The case study summaries that follow are included in this study to provide historical context to the main body of the report and to further illuminate the categorizations that appear in Table 4.1 (Case Study Analysis Compared with Adversary Will and Capabilities Matrix). They also provide additional information about the cases for readers not familiar with them. Although the case synopses are by no means comprehensive historical accounts, each case includes a footnote listing sources where more-extensive information can be found.

**SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES (SCA)**

**Case: Los Angeles Riots (Los Angeles, California, 1992)**

**Category.** B1. The rioters in Los Angeles had no military capability, although they did have the capacity for violence and mayhem. It appears that the presence of uniformed, armed military personnel was a significant element in deterring the rioters, thus reducing the level of violence and looting.

---

1As discussed above, these three cases were not included in the analysis in Chapter Three but are described here to complete the picture of how military forces may be used for coercion across the spectrum of operations.

Result. Within a week of the deployment of uniformed military personnel, the level of violence in Los Angeles receded to a level that it could again be dealt with by civilian law enforcement agencies.

Case Synopsis. The 1992 Los Angeles riots provided three unique opportunities to study coercive strategy at the SCA level. The beginning of the riots coincided with the announcement of the not guilty verdict in the highly public trial of officers in the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) charged in the videotaped beating of Rodney King. At 4:15 p.m. on April 29, 1992, slightly more than an hour after the verdict was announced, crowds began looting in South Central Los Angeles. The riot escalated overnight and peaked on the second day, with elevated levels of lawlessness continuing until May 4. By the time order was fully restored, 54 people had died, 2,383 had been injured, and about $717 million of property damage had occurred.

The response to the riot followed three distinct phases. The first phase consisted of the failure of the LAPD to deter and contain the rioting in the opening day of the crisis. The LAPD’s response to this highly predictable event was hampered by an “emergency ‘plan’ so general and unspecific, untested, unfamiliar to those who were later called upon to carry it out, and largely nonresponsive to the nature of the civil disturbance that occurred, that it proved to be essentially useless.”3 On the evening of April 29, elements of the California National Guard (CANG) were called up, marking the second phase of the riot response. The first element of the CANG to deploy, the 3rd Battalion, 160th Infantry (Mechanized), 40th Division, required almost a full day to become operational in the city. Frustrated by the slow deployment, civil authorities requested federal assistance and the CANG was federalized on May 1, marking the third phase.

The federal response, which materialized on May 3, was designated Joint Task Force–Los Angeles (JTF-LA). The Army contributed 2,023 soldiers from the 7th Infantry Division, and the Marine Corps contributed 1,508 troops from Camp Pendleton. These forces, along with the 10,465 National Guardsmen under federal control, operated in Los Angeles County until May 8 and were completely withdrawn by May 10. During their stay, the violence subsided markedly. JTF-

---

3Webster, *The City in Crisis*, p. 16.
LA was assisted by other agencies, including the FBI (1,200 agents), Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Customs Service, and Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Case: Operation Rio (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 1994–1995)\(^4\)

**Category.** B1. The criminal element in Rio de Janeiro had no military capability, although it did have large number of arms and had demonstrated the capacity for violence and lawlessness. The presence and operations of uniformed, armed military forces deterred further large-scale criminal activity.

**Result.** Operation Rio resulted in a rapid decline in criminal activity, capture of large numbers of weapons, and the reestablishment of a condition in Rio de Janeiro in which the rule of law could again be enforced by civilian law enforcement agencies.

**Case Synopsis.** Operation Rio was a federal effort to reestablish the rule of law in Rio de Janeiro during the early summer (November to January) of 1994–1995. During the early 1990s, the exploding population of the city, combined with an absence of government services and police protection, led to a steep increase in organized crime. The government had no effective control over large areas of the city, which became the scene of shootings, gang activity, bank robberies, and rampant drug trafficking. The state and local governments authorized the use of federal troops to restore and maintain order.

The Brazilian operation focused first on isolating the targeted areas by establishing a cordon around them. This barrier was intensively patrolled by police to restrict the movement of the criminals and interrupt contact between them and outside sources of money and arms. Finally, for three months, the task force conducted raids against specific targets inside the isolated area. The mission statement restricted both the length of the operation and the authority of federal troops, who were in effect defederalized and required to arrest suspects and participate in their eventual prosecution. Martial law was never declared and the operation was conducted under

heavy media attention. Because of the rapid decrease in criminal activity throughout the city, the large number of weapons recovered, and the absence of unintended deaths or injuries, Operation Rio was officially and publicly considered a success.\(^5\)

To achieve this success, the Brazilian government dedicated substantial military assets to Operation Rio. The core of the Task Force was formed by four Army infantry battalions and one battalion of Army military police. Further ground forces included two Marine battalions and two State Police SWAT battalions. A squadron of Army helicopters provided logistics and communications support during combat missions, and a squadron of Air Force search and rescue aircraft also participated. Force protection was complemented by a battalion of Air Force military police and civil and federal police. Finally, Operation Rio was supported by joint and interagency intelligence assets and a joint Special Operating Task Force.

**Case: Desegregation of Central High School (Little Rock, Arkansas, 1957–1958)\(^6\)**

**Category.** B1. The element protesting the integration of Central High School did not have a military capability but posed a real threat to the nine black students attempting to attend the school. The presence of armed soldiers deterred violence against the students.

**Result.** The presence of armed soldiers deterred violence against the black students. Integration of Central High School was accomplished without extreme violence.

**Case Synopsis.** In accordance with the landmark 1954 Supreme Court ruling in *Brown v. Board of Education*, Arkansas began a well-structured process of desegregating its public education system. In 1957, following the orderly and successful desegregation of several state universities, the Little Rock school board voted unanimously to begin desegregating local high schools. Arkansas Governor Orval

---

\(^{5}\)Ibid.

Faubus opposed these plans and, against the wishes of both the mayor and school board, called up the Arkansas National Guard to physically bar the admittance of the nine black students who were to begin classes on September 3. Although the public protests predicted by Governor Faubus failed to materialize, the National Guard did succeed in preventing the desegregation of Central High School.

On September 20, a court ruled against Governor Faubus and the National Guard was withdrawn. The nine black students again attempted to attend Central High School, succeeded in entering the school, but could not stay because of the danger posed by approximately 1,000 protesters. On September 24, the mayor of Little Rock appealed to President Dwight Eisenhower for assistance, requesting first U.S. Marshals, then federal troops. Eisenhower agreed to send soldiers, and that evening 1,200 soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division began arriving in Little Rock. The president also federalized the Arkansas National Guard, thereby nullifying the governor’s ability to directly frustrate federal law. The next day the soldiers from the 101st escorted the nine black students into Central High School.

The soldiers of the 101st created an imposing presence. On September 25, soldiers drove the students to the school in a convoy of machine-gun armed jeeps with a helicopter escort. Each student was accompanied throughout the day by an armed soldier. The soldiers of the 101st were redeployed in November, but the Arkansas National Guard stayed at the school until the end of the academic year.

STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS (SASO)

Case: UNPROFOR/IFOR/SFOR (Bosnia, 1992–present)


Category. C2. The Bosnian Serbs had modest but significant military capabilities, and while they were inclined to expand their terri-

---

torial control, they were deterrable when confronted by substantial military force.

**Result.** UNPROFOR did not ultimately deter further attacks by the Bosnian Serbs, including the seizure of Srebrenica. The conflict was finally halted by NATO air strikes and a Bosnian-Croat offensive in late 1995.

**Subcases B and C: IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia, 1995–present**

**Category.** C1 (IFOR), B2 (SFOR). Following Operation Deliberate Force and the Dayton Accords, the Bosnian combatants, primarily the Serbs, had limited military capabilities and little motivation to resume fighting in the face of NATO peacekeeping forces.

**Result.** Resumption of the Bosnian war has been deterred since 1995, although compelling the parties to carry out their other commitments under the Dayton Accords has been only partially successful to date.

**Case Synopsis.** In response to fighting between Croat and Serb forces supported by the Yugoslavian Republic from which Croatia split in 1991, the Secretary General of the United Nations appointed Cyrus Vance as his Special Envoy for Yugoslavia. Vance succeeded in negotiating a cease-fire and reaching a consensus among the Yugoslav parties that an international peacekeeping force should be deployed to the region. On February 21, 1992, the UN Security Council approved the creation of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to conduct peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavian republics. The initial mission of UNPROFOR focused on the defense and disarmament of the population in Serb-held Croatian enclaves designated as UN Protected Areas. In June 1992, the focus began to shift toward peace enforcement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ultimately leading to an expanded mandate calling for the establishment of safe areas, the partial disarmament of the population, delivery of humanitarian aid, and patrolling and enforcing no-fly zones.

UNPROFOR originally consisted of only 50 special military observers deployed to Croatia. This number eventually grew to 38,599 military peacekeepers supported by 803 civilian police and more than 2,000
international civilian staff, the majority of whom were deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The United States contributed airlift assets to aid in force deployment and the distribution of humanitarian aid and in Operation Deny Flight deployed an aircraft carrier and made available land-based air assets to assist in the enforcement of the no-fly zone and provide ground attack capabilities as required. The United States also contributed 300 ground troops to support UNPROFOR operations in Macedonia and an additional 448 ground troops throughout the theater.

The international peacekeeping force deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina was flawed from the outset. In a report on the greatest failure of UNPROFOR, the Bosnian Serb Army’s massacre of ethnic Muslims at Srebrenica in June 1995, the UN admits that the force deployed was inadequate to the needs of the crisis and accepts blame for trying “to create—or imagine—an environment in which the tenets of peacekeeping—agreement between the parties, deployment by consent, and impartiality—could be upheld.” Upon the expansion of the UNPROFOR mandate to include enforcement of safe areas and disarmament in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the force commander “had estimated an additional troop requirement of approximately 34,000 to obtain deterrence through strength, [while] the Secretary-General [Boutros Boutros-Ghali] stated that it was possible to start implementing the resolution under a ‘light option,’ with a minimal troop reinforcement of around 7,600. That option represented an initial approach and had limited objectives. It assumed the consent and cooperation of the parties and provided a basic level of deterrence.” Although troop concentration in the area of operations steadily increased through 1995, UNPROFOR was never able to deter the threat posed by the Bosnian Serb Army or achieve its primary mission of disarmament and protecting the population. As a result of these failures, and following NATO’s Operation Deliberate Force bombing campaign and a successful ground offensive by Croatian

---

8On the origins of UNPROFOR, see Lewis MacKenzie, Peacekeeper: The Road to Sarajevo (Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre, 1993).


and Bosnian government forces in autumn 1995, a new peace settlement was negotiated and UNPROFOR disbanded to be succeeded by three distinct UN operations and a new international military presence led by NATO.

On December 14, 1995, the Dayton Peace Accords were signed, establishing the conditions under which a new peacekeeping mission might begin in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Six days later, NATO troops began Operation Joint Endeavor and deployed the Implementation Force (IFOR) to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The original IFOR consisted of 60,000 soldiers and had a one-year mandate to bring about and maintain the end of hostilities, separate belligerent factions within the region, and collect and store heavy weapons. These missions were accomplished by June 1996 and allowed for the withdrawal of 28,000 soldiers by December of that year. At that point, IFOR was redesignated the Stabilization Force (SFOR) and charged with the maintenance and enforcement of stable conditions and coordinating with civilian organizations to support their efforts. The remaining force of 32,000 peacekeepers from some 30 nations remained in place until the security situation improved, and then it was further reduced to 20,000 soldiers.\(^{11}\)

The United States contributed 20,000 troops to the original deployment of IFOR. This force, primarily Army soldiers, was complemented by an Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) based in Aviano, Italy, from which missions to enforce the no-fly zone were conducted. The AEF also provided the capability of conducting air strikes, though this action never proved necessary. The United States maintained this strength until June 1998, when its presence was reduced to 6,800 soldiers. This number was gradually reduced thereafter, most recently in May 2001, leaving the U.S. presence in Bosnia at 3,200 soldiers, out of a total of 28,000 peacekeepers. The coalition force performs regular patrols throughout their area of operations and continues to coordinate with civilian organizations operating in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Case: Operations Provide Relief (UNOSOM II), Restore Hope (UNITAF), and Continue Hope (UNOSOM II) (Somalia, 1992–1994)\(^\text{12}\)

Subcase A: Operation Provide Relief (UNOSOM I: August 15–December 9, 1992)

Category. B1. Somali factions were armed with light weapons, rocket-propelled grenades, and machine guns. Although they did not meet the criterion of having a “modest capability” in terms of being an organized military threat, the factions did have the capacity for significant violence, especially inside Mogadishu.

Result. The forces deployed in UNOSOM I, although they did initially enable a significant humanitarian assistance effort, were not able to deter the eventual disruption of relief supplies by Somali warlords. In the face of this disruption, the UN operation was reinforced and became UNITAF.

Subcase B: Operation Restore Hope (UNITAF: December 9, 1992–May 4, 1993)


Result. UNITAF was largely successful in its dual mission of providing humanitarian assistance and restoring order in southern Somalia.

Subcase C: Operation Continue Hope (UNOSOM II: May 4, 1993–March 31, 1994)

Category. E1. Although still possessing the capabilities mentioned in Subcases A and B above, Somali factions, particularly those of Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed, resisted UN attempts to restore order and actively engaged UN forces in combat.

Result. UNOSOM II was a peace enforcement mission whose goals included disarming the Somali clans and establishing a secure environment throughout Somalia. Eventually, this mission resulted in an escalation of the level violence, which could no longer be deterred, followed by the withdrawal of U.S. and UN forces.

Case Synopsis. In 1992, the UN responded to a devastating famine and the disintegration of government control in Somalia by implementing Operation Provide Relief. The operation was designed to deliver humanitarian aid to the Somali population by deploying a limited number of observers supported by UN peacekeepers designated as UNOSOM. The scope of the problem, particularly the observers’ inability to control the distribution of aid, quickly overwhelmed the effort. Confident that greater stability in Somalia could facilitate the distribution of aid and avert a humanitarian disaster, the United States proposed and won UN endorsement of a second mission to Somalia called Operation Restore Hope, or UNITAF (for “unified task force”).

UNITAF was built around the U.S. 1st Marine Expeditionary Force. In total, the United States contributed 28,000 personnel, including 10,300 U.S. Army soldiers, and other nations contributed close to 10,000 troops. The forces participating in UNITAF included soldiers from Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe. The entry force of U.S. Marines landed unopposed in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, on December 9, 1992, secured the airfield at Baledogle on December 13, and on December 16 occupied the southern town of Baidoa, which was the key staging area for relief missions in the interior of the country. These early successes were followed by operations to improve the local infrastructure, confiscate heavy crew-served weapons, and escort convoys, all in order to speed and ensure the distribution of humanitarian aid. Casualties were rare and UNITAF naturally ingratiated itself to the population. As mandated by the original charter, preparations were made to transfer authority to a UN peacekeeping force designated UNOSOM II in order to provide for the withdrawal of military forces.
The third and final stage of U.S. operation in Somalia began on May 4, 1993. The immediate crisis of famine having passed, the mission in Somalia turned to the restoration of law and order in hopes that a functioning civil society might protect the welfare of the population. The majority of U.S. soldiers were withdrawn, leaving only 28,000 peacekeepers to enforce an expanded mandate that included the general disarmament of the population. The remaining U.S. soldiers consisted of 4,500 soldiers, which included a 1,150-man Quick Reaction Force provided by the 10th Mountain Division (Light). The more expansive mission of UNOSOM II clashed with the authority of local warlords, and UN forces became, in effect, co-belligerents. In June, a detachment of Pakistani peacekeepers was ambushed with the loss of 24 men by the forces of Mohammed Farah Aideed, a prominent Somali warlord.

In response to the ambush of the Pakistanis, the UN passed Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 837, which called for the immediate apprehension of those responsible. This led to a hunt for Aideed by a detachment of U.S. Special Operations forces deployed in late August under the name Task Force Ranger. The more aggressive strategy pursued by UNOSOM II, and the level of force applied to achieve the expanding number of goals, eventually frayed the relationship between the force and the population they were sent to assist. The degree to which this relationship had deteriorated became clear on October 3, 1993, when Task Force Ranger soldiers and helicopter crews came under heavy fire by an enraged mob of Somalis. That day, 18 American soldiers were killed and 78 wounded. The effect this event had on the mission, particularly the U.S. role, was palpable. Rather than continue to escalate the level of violence in Mogadishu, U.S. commanders retreated into fortified bases, rarely dispatching soldiers to conduct reconnaissance for the remainder of the operation. U.S. troops were withdrawn from Somalia in March 1994.13

13Allard, Somalia Operations, pp. 13–20. See also Bowden, Black Hawk Down.
SMALLER-SCALE CONTINGENCIES (SSCs)

Case: Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) Sinai (Sinai Peninsula, 1982–present)14

Category. B4. Both Israel and Egypt have substantial military capabilities; the MFO Sinai has very modest military means.

Result. The MFO Sinai has, by its presence, contributed to the deterrence of renewed conflict between Israel and Egypt.

Case Synopsis. Under the terms of the 1979 Camp David Peace Accords, the Sinai peninsula was returned to Egypt after 12 years of Israeli occupation following the Six-Day War. Israel agreed to withdraw to its pre-1967 border and the Sinai would become a demilitarized and “restricted force” zone. Although a force of UN observers had existed on the Sinai since 1948, it had withdrawn during times of hostility and demonstrated no ability to preserve peace or deter conflict in the region. The arrangement agreed to in 1979 and implemented fully in 1982 called for a U.S.-organized detachment of soldiers and observers to supervise the treaty and promote transparency and trust between Egypt and Israel.

Today, 11 countries participate in the MFO, fielding a force of some 1,900 troops. The United States is by far the largest contributor of forces, deploying 895 soldiers, along with troops from Colombia, Fiji, Italy, Uruguay, Hungary, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, France, and Norway. Although the force is centered around observers and logistics support, there are small detachments of fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and maritime support. Having operated for close to two decades, deploying troops to the Sinai has become routine. In a recent announcement, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld suggested that the United States might withdraw from the MFO. This suggestion drew protests from both Egypt and Israel who credited the MFO with providing a key source of stability in a troubled region.15

14For information on the mission and history of the MFO Sinai, see http://www.mfo.org.
Case:  **British Intervention in Kuwait (1961)**¹⁶

**Category.**  C3.  Iraq had built up substantial military capabilities and appeared to be prepared to annex Kuwait in the absence of substantial defensive forces.

**Result.**  Deterrence appears to have succeeded following the rapid deployment of British forces to Kuwait, as Iraq withdrew the forces it had been massing on the border.

**Case Synopsis.**  A week after Kuwait became a fully independent state in 1961, having been a British protectorate since 1899, Iraqi President Abdul Karim Kassem announced his intention to annex the newly proclaimed country, over which Iraq had a long-standing territorial claim, and Iraqi forces began moving south from Baghdad. Within two days of this announcement the Kuwaiti emir, Abdallah al-Salim Al Sabah, requested British military assistance. The British response was immediate and apparently effective, providing an example of either the successful deterrence of cross-border aggression or the gross misinterpretation of Iraqi diplomatic signals. It is unclear whether Iraq seriously intended to attack, but if so this threat never materialized and the crisis ended peacefully.

The British response came in two stages: the first secured points of disembarkation inside Kuwait, the second established a line of defense along the Kuwait-Iraq border. The operation was most notably characterized by the speed of its execution. Deployment was greatly accelerated by the fact that the 42 Royal Marine Commando was onboard HMS *Bulwark* off Karachi at the time of the crisis. These troops immediately headed to Kuwait where they secured landing areas and the airport by the morning of July 1, two days after Kuwait requested assistance. These initial entry forces were supported by 45 Commando, stationed in Aden, followed by airlifted British infantry from Bahrain and Kenya and paratroopers stationed in Cyprus and the United Kingdom. Arrival of the latter was delayed several days because Turkey refused to grant overflight rights.

Almost immediately after arriving in Kuwait and securing the points of entry, British soldiers established a line of defense along the border. Although light troops alone would have been overwhelmed by an Iraqi attack, the British soldiers were supported by two squadrons of RAF fighters quickly deployed to Kuwait from Aden and Kenya, arriving on July 1, bombers and other aircraft deployed to Bahrain and Sharjah, and soon by the aircraft carrier HMS *Victorious,* which was dispatched from the South China Sea at the outset of the crisis. By October, Arab League members had generated a force sufficient to take over the mission, their strategic aim being not so much to deter Iraq as to replace the British. The British were able to withdraw completely by October 19. Their experience in Kuwait highlights both the inherent ambiguity of successful deterrence and the advantage of global engagement and forward deployment.

**Case: Argentine Invasion of the Falkland Islands (1982)**

**Category.** D3. Argentina possessed substantial military capabilities relative to those of the UK, and had a high coercion threshold.

**Result.** Britain failed to deter the invasion of the Falklands, underestimating both the Argentine regime’s strong motivation to invade the islands and Argentina’s willingness to discount the UK’s capability and will to liberate them.

**Case Synopsis.** In 1982, the long-standing dispute between the United Kingdom and Argentina over possession of the Falkland Islands, known as the Islas Malvinas in Argentina, escalated into a major military conflict that resulted in the loss of close to 1,000 British and Argentine personnel and several warships. This study focused primarily on the opening stages of the Falklands War in order to describe and critique the British strategy for deterring an Argentine attack.

---

Prior to the crisis, the Argentine government was facing intense internal pressure. Street demonstrations throughout 1981 had weakened the military junta that had taken power in a 1976 coup, and in December 1981 a new junta assumed power. This government felt pressure to produce an early victory to increase its popularity and enhance the prestige of the military.\textsuperscript{18} Indications that the United Kingdom was decommissioning its only naval vessel stationed in the region contributed to the impression that an invasion of the Falkland Islands would be an easy affair, unopposed by the British, as well as essential to the regime’s survival.\textsuperscript{19}

At the time of the invasion, March 2, 1982, only 67 British Marines were on the Falklands. Even this token force was actually twice its normal strength because the invasion came during the garrison’s annual rotation cycle. Despite increasing tensions, including an uprising by Argentine workers on neighboring South Georgia Island, which lies about 900 miles to the east, and a history of contention with Argentina over the sovereignty of the island groups, no attempt was made by the British to reinforce the garrison or deter an attack on the Falklands in the weeks leading up to the invasion. Even in the two days preceding the invasion, after British intelligence sources had warned that an attack was imminent, no extraordinary measures were taken by the military to support a coercive policy that might avoid war. Argentina pressed ahead with the invasion and occupied the islands until they were reconquered by British forces in June 1982.

The Falklands conflict demonstrates several elements of coercion, including the importance of clearly communicating commitments, deploying adequate forces for the protection of contested territory, and understanding what stresses on one’s adversary might result in highly risk-acceptant behavior, all of which the British failed to do.


Case: Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti, 1994–1996) 20

Category. D1. Haiti had negligible military means but refused U.S. and UN coercion efforts until the threat of significant military means was employed.

Result. The threat of a U.S. military strike coerced the resignation of Raul Cedras and enabled the permissive deployment of U.S. forces into Haiti.

Case Synopsis. Following the ouster of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1991, the government of Haiti fell into the hands of a series of irresponsible and malevolent military dictators, the last of whom was General Cedras. Despite early signs of cooperation with the UN, Cedras abandoned his 1993 pledge to return Aristide to power, prompting the UN to reimpose economic sanctions. The sanctions, combined with the violence perpetrated against the population by the military regime, resulted in untenable conditions for the Haitian people, many of whom fled the country by sea, seeking asylum in the United States. In response to the outrages being committed in Haiti and the humanitarian crisis resulting from the flood of refugees, the United States formed a multinational force in support of a UN-mandated military intervention. The intervention, Operation Uphold Democracy, resulted in the successful and peaceful occupation of the island nation in September 1994. The ultimate mission of stabilizing the society and restoring democratic institutions was undertaken in March 1995 by a UN-led force under the name Operation Restore Democracy.

Throughout the negotiations leading up to Operation Uphold Democracy, the United States and the UN clearly communicated to the Cedras regime their demands for Aristide’s reinstatement and the dissolution of the military junta. To add weight to these demands and in support of the original 1993 agreement (the Governors Island Accords) the United States dispatched the USS Harlan County to the Haitian capital, Port-au-Prince. The USS Harlan County, a tank

landing ship (LST), carried on board Joint Task Force HAG. JTF HAG consisted primarily of an Army Special Forces Company, a platoon of Marine Military Police, a Navy Construction Battalion, and a Royal Canadian Air Force Engineer detachment. The ship entered Port-au-Prince harbor on October 11, 1993, unescorted, presuming a permissive entry based on negotiated agreement. Instead, the USS Harlan County was opposed by an unruly armed mob on the docks and harassed in port by armed motorboats. Faced with this unexpected opposition and unequipped and lacking the mandate to force an entry into Haiti, the captain of the USS Harlan County remained until the afternoon of the next day, when he withdrew to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. This early attempt to compel an end to the violence on Haiti proved unsuccessful and is believed to have damaged American credibility in future negotiations with the Cedras regime.

In response to the deterioration of conditions within Haiti and the growing refugee problem posed by Haitians fleeing their country, the United States mounted Operation Uphold Democracy in September 1994. The military preparations were conducted in concert with ongoing diplomatic negotiations with the Cedras regime to avoid the necessity of a forced entry. Two task forces of light troops, one made up of soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division, the other from the 10th Mountain Division, trained and assembled for Operation Uphold Democracy to accommodate to the need for either a peaceful or forced entry. The decision on September 17 to go ahead with a forced entry by the 82nd Airborne did not rule out the possibility of a last-minute change. Indeed, negotiations between Cedras and a special delegation of Jimmy Carter, Sam Nunn, and Colin Powell arranged for the unopposed entry of soldiers already en route to Haiti. The credibility gained by the delegation as a result of the commitment of soldiers is uncertain. However, it is clear that until Cedras was faced with the certainty of a military intervention he did not accommodate to the multinational force’s demands. The majority of U.S. troops were withdrawn from Haiti in 1995. However, through the end of 2000, the U.S. Army maintained a force of approximately 200 soldiers to perform security, medical, and civil assistance missions.

---

Case: **French Quadrillage and Morice Line (Algeria, 1957–1958)**

**Category.** D2. The insurgents in Algeria possessed a modest military capability and their supporters were bent on infiltrating support into Algeria.

**Result.** The significant investment by the French in the Morice Line deterred infiltration into Algeria, but its cost proved unsustainable and the effort ultimately failed.

**Case Synopsis.** The Algerian Civil War stands out as one of the most vicious conflicts in modern history. Rather than study the entirety of the war, which continued in various forms from 1954 to 1974, this report focused on a single phase of the French involvement known as the Quadrillage. The French had been engaged in Algeria since 1830 and persisted in the civil war from 1954 until 1962. In 1956, France granted independence to Tunisia and Morocco, the better to focus their efforts on Algeria. Their efforts were hampered, however, by supporters of the Algerian cause in the newly independent states who infiltrated supplies and fighters across the border. To isolate the Algerian conflict, the French erected elaborate defenses along the Algerian border. This effort to compel an end to efforts to aid the Algerian FLN (Force Liberation Nationale) approached pure force yet ultimately proved to be an effective, though unsustainable, coercive strategy.

The border defenses, known as the Morice Line after the French Defense Minister, were completed in 1957. Extending 450 kilometers along the Tunisian border and 750 kilometers along the Moroccan border, the Morice line consisted of barbed wire, followed by a minefield, followed by an eight-foot-high electrical fence. About 80,000 French soldiers, out of a total force of 400,000 in Algeria, were concentrated along the line to prevent insurgents from infiltrating across the frontier and to pursue those who succeeded. The defenses achieved their purpose, cutting external support to the FLN by 90 percent, capturing 4,600 weapons, and resulting in the death of 6,000 FLN soldiers. The effort required to sustain the defenses, however,

---

22 Brush, "The Story Behind the McNamara Line."
soon exhausted the French Army and led to an abandonment of this strategy after only seven months.

**Case: Chechen Insurgency (Chechnya, 1994–present)**

**Category.** E2. The Chechen insurgents have a modest military capability and appear determined to form an independent state.

**Result.** Despite early setbacks, the Russians have prevented the separation of Chechnya, although an active state of guerrilla warfare persists.

**Case Synopsis.** Chechnya, a region in the Northern Caucasus mountain range, declared independence from Russia in 1993. This action resulted in a civil war that brought Russian troops into the province in 1994. The subsequent Russian military involvement in Chechnya is generally divided into two parts. The first, from 1994 to 1996, resulted in the deaths of several thousand Chechen citizens and several hundred Russian soldiers without resolving the question of Chechen independence or creating conditions for a stable peace. The second phase, from 1999 until the present, has so far resulted in the destruction of the Chechen capital of Grozny by Russian forces that, in turn, sustain mounting casualties from guerrilla attacks. With the exception of the temporary Russian withdrawal from 1996 to 1999, neither side has succeeded in destroying its adversary’s will or ability to mount a significant resistance.

Following months of clandestine involvement and support of pro-Russian Chechen factions, the Russian military intervened openly in the Chechen conflict in December 1994. Attempting to quickly establish control over Grozny, three Russian armored divisions, supported by pro-Russian Chechen forces and Russian internal security units, launched an invasion of Chechnya. Entering the city, the Russian forces found themselves vulnerable to well-organized resistance, resulting in the loss of hundreds of tanks and other armored

---


24Casualties sustained by both sides are poorly reported and vary greatly. The Chechen population suffered severely during both phases of Russian operations in the region, while the Russian forces were seriously harmed during the first.
vehicles and mounting pressure from the public to withdraw from the conflict. In 1996, a cease-fire was negotiated, leaving the question of Chechen independence to be decided at a later date.

In October 1999, the Russian military launched a more concerted campaign to establish control over the region. The attack again centered on Grozny, but during this operation extensive use of artillery and aerial bombardment leveled much of the city before Russian ground forces entered. As a result, Russian casualties were much lower during the second siege of Grozny. The Russian military also did a more effective job of controlling media access inside Chechnya, thereby avoiding much of the public outcry that accompanied the earlier campaign. Despite greater success in capturing the capital, Russian forces have struggled to gain control over Chechen rebel forces in the mountainous countryside and are frequently subject to guerrilla attacks.

Case: Operations Allied Force and Joint Guardian (Kosovo, 1999–present)\(^{25}\)

Subcase A: Operation Allied Force, 1999

**Category.** D3. Serbia possessed substantial military capabilities, and Serb President Slobodan Milosevic was strongly motivated to resist NATO demands that Serbia cede control of a major part of its territory.

**Result.** Serbia complied with NATO’s compellent demands to withdraw its forces from Kosovo following an 11-week bombing campaign.

Subcase B: Operation Joint Guardian, 1999–present

**Category.** B1. Kosovar Serb and Albanian groups possess modest ability to commit violence against each other and limited motivation to do so in the presence of NATO peacekeepers.

Substantial violence in Kosovo has largely been deterred since the arrival of KFOR.

The international response to the crisis in Kosovo transpired in two basic phases. The first phase, named Operation Allied Force, compelled the Serbian Army and internal security forces to withdraw from Kosovo. The second phase, named Operation Joint Guardian, deterred aggression between the Kosovo Liberation Army and the Serbian Army and paramilitary groups while protecting the population from unorganized social unrest. Both operations, at this point, can be considered successful coercion.

Kosovo, a province in southern Serbia, has a population with a large majority of ethnic Albanians. Kosovo had enjoyed a large degree of autonomy within Yugoslavia since 1973, but, when the federal state disintegrated in 1989, President Milosevic revoked Kosovo’s local autonomy. The crisis began in earnest in 1998 when the Serbian Army’s and security forces’ campaign against Kosovar rebels resulted in the deaths of more than 1,500 Kosovar Albanians and the internal displacement of 400,000 refugees. Concerned for the welfare of the Kosovar Albanians and the fragile peace being maintained throughout the region, the UN Security Council issued a declaration on March 31 expressing its interest in the matter and determination that the violence stop. In support of this resolution, NATO identified two primary goals regarding the crisis in Kosovo:

- to help achieve a peaceful resolution of the crisis by contributing to the response of the international community; and
- to promote stability and security in neighboring countries with particular emphasis on Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.26

This resolution allowed NATO to consider an active military role in the developing Kosovo crisis. This role proved necessary in October. On October 13, 1998, NATO approved air strikes against Serbian targets in a move to support of a diplomatic mission calling for the safe

---

return of refugees to their homes in Kosovo and permission to deploy a team of international observers. These conditions were agreed to.

In 1999, Kosovar and Serbian officials failed to reach agreement at talks held in Rambouillet, France. Following the breakdown in negotiations, the Serbian government moved tanks and additional forces into Kosovo, violating their earlier agreement and exacerbating the refugee crisis. Again, a diplomatic mission to Serbia was backed by the threat of NATO air strikes, though in this case Milosevic was not coerced into compliance. His defiance led directly to Operation Allied Force, which began on March 23, 1999, and lasted until June 10.

Operation Allied Force’s goal was to compel the complete withdrawal of Serbian military and paramilitary forces from Kosovo in order to create conditions for the deployment of a NATO peacekeeping mission to the region. In support of this mission, NATO aircraft flew 10,484 strike sorties over the 78 days of Operation Allied Force. The United States contributed approximately 730 of some 1,055 aircraft used in Operation Allied Force. The largest contingent of planes served as part of the Air Force’s 31st Air Expeditionary Force, based in Aviano, Italy, along with U.S. Marine fighter-attack and electronic warfare aircraft. The U.S. Air Force also contributed a large contingent of KC-135 tankers and flew bombing, refueling, reconnaissance, and airlift missions from air bases in Germany, England, the Middle East, and CONUS. The Navy contributed the aircraft of the USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier battle group and ships and submarines armed with land-attack cruise missiles, and it also kept a Marine Expeditionary Force in the theater. The Army deployed Task Force Hawk, a force based around attack helicopters, to Albania in the later stage of the conflict.

During most of Operation Allied Force, attacking aircraft generally stayed above 15,000 feet to reduce the risk of losses from Serbian air defense systems. Together with extreme reluctance to cause civilian casualties, this restriction limited the effectiveness of air strikes against certain targets, such as camouflaged tanks. Beyond targeting these smaller military assets, however, NATO attacked strategic targets inside Serbia, such as oil refineries, electrical utilities, bridges, television stations, and government offices. With its infrastructure devastated, its forces inside Kosovo increasingly vulnerable to
attacks by the paramilitary Kosovo Liberation Army, and the threat of an eventual NATO invasion of Serbia looming on the long-term horizon, the Serbian leadership was compelled to withdraw its forces from the region and to permit an international peacekeeping force to enter Kosovo. The UN accepted the terms of the agreement and called for the immediate deployment of an international force to Kosovo.

On June 12, 1999, the first elements of KFOR arrived in Kosovo to undertake Operation Joint Guardian, the deterrence phase of the mission. Their entry, coordinated with the withdrawal of the Serbian Army, proceeded peacefully and was greatly speeded by the pre-deployment of soldiers to the Macedonia-Kosovo border under UNPREDEP. The first U.S. troops to arrive in Kosovo belonged to a Marine Expeditionary Force (1,700), Task Force Hawk (1,900), and approximately 200 soldiers based in Germany tasked with setting up a joint headquarters. The Marine and Task Force Hawk contingents were soon withdrawn, and a regular Army force deployed from Germany. By late 1999, approximately 7,000 soldiers formed the U.S. contribution to a total KFOR deployment of 50,000 soldiers.

The primary goal of KFOR was to facilitate the return of refugees to their homes by creating a safe environment. Accomplishing this mission required KFOR soldiers to establish a high level of presence throughout the region, de-mine roads, confiscate heavy weapons, and create a concentrated presence along the Serbia-Kosovo border. The resolution also called for the training of a professional, ethnically mixed security force to gradually replace the international presence and an investigation of war crimes to prepare for possible prosecution. Although these tasks are conducted primarily by independent agents of the UN, their work requires close cooperation with KFOR.


Subcase A: Chinese deterrence of U.S. escalation in North Vietnam

\textsuperscript{27}There is a vast literature on the Vietnam War. Two good general histories are George C. Herring, \textit{America's Longest War}, second edition (New York: Knopf, 1986), and Guenter Lewy, \textit{America in Vietnam} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978).
Conventional Coercion Across the Spectrum of Operations

Category. A4. The United States and China both had substantial military capability. The United States believed that China was highly motivated to prevent the escalation of the war against North Vietnam, particularly a ground invasion.

Result. China, through nonmilitary means, successfully deterred the United States from conducting a ground invasion of North Vietnam and from prosecuting a more aggressive air campaign against North Vietnam for the majority of the war (until the Linebacker bombing campaigns in 1972). The United States was deterred largely because it feared active Chinese intervention in the war, based on the precedent of the Korean War.

Subcase B: U.S. deterrence of North Vietnamese aggression in South Vietnam

Category. E3. The United States faced North Vietnam, a state with significant military power and a very high coercion threshold.

Result. The United States was unable to apply sufficient military (or nonmilitary) means to coerce the North Vietnamese into abandoning their goal of unifying North and South Vietnam. The United States viewed the conflict as a limited war. The North Vietnamese viewed it as a total war. In short, the North Vietnamese had the will to withstand the military (and other) means the United States was prepared to apply.

Case Synopsis. The American intervention in Vietnam began in December 1961 in response to the danger posed to the pro-Western South Vietnamese government by Communist guerrilla forces and the Communist government of North Vietnam. The initial deployment of 4,000 soldiers to advise and train South Vietnamese soldiers would eventually become the largest American military operation since World War II. The deployment peaked in 1969 when the American presence reached 543,000 military personnel. Despite the extensive ground, air, and naval operations in South Vietnam and air and naval operations against North Vietnam, the United States never succeeded in creating peaceful and stable conditions in the South Vietnam. The last American soldiers were withdrawn in 1973, and the South Vietnamese government fell to the attacking North in 1975.
Among the difficulties encountered by American strategists were containing Communist forces in the South and preventing supplies and main force conventional units from North Vietnam from influencing the war. The U.S. military was constrained in this regard, limiting itself to conducting ground operations only in South Vietnam, thus precluding ground intervention in North Vietnam or against the supply routes running through Laos and Cambodia. Air operations, although initially limited against the North, gradually expanded in 1964 and 1965 and even more so during heavier bombing campaigns in 1966–1968 (Operation Rolling Thunder) and 1972 (Operations Linebacker I and II).

China, a supporter of North Vietnam, opposed the American presence in South Vietnam and continually warned against U.S. offensives against North Vietnam. China also provided materiel and safe storage areas for supplies and, between 1966 and 1968, deployed soldiers to North Vietnam. Finally, China served as a deterrent against larger-scale U.S. bombing and any ground invasion of North Vietnam because the United States, chastened by its experience during the Korean War, feared a Chinese intervention in the war. The Soviet Union also provided materiel assistance, particularly in the form of sophisticated air defense systems.


Category. E2. Afghan resistance forces possessed relatively limited military capabilities but virtually unlimited commitment to resist the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, even at a very high price.

Result. In spite of intense efforts to compel the mujahideen to give up, which inflicted great damage and were largely unconstrained by concern with public opinion or humanitarian costs, the Soviets failed to make resistance to their occupation appear entirely hopeless or intolerably costly, and compellence failed.

---

Case Synopsis. In September 1979, Afghanistan’s unpopular pro-Soviet government was overthrown in a coup led by the country’s premier, Hafizullah Amin. This generated tension with the Soviet Union, which feared that a weakened central government would limit its influence in the country and might eventually pose a threat to stability in the Soviet republics on the Afghan border. In December 1979, Soviet forces began massing along the border with Afghanistan and increased their presence in the Afghan capital of Kabul to deter rebel forces from overthrowing the government and simultaneously prepare for the removal of Amin.

On December 24, 1979, Soviet special forces seized the airport at Kabul. The following day, three Soviet airborne divisions flew into the capital while four motorized infantry divisions crossed the border into Afghanistan. The Soviet forces faced resistance from both the Afghan Army and rebel forces, though within three days the forces succeeded in overthrowing Amin’s government and installing a regime friendly to the Soviet Union.

Throughout 1980, rebel forces, particularly the mujahideen, increased their resistance to the Soviet occupation while international protests, including the U.S.-led boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games, condemned the Soviet action. The Soviet strategy focused on establishing defense perimeters around major cities, controlling supply routes through the mountain valleys and across the Khyber Pass to Pakistan, and launching raids and air strikes against mujahideen rebels and the villages that supported them. This strategy called for the concentration of ground troops in urban areas and the creation of air bases to supply the troops and initiate air assault operations. By 1984, 19 airports in the region had either been built or newly constructed, allowing for the extensive use of fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. Attack helicopters proved particularly effective in the mountainous terrain and were used to prepare landing sites before the insertion of airborne soldiers. Although the Soviet government disguised from the world and its own citizens the true scope of their involvement in Afghanistan, an estimated 120,000-plus Soviet troops were engaged in Afghanistan at the conflict’s height and Soviet casualties exceeded 15,000 during the course of the eight-year occupation.
The mujahideen successfully resisted Soviet forces by relying on guerrilla warfare tactics and receiving substantial amounts of military aid from Arab and Islamic countries as well as the United States. Their military capability was greatly enhanced by the delivery from 1986 of U.S.-made Stinger antiaircraft missiles. This weapon gave the mujahideen an effective defense against the airplane and helicopter attacks that had become the cornerstones of Soviet tactics. Despite being generally poorly armed and uncoordinated, and despite the devastated state of Afghanistan’s economy and civilian population, the rebels showed no sign of weakening, while Soviet casualties and international and domestic pressure to withdraw from the conflict continued to escalate. In April 1988, the Soviet Union reached a cease-fire agreement and began removing its military forces, and by 1989 Soviet forces had fully withdrawn from Afghanistan. The Soviet-backed regime remained in power until 1992, when the mujahideen captured Kabul.

MAJOR THEATER WARS

Case: Gulf War and Subsequent Deterrent Operations Against Iraq (Southwest Asia, 1990–Present) 29


Category. D4. Iraq possessed very large, albeit overrated, military forces and a strong incentive to resist U.S. coercive demands in the wake of the Kuwaiti invasion.

Result. Iraq was not deterred from occupying Kuwait, and even when threatened with imminent attack was not compelled to withdraw. Late in the Gulf War, Iraq pursued a negotiated withdrawal from Kuwait but complied with Allied surrender terms only after being expelled from it and when facing the threat of further military operations against Iraq.

Subcase B: U.S.-led deterrence of Iraq, 1991–present

Category. C3. Iraq’s military capabilities were substantially reduced by the Gulf War, and it was not inclined to launch major military operations against substantial opposition.

Result. Iraq was deterred from further attacks against Kuwait or Saudi Arabia and from major violations of the no-fly zones, in the face of U.S. and allied military forces.

Case Synopsis. The conflict between Iraq and Kuwait has evolved over the past decade and come to include several distinct elements, each of which provides material for a study of coercive strategy. This study focused on Iraq’s initial aggression in 1990, the immediate American response, the coalition strategy leading up to the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, postcrisis enforcement of the cease-fire and no-fly zones, and ensuing efforts to address Iraqi provocations and instability throughout the region.

Iraq has laid a claim to Kuwait since the small country gained independence from Britain in 1961. In the summer of 1990, following disagreements over Iraqi debt held by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and over oil production in a shared field, Iraq became increasingly menacing toward Kuwait. The U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, met with Iraqi president Saddam Hussein on July 25 to learn Iraq’s intentions toward Kuwait but did not explicitly proclaim Kuwait’s territorial integrity as a vital national interest that would provoke a strong American response. Iraq moved into Kuwait on August 2, 1990, with a force of approximately 120,000 soldiers led by 2,000 tanks. At the time, Iraq had one of the largest armies in the world, estimated to stand at almost 1 million soldiers, a modern air force, and a demonstrated willingness and capability to employ chemical weapons.

The international community responded quickly. On August 5, President Bush stated unambiguously that the invasion of Kuwait would not stand and called on Iraq to withdraw immediately. The UN also condemned the action, imposed an embargo, and passed a resolution calling for the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. A later UN resolution, passed on November 29, authorized the use of necessary force to compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.
In coordination with these diplomatic efforts, the United States and other nations began deploying military forces into the theater as a nascent coalition against Iraq. Saudi Arabia requested American military assistance on August 6. On August 7, the first U.S. forces, Air Force F-15 fighters, arrived in Saudi Arabia and the 82nd Airborne Division’s second brigade began deploying. This brigade completed deployment on August 14, and by August 24 three full brigades of the 82nd were deployed to Saudi Arabia. These soldiers initially took positions alongside the Saudi Arabian National Guard. Within the first week, 4,000 U.S. Army soldiers had deployed, supported by 15 Apache helicopters, 18 Sheridan tanks, 56 TOW missile systems, two Multiple-Launch Rocket Systems, and 12 105-mm howitzers.

The Army was further supported by robust joint forces in the theater. On August 2, the day of the invasion, the Navy had two carrier battle groups in the region: one in the Mediterranean and the other in the Indian Ocean. By August 8, both of these groups were in position and capable of launching strikes against Iraqi forces. In addition, the Navy sent two Marine Expeditionary Brigades that arrived in the Persian Gulf shortly after the 82nd Airborne Division. By the end of August, more than 700 Air Force fighter and attack aircraft were in the theater. By September 1, the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf totaled 95,965 troops, of which 31,337 were Army.30

The massive buildup of forces continued for months but did not compel Iraq to abandon Kuwait. On January 17, 1991, coalition forces began conducting air strikes on Iraqi forces and other targets in Kuwait and Iraq. Coalition air attacks decimated Iraqi forces for weeks, until coalition ground forces began the attack on Iraqi forces in Kuwait and Iraq on February 24. Iraqi forces were badly beaten in every encounter and soon began surrendering and retreating en masse. A cease-fire went into effect on February 28.

The termination of Desert Storm led to the liberation of Kuwait and the creation of several missions to preserve the peace and stabilize the region. Foremost among these were Operation Provide Comfort

and Operation Southern Watch. The purpose of these missions was to control Iraqi aggression against minorities inside Iraq and, in the case of Provide Comfort, to deliver humanitarian assistance to these minorities. (Operation Northern Watch succeeded Provide Comfort and focused solely on containing Iraqi aggression.) These missions were mandated by UNSCRs 678, 687, and 688 in the case of Northern Watch and UNSCRs 687, 688, and 949 in the case of Southern Watch.

To protect ethnic minorities concentrated in the north and south of Iraq, no-fly zones were established following the end of the ground offensive. Operation Southern Watch, which enforces a no-fly zone in Iraq extending south of the 33rd parallel, combines forces from United States, France, Great Britain, and Saudi Arabia. The original mandate for the operation was provided by UNSCR 688 in April 1991. Missions to enforce this resolution, prompted by Iraqi violations, began on August 27, 1992. The largest contributor to Southern Watch forces is the United States, which provides approximately 14,000 personnel for ground-based air forces and two carrier battle groups. The Air Force conducts approximately two-thirds of the sorties. Although Iraq launched fighters to confront coalition air forces during the early phase of Southern Watch, they currently resist only with antiaircraft artillery fire and missile launches. Patrolling aircraft are authorized, acting in self-defense, to target and destroy any Iraqi force posing a threat and have thus avoided suffering any losses.

Operation Northern Watch uses the same rules of engagement to patrol the no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel. Approximately 45 aircraft and 1,400 personnel are based at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, to perform the mission. The United States contributes a joint force of approximately 1,100 soldiers to support Operation Northern Watch. Although patrolling aircraft are frequently fired on by Iraqi forces, no casualties have been suffered.

U.S. forward-deployed and prepositioned forces in the region also remain poised to confront Iraqi attacks against neighboring states. These assets were required in late September 1994, when Iraq again

---

threatened Kuwait. In response to significant Iraqi armor and personnel mobilizations south of the 32nd parallel, the UN Security Council passed UNSCR 949, condemning the movements and demanding a demobilization. President Clinton initiated Operation Vigilant Warrior on October 14, 1994, to demonstrate both American resolve to contain Iraq and the military’s ability to deploy quickly in strength. Within two weeks, the United States had increased its presence in the region from 3,500 to over 28,000 troops and deployed more than 200 additional combat aircraft. The prepositioned afloat AWR-3 was offloaded by elements of the 24th Infantry Division and exercised in coordination with the prepositioned brigade in Kuwait and the Kuwaiti National Guard. In late October, Iraq withdrew its forces north of the 32nd parallel and American soldiers began redeploying in November.

Case: The Korean War and Aftermath (Korean Peninsula, 1950–Present)\(^{32}\)

Subcase A: North Korean invasion of South Korea, 1950

Category. E4. North Korea had substantial military capability and was committed to the reunification of Korea through force.

Result. U.S. and South Korean forces were unable to deter a North Korean invasion of South Korea. North Korea was compelled to leave South Korea through the application of substantial military force.

Subcase B: UN invasion of North Korea, 1950

Category. D4. China possessed significant military capability and was committed to the existence of a North Korean state.

Result. China did not deter UN forces from occupying North Korea. China compelled the removal of UN forces when it attacked them in

North Korea and drove them south of the 38th parallel. Eventually, the status quo ante bellum was restored.

**Subcase C: Post–Korean War divided Korea, 1953–present**

**Category.** C4. North Korea possesses significant military capability and has positioned substantial forces along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that separates the two Koreas, the assumption for some 50 years is that North Korea is committed to the forceful reunification of Korea.

**Result.** The United States and South Korea have maintained a significant military capability that has deterred the potential invasion of South Korea by North Korea.

**Case Synopsis.** The conditions resulting in the Korean War were largely established by an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on August 15, 1945, which determined that Soviet troops would accept the surrender of Japanese soldiers on the Korean peninsula north of the 38th parallel and U.S. soldiers would accept the surrender of Japanese soldiers south of the 38th parallel. This agreement led to the de facto division of Korea at the 38th parallel following World War II. In 1947, following an initiative by the UN, the Republic of Korea (ROK) was established in the American-held southern sector. In protest, the Soviet Union established the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the north. The DPRK immediately began harassing the ROK through low-intensity conflict while cooperating with the Soviet Union to develop its armed forces. The ROK received military assistance from the United States, though in June 1949 the United States largely withdrew its soldiers from the ROK. This withdrawal was part of a realignment of U.S. priorities in Asia, which, as described by Secretary of State Dean Acheson in January 1950, included Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines as vital American interests but not Korea.

The North Korean invasion of South Korea began on June 25, 1950. By the end of the war, three years later, 15 members of the United Nations had entered the war as a Unified Command on the side of the ROK and the DPRK had been reinforced by Communist China. The UN force suffered 118,515 killed and 264,591 wounded. Of these, 33,629 of the dead and 103,284 of the wounded were Americans. More than 10,000 Americans were captured, the majority of whom
never returned. The ROK military suffered 70,000 killed, 150,000 wounded, and 80,000 captured while approximately 3 million ROK civilians died as a result of the war. The opposing Communist forces lost approximately 1.6 million soldiers. At the height of its involvement (April–July 1953), the United States deployed more than 440,000 troops to Korea: 276,581 Army, 84,124 Navy, 36,966 Marines, and 46,388 Air Force.33

The salient events of the Korean War, and those most pertinent to a study of coercive strategy, include the initial invasion, the initial American response, the Inchon landing, the Chinese intervention, and the armistice establishing the persistent confrontation between the DPRK and the ROK across the 38th parallel.

At the outset of the war, the North Korean Army was vastly superior to the South Korean forces. The North Korean Army was trained and equipped by the Soviet Union and consisted of approximately 130,000 men, a brigade of T-34 medium tanks, and 100,000 reserves. Some of these soldiers were veterans of the Chinese revolutionary wars in Manchuria. The North Korean Air Force was equipped with 180 World War II fighters and attack aircraft provided by the Soviet Union. South Korea, on the other hand, had no significant air force, armored force, or artillery. Its entire military power consisted of a 100,000-man constabulary force. The United States, which had avoided guaranteeing the ROK’s security, possessed limited military power in the theater. The Seventh Fleet was available, and the Air Force maintained eight combat groups in the Far East Air Forces. The U.S. ground strength was limited to four divisions manned at two-thirds strength, located primarily in Japan. Artillery, tanks, and other supporting arms were in short supply.

Immediately following the North Korean invasion, the UN condemned the act, and President Truman authorized General Douglas MacArthur, commander of U.S. forces in Asia, to support the ROK with air and naval forces. On June 30, Truman extended MacArthur’s mandate and authorized the use of U.S. ground troops to compel an end to hostilities. On July 5, the first element of U.S. ground intervention came into contact with the North Korean Army. Task Force

Smith, named after its commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Smith, consisted of 540 infantrymen lightly supported by artillery. This force positioned itself to block an advancing North Korean Division led by 30 tanks. Task Force Smith was completely overwhelmed, suffering 150 casualties and abandoning most of its equipment in a disorganized retreat. The North Korean Army advanced steadily until the ROK and its allies, by now organized as the UN Command (UNC), controlled only a small corner of the peninsula around the port of Pusan.

Following an amphibious landing at Inchon on September 15, 1950, the UNC rapidly pushed the North Korean Army out of the south, crossing the 38th parallel on October 1 and reaching the Chinese border along the Yalu River on October 28. Before the UNC crossed the 38th parallel, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai warned that China would not tolerate an invasion of North Korea. He also sent a private message to the U.S. government through an Indian official that China would intervene in the war if U.S. forces crossed the 38th parallel. As the UNC approached the Chinese border, the Communist government massed hundreds of thousands of troops along its frontier. The exact number of Chinese soldiers was unknown to MacArthur because of a prohibition on aerial reconnaissance north of the Yalu. Both MacArthur and the Central Intelligence Agency believed that Chinese forces would not attack unless China were invaded, despite Chinese statements to the contrary and evidence that Chinese forces had been operating in North Korea since early November. On November 24, 1950, MacArthur ordered an advance on the Yalu. Chinese forces attacked in strength the next day, pushing back UNC forces and eventually achieving a stalemate roughly along the 38th parallel.

Following the first year of dramatic offensives and counteroffensives were two years of punishing stalemate. An armistice signed on July 28, 1953, ended the fighting without resolving the status of Korean unification. U.S. forces remained in Korea to protect the devastated population from future Communist predations. Until the 1970s, the United States maintained a force of more than 80,000 troops in the ROK, primarily soldiers belonging to the 8th Army. Starting in 1971, this number was reduced to 43,000. The present U.S. strength of 36,000 military personnel consists of 25,000 Army, 10,000 Air Force, and detachments of Naval and Marine forces. The reduction of U.S.
presence is largely compensated for by the increasing strength of the ROK economy and armed forces that took over defense of all but one kilometer of the border in 1971.

STRIKES

Case: Operation Urgent Fury (Grenada, 1983)\(^{34}\)

**Category.** E1. Forces opposing the U.S. strike on Grenada had negligible military capability but were committed to staying in power.

**Result.** Little coercive effort against the regime in Grenada before the U.S. strike. U.S. forces invaded Grenada and forced a regime change after overcoming negligible resistance.

**Case Synopsis.** Although the small island nation of Grenada had been run by a Socialist government since 1979, it maintained good relations with the United States until October 1983, when a military coup resulted in a more radical government and the breakdown of civil society. Worried that the increased presence of Cuban military personnel on the island signaled a pro-Communist Grenada and concerned for the safety of 800 American medical students there, the United States, in coordination with the Organization of American States (OAS), decided to take action.

President Ronald Reagan had paid particular attention to the situation on the island since a 1982 conference with Caribbean leaders in Barbados, concluding that Grenada might serve as an additional Communist beachhead in the Caribbean.\(^{35}\) In March 1983, Reagan voiced his concerns regarding Grenada in an address to Congress, unambiguously identifying the threat to American national security posed by Cuban and Soviet influence in Grenada.\(^{36}\) In light of these

---


initiatives, the October coup and the necessity of launching an invasion can be viewed as a failure in a general deterrence strategy aimed at containing Communist influence in the Western Hemisphere.

The invasion was named Operation Urgent Fury. Consisting primarily of U.S. soldiers, the force’s mission was to capture the Point Salines airfield that was considered to have strategic value, to secure and evacuate the American medical students, and to replace the ruling regime with a democratically elected government. The first mission, capturing the airfield, was performed by U.S. Army Rangers, who parachuted into the target and secured it for the eventual arrival of elements of the 82nd Airborne Division. These soldiers were supported from the air by Air Force AC-130 Spectre gunships and Navy A-7 Corsairs and from sea by the USS Caron. The second part of the mission, securing and evacuating the American medical students, was conducted by a 400-strong Marine Amphibious Unit. The final mission, to establish a democratically elected government, was supported by U.S. Navy SEAL teams that parachuted into the theater to secure the Governor General, who was under house arrest. In all, 1,900 American troops initiated the operation, eventually climbing to a peak presence of 5,000 American and 300 OAS-member soldiers. The mission succeeded at the cost of 19 Americans dead and 119 wounded. U.S. forces were withdrawn from Grenada in 1985.

Case: Operation Just Cause (Panama, 1989–1990)37

Category. E1. The Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) had a negligible military capability, but General Manuel Noriega was committed to remaining in power.

Result. Prestrike efforts to coerce Noriega into leaving office failed. U.S. forces conducted a strike that neutralized the PDF and removed Noriega from power.

Case Synopsis. General Manuel Noriega, the leader of the military regime in Panama, became increasingly hostile to American interests throughout 1989. To protect Americans and American installations

in Panama, capture General Noriega (who was accused of drug trafficking), and install a democratically elected Panamanian government, the United States executed Operation Just Cause in December 1989. Operation Just Cause was a strike designed to arrest General Noriega, who had resisted all efforts to compel him to surrender to U.S. authorities. Based on PLAN 90-2, it called for a complete neutralization and restructuring of the PDF.

To achieve this mission, the Joint Chiefs of Staff formed Joint Task Force South (JTF South). JTF South was based around a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division, two brigades of the 7th Infantry Division, and a Joint Special Operations Task Force based on the 75th Ranger Regiment. These forces, supported by more than 145 aircraft belonging primarily to the 830th Air Division, began their attack on the PDF on December 20. The first strikes, carried out by air dropping elements of the 82nd Airborne and Ranger Regiment, were on Rio Hato, the Torrijos and Tocumen airports, and entry routes to Panama City. The support of F-117 stealth fighters and particularly AC-130 gunships was essential to the early destruction of the PDF command and control network. These entry forces were soon reinforced by the soldiers of the 7th Infantry Division. In all, JTF South required 22,000 Army soldiers, 3,400 airmen, 900 Marines, and 700 sailors. By striking quickly and employing overwhelming force against a poorly led and poorly equipped adversary, JTF South established control over the country within four days. General Noriega was eventually transferred into U.S. custody on January 3. Redeployment began that day with the ultimate target of under 10,000 soldiers, the original strength of SOUTHCOM before Operation Just Cause, being reached by the end of January. The operation officially ended January 11, 1990, with the United States having suffered 23 soldiers killed and 322 wounded, and Panama suffering 297 killed and 123 wounded.

Case: Osirak Reactor Strike (Iraq, 1981)\textsuperscript{38}

\textbf{Category.} E4. Iraq was a major military power by Middle Eastern standards, and its motivation to develop nuclear weapons was extremely high.

Result. Noncoercive strike inflicted temporary damage on the Iraqi nuclear program as intended.

Case Synopsis. The Osirak reactor facility, 12 miles southeast of Baghdad, was a centerpiece of Iraq’s ambitious nuclear weapons development program. Israeli intelligence agents had long worked to impede the Iraqi nuclear program, and two unidentified F-4 aircraft, believed to be Iranian, had attacked the site unsuccessfully in September 1980, early in the Iran-Iraq War. With the plant soon expected to become operational and begin producing weapons-grade uranium and plutonium, after which bombing the reactor would release radioactive fallout, Israeli leaders ordered an air attack against the facility to be launched on Sunday, June 6, 1981. The attacking force consisted of eight F-16A fighter-bombers, each carrying two 1,000-kilogram bombs, escorted by six F-15A fighters. It crossed Jordanian and Saudi airspace prior to entering Iraq, flying at very low altitudes to avoid detection by Iraqi air defense radars and U.S. AWACS patrols over Saudi Arabia. The aircraft attacked the reactor at dusk, surprising the defenders and reportedly hitting the target with all sixteen bombs, destroying it. The Israeli aircraft then returned to base without loss after a round trip of 1,370 miles.

The Osirak attack was a highly successful aerial strike, achieving its physical objective as planned. It did not—and presumably was not intended to—deter Iraq from further efforts to develop nuclear weapons. These programs were subsequently carried on in heavily camouflaged facilities, most of which were unknown to the United States until discovered by weapons inspectors after the 1991 Gulf War, by which time they were very advanced, with Iraq’s first nuclear weapons estimated to have been only several years away.

RAIDS

Case: Operation El Dorado Canyon (Libya, 1986)39

Category. E2. Libya had modest means relative to the U.S. military but was apparently strongly motivated to resist U.S. coercion.

Result. The U.S. attack did not deter further Libyan-supported terrorism.

Case Synopsis. Tensions between the United States and Libya had been mounting for some years when, on April 5, 1986, a discotheque in West Berlin frequented by U.S. servicemen was bombed by terrorists. In response to evidence of Libyan involvement in the attack, the United States launched a multiservice air strike against targets in Libya, code-named Operation El Dorado Canyon, on the night of April 15–16, 1986.

Prestrike photographic and electronic reconnaissance missions were flown by U.S. Air Force and Navy aircraft from bases in Spain, Cyprus, and the United Kingdom. The central element of the attack was 18 USAF F-111F bombers, escorted by three EF-111A electronic warfare aircraft and supported by more than 60 tanker aircraft, which flew 4,000 kilometers each way from bases in England (along a circuitous overwater route through the Strait of Gibraltar because France and Spain denied overflight permission for the mission) to bomb targets in Tripoli. These included the military side of Tripoli airport, a terrorist training facility, and a military barracks that served as a command and control center and as one of Libyan dictator Col. Muammar Qaddafi’s residences. Meanwhile, U.S. Navy and Marine aircraft from the America and Coral Sea carrier battle groups attacked a military airfield and a barracks near Benghazi. Damage to the targets was substantial, although significant collateral damage occurred in the area around the barracks in Tripoli, including damage to several European embassies. One F-111 was lost with its crew as the bombers flew away from their targets.

Assessing the strategic success of the raid is difficult, and 15 years later the debate continues to rage. Its inherently imprecise central objective was to deter Libyan and other support of international terrorism, and, although the overtness of Libyan support for terrorism, particularly against U.S. military personnel in Europe, did decline during the several years following the raid, Libya went on to sponsor the bombing of a Pan American 747 airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988. Popular reactions to the attack in both the United States and Western Europe were largely favorable, although the appearance of a U.S. hard line against terrorism may have been weakened by revela-
tions of the White House’s arms-for-hostages deals with Iran during the same period.

Case: Operation Infinite Reach (Sudan and Afghanistan, 1998)\textsuperscript{40}

Category. E?. Al Qaeda’s destructive capabilities were believed at the time to be trivial by military standards, but the motivation of Osama bin Laden and his followers to resist U.S. coercion was virtually unlimited.

Result. The raids had no discernible coercive impact, and their limited nature may have encouraged the target to expect similarly mild retaliation in response to future attacks.

Case Synopsis. On August 7, 1998, two simultaneous terrorist attacks on American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania killed 224 people, including 12 Americans. Based on information that al Qaeda, a terrorist network headed by Osama bin Laden, had been responsible and was planning additional attacks in the immediate future, the United States unilaterally launched an attack on August 20 against targets inside Afghanistan and Sudan. Using Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles launched from naval vessels, the attacks were timed to simultaneously strike four targets within Afghanistan and one target in Sudan. The targets in Afghanistan, all close to the Pakistani border, were described as training camps connected to Islamic terrorist organizations, including al Qaeda. The target in Sudan was a chemical factory in Khartoum believed to be involved in the manufacture of V-series nerve agents.

The mission of Infinite Reach was to deter future terrorist acts against the United States by demonstrating a willingness and capability to punish terrorist organizations. In addition, there was an effort to reduce future chemical terrorist threats by destroying the Sudanese factory, thereby denying terrorists access to the chemical agents it was believed to produce. Infinite Reach does not appear to have been successful. The United States continues to suspect Osama

bin Laden of promoting terrorism, including the attack on the
destroyer USS Cole in Yemen on October 12, 2000, and the terrorist
attacks in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. The
attack on the factory in Khartoum came under immediate suspicion
after Sudanese officials claimed the factory was engaged in the legal
manufacture of pharmaceuticals, a claim supported by Western
contractors connected with the plant. Documents later revealed dis-
agreements within the American government concerning the accu-
rcy of the information regarding the Sudanese factory and its being
included as a target in Operation Infinite Reach.41