This appendix derives the practical implications of the model for the analyst through the use of questions and guidelines to address aspects of each of the model’s three stages. For the sake of clarity and in order to come as close as possible to specific indicators and essential elements of information, each set of questions is grouped and coded (up to four characters) with a series of letters and numbers. The coding sequence (explained below) aims to provide a step-by-step guide for an analyst in organizing the analysis. The guidelines are presented so as to guide the analyst in using the tables and matrices.

The first character in the coding sequence of all questions is a letter (capitalized, ranging from A to D) that pertains to the overall position of the question within the framework of the model. Thus, all questions pertaining to the first stage of the model, or the potential for strife, have codes starting with the letter “A”; all questions pertaining to the second stage of the model, or the mobilization of the group for political action (thus transforming the potential into likely strife), have codes starting with the letter “B”; all questions that aim to assess the state’s capabilities, or the half-step of the third stage of the model that aims to establish the state’s strengths and weaknesses in key areas, have codes starting with the letter “C”; all questions (really guidelines at this stage) to assess the strategic bargaining process have codes starting with the letter “D.”

The second character in the coding sequence is a number that pertains to one of the subcategories in each of the three stages of the model. For all questions on the potential for strife (i.e., questions...
with a code starting with the letter A), the second character of the code is a number ranging from 1 to 4 that refers either to the political factors (A1), the economic factors (A2), the social factors (A3), or the overall assessment of potential for strife (A4). For all questions on the mobilization of the group (i.e., questions with a code starting with the letter B), the second character of the code is a number ranging from 1 to 6 that refers either to incipient changes (B1), galvanizing (“tipping”) events (B2), leadership (B3), resources and organization (B4), the foreign element (B5), or the overall assessment of mobilization (B6). For all questions on the assessment of the state’s strengths and weaknesses in key areas (i.e., questions with a code starting with the letter C), the second character of the code is a number ranging from 1 to 3 that refers either to the accommodative capability (C1), the fiscal and economic capability (C2), or the coercive capability (C3). For all guidelines to assess the strategic bargaining process (i.e., questions/guidelines with a code starting with the letter D), the second character is a number (either 1 or 2) that is related either to the measurement of the capacities of the group and the state (D1) or the comparison of the preferences within the bargaining process (D2).

In most of the categories, the breakdown into more specific questions or guidelines continues, and the codes reflect the further subcategorization. The third character is a letter (not capitalized, ranging from a to e) that further distinguishes the questions and their relationship to the larger categories. For example, within the overall category of assessment of the potential for strife (“A”) and its subcategory of assessing closure in the political realm (“A1”), questions are further subdivided to address the distribution of power among the top political executive (A1a) and security (A1b) authorities.

The coding sequence also extends in some cases to a fourth character that further differentiates some questions or guidelines within the model framework. The fourth character is a number, ranging from 1 to 4. For example, the subcategory explained just above (A1a) is further divided into two groups, with questions coded A1a1 referring to indicators that focus on the highest-ranking individuals, and questions coded A1a2 referring to the indicators of the lower-ranking bureaucrats.
A. THE POTENTIAL FOR STRIFE

Assessing the potential for strife is especially applicable to countries that lack any visible and organized ethnic movements. But the assessment is also useful for countries where such movements exist, because it allows the analyst to ascertain the depth of the ties that bind the existing groups as well as point to the potential for new groups to arise. Both of the latter are especially useful for long-term assessment of the potential for strife.

As outlined in the model, the analysis must examine all three arenas of closure: political, economic, and social. The static “snapshot” of the current situation must be supplemented with a dynamic assessment of the ease of changing current stratification patterns. But first the analyst needs to assemble data on the substate characteristics of the given population before proceeding to the specific questions. The task involves compiling data on racial, religious, linguistic (including significant dialects), regional, or other significant cultural differences. For populations of small countries, where kinship ties may remain important, extended clan groups may also need to be examined. The purpose of the compilation is to establish the “terms of reference” for examining closure boundaries. At this point, the task is simply to note the numerical data and distribution patterns of the given subpopulation. The analyst should note discrepancies between figures from different sources (for example, for the population size of one linguistic group, members of that group and the government may provide quite different numbers).

The following outline presents the topics of the questions that an analyst needs to consider in assessing the potential for strife. The outline is presented to make clear the organization of the section and the logical connections between the questions. The actual questions follow the outline.
Outline of Questions for Assessing:
A. The Potential for Strife

A1. ASSESSING CLOSURE IN THE POLITICAL REALM
A1a. Top political authorities
   A1a1. Highest-ranking individuals
   A1a2. Director-level managers
A1b. Top security authorities
   A1b1. Highest-ranking individuals
   A1b2. Director-level managers
A1c. Assessment of static factors at the political level
   A1c1. Comparing patterns at the political executive level
   A1c2. Comparing patterns at the security level
A1d. Assessment of dynamic factors at the political level
   A1d1. General framework for change
   A1d2. Framework for change by specific groups

A2. ASSESSING CLOSURE IN THE ECONOMIC REALM
A2a. Distribution of wealth
   A2a1. The elite level
   A2a2. The general population level
A2b. Assessment of static factors at the economic level
A2c. Assessment of dynamic factors at the economic level
   A2c1. General framework for change
   A2c2. Framework for change by specific groups

A3. ASSESSING CLOSURE IN THE SOCIAL REALM
A3a. Status distribution: static aspects
   A3a1. Determinants of status distribution
   A3a2. Benefits and restrictions based on status
A3b. Status distribution: dynamic aspects
   A3b1. General framework for change
   A3b2. Framework for change by specific groups
Questions and Guidelines for the Analyst 295

A4. OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF CLOSURE

A4a. Framework for closure

   A4a1. Patterns of privilege and deprivation
   A4a2. Degree of relative deprivation
   A4a3. Potential for change

A4b. Ranking the groups

A1. Assessing Closure in the Political Realm

An examination of the political realm consists of looking at the static and dynamic aspects of the distribution of power among the political executive and security authorities. Using the terms of reference already compiled (data on population characteristics), the analyst should examine the distribution of power among the top political executive (questions coded A1a) and security (questions coded A1b) authorities, with both the uppermost and more broadly understood upper-level officials scrutinized. The actual characteristics exhibited should then be compared with the characteristics of the population (guidelines for comparison are coded A1c). The questions and guidelines coded A1a–A1c consist of the static factors. A final element follows, the evaluation of dynamic factors in assessing closure in the political realm (questions coded A1d). The following questions should guide the examination.

A1a. Top political authorities. The top political authorities need to be examined at two levels: the highest-ranking individuals (questions coded A1a1) and the director-level managers (questions coded A1a2) who make the everyday decisions and implement government policies. An examination of both levels is necessary so as to avoid skewed results in either area.

   A1a1. Highest-ranking individuals. Which substate characteristics\(^1\) do the top five to ten individuals in positions of executive political authority exhibit? The top executive political positions are those where the final responsibility for the implementation of gov-

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\(^1\)The “substate characteristics” are defined in the paragraph under the previous heading “A. The Potential for Strife.”
ernment policy rests. Generally, these positions include (though may not be limited to): the president, the prime minister, and the ministers concerned with the economy (treasury, finance, industry, energy, etc.) and internal administration (interior, justice).\(^2\) Top executive personnel in the security realm are the subject of another question (A1b1). In cases of divided government (real constraints on executive power), the legislative and/or judicial branches also may need to be examined in the manner presented above. In states where provincial administration has substantial political power (as in federal states), the key figures for the province also need to be assessed.

**A1a2. Director-level managers.** Which substate characteristics do the individuals in charge of everyday implementation of governmental policy exhibit? The positions in question here are sectional chiefs of the executive bureaucracy (one or two grades down from the ministerial level). The data pertain to the same ministries in the economy and security realms identified in the preceding question (A1a1). The same qualification as in A1a1 applies to states with divided governments and to states where the provinces have substantial room for independent action.

**A1b. Top security authorities.** The assessment of top security authorities proceeds in a fashion similar to the examination of the top political authorities, with one assessment at the level of the highest-ranking individuals (questions coded A1b1) and a complementary assessment at the director level (questions coded A1b2). The rationale for the two levels is the same as in the political level assessment: to avoid skewed results in either area.

**A1b1. Highest-ranking individuals.** Which substate characteristics do the top five to ten individuals in positions of authority in the security sphere exhibit? The top positions in the security apparatus are those where the final responsibility for the implementation of governmental policy rests. The security apparatus consists of (but is

\(^2\)In some cases, the most important executive authority may not have any formal state title but instead go by “Great Leader” or “Supreme Guardian.” Since the aim of the exercise is to focus on the top leaders, the analyst should go by the function performed rather than by formal title. In most cases, formal titles are the best tip-off for the function performed.
Questions and Guidelines for the Analyst

A1b2. **Director-level managers.** Which substate characteristics do the individuals who form the upper levels of the security apparati exhibit? The positions in question here are the upper-level ranks of the security bureaucracies identified in the preceding question (A1b1). For example, concerning the military, the ranks of the officer corps at the level of colonel and above, form the group for examination. The same qualification as in A1b1 applies to states with shared central-provincial authority.

A1c. **Assessment of static factors at the political level.** The data assembled in A1a and A1b present a picture of the top authorities, but they mean little without a comparison to the situation existing in the society as a whole. Any patterns that may point to closure emerge only in such a comparison. The questions below are meant to guide the comparison, with one set of questions (coded A1c1) focusing on the political executive authorities and another (coded A1c2) looking at the security authorities.

A1c1. **Comparing patterns at the political executive level.** What is the discrepancy at the political (executive) authority level (A1a), both in terms of the elite (A1a1) and upper-level administrators (A1a2), between the actual characteristics exhibited and the characteristics of the population as a whole? Discrepancies between the actual and proportional characteristics may indicate limitations on access to power (closure). Rather than focusing on small differences, the analyst should note major differences in the two patterns (in over- and underrepresentation). For example, compare the population of country X and its political (executive) elite and top administrators in terms of linguistic preferences. Assuming that 35 percent of the country’s population are native speakers of language z, the fact that 5 percent of the elite and 10 percent of the top administrators are native speakers of language z may indicate closure in the political realm (with native speakers of language z in
an inferior position). In case of a comparison of the actual and proportional figures at the provincial level, the analyst should assemble data and compare both characteristics at the provincial (rather than state) level.

A1c2. Comparing patterns at the security level. What is the discrepancy in the security sphere (A1b), both in terms of the elite (A1b1) and upper-level ranks of the apparati (A1b2), between the actual characteristics exhibited and the characteristics of the population as a whole? The same guidelines outlined in A1c1 apply, in that large discrepancies (either over- or underrepresentation) between the actual and proportional characteristics may indicate limitations on access to power (closure). When provincial-level characteristics are also to be examined, the same guidelines as in A1c1 apply.

A1d. Assessment of dynamic factors at the political level. The static snapshot of possible closure that is determined in A1a–A1c needs to be supplemented by an examination of the restrictions on access to positions of power in the political and security spheres. The dynamic component is indispensable to a long-range assessment, for it provides grounds for establishing the possibility for changing the situation identified in A1a–A1c. Formal restrictions should be the primary focus (because of the ease in identifying them), but any informal restrictions also should be noted. Both the ease of change at all (questions coded A1d1) and ease of change on the part of some substate groups (questions coded A1d2) need to be examined.

A1d1. General framework for change. Is suppression of overt dissent a part of the governing process? Is there a codified process for the legitimization and/or replacement of political elites? These questions assess the overall state of development of the political institutions and establish whether change of access to the political realm by peaceful means can be contemplated realistically.

A1d2. Framework for change by specific groups. Are there any restrictions on access to the political realm (voting rights, ability to hold office) along the lines of characteristics of the population at the substate level? Are there any restrictions at the level of substate characteristics on redress of grievances in the judicial system? Are there any restrictions on assembly along the lines of substate charac-
teristics? Are there any restrictions on, or are any groups singled out for, service in the security apparati? Formal rules curtailing access are easily identifiable and may be found in constitutions and specific laws. Informal rules curtailing access are not as easy to identify, but in conjunction with the answers to economic (A2) and social (A3) closure indicators, they may become clear. For example, formal restrictions on access to politics may be written so as to target specific economically disadvantaged substate groups without naming those groups explicitly.

**A2. Assessing Closure in the Economic Realm**

Using the same terms of reference as in A1 (data on population characteristics), the analyst should examine the distribution of wealth in the society (questions coded A2a) and then compare the actual characteristics with the characteristics of the population (questions coded A2b). The resulting assessment comprises the static snapshot of the situation. Another set of questions (coded A2c) evaluates the dynamic factors in assessing closure in the economic realm. The following questions should guide the examination.

**A2a. Distribution of wealth.** An analysis of the distribution of wealth in a given society needs to proceed at two levels: the patterns at the elite level (questions coded A2a1) and the patterns at the level of the general population (questions coded A2a2). An examination of both levels is necessary so as to avoid skewed results in either area.

**A2a1. The elite level.** Which substate characteristics does the wealthiest 1 percent of the population (identified in terms of assets) exhibit? The 1 percent figure is adopted for convenience only, as a somewhat arbitrary way to identify the wealthiest; alternatively, figures anywhere from 2 to 5 percent also may provide the information. The central aspect of this analysis is to identify the richest stratum of the population. Data may be difficult to obtain on this point (because of holdings in other countries), and there is an acute need for information here beyond what may be officially supplied.

**A2a2. The general population level.** What are the patterns of wealth (in terms of substate characteristics) in the population as a whole? A standard measure, such as per-capita income distribution, needs to be applied. The central aspect of this analysis is to identify
the prevailing patterns of wealth in the population as a whole. Accurate data for this analysis may be difficult to obtain.

A2b. Assessment of static factors at the economic level. By itself, the data assembled in A2a provide a picture of the patterns of distribution of wealth, but this means little without a comparison to the breakdown of the society into substate groups according to the terms of reference gathered initially. The specific questions for the analyst are: What is the discrepancy in the pattern of wealth distribution, both in terms of the elite (A2a1) and the general population (A2a2), between the actual characteristics exhibited and the characteristics of the population as a whole? Discrepancies between the actual and proportional characteristics may indicate limitations on access to wealth (closure). The analyst should note major differences in the patterns observed (in over- and underrepresentation). For example, compare the population of country Y and its wealthiest 1 percent and the general pattern of wealth distribution among the population in terms of religious preferences. Assume that 60 percent of the population of the country are adherents of religion x. The fact that 95 percent of the wealthiest 1 percent are adherents of religion x and that 80 percent of the wealth is concentrated in the hands of adherents of religion x may indicate closure in the economic realm.

A2c. Assessment of dynamic factors at the economic level. The static snapshot of possible closure that is determined in A2a–A2b needs to be supplemented by an examination of the restrictions on access to wealth. The dynamic component is indispensable to a long-range assessment, for it provides grounds for establishing the possibility for changing the situation identified above. Formal restrictions should be the primary focus (because of the ease in identifying them), but any informal restrictions also should be noted. Both the ease of change at all (A2c1) and ease of change on the part of some substate groups (A2c2) need to be examined.

A2c1. General framework for change. Is suppression of independent economic activity a part of the governing process? Are there any fundamental noneconomic barriers to activity leading to capital accumulation? These questions assess the overall state of the economic institutions and establish whether change of access to wealth through economic means can be contemplated realistically.
A2c2. Framework for change by specific groups. Are there any restrictions on access to wealth (property laws, tax laws, limits on establishing firms) along the lines of characteristics of the population at the substate level? Are there any restrictions on consumption that may disadvantage individuals sharing certain substate characteristics? Formal rules curtailing access are easily identifiable and may be found in specific laws. Informal rules curtailing access are not as easy to identify, but in conjunction with the results of answers to political (A1) and social (A3) closure indicators, they may become clear. For example, formal restrictions on access to wealth may be written so as to target specific economically disadvantaged substate groups without naming those groups explicitly. Examples of such practices may be discerned through attention to the tax structure, subsidies, trading patterns favored, and land transfer practices. For example, tax preferences and/or subsidies may exist for certain industries (and these industries may be identified with specific substate groups). In addition, certain economic activities may be defined as criminal and prosecuted. The analyst should note the informal restrictions that amount to limits on capital accumulation for some and the retention of wealth for those who are already wealthy.

A3. Assessing Closure in the Social Realm

Using the same terms of reference (data on population characteristics), the analyst should examine the distribution of status in the society (questions coded A3a) and the possibility for changing the pattern of status distribution (questions coded A3b). The former provides a static snapshot of the possible closure in the social realm, while the latter provides the dynamic element. Differentiation of substate groups according to status may help pinpoint some informal closure rules in the political and economic realms. The following questions should guide the examination.

A3a. Status distribution: static aspects. Because status according to substate characteristics is, by definition, accorded to the entire group, this set of questions lacks the division into two levels of analysis (elite and mass) that was necessary in the assessments at the political and economic levels. Ascertaining status distribution should be carried out by first looking at the existing pattern of distribution (questions coded A3a1) and the specific benefits conferred or
restrictions imposed on individuals belonging to a higher or a lower status group, respectively (questions coded A3a2).

**A3a1. Determinants of status distribution.** What is the basis for the pattern of status hierarchy and stratification in the state (vocational, hereditary, or hierocratic)? If vocational, are there any vocations identified with specific substate groups? If hierocratic, are there any groups identified specifically with the state (is the state defined in national/group terms or not)? For example, does the constitution speak of the state as an expression of a specific national group, or does it speak of the citizens of the state (not defined in national terms)? Are there any groups seen as foreign or unassimilated? Based on status differences, the analyst should put together a status stratification map of the society, ranging from the privileged to the pariah groups.

**A3a2. Benefits and restrictions based on status.** What kind of benefits accrue to members of the higher status groups simply on the basis of belonging to the group? Conversely, what kind of restraints affect members of the lower status groups simply on the basis of belonging to the group? For example, does belonging to a higher status group carry exclusionary rights to participate in the political realm, or is it simply a symbolic reference that no longer carries any tangible benefits? Similarly, does belonging to a lower status group carry any identifiable constraints on the range of economic activity in which an individual can take part? Are certain linguistic groups disadvantaged in state structures (for example, in the judiciary system)?

**A3b. Status distribution: dynamic aspects.** The static snapshot of possible closure that is determined in A3a needs to be supplemented by an assessment of the rigidity of the status stratification and the extent of mobility among the status groups. The dynamic component is indispensable to a long-range assessment, for it provides grounds for establishing the possibility for changing the situation identified in A3a. Formal restrictions on membership in status groups should be the primary focus (because of the ease in identifying them), but any informal restrictions should also be noted. Both the ease of change at all (questions coded A3b1) and ease of change on the part of some substate groups (questions coded A3b2) need to be examined.
A3b1. General framework for change. How fluid is membership in a group, and is mobility between status groups possible (or are groups defined so as to preclude movement between them)? Does the state establish rules on status groups, and does it punish those who do not follow them? Is there a norm (perhaps upheld by the state) of social tolerance, or is there a norm of exclusion and separation? These questions assess the overall possibility of whether change toward belonging to a higher status group can be realistically contemplated.

A3b2. Framework for change by specific groups. If mobility is possible, how easily is it accomplished? Are members of some groups precluded from mobility? What is the length of time in which an individual can change status groups? Is it a matter of rapid accomplishment in a given vocation, or is it tied to intermarriage and generations of residence in the same locality? Are certain groups especially disadvantaged by the existing rules on mobility?

A4. Overall Assessment of Closure

The examination of the specific realms of closure performed on the basis of the questions in A1–A3 has described the cleavages and potential areas of closure within the society being assessed. On the basis of the assembled information, the analyst needs to put together an assessment of the rankings of the various groups in the society. First, the analyst should establish the framework for the rankings (questions coded A4a) and then put together an explicit ranking system along the lines of discovered closure (guidelines coded A4b).

A4a. Framework for closure. The composite assessment of the framework for closure needs to make use of the information gathered so far in a manner that is most useful to the overall model. In this sense, the data gathered so far should be reinterpreted along the following lines. Using the data compiled on the characteristics of the society, which groups (if any) are privileged and which are not? (Questions coded A4a1 address this issue.) Of the groups that are not privileged, what is the degree of relative deprivation? (Questions coded A4a2 address this point.) How easy is it to change the existing inequalities and imbalances? (Questions coded A4a3 address this issue.)
A4a1. Patterns of privilege and deprivation. Do any groups show a consistent pattern of privilege or deprivation across the three realms of closure? The analyst should make the assessment on the basis of the existence of potential closure patterns established in A1c1–2, A2b, and A3a1, treating the political realm (A1c1–2) as most important. In cases where strong patterns of closure exist in all three realms, a given group may be said to be experiencing a high degree of closure (either in a position of domination or dominated). In cases where less clear-cut patterns of closure exist or if the patterns do not extend across all three realms, a given group may be said to be experiencing a moderate degree of closure. If no clear pattern emerges, then closure along that specific variable may not be a factor in the given polity.

A4a2. Degree of relative deprivation. Assuming an identified high or moderate degree of closure, what is the degree of deprivation that a given group may be suffering? The analyst should make the assessment on the basis of the extent of potential closure patterns established in A1c1–2, A2b, and A3a2. Taking the most privileged group as the point of reference, how much are other groups deprived relative to it? In cases where far-reaching differences exist in all three realms, a given group may be said to be experiencing a high level of deprivation as a result of its closure. In cases where the differences are not clear cut across the three realms, a given group may be said to be experiencing a moderate level of deprivation as a result of its closure. In cases where differences are small, then deprivation is low.

A4a3. Potential for change. Looking at the groups experiencing a high or moderate degree of closure, how amenable is the existing situation to change? The analyst should make the assessment on the basis of the dynamic factors identified in A1d, A2c, and A3b. In cases where the situation is not amenable to change at all or is amenable to change only in an extremely lengthy (generational) fashion, a given group may be said to be experiencing an extremely rigid form of closure (either in a position of domination or dominated). In cases where the situation is amenable to change in an individual’s lifetime, a given group may be said to be experiencing a moderately rigid form of closure. In cases where the situation is amenable to rapid change (a manner of years), a given group may be said to be experiencing a fluid form of closure.
A4b. **Ranking the groups.** On the basis of the assessments in A4a, the analyst should place the various groups, ranging from those in a position of privilege to those in a position of lacking privilege, using the levels of deprivation and rigidity to differentiate the various groups. The ranking represents a final assessment of the potential for certain groups to be willing to take up arms in order to change their position in the society. Rather than a strictly hierarchical ranking, some groups are likely to be advantaged in some areas and facing deprivation in others. The analyst must take such nuances into account. The assessment represents the final results of the application of the first stage of the model to a given case.

**B. TRANSFORMING POTENTIAL INTO LIKELY STRIFE**

As outlined in the model, the assessments derived in the preceding section (questions coded A) only point to groups that are aggrieved and might be willing to contemplate violence in order to change the existing patterns of power and domination. To assess the likelihood of violence, the aggrieved groups must be analyzed in terms of mobilization potential.

There are five catalysts of mobilization that may lead to effective group action, and they need to be examined in detail. The questions below address each of the factors: incipient changes (questions coded B1), galvanizing events (questions coded B2), leadership (questions coded B3), resources and organization (questions coded B4), and the foreign element (questions coded B5). In addition, a final set of guidelines (coded B6) assesses the overall mobilization potential.

Whereas the nature of closure made a systematic examination of its components fairly straightforward, an examination of the factors needed for mobilization lacks such a uniform structure for two reasons. First, the time frame is different; unlike an examination of the structure and the persistent features of the society, an examination of mobilization processes has to take into account that mobilization can be quite rapid and surprising, even to the participants. Second, the specific nature of how the five factors identified as necessary for mobilization will demonstrate themselves is exceedingly difficult to anticipate. However, thinking in terms of the five categories can shape the analyst’s understanding of the mobilization and its
strength, provide an early understanding that what is happening is indeed mobilization along ethnic or communitarian lines, and is crucial to understanding the third stage of the model—the bargaining process.

The following outline presents the topics of the questions that an analyst needs to consider in assessing the transformation of potential into likely strife. The outline is presented to make clear the organization of the section and the logical connections between the questions. The actual questions follow the outline.

**Outline of Questions for Assessing:**

**B. Transforming Potential Strife into Likely Strife**

- **B1. Incipient Changes**
  - B1a. Long-term changes
  - B1b. Sudden changes

- **B2. Galvanizing (“Tipping”) Events**

- **B3. Leadership**

- **B4. Resources and Organization**
  - B4a. Resources
    - B4a1. Overall availability
    - B4a2. Mechanisms for extraction of resources
  - B4b. Organization
  - B4c. Overall assessment

- **B5. Foreign Element**
  - B5a. Co-ethnics abroad
  - B5b. International disputes

- **B6. Overall Assessment of Mobilization**
B1. Incipient Changes

An incipient change in closure and power relations can stem either from long-term trends (questions coded B1a) or sudden events (questions coded B1b). Ongoing small changes in a society are difficult to discern precisely because they are constant and ever present. However, long-term incremental change amounts to a fundamental change, and at some point, through a specific event, the full magnitude of the long-term changes becomes evident in a manner that upsets the existing power balance. Sudden events, such as technological breakthroughs or mineral discoveries in a certain region, also threaten the existing power balance. It is possible to predict the eventual effect of long-term changes, but the changes themselves are difficult for an analyst to discern. The sudden changes are easily noted, but they are impossible to predict because they are event-specific and, by definition, unexpected. Whatever the cause, the crucial aspect here is the change in power relations and the upsetting of the status quo through a specific event.

B1a. Long-term changes. Using the terms of reference ascertained earlier, what are the demographic, economic, and environmental trends in a given society? At what point will these trends amount to pressures for systemic change? What venues are likely for the actualization of such pressures? For example, if two substate groups inhabit a given state and the smaller group (one that is in a state of relative deprivation vis-à-vis the larger group) has a natural growth rate twice that of the privileged group, at some point the deprived group will become numerically larger. At that point, demands for recognition of the group’s majority status (and redressing the group’s deprived status) through political measures might be forthcoming. When the time is close to such a demographic shift, all the actors will understand that an incipient change is coming. The main task for the analyst is to note the point at which long-term incremental changes amount to a basic change in power relations.

B1b. Sudden changes. Using the earlier defined terms of reference, which groups are likely to gain and/or to lose from unexpected major breakthroughs or discoveries? For example, if major gold or oil deposits are discovered in a province populated primarily by a group that is in a subordinate position in that country, the expectation of a sudden inflow of capital into the province may amount to an unex-
pected shift in power balance in the country as a whole. Unlike B1a, where the trends are possible to predict, the analyst should look at the issue of sudden changes from the perspective of monitoring ongoing events and ascertaining their impact on the larger power relations and closure in a given society. In other words, an analyst should consider specific events from the standpoint of ascertaining their potential for causing disruptions to the status quo and closure.

B2. Galvanizing (“Tipping”) Events

A public event that galvanizes group sensibilities can range from the firing of an outspoken newspaper editor to a violent crackdown on the members of a given group. As such, the specific form that a galvanizing event might take is nearly impossible to anticipate. But through a series of questions the analyst might at least anticipate that certain events may have the potential to become galvanizing events. Keeping in mind that the central point of a galvanizing event is the symbolism behind the action, the following questions may help in narrowing the range of possibilities and should be useful in structuring the analysis. The questions focus on group anniversaries, places of special significance, prominent personalities, and group-specific cultural traits.

Are there any regularly scheduled marches or demonstrations (related, for example, to a date that holds special group-specific meaning) that may lead to a clash? Is there a specific place of symbolic significance for the group (for example, a temple or shrine) that may be subject to destruction? Is there a specific figure whose death or imprisonment will lead to his or her martyrdom? Are there any specific physical or cultural characteristics of the group (headdress, facial hair, language, certain food or drink) that may be subject to outlawing or persecution by the state? As noted above, the list is almost inexhaustible because it is event-specific, but the four distinctive categories given above provide some structure in identifying the range of choices.

B3. Leadership

Just as in the case of galvanizing events, the emergence and background of leaders is event-specific and idiosyncratic. However, simi-
larly to galvanizing events, a skeleton analytical structure can be put together so as to identify likely leaders. One realm of difference is related to the type of social structures in the given society. Therefore, a basic question is whether traditional (patrimonial) or bureaucratic power structures are paramount in the given society. Individuals emerging from organizations that are respected in the given society will be more likely to command respect and loyalty. In societies where patrimonial structures exist, some individuals assume a position of certain stature on the basis of birth and family. In societies where bureaucratic structures exist, some individuals who rise to a high position within them command a certain degree of stature. However, to be effective and act as a motivating force for the group, a leader must have a certain degree of charisma and be willing to take some risk to his safety. Keeping in mind the natural division between traditional and modern power structures that result in different types of respect and stature depending on the society, the following questions may narrow the choices in identifying potential leaders.

Are there any activists who disregard personal safety and comfort to energize the group? Are there any individuals whose speeches have a markedly and noticeably strong effect upon the audience? Are there any unusually talented individuals from a subordinate group who have risen quickly through the ranks in the armed forces or civil service? Are there leadership vehicles in place (unions, clubs, societies, etc.) so that a leader may emerge?

B4. Resources and Organization

Unlike leadership and galvanizing events, it is easier to make an assessment of resources (questions coded B4a) and level of organization (questions coded B4b) of a given group. An overall composite assessment should follow (guidelines coded B4c). Since the existence of traditional (patrimonial) or modern (bureaucratic) power structures in the society affects the existence of resources and organization, the answer to that question (from answers regarding leadership issues, or B3) should be kept in mind. The following questions should assist in the analysis of the level of resources.

B4a. Resources. Resources that theoretically might be made available in conditions of full mobilization should be the goal of the
assessments (questions coded B4a1), modified by an evaluation of the mechanisms for achieving full mobilization (questions coded B4a2).

**B4a1. Overall availability.** What are the overall levels of wealth of the group? Are there any other groups that might sympathize enough with the mobilizing group so as to make available some of their resources? Are there any specific wealthy individuals (either from the group or from outside of it) who sympathize with the group and/or its leader?

**B4a2. Mechanisms for extraction of resources.** Since the higher the deprivation the more likely the willingness to contribute resources, how high is the level and rigidity of deprivation of the group (also see A2b–c)? How effective a mechanism can the group construct to ensure compliance with “taxes for the group?” Does it need to rely on force for compliance, or can it rely on voluntary contributions?

**B4b. Organization.** The initial question on organization is whether the leader brings in an already existing organization to the mobilization process, for example as a result of a patrimonial basis to leadership (B3). The analyst should then attempt an assessment of the potential for the formation of a functioning organization on the basis of background and experiences of the group and its leader. Does the leadership have first-hand knowledge of and experience with complex hierarchical organizations? Are there any individuals closely associated with the leader who have such knowledge or experience? What are the existing organizational mechanisms within the group that might be used by the mobilizing leader?

**B4c. Overall assessment.** The analyst then needs to link the answers about resources and organization (B4a–b) to assess the level of organizational effectiveness that the mobilizing group can achieve. If the leadership is in a strong position to mobilize and organize the resources of the given group, then it can be said to have high organization potential. If the leadership does not appeal to the whole group and/or is unlikely to have the organizational skills needed to utilize the resources effectively, then it can be said to have moderate organizational potential. If the leadership is weak, has limited appeal to the group as a whole, and has few of the skills needed to use the resources, then it can be said to have low organizational potential.
B5. Foreign Element

Foreign assistance is a means of boosting the mobilizing group’s resource and organization base. The assistance can be distinguished along two lines: group affinity (questions coded B5a) and independent state interests (questions coded B5b).

B5a. Co-ethnics abroad. Group affinity relates to the possibility that the members of the given group inhabit areas of neighboring countries as well as form distinct diasporas as a result of immigration. The questions for the analyst focus on both types of groups. Do the state boundaries cut across a given group’s homelands? Are there any identifiable irredentist organizations in the neighboring country? What kind of resources and skills can the ethnic diaspora add to the resource base of the mobilizing group? Are there identifiable mechanisms in the diaspora that can channel the resources and skills back to the group?

B5b. International disputes. Do any of the neighboring states have existing disputes with the given state? How strong are the disputes? Under what conditions might the neighboring state give support to the mobilizing group? What kind of support (in terms of resources and organization) can the neighboring state offer?

B6. Overall Assessment of Mobilization

As noted above, the criteria for assessing the potential for mobilization have to remain vague because of its event-specific nature. However, the analyst should draw certain scenarios designed to elucidate the range of possibilities in resources and organization, based on (1) projection of an incipient change, (2) assumption of a galvanizing event, (3) potential emergence of three types of leader (strong, moderate, and weak), and (4) foreign support (if applicable). The drawing out of scenarios should make clear the possible consequences of mobilization. In some cases, even a strong leader might not be able to command significant resources. In other cases, even a weak leader might have substantial resources at his or her disposal. The crucial role of the leader is evident in this type of assessment of mobilization potential.
The assessment represents a way to portray the effect that an aggrieved and subordinate group might have through mobilization. Ideally, in conditions where several aggrieved groups have been identified in stage 1, the analyst should examine the mobilization potential of all of them, ranking them in terms of strength of mobilization. Just as in the final assessment in stage 1 of the model, the analyst should place the various aggrieved groups on a continuum, differentiating them by the level of mobilization potential. The differentiation represents a final assessment of the likelihood that certain groups might take up arms in order to redress their position in the society. The assessment also represents the final results of the application of stage 2 of the model to a given case.

C. ASSESSING THE STATE

As outlined in the model, the mobilization of a group for political action does not necessarily lead to violence; the interaction between the state and the mobilized group may lead to any number of outcomes, ranging from peaceful reconciliation to an attempt at genocide. Anticipating what the potential outcome might be is the focus of the third stage of the model, which deals with the bargaining process.

The analysis first needs to establish the state’s capabilities in three categories: accommodative (questions coded C1), fiscal and economic (questions coded C2), and coercive (questions coded C3). The accommodative capability is most important, since it pertains to the central issue of domination and monopolization of power. The results then need to be compared to the group’s capabilities so as to arrive at a determination of the strategies the two actors will pursue. Establishing the state’s capabilities is a step analogous to the analysis performed in stage 2 (questions coded B). The actual matching up of resources and elaboration of expected outcomes is a more mechanistic process, carried out with the aid of tables and matrices (guidelines coded D).

The following outline presents the topics of the questions that an analyst needs to consider in assessing the state. The outline is presented to make clear the organization of the section and the logical connections between the questions. The actual questions follow the outline.
Outline of Questions for Assessing:  
C. The State

C1. ACCOMMODATIVE CAPABILITY
   C1a. Responsiveness of political structures
      C1a1. Level of inclusiveness
      C1a2. Potential for change in political structures
      C1a3. Overall assessment of responsiveness
   C1b. Prevailing norms of governance
   C1c. Cohesion among ruling elites
   C1d. Composite assessment of accommodative capability

C2. FISCAL AND ECONOMIC CAPABILITY
   C2a. Fiscal health
   C2b. Resource extraction potential
   C2c. Size and wealth of ruling elites
   C2d. Composite assessment of fiscal and economic capability

C3. COERCIVE CAPABILITY
   C3a. Command and control over the apparati of violence
   C3b. Composition of the apparati of violence
   C3c. Norms toward domestic use of violence
   C3d. Suitability of the force for domestic use
   C3e. Composite assessment of coercive capability

C1. Accommodative Capability

Three categories of questions address the state’s accommodative capabilities. The first category aims to ascertain the level of responsiveness of the state’s political structures to popular will (questions coded C1a). The second category deals with the prevailing norms of governance that the political structures embody (questions coded C1b). The third category addresses the extent of cohesion among the ruling political elites (questions coded C1c). An overall determina-
tion of the accommodative capability is the final step (guidelines coded C1d).

**C1a. Responsiveness of political structures.** Assessing the responsiveness of political structures to popular will can be answered through two sets of questions. The first set addresses the level of inclusiveness of the political structures (questions coded C1a1). The second set deals with the possibility and ease of change of the political structures (questions coded C1a2). The result is a composite assessment of responsiveness (guidelines coded C1a3).

**C1a1. Level of inclusiveness.** Are the political structures inclusive or exclusive? Are there mechanisms in place (such as elections) that regularly hold political authorities accountable to popular will? Are there differing levels of inclusion/exclusion from the political process according to some group criteria? Are there certain groups that are habitually excluded from the political process on whatever basis, formally or informally? Constitutions and other laws are the specific indicators the analyst should consult. But the effort should go beyond the formal to the informal rules governing participation; these can be gauged from actual participation rates. The analysis should focus on evidence of low participation by a group as a potential indicator of informal exclusionary rules (some of the data gathered by the analyst while assessing closure—questions coded A—may be useful also at this stage).

**C1a2. Potential for change in political structures.** What are the mechanisms of conflict resolution built into the political structure? Are there established channels for change in political institutions? Again, the indicators are formal rules and laws, but the actual evidence of whether these channels are effective needs to be assessed by whether changes in institutions actually occur over time. Lack of changes over a lengthy time may point to possible inflexibility of the political structures in practice even if formal rules make them appear flexible.

**C1a3. Overall assessment of responsiveness.** On the basis of C1a1 and C1a2, the analyst needs to make an assessment of the overall level and extent of responsiveness of the political institutions. The level of inclusiveness and the flexibility of the political structures deserve equal weight.
C1b. **Prevailing norms of governance.** Are there tolerant norms in place in the society, and are they reflected in state structures? The analyst should keep in mind that even if the political authorities are responsive to popular will, the state may still be prone to informal exclusion if dominant norms of intolerance are in place. The question goes beyond the formal institutional structures to the belief system underpinning them. The indicators of tolerance should be evident in the extent of effort expended in order not to exclude certain groups from participation in the political process. In certain countries, polling data on views toward other groups may be available; if reliable, such data may provide important clues as to the prevalent norms.

C1c. **Cohesion among ruling elites.** Is there prevailing agreement among the ruling elites about upholding the existing political structures? Are there certain elites whose actions demonstrate ambiguous views about the existing political structures? The specific indicators of cohesion should be evident from internal debates among the ruling elites. Public actions, such as obvious distancing by some of the elites, may also provide clues.

C1d. **Composite assessment of accommodative capability.** The assessment of the accommodative capability of the state is a composite picture based on C1a–C1c, giving most importance to factors of responsiveness (C1a), determined in C1a3. Democratic states are bound to score better than authoritarian ones in responsiveness. However, responsiveness may vary considerably among democratic states. States with new democratic structures may be quite different in their level of responsiveness from longstanding states where inclusionary institutions have had a chance to develop and norms of tolerance have been internalized. In this sense, C1b can be an important modifier of the assessment arrived at in C1a3. In addition, the existence of factions in the ruling elite that have doubts about upholding the existing political structures lowers the accommodative capability of the state, even if the assessments in C1a and C1b may give the state an otherwise high mark in this category.

**C2. Fiscal and Economic Capability**

Three sets of questions address the issue of economic resources that the state can amass in its competition with the mobilized group. The
category is important because it establishes the bounds on how well the state can deal with the group and its demands without resorting to force. The first set of questions deals with the state’s overall fiscal health (questions coded C2a). These questions address the financial resources readily available to the state. The second set of questions pertains to the resources that potentially could be extracted from the society by the state machinery and made available for the competition with the mobilized group (questions coded C2b). The third set of questions deals with the size and wealth of the main group that is represented by the ruling elites (questions coded C2c). On the basis of the assessments in each category, an overall assessment of the state’s fiscal and economic capabilities needs to be made (guidelines coded C2d).

C2a. Fiscal health. Is the state engaged in deficit spending, or is it amassing surpluses? If it is deficit spending, has the trend gone on for some time? What is the burden imposed on the state treasury by payment of debt and interest? How is the budget appropriated, and could the state make substantial shifts in how the funds are appropriated? For example, could substantial funds be transferred from defense to specifically targeted social spending? Data to determine the health of the treasury are generally available from official sources, though they should be assessed first for reliability.

C2b. Resource extraction potential. How much slack is there in terms of the state being able to increase the rate of extraction of resources from the society? Is the tax burden at such a high level that a significant increase will be counterproductive (flight of capital, substantial erosion of political support)? Or are tax burdens fairly low and are there readily identifiable areas of wealth? And is the bureaucratic machinery in place able to collect the additional resources? Some of the data to answer these questions should be readily available in official publications. The comparative assessment of whether the tax burden is low or high needs to be made on the basis of real tax rates per capita and investment climate (as rated by international banks) against countries at similar development levels (potential competitors for foreign investment). An evaluation of the efficiency of the tax collection bureaucracy (based on indicators such as estimates of levels of tax evasion) also needs to be made.
C2c. **Size and wealth of ruling elites.** What is the size and level of wealth of the ruling elite’s core constituency (the group whose interests the ruling elite represents the most)? What are the comparative wealth levels of this group vis-à-vis the population as a whole? How high of a real tax burden (with taxes understood in the wide meaning of the term) is the group facing at this time? And what are the levels of tax burden that the core group might be willing to endure in order to support the ruling elite? In other words, is it likely that the main social base for the ruling elite will be willing to endure higher burdens than the general population in order to keep its privileged position? Data to answer these questions stem more likely than not from estimates derived from general tax burden levels.

C2d. **Composite assessment of fiscal and economic capability.** The assessment of the fiscal and economic capability of the state is based on a composite of C2a–C2c, so as to incorporate both the present and the potential level of mobilization of resources by the state. All three factors play a major role, and strength in one area can offset weaknesses in another.

C3. **Coercive Capability**

Four separate sets of questions address the ability of the state to marshal and use force in its competition with the mobilized group. First, what are the structural command and control links between the ruling elites and the apparati of violence, such as the police, militia, and the armed forces (questions coded C3a)? This is the most important of the four factors. Second, what is the composition—at the rank-and-file level—of these apparati (questions coded C3b)? Third, what are the norms toward and experience with respect to the use of force against internal opponents (questions coded C3c)? Fourth, how capable are the apparati of violence in dealing with internal opposition (questions coded C3d)? A final assessment of the coercive capability is based on an examination of all these factors (guidelines coded C3e).

C3a. **Command and control over the apparati of violence.** What are the mechanisms for ordering the use of the police and/or the military against internal opponents? Is the process subject to the influence and opinions of others besides just the top executive authority? Do any other political structures—besides the executive—affect the
extent of employment of the apparati of violence against domestic opponents? The indicators of the structural constraints (or lack thereof) on executive authority and command of use of the apparati of violence internally are embedded in the legal rules governing the use of force. An evaluation of how closely such rules are followed in practice is an essential component of the assessment.

C3b. **Composition of the apparati of violence.** Who serves in the apparati of violence? Are some groups overrepresented? Are the rank and file in the apparati of violence likely to follow the orders of the top authorities? How likely are the rank and file to identify with an aggrieved group? The data on the composition of the police and the military may be sensitive, especially in states where internal problems may be severe. Intelligence sources may be needed to supplement data from open sources. The assessment should focus on the units most likely to be used for internal purposes, though data for all of the police and the military should be taken into account.

C3c. **Norms toward domestic use of violence.** What is the state’s propensity for the use of force, based on historical tradition and experiences? Is there a longstanding reputation of the state to rely on the apparati of violence to quell internal dissent? Have the apparati of violence been used for such purposes within the past two to three decades (one generation)? The data for this assessment are openly available and based on the historical record.

C3d. **Suitability of the force for domestic use.** Are the equipment and training of the apparati of violence suitable for quelling internal unrest? Are there units (in either the police or the military) that have a specific internal orientation (such as anti-riot units)? How large are such forces? The data for this assessment should be openly available, though some details (equipment of the anti-riot police) may be more difficult to locate. Evaluations of the training of domestically tasked units by outside observers also would be helpful in assessing the proficiency of such formations.

C3e. **Composite assessment of coercive capability.** The assessment of the coercive capability of the state is based on a composite of C3a–C3d, with particular attention to C3a (because of its crucial role in constraining the decisionmaking process on the use of force).
D. STRATEGIC BARGAINING

The bargaining process between a mobilized group and the state determines whether the outcome of the process will be violence, peaceful reconciliation, or some point in between. Both the group’s and the state’s preferences are structured by their own strengths and weaknesses as well as the opponent’s strengths and weaknesses. The optimal strategy is one based on maximum cost-effectiveness (in political terms). In other words, the strategies the group and the state will pursue stem from the specific characteristics of each relative to the other. Rather than questions for the analyst, this section consists of guidelines, for the task here is to model the interaction on the basis of the data gathered so far.

Modeling the interactive process to anticipate the potential for violence requires placing the information gathered so far on the group and the state into a format that categorizes each into a specific state or group type. Using the two tables that describe the state and group capacities (guidelines for measuring the capacities are coded D1), a composite picture emerges of the essential strengths and weaknesses of the group and the state. The interaction between each type of group and each type of state is then simulated with the help of two matrices (guidelines on using the matrices are coded D2). A comparison of the preferences of the state and the group illustrates a likely outcome. Whether the outcome is violent or not addresses the fundamental point of the entire exercise—that is, the likelihood of violence.

The following outline presents the organization of the guidelines and the logical connections between the steps that an analyst needs to perform in order to come up with a final assessment on the likelihood of strife that might result from the bargaining process. The actual guidelines follow the outline.
Outline of Guidelines for Assessing:
D. Strategic Bargaining

D1. MEASURING THE CAPACITIES OF THE GROUP AND THE STATE

D1a. Measuring the group’s capacities
   D1a1. Group capacity: leadership
   D1a2. Group capacity: sustainment
   D1a3. Group capacity: cohesiveness
   D1a4. Locating the group type

D1b. Measuring the state's capacities
   D1b1. State capacity: leadership
   D1b2. State capacity: fiscal position
   D1b3. State capacity: regime type
   D1b4. Locating the state type

D2. COMPARING PREFERENCES WITHIN THE BARGAINING PROCESS

D2a. Preferences of the group toward the state
D2b. Preferences of the state toward the group
D2c. Final outcome: preferences for violence

D1. Measuring the Capacities of the Group and the State

The first step is to measure the capacities of the group (guidelines coded D1a) and the state (guidelines coded D1b) in three critical areas. The critical areas are similar, though not the same, for the state and the group. The data for the measurement are based on assessments from previous sections (coded B and C). The measurements categorize the group and the state into one of eight specific types. The eight types comprise all of the possible combinations of the three categories, each coded in a binary fashion. The analyst must make some difficult choices at this point. The gathered data can structure the decision, but there is no way to avoid subjective reasoning in making an assessment based on only two choices.
D1a. Measuring the group's capacities. Categorizing the group in terms of three essential capacities—accommodative, sustainment, and cohesiveness—requires a binary assessment of leadership, resources, and the level of popular support of the group. Accommodative capacity measures the group’s ability to accommodate its goals to the other competing social formations, especially the state. Sustainment capacity measures the group’s ability to sustain its political campaign as it attempts to redress its grievances. Cohesiveness measures the group’s ability to maintain group identity in the process of pursuing its group aims. The manner and strength of the group’s mobilization determines its capacity in each of the three critical categories. Arriving at the determination means ranking the group in three areas: leadership (guidelines coded D1a1), sustainment (guidelines coded D1a2), and cohesiveness (guidelines coded D1a3). The specific rankings then determine the group type (guidelines coded D1a4).

D1a1. Group capacity: leadership. The analyst must rate the group in terms of leadership, using the choices of either strong or weak. Strong leadership is defined as having the following characteristics: (1) self-confident and secure in its position, (2) willing to take some risks of losing popularity in order to achieve its ends, and (3) owning a clear view of the goals it wants to accomplish. Weak leadership is defined as having the following characteristics: (1) conscious of other potential leaders, (2) cannot afford to take risks and obliged to appeal to the group broadly, even if such action compromises its goals, and (3) wavers in dedication to the goals. The assessments derived in the section on group mobilization regarding leadership (questions coded B3) should form the building block for a rating of the leadership.

D1a2. Group capacity: sustainment. The analyst must rate the group in terms of resource support, using the choices of either good or weak. Good resource support is defined as: (1) sufficient support to meet all near-term objectives, most mid-term objectives, and some long-term objectives, (2) real prospects of increased support as the group gains momentum, and (3) available support is suited to means and ends. Weak resource support is defined as: (1) insufficient support to meet even all near-term objectives, causing expenditure of considerable efforts in obtaining support, perhaps even driving the group into survival mode, (2) limited or uncertain prospects
of increased support, and (3) mismatch between available support and means and ends. The assessments derived in the section on group mobilization regarding resources and organization (questions coded B4) as well as foreign support (questions coded B5) should form the building block for a rating of resource support.

**D1a3. Group capacity: cohesiveness.** The analyst must rate the group in terms of popular support, using the choices of either broad or weak. Broad popular support is defined as: (1) strong appeal of the ideas to the group and (2) potential for sympathy and/or support from other groups. Weak popular support is defined as: (1) weak resonance of the ideas beyond the leadership (ideas are either not fully or not widely accepted) and (2) no potential for support from other groups. The assessments derived in the section on group mobilization regarding incipient changes (questions coded B1), galvanizing events (questions coded B2), and the overall strength of mobilization and group identity (questions coded B6) should form the building blocks for a rating of popular support.

**D1a4. Locating the group type.** Based on a rating in each of the three categories, the analyst should locate the group type for the specific group being examined. Each type of a group (one of eight types, ranging from A to H), has corresponding capacities in three critical areas (see Table A.1).

**D1b. Measuring the state's capacities.** Categorizing the state in terms of three essential capacities—accommodative, sustainment, and coercive—requires a binary assessment of leadership, the fiscal health of the state, and the regime type. Accommodative capacity measures the state’s ability to accommodate the group’s demands. Sustainment capacity measures the state’s ability to sustain its political preferences in competition with the group. Coercive capacity measures the state’s ability to coerce the opponents into compliance. The political structure of the state, the state’s potential for the use of force, and its fiscal and economic health determine its capacity in each of the three critical categories. Arriving at the determination means ranking the state in three areas: leadership (guidelines coded D1b1), fiscal health (guidelines coded D1b2), and regime type (guidelines coded D1b3). The specific rankings then determine the state type (guidelines coded D1b4).
### Table A.1

**Capacity of a Mobilized Group**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF MOBILIZED GROUP</th>
<th>CAPACITY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Descriptors</td>
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</table>
| A   | Strong leadership  
    | Good resource support  
    | Broad popular support | High | High | High |
| B   | Weak leadership  
    | Good resource support  
    | Broad popular support | Low | High | Low |
| C   | Strong leadership  
    | Weak resource support  
    | Broad popular support | High | Low | High |
| D   | Strong leadership  
    | Good resource support  
    | Weak popular support | Low | High | High |
| E   | Weak leadership  
    | Weak resource support  
    | Broad popular support | Low | Low | Low |
| F   | Weak leadership  
    | Weak resource support  
    | Weak popular support | High | Low | Low |
| G   | Strong leadership  
    | Weak resource support  
    | Weak popular support | Low | Low | Low |
| H   | Weak leadership  
    | Good resource support  
    | Weak popular support | Low | High | Low |

**D1b1. State capacity: leadership.** The analyst must rate the state in terms of leadership, using the choices of either strong or weak. Strong leadership is defined in the same manner as for the group, and it has the following characteristics: (1) self-confident and secure in its position, (2) willing to risk losing popularity in order to achieve its ends, and (3) owning a clear view of the goals it wants to accomplish. Weak leadership is also defined in the same manner as the group, and it has the following characteristics: (1) conscious of other potential leaders, (2) cannot afford to take risks and obliged to appeal to the group broadly, even if such action compromises its
goals, and (3) wavers in dedication to the goals. The assessments derived in the section on the political structure (questions coded C1) are the shaping influences on any specific leadership in power. The structural elements are more important than the specific personalities in question, though some knowledge of the specific leadership is also necessary.

**D1b2. State capacity: fiscal position.** The analyst must rate the state in terms of its fiscal position, using the choices of either strong or weak. Strong fiscal position is defined as having the following characteristics: (1) budget surpluses or low deficits, (2) room for major reallocations within the structure of the budget, (3) enough wealth for increased revenue generation. Weak fiscal position is defined as having the following characteristics: (1) deep and/or prolonged deficit spending, (2) highly constrained room for reallocation within the budget, and (3) limited potential for increased revenue generation due to limited wealth. The assessments derived in the section on the fiscal and economic health of the state (questions coded C2) should form the building blocks for a rating of the fiscal position.

**D1b3. State capacity: regime type.** The analyst must rate the state by regime type, using the choices of either inclusive or exclusive. While the two choices have some overlap with democratic and nondemocratic regime types, the terms are not the same, for they focus both on the normative as well as institutional aspects. An inclusive regime is defined as having the following characteristics: (1) competitive elections and unrestricted rights to assembly, (2) uncensored media, (3) limits on the executive power, and (4) prevailing norms of tolerance. An exclusive regime is defined as having the following characteristics: (1) lack of competitive elections and/or restrictions on rights to assembly, (2) restrictions on or censorship of the media, (3) no real check on the executive power, and (4) norms of tolerance are either weak or nonexistent. Almost all democratic regimes are inclusive, but not all inclusive regimes are democratic. Similarly, almost all oligarchic or authoritarian regimes are exclusive, but not all exclusive regimes are nondemocratic. The assessments on political structure (questions coded C1) and the apparatus of coercion (questions coded C3) should form the building blocks for rating a state on regime type.
Table A.2
Capacity of the State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF STATE</th>
<th>CAPACITY</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Descriptors</td>
<td>Accommodative</td>
<td>Sustainment</td>
<td>Coercive</td>
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<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Strong leadership</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
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<td>Strong fiscal position</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Inclusive regime</td>
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<td>B</td>
<td>Weak leadership</td>
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<td>Strong fiscal position</td>
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<td>Inclusive regime</td>
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**D1b4. Locating the state type.** Based on a rating in each of the three categories, the analyst can locate the state type for the specific state being examined. Each type of a state (one of eight types, ranging from A to H), has corresponding capacities in three critical areas (see Table A.2).
Identifying Potential Ethnic Conflict: Application of a Process Model

D2. Comparing Preferences Within the Bargaining Process

Once the analyst has defined the group and the state as fitting one particular state and group type, the next step is to locate the specific preferences of each on a matrix of preference choices. This is essentially a mechanical step, carried out in two stages: figuring out the preferences of the group toward the state (guidelines coded D2a) and figuring out the preferences of the state toward the group (guidelines coded D2b). The interaction of the two preferences makes up the final assessment of whether violence is likely (guidelines coded D2c).

D2a. Preferences of the group toward the state. Using Matrix A.1, the analyst should locate the row appropriate to the specific type of state that the group is facing. For example, if the specific determination from D1 has concluded that the situation pits group type D against a state type C, the analyst would locate group D in the column at the left of the matrix and, using the row of group type D, look at the set of three preferences in the column under state type C. Circling the specific three preferences in the matrix, the choices are: (1) Neg, (2) Exp, and (3) Int. (An explanation of the preferences follows in D2c.)

D2b. Preferences of the state toward the group. Using Matrix A.2, the analyst should locate the column appropriate to the specific type of group that the state is facing. As in the example used in D2a, if the specific determination from D1 has concluded that the situation pits state type C against a group type D, the analyst would locate state type C in the row at the top of the matrix and, using the row in group type D, look at the set of three preferences in the column under state type C. Circling the specific three preferences in the matrix, the choices are: (1) Rep, (2) Exp, and (3) Neg. (An explanation of the preferences follows in D2c.)

D2c. Final outcome: preferences for violence. Combining D2a and D2b determines the likelihood of violence in the given case. There are four preference choices used in the matrices. For the state, the preferences are: “Rep” (repress), meaning the use of violence against the group; “Exp” (exploit), meaning the use of nonviolent means to compete with the group; “Neg” (negotiate), meaning the use of peaceful negotiation; and “Sur” (surrender), meaning the state surrenders to the demands of the group. For the group, the preferences...
# Matrix A.1

## Mobilized Group Preferences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mobilized Group Type (Table A.1)</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
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neg = negotiation; exp = exploitation; int = intimidation; sur = surrender
### Matrix A.2

#### State Preferences

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**neg** = negotiation; **exp** = exploitation; **rep** = repression; **sur** = surrender

are: “Int” (intimidate), meaning the use of violence against the state; “Exp” (exploit), meaning the use of nonviolent means to compete with the state; “Neg” (negotiate), meaning the use of peaceful negotiation; and “Sur” (surrender), meaning the group surrenders to the pressure by the state.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Daniel L. Byman is a policy analyst at RAND; his work focuses on civil wars, the Middle East, and other topics related to U.S. national security.

Graham E. Fuller is a consultant at RAND, and a former National Intelligence Officer for the Middle East at CIA.

Sandra F. Joireman is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Wheaton College in Wheaton, Illinois and author of Property Rights and Political Development in Ethiopia and Eritrea (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2000).

Pearl-Alice Marsh, Ph.D. is a political scientist and a former Senior Research Associate at the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies.

Thomas S. Szayna is a political scientist at RAND; his research interests include contemporary security environment, intrastate conflict, and peacekeeping.

Ashley J. Tellis is a senior policy analyst at RAND. His work focuses on international relations theory, military strategy and proliferation issues, South Asian politics, and U.S.-Asian security relations.

James A. Winnefeld is a retired RAND senior analyst and a former naval aviator.

Michele Zanini is a Ph.D. candidate at the RAND Graduate School and an author of a number of RAND publications on NATO strategy in the Balkans and Mediterranean, terrorism, and European defense planning.