INTRODUCTION

The armed forces of the United States do not and cannot operate in isolation from the larger American society. They are part of a polity whose needs they must serve. Moreover, to win the trust and support of the larger polity, the armed services must be widely perceived as serving important social needs. Without this trust and support, the armed forces will not get the resources they need to function effectively.

We argue that the Air Force can secure support by understanding and managing three kinds of linkages between the military and society (Kestnbaum, 1998). These linkages take the form of a shared value system, a shared social structure, and shared interests and attachments. We further argue that because the RC has considerably more opportunity for interaction with civilian society, it is better situated than the AC to develop these three linkages. The RC can communicate the desires and expectations of civilian society to the total force and can, in turn, communicate the missions and needs of the armed forces to civilian society, thus limiting overall isolation of the armed forces from society.

In this chapter, we first explain the theoretical framework of how each of these linkages works to increase the attachment between the armed forces and society. We then examine a number of social and political factors that have a bearing on the strength of these linkages. Finally, we assess how these social and political considerations should operate to constrain the force mix.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The first potential linkage between the armed forces and society is a shared value system. Shared values in a democratic society might relate to such issues as diversity and inclusion, citizenship rights in relation to obligations, closeness of the military to the people it is supposed to protect, responsiveness of the government to its people, the protection of democracy from centralism and tyranny, and limitations on adventurism. The operative mechanism to establish this linkage is identification, whereby people can look across institutional divides and find others who share their values or ideals. Citizens who identify with their armed forces are more likely to support them.

The second potential linkage is a network of shared social structures through which military members are intertwined with their civilian counterparts. Shared social structures can be found in the workplace, schools, churches, community service or political organizations, or even through being in common social positions, such as middle-class taxpayers in a small town. Compared with the AC, members of the RC are likely to have many more such shared structures with the civilian communities of which they are a part. The operative mechanism to establish this linkage is embeddedness, whereby people who are separated by institutional boundaries in one sphere (military versus civilian) are linked with common institutions in other spheres. An armed force embedded into larger society will have more opportunities to understand and be understood by civilians.

Finally, the RC promotes greater shared interests and attachments between those in the armed forces and civilian society, the third linkage. For example, veterans maintain an interest in the military; the number of veterans in society is arguably greater with a larger RC. Also, the mobilization of reservists generates interest among others in their communities. The operative mechanism to establish this linkage is investment, through which people become interested in persons and institutions by virtue of their connections and attachments to these people. A citizenry invested in its armed forces is more likely to support them.
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FACTORS

A number of social and political factors have been offered as arguments for reserve forces:

- The maintenance of state militias as entities separate from a national armed force is written into the Constitution.
- The RC increases the public’s awareness and trust of military institutions.
- Public reaction to reserve call-ups provides a check on excessive use of the military.
- The RC is more representative of society than the AC.
- The RC increases political support for the armed forces.
- The National Guard serves specific state roles.

Each of these social and political factors would work through the mechanisms of identification, embeddedness, and/or investment to increase the connections between society and the military.

Beyond the fact that such factors argue for the existence of the reserves, it is also reasonable to consider such factors in force-mix decisions, supplying decisionmakers with compelling reasons to maintain some minimum proportion of the force in the RC. It may be more difficult to quantify how these social and political considerations should affect the force mix than it would be to quantify how other factors such as cost, effectiveness, or personnel flow should do so. Yet without the linkages and support that these social and political considerations embody, the military will be less able to gather the resources it needs. Perhaps more important, the considerations offer something of a basis for maintaining an RC within a democratic society.

Militia-Nation Considerations

The tradition of citizen soldiers in the United States dates back to before the nation was born, and then further back into Anglo-Saxon tradition in England. Part of our romantic understanding of the Revolutionary War is that of farmers laying down their plows and
picking up their muskets to drill and then to serve. The Constitution of the United States reflects this tradition and clearly lays the groundwork for the existence of part-time soldiers, as the excerpts in Table 3.1 demonstrate.

Section 8 of Article I gives Congress the power to federalize the militia as a means to achieve broader government objectives such as security and stability. However, the militia is clearly not a federal force—since there are certain rights and responsibilities reserved to the states, such as officer appointments and training. In fact, Section 2 of Article II distinctly separates the regular forces, which now in-

Table 3.1
The Militia in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article I, Section 8</th>
<th>The Congress shall have Power</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;</td>
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<td>To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress; And</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

| Article II, Section 2 | The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States. |

| Amendment II           | A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. |
clude the Air Force as well as the Army and Navy, from the militia, or National Guard.

This constitutional language was a compromise between two factions of the document's drafters—the Federalists, who wanted a strong national government, and the Anti-Federalists, who wanted to ensure states' rights. The Federalists inserted the clause that grants Congress the power to call forth the militia. The Anti-Federalists wanted to make sure the states would have access to the militia to balance the powerful central government, so the Second Amendment was incorporated into the Bill of Rights. The language in this amendment is often understood in a limited sense as the right to bear arms. However, the right to bear arms should be understood in the context of maintaining a local militia that can be used by the states.

The militia was understood by drafters of the Constitution to be a crucial means to certain ends that cannot be better served by enlarging the standing army because the two institutions are fundamentally different. Kohn (1997) suggests that the militia is an armed countervailing power to prevent the regular military from becoming too strong and to ensure that civilians have control over military affairs. He sees this countervailing power as necessary to prevent tyranny of a strong central government based on military control and the adventurism of such a government attempting to increase its span of control by trying to conquer other nations. The founding fathers saw examples of these risks all over Europe.

Another end that the militia serves is one of citizenship, as suggested by Kestnbaum (1997). Democratic society is strengthened when rights of participation in the democracy are earned in the defense of the nation. Also, a democratic armed force must remain rooted in the people by making sure that a substantial portion do not see themselves strictly as career military but instead identify with civilians and plan to return to civilian life.

Though the Constitution calls for a militia, it does not offer direct, specific purchase on the question of sizing the National Guard. At its heart, the Constitution is a document embodying the shared values of our society, and the existence of the RC is an expression of these values. The function of the RC in this instance is to help maintain
the democracy and enhance its value. Decisionmakers need to be aware of this function when sizing the total force.

**Public Awareness/Trust of Military Institutions**

The RC serves to promote public awareness and trust of military institutions by providing civilians contact with the military and by providing military members contact with civilian society.

**Civilian Contact with the Military.** The contact hypothesis suggests that one role reservists play is communicating the culture, structures, and goals of the military to a wider public. This role has not gone unrecognized within the RC community. McDonald (1996) exhorts reserve officers to develop links with the community and to try to enhance the image of the reserves through the media. “Young officers represent an important link between the armed forces and the civilian society and are first-class military ambassadors. They are key players in promoting a broader understanding of the importance of our military defense” (p. 34).

Contact between the military and society provides an entrance for positive military values into the broader culture. For example, military sociologist Charles Moskos and his associates (e.g., Moskos and Butler, 1996) have long made the argument that the military has a higher percentage of African American managers than any other employment sector of the U.S. economy. These managers are, of course, the members of the officer corps. In the military, whites are much more likely to report to, and take direct orders from, blacks than they are in the civilian economy. RC members who are managed by minority officers in the military will be able to recognize and communicate the value of diversity in their civilian jobs.

Civilian contact with the military is enhanced by the fact that the RC, particularly the ANG, is by design far more geographically dispersed than the AC. As indicated in Figure 3.1, 75 percent of the Air Force AC is concentrated in 13 states, whereas 75 percent of the RC is spread over 25 states. For operational reasons related to heavy deployment demand, the AC can be made more efficient and less stressed by concentrating it on a smaller number of larger-scale installations. If such rebasing were to occur within the AC, the RC’s relatively greater geographical dispersal would take on even greater
importance as an avenue to increase opportunities for contact between civilians and the military.

**Military Contact with Civilians.** The flip side of public support for military institutions is military members’ understanding of the larger society. Although active-duty members of the military may have significant contact with civilians in their daily lives and jobs, they may also be isolated from them, especially if stationed on a remote base or abroad. The military branches have taken considerable care to develop cultures that reflect certain values, with an eye toward making a better, stronger, and more cohesive fighting force. These values may not be shared or, if shared, followed by larger society. Ricks (1997) tells of Marines after boot camp being faced with a kind of culture shock when they go home on leave. Civilians are “a bunch of freaks” (p. 233); “overweight, and a little sloppy” (p. 228); “self-destructive, not trying, just goofing around” (p. 229); “losers” (p. 229); “people with obnoxious attitudes, no politeness whatsoever, nasty” (p. 231). One Marine, fresh out of boot camp says “Defending my country? Well, it’s not really my country. I may live in America, but the United States is so screwed up” (p. 236).
The quotations, although not a representative sample, are telling and are a cause for concern. Members of the military are sworn to protect and serve the larger society. The potential danger lies in an armed force that decides that it is above society or that society is not worthy of protection. While we do not consider this a likely outcome, it is the worst-case consequence of a military that becomes too remote and disconnected from the general citizenry and their values.

In fact, members of the military are very different from civilians in terms of their political affiliation. In a 1997 Olin Institute paper (also cited in the Wall Street Journal, 1997), Holsti found that the military is notably conservative and partisan. In 1976, 33 percent of the military and 25 percent of the civilian opinion leaders surveyed identified themselves as Republicans. By 1996, 67 percent of the military opinion leaders were Republicans, whereas only 34 percent of the civilian leaders were. This significant, radical shift to the right is even more pronounced among younger military opinion leaders: 92 percent of those born after 1954 are Republican. The Wall Street Journal article cites an unnamed three-star general who claims that the “single greatest danger facing the U.S. military today [is] the possibility that a politicized military will stay that way, growing less and less responsive to civilian control over time.”

Reservists offer a bridge between the military and larger society because, as full-time employees within and generally longer-term residents of their respective communities, they enjoy greater embeddedness in shared social structures than their AC counterparts. Whereas AC airmen and officers may also have contact with civilians, their contacts are generally less extensive and less well developed than that of their RC counterparts. The RC is better situated than the AC to make known the Air Force’s missions and needs to civilians

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1 In this study, a survey sample was drawn from 4000 opinion leaders whose names had been derived from such general sources as Who’s Who in America and Who’s Who of American Women, as well as more specialized directories listing leaders in occupations that are underrepresented in Who’s Who, including media leaders, politicians, military officers, labor leaders, State Department and Foreign Service Officers, and foreign policy experts outside government. The military sample included students at the National War College and a smaller number of senior uniformed Pentagon officers whose names were drawn randomly from the Congressional Directory.
and in a better position to understand the values and interests of civilians and convey these back to the total force.

**Implications for the Force Mix.** The force-mix implications of increased opportunity for military/civilian contact are related to how the views and ideas of a minority group are respected by the majority. In this case, the issue is whether a better appreciation of the values and interests of the larger society found among members of the RC (a minority) can be effectively communicated to members of the AC (a majority). Insight can be found in the literature on organizations. Kanter (1977) offers a typology of minority groups based on their level of representation in an organization. Her work focuses on women in the workplace, but the reasoning can be extended to any situation where less-represented individuals are trying to make an impact in a larger group.

In Kanter’s system, a uniform group is one where members are all in one category. A skewed group is one where most of the people are of one type, perhaps making up 85 percent of the whole. Members of the minority group would be rare enough to appear as tokens and would face heightened performance pressures, since their successes may be discounted but their failures highly publicized and scrutinized. More seriously, social isolation would make it “difficult for [these members] to generate an alliance that can become powerful in the group” (p. 209). In tilted groups, the split is less severe, with perhaps 65 percent of members in one group and 35 percent in the other. Kanter characterizes the larger group in this range as a majority and members of the smaller group as a minority rather than as tokens. Here, “minority members have potential allies among each other, can form coalitions, and can affect the culture of the group. They begin to become individuals differentiated from each other as well as a type differentiated from the majority” (p. 209). At ratios of 60:40 through 50:50, the majority and minority members are balanced and can become distinctive “subgroups that may or may not generate actual type-based identifications” (p. 209).

For the RC to be taken seriously—to be able to form a coalition that can be heard—this analysis would suggest that maintaining the status of minority rather than token is necessary. Kanter is not clear on the proportion at which members of a subgroup cease to be tokens
and achieve minority status.\(^2\) Indeed, this can be expected to vary by situation. However, one possible reading of the work is that a subgroup acquires minority status with as little as 20 percent or as much as 40 percent of the population. This indicates that the RC should constitute a minimum proportion of the total Air Force in the 20–40 percent ranges to ensure it has sufficient “voice.” This assumes that the ANG and AFR can join together in a coalition to represent the viewpoints of the citizen-soldier.

Kanter’s arguments about tokenism and how proportions of minorities affect their perceived influence were based on observing females in the workplace in the early 1970s. In her example, company management did not provide the leadership required to reduce discrimination against women within the organization. In many cases, women found it difficult to do their jobs effectively because of efforts to subvert them at all levels of the organization. The level of minority representation she offers as a point at which minorities can be heard (35 percent) is probably a function of this problematic situation.

In contrast, RC members performing their jobs among AC members might not be as noticeable as females would be in a predominately male environment. Indeed, it is questionable whether AC officers and airmen in fact view RC individuals as being of distinct and lower status. Also, the Air Force does have experience integrating a minority group into its ranks. The history of removing racial barriers blocking African American participation in the armed services offers a fascinating example of how strong leadership enabled an organization to give lie to the argument that social cohesion resulting from racial similarity is a critical factor in unit performance (Rostker and Harris, 1993). Strong civilian and military leadership that focused on legislating acceptable behaviors of whites rather than on changing attitudes helped create the integrated Air Force that we observe today.

\(^2\)Other research on gender tokenism finds a different range of effects. South et al. (1982) find that “token women are not found to face more severe organizational pressures than nontokens” (p. 587). Yoder (1991) finds that the studied pressures on women “occur only for token women in gender-inappropriate occupations,” whereas in the Air Force, RC members are not in inappropriate occupations. Izraeli (1983), however, generally supports Kanter’s work on tokenism.
It is extremely doubtful that members of the RC are in a position analogous to that of African Americans before integration (or of women in Kanter’s study). In contrast, the RC is well integrated into the functioning of the total force. Moreover, the message remains that a strong, effective, and educated leadership can ensure that members of the RC are treated with respect. Thus, we believe that a constraint toward the minimum (20 percent) of Kanter’s “minority status” range of thresholds would be sufficient to ensure that the RC has effective voice in the total force.

**Linking Force Employment to Public Support**

After the Vietnam War, the military developed its total force policy, which it has maintained to the present day. Binkin (1993, pp. 110-111) offers a considered discussion of the basis for this policy and its viability.

As related by Binkin, General Creighton Abrams, after the armed forces’ Vietnam experience, advocated a close operational association between the active Army and the RC to keep the AC from being sent to a war without the involvement of the RC. The RC would bridge the gap between the active military and American citizens, so that the active military would be less isolated in case of war. Hence, “if reserves must be activated in order to sustain active forces in anything more than limited contingencies, presidents will be less inclined (and politically less able) to become involved in military actions without extensive national debate and political consensus.” (Lacy, 1986; also cited in Binkin.)

The total force policy increases the possibility that civilians will be acquainted with someone who is serving in the theater of war, and possibly someone who becomes wounded or killed. In short, since members of the RC are embedded in society, their friends and coworkers will have a higher probability of being directly tied to someone making a sacrifice for the country. The total force policy brings the war home to a larger number of civilians. If only military career professionals were involved, the boundaries around who gets killed or wounded could keep the war on an intellectual and less-emotional level for those civilians without friends or coworkers who are serving and sacrificing. Thus, using the RC ensures an involved society.
Binkin (pp. 149–151) tests this proposition using data from the Persian Gulf conflict, reaching much the same conclusions as a RAND report (RAND, 1992, pp. 95–97). (In fact the two authorities cite each other on this topic.) Binkin plots Gallup poll data on public support for the war against reserve mobilizations, showing that support for the war declined as reserves were being called up. He does not definitively state that there was a cause-and-effect relationship between the two factors, but he suggests that support might have declined further if the conflict had been longer and the number of American casualties had increased. Public opinion did not necessarily act as a brake in the short and relatively unbloody (for Americans) conflict. RAND cites anecdotal evidence that “mobilization of reserves also mobilized support of the war” and that employers supported their reservist employees (p. 96). However, there is no strong evidence either way that integrating the reserves with the active military helps maintain support or diminishes it.

RAND (1992) concludes that if decisionmakers consider that integration of the components of the force is important and necessary, then this is a political reason to shape the force in such a way. The resulting interaction produces a citizenry that knows and cares more about the military and the institution and may be more likely to participate knowledgeably in any public debate about force employment. People may be more likely to support funding for the armed forces so that those they know will be better prepared in the event of military action.

However, these analyses offer little or no purchase on the proportion of the total force that must be in the RC. If the thesis underlying the total force policy is valid—that using the RC imposes a check on inappropriate military action and creates public support for those actions that are undertaken—researchers have offered no hypotheses on how many people must have contact with RC members to obtain those effects.

Representative Force Issues

Krislov (1974) suggests that one method of securing broad social support for government policy and action is to draw a representative segment of society into the government. Doing so promotes both investment in the values of and identification with the interests of the
government on the part of all segments of society. Applied to the Air Force force-mix question, this perspective would argue to increase proportions of the force that are more demographically representative and decrease those that are not. To determine the relative representativeness of the various components, we reviewed DoD demographic data on officers and enlisted personnel both at current strengths and among new accessions (DoD, 1997).

**Gender Diversity.** Figure 3.2 shows the percentage of women in the officer corps as well as new officer accessions in fiscal year 1996. Figure 3.3 does the same for the enlisted ranks.

Of the three branches, the AFR has by far the highest percentage of active female officers, at over 24 percent, while the ANG has the least diverse officer corps of the three components, being only 13.4 percent female.

All three components are attracting female officers at a higher percentage than their current representation, with new female officers...
in the AFR making up almost 28 percent of the total. If the trend is maintained, it will lead to a gradual increase in the percentage of female officers in the three branches. Thus, the level of gender diversity among officers in the Air Force could be increased by making the AFR larger relative to the other two components.

For the enlisted corps, the AFR is again the most gender-representative component. In fiscal year 1996, 19.1 percent of the members of the AFR were female, whereas women made up 16.9 percent of the AC and 15.1 percent of the ANG. The ANG again has the least gender diversity in the Air Force.

However, of the three components, the AC is recruiting the largest percentage of enlisted females, at 26 percent. If this trend continues, the AC should surpass the AFR as the most gender-representative component. The AFR lags behind, with 21.4 percent of its new recruits being female. Again, the ANG attracts the smallest proportion of new female recruits, at 17.7 percent. However, all three components are recruiting females at higher levels, which over time will increase the percentage of female enlisted airmen. Thus, the level of
gender diversity among enlisted personnel in the Air Force could be increased by making the AFR and AC larger relative to the ANG.

We note that our analyses of gender representation were conducted at an aggregate rather than an occupational level. Some occupations have been, historically, more female-intensive than others. Thus, it is possible that gender differences among the components reflect differences in the occupational mix among the components.

Racial/Ethnic Diversity. Figure 3.4 breaks down the numbers for the officer corps and for officer accessions of the three components in fiscal year 1996 in terms of racial/ethnic diversity. Figure 3.5 provides the same information for enlisted personnel.

As the figure shows, there are few major racial/ethnic differences among AC and RC officers. The ANG has the highest percentage of Hispanic officers, whereas the AC leads in percentage of blacks. However, the differences are not great.

Figure 3.4—Percentage of Minority Officers and Officer Accessions Among Three AF Components in the Total Force, FY 1996
For officer accessions, there are again only slight differences in recruitment patterns of minorities. The ANG exceeds the other two components in its recruitment of Hispanics. The AC has the highest total proportion of minority accessions.

As shown in Figure 3.5, the enlisted ranks are markedly more racially/ethnically diverse than the officer corps. In particular, the AFR has a high percentage of blacks, at 18 percent. Differences among the components regarding participation by Hispanics are less marked, with the ANG having the highest proportion in its current strength and the AC recruiting the largest proportion. The ANG leads in the “other” category, which includes Asians, Native Americans, and Pacific Islanders. We cannot draw clear conclusions about which component does the best job of recruiting and retaining minorities.

Implications for the Force Mix. We found that the RC is more diverse than the AC in some gender and racial/ethnic categories and less diverse in others. Thus, representativeness does not argue for shifting the proportion of the force toward either the RC or the AC.
Influence of Veterans in Society

Holding force costs constant, a larger RC proportion results in a larger total force and, arguably, produces more veterans (members with some military service). The influence of these veterans can be positive in defense-related matters. In addition, veterans have ties to others in society and can thus increase understanding of the military among those with whom they come into contact.

Butler and Johnson (1991) studied how Americans felt about fiscal support for the military (spending on arms and foreign aid, in particular), the obligation to serve, the overall quality of the military, and minorities in the military and opportunities for minorities serving. They analyzed data from the General Social Survey, a biennial national survey of adults not living in institutional settings (such as hospitals, prisons, and military barracks). They pooled data from 1982, 1983, and 1984 to generate a sample with a larger number of veterans and African Americans. Generally, they find that, holding other factors constant, veterans, older people, and southerners are more likely to support the military, while more highly educated people are less supportive of the military. Characteristics having little effect include race and income. Of importance here is their finding that military service increases support for the military.

Ivie, Gimbel, and Elder (1991) analyzed data on men and women who were born in the 1920s to see if military experiences in World War II and Korea affected their attitudes toward the military. They find that being a veteran or being married to a veteran, having a child who served in the military, and maintaining social ties with friends from the service increase support for military preparedness.

3Holding costs constant, a larger RC proportion results in a smaller AC and an RC that increases by more than the decrease in the AC. Some proportion of the larger RC requirement would be met using nonprior service resources. If those nonprior service resources turn over at the same or higher rates than the smaller number of AC resources they displace, the result will be more veterans. Although we do not have separate turnover for prior-service and nonprior service reservists, we note that turnover in the RC is generally higher than turnover in the AC.

4Support for military preparedness is measured by a five-point scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree,” indexing support for the following four statements: (1) A strong defense should be the number-one priority today, ranking above social needs and a balanced budget; (2) Registration for the draft is needed to ensure a strong America; (3) Military training should receive strong support in our colleges and
Similarly, Butler and Johnson (1991) find that veteran status is positively related to support for the military.

Military experience is increasingly rare among members of Congress. Within the last 25 years, the percentage of members with any military experience has fallen from 70.6 to 35.8 percent. With fewer veterans in Congress, there is a greater possibility that military appropriations will fall short of needs.

**Political Influence of the RC**

Members of the RC can use their extensive political networks to garner national support for the armed forces. The ANG, in particular, has members in all 50 states who can lobby their congressional representatives in support of their goals. Even without active lobbying by the RC, congressional interest in maintaining a local military presence, perhaps because of jobs, will enhance the likelihood that Congress will vote in support of particular AC or RC goals.

One example is the perpetual overfunding of C130 transport aircraft procurement. Year after year, Congress, perhaps lobbied by either the aircraft manufacturer or local reserve components, funds procurement of more C130s than the Air Force requests. The extras find a home in the RC, where in fact a large portion of the airlift mission exists.

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5Data for the 93rd Congress are derived from Roster of United States Congressional Officeholders and Biographical Characteristics of Members of the United States Congress, 1789-1993: Merged Data File, 9th Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1993, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Data for the 105th Congress are derived from Congressional Universe (worldwide web service), Congressional Information Service, Bethesda, Maryland (accessed December 17, 1998).

6As stated in the Introduction, the objective of fostering a larger number of veterans in society and in government is not to maximize military resources but rather to help create conditions in which democratic social and political processes result in an appropriate level of military resources.

7This raises the question of whether the Air Force in fact relies on knowledge that this will happen when it puts together its budget requests for aircraft acquisition. If programers know that Congress is going to force a certain number of airlift aircraft on the Air Force, the Air Force can ask for more fighters or bombers than if it had to husband its resources more carefully.
According to this argument, RC political influence should be harnessed in support of all new weapon acquisitions by planning for initial introduction of new weapons in both AC and RC units. But should force-mix decisions be shaped to invoke political support? Our view is that the public interest is generally not well served when an agency attempts to bend national priorities toward its own ends through political advocacy rather than shaping its mission to what the citizenry deems important. This is particularly true if a less effective or efficient force mix were adopted to gain political advantage.

We distinguish such direct political RC influence from a more indirect sort, which is the development of public support for the armed forces through voting and other manifestations of political preferences. The military needs public support to sustain itself in an environment of limited resources, where defense is just one of many public goods competing for tax dollars. The RC, with its ties to the larger society, is well positioned to communicate the importance of defense and national security policy to a citizenry whose more immediate concerns and interests may lie in other directions. We argue in this report that the RC’s indirect influence—through the processes of identification, embeddedness, and investment—plays a significant role in generating public support for the military.

**State Missions of the ANG**

Unlike the other components of the armed services, the National Guard has a state role. It can be called upon by state governors to offer emergency assistance in a disaster that may present problems to an overwhelmed citizenry. Examples are snowstorms, floods, earthquakes, and fires, as well as emergencies resulting from social unrest.

Brown, Fedorochko, and Schank (1995) examined the nature of the state missions of the National Guard to determine if the Guard had sufficient manpower to fulfill them. They collected survey data from 49 of the 54 National Guard entities (in all 50 states, plus the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands). In addition, they conducted 15 site visits to study in depth state requirements for the Guard and how well they had been met. The
study included both the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard.

The authors examined cases where the Guard was called out to respond to state emergencies, including Hurricane Andrew that struck Florida and Louisiana in 1992, Hurricane Iniki that damaged Hawaii in 1992, the enormous Midwestern floods in 1993 that put huge portions of Wisconsin, Missouri, Iowa, Illinois, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, and North Dakota under water, and the 1992 Los Angeles riots that followed the acquittal of the police officers who had been accused of brutalizing Rodney King. In each of these cases, National Guardsmen numbering in the thousands were called up to respond to the crisis conditions.8

The staffing of the National Guard was more than adequate to perform all the state missions for which it was called upon. The Guard usually backed up state resources and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) rather than serving as a front-line response to disaster. There may not be enough National Guard capacity to fully resolve peak disasters, but these peaks are relatively rare, and the Guard is one tool in an adequate package of emergency relief that is sufficient to respond to civil emergencies. Brown and his colleagues do not recommend increasing the size of the Guard to respond to peak disasters, which they characterize as an uneconomical approach. Sizing the Guard to deal with rare disasters would mean creating a force that is underused the vast majority of the time. If increased capability should be considered necessary, regional pacts between the state Guard organizations could institutionalize and ease the sharing of resources among the states. The example of the Oklahoma Air Guard airlifting feed to cattle in New Mexico while the New Mexico Guard responded to other aspects of a heavy snowstorm shows the viability of this option.

Brown et al. (1995) report that only a small fraction of ANG units or members serve on state missions in any given year (and in many years there is no requirement for their services). Thus, even a

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8Major disasters tend to require resources more likely to be found in the Army National Guard than in the Air National Guard. However, the ANG contributes special capabilities, such as airlift and civil engineering, in addition to general-purpose manpower.
significantly reduced RC would not negatively affect the ability of the ANG to perform its state missions.

State missions of the ANG garner a great deal of positive publicity from the media and support from the public, increasing interest and investment in the institution. Moreover, citizens who may have little or no contact with the military or its members in usual times may have significant contact during disasters, further deepening this means of attachment between civilian society and the armed forces. This is probably not a sufficient reason to set a floor on the size or proportion of the ANG in the total force.

**HOW SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS CONSTRAIN THE FORCE MIX**

Our current research seeks to determine the degree to which social and political considerations should constrain the force mix. We illustrate our findings using the two constraint lines depicted in Figure 3.6. Note that the lines in Figure 3.6 are labeled differently from the corresponding lines in Figure 2.2. The labels introduced here more fully reflect the vocabulary and concepts introduced in Chapter Three. One line represents the RC proportion of the total force needed to provide a sufficient level of social identification, embeddedness, and investment (IE&I) linking the armed forces to the larger society. The other line represents the minimum proportion that the RC must occupy to have a meaningful level of representation and influence within the total force.

The IE&I constraint line is sloped but its precise position cannot be determined. We can theorize that as the total force decreases in size and is more geographically concentrated, the RC would play an increasingly important role in maintaining contact with the larger society. The RC would have to occupy an increasingly larger proportion of the total force to provide the required mass in a sufficient number of communities. This explains the slope of the line. However, we have no basis for estimating the mass or community penetration needed to obtain these benefits. Thus, the position of the line is unknown.

A minority status constraint is shown at 20 percent. As discussed earlier, this is at the low end of Kanter’s range of thresholds between
Figure 3.6—Locus of Political and Social Constraints on the Force Mix

a token and minority level of representation for a separately identifiable subgroup within an institution. We offer this constraint with the caveat that Kanter’s theory was developed after observing demographic minorities that are more clearly distinct than are the active and reserve components of the armed services, and in a situation where leadership did not work to ensure that the minority was taken seriously. Generalizing the theory to apply it in the force-mix context must be done with caution.

Finally, we offer a caveat that Air Force force-mix implications cannot be considered in isolation from those of the other armed services. In many cases, the social and political functions that are part of the logic of a strong RC are served similarly by the Army and the Air Force National Guards and Reserves. The Army RC is much larger than the Air Force RC, and presumably how the Army addresses the force-mix question would have more of an effect on the feedback loop between the military and society than would the force mix within the Air Force.