This study is the product of more than two years’ research and writing as part of a wider National Defense Research Institute–financed project on overall U.S. engagement in European security and institutional arrangements across the Atlantic. It relies heavily on the author’s background, which includes a doctoral dissertation at the London School of Economics (1969) on the origins of the Brussels Treaty—the forerunner of Western European Union1 (WEU) and, hence, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP); responsibility for both NATO and European community affairs at the National Security Council (1977–79); and service as U.S. ambassador to NATO and representative of the United States to the WEU (1993–98), during which time the author played a key role in formulating U.S. policy toward the European pillar and negotiated for the United States new arrangements between NATO and WEU—as the then executive agent for what is now called the European Union’s ESDP.

This study should be of interest to a wide audience, including those interested in the evolution of U.S.-European relations, especially in,
but not limited to, the security field; the development of institutional relationships; and key choices that lie ahead regarding U.S.-European relations. For students of process and Atlantic Alliance history, this study lays out the development of what NATO has called the European Security and Defense Identity and what the European Union calls ESDP. For policymakers—on both sides of the Atlantic—this study provides an essential background for understanding how security issues between NATO and the European Union are being raised for the early part of the 21st century. These include the new circumstances following the terrorist attacks in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001. For policymakers, this study also provides guidelines for helping to ensure that the creation of ESDP—including a new European rapid reaction force—can strengthen the Atlantic Alliance overall, and especially relations with the United States. The study seeks to be comprehensive—as befits any effort to delve deeply into the reality of policy discussion and decision—and includes analysis of burden sharing, influence within the alliance, the role of various allies and the two basic institutions, and the ways in which both institutions can and should develop a relationship (quite different from the cold war years) that can be mutually beneficial.

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