Figure 1 illustrates the title of this report, which is presented as an annotated briefing. The Army and the Department of Defense (DoD) have been criticized for the lack of a systematic approach to determining training land requirements and for the failure to set priorities among training land initiatives. The purpose of this report is to re-
view the Army's current approach to assessing land requirements and to determine the validity and impact of the critiques.

A central issue is whether current policies lead to efficient land use or whether internal Army organizational boundaries divide land resources in inefficient ways and create a need for additional land. In other words, does the division of Army lands among major internal organizational entities (commands, subcommands, and installations) create obstacles to efficient sharing of land resources? Although our focus is on the Army, we will also ask similar questions about the Army's ability to access Air Force and Navy lands. This is important because much of the public views military land as a single resource.
Figure 2

The title of Figure 2 continues the sentence in Figure 1 by presenting a critic’s view of Army (DoD) land use policy. It suggests that Army land use strategy is a product of the inability of one part of the organization to understand the needs and actions of others. Figure 2 also suggests part of the outline of this briefing. In the first half of the report, we develop a “strawman” criticism of the Army’s land use strategy. Previous studies by government agencies and comments by advocacy groups are the basis for this critique. We then analyze the validity of the critique.

At a broad level of national policy, the end of the Cold War and declining DoD budgets have created the perception that there is less need for military land.\(^1\) This perception has been enhanced by re-

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\(^1\)Although our focus is on Army policy, the public’s perception of Army land policy is linked to its perception of the entire military, hence we refer to the DoD budget rather than the Army budget. More generally, the critique of Army land policy has also been
peated pleas from the Secretary of Defense for additional rounds of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC). Many assume that the desire to close bases (and the corresponding land holdings) indicates that the DoD has more than enough land.

The DoD and the military services have also been aggressively funding training-simulation initiatives. These technologies offer the possibility of reducing land needs by allowing training in a simulated environment. This feeds the critics’ arguments, and moreover we found that a not insignificant number of DoD and Army policymakers believe such simulations will significantly reduce future land use needs.

Despite these developments, several Army (and Navy and Air Force) installations are pursuing land initiatives aimed at preserving or expanding their land holdings. These initiatives are primarily for training land, as opposed to land for testing new weapon systems. Testing and training are the dominant uses of military lands, though there are smaller land uses for logistics, the reserve components, offices, and other military functions.

The seeming inconsistency between installation-level actions and perceptions of national-level trends suggests to some that the Army does not have a coordinated land strategy. It suggests that even if individual installations have land deficiencies, the Army, or the military more generally, have adequate resources that can and should be used to offset local needs.

It also suggests that internal organizational boundaries define the Army (and the DoD) approach. By this we mean that each installation assesses its needs without considering Army-wide (or DoD-wide) needs and resources. Bureaucratic obstacles are seen to make it difficult to share land among Army organizations or between Army organizations and those of the Air Force and Navy. The critique also suggests that headquarters has failed to properly integrate national needs and resources. At worst, all these perceptions confirm the no-

applied to that of the other services and the military as a single entity. So though our focus is on Army land policy, we examine this policy in the context of the entire military land resource and suggest that the Air Force and the Navy face similar issues.
tion that the military merely seeks to acquire land whenever it can and is involved in a series of “land grabs.”²

Given the perceived contradiction outlined in Figure 2, this briefing will attempt to answer the following policy questions:

• Why is it important to have a coherent national military land strategy?

• What organizational boundaries divide DoD land resources? What physical boundaries?

• How does the Army determine land needs, and how would a strategy that minimizes the role of organizational boundaries change decisionmaking?

• How much land does the Army need?

• How will these answers change with new developments in simulation technology or with additional rounds of BRAC?

The approach used in this report is to develop answers to these questions in the context of the Army’s need for training lands for the active Army. Although testing requires vast spaces of land, overall test activity has dropped since the end of the Cold War. We will consider the needs of the active Army in the context of the entire training and test land resource. The reserve component is also a user of lands but will do much of its large-scale training on installations used by the active Army. If installations are sized properly for the active Army, they should be adequate for the reserves. Depots, offices, arsenals, and other Army functions occupy land but generally require only small parcels.

²The term “land grab” or “military land grab” has been used by a variety of critics. See, for example, Coman McCarthy, “The Pentagon’s Land Sighting,” Washington Post, January 21, 1990. The term was also used in conjunction with the Army’s interest in a land exchange at Camp Shelby, Mississippi; see Biloxi Sun Herald, January 22, 1990.