Because the Helsinki decisions gave much greater substance and reality to the prospect that a European Security and Defense Policy—and rapid reaction force—could actually come into being, attention began to focus on the precise qualities of the relationship to be forged between NATO and EU/ESDP. Three reasons have already been cited: The risks (however slight) that (1) some sort of competitor for (or even just distraction from) the NATO integrated military command structure could be developing; (2) so much effort would be put into creating ESDP structures that the necessary political will and resources would not be put into building up European defense capabilities, well and truly interoperable within NATO; and (3) the qualifier “unnecessary” of the word “duplication” might be lost sight of as the Europeans sought to create structures that would focus on capacities that would not in fact add to the sum of allied military strength.

Five other factors affecting relations between NATO and EU/ESDP—and thus of concern to the United States about the latter’s evolution—either came into play after Helsinki or were intensified by decisions made there. These factors involved (1) military and economic cultures, (2) arm’s-length NATO-EU relations, (3) a European caucus in NATO, (4) defense production and trade, and (5) crisis management.
MILITARY AND ECONOMIC CULTURES

One such factor was the progressive diminution of a role for the Western European Union (although it will continue formally to exist for residual Brussels Treaty purposes). For years if not decades, the WEU had served as a form of “buffer” between NATO and the European communities/European Union. Issues arising in the latter body that related to defense questions would, in the main, be shifted over to the sister European organization, if not just dealt with at NATO. At the same time, the WEU was able to bring to bear for NATO some of the perspective of the EU on particular issues—a service that was especially important because of the nature of the career foreign services in Western Europe and the bureaucratic culture of the EU itself. For virtually all these foreign services, to a degree exceeding that in the United States, officers have classically developed a career pattern that is either political-economic (and thus, in the realm of European integration, producing assignments and perspectives dealing with EU issues and EU institutions) or that is political-military (with a corresponding emphasis on such issues and, institutionally, on the WEU and NATO). Buffer relationships will progressively disappear. Political-military diplomats and other officials will need to be accommodated within EU institutions (and learn to compete within its bureaucracy and with its nonmilitary issues, including competition for resources). In addition, NATO is finding itself creating a relationship with a bureaucracy that, at least at first, seems strange—as opposed to dealing with the WEU.

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2 During the author’s service of four and a half years as U.S. ambassador to NATO, only one of his European counterparts had ever served as an ambassador to the European Union, and few had ever served there in any capacity; but most of them from countries belonging to the WEU were “double hatted” to it. A similar pattern applied to more-junior officers, although it has been changing in recent years, with some more “cross-cultural” experiences between economic and military issues.
ARM’S-LENGTH NATO-EU RELATIONS

Another new factor was the added sense of complexity introduced into NATO’s dealing with the new EU bodies that were being created. At the best of times, these two institutions have kept one another at arm’s length, for a variety of reasons. Significantly, some European states (notably France) have not wanted to risk that NATO (meaning the United States) would unduly influence EU policy and decisions, while others (notably Britain) have at times worried that institutionalizing direct NATO-EU relations would risk giving too much of a role to the supranational European Commission at the expense of the member-state European Council. Thus, NATO and the EU have done surprisingly little to coordinate their respective policies in many critical areas: On the post–cold war agenda they share, these have included engagement in Central Europe, their respective processes for admitting new members, relations with Russia, and involvement in the Balkans—although post-war efforts in both Bosnia and Kosovo have led to progressively better EU-NATO relations in the region, as a matter of necessity. After Helsinki, however, it has become essential that the two institutions cooperate and coordinate with one another, at least on a key range of issues. One result of this pressure—and of this opportunity—has been the joint Solana-Robertson diplomacy on Macedonia in 2001.

This NATO-EU cooperation has acquired particular importance with regard to military planning. Following Berlin in 1996, NATO offered to assume responsibility for conducting the operational planning of WEU military activities, and it did so by working with different national scenarios provided by the WEU, based on the Petersberg Tasks. But since some European countries, notably France, began to press for the EU’s ESDP to have an “autonomous” capability, the

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3While U.S. ambassador, the author, as part of his efforts at NATO to break down some of these barriers and old habits, used to refer to NATO and the EU as “two institutions in the same city living on different planets.”

4Following the creation of the NATO-led Implementation Force in Bosnia, the author arranged for the first briefings to take place at the North Atlantic Council by Carl Bildt, the high representative (in effect the EU representative) of the Peace Implementation Conference. Not all the Europeans welcomed this interaction.

5See footnote 10 of Chapter Three and Chapter Six under the heading “Discriminating,” with regard to the NATO role in WEU planning after Berlin 1996.
creation of a separate planning capacity was placed high on the list of priorities. For NATO—and particularly for the United States—this seemed to pose a risk of confusion, especially with the perceived need to create as “seamless” a connection as possible between what military operations the EU might undertake under ESDP—all the more so following the creation of the rapid reaction force—and the potential engagement of NATO if military threat or action escalated to the point where it would have to become engaged. By the same token, NATO would need to know what the EU, through ESDP, was contemplating in terms of operations, in order to assess what military assets might not be available to NATO, even though nominally subject to recall—given that the Europeans’ national “NATO” forces and “rapid reaction forces” are, for the most part, one and the same.

This NATO need for foreknowledge could exist even in some circumstances “where NATO as a whole were not engaged,” but at a time when it could face a challenge elsewhere that would affect military deployments or even operations. This issue of coherence in planning by the two institutions has continued to pose questions; at the very least, it has led NATO to insist on a high degree of transparency in what the EU, through ESDP, is doing or contemplating doing.

EUROPEAN CAUCUS IN NATO

The development of ESDP institutions also raised profound issues about how the EU would make its decisions. Some of these issues have been introduced above, especially the manner in which non-EU NATO members would be able to take part in ESDP military operations—if any were, indeed, ever undertaken; and, as noted earlier, the European Union has been clear about reserving to itself a monopoly of actual decisions about such operations, however much others might be able to take part in the stages, either before these decisions (planning) or afterward (implementation). At the same time, however, the evolution of ESDP and its companion, CFSP, begins to raise in practice an issue that heretofore had only existed in theory—how EU member states would make decisions and then act upon them, within international institutions to which they belong. Most germane to EU/ESDP–NATO relations: Would EU member states seek to act, in effect, as a single unit within NATO bodies, and particularly its premier policymaking organ, the North Atlantic Council?
There is no simple answer. To begin with, as early as the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the EU had agreed that, following decisions reached by the European Council in the context of CFSP, EU representatives in "international organizations shall cooperate in ensuring that the common positions and common measures adopted by the Council are complied with and implemented." This provision was modified somewhat by the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), but it still retained its force: "Member States shall coordinate their action in international organisations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such fora."

Yet this “theoretical” provision, if implemented, could have major practical effects for the conduct of NATO affairs and especially deliberations within the North Atlantic Council. The council always operates on the principle of consensus and never takes a vote, formal or informal. As a matter of practice, this devotion to consensus is based on twin understandings that no allied country is prepared to cede to others the right to determine circumstances in which its military forces are put at risk and that, when a consensus is indeed reached, NATO honors its commitments—a core quality of the alliance. Classically, the process of reaching consensus has been a matter of give and take among member states, to a remarkable degree actually taking place within the council chamber, as opposed to nations’ either bargaining out positions bilaterally between national capitals or simply bringing settled national positions to the council table. Even allies with a greater degree of influence—the United States, first, as well as some of the larger European states—often find themselves influenced decisively by arguments made and ideas advanced by other allies; and what emerges from council discussion are workable compromises that at times actually reflect the preferences of no single ally and not all of what any ally wanted to begin with. Each NATO ambassador—sometimes all of them, including the U.S. ambassador—then undertakes to convince his home government that the

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7See *Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union*, op. cit., Title V, Article 19, 1.

8From some discussions that took place in late 2000, U.S. diplomats believed they detected efforts at NATO, led by France, to enforce discipline among EU countries. Comments made to the author, December 2000.
(provisionally) agreed course is the best overall, especially because it can gain the precious strength conferred by consensus. Nor has this proved to be a “least common denominator” process, partly because of leadership, especially by the United States, but partly because of the regularity of this method of discussion and agreement, followed for more than half a century, and the seriousness of the stakes for the alliance and its credibility.

To be sure, different groups of allies will talk beforehand about their positions, and on particular issues there can be considerable agreement of views. But to develop what is termed a “European caucus” within NATO would radically change the way in which the North Atlantic Council works. If there were simply an informal comparing of notes and sharing of preferences among the EU states belonging to NATO, that would be one thing; but if the Maastricht/Amsterdam strictures were followed faithfully, then the council could be confronted with a bloc of representatives, each saying more-or-less the same thing, and all unable to vary their national positions without constant consultations—and very likely formal convocation—at the EU in another part of Brussels. Furthermore, in the absence of an acknowledged leader—as the United States is at NATO; in the presence of some EU countries that are not also members of NATO; and with the EU’s penchant for “log-rolling” rather than for decisive action, at least not rapid decisive action—such EU-only deliberations are likely to prove least-common-

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9Indeed, the North Atlantic Council has what it calls a “silence procedure,” under which a “decision sheet” is agreed upon by the ambassadors, subject to confirmation by all allied governments. A period of “silence” is decreed—perhaps 24–48 hours; if, at the end of that period, no government has “broken silence” (in French, rompre la silence), then the provisional decision goes into effect. This method is followed to put pressure on one or more not-quite-convinced governments to go along with the rest of the allies. Even the United States at times finds itself under pressure not to be the nation “breaking silence.”

10 These informal discussions among groups of allies take place in different forums, both at NATO and elsewhere, including bilaterally, with common approaches worked out beforehand. Most notably, these have historically engaged the four largest powers in the alliance: the United States, the U.K., France, and Germany.

11 The “back-door” involvement of non-NATO EU members in the NATO decision process, even indirectly, would be at variance with an unspoken NATO principle that the countries making the decisions should be those that would have to incur (share) any ensuing risks.
denominator.12 For the United States, in particular—although also for other non-EU NATO members—this challenge to the North Atlantic Council’s capacity to function effectively would be too high a price to pay for honoring a particular aspect in the development of an ESDP that may not in fact undertake serious security responsibilities, at least in areas and in circumstances where NATO might consider becoming engaged. Indeed, this issue is one of the few in the NATO-ESDP debate both on which the United States has taken a strong position and to which the Europeans should pay careful heed.

DEFENSE PRODUCTION AND TRADE

As ESDP became more serious, five principal issues came to the fore in regard to European defense industries. First, it had been clear since the early post–cold war period that allied defense budgets would fall—as indeed they have done—and thus there would be less work for existing European defense industries. Among other things, economic reality began to press for consolidation of companies and of whole sectors of the European defense industry, including across national boundaries, with the sharing of critical activities like research and development and with other economies of scale. As so often happens, politicians were slower to respond than industry, but by the late 1990s, consolidation fever from the United States had finally spread to Europe. This was a contagion, incidentally, that U.S. defense companies had themselves urged the Europeans to “catch,” so that there would be both viable European partners (where this was both possible and sensible in business terms) and the likelihood of a continuing European military market.13

Second, as ESDP began to enter the realm of potentially (1) enabling the EU to take military action, through commitment to create a rapid reaction force, and (2) considering capabilities needed to make this or any other capacity a reality, the Europeans began to place added

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12It is most doubtful that, if the EU had had a “European caucus” at NATO in 1995, the alliance would have decided to use airpower in defense of Bosnian safe areas. The case is less clear-cut in regard to NATO’s Kosovo operations in 1999, but the point is still instructive.

13See, for instance, Vance D. Coffman, Chairman and CEO, Lockheed Martin Corporation, Bridges Are Better Than Walls, the Lockheed Martin Paris Air Show Press Dinner, Ritz Hotel, Paris, June 17, 2001.
emphasize on the means of producing defense goods and especially the potential for cooperation among the ESDP countries and companies. This emphasis has extended to the point that some ESDP countries have put pressure on non-EU countries to “buy European,” as opposed to U.S. defense products.\(^\text{14}\)

Third, pressures from the United States both to keep European defense spending from falling and to embark on the ambitious Defense Capabilities Initiative necessarily increased interest in Europe about the role of indigenous defense industries. In short, if the allies were to be expected to increase their contribution to the common military effort, then European companies, along with European workers and the technological base, should share in the benefits. In addition, if the United States were concerned about an increase in the European part of burden sharing, then there should be an increase in the Europeans’ capacity to produce defense goods, especially at the high end of technology, which is most critical to sustain interoperability, rather than having to secure these goods from the United States.

Fourth, European leaders were alert to the industrial aspects of European integration as it played out within the military realm. Indeed, this theme was routinely included in presentations about the future of ESDP. Thus at the Cologne EU summit, the leaders

> recognize[d] the need to undertake sustained efforts to strengthen the industrial and technological defence base, which we want to be competitive and dynamic. . . . [They were] determined to foster the restructuring of the European defence industries . . . [and would] . . . work towards closer and more efficient defence industry collaboration. We will seek further progress in the harmonisation of military requirements and the planning and procurement of arms.\(^\text{15}\)

Indeed, “enhanced cooperation in the field of armaments with the aim of creating a European armament agency” had been a goal as

\(^\text{14}\)Poland, for example, has been pressed by some EU states to buy European as opposed to U.S. defense goods. The argument made is that “the U.S. got you into NATO, but only we can get you into the EU.” Comments made to the author by Polish officials, February 2001. Pressures on Norway were discussed above.

early as the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. Similar statements have been made at subsequent European Council summits; and the Nice summit (December 2000) identified a number of vital projects which would contribute to bolstering the capabilities at the Union’s disposal: The Future Large Aircraft (Airbus A400M), maritime transport vessels, Troop Transport Helicopters (MH 90).

Not surprisingly, these projects focused on force mobility, as foreshadowed by the move to create the European rapid reaction force. Whether these projects reflect “unnecessary duplication” from the U.S. point of view has been discussed earlier. But the bottom-line issue could be whether the Europeans would otherwise be spending such moneys on defense at all.

It was also during this period that major steps were taken regarding the consolidation of European defense industries: notable were the acquisition by British Aerospace (BAe) of the defense electronics division of GEC-Marconi (announced January 1999) and, in part as a response to that unexpected step, the creation of the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company—a merger of Aerospatiale Matra S.A. (France), Construcciones Aeronáuticas S.A. (Spain), and DaimlerChrysler Aerospace AG (Germany), which became a publicly traded company in July 2000. These and other steps followed the conclusion of a letter of intent signed by the defense ministers of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Sweden in July 1998 to promote formal arrangements among defense companies across national boundaries, “to facilitate the restructuring of the European

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17Thus at Helsinki, the Presidency Conclusions noted that Member States welcome the recent progress made towards the restructuring of European defense industries, which constitutes an important step forward. This contributes to strengthening the European industrial and technological defence base. Such developments call for increased efforts to seek further progress in the harmonisation of military requirements and the planning and procurement of arms, as Member States consider appropriate (Helsinki European Council, December 10–11, 1999, op. cit.).
defence industry.” Furthermore, as early as November 1996, France, Germany, the U.K., and Italy had “started a global process to manage their armament programmes jointly.” This led to creation of the Joint Armaments Cooperation Organisation (OCCAR), which formally gained legal status in September 1998.

At the time, UK Defence Minister George Robertson said:

An increasing proportion of the United Kingdom’s equipment requirements are likely to be met by collaborative projects in future, and OCCAR was created with the specific aim of improving the way these projects are managed.

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19 See Letter of Intent Between 6 Defence Ministers on Measures to Facilitate the Restructuring of the European Defence Industry, London, July 6, 1998 (http://projects.sipri.se/expcon/loi/lointent.htm). Another significant combination was the acquisition by Thomson-CSF of the UK firm Racale in January 2000; the company is now known as Thales.

20 Organisme Conjoint de Coopération en matière d’Armement (OCCAR) has four principles:

- Creation of transnational integrated program teams, and the use of modern, high-performance methods to manage the programs;
- Consolidation and development of the European industrial and technological defense base;
- Application of a global “juste retour” principle over several programs and several years;
- Preference, in procurement decisions, for materials developed with the participation of countries belonging to OCCAR, their participation being within the context of the organization (The French Armaments Policy: Institutional Framework for Cooperation: OCCAR, www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/dossier/d26e/fiche2.html).

Also speech by Alain Richard, May 17, 2001, op. cit. Richard argued that, by 2001, OCCAR was “now gaining more influence,” noting that it “has already integrated its first program and gained a legal status last January. This is a precious tool for the development of a coherent armament policy on a European basis.” He foresaw other countries joining. Ibid. In addition, the Europeans have had the Western European Armaments Group. See, for instance, WEU Ministerial Council, Marseille Declaration, November 13, 2000.

21 Defence Systems Daily: Farnborough 98 News, “European Defence Ministers Sign OCCAR Treaty,” September 10, 1998. However, later that year, a House of Commons Select Committee of Defence, in approving the OCCAR Convention, noted that

There remains . . . a disappointing lack of agreement amongst the governments of its member states about OCCAR’s place in European defence in the
As French Minister of Defense Alain Richard put the point in May 2001:

The complexity of technology and the high level of fixed costs is [sic] a strong incentive for us [Europeans] to join our forces and share the effort. The only way for our companies and research agencies to achieve the highest standards, is to combine our assets and capabilities.\(^\text{22}\)

But what effects will these steps toward consolidation—and potentially cost savings—of European defense companies have on European capabilities and relations with counterparts across the Atlantic? Neither part of the question can yet be answered with any certainty. In theory, consolidation and rationalization should provide the Europeans with “greater bang for the Euro,” but whether this will also lead to effective pressure to reduce defense ties across the Atlantic is more problematic—a side effect of the development of ESDP. This reduction is not foreordained; indeed, there has been a thickening of company-to-company relationships across the Atlantic, including some European purchases of U.S. firms and even acceptance by the U.S. Defense Department of European participation in some major U.S. defense projects—notably the Joint Strike Fighter, highlighted by the significant role for BAe in Lockheed Martin’s successful bid.\(^\text{23}\)

Fifth, defense industry relationships across the Atlantic are deeply affected by one development that would have existed even if there were no ESDP, but that is more important because of the ESDP’s creation: the sharing of U.S. military high technology with European partners. Given that most (though certainly not all) such advances

longer term, and about OCCAR’s relationship with the North Atlantic Alliance. Unless that vision begins to emerge soon, there is a risk that OCCAR, like so many of its predecessors have done, will begin to lose its way (House of Commons Select Committee of Defence Approves OCCAR Convention, UK House of Commons, December 6, 1998, www.parliament.uk/commons/selcom90/defpnt2.htm).

\(^\text{22}\)He saw this as “especially true for the UK and France, which concentrate together more than two thirds of the overall defense R&D in the whole of Europe” (speech by Alain Richard, May 17, 2001, op. cit.).

\(^\text{23}\)BAe has become the fifth-largest supplier of defense goods to the Pentagon, chiefly through U.S.-owned subsidiaries.
take place in the United States, clearly the effort to preserve the capacity for interoperability among allied forces requires broad access to the same or similar technologies—although, in some areas, what is called “open architecture” can permit a European military to make use of American capabilities without having access to the so-called black box of the most sensitive technology. But this is an imperfect solution, one that is not politically acceptable over the long term for many if not most European governments, and also one that is likely to stimulate an increase in European efforts to have the potential for developing military capacities independent of the United States.

Furthermore, if the United States presses European allies to join in coalition operations beyond Europe—either as formal NATO operations or as “coalitions of the able and willing”—then issues of interoperability gain in importance. If the United States wants allied cooperation in such operations, it will have to be more responsive with the sharing of defense high technology. Given that the political culture in the United States since the end of the cold war has been to focus on coalition operations, as a matter of risk sharing, U.S. domestic politics, and maximizing international support, this is a highly significant point.

The United States has been slow to respond to European concerns about the sharing of U.S. high technology in the defense field, although it has taken some steps. In February 2000, U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen and UK Secretary of State for Defence Geoff Hoon signed a declaration of principles that provided special, reciprocal treatment for one another’s defense companies (including in the area of classified information), such that “UK defence companies doing business in the US should be treated no less favorably than US

24Such operations are certainly implied by NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative. See Defence Capabilities Initiative, April 25, 1999, op. cit.:

The objective of this initiative is to improve defence capabilities to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full spectrum of Alliance missions, in the present and foreseeable security environments [paragraph 1]. Potential threats to Alliance security are more likely to result from regional conflicts, ethnic strife or other crises beyond Alliance territory [paragraph 2]. Operations outside Alliance territory may need to be undertaken with no, or only limited, access to existing NATO infrastructure [paragraph 3].
defence companies doing business in the UK.”

Several other European nations objected to the “exclusive” nature of this arrangement; but it was designed to have broader involvement of other allies. In May 2000, U.S. Secretary of State Albright launched a Defense Trade Security Initiative at the Florence foreign ministers’ meeting of the North Atlantic Council. This initiative consisted of some 17 changes to U.S. procedures, including the way in which export licenses would be granted for particular defense products. These are “steps on the way,” but they have not resolved all the outstanding problems sufficiently to create a climate of cooperation and to end European concerns.

This issue of the so-called two-way street in defense arrangements continues to pose difficulties for U.S.-European cooperation, including resolution of matters affecting NATO-EU/ESDP relations and attitudes on both sides of the Atlantic about those relations.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT

With the complex arrangements worked out at Helsinki, another aspect of ESDP became more apparent and provided a stark contrast with NATO. Put simply, as part of a broader European CFSP, ESDP is designed to function as an instrument for the former; NATO, by contrast, is much more “stand alone.” As a military alliance, although with political-military aspects, NATO has never developed mecha-


We hope that this will help facilitate even greater interaction between our respective industries so that we can have a harmonized approach to sharing technology, working cooperative and partnership arrangements and potentially mergers as well (Secretary of Defense William Cohen and U.K. Secretary of State for Defence Geoffrey Hoon, Pentagon News Briefing on Bilateral Defense Cooperation, February 5, 2000).

26 Secretary Cohen, ibid.: “We hope to consider other countries, Germany among them. We are pursuing this with several countries.”


Nisms for conducting a “foreign policy,” or even “crisis management.” NATO’s secretary general (who also serves as chairman of the North Atlantic Council) is not a foreign minister reporting to a government, with broad latitude to act on behalf of the institution, even though, on occasion, he has been given a special and limited mandate to negotiate with other governments on behalf of the council, for example, in conclusion of the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997 and in diplomacy over Macedonia (jointly with the EU’s Javier Solana) in 2001. In addition, the NATO secretary general’s “master”—the council—does not function like an independent government but remains a collection of representatives of sovereign governments. Thus, for neither of NATO’s only two sustained uses of force—Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999—did the North Atlantic Council have a direct role in the diplomacy leading up to, or during, conflict; at the time of both conflicts, that responsibility rested, at least formally, with the so-called Contact Group that, while including some NATO allies, had no connection with the alliance and did not always keep NATO fully informed of what it was doing.29 Similarly, in leading the two peacekeeping forces (SFOR and KFOR), NATO does not also have overall political responsibility for what happens in its areas of operation; responsibility is bifurcated.30 To be sure, at the April 1999 Washington summit, the allies did agree that

>This new Alliance will be . . . able to undertake new missions including contributing to effective conflict prevention and engaging actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations [emphasis added].31

The aspiration, however, made no provision for its achievement.

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29NATO planning was available for negotiators at the Dayton peace talks of autumn 1995; by contrast, this was not done for the Rambouillet talks over Kosovo in spring 1999—one reason, it could be argued, for the failure of those negotiations.

30The relative success of UN operations in Eastern Slavonia (the United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia), as opposed to those in Bosnia, is often credited, at least in part, to the fact that political and military responsibility were unified—for much of the time under the leadership of a U.S. foreign service officer, Jacques Klein, who also happened to be a major general in the U.S. Air Force Reserve.

31NATO, Washington Summit Communiqué, April 24, 1999, op. cit., paragraph 2.
By contrast, CFSP and ESDP are designed and constructed to have crisis management responsibilities: indeed, the capacity (in theory) to deal with a situation from start to finish. Thus, the December 1999 Helsinki European Council mandated that

a non-military crisis management mechanism will be established to coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means and resources, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the Union and the Member States.32

This was based on an inventory of member state capacities, which showed they “have accumulated considerable experience or have considerable resources in a number of areas.” It was also concluded that the

Union needs to strengthen the responsiveness and efficiency of its resources and tools . . . [and] to draw up an action plan . . . to develop a rapid reaction capability in the field of crisis management using non-military instruments.33

There would be “the development of a military crisis management capability as well as a civilian one.”34 The EU would also have the


33Ibid., Annex 2 to Annex IV, among other things:
The Union should aim at:

— strengthening the synergy and responsiveness of national, collective and NGO resources in order to avoid duplication and improve performance, while maintaining the flexibility of each contributor to decide on the deployment of assets and capabilities in a particular crisis, or via a particular channel;

— enhancing and facilitating the EU’s contributions to, and activities within, other organisations, such as the UN and the OSCE whenever one of them is the lead organisation in a particular crisis, as well as EU autonomous actions;

— ensuring inter-pillar coherence.

34See Santa Maria da Feira European Council, *Presidency Conclusions*, June 19–20, 2000, paragraph I.C. There was even some thinking that an EU capacity in this area could be made available “to the transatlantic community”—implying NATO, espe-
benefit of a single individual in at least nominal charge: the secretary general of the council and high representative—who is also secretary general of the WEU.\textsuperscript{35}

This disparity between the formal competence of CFSP/ESDP (policies of the EU) on the one hand and NATO on the other may never become of material importance—and the tandem ESDP-NATO diplomacy over Macedonia in 2001 offers a hopeful prospect. But in theory, at least, the European arrangements have the advantage, in terms of being able to conduct a crisis management operation that does not require a formal handing over of responsibility from one institution to another—with all of the inherent difficulties that such a process could entail.\textsuperscript{36} In contrast to some other ESDP developments, however, this one should not be seen as a challenge to NATO but rather as highlighting the latter’s own lack of competence—in the institutional sense of the term—in relation to what are likely to be real-world security situations in the future. The issue is not to try limiting what the EU does through ESDP, or even primarily to make ESDP compatible with NATO’s capabilities and methods of operation, as desirable as the latter would be, but rather to find means whereby the alliance—and more particularly the North Atlantic Council, as well as the military commands—can be linked to processes of diplomacy and crisis management that may largely determine what practical responsibilities NATO is called upon to exercise. This 21st-century challenge to NATO and to its relationship to the “pre-military action” world of diplomacy and crisis management would have existed even if ESDP and CFSP had never been invented.

\textsuperscript{35}In comparing NATO and the EU in terms of crisis-management capability, it must be acknowledged that the EU’s institutions will only be able to act where the member states will permit, and that there will continue, at least for some time, to be a relatively “short leash”; but the EU will be able to bring to bear civilian instruments beyond those that NATO can muster or, as discussed later, instruments “such as mine clearance, customs, mediation, training of police or judges” (www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/news/ip_01_255.htm).

\textsuperscript{36}Diplomacy prior to the Kosovo conflict is a pertinent example of NATO’s being brought late into the process of dealing with an emerging crisis.