion rates fail to meet the legal objectives, the secretary must provide information on specific failures and describe actions or plans to prevent future failures.

\(^3\)The JSO designation remains with an officer throughout his or her career, regardless of whether he or she is currently serving in a joint billet.

\(^4\)By policy, officers who were serving in or had served in OSD should also meet this standard.
The third objective pertains to general and flag officers. To ensure that they are well-rounded in joint matters, the law requires general and flag officers to complete a JDA before being promoted to the grade of O-7. Furthermore, many suitable positions on the JDAL are designated as critical billets. The law requires that these critical positions be filled by JSOs who have not only completed a prior joint tour but have also completed JPME. The requirement of a prior joint tour before promotion to O-7 and the need to ensure that the promotion objectives are met require careful management of officer careers and of the officers assigned to JDAs. Service personnel managers must identify all officers with a chance of promotion to general or flag rank and ensure they have a joint tour. Also, managers must select officers for assignment to JDAs such that the “quality” officers are shared between the services and the joint world.

Objectives four and five are addressed with the “50 percent” rule of Goldwater-Nichols, which requires that at least half the positions on the JDAL above the grade of O-3 be filled by JSOs or officers nominated as JSOs. These officers are to have special joint education and repeated tours in the joint environment.

The original implementation of Goldwater-Nichols, and the one that is still being used today, applied a broad-brush approach. Joint duty consideration is limited to pay grades above O-3. All such positions in some organizations (OSD, the Joint Staff, and the unified commands) are placed on the JDAL, while half of the positions in defense agencies are placed on the list. The law specifically prohibits positions in service organizations from receiving joint duty credit. The original implementation led to a list of approximately 8,300 positions designated as JDAs.

**CONCERNS ABOUT GOLDWATER-NICHOLS**

The initial implementation of Goldwater-Nichols led numerous organizations to raise concerns. The defense agencies expressed

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5Goldwater-Nichols created the JSO classification to ensure a pool of officers with joint education and experience. Although several paths lead to the designation, the majority of JSOs have completed their JPME, Phase II, and then a joint duty tour. Their service selects them for the designation, and the Secretary of Defense approves it. JSO nominees have completed JPME and are currently serving their first joint tour.
their concern that only half of their positions would qualify for joint billets, when all the positions in other organizations were on the JDAL. The services felt that certain “in-service” positions had a joint content and should be considered for the JDAL. Finally, examples were noted of positions on the Joint Staff or the unified commands (where all positions above the grade of O-3 were granted joint duty credit) that had little or no joint content.

The services also expressed their concerns about meeting the various constraints and promotion objectives the law specifies. They felt it was difficult to qualify a sufficient number of officers to meet the “50 percent” rule. They also found it hard to manage their “quality” officers to ensure that sufficient numbers served in joint duty positions. The dual issues of developing JSOs and managing quality officers to meet certain promotion objectives are the two predominant problems that constrain service support of positions on the JDAL.

During the ensuing years, some minor modifications were made—such as a reduction in the tour length of JDAs— but the basic stipulations of the law remain as originally written. The designation of positions that qualify for joint duty has also remained constant over the several years since the JDAL was first published.

Recent reductions in military personnel strength have also exacerbated the problems the services face. The personnel demands of joint organizations have grown, while the number of officers available to meet those demands has decreased. As a result, service personnel managers assert that they find it increasingly difficult to “share” their high-quality officers between the joint and service worlds.

DETERMINING AND VALIDATING THE JDAL

Managing JDAL billets—including determining and validating the positions that are included on the list and determining assignment policies—can be considered separately from establishing officer

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6Title IV initially specified that JDA tours average at least three-and-one-half years for field-grade officers and at least three years for general and flag officers. These tour lengths were later amended to three years for field-grade officers and two years for general and flag officers.
requirements. Said another way, in some circumstances a billet may be added to (or deleted from) the JDAL without changing the number of requirements; the billet remains, but whether the officer receives joint credit has been reversed. In other situations, such as when all billets in an organization (OSD, the Joint Staff, or combatant commands) are on the JDAL, any billet added to the JDAL represents a newly created requirement.

However, given this disconnect, we chose to discuss how the JDAL is determined and validated separately from our earlier discussion of validation of external requirements. The Joint Officer Management Program, described in DoDD 1300.19 (DoD, 1997) and DoD Instruction 1300.20 (DoD, 1996), refers to positions both inside and outside DoD, much as the JDAL includes positions both inside and outside DoD.

Joint activities submit JDAL change proposals through the CJCS to the JDAL Validation Board. In preparation for the review, activities and positions are divided into several categories. The first set of categories includes OSD, the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, NATO, and the North American Aerospace Defense Command. The second set of categories includes the defense agencies, as well as activities outside DoD. J-1 then screens each change proposal to ensure that it meets basic legal and policy requirements, and the JDAL Validation Board votes on the proposed changes. Finally, the ASD(FMP) accepts or rejects the changes, based on the Board’s recommendations and notifies joint activities of its decisions.

The Joint Staff J-1 is charged with making the necessary adjustments—additions and deletions—in the JDAL and the Joint Duty Assignment Management Information System (JDAMIS), based on information received from the various joint activities and any changes OSD approves. JMAPS interfaces with the JDAL, providing data on JDAs for activities within the JMP. Data from non-JMP activities are incorporated into the JDAL separately. The JDAMIS

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7The eight voting members of the JDAL Validation Board are general or flag officers or the civilian equivalent. Each service designates one member; the Director, Joint Staff, designates two from the Office of CJCS; and ASD(FMP) designates two from OSD. The secretary may also have another OSD "nonvoting" representative serve as an activity expert. Representatives from OSD and the Joint Staff cochair the board (CJCS, 1998, p. II-4).
includes automated files reflecting the approved JDAL, as well as personnel data on officers who are JSOs or JSO nominees and other officers who have served or are serving in JDA positions or have completed or are attending a program of joint education (PIE).

J-1’s final responsibilities are to publish and distribute the JDAL and to provide data for the Joint Officer Management Annual Report to Congress.
This chapter characterizes the fill rates for internal and external organizations and provides a detailed examination of JDAL billets. The analysis of JDAL billets compares the Navy to other services, analyzes the Navy requirements and inventory by common descriptors, shows historic fill rates, and identifies the JDAs most and least likely to be filled. The intent of this chapter is to identify trends and patterns. While some of these trends deserve additional analysis to ascertain the source or cause of the behavior, that analysis exceeded the scope of this effort.

NAVY MANNING SUPPORT FOR EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS

The chapter begins by showing the levels of fill for internal and external organizations. It then discusses some of the complexities surrounding the detailing process. This section of the chapter concludes with a discussion of the lack of policy guidance for external billets.

Level of Fill

Overall, the data suggest that the Navy staffs external organizations at levels similar to those of internal ones, but that there is a range of fill rates across organizations. As of June 2001, some organizations (e.g., Naval District Washington, D.C., OSD, the Joint Staff) have fill rates above 100 percent of billets authorized. Other organizations
fall much lower in priority, and more organizations appear to be undermanned than overmanned. Of note is that similar organizations can have very different manning rates. For example, as of June 2001, SOCOM and Southern Command were both manned at 98.7 percent (75 officers assigned against a total of 76 billets); Central Command was manned at 95.6 percent (65 officers against 68 billets); European Command was manned at 93.7 percent (119 officers against 127 billets); and PACOM was manned only at 81.5 percent (88 officers against 108 billets). Variation also occurs among internal organizations; for example, CINC Atlantic Fleet, was fairly well manned, at 98.7 percent fill, but CINC Pacific Fleet had only 88.2 percent of manning in this snapshot.

**Challenges of the Detailing Process**

Placement officers in the Navy’s PERS 4 organization monitor the manning of the unified CINCs, and are considered the CINCs’ advocates in the detailing process. Their responsibility is to ensure the unified CINCs are manned with the right individuals, on time, and with the correct training. These personnel coordinate with the staffs of the unified commands to meet their Navy manpower needs. Numerous factors and trade-offs influence the detailing of officers to external commands or internal Navy assignments. CINC staffs are aware of naval officer manning challenges but are concerned that they are not manned equally. Lack of parity stems from a need for policy guidance in the detailing process to apportion fair share of officers among the CINCs.

Challenges to the assignment process include the fact that the CINCs have varied needs for officers by designator and by grade. For example, as compared with other CINCs, Strategic Command (STRATCOM) has a relatively large number of billets authorized for submarine officers. The challenge here is that as submarine officers graduate from JPME, many return to sea duty. With a limited number of submarine officers available to be spread among the CINCs and with STRATCOM already “owning” a large share of the authorized billets, the Navy must consider the best use of the next available submarine officer. Should he be assigned to a command “heavy” with submarine officers or to a CINC staff with a relatively smaller number? The CINC can argue that this officer, with his warfare
expertise, will have a bigger impact at the CINC’s command than at a command with a larger concentration of submarine officers. Further, both CINCs and Navy commands can make the same argument for all warfare designated officers.

Other detailing factors affecting CINC officer manning include the size of the CINC’s staff relative to those of other CINCs, as well as the direct involvement of flag officers in achieving the manpower needs of their commands. CINCs are aware of the manning levels within other staffs. If a given unified command’s manning is not at the notional level, naval officer detailers are contacted to remedy this. Raising the manning level to a notional percentage will require more than a few officers for a larger command but will require just a few for a smaller command. Placement officers also make subjective judgments of where an officer will have the biggest effect on readiness. One primary factor considered, as the earlier discussion of submarine officer placement illustrates, is whether all the warfare specialties for which there are requirements are represented.

Detailing is a complex process of putting the right person in the right billet at the right time. Some commands have the added advantage of being in a desirable location with all the right amenities (good schools, affordable housing, base facilities, etc.). Detailing requires constantly balancing the needs of the Navy and the needs of the individual. Therefore, manning differences within unified CINCs result from the dynamic need for a specific type of officer, the availability of such officers, and the personal desires of individual officers.

The effects on any external organization of having less than 100 percent officer manning will vary by grade and the relative decrease in manning percentage. If a “high-visibility,” high-quality (post major command) O-6-level position is “gapped” (one officer has left and his or her successor has not yet arrived) or left vacant, a joint command may ask another service to fill the position. Such joint command “workarounds” may result in the Navy potentially losing experience and influence in these senior positions. To accommodate manning shortfalls in other assignments, personnel who are already on board may have to work more shifts and/or have increased workloads.
Standard Assignment Policy Absent

There is no consistent policy or standard on how to man CINC staffs. Without a Navy Manning Plan to apportion fair shares to each internal or external command, each manning decision is made in isolation and means a new fight for each fill. Navy detailers have competing demands from internal and external commands for warfare specialists and are responsible for manning Navy command and fleet headquarters and type commanders. Because detailing officers tend to be from the same community as the officers they assign, an institutional bias exists toward detailing officers to community headquarters. Faced with a detailing decision on where to place naval officers and without a consistent unified CINC manning policy, the system tends to default to sending the officer to an internal Navy command. There may be more internal Navy pressures to maintain Navy staffs on par with each other.

The implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act keeps a steady stream of officers to OSD, the Joint Staff, and unified CINCs, but, institutionally, the Navy does not support joint assignments as well as the Air Force and the Army do. In the Navy, except for the few JSOs, joint duty is viewed as an assignment away from one’s warfare specialty and from the Navy and as a limit on an officer’s use to the Navy. On the other hand, the Air Force appears to value a joint assignment more and will more readily provide officers “out of hide” to a joint duty billet.

NAVY MANAGEMENT OF JDAL BILLETS

The process for creating and filling JDAL positions was described earlier. This section

- compares Navy positions to other service positions in the aggregate over time
- analyzes the Navy requirements by common descriptors (e.g., grade, designator, and command or agency)
- analyzes Navy inventory by similar descriptors
- matches individual officers with individual positions to show fill rates
- describes attributes of positions that make them more or less likely to be filled.
To do this, we obtained from the DMDC information on every position that has been on the JDAL since inception for all services and, for the Navy alone, information on all officers ever assigned to such positions. We manipulated these data to create the portrayals below.

**Navy Compared with Other Services**

At the JDAL’s inception in October 1986, the list contained about 1,750 Navy positions; by October 1988, this had grown 14 percent to slightly over 2,000 positions. The size of the Navy list then reversed course, decreasing by about 9 percent to about 1,825 positions in September 1991. Over a three-year period ending in October 1995, the list grew again by 14 percent. The list has since fluctuated up and down by no more than 3 percent and currently stands at about 2,050 officers. Figure 4.1 shows how the size of the Navy’s portion of the JDAL varied from October 1986 through August 2001.

The other services had similar ups and downs in their shares of the JDAL, as shown in Figures 4.2 and 4.3. Figure 4.2 portrays the data by numbers, and Figure 4.3 shows by percentage.

The establishment of STRATCOM in June 1992 saw the addition of primarily Air Force and some Navy billets to the JDAL. What appears to be a drop in Army positions in Figure 4.3 is simply the change in the Army’s percentage share of the JDAL as the Air Force and Navy shares grew. The Army and Air Force have greater shares of the JDAL because they have more officers than the Navy and Marine Corps.
Figure 4.1—Navy Positions on JDAL.
Figure 4.2—Service Positions on JDAL.
Figure 4.3—Percentage of JDAL for Each Service
Another point of comparison is whether the Navy has a higher or lower percentage of the JDAL with respect to the size of the officer corps most likely to be on the JDAL in each service. Figure 4.4 provides the answer. The Navy has 22 percent of the JDAL, and Navy has 25 percent of all O-4 to O-10 officers in the DoD. The ratio in Figure 4.4 compares the content of the JDAL with the percentage of DoD officers in grades O-4 to O-10 in each service. In essence, if a service had exactly the same proportion of JDAL billets as it did of all officers in grades of O-4 to O-10, the ratio would be 1; if continual adjustments were made to keep representation proportional, the ratio would stay at 1. The calculated ratio that has the Navy below 1 for the 15-year period means that the Navy has fewer JDAL billets than its content of O-4 to O-10. Therefore, it should be easier for the Navy to meet JDAL commitments than for either the Army or Air Force because the Navy has a greater pool of such officers compared to the joint requirement for them. On the other hand, proportionally more Army and Air Force O-4 to O-10 officers will have joint experience.

It is also instructive to look at various breakouts of the JDAL across the services by type of position. Figure 4.5 presents data for a recent month. The Navy has about 22 percent of all JDAL billets. This percentage increases from O-4 to O-6, starts low at O-7 again, and increases to O-10. As we shall see below, these most-senior positions fluctuate more widely over time because of their small numbers. We also examined nominative, permanent, and rotational JDAL positions at the grade of O-6, and all exceed the Navy average.

A consistent pattern emerges when examined over time. Of all O-4 to O-6 positions on the JDAL, the Navy has more than its average share of the JDAL at grade O-6 and less at grades O-4 and O-5, as shown in Figure 4.6.
Figure 4.4—Ratio of JDAL Percentage to Percentage of Service O-4 to O-10
Figure 4.5—Navy Share of JDAL (August 2001)
Figure 4.6—Navy Share of JDAL, O-4 to O-6
This is not the case for the most-senior positions. From 1985 to 1995, the Navy share of these positions exceeded the Navy average for all positions. Before and after that period, the pattern is similar, as shown in Figure 4.7. Navy O-7 billets are less than the Navy average; the other grades are higher.

Last, we examined the Navy share of the JDAL O-6 billets for selected commands and staffs for a recent month of data, as shown in Figure 4.8. Figure 4.6 indicated that the Navy has an average of 24 percent of the joint O-6 billets, but Figure 4.8 indicates that the Navy does not have a constant 24 percent of O-6 billets at all joint organizations. Rather, the Navy is somewhat underrepresented among O-6 billets at the CINC's and somewhat overrepresented at OSD and the Joint Staff. Among the CINC's, Navy O-6 billets for this month are overrepresented at Joint Forces Command, Space Command, and Strategic Command and underrepresented at the others.

Many perceive that the numbers of external, especially joint, positions, are increasing. Figure 4.9 indicates that JDAL billets have increased over time as a percentage of all Navy billets. The percentage increased through 1995 because the number of Navy officers was decreasing faster than the number of Navy JDAL billets did. However, this chart also indicates that the relative size of the Navy portion of the JDAL, compared to overall Navy billets, has largely stabilized since 1993. The total relative increase has been only slightly more than 1 percent since 1986, or about 300 officers over the 15-year period. Many of these increases were new billets but the movement of existing billets from non-JDAL status to JDAL status, as in the case of STRATCOM.

In fact, the JDAL is not static. Figure 4.10 indicates that the JDAL history actually includes a pattern of both additions and deletions of billets, with cumulative net increases over time. Since 1995, there have been fluctuations of up to 100 positions, but the present size is about the same as it was in 1995. JDAL billets currently represent 3.7 percent of naval officer end strength.
Figure 4.7—Navy Share of JDAL, O-7 to O-10
Figure 4.8—Navy Share of JDAL for O-6, August 2001
Figure 4.9—IDAL as a Percentage of Naval Officer Billets
Figure 4.10—JDAL Starts and Stops
Composition of Navy Positions on the JDAL by Grade and Designator

Figures 4.5 and 4.6 showed the Navy share of the JDAL by grade. We now examine the JDAL by grade and designator, looking only at the Navy billets. Figure 4.11 shows the content of the Navy portion of the JDAL, by grade over time.\(^1\) When the list was first established, most positions were at the grade of O-5 (39 percent), with grades O-4 and O-6 constituting 35 percent and 22 percent, respectively. Since that time, grade O-6 has trended down to about 19 percent of the list. Grade O-5 has fluctuated slightly over the years but still has 39 percent of the list, while grade O-4 has steadily increased, also to 39 percent of the list. Thus, of the positions the Navy is supposed to fill, more are at grade O-4 than at O-6. It is not clear whether this has implications. One could speculate that it may be easier to qualify officers as JSO nominees if they are nominated earlier in their careers. On the other hand, the change in O-6 billets may mean that it is less likely that an officer will serve as a JSO and also less likely that the Navy will be well-represented by senior officers in the joint organizations.

The ten designators shown in Figure 4.12 account for slightly more than 90 percent of the Navy JDAL. Of the ten, 1000 and 1050 positions account for 36 percent of the JDAL; the 1050 positions increased from 15 to 19 percent over the period, while the 1000 positions fell from 19 to 17 percent.\(^2\) Because these designators do not specify the kind of warfare or special-duty officer required, we consider these to be “undesignated positions.” Intelligence and submarine officer billets have increased over time, while the Supply Corps has decreased.\(^3\)

\(^1\)We have excluded flag grades, which constituted about 3 percent of the list in 1986 and 2 percent currently. With rounding, the total is slightly less than 100 percent.

\(^2\)Before proceeding with a discussion of manning gaps, we believe it is important to establish how we analytically address Navy billets that are not directly associated with officers of a particular designator. Although most Navy billet descriptions identify the particular kind of officer that should fill the billet, there is considerably more leeway in determining which officers are assigned to 1000 and 1050 billets. 1000 billets can be filled either by any URL or any URL special duty officer (URL/SD); 1050 billets can only be filled by a URL qualified warfighter.

\(^3\)We have excluded from this analysis the small number of limited duty officer (LDO) positions that could be associated with certain communities.
Figure 4.11—Distribution of Navy JDAL Positions by Grade
Figure 4.12—Distribution of Navy JDAL Positions by Designator
Naval Officers Assigned to JDAL Positions

Previous sections analyzed Navy billets on the JDAL. This section discusses the aggregate inventory of naval officers that have been assigned to JDAL billets. Figure 4.13 shows the percentage of potential fill of total positions, and Figure 4.14 shows the composition of the assigned inventory by grade. Some caution is needed with respect to aggregate data. We label the data as potential fill because aggregate data do not indicate whether an individual is correctly assigned by grade or designator. Also, if a position has overlap, more than one officer is potentially being used against one position. Later in this section, we will show fill rates for individual officers assigned to specific billets. The data shown here account for all assigned officers and thus represent maximum potential fill if all officers were assigned to only one billet each.

Assignments appear to have stabilized around October 1988. Since then, in general, only enough Navy officers have been assigned to JDAL positions to fill between 80 and 90 percent of Navy JDAL billets at any given time.

The grade composition of assigned officers changed significantly after October 1995 (Figure 4.14); the potential fill percentage subsequently increased. Before then, O-5 officers accounted for about 40 percent of the inventory, O-4 officers for about 28 percent, and O-6s for about 23 percent. Between October 1995 and October 1998, O-5 composition increased significantly and then dropped to 32 percent. O-6 composition similarly increased and then decreased to about 18 percent. Conversely, O-4 composition dropped as low as 25 percent before rising to about 42 percent at the present. Over the entire period, O-3 composition drifted down from 10 percent to about 7 percent. At the aggregate level, it is unclear why these changes occur.

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4About 100 officers in grade O-3 are filling higher-graded positions.
Figure 4.13—Potential Fill Percentage of Navy JDAL Positions
Figure 4.14—Grade Composition of Assigned Navy Inventory
Because almost all the officers serving in JDAL positions are in grades O-4 to O-6, this analysis focuses on these grades. Table 4.1 summarizes officer representation (O-4 to O-6) for selected designators relevant to the JDAL. For example, the table indicates that aviators represent 23.6 percent of all officers in grades O-4 to O-6, and 42.5 percent of officers in these grades who are eligible to serve in billets coded 1000. This table serves as a basis of comparison to determine whether officers are assigned to joint positions relative to their proportionate representation.

Figure 4.15 shows the percentage distribution of officers serving on the JDAL by designator. Approximately one-third of all officers assigned to JDAL positions are aviators, while only 13 to 14 percent of Navy JDAL positions require aviators (Figure 4.12). Surface warfare

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designator</th>
<th>Percentage of Naval Officers</th>
<th>Percentage of 1000 Eligible Officers</th>
<th>Percentage of 1050 Eligible Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aviator (130x, 131x, and 132x)</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>52.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface Warfare Officer (111x)</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarine (112x)</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Warfare/Ops (113x and 114x)</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Duty Officer*</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleet Support (113x and 114x)</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Table includes only designators from which all officers qualify. We recognize that small numbers of officers from other communities can serve in 1000 and 1050 billets. For example, in September 2000, 99 percent of 1000 billets and 94 percent of 1050 billets were filled with officers from the designators listed. The remaining billets were filled by LDOs, supply officers, engineering duty officer, and Medical Service Corps. Some of these individuals likely received a warfare qualification before they transferred to a different designator.

*Special Duty Officers include restricted line designators 161x, 162x, 163x, 165x, 166x, 167x, 169x, and 180x.
officers are the second largest group and have decreased slightly over time to about 18 percent. Submarine and Fleet Support have increased over time, while Supply Corps has decreased. The eight designators shown account for over 90 percent of assigned officers.

Aviators are assigned to a large share of both 1000 and 1050 undesignated billets, consistent with their share of the population. Figure 4.16 shows the officers by primary designator assigned to 1000 billets, and Figure 4.17 shows the officers by primary designator assigned to 1050 billets. The large number of aviators assigned to these billets accounts for the fact that the overall inventory of aviators assigned against the JDAL greatly exceeds the specific billets for aviators. Yet the number is proportionate to the representation of aviators among all officers eligible to serve in 1000 and 1050 billets. It is not clear, however, that proportionate assignment to 1000 and 1050 billets is actually appropriate. For example, enough aviators may receive credit for joint duty through other types of assignments to produce sufficient aviators eligible for promotion to flag rank, one of the goals of such service. Since it is expensive to develop and compensate aviators, reducing the overall demand for them has the potential for significant cost savings. One way the Navy might manage its manpower resources to achieve this would be by assigning fewer aviators to 1000 and 1050 billets on the JDAL.
Figure 4.15—Designator Composition of Assigned Inventory
Figure 4.16—Primary Designators of Officers Assigned to 1000 Positions
Figure 4.17—Primary Designators of Officers Assigned to 1050 Positions
Anomalies in the Data. The aggregate data for the Navy mask two interesting stories with respect to the management of the JDAL process that do show up when inventory is matched to particular positions. Figure 4.18 shows inventory, i.e., individual officers, who cannot be matched to a position. In the first case, it appears that JDAL, like any new system, had startup inefficiencies. It took approximately four years to get all officers matched to particular positions, with the inefficiency declining rapidly over the four-year period. In the second case, in the early 1990s, a number of officers were all assigned to one position. Anecdotally, this was apparently a workaround during Desert Shield/Desert Storm to accommodate the officers added for that operation.

Fill Rates of Navy Positions

In this subsection, we match individual officers to particular billets to determine fill rates. We allow only one officer to be in one position in each period.

Total and Grade Fill Since October 1986. Figure 4.19 shows the total fill of all billets and the fill of billets in grades O-4, O-5, and O-6. Here and in the following charts, we calculated the percentages by dividing the number of months that someone filled the position, irrespective of whether the attribute is perfectly matched, by the sum of all positions in all months since October 1986 for the given attribute. So, for example, Figure 4.19 shows that all possible position-months were filled by an officer about 78 percent of the time. The O-6 positions were filled by an officer of some grade about 76 percent of the time. On average, the Navy fills slightly less than 80 percent of JDAL positions with better fill for O-4 positions than for O-6 positions. Said another way, about 20 percent of all validated positions on the JDAL are vacant at any given time.

Designator Fill Since October 1986. Figure 4.20 indicates that, compared to the average total fill rate of 78 percent, designator fill rates vary from 74 percent (URL/SD billets) to 83 percent (Supply Corps, Submarine). Also note that fill rates do not appear to swing widely by designator.
Figure 4.18—Data Anomalies
Figure 4.19—Percentage of Fill, Total and by Grade
(October 1986–August 2001)
Figure 4.20—Percentage of Fill, Total and by Designator
(October 1986–August 2001)
**Fill by Grade and Designator Since October 1986.** Another way to look at the data is by grade for all designators or by designator for all grades. Figure 4.21 presents the first view. More distinct differences are observable. Supply Corps at grade O-4 and Submarine at grades O-4 and O-5 have relatively high fill rates. Four designators (Any URL/SD, Fleet Support, Surface, and Cryptology) have relatively low fill rates at grade O-6.

Looking at the same data across grades, as in Figure 4.22, the high and low rates of fill are apparent. (For clarity, percentages are labeled on certain designators.)

Figure 4.23, for comparison, indicates the fill rate by various kinds of organizations. This indicates that OSD and OSD-controlled agencies have had the lowest fill rate, at 67 percent, while the fill rates for other types of organizations have ranged from 78 to 89 percent.

**Over Time.** Fill rates for all grades and for grades O-4 to O-6 are shown in Figure 4.24. As the figure indicates, the fill rates for all grades, especially for the last several years, appear reasonably consistent month by month and have varied between 80 and 86 percent for the last few years. Since October 1989, O-4 fill rates have varied between 80 and 90 percent; since October 1996, fill rates for O-5 and O-6 have been within the same band.

---

5This is an internal Navy categorization of organizations to identify Navy support to the CINCs, defense agencies, and other activities. The “Unified Commands” category includes activities governed by guidance contained in the JMP procedures (CICS, 1998), i.e., Unified CINC. “Combat Support Agencies” include defense agencies governed by JMP procedures and OSD-established manning levels. “NATO Activities” reflect manpower support to NATO military commands and agencies and are governed by JMP guidance. “Other Jointly Manned Activities” are those supported by two or more services (not defense agencies) where some joint duty credit is awarded, and are not governed by JMP procedures. “OSD, JS, and Agencies” are activities for which manning levels are established by OSD but that are not governed by JMP procedures, e.g., staffs of OSD and JCS. “Other Outside DoD” includes support provided to the U.S. Coast Guard, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the White House Military Office, among others. The manning levels associated with the unit identification codes for the activities were sorted according to these categories and applied to the JDAMIS database to extract fill rates from 1986 to the present.
Figure 4.21—Percentage of Fill by Grade for Selected Designators
(October 1986–August 2001)
Figure 4.22—Percentage of Fill by Designator for Selected Grades (October 1986–August 2001)
Figure 4.23—Percentage of Fill by Agency
(October 1986–August 2001)
Figure 4.24—Navy JDAL Fill Rates Over Time by Grade
Similarly, fill rates by selected designator tend to vary within a band of 75 to 90 percent, as shown in Figure 4.25. Positions for Surface Warfare were filled at a high rate during the late 1990s (94 percent) but have most recently been filled at only 76 percent. The fill rate for Supply has been as high as 100 percent, while that for Submarine is consistently high.

Figures 4.26 through 4.28 break the above data into logical clusters for clarity.

Figure 4.29 provides fill rates over time for different categories of organizations.

**Summary**

Aggregate fill rates do not appear to differ greatly by either grade or designator; the difference is not much more than 10 percentage points (up or down) in the extreme. The data are generally within ±5 percentage points from the overall average.

Looking at the same data over time leads to similar observations. There is variation within a band, with some grades and designators having higher or lower fill rates at various points.

**ATTRIBUTES OF FILLED AND UNFILLED POSITIONS**

To determine which positions were more or less likely to be filled, we used the aggregate data and eliminated from consideration all designators that had few positions. Figure 4.30 presents the ten grade and designator combinations with the highest fill rates and the ten with the lowest fill rates. Grades O-4 and O-5 and more specialized designators appear at the high end; grade O-6 and one designator (Oceanography) appear to dominate the list at the other end.
Figure 4.25—Fill Rates Over Time for Selected Designators
Figure 4.26—Fill Rates Over Time for URL/SD Designators
Figure 4.27—Fill Rates Over Time for URL Designators
Figure 4.28—Fill Rates Over Time for Non-URL Designators
Figure 4.29—Fill Rates Over Time by Agency
Figure 4.30—Positions Most and Least Filled
(October 1986–August 2001)
This chapter characterizes the legal requirements pertaining to filling JDAs and explores whether the Navy can satisfy the requirements for lists of various sizes.\footnote{Much of this chapter is based upon earlier analysis published in Harrell et al. (1996), which has been recalculated here to update the numbers and provide Navy-specific output.} This chapter also explores the impact of changing various requirements.

**BENEFITS OF LARGER JDAL**

There are certain benefits of having a larger share of the JDAL. Given that the requirements exist and are filled anyway, giving those who fill these required billets joint duty credit does benefit officer development, despite the additional management care required when assigning officers to JDAL billets, because these officers receive the joint credit necessary for promotion to flag rank. Additionally, the services maintain a prominent role in the joint operational community. However, because of the legal constraints on how JDAs are to be filled, no service can support an unlimited JDAL.

The primary constraints pertain to JSOs, ISO nominees, and COS officers. JSOs are those who have attended JPME (Phase II), have served in a JDA, and have then been designated as an ISO by their individual services.\footnote{Officers can also be designated as JSOs having first served in a JDA and then having received JPME (Phase II) or after having served in two JDAs. The text above describes the most common path to JSO.} Goldwater-Nichols established the JSO as a way
to ensure that some officers serving in JDAs had the benefit of both joint education and prior joint experience. JSO nominees are officers who have received JPME (Phase II) and are serving or have served in a JDA. COS officers are generally warfighters and can serve as JSO nominees (in a limited number, as discussed below) without completing JPME (Phase II) first. The legal restrictions are summarized below:

- Each service is responsible for a certain set of critical billets, which are to be filled with JSOs.
- Half the list, including the critical billets, is to be filled with JSO nominees (officers who have received JPME (Phase II) and JSOs.
- However, up to 12.5 percent of the list can be filled by COS officers, who can serve in JDAs as JSO nominees without attending JPME (Phase II) first.

Thus, several analytical steps are required to determine whether the Navy can support the current JDAL and to identify the largest JDAL the Navy might be able to support. First, it is important to identify whether it has the appropriate resources and policies to create sufficient numbers of JSOs for assignment to critical billets. Then one must consider whether the Navy is able to satisfy the requirement to assign JSOs and JSO nominees to half the list, including the critical billets. This chapter proceeds through these steps, then addresses additional legal and policy changes that would either increase the size of the list the Navy could support or, alternatively, make it easier to support the current JDAL.

THE NAVY CAN PRODUCE AN ADEQUATE NUMBER OF JSOs

Prior analysis explored the number of JSOs that the Navy could produce and concluded that the Navy had the opportunity to produce sufficient numbers of JSOs such that it could achieve high ratios of JSOs to critical billets. Given the number of JPME seats, the assignment policies, loss rates, and JSO selection policies at the time of the

---

3Manpower experts from each of the services identified an absolute minimum ratio of 3:1 but considered 5:1 to be more easily manageable and 7:1 to be especially comfortable to manage (Harrell et al., 1996).
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prior analysis, the Navy was on track for a minimum ratio of 5:1. The analysis also indicated that selecting all the Navy officers eligible for JSO as JSOs could achieve a ratio as high as 9:1. The Navy might not want to select every JSO-eligible officer to be a JSO, for such management reasons as specified promotion rates for JSOs relative to select non-JSO peers. Nonetheless, a sufficient future supply of JSOs to satisfy Navy critical billets was established.

Since that analysis, several changes have occurred. The Navy currently has a greater JPME capacity, as indicated in Table 5.1, which compares the service quotas at each of the JPME sources for 1994 and 2001. The increase in JPME capacity was largely due to staffing the Joint Forces Service College (JFSC)\textsuperscript{4} faculty to its full capacity. It is of note that, as indicated in Table 5.2 and Figure 5.1, at the time of the prior analysis, the Navy had the largest JPME share of all the services compared to its share of critical billets. Since then, the Navy has retained the same percentage of the increased JPME capacity but now has a slightly reduced share of a decreased number of total critical billets. When one considers the actual numbers, the Navy stands in even better stead now than it did in 1994. Instead of developing JSOs for 182 critical positions with 262 JPME seats, it now is responsible for only 146 critical billets and has the benefit of 290 JPME seats.

Given these changes and assuming a moderate policy of assigning 75 percent of JPME grads directly to JDAs,\textsuperscript{5} the Navy is capable of producing sufficient JSOs and JSO-eligible officers to satisfy the current critical billet requirements (146) at a ratio of approximately 10 to 1 if one only considers JSOs and at a potentially higher rate if more JSO eligibles were made JSOs. The future population of Navy JSOs is shown in Figure 5.2.\textsuperscript{6}

\textsuperscript{4}Formerly known as the Armed Forces Service College.

\textsuperscript{5}The law requires at least 50 percent of JPME graduates to continue directly to JDAs; at the time of our previous analysis (Harrell et al., 1996), the Navy was assigning approximately 75 percent to JDAs. This is thus considered both achievable and moderate, given that the other services' assignment rates ranged from 80 (Army) to 84 percent (Air Force).

\textsuperscript{6}This diagram begins with the status quo as of the time of our analysis; the numbers then dip as a function of the modeling calculations before they reach steady-state levels of JSO and JSO eligibles. The model is described in greater detail in Harrell et al. (1996). The inputs for this figure were updated to reflect the current JPME allocation and current loss rates. More details are available from the authors on request.
Table 5.1
JPME Quotas (1994 and 2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
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<td>58</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>171</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFSC (Int)</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFSC (Sr)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>1,089</td>
<td>1,206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.2

Service Shares of JPME Quotas and Critical Billets
(percentage of total)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>40</td>
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<td>34</td>
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<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
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<td>24</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td>Air Force</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5.1—JDAL Billets and JPME Quotas, by Service
Figure 5.2—The Ratio of Future Navy JSOs to Critical Billets
JISO NOMINEES CONSTRAIN THE SIZE OF THE JDAL

Given that the Navy can produce an adequate number of JSOs to fill critical billets, the next possible constraint for the size of a supportable JDAL is the number of JSO nominees required. These calculations begin with the 50-percent rule. Because 50 percent of the JDAL must be filled by JSO nominees and JSOs, the following equation reflects the JDAL in algebraic form:

\[ \frac{1}{2} \text{JDAL} = \text{JSOs} + \text{JSO Noms} \]

In this case, JSOs is used to represent any JSOs serving on the JDAL, whether in critical or noncritical billets. JSO Noms includes both the JPME graduates who proceed to joint billets and COS exceptions who did not complete JPME but are serving as JSO nominees. Therefore, the equation can be expressed as:

\[ \frac{1}{2} \text{JDAL} = \text{JSOs in JDAs} + \text{JPME Grads in JDAs} + \text{COS Exceptions} \]

While the JSOs are supplied from pools of officers (discussed above) who remain JSOs for the rest of their careers, JSO nominees are produced continually and, for the purposes of this calculation, are only considered nominees while serving in their joint billets. The number of JSO nominees is constrained by the annual JPME output and the service policies that assign JPME graduates to joint billets. Given an average JDA tour length of three years, one-third of the list turns over every year. Therefore, the annual JPME output must support one-

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7When we refer to the size of the JDAL, we are using current DoD policy of excluding grade O-3. A more-precise statement would be the number of positions on the JDAL above the grade of O-3.

8Title IV initially specified that JDA tours average at least 3-1/2 years for field-grade officers and at least 3 years for general and flag officers. These tour lengths were later amended to 3 years for field-grade officers and 2 years for general and flag officers. Certain exclusions are allowed in calculating tour lengths, and our analysis suggests that these reduce the average tour length for all field-grade officers to approximately 2 years and 8 months. Our analysis also indicates that JPME graduates serve an average of approximately 2 years and 11 months. The current tour length exclusions are likely to decrease as the drawdown effort decreases—and hence the number of retirements and separations stabilize—and as overseas JDAs decrease. While year-to-year fluctuations will occur, this analysis has adopted a long-term focus, which minimizes the effects the fluctuations in any one year might have on the data. We used 3 years as a nominal average tour length for this analysis and address the effects of different average tour lengths upon the size of a supportable JDAL in Table 5.4.
third of the JDAL, minus the positions filled by JSOs and COS exceptions. So, if the entire JDAL turned over every three years, three years worth of JPME graduates would be available to support all the billets. The equation below reflects the dependence upon three years of JPME by inserting a “3” to create the formula for the maximum size of the JDAL.

\[
\frac{1}{2} \text{Max JDAL} = \text{JSOs in JDAs} + 3 \text{ JPME Grads in JDAs} + \text{COS Exceptions}
\]

Because the total number of COS exceptions is limited to 12.5 percent (or 1/8) of the JDAL, and very few COS exceptions return to JPME, the equation becomes:

\[
\frac{1}{2} \text{Max JDAL} = \text{JSOs in JDAs} + 3 \text{ JPME Grads in JDAs} + \frac{1}{8} \text{ JDAL}.
\]

Basic algebra provides the following progression of equations:

\[
\frac{3}{8} \text{Max JDAL} = \text{JSOs in JDAs} + 3 \text{ JPME Grads in JDAs}
\]

and

\[
\text{Max JDAL} = \frac{8}{3} \text{JSOs in JDAs} + 8 \text{ JPME Grads in JDAs},
\]

which can be expressed as:

\[
\text{Max JDAL} = 2.67 \text{JSOs in JDAs} + 8 \text{ JPME Grads in JDAs}.
\]

This equation reflects the relationship between JPME and the maximum supportable JDAL. Stated more simply, for the total JDAL and under the assumption that 1,000 JSOs serve in critical or noncritical JDAs, the maximum JDAL is equal to 2,670 plus 8 times the number of JPME grads who are assigned to JDAs each year. This relationship was used to produce Table 5.3, which indicates the maximum Navy share of the JDAL, given different assumptions about JPME output and the Navy assignment policies for JPME graduates. The current Navy share of the JDAL is 2,046 billets.

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9The analysis in the previous subsections demonstrates that there are sufficient JSOs or JSO eligibles for this to be true.
Table 5.3
Effect of Assignment Policy on JDAL Supportability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assignment Policy</th>
<th>Resulting Navy JDAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maximum (100%)</td>
<td>2,710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievable (83%)</td>
<td>2,318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate (75%)</td>
<td>2,134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal minimum (50%)</td>
<td>1,550</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 100-percent assignment policy is admittedly an unreasonable expectation, given the need for Naval War College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces graduates within the services. The legal minimum assignment policy is 50 percent, also shown in the table, which leads to the minimum number of JPME graduates in JDAs. However, at the time of the prior analysis, the other three services each assigned 80 to 84 percent of JPME graduates to JDAs immediately following JPME completion, so 83 percent is deemed an achievable assignment rate for the Navy. This policy translates roughly to a 50-percent joint assignment rate for NWC and ICAF graduates and a 95-percent joint assignment rate of JFSC graduates.

Given the 2001 Navy JPME quota of 290 and the current 146 Navy critical billets, the maximum supportable size of the JDAL within current law and the current assignment policies (75 percent from JPME to JDAs) is approximately 2,134 positions. The maximum size of the Navy portion of the JDAL can be increased by moving to higher assignment percentages. It could also be increased by assigning more JSOs to noncritical billets or by increasing average tour length.\(^{10}\) The sensitivity of different tour lengths is shown in Table 5.4, which provides the range of JDALS that would be supportable with different average tour lengths and different assignment policies for recent JPME graduates. The first row provides the supportable JDAL with an average JDA tour length of 2.75 (2 years, 9 months) for

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\(^{10}\)The maximum JDAL would increase by a factor of 2.67 for each additional JSO assigned to a noncritical position. Conversely, if the number of critical billets were less than 1,000 and if JSOs were not assigned to noncritical billets, the maximum JDAL would decrease by a factor of 2.67 for each such officer.
JPME graduates given the current JPME quotas and assignment policies of either 75 percent or 83 percent of recent JPME graduates proceeding immediately into JDAs. The next two rows provide the figures for average tour lengths of 3 years, 3.25 years, and 4 years. Another implication of these data is that the longer the average tour length, the fewer officers need to be assigned to JDAs to satisfy joint requirements. So, if the average tour lengths increased to four years, 8 percent fewer JDAs would have to be filled each year (one-fourth turnover each year rather than one-third turnover).

Given the expressed difficulty of fitting a joint tour into a career, we recognize the career path difficulty for many officers inherent in serving a four-year joint assignment. However, longer average tours mean that fewer officers are needed to satisfy joint requirements. Thus, one logical approach is to maintain shorter tours for COS officers and any other officers perceived to be relatively fast-burners and likely future flag officers. Other officers serving joint tours, especially non-warfighters, might serve longer tours to decrease the effects of joint requirements on the overall population of naval officers.

### Table 5.4

Maximum JDAL Resulting from Changes to Policy or Parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tour Length</th>
<th>Max JDAL Calculation</th>
<th>JDAL for Assignment Rate of:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.75 years(^a)</td>
<td>2.67 JSOs in JDAs + 7.33 JDME Grads in JDAs</td>
<td>1,964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>2.67 JSOs in JDAs + 8 JDME Grads in JDAs</td>
<td>2,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.25 years(^b)</td>
<td>2.67 JSOs in JDAs + 8.67 JDME Grads in JDAs</td>
<td>2,276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 years(^c)</td>
<td>2.67 JSOs in JDAs + 10.67 JDME Grads in JDAs</td>
<td>2,711</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Assumes 146 JSOs serving in JDAs, and the current Navy JPME quota of 290.

\(^a\)Equals 2 years, 9 months.

\(^b\)Equals 3 years, 3 months.

\(^c\)Equals 48 months.
In point of fact, the reported Navy average assignment length has ranged from 38.5 months to 39.7 months (as of FY 1998).\textsuperscript{11} The data indicate, however, that there is considerable range in the length of JDA's; Figure 5.3 indicates the number of days served in JDA's for each naval officer who left a JDA assignment within the past five years. These data indicate that a large number of officers leave their joint assignments after two years and after three years. This dual pattern is consistent with officers assigned to the Joint Staff, with COS officers serving in any JDA's leaving their assignments earlier than other officers.

Moreover, the maximum supportable JDAL could be increased even further by changing the law as it pertains to any combination of the following:

- alternative means for meeting the JPME requirement\textsuperscript{12}
- decreasing the 50-percent requirement for JSOs and JSO nominees in JDA's\textsuperscript{13}
- increasing the maximum allowable percentage of COS exceptions above 12.5 percent.\textsuperscript{14}

The impact of these potential changes is shown in Table 5.5, which includes potential changes to the law, the resulting equation expressing the maximum JDAL, and the resulting maximum JDAL. The magnitude of these changes could be increased for a much larger JDAL. These numbers are intended only as an example of the maximum JDAL that could become supportable with fairly small changes to the current law.

\textsuperscript{11} Annual Reports to the President and the Congress (Cohen, 1999, is an example).

\textsuperscript{12} For example, if officers in one service who attended either the intermediate or senior service school of another service were given credit for JPME, the maximum JDAL could increase by a factor of 8 for each such officer who followed this education with a JDA.

\textsuperscript{13} If the requirement were 49 percent, the equation would become Maximum JDAL = 2.74 JSOs in JDA's + 8.22 JPME Grads in JDA's. If the requirement were 40 percent, the equation would become Maximum JDAL = 3.64 JSOs in JDA's + 10.91 JPME Grads in JDA's.

\textsuperscript{14} If the COS exception were increased to 25 percent, the equation would become Maximum JDAL = 4 JSOs in JDA's + 12 JPME Grads in JDA's.
Thus, given either a constant number of requirements or an end strength that increases relative to the increase in the JDAL, the primary constraints to the size of the JDAL are various policies, such as the percentage of JPME graduates that continue directly from JPME to a JDA; laws, such as the percentage of the JDAL that must be filled with JSO nominees; or the limitation on the number of COS exceptions permitted in JDAs. Even if one assumes that the Navy is not leaving internal service billets empty to fill JDAs, the rules for how the JDAs are to be filled limit the number of JDAs the Navy can support.
Table 5.5
Maximum JDAL Resulting from Changes to the Law

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change to Law</th>
<th>Max JDAL Calculation</th>
<th>Resulting JDAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40% rule (rather than 50%)</td>
<td>3.64 JSOs in JDAs + 10.91 JPME Grads to JDAs</td>
<td>2,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20% COS exceptions</td>
<td>3.33 JSOs in JDAs + 10 JPME Grads to JDAs</td>
<td>2,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40% rule and 15% COS exceptions</td>
<td>5 JSOs in JDAs + 15 JPME Grads to JDAs</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Resulting JDAL assumes 146 JSOs serving in JDAs, the current JPME quotas, and the current assignment policy of 75 percent of JPME grads to JDAs.

Nonetheless, this analysis suggests that the Navy has the JPME resources available to support a larger number of JDA billets, absent inside-the-Navy manning constraints.

HOW BEST TO FILL 1000 AND 1050 BILLETS ON THE JDAL

Four competing concerns must be addressed when choosing designators to fill JDAL billets. This is especially so for 1000 billets, which are filled by any appropriate unrestricted line or special duty officer, and 1050 billets, which can be filled by any warfare qualified unrestricted line officer. In these instances, the Navy decides which officer designator will fill a given billet. First, the various community managers are concerned that they are responsible for more than their “fair share” of joint billets. In rough terms, this represents a general sense that any single community should not necessarily fill a disproportionate share of these JDAL billets. Second, and on the other hand, community managers are also concerned about officer development: To promote officers to flag rank from their communities, they need to have officers who have served time in joint billets. Thus, they are reluctant to have their share of joint assignments drop much below their “fair share.” Third, inventory can drive the fill patterns. For example, there was a greater need ten years ago for naval flight officers than today’s aircraft can support. Using 1000 and 1050 billets is one way to absorb personnel when the requirements change. Fourth, however, is a factor that is generally not considered:
the cost to the Navy to develop officers of different designators. Table 5.6 indicates the annual cost to the Navy to develop and compensate officers of various communities and pay grades. These data suggest that, as long as the joint billets that specifically denote aviation and submarine designators provide enough of such officers with joint experience, and all other things being equal, the Navy should fill as many 1000 and 1050 billets as possible with surface warfare and other less-expensive designators. For example, if there were ten fewer joint requirements for aviators, the Navy could potentially have ten fewer aviators. If the requirements were for intelligence officers instead, the Navy would instead have ten more intelligence officers (if the Navy managed to requirements), and the savings to the service would equal the difference between developing and compensating ten aviators and developing and compensating ten intelligence officers. One potential constraint to filling all 1000 and 1050 billets with less-expensive officers, such as surface warfare officers, is whether the “absorption” ability of the service—the number of junior officers who can be exposed to the appropriate experiences immediately following accession and training—can develop enough officers to satisfy both the internal Navy requirements and external requirements for that designator.

15 The Naval Center for Cost Analysis’ Cost of Manpower Estimating Tool (COMET) was used to calculate these costs. Direct costs for personnel include the elements of MPN that are attributable directly to the individual: regular compensation, special pays and bonuses, retired pay accrual, etc. Indirect costs are the (prorated) MPN costs paid to others for such things as initial recruiting and training, medical, base support, administration, and the Individuals Account. (The Individuals Account includes students, trainees, transients, hospital patients, and prisoners.) Conceptually, COMET identifies the total costs required for the Navy to have a specific designator or grade in the fleet. The COMET model along with extensive documentation and data files is online at http://www.ncca.navy.mil/services/comet.cfm (as of May 3, 2002). There are several sources of Navy manpower costs, each of which meets specific users’ needs. Resource sponsors use standard programming rates, which give a single dollar figure (typically the average MPN for all Navy officers) for an officer regardless of grade or skill; this figure is used in the POM process, which typically programs manpower in units of end strength. Composite Standard Military Rates provide officer costs (average MPN costs) differentiated by grade and are typically used for estimating reimbursable costs. Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs provides historical personnel (MPN) costs by unit (ships, squadrons, etc.). Direct costs include military compensation, housing and subsistence allowances, moving costs, retired pay accrual, special and incentive pays, and other benefits paid to the officer. Indirect (MPN) costs include the average cost per officer for recruiting, initial training, locating (Individuals), medical and dental, base support, and administration.
Table 5.6
Development and Compensation MPN Costs (FY 2001 $) by Designator and Grade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designator</th>
<th>Community</th>
<th>O-1</th>
<th>O-2</th>
<th>O-3</th>
<th>O-4</th>
<th>O-5</th>
<th>O-6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1110</td>
<td>Surface Warfare</td>
<td>88,122</td>
<td>104,405</td>
<td>122,334</td>
<td>138,953</td>
<td>158,210</td>
<td>184,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1120</td>
<td>Submarine</td>
<td>129,301</td>
<td>147,247</td>
<td>168,722</td>
<td>184,027</td>
<td>202,756</td>
<td>227,442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1310</td>
<td>Pilots</td>
<td>130,095</td>
<td>145,382</td>
<td>164,511</td>
<td>180,229</td>
<td>202,538</td>
<td>228,659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1320</td>
<td>Naval Flight</td>
<td>131,048</td>
<td>146,484</td>
<td>165,606</td>
<td>181,989</td>
<td>203,876</td>
<td>228,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1610</td>
<td>Cryptology</td>
<td>74,092</td>
<td>87,509</td>
<td>105,008</td>
<td>121,039</td>
<td>140,723</td>
<td>161,874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1630</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>72,273</td>
<td>87,908</td>
<td>103,420</td>
<td>117,332</td>
<td>140,071</td>
<td>165,413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1700</td>
<td>Fleet Support</td>
<td>68,944</td>
<td>86,700</td>
<td>102,715</td>
<td>117,699</td>
<td>136,165</td>
<td>160,349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2100</td>
<td>Doctors</td>
<td>147,912</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>166,386</td>
<td>183,944</td>
<td>201,074</td>
<td>224,032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2200</td>
<td>Dentists</td>
<td>110,556</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>127,818</td>
<td>155,129</td>
<td>175,407</td>
<td>202,603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2300</td>
<td>Medical Svc Corps</td>
<td>74,270</td>
<td>86,820</td>
<td>102,614</td>
<td>117,575</td>
<td>136,888</td>
<td>162,664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2900</td>
<td>Nurses</td>
<td>72,810</td>
<td>86,595</td>
<td>103,460</td>
<td>115,187</td>
<td>137,884</td>
<td>167,114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3100</td>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>90,409</td>
<td>106,081</td>
<td>122,678</td>
<td>136,777</td>
<td>156,456</td>
<td>179,149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5100</td>
<td>Civil Engineer</td>
<td>71,851</td>
<td>86,985</td>
<td>103,018</td>
<td>118,151</td>
<td>138,946</td>
<td>168,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6000</td>
<td>LDO</td>
<td>82,445</td>
<td>95,203</td>
<td>115,099</td>
<td>129,831</td>
<td>149,655</td>
<td>185,991</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
HAS THE NAVY BEEN SATISFYING GOLDFWATER-NICHOLS LEGAL REQUIREMENTS?

This section has asserted that the Navy should have adequate numbers of officers who have received JPME and can serve in JDAs as JSO nominees and should also have sufficient JPME quotas to develop sufficient numbers of JSOs to fill the critical billets. We can examine both these propositions.

First, as discussed in the previous section, the law requires filling certain portions of the JDAL with officers who are JSOs or nominees to be JSO. In essence, the law requires approximately half of JDAL billets to be filled with officers who have the joint specialty or have been nominated for it. Of the group of JSOs and JSO nominees, not more than 25 percent may be officers who have a COS.

Figure 5.4 portrays data for the Navy since the inception of the JDAL. For this calculation, we used the same data we used earlier for potential JDAL fill, i.e., all naval officers assigned even if they are assigned to the same billet. The figure shows that it takes time to build JSOs and to accumulate officers nominated for the joint specialty. Several points emerge from the figure. First, not all JDAL billets are filled. The number of officers who are neither JSOs nor nominees has decreased as the number of JSOs and JSO nominees has increased. This figure indicates that the Navy cannot meet the requirement for 50 percent of officers to be JSOs or nominees without exceeding legal constraints on the number of officers from the COS nominee category. In short, the three categories of JSO, JSO nominees with JPME, and usable JSO COS nominees do not satisfy half of the JDAL.

Figure 5.5 shows the same data on a percentage basis, with the 50 percent line marked. The three categories at the bottom of the chart are required by law to exceed this line, but do not.

Second, despite currently having almost ten JSOs for every critical billet it is responsible for filling, the Navy has not been filling critical JDAs with JSOs. This is consistent with the practices of the rest of the services. Figure 5.6 indicates the percentage of critical billets filled by JSOs, as reported in the Annual Report to the President and the Congress (see, for example, Cohen, 1999). However, until FY 2000
Figure 5.4—JDAL Fill by JSO Status
Figure 5.5—JDAL Percent Fill by JSO Status
this number reported was the percentage of officers filling critical billets who were JSOs. This calculation is misleading; in the most extreme case, a service could have 100 critical billets but might assign only a couple of JSOs to critical billets. As long as the other critical billets remained empty, the number reported (the percentage of officers filling critical JDAs that are JSOs) would be 100 percent. Even so, that mathematical calculation still indicated a decreasing rate of officers in critical billets having JSO designation. In FY 2000, the statistics reported were changed to represent the percentage of critical billets that were filled by a JSO.

Figure 5.7 is more revealing, as it shows, for the Navy only, the number of critical billets filled by JSOs, the total number of Navy critical billets, and the percentage of the critical billets filled by a JSO. These data indicate that the Navy was assigning a decreasing number of JSOs to a decreasing number of critical billets. Such a decrease in overall critical billets should have made it easier for the Navy to satisfy the requirement to fill such billets with JSOs; had the Navy even held constant the number of JSOs assigned to critical billets, the percentage would have increased.

Figure 5.8 indicates that this pattern of behavior is consistent with DoD behavior overall; decreasing the number of critical billets has not translated into a higher rate of JSO fills. Rather, the services have reduced the number of JSOs assigned. In addition, the increasing number of officers that fill critical billets with the waiver “best qualified officer is not a JSO” suggests several alternative points. First, it is possible that joint organizations need expertise that cannot be gained in a career path that also includes time spent in JPME and a prior JDA. Related to this point, high-level personnel in joint organizations may be requesting such officers by name or requesting officers who are more current in their warfare specialties. Second, the services may not be making the right officers JSOs. Third, it is possible that this category of waiver has become a catchall, in that it is the only waiver for filling critical billets with non-JSOs that is based on a judgment call. Regardless, it appears that filling critical billets with JSOs is no longer perceived as an important issue; quite possibly, the services are under little or no pressure to increase the number of JSOs serving in JDALs.
Figure 5.6—Percentage of Officers Filling Critical JDAs Who Are JSOs
Figure 5.7—Navy JSOs and Critical Billets
Figure 5.8—DoD JSOs and Critical Billets
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Our analysis concludes that many of the issues the Navy must consider regarding external requirements for naval officers consist of internal management trade-offs and considerations. These include such trade-offs as the optimal assignment length for officers serving in joint duty billets, which designators are most appropriately assigned to 1000 and 1050 JDAs, and which positions to fill. This final chapter consists of concluding observations and recommendations to inform and support such management decisions.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Regarding the determination and validation processes for external requirements:

- There are approximately 4,500 external requirements for naval officers, including those outside the Navy but inside DoD, as well as those outside DoD. Myriad instructions and directives exist for this wide variety of external billets, but the processes seem relatively well-defined. The JMP determination process is not significantly different from that the Navy uses internally for shore billets, is as objective, and may be better validated.

- Outside the Department of the Navy requirements may or may not be on the JDAL. Requirements are determined first, and JDAL designation follows.

- Permanent positions, once validated, are seldom revalidated. Outside-DoD details are frequently revalidated, although some such details appear somewhat permanent.
• Some outside-DoD details, likely several hundred, appear not to be requested, validated, and tracked in the formal system through the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs). Some inside-DoD details are also not tracked.

• The temporary duty positions, such as those in JTFs, are filled both by active duty personnel and by reservists.

Regarding the Navy and the JDAL:

• Individual billets are consistently added and deleted from the JDAL.

• The total number of JDAs has remained approximately the same in recent years. The Navy’s proportion of the JDAL has increased slightly but is still smaller than that of either the Air Force or Army.

• The overall number of critical billets and the number of critical billets for which the Navy is responsible have both decreased, but the Navy share of critical billets has remained relatively constant.

• The Navy share of the JDAL includes more than its proportionate share of O-6 billets and less of its proportionate share of O-4 and O-5 billets.

• Compared to the Navy share of the JDAL, Navy O-6s are currently underrepresented at the unified CINCs and slightly overrepresented at OSD and the Joint Staff.

• Approximately 80 percent of JDAs are filled, on average, at any time, but only about 40 percent of critical billets are filled with JSOs. It is not clear whether these fill rates represent a policy decision by the Navy leadership to go only so far in complying with Goldwater-Nichols.

• The NAVY JDAs most likely to be filled are O-4 and O-5 billets in general and the specialized billets (public affairs, civil engineer, aviator, supply, submarine).

Regarding career development and management of naval officers:

• Community managers perceive it to be difficult to fit JDAs into the career development of a warfare-qualified officer. Nonetheless, these assignments are important for career development
and may become increasingly important should emphasis on more than a single joint assignment as a requirement for promotion to flag rank increase.

- The legal restrictions of Goldwater-Nichols (for example, having enough JSO-qualified officers and enough officers who can complete JPME) are not as much the problem for the Navy as is fitting those assignments (both JPME and JDAs) into the career path.

- Recent joint command workarounds to accommodate low rates of Navy fills will have the eventual result of fewer titled, or important, positions for naval officers in those commands.

- A large proportion of the JDAL requires an aviation designator, and aviators also fill a large number of 1000 and 1050 billets. Costing criteria suggest that filling 1000 and 1050 billets with aviators is inefficient, but career path concerns may not support costing decisions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Standardize the determination and validation processes; pursue expansion of the JDAL; and simplify the management processes for external assignments.¹

All external requirements should be determined and validated with one consistent process transparent to all. We recommend applying the JMP guidelines or a similar process to all external billets, and this is apparently under consideration. Adding existing external billets to the JDAL will grant officers serving in such billets joint credit. This change will not increase Navy requirements but will increase the number of individuals receiving joint credit. Simplifying the management of JDAs, including the promotion calculations and comparisons Goldwater-Nichols requires, will reduce any management burden inherent in adding all external billets to the JDAL. Since the services fill JDAs at approximately the same rate as internal billets,

¹In the 2002 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress made changes to the personnel provisions of Goldwater-Nichols and called for a study to examine other changes.
increasing the JDAL will not necessarily impede the management of these billets.

**Determine the Navy perspective on joint duty billets and other external assignments.**

There is currently an “us versus them” perspective on joint duty for naval officers. Joint assignments are considered “time away” from the officer’s warfare specialty and career path, and officers are advised to “stay Navy” until selected and screened for command.

We acknowledge that the benefits to the individual and to the Navy differ depending on whether the Navy sends officers to JDAs or to other external billets. This recognition is inherent in the suggestion above to increase the number of external billets on the JDAL. Nonetheless, the Navy leadership needs to determine the Navy’s perspective on joint and other external billets. This perspective should be consistently expressed and acknowledged throughout the Navy manpower and personnel system. If the Navy chooses to support joint opportunities positively, it should readdress its current assignment policies. The Navy currently risks losing key influential joint positions because its performance in assigning officers to these positions has been indifferent. Regardless, the Navy perspective should determine how assignment to joint billets will affect naval officers, as discussed in the next recommendation.

**Reconcile the Navy perspective on joint and other external assignments with officer career paths.**

There are multiple approaches to assigning officers to joint and other external billets. These approaches can either minimize or maximize the number of officers assigned outside the Navy, given a constant number of authorizations. Exposing fewer officers to joint and other external billets would require longer tours for each officer and, likely, repetitive tours for those who do serve externally. This would minimize the disruption to most officers’ Navy-only career paths. Officers who go to external billets would be perceived more as specialists in this environment.

A middle ground would affect officers who are likely to achieve flag rank and either would require carefully selecting likely future flag officers for a single joint tour or would increase the Navy's depen-
dence on waivers for promotion to flag rank without joint duty. If well managed, the system could provide joint experience for likely future flag officers yet still minimize the effects on the majority of naval officers. This approach would support a general reexamination of the types of officers assigned to outside billets, especially when a given billet does not require a specific designator. For example, aviators currently fill a disproportionate number of 1000 and 1050 billets. Yet aviators are among the highest-cost officers; assigning them to such billets is thus not fiscally sound.

In contrast, a different approach would increase the number of officers exposed to joint and external duty for minimum tours, thus minimizing the effects on any single officer’s Navy assignments. This approach would require fairly significant changes in current personnel processes, such as longer careers for most officers, to permit the external opportunities. For JDA’s, this approach may also require relief from the current constraints on tour length, to reduce the tour length and allow more officers to serve.

As long as the joint billets that specify aviation and submarine designators provide enough of these kinds of officers with joint experience, and all other things remain equal, fill 1000 and 1050 billets mainly with surface warfare officers and officers with other less expensive designators.

Our research indicates varying development and compensation costs for officers of different designators. Given that the Navy can determine what kinds of officers to send to billets coded 1000 and 1050, cost should be a factor, all other things being equal. This would reduce the number of requirements for officers with more expensive designators and thus, if the Navy manages its officer force to match requirements, would reduce the number of officers in the more expensive occupations, and ultimately, the cost of the officer corps.


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In addition to filling their own ranks, the military services must assign officers to outside organizations. Many in the services believe that these external requirements are increasing and are concerned about the consequences. The work reported here identified external billets, explored how requirements are determined and validated, and examined the Navy's ability to meet these requirements as well as other needs. Focusing on billets that appear on the Joint Duty Assignment List, the authors examined the effects of recent changes, the processes used to determine staffing, and the costs of certain types of staffing. Among the recommendations that emerged from this work were that the Navy should define its own perspective on joint duty billets and other external assignments and reconcile this perspective with officer career paths.