ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING SUPPORT TO COUPS OR REBELLIONS

The United States might also act to remove or intimidate hostile leaders by attempting to facilitate their overthrow by a coup or rebellion. In sanctioning military and other support to a coup or rebellion, U.S. decisionmakers might anticipate consequences such as the following:

- U.S. assistance would be sufficient to make an otherwise problematic coup or rebellion successful.
- The successor government installed after the overthrow would adopt policies and behavior more acceptable to the United States.
- Even if the hostile regime was not overthrown, the regime’s perception of the threats posed by continued coup plotting or by a U.S.-supported rebel force would provide the United States with bargaining leverage.
- In the event that U.S. forces became engaged in combat with the forces of the enemy regime, any enemy resources diverted to guard against a threatened coup or rebellion would weaken the enemy’s frontline fighting capabilities.

A POOR SUCCESS RATE WITH COUPS AND REBELLIONS

During the course of the Cold War, the United States supported coups and rebellions in an attempt to prevent countries with left-
leaning regimes from moving decisively into the USSR’s orbit; backed resistance movements in countries occupied by external communist forces; and attempted to generate rebellions in Third World states already ruled by Marxist-Leninist governments. During the 1980s and 1990s, the United States also attempted to unseat leaders who were viewed as promoting policies threatening to U.S. interests. With a few notable exceptions, such U.S. attempts to remove undesirable leaders by coup or rebellion have failed.

A Few Weakly Protected Governments Were Ousted

During the 1950s, the United States, with only minimal investment, succeeded in unseating leftist regimes in Iran and Guatemala that lacked strong support from their own military. In 1963, the United States acquiesced in the overthrow of President Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam, an act that unexpectedly proved seriously counterproductive to the immediate war effort in that country.

The Overthrow of Mossadeq in Iran. In 1953, Kermit Roosevelt and a few other CIA operatives organized a successful coup against Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq, whom the United States saw as becoming increasingly alienated from the West and more closely allied with Iran’s Soviet-dominated Tudeh Party. To prepare the way for the coup, Roosevelt eventually secured the reluctant support of the shah (who signed firmans [royal decrees] dismissing Mossadeq and appointing Gen. Fazlollah A. Zahedi, a high-ranking officer who had been selected to spearhead the coup, as prime minister) and that of influential mullahs and key military leaders. Roosevelt also recruited a number of Iranian agents, including some who had formerly been in the employ of the British Secret Intelligence Service, which was involved in the planning of the coup.1

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To prepare the groundwork for the coup, CIA agents mounted political action campaigns armed at discrediting both the Tudeh Party and the Mossadeq regime. To stir up anticommunist and antigovernment sentiment in the religious community, local CIA operatives pretending to be Tudeh Party members threatened Muslim leaders with “savage punishment if they opposed Mossadeq.”

The coup, which was scheduled to take place on August 16, 1953, almost came asunder when an indiscreet Iranian officer involved in the operation inadvertently betrayed the plot. The Mossadeq government took immediate preemptive action, positioning units from the Tehran garrison at key points around the city and arresting Iranian officers thought to be involved in the plot. Fortunately for the coup plotters, the Mossadeq government then played into the CIA’s hands first by dissolving the parliament, which inflamed public opinion against the regime, and second by prematurely recalling most of the troops it had stationed around the city, erroneously believing that the coup plotters had been suppressed.

As a result of the government broadcasts disclosing the coup plot, thousands of Tudeh partisans and other extremists took to the streets on August 15 denouncing both the shah and all Americans. Washington considered this anti-American outburst sufficiently threatening to order Roosevelt to cancel his operation and pull out of Iran. The Tudeh rioters, however, also overplayed their hand by “looting everything they could grab,” defiling statues of the monarch, and erecting their own flags. Hoping to inflame anti-Tudeh sentiments even more, CIA political action assets feigning to be Tudehites also took to the streets to loot and smash shops. The rioting contin-


5 The Washington message to withdraw, which was sent through Cyprus by Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith, was held up by the British and did not reach Roosevelt until after the coup had succeeded. Roosevelt disclosed that the Tudeh rioting had “scared the hell out” of him as well. Ambrose (1981), pp. 208, 210.

ued for two days and was quelled only after the U.S. ambassador to Iran, Loy Henderson, cajoled Mossadeq into ordering his U.S.-trained police to restore order. Henderson had threatened to pull all Americans out of the country if the rioting did not stop—a contingency Mossadeq found unacceptable in that it would “make it appear that his government could not govern.” Stephen Ambrose characterized Mossadeq’s agreement to crack down on his Tudeh allies as the “old man’s fatal mistake.” Policemen and soldiers previously constrained from taking steps that might offend the Tudeh “were delighted to be turned loose.”

With the Tudeh rioters forcibly dispersed and subdued, Roosevelt’s Iranian agents swung into action. They arranged for copies of the shah’s *firmans* dismissing Mossadeq and appointing Zahedi to be widely disseminated throughout Tehran in newspapers and hand-delivered broadsheets. They also undertook to purchase a mob of their own to demonstrate this time in support for the Shah. On August 19, 1953, a pro-Shah demonstration began to form in Tehran’s bazaar area and rapidly took on “overwhelming proportions.” Even though some CIA political action assets were involved in its incitement, the demonstration was largely spontaneous. Army troops and armored elements soon joined the demonstrators. Still-at-large Iranian military leaders involved in the coup who had heretofore been dormant swung into action, directing their forces to seize key government facilities and arrest progovernment military and civilian officials. Pro-shah military units armed with tanks moved on Mossadeq’s house and in a two-hour battle subdued the troops of Mossadeq’s household guard, who surrendered once their ammunition ran out. Total casualties to both sides in this battle—which constituted the only organized fighting during the coup—were estimated at 100 killed and 300 wounded. By the end of the day, the country was in the hands of a new premier, General Zahedi, and

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9 The coup plotters had developed “arrest lists” of the Mossadeq officials and supporters to be detained. See Wilber (1954), pp. xii, 65–74, and Appendix D, pp. 6–7.

members of the Mossadeq government were either in hiding or incarcerated.\textsuperscript{11}

The entire operation to overthrow Mossadeq “from first order to end” took but six months and probably cost $1 million dollars or so, including the $200,000 Roosevelt reportedly spent to finance anti-Mossadeq street demonstrations.\textsuperscript{12} According to Roosevelt, the coup succeeded because Mossadeq lacked support both within the Iranian military and among the public at large. As Roosevelt saw it, when the people and the armed forces were shown that they had to choose between the monarch and a revolutionary figure backed by the former Soviet Union, “the people and the army came, overwhelmingly, to the support of the Shah.” The British officials who were closely involved in the coup planning estimated that, whereas only a few top army leaders were probably pro-Mossadeq, the “bulk of the officers and essentially all noncoms and enlisted personnel” were loyal to the shah.\textsuperscript{13}

\textbf{The Overthrow of Arbenz in Guatemala.} Emboldened by the success of the Iranian operation, the CIA orchestrated a combination of military and psychological pressures to drive the leftist Guatemalan president, Jacobo Arbenz, from office in 1954. The operation, code-named Operation BPSUCCESS, employed an invasion by a ragtag “liberation” army, psychologically effective CIA air attacks, fictional arms drops, and disinformation disseminated over a CIA-controlled “Voice of Liberation” radio to prompt leaders of the Guatemalan army to demand the president’s resignation.\textsuperscript{14} The CIA operation succeeded despite the fact that it was plagued by chronic lapses in security; inadequate planning; a poor understanding of the inten-

\textsuperscript{11}Wilber (1954), p. xii.


tions of the Guatemalan army, the Arbenz government, and its political allies; and the “hopeless weakness” of the friendly forces that had been recruited to invade the country.\textsuperscript{15}

The CIA-supported invasion that was launched from neighboring Honduras on June 20, 1954, under the overall command of Arbenz’s intended successor, Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, ran into immediate trouble when two of its four prongs were decisively defeated by small government police and army elements acting on their own initiative. These setbacks cost Armas almost half of his initial 480-man army. The remainder of Armas’s forces eventually penetrated some 30 miles into the country, occupying several towns that surrendered essentially without a fight. However, even when bolstered by additional recruits, the invasion force could easily have been crushed by the government troops situated in the local area, had the Guatemalan army commanders chosen to attack them.\textsuperscript{16}

The Guatemalan military leaders opted not to fight because they were paralyzed by the fear that the United States, if need be, would intervene with its own forces to oust Arbenz. As one Guatemalan officer explained: “Fear defeated them. They were terrorized by the idea that the United States was looming behind Castillo Armas.”\textsuperscript{17} To foreclose the possibility of such a military confrontation with the United States, the senior Guatemalan military leaders decided that Arbenz must resign.\textsuperscript{18} Following a “game of musical chairs” in which five provisional governments, each entirely staffed by military officers, succeeded one another, the United States finally maneuvered Armas into the presidency on July 7, 1954.\textsuperscript{19}

\textbf{The Overthrow of Diem in South Vietnam.} In 1963, senior officials in the Kennedy administration concluded that South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem was hindering the successful prosecution of the counterinsurgency war in South Vietnam and had to be replaced. A group of anti-Diem Army of Vietnam (ARVN) generals began plotting against the South Vietnamese president with the

\textsuperscript{15}Cullather (1999), p. 97.
\textsuperscript{17}Quoted in Gleijeses (1991), p. 338.
\textsuperscript{18}Gleijeses (1991), pp. 345–346.
\textsuperscript{19}Gleijeses (1991), pp. 351–357.
“active acquiescence” of U.S. officials in Saigon and Washington. On October 6, 1963, U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge received the following instruction from Washington:

> While we do not wish to stimulate a coup, we also do not wish to leave the impression that U.S. would thwart a change of government or deny economic and military assistance to a new regime if it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness of military effort, ensuring popular support to win the war and improving relations with the U.S.\(^{20}\)

As a former senior officer in the CIA’s clandestine service put it: “No attempt was made to stop the coup and in effect American officials gave the generals a green light.”\(^{21}\)

The ARVN forces that spearheaded the coup on November 1 rapidly overwhelmed Diem’s palace guard. Diem and his brother Nhu eluded capture for a few days but were eventually taken into custody and killed by junior ARVN officers. American officials had wanted Diem to be given safe conduct out of the country and were shocked by his execution.

The coup produced serious unintended consequences. Rather than facilitate the counterinsurgency effort in South Vietnam as the U.S. officials had expected, the removal of Diem further undermined it. Diem’s overthrow, as one historian put it, “did not lead to a regime more responsive to the needs of the people of South Vietnam and it brought with it a dangerous degree of political instability.”\(^{22}\) A series of power struggles and further leadership changes ensued, producing governments that were neither particularly popular nor competent. The turmoil in Saigon and the changes in provincial leadership that followed each governmental turnover significantly disrupted South Vietnamese efforts to secure the areas of the countryside, where the Viet Cong were actively contesting government control.\(^{23}\) Indeed, emboldened by the diversions in Saigon, the “Viet Cong made

\(^{22}\)Lewy (1978), p. 28.  
\(^{23}\)Lewy (1978), p. 28.
widespread political and military advances across the country, and many of the Strategic Hamlets were overrun."\textsuperscript{24}

**Most Attempts to Oust Entrenched Regimes Have Failed**

Balanced against the successes in Iran and Guatemala is a longer list of instances over the past 50 years in which U.S. attempts to foment successful coups and rebellions against more entrenched regimes failed. These include the U.S. attempts to overthrow Enver Hoxa in Albania, Fidel Castro in Cuba, Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya, Manuel Noriega in Panama, and Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

**The Attempt to Unseat the Hoxa Regime in Albania.** In spring 1950, the United Kingdom and the United States made a concerted effort to organize a guerrilla movement in Albania that would gain enough popular support to overthrow the communist government in Tirana. Albania had become an attractive target for paramilitary action because the Hoxa regime’s control appeared to be somewhat shaky. Over a period of two years, British and American agents attempted to infiltrate team after team of “free Albanians” into the country by air, sea, and land. However, none of these teams succeeded in gaining a foothold, as all were betrayed beforehand:

Almost every mission misfired. Teams sent across the border from Greece ran into police ambushes. Teams landing from rubber craft were met at the beach by police. Drop zones were surrounded by Albanian troops. A few radio operators who came up on the air transmitted under Albanian control.\textsuperscript{25}

The armed “liberation” of Albania proved to be a disaster. The operation had been thoroughly compromised from the start by Kim Philby, a Soviet agent, who oversaw the London desk of the British service that ran the clandestine Albanian operations. Philby not only informed Moscow of British-American plans but also provided details on the dispatch of individual agent teams before they landed in Albania.\textsuperscript{26}


\textsuperscript{25}Rositzke (1977), p. 172.

\textsuperscript{26}Rositzke (1977), p. 172.
The Attempts to Overthrow the Castro Regime in Cuba. On April 17, 1961, the CIA sponsored the landing of some 1,500 combat-trained and heavily armed Cuban exiles at the Bay of Pigs along the southern coast of Cuba. This brigade-sized force was expected to maintain itself in Cuba for a sufficient period of time “to administer a ‘shock’ and thereby, it was hoped, to trigger an uprising” and defections from Castro’s armed forces.27 As the CIA’s inspector general described it in his critique of the Bay of Pigs operation:

The invasion operation was based on the hope that the brigade would be able to maintain itself in Cuba long enough to prevail by attracting insurgents and defectors from the Castro armed services, but without having in advance any assurance of assistance from identified, known, controlled, trained, and organized guerrillas. The Agency hoped the invasion would, like a deus ex machina, produce a “shock,” which would cause these defections. In other words . . . the invasion was to take the place of an organized resistance which did not exist and was to generate organized resistance by providing the focus and acting as a catalyst.28

The inspector general found such expectations unrealistic given the failure of the CIA’s earlier attempt to supply the nascent Cuban resistance groups by airdrops and “the success of the Castro security forces in arresting our agents, rolling up the few existing nets, and reducing guerrilla groups to ineffectiveness.” Indeed, following the D-day-minus-2 air strike that preceded the invasion, Castro’s security forces immediately arrested some “tens of thousands of suspected persons.” The inspector general also found it unrealistic to expect a 1,500-man brigade, put ashore by amphibious landing, to prevail over a revolutionary army of some 32,000 men and a militia of some 200,000 men armed with communist bloc heavy weapons.29

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27See the CIA inspector general’s critique of the Bay of Pigs operation for the Director of Central Intelligence in CIA, Survey of the Cuban Operation and Associated Documents, Washington, D.C., February 16, 1962, p. 47. For the official critique of the Bay of Pigs operation, conducted by the Cuban Study Group chaired by General Maxwell D. Taylor, see Board of Inquiry on the Bay of Pigs, Operation Zapata: The “Ultrasensitive” Report and Testimony of the Board of Inquiry on the Bay of Pigs, Frederick, Md.: Aletheia Books, University Publications of America, Inc., 1981.


29CIA (1962), pp. 54–56.
An important component of the Bay of Pigs operation was the plan to neutralize Castro’s air force. On April 15, eight B-26s flown from a CIA base in Nicaragua destroyed approximately half of Cuba’s combat aircraft. However, late on April 16, the eve of D day, the air strikes designed to destroy the rest of Castro’s air force on the following morning were canceled. When the CIA’s cover story about the origins of the first strike began to unravel—the legend was that the B-26s were from Castro’s own air force and were piloted by defectors—Secretary of State Dean Rusk and President John Kennedy concluded that “a second strike from Nicaragua would raise the international noise level to an intolerable degree.” As a result, Castro’s remaining T-33 jets, Sea Furies, and B-26s were eventually able both to prevent the invasion force from being resupplied from the sea and to reduce greatly the interdiction and close support the invasion force could receive from friendly B-26s. The absence of ammunition resupply and the fact that the terrain in the Bay of Pigs area offered little possibility for a breakout doomed the surrounded exile brigade to catastrophic defeat.

In November 1961, the United States initiated a major new covert action program to overthrow Castro. Code-named “Operation Mongoose,” the program initially sought to use propaganda and sabotage to create the conditions whereby the Cuban “people themselves would overthrow the Castro regime.” However, a growing realization that the Castro regime was unlikely to be overthrown by internal means without direct U.S. military intervention led U.S. planners in August 1962 to change the overall objective of Operation Mongoose from one of overthrowing the Castro regime to one of causing its failure by splitting off Castro from “old-line communists.” In 1963, the objective of the U.S. covert action programs was downgraded once again to the even more limited aim of nourishing “a spirit of resistance and disaffection which could lead to significant defection and other by-products of unrest.” However, there is little evidence

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31 CIA (1962), pp. 28-33, 55.
32 See U.S. Senate (1975), pp. 139-140.
33 U.S. Senate (1975), p. 163.
that U.S. covert operations were able to secure even this modest objective on an island a mere 90 miles from the U.S. coast.

The Attempts to Spark a Coup in Libya. When Qaddafi began to challenge American interests in the early 1970s, U.S. agencies were asked to increase attention on collecting intelligence on “Libya, Qaddafi’s machinations, and the activities of Libyan groups opposed to Qaddafi.” After the Reagan administration assumed power in 1981, the United States began to pursue Qaddafi’s overthrow assertively, establishing contacts with various Libyan opposition groups in both Rome and Cairo. By mid-1981, President Reagan had directed that “nonlethal” aid and training be provided to some anti-Qaddafi exiles. American officials also reportedly explored the possibility of joint covert operations against Qaddafi with representatives from several other countries, including Egypt and France.

In spring 1982, the Reagan administration initiated measures designed to exploit Qaddafi’s political vulnerabilities and “create the conditions for an internal military coup.” A proposal for more potent U.S. action to topple Qaddafi surfaced in fall 1985, when President Reagan signed an intelligence finding authorizing the CIA to provide lethal aid to the Libyan opposition groups undergoing training in Egypt and Algeria. However, this covert plan ran into opposition from leaders of the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee and had to be scuttled when it was leaked to the Washington Post.

Although the central purpose of the April 1986 air strikes on Libya was to send a message to Qaddafi about the price he would pay if he continued to support terrorism, Washington decisionmakers apparently also hoped that the air attacks might help promote a coup or, eventually, some kind of popular uprising against Qaddafi. Within minutes after the U.S. bombs had fallen, the Voice of America’s

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35One of the CIA’s key listening posts was Rome, which “was awash in Libyans”—Libya having been a former colony of Italy. See Duane R. Clarridge, A Spy for All Seasons: My Life in the CIA, New York: Scribner, 1997, pp. 174–175.


Libyan service began repeated broadcasts of an editorial pointing out the tragic costs to the Libyan people of Qaddafi’s continued rule. In a speech following the raid, President Reagan took pains to distinguish between America’s quarrel with Qaddafi and its sympathy toward a people “caught in the grip of a tyrant.” The obvious import of the message was that Libya could expect good relations with the United States once Qaddafi was ousted.

Whereas Reagan administration officials probably thought the likelihood of a popular uprising in Libya to be low, they seemed to have harbored greater expectations about the possibility of a coup. At his news conference on the day following the attack, Secretary of State George Shultz disclosed that the targets of the air strikes, including the attacks on the Azziziya Barracks compound that housed Qaddafi’s personal guard unit, were selected, at least in part, to stimulate anti-Qaddafi action by the Libyan military. Expressing the belief that “there was considerable dissidence in the armed forces of Libya with Qaddafi and what he is doing,” Shultz said that the United States had tried to send two messages by the targets selected for attack: First, Libya’s involvement in terrorist activities was likely to cost the Libyan military some of the equipment it most prized; second, the “Praetorian Guards that surround Qaddafi and intimidate the people are not invulnerable.”

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that’s all to the good. We know there are lots of people in Libya who think Libya would be better off if Qaddafi was not there. There are even more people not in Libya who think that.
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40The message read: “The people of the United States bear Libya and its people no enmity or hatred. However, Colonel Qaddafi is your head of state. So long as Libyans obey his orders, then they must accept the consequences. Colonel Qaddafi is your tragic burden. The Libyan people are responsible for Colonel Qaddafi and his actions. If you permit Colonel Qaddafi to continue with the present conflict, then you must also share some collective responsibility for his actions.” Quoted in Martin and Walcott (1988), p. 313.


There is no evidence that this rhetoric or the fine-tuning of military targets produced the hoped-for effect on the Libyan military. Indeed, one observer argues that rather than facilitating a coup, the raid had the opposite effect of strengthening Qaddafi vis-à-vis his potential rivals within the government. 45 According to this view, the attack ruined the chances of a military revolt because it demoralized the armed forces and discredited them in the eyes of the Libyan public: “After the attack, there was no support for a coup.” 46

At any rate, these actions and the more subtle military and covert pressure the Reagan administration subsequently applied against Libya in hopes of provoking a coup failed to produce Qaddafi’s ouster. Of the many coup attempts mounted against Qaddafi during the 1980s and 1990s, it is unclear whether any were the result of U.S. activities. 47

Qaddafi’s continued survival in power can be attributed in part to the fact that Libyans are “largely apolitical people” who are known to be “wistfully peaceful, with little taste for fighting—in ironic counterpoint to their leader.” 48 But Qaddafi’s longevity is also a product of the care and resources he has invested in his personal safety and the security of his regime. Many of Qaddafi’s personal bodyguards, for example, are recruited from his tribe, the Qaddafadam. Qaddafi has, moreover, kept the Libyan military in line by rotating its commanders to keep any one of them from accumulating too much power and by ruthlessly eliminating officers who might pose a threat. 49 To eliminate leaders and groups through which discontent might be channeled, Qaddafi has ordered the assassination of Libyan exiles overseas and has imprisoned and executed thousands of Libyans over the years—some by public hanging. 50

In addition to his police and intelligence service, Qaddafi has relied on his so-called revolutionary committees to maintain control and

root out potential enemies. The committees are present in every neighborhood, factory, and government office and are manned by loyal political zealots who serve as informants and exercise powers that often supplant the police and the courts. The committees also exist within the Libyan military, where they include loyalist soldiers of various ranks who perform critical functions, such as controlling access to the ammunition and weapon armories. Their presence makes organization for a successful coup difficult if not “virtually impossible.”

The Attempts to Promote a Coup Against Noriega in Panama. The United States began a determined effort to oust Manuel Noriega from power in February 1988 when the Panama Defense Force (PDF) commander seized control of the Panamanian government following his indictments by two federal grand juries in Florida on drug-trafficking charges. An attempted coup against Noriega failed the following month, triggering a purge of nearly one-quarter of the PDF’s officer corps and solidifying the Panamanian leader’s hold on power. According to former Secretary of State James Baker, “With his usurpation of power and the indictment, Noriega became persona non grata to American policymakers overnight.”

Eschewing the use of U.S. troops to remove Noriega, the Reagan administration imposed stringent sanctions on Panama to build pressure on Noriega to leave office. The administration attempted to broker a deal whereby Noriega would permanently depart Panama in return for the withdrawal of the U.S. arrest warrants against him; U.S. guarantees not to extradite or “snatch” him from his place of exile; and promises to allow Panamanian funds held in the United States to flow out of escrow. Although Noriega initially accepted these arrangements, he backed out of the deal when it ran into opposition from other PDF officers.

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53According to Secretary Shultz, the February 4, 1988, indictments were sought by the U.S. Department of Justice without adequate consultation with the State Department or the White House. See Shultz (1993), p. 1052.
56See p. 96.
When Noriega stole the May 1989 Panamanian election, the Bush administration began active efforts to stimulate a coup against the Panamanian leader. American training exercises in Panama were significantly increased and were frequently staged in areas normally controlled by the PDF. According to Secretary Baker, this was psychological warfare: “We wanted Noriega to believe we were coming if he didn’t leave first. More to the point, we also wanted to send the PDF a message; ‘Noriega is the problem; either you remove him, or the U.S. military will.’”

Secretary Baker also delivered a blunt message to Noriega, reiterating President Reagan’s earlier warning that “the crisis will not end until you give up power.” In a transparent attempt to foment a coup, American officials in Panama were also instructed to deliver a similar message to their contacts within the PDF. The message conveyed by these U.S. officials emphasized that the United States had no quarrel with the Panamanian military and called on the PDF to restore its reputation—now sullied because of the army’s brutalization of the Panamanian people—by joining in a partnership with the democratic opposition. The message concluded: “There will be no place in Panama for those who remain with Noriega until the end. The crisis will not be resolved until he gives up power. It can only get worse and worse.”

A coup, albeit not quite the one U.S. leaders had hoped for, occurred on October 3, 1989. American officials first learned that a coup was in the making on October 1, when the wife of a PDF major named Moises Giroldi made contact with an American official attached to SOUTHCOM headquarters at Quarry Heights and announced that her husband planned to execute a coup against Noriega the following day. She explained that Giroldi planned a bloodless coup, the aim being to “retire” Noriega from power in keeping with the 25-year limit Panamanian law imposed on service in the armed forces. While Giroldi did not want to “taint” his coup with direct U.S. military participation, he did require a limited amount of help from the U.S. military. Specifically, Giroldi asked that his family members be given

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sanctuary while the coup was under way and that U.S. forces block two roads leading into Panama City that PDF units loyal to Noriega might use to mount a rescue attempt.\(^{60}\)

The initial U.S. reaction to Major Giroldi’s request for assistance was negative. American officials knew little about Giroldi, and the little they did know made them skeptical.\(^{61}\) Giroldi was the commander of the security detail at the Commandancia, the PDF’s headquarters, and was one of the key figures who had helped suppress the March 1988 coup against Noriega. He was therefore considered a Noriega loyalist.

Indeed, SOUTHCOM considered the coup report to be a hoax: a Noriega provocation designed to test or embarrass General Thurman, who had assumed command of SOUTHCOM only the previous day. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, GEN Colin Powell (who had also just assumed his position as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS]), and the service chiefs all believed that the United States should not become involved in what had all the earmarks of a poorly organized effort.\(^{62}\) Washington’s skepticism increased when word was received that the coup would be delayed by a day. It was dismissed by Bush administration officials as another of the frequently rumored anti-Noriega coups that failed to materialize.\(^{63}\)

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\(^{61}\)According to General Powell, the SOUTCOM commander, GEN Max Thurman, initially reported that “We don’t know anything about him [Giroldi].” General Thurman went on to suggest that the “coup seemed to be a job grievance” on the part of “disgruntled unpaid PDF soldiers.” See Colin Powell, *My American Journey*, New York: Random House, 1995, p. 417. See also Baker (1995), p. 185.


The main exception to those wanting to do nothing was President Bush, who was more open to an active U.S. role. During an Oval Office meeting on October 2, he told his advisers: “Look, you’ve had me out there for the last couple of months begging these guys to start a coup. If someone’s actually willing to do one, we have to help them.” President Bush reiterated these sentiments on October 3, when the coup in fact began, and ordered U.S. troops to establish the two roadblocks requested by Major Giroldi.64

The coup turned out to be a poorly executed affair. Noriega, who had access to a telephone while he was in Major Giroldi’s custody at the Commandancia, was able to call loyalist subordinates both in Panama City and in Rio Hato, some 75 miles away, to arrange his own rescue. The forces in Rio Hato commandeered Panamanian civil aircraft to fly them to Omar Torrijos Airport on the outskirts of the capital and from there moved rapidly to surround the Commandancia.65

Prior to the rescue, discussions were held between representatives of the coup group and SOUTHCOM about the possibility of turning Noriega over to U.S. authorities. These negotiations came to naught, however, because Major Giroldi and his cohorts wanted the political cover of having U.S. forces conspicuously seize Noriega from their custody, whereas General Thurman was ordered not to initiate action to seize Noriega and to take him into custody only if he were offered to the United States by the rebels.66 Unwilling to assassinate Noriega, Major Giroldi and his coconspirators released the Panamanian leader unharmed and surrendered to the forces that came to his rescue. Major Giroldi and several of his coconspirators were promptly executed, some reportedly by Noriega’s own hand.67

As a result, the coup strengthened, rather than diminished, Noriega’s stranglehold on Panama. As Secretary Baker described the aftermath:

[Noriega] unleashed his intelligence operatives on the PDF, and within a matter of days they’d turned up evidence that at least two other coups were being plotted. These ringleaders, who were more senior and considerably more capable than the luckless Major Giroldi, were tortured and jailed. The end result was that contrary to public impression, the October coup strengthened Noriega’s position instead of undermining it. He was now an even bigger problem than before.68

The one positive fallout from the coup was that it helped U.S. commanders refine their plan for the U.S. invasion of Panama that was to follow nearly three months later. American commanders went to school on the rescue of Noriega and gained vital new information about the loyalties and reaction capabilities of key PDF units. This information would lead U.S. planners to revise the targets that were to be attacked at H-hour of Operation Just Cause.69

The Attempts to Oust Saddam Hussein. Since the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, U.S. leaders have sought to encourage the removal of Saddam Hussein by coup d’état. However, because they believed that the preservation of a unified Iraq was important to Gulf stability and security, U.S. decisionmakers have exhibited a marked ambivalence about attempting to promote the Iraqi leader’s overthrow by popular rebellion. This ambivalence was manifest in the U.S. military and information operations conducted during the course of the Gulf War, in the U.S. refusal to militarily support the Shia and Kurd uprisings that immediately followed that conflict, and in the U.S. policy and behavior toward Iraqi opposition groups that evolved in subsequent years.

Attempts to Foment a Coup or an Uprising During the Gulf War. The planners who designed the Coalition air campaign during the Gulf War hoped that attacks on specific strategic targets might help bring down Saddam’s regime in one of three ways: A direct hit might eliminate or incapacitate the Iraqi leader, or the bombing might weaken the security structure that maintained Saddam in power and spark either a coup by disaffected Iraqi military elements or an upris-

ing by the population at large. As Coalition air component commander General Horner described it, the objective was to create an environment in Iraq “where the current leadership cannot control and provide the opportunity for new leadership to emerge.”70 However, beyond voicing such general aspirations, Coalition leaders were “vague” as to just how this change of government might come about.71 While the air planners would have preferred that Saddam be removed prior to the start of the ground campaign—as this would probably have obviated the need for a ground assault—they anticipated that any weakening of Saddam’s security structure through air attack would also increase the probability of his overthrow after the conflict had ended.72

Coalition air planners attached high priority to the destruction of leadership bunkers and residences, communication facilities, and command-and-control sites. Although the primary reason for attacking such targets was to deny the Baghdad leadership the ability to direct Iraqi forces in the field, the destruction of these target sets was also deemed essential for producing a change in the Iraqi government. These facilities constituted the central nervous system of the Baghdad regime that enabled Saddam and his subordinates to govern and control Iraq and its population.73

To create conditions more conducive to Saddam’s overthrow, Coalition aircraft attacked the Baghdad headquarters of the various agencies that protected Saddam’s person and enforced his hold on power, including the headquarters of the secret police, Republican Guard, special security service, military and civilian intelligence services, Directorate of Internal Security, and Ba’ath Party.74 Attacks were also mounted on other national command-and-control centers and VIP bunkers that were thought to house senior Iraqi officials, which pre-

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sumably put some of the internal security, intelligence, and military personnel who were most important to Saddam’s survival in power at risk. The Coalition also tried to isolate Saddam and other senior regime leaders by attacking the key Iraqi communication facilities and nodes that allowed Iraqi leaders to communicate with one another, with Iraqi military forces and government agencies, and with domestic and foreign audiences.\footnote{Hosmer (1996), pp. 50–51.}

Coalition commanders also singled out the Iraqi Republican Guard armored and infantry divisions situated along the periphery of Kuwait for particularly heavy attack. The Republican Guard forces were considered prime targets not only because they were Iraq’s best-trained and best-equipped military units but also because they were thought to be among the most important elements sustaining Saddam’s continued rule.\footnote{Hosmer (1996), p. 51.} Brent Scowcroft, President Bush’s National Security Adviser, described the reasoning behind the decision to target the Republican Guard “wherever we could find them”:

> Since these troops were also the backbone of the regime, their destruction would further undermine Saddam’s grip on power. Our Arab allies were convinced, and we began to assume, that dealing Saddam another battlefield defeat would shatter what support he had within the military, which probably would then topple him. Hitting the Republican Guard went to the heart of the problem.\footnote{George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998, p. 433.}

In addition to attempting to weaken Saddam’s security structure and command and control, the Coalition mounted attacks that aimed to foment antiwar sentiment and active opposition to Saddam’s continued rule among Iraq’s civilian population, particularly among the residents of Baghdad. Coalition air planners sought to stimulate antiregime sentiment by (1) shutting down Iraq’s electric power system to “turn the lights out in Baghdad”; (2) destroying the bridges across the Tigris River in downtown Baghdad to cut the city in half and disrupt civilian commerce; (3) destroying radio, TV, and other communication facilities to sever the regime’s contact with the
population and to cause the Iraqi people to feel isolated; (4) bombing other military targets in the vicinity of Baghdad to maintain psychological pressure on Iraqi leaders and the public; and (5) destroying symbolic targets, such as the Ba’ath Party headquarters, to humiliate Saddam in the eyes of the Iraqi public.78

The U.S. psychological operations (PSYOP) policy and practice relating to the incitement of coups and uprisings was inconsistent and often ad hoc. Even though one of the objectives of the Gulf War PSYOP plan was to encourage the “Iraqi government, people, or military to remove their dictator,” none of the leaflets dropped on Baghdad explicitly called for Saddam’s overthrow.79 Indeed, CENTCOM never approved requests from Air Force planners for leaflet drops on Baghdad that would explicitly call for Saddam’s overthrow and would thus more directly support the psychological objectives of the strategic air campaign. Air planners attributed this refusal to the CENTCOM staff’s hesitancy to “encourage rebellion against Saddam’s regime.” According to the air planners, “CENTCOM’s rationale was a mixture of deference to perceived Saudi uneasiness about seeking democratic upheaval in the Arab world along with the notion that encouraging the collapse of an enemy government at war was somehow illegal.”80

However, U.S. aircraft operating over northern Iraq from bases in Turkey did drop two types of leaflets that explicitly called on Iraqi military and civilian populations to revolt.81 The message on one of these leaflets called on the population to “rise up and flood the streets and alleys for the overthrow of Saddam and his supporters.” The message on a second leaflet exhorted its readers to “act against Saddam now. Saddam’s fall is inevitable.” The messages on both leaflets were printed on the back of replicas of Iraqi 25 dinar notes.82

79Some of the leaflets dropped on Baghdad did aim to generate hostility toward Saddam by blaming him for the war and the continued bombing. Baghdad received relatively few leaflets: All told, F-16s made only two leaflet drops on the capital, disseminating fewer than one million leaflets. Hosmer (1996), p. 55.
80Watts et al. (1993a), p. 246.
81These aircraft were part of U.S. Joint Task Force Proven Force.
82Richard Denis Johnson, Propaganda Materials of the Persian Gulf War, Salt Lake City, Utah: 1995a, leaflets E10 and E11.
Calls for Kurds, Shias, and other Iraqis to rise up against Saddam were also broadcast over two “black” radio stations, the Voice of Free Iraq and Radio Free Iraq, which are said to have been located in Saudi Arabia and operated by the CIA.83 After the Coalition ground offensive commenced on February 24, 1991, the Voice of Free Iraq, which by this time claimed to be broadcasting from Baghdad, stepped up its call for an uprising, suggesting that Saddam was preparing to flee the country:

As you can see, [Saddam] is unjustifiably and aimlessly pushing our sons into the deadly incinerator. He will inevitably lose this battle, as he has lost all previous battles. . . . Honorable sons of Iraq, do you know that Saddam has smuggled his family out of Iraq, and has smuggled out with them the remaining funds and wealth, so that he will leave Iraq in ruins and quite empty? . . . Stage a revolution now before it’s too late. . . . Hit the headquarters of the tyrant and save the homeland from destruction.84

Although this and other clandestine broadcasts undoubtedly reached the Shia areas of southern Iraq, it is possible that these stations lacked the power to reach Baghdad and other areas of central Iraq.85 However, such international broadcast services as Radio Monte Carlo and the BBC, which Iraqi audiences reportedly listened to and found credible, did reach all of Iraq. While these services did not engage in PSYOP, they did report the news and may have carried President Bush’s February 15 remarks urging the Iraqi people and military to “take matters into their own hands, to force Saddam Hussein the dictator to step aside and to comply with the [UN] resolutions.”86

The Coalition attacks on strategic targets in Baghdad failed to produce the coup or popular uprising in the capital the air campaign

84Quoted in Taylor (1992), p. 239.
planners had hoped for. Many Iraqi leadership sites and communication facilities escaped destruction. On February 23, 1991, the eve of the Coalition ground attack, some 70 percent of the national telecommunications, 25 percent of the military communications, and 30 percent of the leadership targets were still operational.87

While the Coalition attacks on Iraqi communication nodes degraded the Iraqi leadership’s ability to command lower echelons, the redundancy built into the Iraqi communication system still allowed the centralized command and control of internal security elements and military forces. Similarly, while the Coalition bombing of Iraqi broadcast facilities frequently interrupted transmission, these facilities were never permanently closed down.88

The bombing of headquarters did not significantly reduce the large numbers of bodyguard, police, special security, and Republican Guard troops guarding Saddam. In the Baghdad area alone, the special security troops committed to Saddam’s protection may have numbered as many as 25,000.89 The bombing of headquarters or even barracks could not disable a force of this size, particularly as Iraqi troops typically took refuge in schools or other civilian facilities when bombing seemed imminent.

The attacks aiming to foment discontent within the Baghdad population fell short of sparking a popular uprising. Attacks on Baghdad, which occurred mainly at night, were kept relatively light because of humanitarian and political concerns. During the single heaviest attack on the capital on the night of February 12–13, F-117s dropped a total of only 34 bombs.90 While the bombing that did occur no doubt disrupted and frightened the people of Baghdad, it hardly provided sufficient motivation for them to rise up and depose...

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87The JCS battle damage assessment for February 22–23 credited the Coalition strikes against leadership targets with the following results: leadership sites destroyed, less than 20 percent, and leadership sites damaged, less than 50 percent. See Watts et al. (1999b), Figure 32, p. 289.


89In times of war, the strength of the Special Republican Guard may total some 25,000 men. The various combat and rapid reaction units of the other Baghdad-based security and intelligence services may number an additional 5,000 persons. See Sean Boyne, “Saddam’s Shield: The Role of the Special Republican Guard,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, January 1999, p. 29.

Saddam. Even though a majority of the population would probably have been delighted to see Saddam depart, they undoubtedly realized that any attempt by an unorganized and unarmed citizenry to oust him would likely prove futile and extremely dangerous. The regime’s internal security apparatus was still intact, and Saddam had a well-known reputation for dealing decisively and ruthlessly with all his opponents.\textsuperscript{91}

Refusal to Support Postwar Shia and Kurd Uprisings. February 28, the day of the Coalition cease-fire, saw the first of a series of major spontaneous uprisings that were soon to engulf the Shia population centers of southern Iraq and most of the Kurdish towns of northern Iraq.

Both the Shias and the Kurds had long-standing grievances against the governance they had received from Baghdad over the years and had risen in revolt before. In 1920, the Shias rose massively against British rule, which led the British to hand the reins of power to the Sunni Arabs. The British believed the Sunni Arabs to be “better partners and better suited to rule” than their Shia counterparts. In 1979–1980, encouraged by the Ayatollah Khomeini’s seizure of power in Tehran, the Shias once more revolted against the secular and essentially Sunni rule of the Ba’ath Party. The Kurds had also engaged in periodic revolt, first against the British and then against various Arab regimes in Baghdad. During the early 1970s, both the United States and Iran had provided covert military assistance to a Kurd uprising so as to tie down Iraqi government forces that might otherwise have been employed in cross-border aggression. The human cost of the Kurd revolt in the 1980s was estimated at no fewer than 100,000 dead.\textsuperscript{92}

The 1991 revolts were precipitated by evidence of Iraq’s catastrophic military rout in the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO), when troops from the Iraqi regular army units fleeing the battlefields joined with the civilian citizenry of Basra and other towns in southern Iraq to

\textsuperscript{91}Hosmer (1996), pp. 54–58.

stage antigovernment demonstrations. These demonstrations quickly turned into armed rebellion as the rebels used tanks and other armored vehicles to seize government and Ba’ath Party offices as well as local security and military headquarters. Within two weeks, much of southern and northern Iraq was in rebel hands.

The paucity of communication and synchronization between the groups conducting the southern uprisings severely limited their effectiveness, as did their general lack of organization and leadership. The uprising in Basra, for example, did not have a “well-forged leadership, an integrated organization, or a political or military program.” Apparently, the rebels also had no plan to move on Baghdad. Nor did the Baghdadis move to join the rebellion. Instead, they are reported to have passively “waited for the revolt to come to them.” Information about the real situation at the front reached the capital’s population slowly, and the delay contributed to their hesitant response. The main cause of their passivity, however, was the lack of an organized opposition structure inside the capital that could mobilize and lead an uprising.

The Coalition air campaign directly influenced the uprisings by encouraging the antigovernment sentiments of the regular army forces in the KTO and by contributing importantly to their catastrophic route. In addition, the Coalition air attacks on the lines of communication between Baghdad and Basra reduced the food and other resupply to southern Iraq, creating shortages that probably intensified the alienation of the southern population and contributed to their uprisings. While the uprisings did not affect Saddam’s decision to withdraw from Kuwait, they probably contributed to the alacrity with which Saddam accepted the Coalition’s cease-fire terms.

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Many of the dissident leaders apparently expected the United States to support their uprising.97 Despite the rebel pleas to U.S. officers for weapons and communication equipment, the United States and its Coalition partners offered no military assistance to the Shia or Kurdish rebels.

The key reason for this denial of support was the concern to preserve a unified Iraq as a buffer against Iran. As former Secretary of State James Baker put it, the United States

did not assist the insurrections militarily, primarily out of fear of hastening the fragmentation of Iraq and plunging the region into a new cycle of instability. The Shia were quite naturally perceived as being aligned with Iran, and the Kurds, who had demanded an independent state of Kurdistan for decades, were very fragmented in their leadership and were a constant source of concern to Turkey. For these geopolitical reasons, we were wary of supporting either group. We believed it was essential that Iraq remain intact, with or without a more reasonable leadership.98

These concerns about promoting the Lebanonization of Iraq “were bolstered by an intense reluctance within the government to do anything that might result in the eventual reinvolvment of U.S. military forces in Iraq.”99

These reservations toward U.S. involvement apparently also ruled out any provision of covert support to the rebels. According to Secretary Baker, several senior officials from other Coalition partners advanced proposals for such covert assistance, arguing that this was the only way to divide the Iraqi military from Saddam. If the rebels were supplied with surface-to-air and antitank missiles, they would be able to defend themselves more effectively and inflict losses on Saddam’s forces. A protracted and costly insurgency might be psychologically unacceptable to the Iraqi military. As one foreign minister put it to Baker,

The military needs to know that as long as Saddam is in power, the army will have to fight a long and costly internal war. When that realization sinks in, the military will be more willing to act against Saddam.\textsuperscript{100}

But such arguments came to naught. The proposals for covert assistance “raised a host of thorny questions” that U.S. decisionmakers apparently were unable to resolve in the affirmative:

Could such operations be mounted successfully, given the intelligence assets that the United States and its Coalition partners could bring to bear? Would such operations just foment the fragmentation of Iraq and backfire against our desire to see stability restored in the Persian Gulf? If such an effort were tried and failed, could we count on maintaining substantial UN economic and political sanctions against Iraq?\textsuperscript{101}

Left to their own devices, the rebellions faltered and were ruthlessly suppressed, partly by Republican Guard forces. Even though the Republican Guard divisions suffered repeated attacks during the air campaign and were the principal target of the Coalition’s ground campaign, most of the Republican Guard forces managed to escape to Iraqi-controlled territory and retained sufficient capability to suppress the Shia and Kurdish uprisings.\textsuperscript{102}

In their suppression activities, Saddam’s forces made effective use of the helicopter gunships whose flight had not been prohibited in the Safwan truce agreements. General Schwarzkopf had given the Iraqis permission to use helicopters to resupply Iraqi troops around the country, but never envisioned that this “logistical courtesy from victor to vanquished” would be exploited for helicopter gunship attacks against Shia and Kurdish villages.\textsuperscript{103}

\textsuperscript{102}About half the Republican Guard armored units and most of the Republican Guard infantry units deployed in the KTO survived both the bombing and the subsequent ground fighting. See Central Intelligence Agency, OIA, \textit{Operation Desert Storm: A Snapshot of the Battlefield}, 1A 93-10022, September 1993.
Post–Gulf War Attempts to Generate Coups and Uprisings. When—contrary to expectations—Saddam was not overthrown following the Iraqi defeat in 1991, President Bush signed a “lethal finding” that instructed the CIA to covertly create conditions that would lead to a change of regime in Iraq. The policy of covertly promoting Saddam’s overthrow was continued under the Clinton administration. During the period since 1991, the CIA tried a number of different plans and supported a variety of different groups in its attempts to oust the Iraqi leader. The groups receiving CIA support included Kurdish dissidents in northern Iraq, Iraqi military defectors in Jordan, Shia dissidents in southern Iraq, and a coalition of Iraqi exiles based in London. None of these groups proved effective instruments for Saddam’s ouster; most were torn by internal quarrels and penetrated by Iraqi government intelligence agents. Their attempts to organize coups or mount attacks against regime elements were violently repressed by Saddam’s military and security forces.

Two failures in particular stand out. The first occurred in March 1995, when Kurdish guerrilla forces, partly trained and armed by the CIA, mounted raids against Iraqi government positions in the northern towns of Mosul and Kirkuk. The guerrillas and the CIA-supported Iraqi National Congress (INC) leaders, who helped plan the operations, hoped that the raids would spark local insurrections, generate defections from government forces, and persuade Saddam that his army would not fight for him. The raids were part of an overall INC strategy to use the guerrilla forces of the two Kurdish factions in the north to erode Saddam’s power—to "hollow out the Iraqi army by making defection to the north safe." The raids, however, were to be accomplished without U.S. help. Upon learning of the planned raids, the president’s NSC adviser directed that the Kurds be informed that their operation had been penetrated and hence risked being violently repressed by Saddam’s military and security forces.

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failure. The Kurds were also told that, if they went ahead with the raids, they would do so without U.S. support or involvement.108

The raids also had to be accomplished with limited force. One of the two main Kurdish leaders, Massoud Barzani—who along with the rival Kurdish leader, Jalal Talabani, was on the CIA payroll—refused to allow his men to participate in the raids.109 Without support from Barzani’s or U.S. military forces, Talabani’s guerrillas made little progress, and the probes were rapidly terminated.110

Barzani subsequently turned on his Kurdish rival and his CIA benefactors in August 1996, when he invited Saddam’s tanks and troops into the north, purportedly to counter Iran’s support for Talabani.111 The Iraqi army exploited the opening provided by Barzani’s defection by rounding up INC personnel, destroying the CIA base, and forcing the evacuation of American intelligence officers from northern Iraq. Some 96 Kurdish dissidents were shot on the spot, and an additional 2,000 Kurds were reportedly taken back to Iraqi intelligence headquarters, where they were reportedly interrogated and then executed.112 More than 5,000 of the most vulnerable Kurds and other Iraqis escaped to Turkey, and some of these were resettled in the United States.

A second major CIA-backed operation collapsed in June 1996 when Saddam’s security service rolled up a network of Iraqi army officers who had been attempting to foment a coup. The network was being organized and run by the Iraqi National Accord, a Jordanian-based Iraqi dissident group that was apparently deeply penetrated by

109Different reasons are given for Barzani’s refusal to join in the raids. According to one account, it was the message from the National Security Council denying U.S. support that “split the Kurds.” Another account suggests that Barzani had been squabbling with Talabani over the division of money from oil smuggling. Barzani had reason to be mistrustful of the United States. His father had led a CIA-backed revolt in the 1970s, which was “sold out and abandoned” by the Americans when the U.S. client, the Shah of Iran, sacrificed the Kurds in a separate peace deal with Baghdad. See Hoagland (1997), p. A29, and Thomas, Dickey, and Vistica (1998), pp. 43–44.
110By one account, the raids won over about 1,000 defectors from the government forces. See Thomas, Dickey, and Vistica (1998), p. 44.
112Thomas, Dickey, and Vistica (1998), p. 44.
agents of Saddam’s security services. More than 100 Iraqi National Accord contacts within the Iraqi military were reportedly executed when the network was taken down.\textsuperscript{113}

Stung by these setbacks, Washington officials were reluctant during the following two years to invest resources in rebuilding the Iraqi opposition.\textsuperscript{114} Beginning in November 1998, however, the Clinton administration began to enunciate a new policy toward Iraq, one that openly embraced the goal of ousting Saddam Hussein. As part of a “deliberate, sustained” effort to overthrow the Iraqi leader, administration leaders promised to commit resources to a “practical and effective” effort to build up potential opponents.\textsuperscript{115} Among other measures, the new plans involved encouraging Iraq’s neighbors to cooperate in efforts to oust Saddam, accelerating efforts aimed at uniting feuding Kurdish and other dissident groups into a cohesive opposition, funneling some $97 million of congressionally designated aid to Iraqi opposition groups, appointing a special U.S. convoy to work with the Iraqi opposition, and stepping up covert U.S. support for Iraqi opposition activities.\textsuperscript{116} However, no arms were provided to the opposition groups.

Administration leaders also dangled incentives for potential Iraqi rebels at the center of power in Baghdad by promising that the United States “would work to ease economic sanctions” and “work to relieve Iraq’s massive economic debts” in the event that a new government assumed power. Finally, administration leaders suggested that the United States was prepared “to use effective force if necessary” to secure its goals.\textsuperscript{117}

Degrading Saddam’s security apparatus was one of the objectives of the four-day Operation Desert Fox bombing that followed the withdrawal of UNSCOM inspectors from Iraq in December 1998. The declared objective of the bombing was to diminish Iraq’s ability to develop WMD and to degrade its capabilities to threaten its neighbors. In terms of these military objectives, the Desert Fox attacks proved generally successful.

But there was also a subsidiary U.S. goal:

> to kill and demoralize the elite forces closest to the Iraqi leader and to send a message to them, and to the less-politicized Iraqi army, that the United States considers supporters of the regime targets for future attacks.

As the chairman of the JCS, General Henry H. Shelton, put it: “We know who protects the center of gravity, and so that’s who we targeted.”

Among other targets, U.S. and U.K. aircraft struck Iraqi command-and-control centers, helicopter deployment areas, and the barracks of the Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard forces. According to General Shelton, the air strikes probably killed “several individuals” who were in the upper structure of the Iraqi leadership and possibly as many as 1,600 guard troops. While CENTCOM commander General Anthony Zinni believed that the raids had “shaken” Saddam Hussein, such short-lived and limited attacks were obviously unable to degrade Saddam’s security apparatus sufficiently to prompt his overthrow.

Overthrowing Saddam will be no easy matter. As the target of frequent assassination attempts and other plots, Saddam has devoted extraordinary attention and resources to his personal protection. Saddam rules Iraq through a clique of longtime Ba’ath Party associates and family members, as well as more distant relatives from his Tikriti clan. This inner circle is closely tied to Saddam’s policies and,

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119 Priest and Graham (1999).
as a consequence, to Saddam’s own fate. Over the years, Saddam has purged all potential rivals and dealt harshly with any opposition.120

For his personal protection and for the protection of his regime, Saddam continues to rely on a large and elaborate security system consisting of personal bodyguards, a division-sized Special Republican Guard security unit, secret and other police forces, and several civilian and military intelligence services.121 The intelligence, police, and other internal security agencies have a multitude of informants in the armed forces, in government agencies, and among the civilian population. Backing up the more immediate protection forces are other units, including the Republican Guard armored and infantry divisions, that Saddam relies on to quell attempted coups and uprisings.

The leaders and key staff members of the intelligence, internal security, and military units that protect Saddam’s person and power have been carefully selected for their reliability and loyalty. Many of the key unit leaders are close relatives of Saddam, and rank-and-file members are often drawn from Saddam’s al-Bu Nasir tribe or from other Sunni tribes and tribal federations that have good relations with the al-Bu Nasir.122 Because these officers and civilian officials


121 Among the security and intelligence elements protecting Saddam were the Special Republican Guard, Special Security Service, and Military Security Service. The Special Republican Guard (which now numbers some 14 battalions) constitutes Saddam’s Praetorian Guard and is responsible for the security of Baghdad. However, several of the security and intelligence services also have brigade- or battalion-sized rapid intervention forces. See Sean Boyne, “Inside Iraq’s Security Network,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, July 1997, p. 312.

122 See Amatzia Baram, *Building Toward Crisis: Saddam Husayn’s Strategy for Survival*, Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998a, pp. 20–31. Saddam also works hard to ensure the loyalty of other important Iraqi tribes, which have become a prime source of his power outside Baghdad. These tribes constitute “a combination of mercenary army, local government and loyalty club, paid and patronized for maintaining order and fealty. Favored tribes get better roads and schools, welcome bounty in a country withered by sanctions for the past decade.” But patronage also can nourish a potential threat to Saddam. The greater the funding from Baghdad, the more manpower the clans can support in their militias. Thus, “the stronger the tribes become, the more the Iraqi leader has to worry that they will become a weapon for his enemies.” See Stephen J. Glain, “Strong Can Backfire,” *Wall Street Journal*, May 23, 2000, p. 1.
are personally beholden to Saddam for their positions and have been rewarded by the Iraqi leader for their services, they have an enormous vested interest in his survival.\textsuperscript{123}

\textbf{SUPPORT OF REBELLION TO CHANGE HOSTILE POLICY}

During the Cold War, the United States provided covert support to resistance movements in an attempt to make communist aggression more expensive, to deny communist forces a lodgment in a strategic area, or to tie down hostile troops so that they could not be used elsewhere. One or more of these rationales underlay the funding, arms, and other supplies the United States provided to the Polish Freedom and Independence Movement (WIN, from the Polish) during the 1950s, the anti-Chinese resistance in Tibet during the 1950s to 1960s, the Hmong and other tribal groups fighting the communist forces in Laos from 1962 to 1973, and the Kurds battling Baghdad government forces in Iraq from 1972 to 1975.\textsuperscript{124}

The attempt to support the Polish resistance proved a debacle, as the movement was under communist control from the outset.\textsuperscript{125} The CIA’s attempt to foster resistance in Tibet also turned out to be misguided, as the Tibetan herdsmen—encumbered by their families and animals—found it almost impossible to fight as guerrillas in the Spartan Tibetan countryside. The Americans who designed and directed the Tibetan operations underestimated Chinese capabilities and lacked “any depth of knowledge about the Tibetan people or the

\textsuperscript{123}Saddam, for example, selects only politically reliable officers to command his Republican Guard units and periodically gives them cars and other expensive gifts to maintain their loyalty.


\textsuperscript{125}American and British services conducted a substantial paramilitary effort in Poland during the early 1950s in hopes of strengthening Polish resistance forces that might sabotage and slow any Soviet military advances should war break out in Western Europe. The allies air-dropped money, military supplies, and radio equipment to elements of the Polish WIN over a two-year period. The operation was terminated when it was discovered that WIN was actually under the control of the Polish security forces, which had “deliberately provoked the British and American services to supply the ‘resistance organization’ with support.” See Rositzke (1977), pp. 169–171.
topography of their country."¹²⁶ The resistance efforts in Laos and Iraq were crushed after the United States (along with Iran, in the case of the Kurds) had withdrawn its support. At its height, the tribal resistance in Laos tied down some 70,000 North Vietnamese troops but was able to maintain a viable defense only so long as U.S. air support was available.¹²⁷

The United States also assisted some rebel organizations for coercive purposes, to encourage foreign decisionmakers to abandon policies and behavior considered inimical to U.S. interests and to create bargaining leverage for negotiations. Such motives underlay the covert U.S. support to antigovernment elements in Indonesia, Angola, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua.¹²⁸ With the exception of Indonesia, this coercive use of rebellion proved effective and, at least in the short run, salutary for U.S. interests. The longer-term outcome in Angola has been less than satisfactory because the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) is faulted for much of the continued fighting there. The longer-term evolution in Afghanistan has proved catastrophic for U.S. interests: A pariah movement—the

¹²⁶ According to John Knaus, the former CIA official who ran the Tibetan operation, almost none of the U.S. officials who were involved in the operation had ever been to Tibet, and none spoke Tibetan. The Tibetans were poor candidates for guerrilla operations because they were accustomed to living in large encampments with their dependents and with their herds, which in some cases consisted of as many as 30,000 animals. The resistance had to operate in an infertile countryside that could barely feed its own people much less a guerrilla force. The resistance fighters could not break up into smaller guerrilla groups—as their CIA-trained handlers kept urging them to do—because the area they inhabited did “not provide sufficient cover and sustenance for them to disperse and survive.” See Knaus (1999), pp. 225–226, 233–235, 297, 332.

¹²⁷ The tribes also received some direct support from Thai artillery units. See Colby (1989), pp. 198–199.

¹²⁸ The United States also provided covert assistance to elements of the noncommunist resistance in Cambodia. By sustaining a noncommunist resistance, the United States helped promote the negotiated settlement realized in the October 1991 Paris Peace Accords, which called for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Cambodia, the cessation of external arms support, the demobilization of armed forces, and the holding of elections. However, the bulk of the military leverage that generated the need for a settlement was provided by Khmer Rouge forces supported by the People’s Republic of China. The noncommunist factions (the royalist Front for a United, Neutral, Cooperative, Independent, Peaceful Cambodia and the republican Kampuchea (Khmer) People’s National Liberation Front) never had sufficient military strength or martial zeal to become a crucial factor in the war. See Trevor Findlay, Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC, Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 1–3, 11.
Taliban—assumed power and provided refuge to Osama bin Laden and key elements of his terrorist network.

**Support to the Colonels’ Revolt in Indonesia (1957–1958)**

In the summer of 1957, the CIA began to provide covert support to an antigovernment revolt by dissident Indonesian army commanders stationed in Sumatra and Sulawesi (Celebes). The avowed objective of this so-called colonels’ revolt was to pressure Indonesia’s then-president, Sukarno, to “desist from his drift toward communism.”

Among other concerns, the dissident colonels opposed Sukarno’s decision that Western-style democracy be abolished in Indonesia in favor of something called “guided democracy” and that representatives of the Indonesian Communist Party be brought into the Jakarta government’s cabinet. They were also acting because they believed that Sumatra, Sulawesi, and the other islands outside Java were paying a disproportionate share of the taxes and other costs of the wasteful, corrupt, Javanese-dominated central government and were receiving inadequate military supplies and other support in return.

Eisenhower administration officials shared the rebel colonels’ concerns about the growing communist strength on Java. And while neither the United States nor the rebel leaders sought the overthrow of Sukarno per se, they shared a common determination to change the makeup of his government in Jakarta. The U.S. objectives in supporting the rebels were (1) to create pressure for such a new government by encouraging cooperation among and strengthening the bargaining position of the noncommunist and anticommunist ele-

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130 In their February 1958 ultimatum to Sukarno, the rebels demanded that the Indonesian president “resume his constitutional position and rescind his unconstitutional actions,” that the incumbent Djuanda cabinet return its mandate, and that Vice President Mohammad Hatta and the Sultan of Yogyakarta be empowered to form a new cabinet, which would hold office until new general elections could be held. Kahin and Kahin (1995), p. 139.

ments on Java, and (2) to ensure a fallback position of noncommunist bastions in the Outer Islands in the event that Java was lost to the communists. U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles apparently sought a situation whereby the United States could plausibly withdraw its recognition of the Sukarno government and transfer it to the rebel elements on Sumatra.

Despite the funds, arms, and eventual covert external air support—including B-26 bombers with U.S. and Asian contract pilots—that the CIA provided the rebel forces, the colonels’ revolt was rapidly suppressed. In early 1958, the dissidents committed the major blunder of declaring themselves an independent government, which energized the majority of military forces that remained loyal to the concept of a unified Indonesian state to take action against the rebels. Elements of the Indonesian navy blockaded the rebels’ ports, government aircraft strafed rebel troops, and army forces sent from Java progressively reduced the rebel positions in Sumatra and, eventually, those in Sulawesi. Despite frantic pleas for continued U.S. help, the CIA found it necessary to “disengage” from the operation in May 1958, following the capture of Allen L. Pope, an American pilot whose B-26 was shot down while bombing targets near the Indonesian port of Ambon. By mid-June, the rebellion was in steep decline, with rebel forces having been driven from most of the key towns they had once held. However, guerrilla opposition from rebel remnants continued for several years.

To the CIA’s surprise and chagrin, many of the rebel troops put up little fight. The rebel troops on Sumatra proved particularly ineffective, fleeing the battlefield whenever they heard the sound of air—

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134 For an account of the air operations that supported the rebels, see Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison, Feet to the Fire: CIA Covert Operations in Indonesia, 1957–1958, Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1999, pp. 82–165.
136 The CIA has been quite sanguine about the rebels’ military prospects, envisioning even possible support for the rebellion among Javanese units. See Kahin and Kahin (1995), p. 133.
craft overhead. In their postmortem of the “patchwork” operation, CIA operatives attributed the ill-advised U.S. intervention to their failure to understand the shortcomings of the Indonesians they were proposing to support. According to their assessment, the fundamental flaw was

our eagerness to support men we didn’t know enough about to start with. We hoped we would learn all we needed to know about them as we went along, but we didn’t find out what they were really like until they were on the battlefield. Then it had been too late.

Ironically, the rebellion and U.S. intervention intensified the leftward policy shifts the United States had hoped to prevent. The rebellion significantly strengthened Sukarno’s power and hastened the destruction of parliamentary democracy in Indonesia. The anti-communist parties closely associated with the rebellion (the Masjumi and the Indonesian Socialist Party) were seriously weakened, while the Indonesian Communist Party became more powerful and respectable. And despite U.S. efforts to repair its relations with the Jakarta government in the years immediately following the rebellion’s collapse, Indonesia’s foreign policy became increasingly radicalized and anti-Western.

**Support to Noncommunist Factions in Angola (1975, 1985–1990)**

To counter Soviet and Cuban attempts to help propel the procommunist faction, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), to power in the former Portuguese colony of Angola, the United States in 1975 provided about $30 million of covert military assistance to the forces of UNITA and the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), which were fighting the MPLA and Cuban troops

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137 The rebel troops excused their lack of military ardor on the grounds that “they would not fight their Muslim brothers.” Conboy and Morrison, (1999), pp. 51, 82.


139 The prestige and power of the Indonesian Army’s chief of staff, Abdul Haris Nasution, was also increased. See Kahin and Kahin (1995), pp. 217–225.
for control of that country.\textsuperscript{140} The U.S. objective was to achieve a stalemate between the factions on the ground and then to go public with pressure on the former Soviet Union to stop its arms supply to the MPLA.\textsuperscript{141}

This scheme was abruptly aborted, however, on December 19, 1975, when the U.S. Senate voted to cut off all further U.S. covert and overt assistance to the noncommunist factions. The U.S. House of Representatives followed suit on January 17, 1976. While the congressional opposition was motivated by a variety of concerns, including a reluctance to see the United States side with South Africa (which had sent troops into Angola to assist UNITA and the FNLA), Congress primarily wanted to forestall the United States from becoming engaged in military action in Angola, either directly or through surrogates.\textsuperscript{142} Following the Senate vote, South Africa chose on January 23, 1976, to temporarily disengage from the conflict. The South African withdrawal and the buildup of Cuban troops, which did most of the fighting, allowed the MPLA to secure much of the country and gain widespread recognition as the legitimate government of Angola.\textsuperscript{143}

However, even with the help of some 30,000 to 50,000 Cuban troops, the MPLA was unable to pacify the country.\textsuperscript{144} Drawing on strong tribal backing among the Ovimbundu peoples, UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi was able to conduct a protracted guerrilla war with South African logistical and other military support.

On August 8, 1985, the way was cleared for a renewal of covert U.S. support to UNITA when the Reagan administration secured the repeal of the congressional prohibition against U.S. aid to the noncommunist factions. Renewed American covert support, including U.S.-supplied antitank and antiaircraft missiles, proved of critical

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\textsuperscript{141}Kissinger (1999), p. 808.
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\textsuperscript{142}See Hosmer (1987), p. 77.
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\textsuperscript{143}Hosmer and Wolfe (1982), p. 84.
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\textsuperscript{144}Secretary of State James Baker put the eventual number of Cuban troops in Angola at approximately 50,000. Baker (1995), p. 598.
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importance to UNITA’s defeat of an MPLA force in October 1987, during the largest battle of the 12-year conflict.\textsuperscript{145}

The U.S. objective in providing this assistance was to gain leverage for negotiations to broker a withdrawal of foreign forces from Angola. This U.S. diplomatic effort proved successful in December 1988, when an accord was reached whereby Cuba agreed to pull its troops out of Angola in exchange for South Africa’s agreement to withdraw its forces from Angola and neighboring Namibia, with the latter then to become an independent state. The United States assumed that the departure of the Cubans would lead to an eventual political settlement in Angola, as it would sooner or later require the MPLA regime to accept a role for UNITA in the government.\textsuperscript{146}

However, the Soviets and the MPLA appeared to believe that with the departure of South African troops, they had a chance to crush UNITA once and for all. In December 1988, the MPLA launched a major offensive that UNITA managed to contain partly because of an emergency infusion of U.S. military aid, including shoulder-fired Stinger antiaircraft missiles.\textsuperscript{147} The ensuing battlefield stalemate allowed the United States to negotiate a peace agreement among the parties in December 1990; the provisions included a cease-fire, a timetable for free elections, guarantees concerning UNITA’s political rights, and a U.S.-Soviet agreement to terminate military aid to their respective clients. Fighting between UNITA and the MPLA resumed in December 1992, after Savimbi claimed election fraud. Despite periodic cease-fires brokered by the UN, hostilities continue.\textsuperscript{148}

\textbf{Support to the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan (1979–1992)}

Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the United States began to provide covert military aid to some of the Mujaheddin groups that were fighting both the 115,000-man Soviet occupation force and the Afghan troops that remained loyal to the communist regime in Kabul. The primary U.S. objectives in provid-

\textsuperscript{145}Shultz (1993), pp. 1123–1124.
\textsuperscript{146}Shultz (1993), p. 1128.
ing this assistance were to increase the costs to the former Soviet Union of its occupation and thereby to force an eventual Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.\footnote{Shultz (1993), pp. 570, 1086, 1089.}

The U.S. assistance, which was funneled through Pakistan,\footnote{Shultz (1993), p. 1091.} in time became extensive, involving the provision of training, logistical support, and a variety of weapons and munitions. The level of U.S. assistance stepped up sharply in March 1985 and further increased in April 1986 when the United States decided to provide shoulder-fired Stinger missiles to the Mujaheddin fighters. These weapons reduced the Soviet’s ability to conduct helicopter assaults and to accurately attack Mujaheddin forces from low-flying aircraft. High-level bombing proved ineffective against the dispersed and mobile Afghan guerrilla forces.\footnote{Shultz (1993), p. 692.}

The Stingers soon began to take a heavy toll on Soviet helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft, and the “tide of the conflict shifted.”\footnote{Shultz (1993), p. 1087.} Because of the heavy human and materiel costs of the occupation and the growing opposition within the former Soviet Union to continued Soviet intervention, President Mikhail Gorbachev announced on February 8, 1988, that Soviet forces would start withdrawing from Afghanistan on May 15 and would be out of the country entirely within ten months.\footnote{Shultz (1993), p. 1088.}

External arms support to the combatants in Afghanistan continued, however, as the United States refused to terminate its arms supply to the Mujaheddin until the Soviets ended their military support to the Kabul government. Initially, the Bush administration believed it would be unwise to cut off arms until there was a political settlement in Afghanistan, as this would have locked in a military imbalance strongly in favor of the Soviet client, Mohammad Najibullah, “and an unacceptable political status quo, setting the stage for further fighting.”\footnote{See Bush and Scowcroft (1998), p. 134.} However, the United States was unable to secure a long-term
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solution in Afghanistan and eventually settled for a mutual U.S.-Soviet cutoff of military aid. Partly out of a desire to resolve foreign policy problems in a way that might unlock Western aid to the former Soviet Union, Gorbachev eventually agreed to terminate Soviet arms support to Kabul by January 1, 1992. The arms cutoff marked the final death knell for the Najibullah regime, which was ousted in April 1992, when Mujaheddin forces entered Kabul. Although U.S. intelligence had predicted that Najibullah would “not long survive the withdrawal of Soviet troops,” the Afghan leader proved unexpectedly resilient, hanging onto power for more than three years after the last Soviet forces left the country.

Support to the Contras in Nicaragua (1982–1990)

In December 1981, the Reagan administration decided to provide covert U.S. support to the Nicaraguan Contra rebels, who were ready to put military pressure on the Ortega regime in Managua and “hoped to force it at least to hold honest elections.” Many of the Contra leaders no doubt also harbored the hope of eventually gathering sufficient force to oust the Sandinista regime. However, former Secretary of State George Shultz contends that by aiding the Contras the United States “was not seeking the overthrow” of the Sandinista junta. Instead, Shultz maintained that the United States was pursuing the more modest aim of putting sufficient pressure on the Managua regime to “distract it from adventures in El Salvador and to induce it to accept regionwide provisions for peace and stability.” Washington decisionmakers, in particular, hoped to arrest Nicaragua’s growing involvement in the transshipment of Soviet bloc arms to the communist insurgents in El Salvador.

157Shultz (1993), p. 289. Shultz’s contention that overthrow was not the objective of Contra assistance is supported by Duane Clarridge, the CIA official who directed the covert operation. While acknowledging that he knew some officials within the Reagan administration who did advocate the Sandinistas’ overthrow, Clarridge holds that the charge that the United States intended to oust the Sandinista regime physically was “ridiculous,” in that “we did not have the capability to do that—barring direct U.S. military involvement, which Reagan had categorically rejected from the outset.” Clarridge (1997), p. 232.
Washington officials believed that “Contra pressure and the Ortega regime’s fear that the United States might try a Grenada-style operation in Managua” might give U.S. diplomatic efforts “at least some foundation in strength.” Through the Contradora process—the regional effort to bring peace to Central America—the United States sought an end to Sandinista support for insurgency and subversion, the removal of external-communist military advisers from Nicaragua, a reduction in Sandinista military capabilities, and the fulfillment of the Sandinistas’ 1979 pledge to the Organization of American States “to govern through democratic practices.” In return for the Sandinistas’ agreement on these four steps, the United States was prepared to end its support of the Contras and to reduce its military activities in the region.

The U.S. support operations included the training, equipping, and sustaining of Contra forces in their Honduran base areas and the aerial resupply of Contra units conducting missions in Nicaragua. The United States also conducted military exercises in Honduras in an attempt to deter Sandinista attacks on that country and to reassure the Honduran government of U.S. support. These exercises may also have been intended to increase the Sandinistas’ anxieties about a possible future U.S. Grenada-style takedown of their regime.

Although the Contras had no difficulty finding recruits—they rapidly built a force of some 20,000 fighters—they never acquired the equipment or numbers to take on the Sandinista army, with its thousands of troops and large stockpiles of tanks, artillery, and aircraft. In particular, the Contras lacked the capability to take the battle to the lowlands of Nicaragua, “the only locale where a denouement of the Sandinistas could be affected.” They even lacked the capability to control towns or to conduct sustained operations within the Nicaraguan highlands and were therefore generally limited to cross-border raiding forays. Among other targets, the Contras attacked

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160The Contradora process involved the sponsoring countries of Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela and the so-called Central American Core Four—Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras—plus Nicaragua. See Shultz (1993), pp. 402, 951.
162For a discussion of Contra recruitment and military limitations, see Clarridge (1997), pp. 231–232, 238, 243.
vehicle parks, bridges, power stations and transformer clusters, and
the storage depots of the “much despised” agricultural collectives.163

Funding the Contra operations proved a recurring problem following
the April 1984 CIA mining of Nicaraguan harbors. This act stimu-
lated a congressional cutoff (through the passage of the third Boland
Amendment) of all U.S. funds to the Contras during fiscal year 1985,
which in turn prompted U.S. operatives to divert to the Contras
payments made by Iran during the course of the 1986 U.S. “arms-for-
hostages” weapon transfers.164 Even though the Congress agreed to
restore U.S. assistance to the Contras when it approved a Reagan
administration fiscal year 1987 request for $100 million in aid, fund-
ing for military support to the rebels became increasingly difficult.165

Secretary Shultz believed pressure from the Contras to be critical for
getting the Sandinistas to the bargaining table and to the success of
the negotiating effort in Contradora. Indeed, the Ortega regime
consistently sought to make progress in the negotiations contingent
on the termination of U.S. support to the Contras.166 Despite the
Contras’ limited military prowess and persistent funding problems,
the Sandinistas apparently viewed the presence of the rebel force in
Honduras as a sufficient long-term threat to warrant concessions on
their part to secure Contra demobilization.

On August 7, 1987, Ortega signed Esquipulus II, a peace plan that
called for a cease-fire between the Sandinistas and the Contras; a
termination of U.S. support to the Contras and a cutoff of Soviet aid
to the Sandinistas; and “free, pluralistic, and fair elections” in
Nicaragua.167 The implementation of Esquipulus II proved a labori-

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165In February 1988, Congress voted down an administration request for $36 million
in aid even though only $3.6 million of that had been earmarked for military aid. Once
the Contras had agreed to a cease-fire in March 1988, Congress voted them $48 million
in nonlethal aid and then appropriated another $27 million to keep them in their
p. 953.
166According to Shultz: “The Nicaraguans sought to make progress contingent on the
ending of U.S. aid to the Contras. While the Central American presidents found it dif-
ficult publicly to support Contra aid, privately (with the exception of Arias) they real-
ized how important it was.” See Shultz (1993), pp. 952–953, 956.
The Sandinistas agreed in February 1988 to hold a presidential election within two years. In return, it was agreed that a plan would be formulated within 90 days to demobilize the Contras. The Sandinista agreement to hold free and fair elections was obviously based on a gross miscalculation of their electoral prospects. However, by the time elections were held on February 25, 1990, the Sandinistas were sufficiently boxed in by international election observers and the media that they were forced to accept the electoral defeat they suffered from Violeta Chamorro’s coalition.168

WHY U.S. ADVERSARIES HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT TO OVERTHROW AND INTIMIDATE

The experience to date suggests that the United States will find it difficult to oust hostile leaders through the support of coups or uprisings. As noted previously, the few successes that occurred during the early 1950s were achieved against governments that lacked any significant backing from their country’s military forces. Indeed, successful coups have been characterized by a dichotomy between the targeted regime and its military establishment, in which the regimes in power pursued policies that were hostile to U.S. interests, whereas significant elements of the country’s military had reservations about those policies and usually retained a close relationship with the United States.169

While the United States has experienced greater success in using its support of resistance movements to extract concessions from hostile regimes, the movements that the United States supported have, with the notable exception of the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan, proved unable to oust incumbent regimes by force of arms. And the import of the Mujaheddin exception is undercut by the fact that the Mujaheddin takeover of Kabul came three years after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country.

The difficulty that the United States has encountered in promoting the ouster of hostile governments can be traced, to one degree or another, to the strengths of the incumbent regime and the weaknesses of the groups attempting to overthrow it.

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Facilitating Coups or Rebellions

Regime Strengths

Any government that the United States is likely to seek to remove by coup or uprising in the post–Cold War era will, by the nature of its internal organization and behavior, be a hard target to overthrow. Its leaders are likely to possess authoritarian, if not dictatorial, powers, invest heavily in their own protection, and manifest a willingness to employ unrestrained violence to maintain themselves in power. Among other practices, the leaders of such regimes are likely to

- Give priority to their personal security and the survival of their rule. Enemy leaders will tightly control access to their person and key governmental facilities and will assiduously guard information about their whereabouts and planned movements.

- Establish and maintain formidable military, police, internal security, and intelligence structures to protect their person and power, uncover plots and spies, and suppress coups and uprisings. Enemy leaders will populate these intelligence, police, and security apparatuses with officers and rank and file, who for reasons of familial or tribal relationships, shared interests, or personal benefit are likely to remain loyal. Such security shields are inherently difficult to reduce by bombing.

- Eliminate or neutralize potential rivals before they can become serious threats and repress any actual or suspected opposition.

- Maintain tight control of their country’s media and exploit the media to manipulate popular opinion.

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Opposition Weaknesses

A regime’s strength is typically magnified by shortcomings in the makeup, organization, security, and combat strength of the opposition element or elements attempting to overthrow it.

• Opposition elements are often fractured and riven by personal rivalries, making it difficult to mount and sustain coordinated efforts against a government. Numerous separate factions make up the opposition in Iraq, including two Kurdish groups that have frequently been at loggerheads and a major Shia resistance organization supported by Iran that refuses to cooperate with U.S. efforts to unify the antiregime elements in that country.\^\textsuperscript{171}

• The ethnic, religious, or tribal makeup of a particular opposition group often limits its ability to mobilize broad-based support within the country. Exile groups, which are frequently extremely fractious, sometimes have difficulty generating a significant following among the population that remains within the country.

• Military groups plotting coups and opposition elements planning uprisings often cannot maintain sufficient operations security to prevent infiltration by government agents, which makes them vulnerable to regime preemptive action.

• Regime security measures and the threat of premature exposure make it difficult for rebel or coup groups to accumulate the military prowess needed to prevail over well-armed regime forces on the battlefield.

The longevity of such leaders as Castro, Qaddafi, and Saddam stems in large part from the strength of their regimes and the weaknesses of the oppositions.

COERCIVE AND DETERRENT EFFECTS OF DIRECT ATTACKS, COUPS, AND REBELLIONS

The Threat of Direct Attacks and Coups Has Had Little Effect

The prospect that the United States might mount a military attack on an enemy leader directly or attempt to foment and support his overthrow by a coup seems to have had little deterrent or coercive effect.

This is not to say that the direct attacks had no effect on the targeted leaders. As previously noted, Qaddafi reportedly was shaken and prone to bouts of severe paranoia after the 1986 U.S. air strikes. Similarly, the constant danger of attack from the air may have caused Saddam considerable anguish and possibly a loss of appetite. When Yevgeni Primakov met with Saddam on February 12, 1991, he was startled by the Iraqi leader’s appearance: Saddam “looked gaunt, as if he had lost 30 or 40 pounds since their last meeting, four months earlier.”

During one visit to his “disguised” headquarters, Saddam, according to his former head of intelligence, showed signs of “deep anxiety.” The pressures caused by the Coalition’s strategic attacks may have increased Saddam’s incentive to bring a halt to the fighting and helped move him closer to agreeing to withdraw from Kuwait.

However, Qaddafi, Saddam, Castro, Noriega, Aideed, and bin Laden all continued to pursue policies anathema to the United States after being targeted by such U.S. operations. None capitulated to U.S.

174 By mid-February 1991, the Coalition’s pressures on Saddam to accede to its demands for an unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait included (1) continued air attacks on Iraqi strategic targets, which potentially threatened Saddam’s personal survival; (2) devastating air attacks on Iraqi forces deployed in the KTO, which were being progressively weakened by losses of equipment and mass desertions; and (3) the impending Coalition ground offensive, which was likely to overwhelm the Iraqi defenders in the KTO. Despite these formidable pressures, Saddam in the end proved unwilling to withdraw unconditionally. He did, however, move significantly closer to accepting the Coalition’s terms by agreeing to pull his troops out of Kuwait. See Hosmer (1996), pp. 62–65.
demands even after what appeared to be narrow escapes from direct U.S. attacks.\textsuperscript{175}

Several factors seem to explain this behavior. First, the leaders apparently believed enhanced security measures would allow them to survive any future U.S. attacks on their persons or power. During the course of their rules, most had escaped previous assassination or coup attempts, mainly by indigenous foes unconnected to the United States, and thus had considerable confidence that they could handle such threats. Indeed, at one time, Qaddafi, Noriega, and Saddam were themselves successful coup plotters.

Second, these leaders apparently believed that their acquiescence in the policy changes demanded by the United States might severely undermine their credibility and authority among the key constituencies that maintained them in power. In cultures where machismo is an expected attribute of leadership, abject capitulation to the United States could place a leader at greater risk of assassination or overthrow than would be the case if he continued to defy the United States. The U.S. attempt to negotiate Noriega out of Panama was thwarted when the deal that was eventually agreed to between Noriega and the U.S. State Department was opposed by some junior officers in the PDF. These officers insisted “that Noriega remain in power, apparently fearing for their own skins should their boss depart.” Noriega told a U.S. official that the junior officers had threatened a coup when presented with the deal and “accused him of selling out the PDF to the opposition.”\textsuperscript{176}

Finally, there are some leaders who may be willing to die rather than to abandon their policy. Hitler and the Japanese hard-line militarists who opposed surrender at the end of World War II are examples of leaders who refuse accommodation at any price. The prospect of death does not deter terrorists who seek martyrdom, such as those who destroyed the U.S. embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut.

\textsuperscript{175}In some instances, U.S. demands for policy changes were explicit and publicly articulated, such as the demands that Saddam “withdraw from Kuwait” and “permit unfettered WMD inspections” or that Qaddafi “cease supporting terrorism and revolution.” In other instances, the demands were implicit, such as the U.S. and UN requirement that Aideed accept the “marginalization” of the SNA’s future role in Somalia.

\textsuperscript{176}Shultz (1993), pp. 1077–1078.
The Threat of Rebellion Sometimes Produces Coercive Leverage

While not fruitful in the case of the colonels’ revolt in Indonesia, U.S. support for rebellions and resistance movements has produced useful coercive leverage in other conflict situations.

As noted above, the covert support provided to UNITA in Angola and to the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan helped prompt agreements for the withdrawal of external communist military forces from those countries. The covert assistance the United States rendered to the Contras helped persuade the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua to terminate its arms transfers to the Salvadoran guerrillas and to hold democratic elections.

These successful U.S. operations shared several commonalities. In each instance, the United States

• backed resistance movements that were able to recruit large numbers of motivated fighters
• enjoyed access to proximate base areas from which to mount its support operations
• was able to sustain its support over a protracted period
• augmented the bargaining leverage derived from its support of the resistance movements with broader packages of economic and diplomatic sanctions and incentives aimed at encouraging enemy acquiescence
• pursued political-military objectives that fell short of seeking the military overthrow of the incumbent enemy regime.

The targeted regimes no doubt saw things differently, however, perceiving the U.S. military support to their opponents as obviously designed to secure their ouster.

Leaders Can Be Coerced by Bombing That Threatens Their Rule

The threat that continued bombing might spark a rebellion can also produce coercive leverage. Such was the case in Italy in July 1943,
when the Allied bombing of railway marshaling yards and industrial targets in the suburbs of Rome helped precipitate Mussolini’s removal from power and Italy’s decision to seek a peace accord. The bombing “caused factory workers to flee or fail to show up . . . [and] . . . provided Italian officials with clear evidence that the civilian population did not have its heart in the war.” The Italian army chief of staff made no move to discourage plotting against the Mussolini government by officers favoring a separate peace because he “feared that bombing, followed perhaps by fighting in Italy itself, might lead to a popular revolt, of which communists would take command.”

Concerns about potential public reactions to continued Allied bombing also helped speed war termination with Japan in 1945 and with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999. One of the key reasons Emperor Hirohito decided to accept Allied peace terms in August 1945 was that he feared the hardships the Japanese people were suffering from the continued Allied bombing and blockade would eventually trigger a revolution that would destroy Japan’s kokutai (social polity) and endanger the imperial house and throne. By summer of 1945, Hirohito; his principal adviser,

177General Paolo Puntoni, who was King Victor Emmanuel’s closest confidant, saw the bombing as the key catalytic event leading to Mussolini’s ouster. However, other factors—including the heavy defeats Italian forces had experienced in North Africa and Sicily; Hitler’s refusal to provide Mussolini with the arms aid he requested; the imminent prospect of an Allied invasion of the Italian mainland; and the fact that Italian military morale was at “rock bottom”—also influenced Italian officials to seek changes in Italy’s leadership and war policies. See Ernest R. May, “Lessons” of the Past, New York: Oxford University Press, 1973, pp. 128–134. For another account of how Allied bombing helped bring Mussolini down and precipitated Italy’s surrender, see Philip A. Smith (Maj, USAF), Bombing to Surrender: The Contributions of Airpower to the Collapse of Italy, 1943, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, August 1998.
179May (1973), p. 133. This concern undoubtedly was based in part on the fact that the Allied bombing of northern Italian cities in the summer of 1943 had already caused strikes and rioting in those urban areas. Prime Minister Churchill also believed that another bombing of Rome would cause a “popular rising,” which would prompt the Germans to “march in and slaughter everybody.” See Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Closing the Ring, Cambridge, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1951, pp. 44, 100.
Marquis Koichi Kido; and other members of the imperial court group knew that

the people were war-weary and despondent and that popular hostility toward the military and the government was increasing rapidly, along with popular criticism of the emperor himself. More particularly, Kido and Hirohito were privy to Home Ministry reports, based on information from governors and police chiefs all over the country, revealing that people were starting to speak of the emperor as an incompetent leader who was responsible for the worsening war situation.181

Such trends were an ominous portent for the emperor and his court group. Indeed, according to Richard Franks,

There is a great deal of direct and indirect evidence demonstrating that fear (perhaps exaggerated) of a domestic upheaval provided . . . the emperor with a powerful impetus to end the war. This collapse of domestic morale arose from the general trajectory of the war but became much more marked in the summer of 1945 due to blockade and the bombing.182

Similarly, Slobodan Milosevic’s decision on June 3, 1999, to accept NATO’s terms for settling the conflict over Kosovo was motivated in large part by the belief that NATO was poised to launch an “even more massive bombing” campaign if its terms were rejected.183 Indeed, Milosevic and other senior Federal Republic of Yugoslavia officials had erroneously concluded that NATO was prepared to demolish Serbia’s entire infrastructure, including its remaining bridges, telephone systems, factories, and electric power facilities.184

Milosevic had every reason to contemplate the prospect of such unconstrained bombing with trepidation. He realized that if there were no containment and reconstitution of the damage being

inflicted by the bombing, the coming winter would greatly magnify
the hardships of the Serbian people. The prospect of a prolonged
denial of electric power was undoubtedly a particularly worrisome
contingency, as it would have threatened the heating of 75 percent of
Serbian homes, shut down the country’s sewage services and water
supply, and seriously impaired the processing, storage, and prepara-
tion of food. Milosevic had reason to doubt that the Serb public
would have passively accepted such deprivation for long once the
frigid Balkan winter set in. He almost certainly recognized that sub-
jecting Serbia to further months of massive bombing risked deci-
sively weakening his rule and that he could best survive in power by
coming to terms and preserving a partially stable and functioning
country.185

This experience suggests that occasions may arise where allied air
attacks can increase an enemy leader’s fear of overthrow and thereby
encourage him to seek early war termination. Some enemy leaders
may be paranoid about the internal threats to their regime and may
overestimate the potential danger caused by U.S. air operations. As a
result, air operations might at times provide greater negotiating
leverage than they actually merit.

PREREQUISITES OF EFFECTIVE AIR SUPPORT TO COUPS
AND REBELLIONS

Obviously, U.S. air intervention can neither negate many of the
strengths that maintain a regime in power nor compensate for fun-
damental deficiencies of the groups seeking a regime’s ouster. How-
ever, under the right conditions, U.S. air power could enhance the
prospects of a successful coup or rebellion. American air strikes
conducted prior to the outbreak of active armed opposition might
help stimulate a coup or rebellion, particularly in conflict situations
where significant elements of the enemy military and population
already harbor serious doubts about the wisdom of continuing a
prowar regime in power.

However, using bombing to actually foment a widespread popular
uprising against an enemy government in time of war will prove dif-

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difficult. Experience shows that enemy populations have failed to move against their governments even when those populations have been directly subjected to massive bombing. The German and Japanese publics that were exposed to prolonged and intensive air attacks remained largely passive throughout World War II. Similarly, the various U.S. attempts to use bombing and PSYOP to encourage the North Korean and North Vietnamese publics to pressure their leaders to accept allied peace terms failed. Humanitarian and legal considerations are likely to increasingly constrain attacks that may cause civilian casualties and other collateral damage in future conflicts, and will therefore limit the forms of pressure that U.S. air power can place on a populace to rise against its rulers.

The barriers to mounting a successful popular revolution during wartime are likely to be formidable. To overthrow their government or otherwise force war termination, dissidents must be able to

- Organize and communicate with other potential rebels. This can prove to be a formidable task when bombing is a constant threat, communications are monitored and tightly controlled, and government security services are ubiquitous and empowered to incarcerate or execute any suspected saboteurs, oppositionists, and defeatists. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey found, for example, that organized opposition activities in Germany during World War II were normally confined, by necessity, to a local scale, because any attempt to establish wider contacts and group connections exposed members to prohibitive risks. The "cell" system was commonly used, whereby only one member of a group knew of the existence of another in a different group.186

- Persuade large numbers of their fellow citizens to actively undermine their nation’s war effort while their sons and other family members are still engaged with the enemy at the front. Mobilizing a massive antiwar movement becomes particularly difficult when the government controls virtually all information about the war and its origins and when a majority of the popula-

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tion believes that their own country is fighting a just, defensive war (as was the case in Germany and Japan).

- Acquire military capabilities that can defeat the internal security forces that remain loyal to the government. Dissident civilians, if armed at all, are almost certain to lack crew-served and other heavier weapons. The only way they can acquire such weapons and the trained personnel to operate them is to persuade elements of the government’s military and internal security forces to defect to their side.

If U.S. air strikes were sufficiently sustained and numerous, they might eventually weaken a regime’s defenses against internal overthrow. More limited attacks, however, are unlikely to substantially degrade a regime’s security structure. It is doubtful, for example, that the December 1998 Operation Desert Fox air attacks on Saddam’s security forces or the subsequent U.S. air strikes against Iraqi air defense and communication facilities fundamentally imperiled Saddam’s continued rule. While reportedly aimed at slowly “whittling down” Saddam’s “power,” “authority,” and “nerves,” such strikes were far too limited in scope and intensity to significantly erode the massive security structure that maintains Saddam in power.\(^\text{187}\)

Direct U.S. air support may hold the greatest potential for significantly increasing the military prowess of coup and rebel forces. The prospects of U.S. air support might embolden otherwise quiescent dissident elements to move against a government; in an actual coup or rebellion, such support could either encourage some of the loyalist elements that might otherwise have come to the government’s support to remain in their barracks or could persuade neutral elements that might otherwise have remained out of the fray to take up arms against the regime.\(^\text{188}\) In these respects, the potential psycho-

\(^{187}\)These strikes constituted only one part of a larger U.S. effort to “create the political and military conditions that would permit a successful change of the regime” in Iraq. See the statement of former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Walter B. Slocombe in Steven Lee Myers and Tom Weiner, “Weeks of Bombing Leave Iraq’s Power Structure Unshaken,” *New York Times*, March 7, 1999, p. 4.

\(^{188}\)It is also possible that in some coup situations an American air intervention might prove psychologically counterproductive, and cause nationalists who might otherwise have remained neutral to rally to the support of the government.
logical effects of direct U.S. air support could be significant. But it is the physical effects of such air support that could be the most telling.

Air Support to Coups

What Coup Forces Must Accomplish. To understand the potential ways in which direct U.S. air intervention might effectively support a coup, it is useful to examine what coup forces must be capable of accomplishing if they are to overthrow an entrenched regime. To be successful, coup forces typically require the following capabilities:

• First, the coup forces must possess sufficient strength, communications, and organization to seize or neutralize all key regime targets in a single operation. The coup forces must possess sufficient intelligence to identify the location and strength of key targets and how these targets might be “taken out” most efficiently. The most critical targets will likely be located in the capital city and are likely to include the senior political, military, and security officials who are most capable of rallying opposition to the coup; the military and security forces that immediately protect this senior leadership; and the principal government residences, ministries, and command-and-control centers from which the leaders operate.

• Second, the coup forces will need to seize or disrupt the regime’s operational communications (military radios, telephone exchanges, etc.) and its means of mass communication (the media), so that the various elements of potential loyalist resistance can be isolated. By disrupting the regime’s communication links, the coup forces can prevent the onset of “networking” among the loyalist forces. By controlling the radio, television, and print media, the coup forces may be able to convince potential opponents and the population at large that the regime’s overthrow is a fait accompli.

• Third, the coup must be conducted with sufficient surprise and speed to leave elements loyal to the regime little or no time to react. One of the greatest challenges for the coup group will be to maintain effective operational security so as to prevent preemptive counteractions from the regime’s security force. Coup groups are likely to be most vulnerable to infiltration and compromise during their later organizational phases, when they seek
to recruit an expanding circle of additional officers and units to their enterprise. Ideally, the coup should be executed when as many of the key human targets are as vulnerable as possible.

- Fourth, in the event that counterattacks are mounted by loyalist elements located inside or outside the capital city, the coup forces must have the means to contain and defeat such threats. The coup group would require sufficient battlefield awareness to be able to establish the makeup and routes of advance of any counterattacking forces.¹⁸⁹

**Tasks U.S. Air Power Might Perform Effectively.** One can envision a number of tasks that U.S. air might effectively perform in support of a coup. These include

- denying the targeted regime the use of its fixed-wing or helicopter aircraft to suppress the coup
- interdicting the movement of loyalist armored and artillery forces
- reducing the military and security forces defending key regime leaders and facilities
- degrading and disrupting the regime’s command, control, communications, and intelligence (C³I)
- denying the regime’s use of its radio and television media
- providing the coup group with platforms from which it could disseminate its own information to the public
- providing the coup group with intelligence about targets and military movements
- providing close air support to embattled coup forces
- moving friendly forces and key personnel to the places where they are most needed at crucial times.

Prerequisites of Effective Air Support to Coups. U.S. decisionmakers are not likely to sanction air support and it is not likely to prove effective unless the United States is (1) willing to act overtly, (2) prepared to respond promptly, and (3) capable of communicating with coup leaders.

A Willingness to Act Overtly. While a few of the tasks listed above might be performed covertly, most would require an overt employment of U.S. air power. This would constitute a major departure from past U.S. practice, as U.S. military forces have not heretofore been called on to provide overt support to coups. The one minor exception to this pattern occurred during the Moises Giroldi coup in Panama, when U.S. Army units set up roadblocks to support the coup forces. Typically, U.S. support to coup groups has been handled in a clandestine manner so that the involvement of the U.S. government could be masked and, if need be, denied.

Any overt involvement of U.S. armed forces in a coup could entail political and diplomatic costs, especially if the coup were to fail. The fact that U.S. air support would be overt could make it difficult to secure agreement from neighboring governments to allow their bases and airspace to be used for such an intervention.

An Ability to Respond Promptly. Because most coups are likely to be decided within hours rather than days, the United States would have to be prepared to move promptly once one is under way. This would require obtaining prior agreement, both within the U.S. government and with the governments of the states from whose territory U.S. operations were to be mounted, on the potential actions U.S. forces might take. It would further require sufficient readiness to respond on very short notice.

A prompt response would also require the capability to judge quickly whether a coup had sufficient military and political prospects to merit U.S. military support. To determine if a coup should receive U.S. air support, decisionmakers would likely want to know whether (1) the coup group, if successful, is likely to pursue policies significantly more congenial to U.S. interests than the policies of its predecessor, (2) the coup has a reasonable chance of success, and (3) the U.S. air intervention would significantly increase the prospects of success. Decisionmakers would also want assurance that U.S. support would not violate Executive Order 12333, which prohibits U.S.
involvement in assassinations. Finally, decisionmakers would want to weigh the possible diplomatic and political costs if the United States provides support and if the coup still fails.

Such assessments are likely to be difficult, in that information about the capabilities and objectives of a coup group may be murky, particularly if U.S. officials had no foreknowledge of the coup and had not previously interacted with the coup plotters. However, if U.S. decisionmakers wait for the smoke to clear and the uncertainties to be resolved, they are likely to miss the window for decisive action.

The need for such precrisis planning and prompt decisionmaking was clear in the Bush administration’s hesitant and ineffectual response to the Giroldi coup in Panama. According to Secretary of State Baker, the Bush administration had been caught unprepared by the coup and its decisionmaking had thus been “less than crisp.”

In Secretary Baker’s words:

A prime opportunity to remove Noriega had been squandered. Our reaction had been wholly defensive. Instead of being so skeptical, we should have gone to Giroldi, demanded to know his plan in exchange for our help, assessed his scheme, and quietly assisted in its execution.

The poor U.S. performance sparked considerable soul searching within the Bush administration. According to Secretary Baker, “All of us vowed never to let another such opportunity pass us by. If an opening ever presented itself again, the United States wouldn’t be caught unprepared.” President Bush “ordered intensive contingency planning to make sure the next chance to topple Noriega wasn’t wasted.” Within two weeks, several scenarios—most envisioning another coup by the PDF—had been vetted. In addition, the administration’s entire crisis-management process was revamped to permit more prompt and thorough coordination between agencies in times of crisis.

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193 The most important of these changes was the strengthening of the role of the Deputies’ Committee in moments of crisis. Baker (1995), p. 186.
**A Capability to Communicate with the Coup Leaders.** A third essential condition for effective air support is prompt communication and liaison with the coup leaders. American commanders will want to know the coup group’s concept of operations, the identification and location of coup forces and the forces that remain loyal to the government, and the nature and exact locale of the U.S. air intervention that is most needed. To minimize fratricide, communication would need to be particularly precise and timely in the event that U.S. aircraft were asked to provide close support to hard-pressed coup forces.\(^{194}\) Ideally, U.S. commanders would like to have U.S. liaison personnel on the ground with the coup leaders, but U.S. decision-makers would probably be reluctant to risk the political and diplomatic costs that could stem from the capture or death of U.S. personnel in a failed coup attempt.

Liaison and communication would be much easier were they to be preceded by coordination and joint planning between the coup leaders and U.S. commanders prior to the coup. However, this may not be feasible or desirable from the coup plotter’s standpoint. Interaction with U.S. personnel might prove difficult and might increase the risks of compromise. There is more than a little truth to the adage that “when the United States knows about a coup beforehand the target government is also likely to know about the coup.” Moreover, the coup forces may exploit a window of opportunity that could not be anticipated beforehand. The coup conducted in 1959 by Brigadier General Abdul Karim el Kassim against the Nuri Said government in Iraq became possible when Kassim’s troops were unexpectedly permitted to move through Baghdad without first having to unload their weapons, as the government had required in previous troop movements.

**Air Support to Rebellions**

**What Rebellions Must Accomplish.** Rebellions can cover a wide spectrum of dissident activity ranging from the spontaneous, sudden popular uprisings that sometimes engulf discredited regimes to the

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\(^{194}\) Inasmuch as the fighting during coups is likely to be centered in built-up areas, the U.S. air support would have to be conducted so as to minimize civilian casualties and collateral damage.
protracted insurrections often conducted by alienated ethnic, religious, or political groups. To seize power, rebellions must accumulate—through recruitment, defection, or outside assistance—sufficient military force to defeat the military and security forces defending the government.

To oust a regime protected by numerous heavily armed military units, insurgents must be able to progressively expand their forces and move to higher levels of warfare. As Vo Nguyen Giap, the former Democratic Republic of Vietnam minister of defense, put it in reviewing the Viet Minh’s successful war against the French: “The general law of a long revolutionary war is usually to go through three stages: defensive, equilibrium, and offensive.” To accomplish this transition, the “guerrilla war must multiply.” The “guiding principle of fighting” is to upgrade the guerrilla war “gradually to regular war, from guerrilla warfare to mobile warfare combined with partial entrenchment warfare.”

Even if it is unable to defeat a regime militarily, a rebellion may be able to generate sufficient pressure on a regime to cause it to make concessions favorable to the United States. Thus, there may be reasons for the United States to support a particular rebellion even if the prospects for an eventual battlefield victory by the rebels seem dim.

**Tasks U.S. Air Support Might Perform Effectively.** Moving a rebel force from guerrilla to mobile warfare usually requires extensive external arms, training, and logistic support. External air support could facilitate and accelerate this transition by helping to protect rebel forces in their early “defensive” phase of operations and then by providing potent firepower when the forces later move to the “equilibrium” and “offensive” phases of operations. The tasks U.S. air power could perform include the full panoply of air support provided U.S. ground forces:

- protecting rebel forces from attack by regime fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft and denying the regime aerial reconnaissance and surveillance

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• preventing the movement of regime forces either by ground or by air
• destroying regime tanks, armored personnel carriers, multiple rocket launchers, and artillery when in cantonment and when forward deployed
• destroying and degrading regime C³
• providing close air support to engaged rebel forces
• providing airlift and air resupply to rebel forces
• providing surveillance, reconnaissance, and other intelligence support to rebel units
• providing command-and-control support to rebel forces.

Prerequisites of Effective Air Support to Rebellions. As with air support to coups, there are a number of essential conditions that should obtain before U.S. air power is committed to the support of a rebellion.

The Rebellion Must Be Viable. Decisionmakers must believe that the dissident group has the inherent potential to gain power if given external air support. This judgment will rest in part on assessments of the opposition’s potential to (1) develop a broad base of support among the population, (2) attract large numbers of defectors and other recruits who are willing to fight for their cause, and (3) operate effectively on the urban and rural terrain where they must eventually engage government forces. Decisionmakers must also be persuaded that a rebel victory will produce an outcome consistent with U.S. interests. It will be recalled that a persistent barrier to the U.S. support of rebellion in Iraq has been U.S. concerns about the possibility of fragmenting the country and a desire to preserve a unified Iraq as a barrier to Iranian expansionism.

The United States Must Be Willing to Operate Overtly. If U.S. air support to rebel units involved attacks on regime forces, the United States would have to willing be to operate in an overt fashion. In the past, the United States has provided only limited covert air support to rebel forces, usually with unmarked, “commercial cover” or “false flag” aircraft piloted by personnel under CIA contract.
While partly designed to stimulate antigovernment opposition and prepare the battlefield for coups and rebellions, the overt U.S. air attacks against Libya (1986) and Iraq (1991–1999) had other announced objectives that could be readily justified to international and U.S. domestic audiences. The no-fly and no-drive zones that the United States maintains in Iraq provide a form of overt U.S. air support to the antiregime Shia marsh peoples in the south and the Kurds in the north. However, the avowed aim of these U.S. interventions is humanitarian and defensive, to protect these beleaguered populations from attack by Saddam’s air and armored forces. The provision of overt U.S. air support to opposition groups conducting offensive operations against a sovereign government would be a different matter and would likely generate criticism and condemnation of the United States in a number of foreign capitals and international forums.

Access to Proximate Bases Would Be Needed. The United States would need access to bases in neighboring countries to conduct protracted air support operations. Proximate bases may also be needed for equipping, training, and resupplying rebel forces. American forces would need to be able to protect these bases against enemy ground and air attack. If the air intervention were overt, the United States might find it difficult to secure and maintain permission for the use of foreign bases. One of the principal reasons for keeping U.S. interventions covert and “deniable” in the past has been to satisfy the political needs of the friendly countries that were “unable to stand up to publicly disclosed involvement” in programs designed to disrupt neighboring governments.

196While successful in preventing Iraqi air operations in the designated areas, the no-fly zones have not prevented Saddam from mounting devastating ground operations against his Shia and Kurdish opponents. The counterinsurgency operations that Saddam’s ground forces have conducted against the Shia marsh peoples have been systematic and draconian. Many of the marshes in which the Shias have lived and gained a livelihood have been drained of water, and tens of thousands of Shias have been killed since 1991. In late 1998, Clinton administration officials suggested that U.S. air power would now be used to counter any renewal of Iraqi ground attacks against Kurdish positions in the north.

197As George Shultz points out, a covert involvement allows foreign political figures to privately support or acquiesce in a U.S. intervention while publicly attacking U.S. policy. See Shultz (1993), pp. 289, 1118–1119. Henry Kissinger argues that any announcement of a formal U.S. intervention in the Angolan civil war would have generated opposition from all African states, including those privately seeking U.S.
Sufficient Political Backing for a Protracted Combat Involvement Must Be Obtained. Even with U.S. air support, it may take an opposition group years to build up sufficient military strength to mount a successful overthrow. As a consequence, U.S. decisionmakers must be confident that they will be able to maintain sufficient backing from the U.S. public for a protracted involvement. Leaders of the countries providing the United States with bases must also have sufficient popular backing to maintain their support over a prolonged period.

The United States Must Be Willing to Escalate, If Need Be. The United States would need to be prepared to escalate its involvement should rebel forces become overextended and come under severe attack. Rebellions take on a dynamic of their own and are not easily controlled by outside powers. It is well to recall that the principal reason the Shah of Iran cut off covert support to the Iraqi Kurds in March 1975 was that the rebellion had provoked an Iraqi counteroffensive of such magnitude that the Kurds could no longer fend for themselves. The Iranians calculated that a continuation of the struggle would require the overt intervention of two Iranian army divisions, an annual budget of $300 million, and security guarantees from the United States to deter possible Soviet military action against Iran to aid the USSR’s Iraqi ally.198

Achieving These Prerequisites Will Be Difficult. Satisfying the above prerequisites for the commitment of U.S. air power is likely to prove difficult. It is unclear, for example, that the Iraqi opposition will be able to develop sufficient unity, popular appeal, operations security, and military potential to pose a viable threat to Saddam’s rule. Former CENTCOM commander General Anthony Zinni, for example, harbored serious doubts about the viability of the badly splintered Iraqi opposition, stating in January 1999 that he did not see an opposition group that had viability “at this point” to overthrow Saddam. He further warned against a situation in which rival opposition groups might eventually oust Saddam but at the price of creating a “disintegrated, fragmented Iraq.” The Clinton administration obviously shared General Zinni’s reservations because it refused to

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198 See Kissinger (1999), pp. 591–596.
provide lethal assistance to any of the Iraqi opposition groups that it agreed to support.199

It is also not clear that the countries the United States would have to rely on for proximate bases would provide such access in the event that the Iraqi opposition matured to the point where it merited and required U.S. air support. Turkey would be reluctant to see the military strength and reach of the Kurdish opposition in Iraq greatly increased.200 Saudi Arabian leaders—while happy to see someone other than Saddam rule Iraq—might prove even more reluctant to see their territory used for offensive air operations aimed at supporting rebel elements fighting to gain power in Iraq.201 While privately

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199In October 1998, Congress passed the Iraqi Liberation Act, which authorized some $97 million in U.S. aid to the Iraqi opposition in the form of military equipment, training, and education. Thus far, the U.S.-backed training provided to the opposition umbrella group INC has largely been limited to nonlethal activities, such as public relations, emergency medical care, and war-crime investigations. However, in March 2001, a small number of INC officers received security training for the purpose of preparing them to “protect any nonlethal presence or activities in Iraq.” In September 2000, the United States signed a memorandum with the INC concerning the opposition’s active involvement in the collection and dissemination of information on the situation in Iraq. As of March 2001, the George W. Bush administration was also studying (at the request of Congress) the possibility of allowing INC to distribute humanitarian goods inside Iraq. There was also speculation that funding would be provided for the INC to open an office inside northern Iraq. See Eli J. Lake, “US to Give Iraq Rebels Weapons, Security Training,” United Press International, February 13, 2001; Richard Boucher, U.S. Department of State Daily Briefing, March 5, 2001; “US Holding Talks on Financial Aid to Iraqi Opposition,” Agence France-Presse, March 6, 2001; Philip Shenon, “U.S. General Warns of Dangers in Trying to Topple Iraq,” New York Times, January 29, 1999, p. A3; Barton Gellman, “U.S. to Start Flow of Aid to Iraqi Opposition: Exile Groups Will Get No Weapons,” Washington Post, May 25, 1999, p. 10; Mark Matthews and Tom Bowman, “Toppling Hussein Poses No Easy Task,” Baltimore Sun, January 13, 1999; and Steven Lee Myers, “U.S. to Aid Iraqi Opposition to Develop a Military Cadre,” New York Times, October 28, 1999, p. A12.

200In times past, Turkey has manifested some unease about the American role in creating and sustaining a Kurdish haven in northern Iraq. The Turks say the haven has been used as a sanctuary by Kurdish guerrillas, who operate in Turkey, and provides an “unwelcome model for Turkish Kurds, who would like a self-governing enclave of their own.” See Stephen Kinzer, “Turkey Reassures U.S. on Air Base,” New York Times, February 13, 1999, p. A5.

201The Saudis have made a point of refusing to allow American warplanes based on their territory to take part in what they regard as “punitive raids” against Iraq that go beyond the purposes of the no-fly zones. They object to “any nation taking matters into its own hands, and using bombing as an instrument of diplomacy.” They further assert that their restrictive policy will change only if the UN Security Council authorizes the use of force against Iraq for other purposes. See Douglas Jehl, “Saudis Admit Restricting U.S. Warplanes in Iraq,” New York Times, March 22, 1999, p. A6.
agreeing for the most part with the goal of “regime change” in Iraq, such Arab countries as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan “want to see the overthrow come from within Iraq rather than from outside.”

In sum, a considerable change in regional attitudes and opposition capabilities would likely be required before U.S. air support to an Iraqi rebellion could become a realistic option for U.S. decision-makers.

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