INTRODUCTION

This chapter applies the “process” model for anticipating the incidence of ethnic conflict to the case of the end of apartheid and the peaceful transition of power in South Africa in 1990–1994. It examines the case of South Africa from the perspective of what an intelligence analyst might have concluded about South Africa’s propensity toward ethnic violence had she used the “process” model to examine the country’s situation in early 1989.

In essence, this chapter examines the mobilization of the majority “black” population in South Africa by the African National Congress (ANC) and the attempt by this mobilized group to move South Africa toward an inclusive political system. As such, the conflict in question is between the ANC and the apartheid South African state. The primary time frame of interest is the period 1985–1989. As in the Yugoslav case, the analytic orientation is in line with the “process” model’s focus on one particular kind of ethnic conflict, namely, the mobilization of an ethnic group challenging the state.

The choice of the date stems from two reasons. One, the cutoff date comes before the major shift away from apartheid but after a sustained period of tinkering with the system (1983–1989) that introduced the possibility of major change. An earlier cutoff date, for example mid-1988 or even mid-1987, would not have led to different results but would have prevented the inclusion of several important factors that drove the process of accommodation. Two, the time frame is realistic in that the fate of South Africa (ranging anywhere
from peaceful transition, to muddling-through, to collapse into vio-
lent civil war) was not preordained in early 1989. Many factors, internal and external, might have changed the outcome. Once the apartheid state legalized the ANC in 1990, and especially after the setting up in 1991 of a mechanism to negotiate the transfer of power, the likelihood of a negotiated transfer of power increased, but even in late 1993 there was nothing inevitable about the outcome.

As was the case with Yugoslavia, some may argue that a simple group-versus-state model is not realistic when applied to the multi-ethnic conditions of 1980s South Africa. Perhaps a model that took greater account of the substantial intergroup competition in South Africa (intra-“black” divisions, inclusion of the “coloureds” or “Asians,” looking at the “whites” as subdivided into Anglophones and Afrikaners) would be a more accurate portrayal of the situation. While the various groups inhabiting South Africa certainly were not monolithic (and every group has subgroup characteristics), the state’s policy of using “racial” criteria to define individuals formed the basis for social divisions in South Africa. In other words, individuals whose self-identity was Xhosa, Zulu, or Tswana, even if they felt distinctly different from each other and spoke different languages, were still lumped together as “blacks” by the state, and none had political rights under apartheid South Africa. The state’s creation of “homelands” for the black majority population recognized ethno-linguistic differences among the “blacks,” but the “homelands” provided no political rights for them in the context of the highest governmental bodies of the state and politically only served to divide the black majority population. Similarly, even though Anglophone and Afrikaans-speaking individuals with European physical features may have felt little in common with each other, the state lumped them together as the politically privileged “whites.” The main polyethnic categories of “whites,” “blacks,” “coloureds,” and “Asians” were creations of state policy in South Africa, even though they may have built on earlier informal social distinctions. But the creations became real and political bargaining came to be carried out under these categories. Thus, the authors do not see that the added benefit of any complicated multigroup model would offset the exponentially greater complexity of the model. Parsimony is a crucial element of any model, and narrowing a conflict to its most essential aspects is the goal of the “process” model.
This chapter uses the terminology of ethnic discourse in South Africa because, as explained above, the polyethnic categories created by the state became a political and social reality. The very terminology of “whites,” “blacks,” “coloureds,” and “Asians” may be offensive, as it is implicitly based on a racist mindset. The use of apartheid terminology is in no way meant to signify the acceptance of such terms or of the mindset that led to their construction.

Some may further question the applicability of a model designed to analyze “ethnic” conflict to the racially polarized situation in South Africa. However, in line with Horowitz, the authors see “race” as a social construct and a rigid subcategory of ethnicity. As many have noted, race is not a preexisting category; it “is not found, but ‘made’ and used.”

Following the format of the previous chapter, four sections follow this introduction. The first section examines the structure of closure and provides an analysis of which ethnic groups were privileged and which were dominated (the demographic characteristics of South Africa in the late 1980s, on which the analysis is based, is appended at the end of the chapter). Then it examines the strength of the challenging ethnic group—the black majority represented primarily by ANC—by looking at its mobilization process. The second section looks at the capabilities the state—the Republic of South Africa—could have brought to bear in dealing with the challenging group. The third section examines the strategic choices, arrived at on the basis of the assessments in earlier sections, that the state and the group were likely to pursue vis-à-vis each other, given their resource base group. Finally, a few observations on model application conclude the chapter.

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1 Alternative terms are also deficient for the purposes of the analysis contained herein. For example, the term “Africans” to denote “blacks” (or more properly, indigenous Africans) has a confusing meaning, since it denies the “African-ness” of individuals with physical features associated with indigenous Europeans but who can trace ancestry for ten generations in southern Africa. Similarly, the term “mixed-race” to denote “coloureds” is no improvement.


ASSESSING THE POTENTIAL FOR STRIFE

Closure in the Political and Security Realms

In terms of closure in the political realm, the president and a tricameral parliament held legislative power under the terms of the 1984 constitution. The three houses of the parliament were segregated on the principle of racial categories. The white population was represented by the House of Assembly, with 178 members (166 elected directly and 12 indirectly). The coloured population was represented by the House of Representatives, with 85 members (80 elected directly and 5 indirectly). The Asian population was represented by the House of Delegates, with 45 members (40 elected directly and 5 indirectly). Each house legislated its own community’s affairs (in other words, the House of Assembly dealt with all issues within the white community). “Own affairs” were defined as matters which specially or differentially affected a population group in relation to the maintenance of its identity and the upholding and furtherance of its way of life, culture, traditions, and customs.

The three houses nominally shared responsibility for national affairs, though the House of Assembly held most of the power. It was up to the president to decide whether a specific issue was a national or a community affair. All three houses and the president had to approve legislation concerning national affairs. If a consensus among all three houses was not achieved, laws still could be enacted through approval by the President’s Council and any one of the houses. The Supreme Court did not have the power of judicial review of parliamentary legislation.

The parliament elected the president to a seven-year term by means of an electoral college. Through a majority-voting process, the three houses chose 50 white, 25 coloured, and 13 Asian members, respectively, as members of the electoral college. It was up to the president to initiate legislation. The president was assisted by the President’s Council, composed of 60 members (20, 10, and 5 members nominated by the three houses, respectively; 15 members nominated by the president; and 10 members nominated by the opposition parties). The president also appointed a Ministers’ Council for each house, from the house’s majority party. The Ministers’ Councils carried out an administrative role for the specific “racial” group. The
The president also chose his own Cabinet, primarily from members of the three houses. The president had the right to suspend the parliament and to dissolve the House of Assembly.

The president was also vested with control and administration of black affairs. Governance of black affairs, in general, was carried out by homeland governments. Homelands were set up on the basis of the 1959 Promotion of Native Lands Self-Government Act, which envisaged eventual political autonomy for blacks within South Africa. Each of the ten homelands had a legislative assembly and an executive council, headed by a Chief Councillor.

The constitution established a strong presidency and made provision for a nominal representative role in national affairs for the coloured and Asian populations. But the constitution made certain that the white representative body could overrule both the coloured and Asian parliamentary chambers and, if necessary, elect the president and pass laws based simply on the majority party of the white chamber of parliament. In addition, the constitution made no provision for national political participation by blacks residing in South Africa.

These patterns are evident from a closer look at the highest-ranking individuals of the political apparatus in South Africa. The Presidency, the Cabinet, and the President’s Council were the most influential institutions concerning national affairs. The dominant political party, the National Party (NP) retained control of the House of Assembly during the elections in May 1987. The NP’s chief source of support came from Afrikaners (though increasingly by the late 1980s, Angophones too voted for the party). Table 4.1 shows the ethnic composition of the politically highest-ranking individuals. Although the nonwhite parliamentary chambers played a minor role in national affairs, the chairmen of these bodies could (and did) play a prominent role in channeling the concerns of the group to the president (see Table 4.2).

Provincial and homeland administrations had direct say over local matters, but because of the segregation of representative bodies along racial lines and the concentration of power for national policy with the Presidency, the latter held a virtual monopoly over executive and legislative powers regarding the main paths of national development.
Table 4.1
South African Presidency and Main Cabinet Members, April 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>P.W. Botha</td>
<td>white, Afrikaner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Finance</td>
<td>B.J. du Plessis</td>
<td>white, Afrikaner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Administration and Privatization</td>
<td>D.J. de Villiers</td>
<td>white, Afrikaner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Economic Affairs and Technology</td>
<td>D.W. Steyn</td>
<td>white, Afrikaner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Home Affairs and Communications</td>
<td>S. Botha</td>
<td>white, Afrikaner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning</td>
<td>J.C. Heunis</td>
<td>white, Afrikaner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Justice</td>
<td>H.J. Coetsee</td>
<td>white, Afrikaner</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 4.2
South African Chairmen of Ministers’ Councils, April 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chairman of Ministers’ Council</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Council for White Own Affairs</td>
<td>C.V. van der Merwe</td>
<td>white, Afrikaner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council for Coloured Own Affairs</td>
<td>A. Hendrickse</td>
<td>coloured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council for Indian Own Affairs</td>
<td>A. Rajbansi</td>
<td>Indian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Since cabinet ministers had the authority to appoint senior political appointees as heads of departments and directorates, the composition of the director-level management of the South African bureaucracy mirrored that of its highest-level officials (see Table 4.3). Accordingly, because the NP controlled the parliament and the Cabinet, NP loyalists predominated in the executive machinery of the government.

In terms of closure in the security realm, the constitution centralized authority over security matters with the office of the Presidency and, in comparison with the pre-1984 constitution, withdrew such matters from parliamentary oversight. The president also had the right to define which matters fell in the security realm. The president chaired the State Security Council, the top state body for security issues, and was the nominal chief of the armed forces.
Table 4.3
South African Director-Level Managers, 1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Director-General, Finance</td>
<td>J.H. de Loor</td>
<td>white, Afrikaner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director-General, Trade and Industry</td>
<td>J.P. du Plessis</td>
<td>white, Afrikaner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director-General, Minerals and Energy Affairs</td>
<td>L. Albert</td>
<td>white, Afrikaner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director-General, Home Affairs</td>
<td>G.B.S. van Zyl</td>
<td>white, Afrikaner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director-General, Constitutional Development</td>
<td>A.H. van Wyk</td>
<td>white, Afrikaner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director-General, Public Works and Land</td>
<td>P.C. van Bloemstein</td>
<td>white, Afrikaner</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Data for April 1989 are not available. However, the 1986 data approximate closely the composition of director-level managers in 1989, as the same party and virtually the same government held power.


The control of the Presidency by the dominant party in the House of Assembly meant a virtual monopoly for the NP on security issues and the highest-ranking security personnel. The minister of defense controlled the administrative machinery of the armed forces. The chief of the armed forces—the South African Defense Force (SADF)—had operational control over the military. The Ministry of Law and Order controlled the South African Police. As with the top political appointees in the administrative machinery of the state, the pool of candidates for top civilian positions in the security realm came from NP loyalists. These were almost exclusively Afrikaners (see Table 4.4). In the police and the armed forces, the association of apartheid with the NP appears to have led to self-selection and promotion patterns that overwhelmingly favored Afrikaners. A survey of top military, police, and intelligence apparati throughout the 1980s shows that these areas were almost an exclusive domain of the white Afrikaners. In the armed forces, Afrikaners comprised 85 percent of the officer corps.4

Assessment of closure in the political and security realms. Under the guise of a democratic set of rules (even if the democratic system was only for a minority of the people), the political system in South Africa in fact established few limitations on the power of the single most powerful political organization of the whites. Because of the strong in-group proclivities and numerical prominence of the Afrikaners among the whites, the Afrikaners—through the vehicle of the NP—had a hold on political power in South Africa.

Similar patterns of dominance are observable in both the political and security realms. There is no question that the Afrikaners had a complete hold on all positions of political power, at both the highest executive and top administrator levels. Even the other white groups appear to have been shut out from these positions. The lack of presence of the coloureds and the Asians was total. Most of all, the majority blacks did not have access even to the institutions of national political power.

The same pattern was observable in the security apparatus. Although rank-and-file membership of the military and security apparatus differed little from the general makeup of the white population (service was compulsory for white citizens only), discrepancies (in favor of the Afrikaners over the Anglophone whites) appeared at the middle levels. At the highest levels, the dominance of the Afrikaners was nearly complete.

### Table 4.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>P.W. Botha</td>
<td>white, Afrikaner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>R.F. Botha</td>
<td>white, Afrikaner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Defense</td>
<td>General M. Malan</td>
<td>white, Afrikaner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff, SADF</td>
<td>Lt. General J.J. Geldenhuys</td>
<td>white, Afrikaner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Law and Order (police)</td>
<td>A. Vlok</td>
<td>white, Afrikaner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief, South African Police (SAP)</td>
<td>General Hennie de Witt</td>
<td>white, Afrikaner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of National Intelligence</td>
<td>Niel Barnard</td>
<td>white, Afrikaner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service (NIS)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In short, the static South African system of *apartheid* had no provision for a dynamic for change. Restrictions on access to the political power system were based on “racial” distinctions, codified by law, and enforced through the machinery of the state. The *apartheid* system severely limited access to political power for all groups other than whites (and especially for blacks) by providing legal roadblocks to participation in politics. The black population had virtually no rights in the political system, other than a limited “self-governing” role in the homelands. The coloured and Asian populations had a nominal input into the national political process, but their role was constrained by institutional rules. Even among the politically privileged whites, rules on parliamentary procedure made it difficult for the Anglophone population to challenge the Afrikaners, if the latter acted in a unified manner.

In theory, there existed a process for the replacement of elites within the political hierarchy. But in fact there was little potential for peaceful change by nonwhites, since access to the elite level was limited to whites. The collectivist principle of race was by far the most important determinant of not only access but even participation in the political process. A whole legal edifice, backed up by a substantial use of force and suppression of any organized dissent, supported the constraints.

Access to positions of power and the ability to change the power structure varied greatly according to the racial categories. In theory, the strong Afrikaner position was most threatened by other whites, for a fundamental political realignment in the House of Assembly and the replacement of the NP by another party spanning the divisions among whites could have reduced substantially the Afrikaner domination of all top positions of political power. But in practice such a realignment was highly unlikely, and as long as the Afrikaners were politically unified, they had a stranglehold on the House of Assembly and political power in the country. The NP government tolerated criticism by other whites and generally lived up to democratic norms within the white community. For example, the leadership of the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) used its position in the House of Assembly to challenge the government on a wide range of policies, though because of PFP’s distinct minority status, its impact amounted to little more than open voicing of opposition.
Relative to the whites, the coloureds and Asians had a distinctly inferior position in the political system. Although the 1984 constitution gave the two groups some access to political power, their practical role was limited to the ability to voice opinions in the governing process. Because of the institutional rules of the parliament and the segregation at the level of parliamentary representation, even if the House of Representatives and House of Delegates were unified in rejection of the dominant party in the House of Assembly, they would still have no significant input into policymaking. In addition, the NP did not extend the same level of tolerance to criticism from the coloured and Asian opposition in the parliament that it extended to the whites (for example, H.J. Henrickse, Chairman of the Ministers’ Council of the House of Representatives, was forced to apologize to the president for offending him during one of Henrickse’s challenges).

But the blacks were, by far, in the worst position. Having no representation at the parliamentary level, and with a policy in place designed to take away gradually even their South African citizenship (the homelands policy), they had absolutely no direct influence over or access to the political system. Outside the homelands, the only governing role for blacks was that of participation in town councils, located in townships and responsible for collecting rents and service fees. The government did not tolerate any organized black political opposition, and virtually all such organizations were banned. These extralegal organizations included the African National Congress (ANC), Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), Azanian Peoples’ Organization (AZAPO), Black Peoples’ Convention (BPC), and black trade unions.

Assessing Closure in the Economic Realm

The distribution of wealth in South Africa was highly skewed along racial lines, with the whites having an inordinate share. The hierarchy evident in the political sphere was replicated in the economic

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5In 1985, President Botha and the NP government conceded that the policy of automatic disenfranchisement of blacks was not prudent. The government declared that no one would be disenfranchised simply because their ethnicity qualified them for citizenship in one of the homelands. However, the government did not extend the rights of full citizenship to blacks residing outside the homelands.
sphere, with the whites in an unchallenged position at the top, coloureds and Asians in the middle, and blacks at the bottom. Among the whites, both the Afrikaner and Anglophone populations were privileged.

Without a doubt, the wealthiest strata of the population were composed entirely of whites, both Afrikaner and Anglophone, though Anglophones seemed to dominate. The top corporate officials of major South African corporations (banking, manufacturing, commerce, and mining—especially diamonds and gold) were probably among the wealthiest individuals. The monopoly position of the major conglomerates (Barlow-Rand, Anglo-American, De Beers, and South African Breweries) enhanced their profitability.

At the general population level, income was inequitably distributed, with the primary differences along racial lines. The general pattern of occupation by racial categories amounted to a hierarchy, with blacks primarily in unskilled jobs, coloureds and Asians in semiskilled jobs, and whites in skilled positions. The roles of owner, manager, and technician were an almost exclusive domain of the whites. Although there were some unemployed whites, there was no white poverty, while the majority of nonwhites lived in poverty and destitution. Virtually all white households employed domestic workers, and many employed a full range of servants, maids, gardeners, and cooks (so that sometimes there were more domestic workers than related members of the white household). Automobiles, telephones, televisions, and computers were luxuries owned primarily by whites. By the 1980s, the previous income disparities between Afrikaners and Anglophones (with Afrikaners in a less privileged position) had largely dissipated.

As Table 4.5 shows, with subsistence level for a family of six calculated at R354/month, most blacks lived in poverty and barely above subsistence level. A small urban black middle class did exist, made up of teachers, doctors, lawyers, nurses, and undertakers, as well as employees of white-owned firms, particularly public relations and human resources, but also in small business and industrial consult-

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Table 4.5
Average Monthly Earnings in South Africa, by “Racial” Categories
(Rand/month)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Asian</th>
<th>White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>1,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>1,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>1,561</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 South African rand (1986) = US$ 0.49 (1986).


Assessment of closure in the economic realm. There is clear evidence that most whites were in the top 20 percent of the population in terms of wealth, whereas virtually all blacks were in the lower 60 percent of the income distribution scale. Moreover, the distribution curve appears to have been S-shaped, with a steep drop-off after the first 20–25 percent.

Was there a mechanism available for changing the static snapshot presented above? Clearly, a developed capitalist system was in place in South Africa and capital accumulation and individual initiative were encouraged, with the major proviso that different races had very different levels of preparation for the process. Moreover, informal practices as well as some legal restrictions gave advantages to the whites and penalized blacks the most.

By 1986, specific laws no longer precluded blacks and other nonwhites from economic aspirations. Though still severely underprivileged, urban blacks could become economically successful. But for the vast majority of nonwhites, and blacks especially, poverty, poor education, lack of capital, and hostile governmental agencies made accomplishing the task difficult. The problem stemmed from the legacy of several decades of longstanding legal discrimination that included even the reservation of jobs for whites. Removing the legal discrimination did not address the legacy of the far-reaching
discrimination or the likelihood that the same economic inequalities would be kept intact through informal mechanisms.

Until the mid-1980s, apartheid laws had made it virtually impossible for blacks to accumulate capital. The 1963 regulations implementing the 1957 Native Law Amendment Act created the following conditions: (1) blacks were forbidden to run more than one business at a time; (2) blacks had to have the right of “permanent” residence in a city before they could function as a business entity (something virtually impossible bureaucratically); (3) blacks were forbidden to form joint-stock companies or companies of more than one person; (4) blacks were forbidden to start up banking or financial businesses, manufacturing industries, or wholesale trading businesses; (5) blacks were not allowed to own business premises. In addition, the Group Areas policy restricted the access of blacks to housing and commercial land in black areas. The Group Areas Act controlled the acquisition of immovable property between individuals or companies of the various racial groups and controlled the occupation of land, buildings, and premises for all purposes. Assuming that wealth is generated primarily by the ownership and investment of capital, the earlier laws had virtually precluded black access to capital, property ownership, and wealth.

Remaining legal prohibitions as well as informal constraints certainly played a role in thwarting the economic mobility of blacks, but the structure of access to education and, consequently access to economic opportunities, was most telling of the lack of preparation for economic success. As Table 4.6 indicates, in terms of educational expenditures, there was a clear hierarchy along racial lines, with whites at the top and blacks at the bottom.

Moreover, government policies requiring school fees prohibited access to effective training in business development and management. Only in the informal sector (as hawkers, small shop proprietors, and as laborers) were blacks economically engaged. There were restrictions on black economic activity even in the “self-governing” homelands, for only through the Native Lands Investment Corporations, heavily subsidized by the South African government, were blacks allowed to build businesses in the homelands.
Table 4.6


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Expenditures (in rand)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blacks, South Africa proper</td>
<td>387.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks, homelands average</td>
<td>243.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>891.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>1,386.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>2,746.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*aBased on data for six homelands. These ranged from a high of R277.70 in Bophuthatswana to a low of R184.00 in Lebowa.


Closure in the Social Realm

Status distinctions in South Africa were abundantly clear, crucial in all aspects of public interaction, and legally upheld through the state machinery. Status stemmed primarily from outward physical features, generalized and categorized into “racial” categories based on an ideological racism. A status stratification map for South Africa (taking into account only the “official races”) might run along the following lines (see Table 4.7).

The basis for the pattern of status and stratification in South Africa stemmed from race, vocation, and national origin. However, race was by far the most important determinant, and a racial hierarchy was established in the constitution.

The doctrine of apartheid (“apartness”), or separate development, was the ideological underpinning for a whole system of segregationist laws, a hierarchy of groups, and a system of privileges and discrimination. The apartheid doctrine stemmed from traditional segregationist South African (primarily Afrikaner) practices legitimized by doctrines of the Dutch Reformed Church and had, at its core, an all-consuming belief in white superiority and the need to safeguard
### Table 4.7
Status Stratification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloureds</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asians</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>– –</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*++ = high status; – – = low status (compiled on the basis of data presented earlier).*

White culture from the indigenous Africans. An enormous consciousness of outward physical differences and the “scientific” race theory of the late 19th and early 20th centuries formed the basis for the belief that various ethnic groups are fundamentally distinct, have different destinies, and must evolve in separation from each other. Christian nationalism in South Africa reconciled the conflict between the Christian monogenesis of humankind and race theory by constructing explanations based on cultural essentialism.

The *apartheid* doctrine built on a highly developed identity of a “chosen people” among the Afrikaners. Based on myths of the Afrikaners’ trek into South Africa’s heartland and their wars against the British and native Africans, a set of beliefs emerged that the Afrikaner “volk” were destined by God to conquer both the land and the natives to prosper, protect, and preserve the white race. Underpinning these beliefs was a strong sense of distinctness from and an

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imposition of an imagined identity upon the indigenous African, describing him as the essential “other” to the European.\textsuperscript{10}

In the Afrikaner ideological framework, there was no room to imagine native Africans as intellectual equals or capable of understanding Western ideas, for Afrikaners saw the different levels of development between the Europeans and native Africans as genetically based. Within such a mindset, it followed that native Africans were not culturally, socially, or intellectually fit to contribute to South Africa’s development and needed only a basic education so as to be allowed to work in unskilled jobs. A paternalistic attitude toward the native Africans as well a belief that they were docile and happy and had no political ambition permeated the Afrikaner mindset. For Afrikaners, the indigenous African population was not monolithic but consisted of many different ethnic and “tribal” groups. But it was up to the highest-developed tribe, the “white tribe” of Afrikaners, to rule over the amalgam of black, coloured, Asian, and white tribes.

In theory, \textit{apartheid} meant the separate but equal development of all “racial” groups. But the emphasis on “separate” led to the formulation of a whole range of laws designed to ensure segregation. Although the accession of the NP to power in 1948 marked the full application of \textit{apartheid} in the political realm, earlier moves had set the stage for the separation of races. In 1913, just three years after the founding of the Union of South Africa, the Native Land Act introduced the principle of territorial separation of black and white populations by fixing the boundaries of tribal lands and prohibiting acquisition of land by blacks outside these boundaries. The Native Trust and Land Act (1938) pursued the policy of geographically distinct territories for blacks by designating the native African homelands. The Immorality Act (1927) banned sexual relations between members of different “races,” and the Black Representation Act (1936) removed blacks from the voters’ roll. But after the NP political victory in 1948, a whole host of basic segregationist laws followed in 1949–1953. The Group Areas Act (1949) gave legal force to the existing practice of segregation in housing, the Population Registration Act (1950) began the process of classifying all inhabitants according to the four “racial” categories (white, black, coloured, Asian), the Pass

\textsuperscript{10}Saul Dubow, \textit{Scientific Racism in Modern South Africa}. 
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Laws Act (1952) required blacks to carry internal passports and made entry into urban areas subject to police permission, and the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (1953) established separate public facilities for blacks and whites.11

The homeland policies followed from the implementation of apartheid by creating autonomous homelands that eventually were to become independent states. The Promotion of Native Land Self-Government Act (1959) provided for the establishment of such self-governing states on the basis of tribal affiliations, and the Black States Constitution Act (1971) authorized their self-government. The whole thrust of the policy was to remove blacks from even having South African citizenship while keeping them in “reservation”-like areas. The end goal of the policy would have been a division of much of rural South Africa into many “independent” states based on tribal identity, while the urban and commercial farm areas remained a part of the white state. In the 1950s, the many blacks residing in urban areas had no political rights whatsoever; in the 1960s and 1970s, these urban blacks were treated as citizens of their respective homelands rather than the townships in which they resided. The homeland blueprints were suspended and the policies reversed in 1986, with the repeal of the pass laws and the return of South African citizenship to citizens of the four “sovereign” homelands who resided and worked in South Africa proper. Although the government abandoned the homelands idea in 1985–1986 and began to look for a way to integrate urban blacks into the political realm, the overall aim of the homelands policy shows clearly the low status accorded to the blacks. At its height, the policy led to outright suspension of all rights of a large number of blacks in South Africa by taking away their South African citizenship.

Restrictions on coloureds and Asians varied in intensity but never approached the level of legal measures applied to the black population. Both groups were seen as at a higher level of development than

11The association of apartheid with the Afrikaners was clear to all in South Africa. Despite the privileges that Anglophone whites enjoyed as a result of apartheid, empirical data shows that hostility among blacks was directed almost entirely against Afrikaner whites, as opposed to all whites. John Duckitt and Thobi Mphuthiy, “Political Power and Race Relations in South Africa: African Attitudes Before and After the Transition,” Political Psychology, Vol. 19, No. 4, December 1998, pp. 809–832.
the blacks, though not equal to the whites. Rather than in some type of homelands, the coloureds and the Asians were envisioned to live in "white" South Africa, though in segregated townships. With the passage of the constitution in 1984, the two groups even received a nominal power-sharing role.

Among the whites, informal and relatively minor status distinctions ran primarily along Afrikaner/Anglophone lines, with the former seeing themselves as having more of a right to hold power because of their position as the original white settlers of South Africa and their development as a "white tribe" in Africa.

The apartheid doctrine amounted to an entire mindset, and the racial hierarchy and status distinctions attendant to it extended to foreigners visiting or residing in South Africa. European foreigners were given identical recognition as white South Africans. Japanese visitors were considered "honorary white," based on lucrative economic relations between South Africa and Japan, but all other Asian foreigners were classified "Asian" and ranked with South African Indians. Affluent foreign Africans and other blacks from outside the southern region had "white" privileges, subject to local custom. African-Americans were granted "honorary white" status to distinguish them as "modern blacks"—different from indigenous Africans—and, in a peculiarly self-contradictory fashion—to affirm the "nonracial" nature of the apartheid racial separation policy.

What were the implications of this racially based status distribution? Racial categorization was the single most important consideration for access to a whole range of benefits. Separate rules curtailing freedom of movement, assembly, residence, employment, and organization governed behavior according to one's race. Benefits and restrictions were ever-present and, because of the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, extended to facilities such as beaches, public transportation, schools, recreational centers, etc. "White only" signs were present at all such facilities. Beginning in 1986, the rules began to be relaxed and some areas began to be opened to all races. But the

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relaxation of formal rules did not mean the disappearance of informal biases and perceptions that had arisen around the status hierarchy that had been in place for so many years. Many whites probably continued to perceive blacks (and coloureds and Asians) as backward, irrational, and at a lower stage of development. The biases tended to be self-reinforcing and undoubtedly affected myriad everyday decisions, leading to still real, even if informally apportioned restrictions on status and benefits.

Was there a mechanism for change within the South African social stratification system? Status was tied directly and intimately to race, one’s race was determined and registered at birth, and there was no real possibility of movement between the racial groups. The political system created an elaborate way of managing intergroup relations, based on segregation and minimum contact. A basic collectivist outlook of treating individuals only as members of substate-level groups underpinned the whole range of apartheid laws.

As long as the hierarchy defined in the constitution remained in place, any change in status distribution would be gradual at best. As a society legally stratified by race, mobility for most nonwhites was virtually impossible. An extremely small number of affluent Indians, coloureds, and even blacks existed and had limited access to social amenities reserved primarily for whites. But such people were very few, and the severe constraints on accumulation of wealth—especially for blacks—virtually precluded all but the slowest change in status. In any event, despite the legal changes to the apartheid laws, the ideological edifice of the apartheid structure remained in place even in the late 1980s.

Overall Assessment of Closure

Based on the information presented above, Table 4.8 summarizes the degree of closure (in an overall sense as well as in the political, economic, and social realms) experienced by South Africa’s main groups in early 1989. To reiterate, closure in Weberian terms refers to the

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13One way of movement between racial groups was by way of formal application and provision of proof that the racial classification was in error. A government body then decided the case.
Table 4.8
Patterns of Closure by “Race” in South Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Overall</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloureds</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asians</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“process of subordination whereby one group monopolizes advantages by closing off opportunities to another group.” In the table, a group experiencing a “low” degree of closure has the most opportunities open to it. A group experiencing a “high” degree of closure has opportunities largely closed off.

As noted earlier, an all-encompassing system of ideological racism underpinned closure patterns in the political, economic, and social realms. There was no hypocrisy or ambiguity about the pattern of closure, and the pattern was upheld by the machinery of the state. By virtue of law, South Africans received privilege, status, wealth, and opportunity solely on the basis of race.

Some distinctions existed among the whites (with the Anglophones facing some closure in the political realm) and among the blacks (with urban blacks facing less closure in the political and economic realms than rural blacks), but such distinctions paled in comparison with the sharp distinctions along racial lines. Since there was virtually no potential for change in the stratification patterns (in all three realms), the closure pattern was extremely rigid.

A final ranking of groups along the lines of privileged to dominated—in relative terms—is illustrated in Table 4.9. The specific placement of groups on the privileged-dominated scale is not evenly spaced. In other words, the range of difference between the top two groups was almost insignificant relative to the wide gap separating the blacks from all other groups or the coloureds from the whites as a whole.

Based only on relative deprivation, the blacks of South Africa seem to have had the deepest grievances and the most reasons for seeking to
Table 4.9

Ranking of Groups in South Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Privileged</th>
<th>White Afrikaners</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White Anglophones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coloureds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominated</td>
<td>Blacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asians</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

change the status quo. The coloureds were the most privileged among the nonwhite groups, though their privileges did not differ all that much from the Asians. The whites were a group that was the target of all the other groups’ grievances. However, the Asians and the coloureds also had much to lose by treating their position vis-à-vis the whites in zero-sum terms, as the whites could then increase the pattern of closure they faced.

TRANSFORMING POTENTIAL STRIFE INTO LIKELY STRIFE

This section analyzes retrospectively the process of ANC mobilization in the late 1980s by focusing on the five aspects of mobilization: incipient changes, galvanizing “tipping” events, leadership, resources and organization, and the foreign element.

The reader should keep in mind that militant black (or primarily black) organizations attempting to change the status quo through violent and nonviolent means date back to the founding of South Africa. The main organization attempting to change the pattern of closure faced by blacks in South Africa, the ANC, was founded in 1912. The ANC engaged in essentially a civil rights struggle, seeking the extension to blacks of the same rights given to whites under the 1910 constitution. After the accession of the NP to power in 1948, the ANC transformed into a mass-based political movement that engaged in nonviolent but illegal activities. In 1961, after a bloody suppression by the police of a peaceful march at Sharpeville, the ANC formed a military arm, the Umkhonto we Sizwe, and in 1969 the ANC endorsed the use of violence against the regime (though it shied away from a reliance on armed struggle and looked upon violence as one of the many ways to pressure the government into changing its
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apartheid policies). Following a bloody police suppression of youth riots (that turned into an uprising) in Soweto in 1976, the ANC launched a guerrilla war in South Africa (primarily sabotage). In 1984, the ANC extended its guerrilla campaign onto “civilian” targets in addition to the previous emphasis on “hard” targets (police, military, and government installations). The move proved to be a disaster in terms of international and domestic support, and the policy was retracted. Armed guerrillas were trained and equipped at sanctuaries in neighboring countries and infiltrated into South Africa.

Thus, considerable violence was already the norm in South Africa by the late 1980s. Although the Soweto uprising in 1976 was a turning point, a mass mobilization of the black population did not really take place until 1985, with the ANC’s successful call to make the black townships ungovernable. Even then, violence was largely localized. The mobilization process presented in more detail below focuses on the situation in South Africa in 1985–1989.

This application of the process model looks only at the ANC. However, as mentioned earlier, other organizations attempting to mobilize the black population existed in South Africa. Among the banned black opposition groups, AZAPO was the most prominent in the 1980s, appealing to a black-centric vision of a future South Africa (as opposed to the ANC’s multiracial vision). Although AZAPO was important as an outlet of an intellectual current within the black majority population, its strength was dwarfed by the ANC.

Among the tolerated black political groupings, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) was the best known and most powerful. The IFP was a populist ethnically based party, appealing to Zulu nationalism. With a power base in KwaZulu (Natal), the IFP was a force that took the homelands policy’s idea of self-government at its word. The IFP’s conservative, group-based (consociational) vision of South Africa, combined with its simultaneous opposition to apartheid and some animosity toward the Xhosa-dominated ANC, put the organization in the middle ground between the government and the ANC. With the surge of ANC power in the mid-1980s, the IFP even cooperated with the apartheid regime against the ANC. But the IFP’s Zulu-centric outlook always constrained its appeal to non-Zulu blacks (indeed, IFP did not even succeed in attracting most Zulus, as there were more Zulus in the ANC than in IFP). The IFP was an important
regional actor in Natal and it could—and did—constrain the ANC in the latter’s mobilization efforts there, but the IFP could not be a national-level actor. Even AZAPO exceeded the IFP in terms of potential appeal.

The focus of this section is on the ANC because of its importance, its wide appeal (in practice as well as potential), and its internationally recognized role as the main organization spearheading the effort to bring down the apartheid system. An analyst looking at South Africa in the late 1980s would have focused primarily on the ANC, since the organization had managed to mobilize successfully the black population in the mid-1980s. However, for the purposes of analyzing the mobilization appeal of other groups, a similar analysis of AZAPO and IFP might have sharpened the results and clarified why the other groups were minor actors in the main confrontation between the ANC and the apartheid state.

Incipient Changes

There were at least four influential changes that, over time, shifted the demographic, economic, and political balance of power in 1980s South Africa.

Demographic pressures. Demographics always favored blacks in South Africa. But the different rates of natural increase among the various groups led to an ever-greater proportion of blacks to whites. The slowing of white emigration into South Africa to a trickle and declining fertility rates among whites contrasted with a high rate of natural increase among blacks. The first census in South Africa in 1911 showed that whites made up 22 percent of the population; the ratio remained similar—21 percent—in 1951, but it declined to 17 percent in 1970 and to 15 percent (including homelands) in 1980. The annual growth rate for blacks in South Africa in 1980–1989 was 2.39 percent. The corresponding figure for whites was 1.08 percent (1.82 percent for coloureds and 1.74 percent for Asians). To summarize, during the first 50 years of the country’s existence, the share of whites had remained at approximately one-fifth of the overall population but then began to decline. Projections showed whites as making up a little over 10 percent of the population by 2000. The decreasing share of whites in the population and the corresponding increasing share of blacks exacerbated a whole range of economic
and security problems for the government. Combined with the backpedaling on the homelands policy beginning in 1985, trends portended further changes in the direction of an ever-decreasing white share of the population.

**Decolonization and gradual fall of white minority regimes in southern Africa.** The *apartheid* policy was implemented during the era of colonial Africa (early 1950s). Despite the decolonization of the 1960s, southern Africa remained a bastion of white minority rule into the early 1970s. South Africa controlled Namibia (then South West Africa). The small states of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland were black-ruled but economically dependent on South Africa and part of the South African Customs Union. Mozambique and Angola were Portuguese colonies. Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia) was ruled by a minority white regime. Even though sporadic guerrilla wars raged in Angola, Mozambique, South West Africa, and Rhodesia, larger states with a black majority rule were far away from South Africa (the nearest being Zambia). However, following the Portuguese coup in 1974, Angola and Mozambique became independent, ruled by black majority Marxist-leaning governments openly opposed to the South African government. Zimbabwe came under black majority rule in 1980. Namibia, enveloped in a guerrilla war, increasingly became a subject of UN attention. The formation of the Southern Africa Development Coordination Commission (SADCC), an attempt by the black majority states in the region to reduce economic dependence on South Africa, had the potential to reduce South African leverage over the neighboring countries.

The strategic changes confronted South Africa with a variety of unsettling developments, and the response was to overextend the country’s armed forces and political posture. As guerrilla bases of an increasingly violence-prone ANC approached South Africa's borders, South African troops became involved in counterinsurgency operations in Namibia, conventional combat operations in southern Angola, and covert assistance to the antigovernment movements in Mozambique and Angola, all the while serving also as a tool to back up South African police in internal security operations. A nonaggression pact between Mozambique and South Africa in 1984 did not stop the ANC activities in South Africa. In 1988, South Africa agreed to withdraw from Namibia, losing another “buffer” state between the black majority states of Africa and the *apartheid* state. Thus, over the
space of fifteen years (1974–1989), there had been a complete change in the strategic situation in southern Africa. By 1989, only South Africa remained under white minority rule, and the neighboring countries either sympathized with the ANC or supported it overtly. South Africa had lost its strategic glacis.

**Structural shift in South Africa’s economy.** Until the 1970s, mining and agriculture had been the main sectors of the economy. The South African government accommodated both sectors with controls over labor and wages. The migratory labor system and homeland policy guaranteed a constant pool of labor, ensured government/industry control over wages, and kept unemployed blacks out of the area. In fact, the framework for the industrial residential areas, job reservation, and wage policies derived from the interests of the mining sector. Government management of the labor force in both instances enhanced the development of each industry by guaranteeing a supply of cheap labor.14

But the gradual shift toward a more developed capitalist economy led to the manufacturing sector dominating the economy, so that by 1973, the total value of manufacturing exceeded agriculture and mining combined. The manufacturing sector needed a more skilled and mobile work force, and the arrangements stemming from the domination of mining and agricultural interests became increasingly out of date. Parallel to the growth of manufacturing, black labor unions began to grow enormously in strength and determination, demanding higher wages and better working conditions. To maintain a stable manufacturing environment, businesses negotiated directly—and illegally—with unions. Thus, negotiations outside the *apartheid* framework and the rigid system imposed by industrial legislation became the norm.15 The initial successful experiences with black trade unions spurred more businesses to negotiate and reach such settlements, providing an important indicator that the *apartheid* state was fracturing. In addition, business began to criti-

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cize the government’s unwillingness to accommodate its needs for a different type of work force and greater flexibility in using it. The contradictions between the laws of capital and those of *apartheid* created a reluctant and distrustful partnership between labor and industry. In short, the structural change in the economy made *apartheid* laws seem inefficient and ill-adapted to contemporary economic needs, and they began to appear as more of a liability than an asset.

**Increasing international isolation and sanctions against South Africa.** Although South Africa had been subject to repeated censure by the United Nations, international sanctions against the country stayed in the realms of culture, sports, and diplomacy until the mid-1970s. Though a nuisance, the sanctions did not carry any great strength. But the sanctions gradually moved to the economic realm. In 1974, South Africa lost representation on the board of the IMF. Then, in 1977, the UN imposed a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa (a 1963 arms embargo had been “voluntary”). After violence broke out in South Africa in 1985, France terminated financial and economic relations, the British government banned new loans to the South African government and its agencies, and the United States imposed comprehensive sanctions on the country. The formal sanctions were accompanied by investor-led disinvestment and divestment pressures on U.S. corporations doing business in South Africa, resistance on the part of most foreign corporations to reinvest earnings, and refusals by banks to roll over loans. The sanctions began to hurt economically, weakened the regime’s standing with the business elite, and brought home the realization to whites that the situation would only become worse, as South Africa assumed the role of an international pariah.

In addition, one major and unexpected event upset the balance of power in South Africa in the late 1980s.

**The fall of communism.** Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms and the unraveling of the Eastern bloc had a profound impact upon the political situation in South Africa. On the one hand, the regime lost a major trump card. With the delegitimization of communism and the end of the Cold War, the regime’s portrayal of the ANC as a tool for a communist takeover of South Africa lost relevance. The reduced perceived threat from the left also diminished the support that South
Africa had enjoyed in the West because of its strategic location. On the other hand, the ANC lost its main source of support and military aid, dampening its prospects for a military success against SADF. Indeed, South African contacts with the USSR, begun during the negotiations over Namibia, were developing well, and there was potential for mutually profitable economic arrangements between the two countries (perhaps leading to a diamond cartel). In any event, both the ANC and the government faced a new situation after 1987–1988.

**Tipping Events**

At least two main tipping events elicited and propelled black mobilization. These events led to the massive wave of unrest in South Africa and should have been clear as “tipping events” to an analyst looking at South Africa in 1989.

**The introduction of a new constitution.** After several years of discussions of constitutional changes, parliamentary (whites-only) approval in September 1983, and an all-white referendum in November 1983, the constitution entered into effect in September 1984. Even though the majority of the coloured and Asian populations boycotted the elections to their newly established two parliamentary chambers in August 1984 (only 16–18 percent turnout), the constitution at least recognized some political rights of the coloured and Asian populations. However, the constitution still did nothing to include the majority black population. As such, its entry into force amounted to a reaffirmation of apartheid and was a powerful statement of exclusion. Massive rioting and unrest in black townships followed. The unrest was accentuated by the focusing of the world’s attention on South Africa after the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Bishop Desmond Tutu (a black activist against apartheid) at about the same time.

**Botha’s Rubicon speech.** Following the outbreak of serious violence and unrest in South Africa’s townships, the government declared a state of emergency in 36 districts in July 1985. Amidst world attention to the unfolding of events in South Africa, the August 15, 1985 speech by South Africa’s president, P.W. Botha, was widely anticipated as a potential breakthrough. Botha was expected to announce a fundamental concession to black demands, such as releasing
Nelson Mandela (the imprisoned leader of the ANC), completely eliminating the pass laws, declaring South Africa a unitary state, or opening a fourth chamber in the parliament for urban Africans. Instead, Botha delivered what was widely viewed as an affirmation of apartheid. In response, the ANC call upon its followers to make South Africa ungovernable was largely heeded, leading to prolonged unrest and rioting and a declaration of a nationwide state of emergency in June 1986 (renewed repeatedly until 1989).

Leadership

Nelson Mandela was a leader with organizational talent and unparalleled moral authority among the black population of South Africa. Mandela started out as a high-ranking member of the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL) in the 1940s and was involved in drawing up ANC’s Program of Action to protest the passing of the apartheid laws in 1948. The program transformed the ANC (founded in 1912) from a moderate organization appealing to educated blacks into a mass political movement. Following the police action at Sharpeville in 1960, Nelson Mandela founded the ANC’s military arm, Umkhonto we Sizwe. Having received military training in Algeria during that country’s war of independence, Mandela proved an able military organizer. However, in 1963, the South African police discovered Umkhonto’s headquarters and captured Mandela and other ANC leaders.

In 1964, Mandela was sentenced to life imprisonment on a charge of sabotage. The decapitation of its leadership led to a virtual collapse of the ANC structure in South Africa, and the organization moved into exile. Although imprisoned, Mandela remained the spiritual embodiment of the black struggle for equal rights. His eloquent writings, smuggled out of prison, continued to influence the development of ANC strategy and thought. The fact that Oliver Tambo, an old colleague of Mandela dating back to the ANCYL days, came to assume leadership of the ANC only strengthened Mandela’s resonance and influence.

Mandela’s consistent emphasis on a multiethnic South Africa and sensitivity to the fears of black majority rule by many whites, combined with an accurate reading of the shifts in thinking among blacks in South Africa, even won him grudging respect among the less de-
voted apartheid supporters as well as more militant black elements. In short, Mandela emerged as a symbol of the ANC and opposition to apartheid in general. Although Mandela was not the tactical on-the-ground leader of the ANC, his views on the general conduct of the ANC’s actions carried enormous weight and shaped ANC policy as well as black (and international) attitudes in general. His leadership skills were evident in his pattern of behavior: first, almost instinctively, Mandela expressed his own—often controversial—views and then, through his power of persuasion, hoped that others would agree.16 Other leaders, such as Cyril Ramaphosa, skilled at organization and negotiation, provided capable leadership and guidance to the ANC and worked out its tactics.

Resources and Organization

Given its largely impoverished base of support in South Africa and no personal wealth among its leadership, the ANC had few in-country resources. The ANC did not extract any monetary contributions from supporters in South Africa. Resources in support of ANC’s activities came primarily from external sources.

What it lacked in resources, the ANC made up for in organization. The leadership of ANC consisted of a 30-member National Executive Committee (NEC), elected by a general congress of ANC’s voting members and subject to approval by the group’s president. A variety of constituent groups made up the ANC, including Umkhonto we Sizwe, ANCYL, guerrilla training camps, the Women’s Section, officials from the ANC headquarters (in Lusaka, Zambia in the 1980s), and delegates from South Africa. In between its congresses, the executive body of the NEC was the National Working Committee (NWC), appointed by the NEC from within its ranks. Two coordinating bodies with executive powers steered activities between meetings of the NWC: the Politico-Military Council (PMC) and the External Coordinating Council (ECC). All departments fell under one of three offices: (1) the Office of the President (head and chief directing officer of the Congress and commander in chief of Umkhonto we Sizwe); (2) the Office of the Secretary General (chief administrative

officer of the movement); and (3) the Office of the Treasurer General (chief custodian of the funds and property of the ANC).  

The Political Committee had the task of mobilizing mass action in South Africa, establishing underground political and *Umkhonto we Sizwe* units, maintaining contact with legal organizations inside South Africa, setting up legal organizations within South Africa for mass mobilization and mass action, and reporting regularly to the PMC on the state of the internal organization and the conduct of political activities. The Women’s Section was specifically targeted to mobilize women outside and inside South Africa, organize international material and political support from women overseas, issue propaganda material for both internal and external use, and report regularly to the Secretary General. ANCYL was focused on the recruitment of youth and students in South Africa into the ANC, organization of the ANC youth abroad into active units, and issuance of propaganda materials inside and outside South Africa.

The Military Headquarters directed the military operations inside and outside South Africa, subject to plans approved by the PMC/NWC/NEC, established underground *Umkhonto we Sizwe* units inside the country, and reported regularly to the NEC on the state of the army and the conduct of military operations. Individual ANC guerrillas, after training in one of the camps in southern Africa (Zambia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Angola), were smuggled back into the country with forged papers and, using safehouses and sympathizers, contacted established ANC cells in the country and used weapons caches already in place.

The ANC had an extensive network of informal contacts with predominantly black organizations in South Africa, such as trade unions, student groups, and churches. For example, the ANC provided leadership and organizational skills to the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU), which later became the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU).

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In the 1980s, then, the ANC possessed a highly sophisticated and far-reaching organizational structure. Its multitude of ties and contacts in South Africa meant good intelligence, while its sympathizers could be found in almost every nonwhite organization in South Africa and could shape political mobilization. The ANC’s military wing also had a core of capable guerrillas and a well-developed network in South Africa.

**Foreign Element**

The black majority-ruled states of Africa (and African states in general) provided diplomatic support and substantial assistance of their own and acted as a conduit for other foreign aid to the ANC. In terms of outright funding, Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt, Gabon, Cote d’Ivoire, and Senegal all contributed at least $1 million annually during the 1980s, but almost all African governments (with some exceptions, such as Malawi) provided some support. Other African states, such as Tanzania, Ethiopia, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Angola provided training camps and facilities for use by the ANC. The Organization for African Unity (OAU) channeled some of the Soviet bloc aid to the ANC.

During the Cold War, the strategic location of South Africa and its strong anticomunist policy made it a strategic—if embarrassing—ally of the United States and NATO. Soviet support to the ANC and other black insurgent movements in southern Africa increased steadily with the rise of Soviet assertiveness in the developing world in the 1960s and 1970s, especially after the Soviet-supported Cuban military intervention in Angola. As South African troops clashed directly with Cuban forces and Soviet-trained and equipped Angolan troops, South Africa became the main Soviet adversary in Africa. The USSR and other Soviet bloc countries (primarily East Germany) were the main sources of military equipment and training to the ANC. The Soviet bloc also provided diplomatic support and funding. The USSR was probably the single most important source of funding and aid to the ANC in the early 1980s.

Disapproval of the *apartheid* policies led to widespread support for the ANC from West European and North American sources. A variety of social-democratic organizations in Western Europe (such as the West German Social-Democratic party) and governments ruled by social-democratic parties (especially the Scandinavian countries)
contributed funds to the ANC. Through a variety of contacts with political parties, religious organizations, student groups, and trade unions, the ANC received support from most of the developed Western countries, including the United States. The UN contributed to funding for the ANC through its financial support for the ANC office at the UN.

In short, there was widespread international support for the ANC. Some of it was tied to the Cold War and Soviet use of black majority rule organizations for its own ends. But support also came from groups in developed Western countries sympathetic to the anti-apartheid cause. In 1986, the ANC claimed that more than half of its aid came from non-Soviet sources, though that may have been an exaggeration.

**Overall Assessment of Mobilization**

The gradual transformation of the South African economy increased the leverage of blacks with the white business elite, while demographic pressures, international isolation, and growing vulnerability of South Africa to penetration by armed ANC groups placed the South African government on the defensive by the early 1980s. After Botha’s unexpected strong defense of the apartheid system and his seeming challenge to the opposition, the ANC’s strong appeal to the blacks of South Africa, its moral leadership under Nelson Mandela, and its worldwide support, combined with its sophisticated organization and a coordinated plan of action, made the organization well able to implement its call to “make South Africa ungovernable” in the mid-1980s. Other anti-apartheid black groups existed in South Africa, but none could match the standing and the clear ability of the ANC to mobilize its supporters.

**ASSESSING THE STATE**

**Accommodative Capability**

How inclusive and responsive were South African political structures to the general populace? A relatively open political system and regular elections served as channels of elite replacement, but the mechanisms extended primarily to whites and secondarily to the
coloureds and Asians. The 1984 constitution amounted to a far-reaching step by the whites toward power sharing with the coloureds and Asians. Though the political power of the two groups remained more nominal than real, their political rights were increased and they obtained a representative voice in the parliament. However, the 70 percent of the population classified as blacks remained without any political rights. These restrictions were written in the constitution. Given such a state of affairs, in an overall sense the political structures were highly exclusive. The political system amounted to a race-based oligarchy, with accountability extended only to the whites.

What potential for change in political structures existed in South Africa in the late 1980s? The constitution established a strong Presidency, giving it a virtually free mandate to decide national issues with only limited oversight (primarily indirect) by the House of Assembly. Since the Afrikaner-dominated NP controlled both the House of Assembly and the Presidency, and since their specific understanding of identity gave Afrikaners strong in-group solidarity, for all practical purposes the political structures could not change peacefully without the approval of the Afrikaners.

The political system did not provide for any meaningful interest-articulation mechanisms for blacks. Instead, the political system tried to establish separate entities that would provide limited (primarily local) self-government and political representation for blacks outside the main political system in South Africa. Without any political representation of the interests of blacks at the national level, the system simply was not equipped to handle conflict resolution between blacks and the state. Since the constitution precluded the formation of any national-level black representation, the potential for fundamental change in political structures was low.

In short, in terms of inclusiveness, the South African political system was explicitly exclusive. The 1984 constitution allowed for the nominal inclusion of the two nonwhite groups but did nothing to address the country’s black majority population. The system had limited flexibility in that it served primarily as a tool of Afrikaners. If a white majority (based on the Anglophones and at least a strong minority, if not the majority, of Afrikaners) decided that the system had to change, they could implement fundamental reforms. But such a transformation depended on a change of views toward apartheid.
Identifying Potential Ethnic Conflict: Application of a Process Model

among the Afrikaners. The best that can be said is that the South African political system had some built-in flexibility within the oligarchic structure.

Prevailing norms of governance varied according to racial classifications. Among the whites there was a good deal of tolerance of differences, as long as the opposition did not step outside the bounds and engage in outright illegal activities. Even then, state sanctions against such individuals were relatively mild. The system showed less tolerance toward the coloureds and Asians and showed very little tolerance toward any displays of opposition by blacks. The premise of the state was that blacks were not fit for modern political institutions and instead were better suited for traditional ("tribal" chief) modes of governance. The state saw actions by blacks aiming to change South Africa’s political system to be essentially impermissible, and even nonviolent acts of disobedience by blacks could be—and sometimes were—treated as fundamental threats to the state.

In the South African polity, racially based collectivist norms were clearly superior to individual rights and underpinned the whole structure of governance. Such norms stemmed from the fundamental racist outlooks toward the various groups, a racially based hierarchy, and different views as to the “proper” role of specific groups in the society. The views had an ideological—indeed, theological—explanation in the apartheid doctrine and seemed deeply internalized, especially among the Afrikaners.

What was the level of cohesion among the ruling elites? For almost two decades after the NP’s victory in 1948, the party was dedicated to a radical form of Afrikaner nationalism and united in its uncompromising attitude about implementing apartheid and in its resentment of Anglophones in South Africa. Differences over the interpretation of apartheid policies in the 1960s (such as allowing visiting black diplomats to stay in white hotels) provoked a split within the NP into two wings, the verkrampte (uncompromising) and verligte ("enlightened" or pragmatic), as well as the formation of an extreme-right splinter party, the Herstigte Nasionale Party (Reconstituted National Party). By 1982, the verligte wing’s discussion of accommodating some urban blacks in the South African political system led to another split and the formation of the extreme-right Conservative Party (CP) by a group of deputies expelled from the NP. The reforms
launched by Botha in the mid-1980s led to further splintering within the NP, with the verkrampte wing openly blaming the reforms and the liberal wing of the NP for the outbreak of violence. In addition, prominent members of the NP (Denis Worrall and Wynand Malan) left the NP and formed political parties dedicated to faster political reform.

In the parliamentary elections in May 1987, the NP kept its majority. The main political party of the Anglophones, the Progressive Federal Party (PFP), lost ground, as many Anglophones voted instead for the NP. The Conservative Party made large gains and became the main opposition party in the parliament. Several additional extreme-right Afrikaner groups (on the neo-fascist fringe) also formed.18 Under such conditions, the NP, led by the verligte wing, emerged as an increasingly centrist organization.

By early 1989, Afrikaners were no longer politically united. As early as 1987, the Broederbond (Brotherhood),19 a highly influential secret Afrikaner society, had accepted the fact that black participation in South African politics at the national level was inevitable and only a matter of time. The militant Afrikaners had bolted the NP for the far-right Afrikaner groups. An alliance of four moderate and liberal parties (two Anglophone and two Afrikaner), aiming to dismantle apartheid, formed a united opposition party, the Democratic Party. Even some leaders of the Dutch Reformed churches declared apartheid evil and a sin against God.

Clearly, Afrikaners had lost their unity. Neither upholding strict apartheid nor anti-Anglophone proclivities remained as pillars of the NP. From a mechanism of militant and segregationist Afrikaners, the NP was evolving into a vehicle for moderate whites (Anglophones and Afrikaners).20 A substantial portion of the Afrikaners turned

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19Membership in the Broederbond was by invitation only, after an Afrikaner had demonstrated a high level of loyalty and leadership to the Afrikaner cause. Almost all prominent Afrikaner political and business leaders (including President Botha) were members of the Broederbond.

toward far-right political groups uncompromising in their stance toward apartheid. Still others rejected apartheid altogether. The lack of cohesion among Afrikaners was matched by an increasing unity among the whites in general about the need to move beyond apartheid.

In conclusion, the accommodative capability of the South African state defies easy labels. Democratic political institutions existed but were limited to certain groups, primarily the whites. If a fundamental shift in views among the whites occurred, the system had enough flexibility to address even the most basic questions. But this responsiveness was only extended to changing views among the privileged minority. Moreover, that minority had profited from the system and had many incentives to keep it in place. Norms of governance and a collectivist racially based view of the society indicated little tolerance of any black political activism or black aspirations to the national political level.

Still, there were numerous signs in place by early 1989 of a fundamental political realignment among the whites in South Africa, with a diminution of earlier Anglophone/Afrikaner differences and the emergence of a consensus among the whites that apartheid had to be dismantled. Black mobilization and consequent violence seems to have played a role in shaping the political realignment.

**Fiscal and Economic Capability**

The fiscal health of South Africa in the 1980s was essentially sound, though there were some worrisome trends in evidence. Until 1986, South Africa had a high rating with international lending institutions, a strong history of debt repayments, and a manageable debt. But the various international sanctions and especially the outflow of investment (the book value of U.S. investments in South Africa fell from $2.4 billion in 1982 to $1.3 billion in 1986) and the stopping of loans to South Africa led to current account problems. A capital flight of $1 billion occurred in the six months between September 1985 and March 1986. The South African currency (the rand) plummeted from US$1.28 to US$0.39 in 1986, where it stabilized until 1989. As Table 4.10 illustrates, the economy continued to grow, though at a sluggish pace, inflation reached worrisome double digits, and the government engaged in sustained deficit spending (though not at alarming levels).
Table 4.10
South African Revenues and Expenditures (Millions of rand)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total revenue</td>
<td>29,851</td>
<td>34,611</td>
<td>38,794</td>
<td>51,234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total expenditure</td>
<td>33,026</td>
<td>40,213</td>
<td>46,319</td>
<td>59,923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deficit</td>
<td>–3,175</td>
<td>–5,602</td>
<td>–7,525</td>
<td>–8,689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deficit as percent of revenues</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


in the late 1980s. In addition, South Africa largely lost the ability to obtain new loans due to international sanctions.

The worsening economic situation notwithstanding, it would be an exaggeration to say that South Africa faced fundamental economic problems. As the world’s leading producer of gold (about 30 percent of world production) and a major producer of diamonds and a variety of rare metals, South Africa was assured of a steady income. However, the international isolation and sanctions had hurt the country’s manufacturing and services industries and threatened to cause further disruptions.

As for the structure of the state budget in the late 1980s, defense already occupied a prominent position among the main budgetary categories, as shown in Table 4.11. Since expenditures on social services for nonwhites were already at low levels, further outlays on defense would have been taken at the expense of social spending for whites.

As Table 4.12 shows, the majority of South African government revenues came from income taxes and of those, most came from income taxes on individuals. Under the South African tax structure in the late 1980s, a progressive tax rate was applied to incomes ranging from 16 percent on the first R10,000 to 53.5 percent on income exceeding R42,000. Because of the concentration of wealth, the main tax burden fell upon the whites, as Table 4.13 indicates. Although the apartheid system served the whites well, it was not cheap.

South Africa had an effective machinery for extracting more resources from the society. However, the portion of the society that
Table 4.11
Structure of South Africa’s Budget, 1987–1988 (Millions of rand)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1987–1988</th>
<th>Percent of State Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>7,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic services</td>
<td>6,248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>8,617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>4,339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other social services</td>
<td>4,274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest on public debt</td>
<td>6,098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9,725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>46,319</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentages may not total to 100 due to rounding.

Table 4.12
South Africa’s Revenue Sources, 1987–1988 (Millions of rand)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1987–1988</th>
<th>Percent of Total Revenues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income tax</td>
<td>21,887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General sales tax</td>
<td>9,954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excise duties</td>
<td>1,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs duties</td>
<td>1,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3,493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>38,794</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 4.13
Income Tax Payable by Individuals, South Africa, 1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Average Income (rand)</th>
<th>Tax, Not Married (rand)</th>
<th>Tax, Married with Four Children (rand)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>5,016</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>6,732</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>9,240</td>
<td>849</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>18,732</td>
<td>3,361</td>
<td>2,265</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

formed the state’s core support group was already taxed heavily. Especially at the upper income levels, tax rates were unattractive in comparison with some of the other developed states. Conceivably, the government could have increased rates further, but such a move threatened to be counterproductive in terms of causing an outflow of capital.

The core support group of the *apartheid* state, the whites, differed in terms of their income and political party support. Surveys of party supporters in the late 1980s showed a pattern of the wealthier whites supporting the political party most identified with the goal of dismantling *apartheid*, while the lower-class whites supported the far-right parties. The pattern indicated in Table 4.14 of the poorer whites especially adamant about protecting their social standing and income against potential competition from blacks is not unusual. Nor is the pattern due to the different levels of wealth between Afrikaners and Anglophones since, by the 1980s, income levels between the two groups had become similar.

In terms of the NP’s overall dependence on support from the whites, the sympathies of the poorer whites with the far-right Afrikaner parties made political appeals to that stratum of the population not all that enticing, compared to an attempt to coopt the wealthier, more liberally inclined whites. The latter approach allowed for the possibility of increased financial support for the party, though it meant liberalizing and perhaps dismantling *apartheid*.

### Table 4.14

**Household Income and Political Party Support Among Whites, South Africa, 1987**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household Income</th>
<th>PFP (liberal)</th>
<th>NP (centrist-right)</th>
<th>HNP and CP (far-right)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upper-middle</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower-middle</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample size</td>
<td>N = 335</td>
<td>N = 801</td>
<td>N = 262</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In conclusion, the fiscal and economic capability of the South African state in the late 1980s defies easy labels. Economic problems certainly existed, caused to no small extent by international sanctions, and worrisome trends were in place (deficit spending, slow growth, and inflation). However, the economy remained essentially sound and the country’s unique assets guaranteed that economic problems would not become catastrophic. In terms of the state’s ability to extract further resources, the machinery to do so existed and the core support group remained wealthy, even if already taxed at significant levels. The more interesting development was the political splintering among the whites—in their views of apartheid—more along income levels rather than Afrikaner/Anglophone distinctions. The wealthier whites, whether Anglophone or Afrikaner, increasingly questioned the wisdom of continuing apartheid. And yet, it was the wealthy whites to whom the ruling elite had to appeal and take into account.

Coercive Capability

There was no ambiguity about the authorities’ access to the command and control channels of the apparati of violence nor about the propensity to use them against domestic opponents. The 1984 constitution established a strong presidency and named the president the commander-in-chief. Under Botha’s tenure, the State Security Council (SSC) was revitalized as a crucial committee at the Cabinet level charged with security.

The SSC secretariat included several directorates: strategy, national intelligence, strategic communication, and administration. The SSC secretariat was also in charge of interdepartmental committees, which oversaw the implementation of strategy at the bureaucratic level, and joint management centers, which ensured the extension of the strategy to the local level. The whole system, known as the National Security Management System (NSMS), amounted to an elaborate security executive mechanism, outside the bounds of any parliamentary supervision.

The minister of defense had direct civilian supervision over the military. The chief of the SADF had the operational command of the armed forces and was accountable to the minister of defense for carrying out the government’s policy for the armed forces. The SADF
consisted of three services (Army, Navy, Air Force). Chiefs of each service reported directly to the SADF Chief. Besides being responsible for defending South Africa’s borders, the Army had the task of preserving state authority and assisting the South African Police (SAP) in internal security operations. The Air Force, through its mission of support to the Army, also had a specific internal security role. The Ministry of Law and Order controlled the SAP.

The legal mechanisms justifying the use of force domestically stemmed from a number of laws passed primarily in the 1950s and 1960s against the opposition Congress Alliance (composed of the ANC, Indian Congress, and the South African Communist Party). The laws included: (1) the Internal Security (Suppression of Communism) Act, 1950 (gave the government the power to ban a wide range of political activities and organizations); (2) the Public Safety Act, 1953 (allowed for the declaration and regulation of a state of emergency); (3) the General Law Amendment Act, 1962 (made sabotage a capital offense); (4) the General Law Amendment Act, 1963 (legalized detention without trial for up to 90 days); (5) the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act, 1965 (extended detention without trial for up to 180 days); (6) the Terrorism Act, 1967 (introduced indefinite detention of persons suspected of terrorism); and (7) the Internal Security Act, 1982 (consolidated all of the above security legislation under the ordinary law).

Who served in the apparati of violence? The military and police apparati were heavily staffed by Afrikaners. There is little doubt that the personnel in the two organizations could be relied upon in case of domestic unrest.

The SADF was divided into the Permanent Force, the Citizen Force, the Commandos, Auxiliary Services, and civilians. Professional soldiers made up the Permanent Force and were responsible for the training and administration of the entire force. The Citizen Force was composed of noncareer soldiers and supplemented the Permanent Force. The Commandos functioned primarily as paramilitary home defense (area protection) units. In 1989, the active personnel strength of SADF was 106,400 (including 64,100 conscripts), some 175,000 active reserves, and 130,000 Commandos. Conscription was mandatory for white males (voluntary for others) at age 18, and the term of service lasted two years. Following the term of service, con-
scripts then had to serve two years over the next 12 years. Following that term, they qualified for the Active Citizen Force Reserve. After five years in the Reserve, they could be called up and assigned to the Commando forces.

Nonwhite volunteers served either as career personnel in the Permanent Force or on a temporary basis in the Citizen Force or Commandos. The nonwhites were assigned to separate units (often specialized). Virtually all members of the Permanent Force were whites and almost 99 percent of the Citizen Force was composed of whites. In 1987, whites made up approximately 85 percent of the Commandos (blacks made up 4 percent, coloured 9 percent, and Asians 2 percent).21

The officer corps of the SADF was overwhelmingly Afrikaner. In its symbols and mythology, the SADF had strong Afrikaner tendencies (for example, one of its main training institutions was the Danie Theron Combat School, named for an Afrikaner with anti-British proclivities). Generally, the higher the rank, the greater was the percentage of Afrikaners and the fewer of Anglophones.

The South African Police had an active strength of 60,950 (32,754 whites and 28,196 nonwhites) in 1987, supplemented by some 20,000 reserves. Generally, black police were not allowed to carry arms. The high command of the SAP seems to have been primarily composed of Afrikaners.

What norms existed with respect to the use of violence domestically? The state had used force (police as well as the military) repeatedly against domestic opponents since the inception of the apartheid system. On several occasions (Soweto in 1976, mid-1980s in many urban areas), the death toll among the protesters ranged into the hundreds. The internal security apparatus also had a reputation for excessive brutality (Sharpeville, 1960) and was implicated in instances of torture and murder of prisoners (Steven Biko, 1977) and detainees (in 1984–1986, 18 people supposedly committed suicide.

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The internal security intelligence apparatus engaged in assassination of suspected opponents, often with the use of proxies (KwaMakutha raid, 1987). While some of the targets of the internal security apparatus were ANC guerrillas and many operations had a counterinsurgency or violent riot-control character, at least some of the actions of the security services fell more in the realm of intimidation of opponents and use of excessive force.

The South African justice system did not hesitate to impose death sentences for incidents related to urban unrest. For example, in the period 1985–1988, 101 people charged with such offenses were sentenced to death (17 were executed). In short, the South African internal security apparatus had a reputation for dealing harshly with nonwhite, and especially black, opponents. Officially, the government considered South Africa under siege, and it treated the black unrest and ANC-sponsored sabotage as a foreign-inspired communist guerrilla war.

Was the force suitable for domestic use? One of the missions of the SADF was internal security, and its equipment and training reflected preparation for the task. Many of the armored personnel carriers used by the Army were suitable for domestic internal security duties. The Air Force used several squadrons of Impala aircraft for counterinsurgency duties. Nonetheless, the military was never at ease with its domestic role and, when used, played a backup role to the police. The primary tools of the state in quelling domestic unrest were the Security Police and the SAP, a heavy police force equipped with substantial riot gear and armored vehicles for patrols in areas where government control was weak.

The internal security apparatus had extensive domestic intelligence capabilities. Three intelligence services were engaged in domestic intelligence collection, coordination, and analysis: the Security Police (domestic security intelligence collection and counterintelligence), the National Intelligence Service (or NIS, intelligence processing and coordination), and the Directorate of Military Intelli-

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gence (or DMI, military and defense intelligence inside and outside South Africa). The intelligence organizations engaged in covert operations against the ANC and its suspected sympathizers.

In conclusion, the coercive capability of the South African state was strong. The state had arrayed a powerful force against internal opponents and showed the determination and will to use the means of coercion on numerous occasions. The top executive authorities had a virtually free hand in ordering force to quell unrest and had set up an elaborate command and control mechanism for effective coordination of all internal security activities. Afrikaners were prominent in the apparatus of coercion and dominant at its higher echelons.

**STRATEGIC BARGAINING**

This analysis of the mobilization of the ANC and the capabilities of the South African state to deal with such a mobilization provides a second example of how the interaction between a mobilized group and a state can be thought of within the framework presented in Chapter Two. Similar to the analysis of Yugoslavia presented in Chapter Three, the group and state types are categorized on the basis of their capacities, and the matrices provide a way to think about their interaction conceptually.

**Measuring the Group’s Capacities**

Concerning the leadership of the ANC-mobilized blacks, Nelson Mandela was as devoted to the ANC and majority rule in 1989 as he had been in 1960 or in 1948, despite spending 25 years in a harsh prison. His moral stature and wide appeal had only increased.23 A core of skilled organizers directed the ANC and provided capable leadership in Mandela’s absence. All of the top leadership of the ANC were convinced of the justice of their cause and unwaveringly dedicated to it. The ANC leadership’s acceptance of violence and their call in the mid-1980s to make South Africa ungovernable shows

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23Robben Island, the maximum security prison where he was held, was known among anti-apartheid activists as Mandela University, because of the political mentoring and leadership he provided to the movement.
that they were willing to take risks. It was by no means assured that the black population would heed the ANC call for massive unrest. Had the call gone largely unheeded (or had it been deterred by a show of force by the South African internal security apparatus), the ANC would have suffered a major blow to its prestige, for its claim to have wide resonance among the black population would have been exposed as false. Thus, the assessment of leadership is “strong.”

Concerning the ANC’s resources and organization, previous observations paint a mixed picture. On the one hand, the ANC had tremendous worldwide sympathy, enough to cause South Africa to suffer international isolation and be treated as a pariah country. On the other hand, the ANC had no domestic resource base to speak of and depended on sometimes fickle financial support from foreign sources. And compared to the South African state, its resources were puny. The fall of communism and the slowing of Soviet aid to the ANC was troublesome. Moreover, the Soviet military support the ANC had received was well suited to forcing the state to spend enormous amounts on defense. However, the resource base was sufficient to meet all near-term goals, such as making South Africa ungovernable, and many mid- and even long-term goals (bringing the South African state to its knees through overextension and isolation). The ANC also showed that it used the resources effectively. Support for the ANC had increased greatly in the 1980s, and there were good prospects that the level of support would at least remain steady. Western support was unlikely to be in the military realm (and would not replace the Soviet bloc support), though other forms of aid too may have been effective. Thus, the assessment of resource support is “good.”

Regarding popular support for the ANC mobilization, there is little question that the ANC had the support of the majority of the black population of South Africa. Neither the black nationalist organizations that competed with the ANC for support among blacks nor the group-based organizations (such as IFP) ever achieved anywhere near the influence of the ANC. And whereas the ANC could subsume the other groups under its umbrella, the other groups could not do the same with the ANC. In the same vein, the multiracial unionism represented by the ANC also elicited support from segments of all other groups in South Africa (coloureds, Asians, and whites). Thus, the assessment of popular support is “broad.”
Based on these assessments, the blacks mobilized by ANC are a type A group. The capacities of such a group are as follows:

- Accommodative: high;
- Sustainment: high;
- Cohesiveness: high.

Note that if resource support is assessed as weak, then the group type is C, with accommodative and cohesiveness capacity remaining high and sustainment changing to low.

**Measuring the State’s Capacities**

Concerning the leadership of the state, all of the observations compiled paint a picture of the Afrikaner leadership in crisis and a political realignment under way by early 1989. Just as Botha was embroiled in a power struggle within the NP (F.W. de Klerk replaced Botha as the NP leader in February 1989), the Afrikaner elements unreconciled to any easing of *apartheid* had become the main opposition to the NP in the parliament. Moreover, the NP had lost its full identification with Afrikaners and was increasing its support among Anglophones. Finally, the heretofore weak liberal white parties had united. Under such circumstances, the Afrikaner leadership (whether moderate or extreme right wing) was conscious of other leaders and engaged in intense political maneuvering. Any leader appealing to a narrow Afrikaner political spectrum was certain to become marginalized in the new intrawhite political environment. Since the Afrikaner political unity had splintered and the Anglophone/Afrikaner division no longer had as great a resonance, making appeals to the greater polity of whites was the only solution for a leader with truly national aspirations. Finally, in conditions of flux and realignment, old political rules and certainties no longer applied, and dedication to the goals of a previous era was not a wise policy for political leaders. Thus, the assessment of leadership is “weak.”

There is some ambiguity about the state’s fiscal capacity. On the one hand, the state had engaged in substantial deficit spending, defense already occupied a prominent place in the budget, and the core group supporting the state, the whites, already faced hefty taxes. On the other hand, deficit spending had not been that lengthy or deep,
there was room for some reallocation of funds, and the state probably could have extracted more resources from the whites had it chosen to do so. Moreover, South Africa remained the world’s single largest producer of gold, it had almost unrivaled other mineral resources, and its economy continued to grow even during the years of unrest in the mid-1980s. In short, the state faced some fiscal problems but not a crisis, and its economy remained essentially sound. Thus, the assessment of fiscal position is “strong.”

Regarding the regime type of the state, for the whites, the South African state was inclusive. Within that group, competitive elections took place, media were uncensored (except for specific instances concerning information about ongoing unrest) and there was an acceptance of democratic practices and tolerance of different views. The integration of coloureds and Asians into national politics, even if more nominal than real, was a definite step toward further inclusiveness. The elimination of a host of apartheid restrictions on blacks by the late 1980s also foreshadowed a potential further move toward political inclusion of the black majority of the population. Despite all of the above, however, the state remained an oligarchy, it denied almost three-quarters of the population any political rights, and it even stripped many blacks of citizenship. Thus, the assessment of regime type is “exclusive.”

Based on these assessments, the South African state is a type H state. The capacities of such a state are as follows:

- Accommodative: low;
- Sustainment: high;
- Coercive: high.

**Outcome of Bargaining and Preferences for Violence**

Based on the matrix showing the preferences of the mobilized group, a type A group has the following preferences toward a type H state: (1) exploit, (2) intimidate, and (3) negotiate. Based on the matrix showing the preferences of the state toward a mobilized group, a type H state has the following preferences toward a type A group: (1) exploit, (2) repress, and (3) negotiate. Note that if the group type is C, due to an assessment of resource support as weak, the group’s pref-
erences stay the same: exploit, intimidate, negotiate. The state’s preferences change to: repress, exploit, negotiate.

Comparing group and state preferences leads to the conclusion that the potential for violence certainly existed in the dyadic encounter between the ANC-mobilized black population and the apartheid regime. However, the more striking observation is that, despite a virtual state of war between the ANC and the state, neither side preferred to resort to violence. Instead, the preferred strategy for both sides was to compete with the other through largely nonviolent means. The preference sets of both sides were the same, namely, a strategy of exploitation designed to weaken the opponent, with a hedging strategy of using violence. Neither side trusted the other, but each respected the other’s capabilities and held out the potential for a negotiated solution.

What is telling about the choice of strategies is the underlying sense of an impasse. The ANC’s resorting to a full-blown strategy of violence would have been risky and would certainly have been costly. But the ANC was left with few alternatives other than to pursue its goals as forcefully as possible without crossing over the threshold of a mass uprising. The state was in a similar position. It commanded considerable coercive resources but preferred to use them as a deterrent and a tool to force the ANC to negotiate a transfer of power on the state’s terms or, even better, to share power without the state losing control.

The matchup of state type H and group type A is a notable dyad in that the preference sets for both provide an interesting combination of least “bad” choices within a highly dangerous (violence-prone) set of dyads. The dangerous elements come into play because an exclusive regime leads to a state type that is highly prone to violence. However, among the four state types having an exclusive regime, type H is the least prone to violence. Also interesting, a type A group has an initial strategy of preference for violence against two of the exclusive regime state types, but not toward type H. In terms of the ANC-South African apartheid state matchup, the implication is that the specific capacities proved fortunate for the purposes of avoiding violence. For example, if the state had strong leadership and had been classified as type D, its first preference for a strategy against group type A would have been “repress.” The South African state in
the late 1970s and early 1980s was probably a type D state and, as the record shows, at that time the state showed no hesitation in using violence at home and abroad against the ANC.

In the alternative classification of the group, that is, if the group is assessed as having weak resource support and coded as type C, then the preferred state strategy changes to repression and the use of violence, with a hedging strategy of exploitation. In other words, the top two state preferences are the inverse of what they would be if the group were assessed as type A. The rationale for the change is straightforward: the state has low accommodative capacity and the group’s low sustainment capacity compares unfavorably with the high sustainment capacity of the state.

The Course of Events

The strategic choices outlined above provide insights into the way that events unfolded. The realignment in South African leadership became clear in 1990. F.W. de Klerk replaced Botha as president in August 1989, and the NP, under his leadership for several months already, won almost half the votes in the early parliamentary elections in September 1989. The extreme-right Conservative Party won almost a third of the votes, while the unified anti-apartheid Democratic Party won a fifth of the votes. F.W. de Klerk came from a different background and generation than Botha and did not have Botha’s history of political run-ins with the Anglophones. The NP under de Klerk was a far different party from the NP of an earlier era. More of a white centrist organization, it ceased to be a tool of militant Afrikaners, and as the 1989 elections showed, it appealed to the moderate elements among Afrikaners and Anglophones united in the view that apartheid had to be dismantled.

Within eight months of the election, the government legalized the ANC and a host of other groups (including the South African communist party, now somewhat ideologically adrift after the fall of communism) and released unconditionally over one hundred political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela. In addition, the government lifted many of the emergency measures and, in May 1990, began direct talks with the ANC about power-sharing and a new constitution. In early 1991, the government abolished the Population Registration Act (which decreed the registration at birth of all
people in South Africa by race), effectively putting an end to *apartheid* once and for all. The convening at the end of 1991 of a multiparty conference to negotiate South Africa’s transition to majority rule (the Convention for a Democratic South Africa, or CODESA) signified the beginning of the process of the actual transfer of power. Following astute political maneuvering by de Klerk, in which the NP defeated the white elements unreconciled to the end of *apartheid*, and after protracted negotiations, the NP government and the ANC (though not some of the other groups involved in the negotiations) agreed on a provisional constitution for a post-*apartheid* South Africa. The actual transition of power came in April 1994, with elections on the basis of universal suffrage.

In terms of the model framework, the state had been a type D in the 1970s and evolved into type H in the late 1980s as a result of shifts in the basis of support for the ruling elite. The preferred strategy of a type D state was “repress,” and then, as a type H, the preferred strategy changed to “exploit.” Moreover, the state became increasingly dissatisfied with a hedging strategy of “repress” and was moving toward the secondary hedging strategy of “negotiate.” Despite the abandonment of the “repress” strategy, the “exploit” strategy did not mean nonconfrontational negotiations. As events showed, negotiations on transfer of power were suspended on several occasions, the state used the specter of intrablack violence and extreme-right white nationalism to pressure the ANC into making concessions and, when it began, the success of the whole process was far from a given. But the “exploit” strategy did succeed in the state effecting in a nonviolent manner a transfer of power while ensuring group-level guarantees for the whites.

From the perspective of the ANC, the group’s strategy of “exploit” and “intimidate” was paying off with the growing proclivity of the state to abandon its “repress” strategy as a hedging option and move toward a “negotiate” strategy. However, the group faced the real problem of potentially losing public support as a result of intrablack violence. (Organized violence was most prominent in Natal between the Zulu-dominated Inkatha Movement and the Xhosa-dominated ANC, but there were other instances of violence, for instance between the ANC and the more militant black republican organizations.) If, over the space of protracted negotiations and loss of public support, the group type actually moved toward type D, then its abil-
ity to negotiate successfully with the state would have been damaged. A type H state would have reverted to a “repress” strategy against the ANC if the latter became a type D group. And a type D group would have lost much of its negotiating leverage against the state, for its threat of violence would have lost credibility and it would be forced to negotiate with the state from a position of weakness. In terms of the model, the change is illustrated by the top strategy preference changing from “exploit” to “negotiate,” with “intimidate” relegated to a tertiary position. Just as with the state’s “exploit” strategy, the group’s “exploit” strategy did not mean non-confrontational negotiations. The ANC issued an ultimatum to the state in 1991 and used a mass protest campaign in 1992 to exert pressure during the negotiations and political maneuvering. But the ANC’s strategy was largely free of violence, especially against the whites, and it did succeed in sweeping aside other groups aspiring to leadership of the blacks and in preparing a dominant position for itself in post-apartheid South Africa.

Had an analyst in early 1989 used a framework similar to the one presented here to examine the situation in South Africa, the following intelligence needs would have become apparent:

- Attitudes and preferences toward political parties among the Anglophones and Afrikaners and the relationship between income and political party support;
- The extent of contacts and ties between SADF and SAP and the extreme-right Afrikaner groups;
- The impact of international sanctions on the South African economy and the perception of the impact by South African business elite;
- Sketches of alternative post-apartheid futures among the white political elite;
- The effect of the fall of communism on the ANC’s resource base and on its views of post-apartheid South Africa;
- The flexibility and openness of the ANC to agree to preconditions (especially guarantees for whites) to negotiations with the state;
- The potential appeal of black republican groups and their strategies of action;
• The views of leaderships of the “homelands” toward the ANC and the extent of the state’s leverage over them.

Close attention to these issues may have allowed for a better understanding of the trends and perhaps more effective U.S. support for the accommodation in South Africa.

FINAL OBSERVATIONS

The framework presented here deals only with the dyad of mobilized blacks under ANC’s leadership and the NP-dominated South African 
apartheid state. The model was applied to analyze the situation that eventually led to the peaceful transfer of power and the disintegration of the 
apartheid state. The model also throws light upon the evolution of the bargaining and negotiations between the two sides in 1990–1994.

This case is of particular interest because of the incidence of violence already occurring by 1989 and the long-standing efforts of the black majority to alter the status quo through both peaceful and violent means. Despite decades of severe discrimination of the majority against the population, institutionalized ideological racism on the part of the state, and on-and-off unrest and attempted insurgency, the two sides (ANC and the 
apartheid state) managed to negotiate a peaceful transition of power.

Use of the model in reference to the last stages of the 
apartheid state illustrates the following main points:

• Long-term trends of increasing international isolation, combined with the transformation of South Africa’s economy, increased the vulnerability of the 
apartheid state and led some whites to question 
apartheid on economic grounds;

• Intrawhite political realignment gave rise to new leadership within the 
apartheid state that was no longer tied to the cause of militant Afrikaners and 
apartheid;

• The fall of communism drove both the ANC and the 
apartheid state toward a negotiated solution to 
apartheid by stripping away some of the fears of majority rule among whites and by reducing some external aid and support to the ANC;
The ANC’s skillful leadership, multiethnic platform, and wide appeal overcame the very real possibility of disintegration of the transition process;

By the late 1980s, the preferred strategy of the apartheid state vis-à-vis the ANC changed from a preference for violent repression to a strategy of exploitation that opened the possibility of negotiation;

The ANC preferred strategy was also one of exploitation, with violence used just enough to make the organization credible, without crossing over the threshold of a mass uprising;

Potential certainly existed for violence in the dyadic encounter between ANC and the apartheid state (hedging strategy for both), but the more interesting observation is that, despite a virtual state of war between them, neither side preferred to resort to violence;

Amidst the various possible mobilizing group and state types with strong proclivities toward violence identified by the model, the specific group and state types existing in South Africa in 1989 were the least prone to violence.

In retrospect, the strategic choices identified with each side were followed closely as events unfolded in 1990–1994. In that sense, the accuracy of the model was validated with respect to the transition in South Africa. The model captured well the strategic preferences of the two actors. Moreover, although the analysis undertaken here used April 1989 as the cutoff date for data gathering, the same analysis could have been undertaken with a cutoff date in mid-1988, or perhaps even in mid-1987, with similar outcomes. Although 1987 was an early point to consider the initiation of the transition process, many of the crucial factors that drove both sides to negotiations were already in place and should have appeared as important elements of an intelligence assessment of that time. Also, the capacity of the state did not change substantially between 1987 and 1989, and indications of an intrawhite political realignment became evident in the May 1987 elections. Thus, the model might have provided a useful tool for intelligence analysts thinking about the potential for a transition away from the apartheid system and toward majority rule in South Africa.
Just as in the case of the Yugoslav chapter, the use of the model to examine the events that led to the South African transition amounts to far more than a retelling of what is by now a well-known story. In addition to serving as a second crucial retrospective test of the methodology of the process model, this case and the analysis contained herein presents another clear illustration of the linkage between specific goals, the resources amassed, and the strategies and choices open to both the mobilized group and the state. The more accommodative strategy pursued by the still NP-dominated state in 1989–1990 stemmed from indications that the previous policy was heading to a dead end as well as the NP’s changing base of support, which led to the rise of new leadership that explicitly acknowledged the dead end of the previous policies. In the words of then-President F.W. de Klerk, “If our old policy, which was so unpopular in many circles, could work, then we would have surely clung to it. But as responsible leaders charged with the government of the country, we came to the conclusion that the policy we had planned could simply not work.”

The fact that South Africa did not dissolve into strife but managed to retain a democratic political system remains a stunning accomplishment of the negotiators of the transition. As the model indicates, violence-prone solutions easily could have unfolded, depending on any number of factors. But the model also shows how, in a situation with strong potential for severe violence, the specific matchup of group and state types was a most fortunate one, the least prone to violence. This occurred because the resource base of the two sides determined the range of choices between accommodation and strife. Both sides were not averse to strong negotiating tactics and threats because both negotiated from fairly strong positions. For example, despite some economic problems, the apartheid state could have relied on outright force and probably could have tried to muddle through for many years. The ANC’s declining base of foreign support even may have made such a state strategy relatively successful. On the other hand, the potential problems of resource base notwithstanding, the ANC had unquestioned widespread popularity and influence in South Africa, and the regime’s attempt to muddle through would not have changed that fact. But since both sides also

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realized their vulnerabilities, the muddling through strategy did not take place. The ultimate choices stemmed from a rational understanding of the available options.