As we observed a number of times during visits to units, it is not just planning and executing the deployments that put stress on the units and their personnel. Other training and operational activities consume time and attention. Permanent change of station (PCS) moves and other movements of personnel also affect a unit’s ability to execute a deployment and exacerbate the difficulties caused by the deployments themselves. In peacetime, a unit does not just pick up as a unit and deploy to a “small-scale contingency” (SSC) as it would to a combat operation in wartime. The adjustments that must be made both for operational and for personnel reasons cause additional turbulence and workload for the unit’s leadership and personnel. They also cause turbulence in other Army units and elsewhere in the personnel system.

These problems were highlighted by a recent RAND Arroyo Center analysis of unit rotations to the Bosnia operation. In this chapter we briefly review that analysis, describing the amount of turbulence generated by the Bosnia deployment and the factors that drove it. The results illustrate why even small deployments can generate extensive turbulence and management difficulties.1

Upon first examination, Bosnia seemed a modest-sized deployment. Its primary activity, Task Force Eagle, involved only about 7,000 soldiers at its peak in 1998–1999. However, it was a continuing deployment—a series of rotations—that imposed consecutive demands on

---

1For a more complete discussion of the research and related results, see Polich, Orvis, and Hix (2000).
a series of units. During 1998 through 2000, those rotations were supported primarily by units stationed at Fort Hood, Fort Drum, Fort Riley, and Fort Carson, and by a National Guard division headquarters. Both operational conditions and personnel constraints made these deployments more demanding than one might expect a priori. Part of the problem was that mounting such an operation is a dynamic process—not just 7,000 soldiers but also unit preparation, recovery, personnel exchanges, and so forth. And that process is superimposed as a unit rotation on an individual replacement system. As we will see, the two systems operate on a different logic—each with its own imperatives—and they inherently cannot mesh smoothly.

OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS

Operational constraints for peacetime deployments impose workload and uncertainties that would not exist in a wartime environment. For a major theater war or large contingency operation like that conducted in the Persian Gulf, the units would deploy as they are organized and as they train in peacetime. For SSCs, like those in Bosnia and Kosovo, the units are more likely to be reorganized (often described as tailoring) in order to more closely align the deploying organization to the particular demands of the SSC. The resulting “task force” may not closely resemble any particular unit that existed at the home station.

This tailoring for a SSC like Bosnia includes both additions and deletions from what a unit may possess in peacetime and from what the unit might have planned to take to a major conflict. For example, a unit going to Bosnia may not need its full complement of heavy armor and artillery; thus, those pieces of equipment and their personnel would remain behind when the rest of the unit deploys. On the other hand, the unit may need additional military police, military intelligence, civil affairs, and public affairs capability. These ele-

2Stabilization Force (SFOR 4–7) rotations commenced at the following dates, supported by the units indicated: September 1998, Fort Hood, 1st Cavalry Division; March 1999, Fort Hood, 1st Cavalry Division; August 1999, Forts Drum and Riley, 10th Mountain Division; March 2000, Texas Army National Guard, 49th Division HQ, and Fort Carson brigade.
ments would be drawn from other units and realigned to deploy with
the resulting task force to the SSC location. In addition, tailoring
may be necessary to stay within strength caps imposed for political
or other reasons. U.S. forces deploying to Bosnia, for example, were
given strength ceilings that could not be exceeded even though the
units were expected to deploy at a C-1 readiness status, indicating
full operational capability.

As a result of these constraints, the task force commander and his
staff must prioritize and decide which personnel may be the least
needed for the specific mission the task force is to accomplish.
These factors place added responsibilities on the planning staff to
ensure that the most effective organization is created, trained, and
deployed. These tailoring actions themselves may also impose addi-
tional training requirements.

In addition, tailoring creates uncertainty for soldiers about who will
deploy. For example, a particular division may be named months in
advance to support a particular rotation to Bosnia. However, the
CINC’s staff, Army Forces Command, and the supporting unit must
negotiate which types of units are required for that rotation and
which specific subelements will participate. Therefore, although a
soldier may know that his division is scheduled to support an up-
coming deployment, he may not know whether he personally will
participate until fairly late in the planning process. Conversely, a
soldier in a nondeploying unit may believe he is exempt but later
learn that his unit (or he as an individual) will be added as part of the
tailoring process.

Training requirements arise both to prepare for the specific require-
ments of the SSC and to help create the unit cohesiveness and confi-
dence that may be lacking as a result of the tailoring or cross-attach-
ing of disparate organizations. First, the unit may need to train on
missions and tasks beyond those normally associated with its
wartime mission. Units deploying to Bosnia, for example, went
through both a train-up at home station and a rotation to the Joint
Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana to prepare for the
unique requirements and rules of engagement in Bosnia.

______________

3For particular illustrations of this, see McNaugher, Johnson, and Sollinger (2000).
PEACETIME PERSONNEL CONSTRAINTS

While operational and training considerations impose additional workload and stress on the units, it is the personnel effects that are often cited as the greatest concern. The personnel effects result primarily from peacetime policies and rules that constrain the options open to the units deploying to a SSC. In wartime, those constraints would be lifted as part of the emergency provisions that typically accompany the outbreak of hostilities. But in peacetime the constraints remain, for very good reasons that stem from the need to continue managing the force, sustaining recruiting and retention, and maintaining overall force readiness to fight a major conflict.

Peacetime personnel policies for deployments affect who is eligible to deploy, how long they may be deployed, and eligibility for reassignments after the soldiers return from the deployment. Nondeployability (i.e., the status of soldiers who, for personnel policy reasons, are ineligible for deployment) creates a broad spectrum of effects on deploying and nondeploying units. It was one of the unexpected problems that came up when units began preparing for deployment to Bosnia from locations in the United States.

Nondeployability

The most important observation from the Arroyo Center’s analysis of the Bosnia deployment—and the driving factor of numerous secondary effects—is the high rate of peacetime nondeployability among soldiers in units.

Table 4.1 shows rates of personnel nondeployability for Bosnia, forecast during July 1998–October 1998 to pertain to three units at the time they would deploy (September 1998 for the rotation supported by the first brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division, and August 1999 for the rotation supported by the 10th Mountain Division and Fort Riley).

The first row of the table indicates that the percentage of personnel who cannot deploy in wartime hovers around 4 percent, as is typically reported in the Unit Status Report. But as the table also shows, two other factors drive up peacetime nondeployability rates. First, the rules governing these rotations provided that a soldier could not
Table 4.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for Nondeployability</th>
<th>1 Cav</th>
<th>10 Mtn</th>
<th>Fort Riley</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USR nondeployable (wartime)</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCS or ETS (in 90+45 days)</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stabilized (returning from unaccompanied tour)</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>35.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>39.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>40.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

deploy to Bosnia if he was scheduled for a PCS move or expiration of term of service (ETS) within 135 days—allowing a minimum of 90 days in theater followed by 45 days to return to home station, pack up, arrange for household moves, out-process, take leave, and so forth.4

Second, some soldiers are stabilized in their current assignment—protected against deployment—because they have recently returned from other overseas duty (dominated in this table by Korea rotations).

These three factors, taken together, drive the total nondeployability rate up to 35 to 40 percent. It is also noteworthy that this rate is uniform across installations. Arroyo Center researchers found this same general pattern across all posts; it was not unique to any one area or element of the force.

**Turbulence**

One of the first-order effects of nondeployability is extensive turbulence. Because of the nondeployable personnel in the deploying units, the Army had to move other personnel to bring the unit to its

---

4PCS moves rotate military personnel between United States or overseas locations. ETS reflects an essential feature of limited contracts for military service; at ETS, an enlisted soldier may leave the Army.
required deployable strength. Figure 4.1 from the recent study shows the potential impact of these personnel movements.

This indicates the situation that the 1st Cavalry Division faced when the division staff began planning for their first brigade rotation to Bosnia. (In the end, the deployment was not actually executed in this way; the staff had to draw upon many more sources than just within their division. However, this illustration shows the magnitude of the challenge and why the effects are never limited to one division.)

Illustrating the situation for 19K soldiers (armor crew members), Figure 4.1 reveals that in the two deploying armor battalions (shown as “deployed units”) there were authorizations for 528 19Ks. Another 884 19Ks existed in other units within the division, which were not scheduled to go to Bosnia. However, of the 528 soldiers originally in the unit’s authorized strength, an estimated 40 percent would be nondeployable. That meant that only 317 soldiers from the original unit could actually deploy (if it had been fully manned at the outset). The remaining 211 nondeployable soldiers would have to move to a stay-behind unit, and 211 other soldiers from those units would have to move into the deploying units to fill them to 100 percent with deployable personnel.

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deployed units</th>
<th>Authorized 19K soldiers</th>
<th>Before transfers</th>
<th>After transfers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Deployable</td>
<td>Non-deployable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>517</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stay-behind units</td>
<td></td>
<td>530</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC</td>
<td></td>
<td>319</td>
<td>565</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

Figure 4.1—Turbulence Caused by Replacing Soldiers Before Deployment
The result of this process would be that 64 percent of the soldiers in the stay-behind units would be nondeployable for Bosnia. Obviously that would complicate supporting a successive deployment immediately following the first brigade’s rotation (which, in fact, is what the 1st Cavalry Division had to do). Naturally, to avoid this situation the deploying units were filled from sources beyond the 1st Cavalry Division: other units at Fort Hood, and “passbacks” that were filled from other installations. That created ripple effects well beyond Fort Hood.

The above analysis led to several key conclusions, which are likely to apply not only to the Bosnia rotations but to other peacetime SSCs:

- First, small deployments—Bosnia involved only 7,000 people in theater—have larger ripple effects across the entire force.
- Second, they create extensive turbulence, which in turn has the potential to undermine Army readiness and adversely affect the quality of life for soldiers and their families.
- Third, these effects are widespread across the Army. They are not limited to a few specific subelements. For example, these problems could not be easily solved by buying more support structure at the expense of combat structure, or vice versa.
- Fourth, the end result is to increase pressure on Army end-strength and structure. The dynamics of this system clearly use more people than a static viewpoint would suggest.

These effects, arising from the dynamic nature of the personnel system interacting with unit deployments, may account for much of the difficulty that the Army and the other military services have experienced with SSCs. Unfortunately, given the nature of the problem, there is no single evident solution. Although a number of ameliorative measures might be considered—such as reducing turnover in the Army personnel inventory, changing from unit rotations to individual rotations, drawing more upon personnel in the Reserve Components, or increasing active Army end-strength—all such solutions involve tradeoffs against goals that are widely held to be important, by both the Army and DoD.

For example, moving to a system of individual replacements in the Balkans would avoid concentrating deployment turbulence in a sin-
gle unit by drawing personnel from all units to support the SSC. However, this would be achieved at the expense of creating a significant amount of turbulence in all units.\textsuperscript{5} Similarly, relying more on the Reserve Components would relieve some of the pressure on the active Army. In fact, the Army has already done so by using a wide range of reserve support elements and some reserve combat elements for certain Balkan rotations. However, those reserve units have their own missions to perform, and reservists are also affected by “time away from home,” which in their case often means time away from their civilian jobs as well as families.

This situation suggests the essential problem facing the Army and the other military services. The existing force structure, by and large, is already committed to certain functions and locations. To undertake new functions—such as the deployments to Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, and Somalia—the Army must divert some personnel who are already committed. But, as illustrated above, it is not simple to deduce which personnel will be diverted or which units will be affected, let alone to quantify the effects on unit readiness. What is certain is that the effects range well beyond the particular units that are selected to deploy.

\textsuperscript{5}See Polich, Orvis, and Hix (2000).