To explore the application of the principles described in Chapter Two, we examined U.S. and foreign coercion cases in four categories along the spectrum of conflict: SASO, SSCs, MTWs, and strikes and raids. Within these categories, we focused on military operations that have an important coercive dimension, as shown below:

- **SASO**: peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations that involve restoring stability through the deterrence of violence or the compellence of parties to comply with the underlying agreements supporting the operations.

- **SSC**: coercion of an adversary whose capabilities and will require significantly less effort than an MTW. We also include an example of a peace enforcement operation designed to deter the outbreak of conflict between Egypt and Israel (MFO [Multinational Force and Observers] Sinai).

- **MTW**: coercion of an adversary whose capabilities and will require substantial military effort to overcome—e.g., Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

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1We also examined a fifth category of the coercive use of military force—“support to civil authorities” (SCA)—and have included three such cases in the Appendix. We do not, however, discuss this category in the main body of the report because we believe that federal military forces, while often important, are complementary to domestic law enforcement and not central to the coercive effort in SCA. Clearly, however, much work needs to be done in the wake of recent events to better understand the role of federal military forces in homeland security—work that falls beyond the scope of this report.
Conventional Coercion Across the Spectrum of Operations

- ** Strikes and Raids:** military operations executed rapidly against adversaries with little capacity to resist, designed to achieve results directly, that may or may not also have a coercive effect.

The case studies are intended to place the theoretical principles of coercion in historical context. They are therefore primarily illustrative and are not intended to be in-depth assessments; neither are they “tests” of the core theory of coercion. Nevertheless, by studying a range of historical cases, even at such a basic level, it is possible to highlight factors that contribute prominently to the outcome of coercive strategies and to offer insights about success or failure and the relative utility of the types of military forces involved.

Two overarching criteria were used to select the cases studied here. First, the project required that cases span the full spectrum of military operations in which coercion is a viable strategy. Second, the study needed to examine both successes and failures of coercion. In addition, to be as comprehensive as possible, cases of both deterrence and compellence within each category of the spectrum of operations were included, and, wherever possible, cases were chosen that varied widely in other respects as well.²

To narrow the case list to a manageable size, several additional factors were considered. More-recent cases, particularly those occurring since the end of the Cold War, were preferred over earlier cases because of their closer relationship to today’s geostrategic environment and state of military affairs. Fifteen of the 30 cases ultimately selected have occurred since 1990, and none of them predates the Korean War. Given the project’s focus on assessing the coercive utility of different military forces, cases in which the military role was

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²Several historical databases were used in the early stages of the case selection process. The Correlates of War database, maintained by the University of Michigan, includes data covering more than 1,000 conflicts from 1816 to 1992. The International Crisis Behavior Project, started by John Wilkenfeld and Michael Brecher, includes almost 900 records describing conflicts from 1918 to 1994. Both of these resources proved useful in the early stages of this project by providing a comprehensive universe of cases, chronologies, and geographical information. However, as the required level of detail increased, the databases proved too general to be of further use. Paul K. Huth’s Cases of Attempted Extended Deterrence catalogs 58 selected cases of deterrence between 1885 and 1983. Because this database was more germane to the subject of the report, it proved to be of greater help in identifying and describing cases of interest.
prominent and well documented were preferred over those in which the military played a minor or uncertain role, and this aspect of the cases is emphasized in the analysis. However, in every instance, the military element complemented a larger strategic effort aimed at achieving the ultimate goal: the successful deterrence of aggression or the redress of aggressive behavior. Finally, because this report is designed primarily to assist U.S. strategists, cases involving the United States dominate the selections. However, a number of cases in which other states were the coercers are examined as well.

One result of applying these nonrandom selection criteria to the universe of possible cases is that the study cannot be used for statistical analysis. For example, the balance between success and failure in the cases presented here should not lead one to conclude that, statistically, a coercive strategy is as likely to succeed as it is to fail. Neither should one conclude that opportunities for coercion are distributed evenly across the spectrum of operations.

Instead, the cases provide a qualitative database for exploring the role of military forces in past coercive strategies. By studying its history, the factors contributing to the success or failure of an operation can be distilled and, after comparison with other operations conducted within and outside that area of the spectrum, an array of common characteristics emerge. It is our hope that by studying these characteristics, military planners at both the tactical and strategic level will have a tool to help them design the most effective possible forces and strategies for deterring or compelling aggressors. The following sections present the findings from the cases, focusing on the coercive potential of military forces, grouped according to where they fall along the spectrum of operations. For readers who desire additional historical details about these operations, a narrative description of each case appears in the Appendix, along with citations of historical sources in which further information can be found.

**STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS**

**Case Analyses**

When a nation's internal security problems exceed the government's ability to address them domestically, a frequent product of deteriorating regimes, the interested parties may agree to a third-party
intervention to preserve order. These operations, classified here as SASO, depend on permissive entry conditions and a secure environment in order to succeed in their effort to maintain and develop the rule of law. They often include both a compellence phase, during which the conditions for a lasting peace are firmly established, and a deterrence phase, during which stability is maintained and reinforced. This pattern appears in each of the three cases discussed here: NATO peace operations in Bosnia, including UNPROFOR, IFOR, and SFOR; humanitarian operations in Somalia, including Operation Provide Relief, Operation Restore Hope, and Operation Continue Hope; and Operation Joint Guardian in Kosovo.\(^3\)

In each of these cases a premium was placed on force protection in order to minimize the costs of intervention for the coercer and to minimize the adversary’s prospects for countercoercion. Force protection can be understood as a function of the rules of engagement (assuming the military capability to act on them), presence, and the threat of armed opposition. As reflected in these cases, SASO are typically distinguished from more-limited paramilitary operations or SCA missions by large areas of responsibility and the threat of armed opposition. The cases show that under these conditions the dynamic between troop presence and force protection often becomes central to the success or failure of the mission, particularly because SASO often only involve secondary or peripheral interests for the coercer.

As demonstrated by these cases, a direct relationship exists among the size of the theater, the size of the deployment, and troop protection. In the Bosnian operations, the intervention forces were charged with protecting the population and disarming belligerent forces. The size of the area of operations (50,000 square miles) demanded a large force to achieve the level of presence necessary both to impose order and to defend against attack. The lightly armed UNPROFOR accommodated to the demands of force protection by concentrating their deployment of 40,000 peacekeepers in and around the six UN-designated “safe areas.” However, this arrangement forfeited any ability to control sources of violence elsewhere in Bosnia. As shown in the subsequent operation, IFOR, this problem

\(^3\)The phase preceding Operation Joint Guardian—Operation Allied Force—is categorized in this report as an SSC and will be examined in the next section.
might have been addressed by deploying a similar number of more heavily armed troops with more-robust rules of engagement throughout the area of operations, had the United Nations and the nations providing the peacekeeping forces been willing to undertake such a mission. In the current phase of Bosnian peacekeeping, SFOR, the number of troops has been reduced. This drawdown was made possible by a reduction of the threat level, while the area of responsibility remained the same. To accomplish the mission with fewer troops, planners retained robust rules of engagement and provided the force with adequate mobility to respond quickly to threats throughout the area of operations.

During operations in Somalia, planners initially miscalculated the role of presence in ensuring stability and accomplishing mission objectives. The first force deployed to the country, Operation Provide Relief (UNOSOM I), initially consisted of only 50 unarmed observers. Despite being reinforced twice and ultimately amounting to 4,269 troops and observers centered in the capital of Mogadishu, the dimensions of the crisis, and of the disintegrating 250,000-square-mile country, dwarfed UNOSOM I. The international community responded with a more robust effort named Operation Restore Hope (UNITAF), which began in December 1992 and eventually deployed 38,000 troops including 28,000 from the United States. The UN mandate for Operation Restore Hope included two important missions: the provision of humanitarian assistance to the Somali people and the restoration of order in southern Somalia. In contrast to the later UN deployment to Bosnia, limiting presence to a few designated “safe areas” was not an option because the mission called for the distribution of assistance throughout the country. To meet their mission, Army planners focused their initial efforts on building bridges and 1,100 kilometers of roads and providing intratheater communications.⁴ These structural improvements and the

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⁴Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), pp. 15–18, 77–82. Communications proved particularly difficult for Army units in Somalia because units commonly operated at distances greater than the range of their tactical FM radios and Mobile Subscriber Equipment. To maintain communication links, Army forces in Somalia had to rely on the very limited number of HF and TACSAT systems available to the force. The commercial INMARSAT system enabled communications between coalition forces and non-governmental organizations.
Conventional Coercion Across the Spectrum of Operations

use of air assault forces permitted the rapid deployment of troops when specific threats arose while also contributing to the distribution of humanitarian aid. The Army further magnified its effective presence by concentrating limited resources on defending high-value targets, such as aid convoys. This strategy, often requiring the dispersal of troops across wide areas, was made possible by the relatively stable security environment and by rules of engagement that preserved impartiality and good relations with the population. Striking this delicate balance between force-protection demands and deploying a limited number of troops through a large area proved essential to the success of Restore Hope.

The emergence of armed opposition greatly increased force protection demands during the final phase of operations in Somalia, Operation Continue Hope (UNOSOM II). The transition to UNOSOM II resulted in a new mission objective: to disarm Somalis regardless of the threat they posed to the peacekeepers. This mission threatened the power base of several Somali factions and increased the resistance directed against UNOSOM II troops, who were now seen as active players in the ongoing struggle for power. The expanded mission and increased threat level demanded an increased presence in the region. However, UNOSOM II forces totaled only 28,000 troops and the U.S. contribution fell to 4,500 Quick Reaction soldiers complemented by Task Force Ranger. To accomplish the mission, the UN commander issued rules of engagement permitting troops to engage armed Somalis without provocation. Rather than increase the security of the peacekeepers, this directive directly contributed to an escalation in violence and the need for still greater force protection.5

Events in Somalia began to unravel in June 1993, when 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed in an ambush. The UN passed a resolution calling for the apprehension of those responsible. On October 2, Task Force Ranger conducted a raid, whose purpose was the capture of Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed, believed to be responsible for the ambush of the Pakistani soldiers. In the ensuing “Battle of Mogadishu,” 18 American soldiers died and 75 were wounded. In the aftermath of the action, the United States made the decision to with-

5Allard, Somalia Operations, pp. 18–20, 35–38.
draw from Somalia. In preparation for the withdrawal, UNOSOM II was reinforced and the planners adapted their tactics and mission objectives to emphasize force protection. The UN experience in Somalia shows the importance of realistically gauging threat levels in order to deploy forces capable of meeting mission objectives. The dimensions of the problem in physical and sociological terms seem to have deceived planners at the opening and closing stages of the crisis, ultimately leading to the overextension of a force lacking the strength and capability to perform its assigned tasks.

UNPROFOR’s deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina shared its central mission with UNOSOM II, the partial disarmament of the local population. Although this task was an ambitious compellence mission in that it demanded a major change in the status quo, UNPROFOR possessed insufficient strength to impose its will. Indeed, the force had insufficient military capability even to defend itself, much less protect the population from concerted attack. These shortcomings derived primarily from an unrealistic assessment by UN force planners of the threat posed by the Bosnian Serb Army. To successfully implement a coercive strategy at this point on the spectrum, a military force must possess an unambiguous capability to control opposing forces.\(^6\) The only capability provided to UNPROFOR that might have deterred a Serbian attack was the threat of NATO air strikes. Both military commanders and political leaders undermined the value of this threat by stating a disinclination to employ air power, and in isolated cases when air strikes were used, by giving the Bosnian Serb Army prior warning. The weakness of UNPROFOR, already understood by Serb commanders, became widely apparent when peacekeepers came under pressure. Lacking the military capability to defend themselves, caused and compounded by a political unwillingness to deploy in strength and provide adequate fire support, UNPROFOR troops were forced to surrender, taken hostage and rendered helpless as Serb troops freely violated designated “safe

\(^6\)Although theory suggests that a coercive strategy can succeed by punishing or threatening to punish an adversary, the case studies suggest that punishment is often not practical at lower levels of conflict. Rather than compel belligerents to comply with demands by inflicting pain until they do so, successful coercive strategies at the SASO level may be better served by working to establish direct control over target populations, coercing through classic deterrence by denial.
areas.” The limited threat at this level of the spectrum allows the coercer, provided the political will exists, to deploy forces possessed of incontestable strength. The case histories suggest the resulting capability for deterrence or compellence by denial contributes greatly to the success of such missions.

**Force Structure Implications of SASO**

The central challenge of SASO is the need to establish a ground-force presence throughout a large area while maintaining an uncontestable level of force protection. Pervasive presence maximizes the intervention force’s coercive power, while force protection limits the adversary’s ability to mount punitive attacks of his own. Although increasing troop mobility allows forces to expand their range to respond to threats as they arise, this approach worked only in relatively low-threat environments. During the opening stages of an operation against potentially significant opposition, the cases strongly support large-scale deployment of ground troops. If security conditions later improve, this raises the likelihood that the number of troops can be safely reduced.

The nature of the troop presence must be appropriate to the security threat posed by potential adversaries. However, these adversaries will not always be immediately apparent during the planning of an operation, which suggests a need for constant reassessment of the true security environment. In general, it seems sufficient to deploy a force capable of defeating any other force or coalition of forces in the theater, but this may not always be a feasible option. The dangers of attempting to coerce an enemy from a position of weakness were vividly demonstrated during UNPROFOR. Increasing force strength,

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8 See James T. Quinlivan, “Flexible Ground Forces,” in Williams, *Holding the Line*, p. 187. Quinlivan attempts to answer the question of the force requirement for SASO by comparing the ratio of peacekeepers to population as that of policemen in a civil society. In the United States, this ratio is two police officers per thousand population. In SASO cases that have required intervention, the ratio has been approximately 20 per thousand (IFOR in Bosnia; KFOR in Kosovo). He also notes that as a specific situation stabilizes over time, the ratio decreases, e.g., SFOR in Bosnia has a ratio of roughly 10 per thousand.
whether through issuing robust rules of engagement or deploying more-heavily-armored forces, may increase coercive power. The former will enhance the adversary’s perceptions of threat credibility, while the latter makes the coercer’s military capability more intimidating, and both may contribute to presence by allowing for the wider dispersal of better-protected forces.

The SASO mission is accomplished primarily through troop presence, making land forces dominant within it, but the force application role of the other services can be important, both for generating the abstract threat of punitive strikes and, in extreme situations, providing the necessary firepower to protect deployed forces from attack. In the two cases above where air support was employed, Somalia and UNPROFOR, this tool was not employed with great effectiveness. In Somalia, the escalation represented by the use of attack helicopters and AC-130 gunships in the pursuit of General Aideed worsened the security environment by aggravating the local population. The failure of commanders to use air power at crucial moments in support of UNPROFOR is well documented but illustrates the unwillingness to employ force that seems disproportionate to the mission of peacekeeping. That analysis, founded on the illusion of a permissive environment, deprived UNPROFOR of the capability to defeat the Serb attack on Srebenica. Had the ground force possessed the organic capability to defeat armored attack or had the commanders demonstrated a willingness to employ air forces to do so, the case analysis suggests that the Bosnian Serb Army would not have staged the assault, just as it was deterred from attacking forces deployed in IFOR and KFOR.

Finally, when establishing the rules of engagement for SASO, it is vital to remember that the primary goal of SASO is to reduce the level of violence. Just as recklessly employing air power would endanger ground troops, approving rules of engagement that provoke open ground combat can also lead to increased risk to the force and ultimately to the failure of the mission. If the security environment requires heavy firepower operating under highly permissive rules of engagement, then planners should reexamine the strategic situation and consider whether SASO is the appropriate response.

9Ibid., p. 107.
SMALLER-SCALE CONTINGENCIES

Case Analyses

SSCs present a greater challenge to decisionmakers attempting to coerce aggressors. In SASO, the threat of organized opposition exists at a low enough level for intervening forces to maintain order by directly controlling the population and potential aggressors. At the SSC level, however, forces must contend with the strength of nation-states or significant nonstate actors backed by both official and popular resolve to resist intervention. For this reason, it is at the level of SSCs that the opponent’s disposition, including both his will and capability to resist, becomes crucial to the employment of coercive strategies. The SSCs examined in this study demonstrate these greater challenges. They are MFO Sinai, Operations Northern and Southern Watch, the British intervention in Kuwait in 1961, the defense of the Falkland Islands, Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti, the Russian campaigns in Chechnya, Operation Allied Force, and the superpower interventions in Afghanistan and Vietnam.

The three dominant characteristics of successful military strategies at the SSC level are correctly understanding the adversary’s goals and his commitment to achieving them; deploying sufficient military capability to frustrate the adversary’s objectives, whether aggressive or defensive; and the ability to isolate the opponent physically and politically. The complexity of SSCs is such that, even when these criteria are satisfied, success is not ensured. Failure is never a trivial prospect, but all the more so at this level of the spectrum, where it usually entails both substantial casualties and the abandonment of significant national interests.

Before pursuing a strategy of military coercion, it is important to determine whether such a strategy has any chance of success. At the SSC level, with the emergence of a capable and well-organized opposition and reduced prospects of directly controlling the population, a military force’s role in coercion lies in its ability to threaten and inflict punishment, denial, or both. In two of the cases studied here, U.S. operations in Vietnam and Soviet operations in Afghanistan, and possibly a third, the crisis in Chechnya, the willingness of the compelled party to withstand punishment exceeded the compeller’s willingness or ability to inflict it. President Raul Cedras of
Haiti, on the other hand, was relatively easy to coerce during Operation Uphold Democracy, in which a credible threat of pain and inevitable defeat (and the offer of a reasonably attractive alternative if he complied) convinced him to change his behavior. While it is not always possible to tell how susceptible an opponent will be to military coercion, applying the guidelines in Chapter Two provides a general indication of the level of effort required to achieve your aims. If an adversary’s will to persist exceeds the coercer’s will to inflict pain, then pursuing a strategy of punitive military coercion will likely lead to failure. That said, it is important to note that a government’s ability to achieve its goals through unfettered military escalation may be tempered by sensibility. On the other hand, by exploiting the increased lethality of conventional weapons while restricting media access to the theater, Russian forces in Chechnya are now achieving limited success against an adversary who appears relatively unsusceptible to coercion.

Having determined that military coercion is technically and politically feasible, it is necessary to design a force with sufficient capability to succeed. At this point it serves to distinguish between deterrence and compellence while accepting that many cases contain elements of both and may shift between the two. The case studies suggest that to successfully deter an adversary it is often necessary to deploy a force capable of defeating a concerted attack in order to convey credibility and hedge against the many intangibles that can contribute to deterrence failure despite an adequate defense. This level of deterrence has been achieved in Operations Northern and Southern Watch, which have successfully deterred major Iraqi violations of the no-fly zones for many years. The uncontestable superiority of Allied air forces has convinced the Iraqi regime to abandon direct challenges to the operations by violating the no-fly zones, though they continue to shoot at planes enforcing the mission, thereby marginally raising the cost of deterrence. The success of other cases, such as the British defense of Kuwait in 1961 and the MFO Sinai, presents more-ambiguous evidence about the role of military forces in preserving the status quo. The MFO Sinai in particular presents a quandary because the force, while certainly contributing to the stability of the region, is utterly incapable of confronting an attack from either party. Likewise, the MFO’s function as a trip wire is obviated by its limited mobility and presence. An
attacking force could avoid engaging the MFO Sinai by simply circumventing it.

The case of unsuccessful deterrence of an SSC studied here, Britain’s failure to deter Argentine forces from invading the Falkland Islands in 1982, illustrates what can happen when the international relationship crumbles and a state attempts to achieve its goals through military means, believing that it is capable of doing so and can escape excessively costly retaliation. Prior to the invasion, Britain garrisoned the Falklands with a small force of approximately 40 Royal Marines. Although it would have been difficult to maintain a ground force capable of repelling a full-scale invasion by Argentina on the remote island group, or even to maintain the necessary naval forces offshore, a consistent policy of declaring commitment to the Falklands’ defense and maintaining a force capable of a significant defense would have contributed greatly to deterrence. Furthermore, had the British government correctly understood the pressure felt by the Argentine junta to generate a military victory for domestic political reasons and had they reacted forcefully to previous incidents suggesting a rise in Argentine nationalism toward the islands, it is possible that a simple reinforcement would have communicated the necessary commitment to Buenos Aires.

Compellence missions, those in which the objective is to change an adversary’s current behavior, generally require a more overt demonstration of capability and commitment, often including the discriminate application of force. Although there is one case in this set, Operation Restore Democracy, in which the threat of force alone compelled an adversary, the other cases examined here indicate that successful compellence at the SSC level often requires a liberal, and sometimes drastic, application of force. During Operation Allied Force, the Serbian leadership in Belgrade decided to end the bombing campaign by agreeing to withdraw from Kosovo and allow NATO peacekeepers to occupy the province. This decision was influenced in large part by diminishing public support for the regime, the result of intense targeting of dual-use infrastructure targets, such as electric power plants, which stressed both the economy and popular support for the war.\textsuperscript{10} The second phase, named Operation Joint Guardian,

\textsuperscript{10}Hosmer, \textit{The Conflict over Kosovo}. 


deterred aggression between the Kosovo Liberation Army and the Serbian Army while protecting the population from unorganized social unrest.

Early in the Algerian Civil War, the French successfully compelled insurgents to stop crossing border areas by setting up an elaborate system of frontier defenses. While this system existed, from 1957 to 1958, external support for the Algerian rebels was reduced by 90 percent, significantly increasing their vulnerability to French counter-insurgency operations. Compared with the discriminate use of air power in Kosovo, the French method appears crude, but at the time it was heralded as a remarkable advance in warfighting. The common aspect of these two examples is that they directly addressed the factors enabling resistance, demonstrating the importance of identifying and targeting the assets your adversary needs to continue to struggle.

In each of these cases, the ability to isolate the adversary in either the political or physical dimension accompanied a successful outcome. The agreement reached during Operation Allied Force to include Russia in a subsequent peacekeeping force, for instance, not only deprived Serbia of a potential ally but also had the added benefit of making the prospect of the intervention less threatening, thus lowering the expected costs of compliance with NATO’s demands. Coalition-building, though it affects military strategy, is primarily a diplomatic tool and was used as such in Restore Democracy, Northern and Southern Watch, Kuwait in 1961, and Allied Force. An alternative to coalition-building is to obstruct the adversary’s attempts to establish contacts with outside supporters. This was the method used by Russia in the second Chechen campaign after the campaign of 1996 provoked international criticism. By restricting media access and the movement of Chechen diplomats, the Russians effectively isolated the conflict, disheartening their adversary and freeing their hands to employ severe tactics.

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13The Russian ability to isolate Chechnya from world media scrutiny seems to be weakening as their casualties mount and the conflict drags on.
Using military force to isolate an adversary is sometimes possible but usually requires a great deal of effort. The French effectively isolated Algeria by sealing its borders and controlling movement throughout the huge country with a series of checkpoints and active patrols. However, the effort required to maintain the Quadrillage, as the strategy came to be known, completely occupied tens of thousands of French soldiers and was abandoned after a year. During the Vietnam War, targeting the sanctuary countries of Laos and Cambodia was frequently cited as the key to victory in South Vietnam. The military employed both air and land forces to interdict supply routes and attack Vietnamese forces in these countries. Fundamental errors in determining the susceptibility of the enemy to coercion, however, ultimately caused these costly efforts to fail to achieve their larger strategic goals.  

**Force Structure Implications of SSCs**

Because conflict at the SSC level anticipates a well-armed opposing force, any military deployment must possess robust defensive and offensive capabilities to accomplish its mission. The specific force mix deployed depends on the adversary’s willingness to resist and its specific capabilities, the terrain, the availability of high-value targets, and the willingness of the coercer to escalate the conflict. This range of factors contributed to a wide range of forces being deployed in the cases studied here, though almost all were joint forces. Although the cases suggest that one-dimensional forces can successfully deter one-dimensional threats, in compellence missions it is useful to be able to adjust the threat and application of force according to your adversary’s behavior, and coercive flexibility is enhanced by the capability to conduct operations in several dimensions—for example, threatening aerial bombardment or a ground invasion to achieve mission objectives.

In the MFO Sinai and Northern and Southern Watch, the coercive strategy was dominated by a single service, the Army and the Air Force, respectively. The Army is particularly well suited to long-term peacekeeping deployments, such as the MFO Sinai, because it com-
bines sustainability with the ability to conduct sustained local observation of ground forces in the region. In this case, the limited capacity of the single-service deployment can be seen as a benefit because it renders the force incapable of exceeding its mandate or posing a threat to either Israel or Egypt. Likewise, Operations Northern and Southern Watch are primarily single-service because their mission extends only to enforcing the no-fly zones, although the deployment of ground troops to these missions is necessary to provide base security.

In more-challenging scenarios as represented by the majority of the cases studied here, the missions did call for joint deployments, particularly when the objective was to compel the adversary. One advantage conferred by joint forces was operational versatility. A good example of this is Operation Uphold Democracy. It was communicated to President Cedras that the 82nd Airborne Division troops en route to Haiti were prepared to fight when they arrived. Convinced, Cedras capitulated, and the same soldiers conducted an unopposed occupation. When the situation on the ground is uncertain or liable to change on short notice, the ability to deploy versatile assets to the theater holds great value. Ground forces distinguish themselves for their operational versatility, though had Cedras not capitulated, the soldiers of the 82nd Airborne would certainly have benefited from the presence and capability of joint fires.

Insofar as jointness is associated with increased capability, joint forces also help convey a message to the adversary: things could get worse. Successful compellence depends on the adversary considering the cost of compliance and comparing it with the cost of further resistance. Joint forces, even when they are not used, expand the coercer’s escalatory options. Although it was never employed, the deployment of Task Force Hawk to Albania during Operation Allied Force, in conjunction with ground forces deployed along the Kosovo-Macedonia border and the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) offshore, may have influenced Milosevic’s decision to comply with NATO’s demands by making the threat of an eventual NATO invasion of Serbia more tangible and credible.15

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15The reasons for Milosevic’s capitulation are still the subject of active controversy. See, for example, Hosmer, The Conflict over Kosovo, and Byman and Waxman, “Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate.”
Finally, deploying a flexible force anticipates future stages of the crisis. The great capacity of air and naval forces to apply long-range firepower may be essential in the opening stages of an operation when there is a high-risk environment created by an aggressive adversary. The ability to strike high-value targets with virtual impunity can be of great coercive value. If the adversary refuses to comply with the coercive demands, he may then find land forces more compelling because of their ability to seize and hold territory, which is often reason enough to include them in a force package. If the adversary does agree to the coercer’s demands, then it is often necessary to deploy ground troops to secure and verify territorial or jurisdictional concessions. In the later stages of a successful mission, particularly if it transitions to something resembling a SASO, it is likely that ground forces will come to dominate. Even then, however, the availability of air and naval forces continues to provide valuable force protection and coercive leverage. In cases where maintaining the desired end-state will require capabilities different from those needed to attain it, the initial creation of a joint task force facilitates the transition while providing the framework for success.

The nature of the mission will indicate whether a joint or single-service deployment is appropriate, but other factors, such as target quality and the expected length of the mission, should also be considered when designing a force. Target quality refers to the availability and vulnerability of targets contributing to a regime’s ability or willingness to resist. In some less-developed countries or when confronting certain nonstate actors, such targets may be difficult to identify or entirely nonexistent, greatly limiting the coercive value of naval or air power and leaving the job of military coercion almost entirely in the hands of ground forces because of their ability to occupy, to police, and in general to interact with local populations on a continuous, face-to-face basis. On the other hand, even against less-than-modern and nonstate adversaries, appropriate intelligence and strategy may enable air or naval power to contribute substan-

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16If what your adversary values most, or what his survival depends on, is an asset that is intrinsically difficult to target, religious identity for example, it will contribute greatly to his ability to resist military coercive strategies.
ially to military coercion by attacking important denial or punishment targets. A final consideration that affects force design at the SSC level should be the expected length of the operation. Although end-states and exit strategies are often much harder to foresee in reality than some strategists like to admit, analyzing your enemy’s capability and commitment (Table 2.1) makes it possible to estimate the amount of coercive effort that will be required to succeed. The longer a force expects to be engaged, the greater the need for sustainability and logistics infrastructure. The Army possesses unique capabilities in this area, and these should be exploited. Furthermore, an initial Army presence provides the kernel for future reinforcements, a useful hedge against uncertainty and unanticipated mission demands.

MAJOR THEATER WARS

Case Analyses

The military plays the central role in coercive strategies at the MTW level. The case studies show that at the outset of an MTW the political will required to act decisively usually exists, primarily because a developing crisis threatens vital national interests, and this level of commitment facilitates coercive efforts. On the other hand, by definition the adversaries encountered at this level of conflict possess considerable resources of their own with which to resist and to coerce their enemies in turn, including powerful armed forces and strong allies that can complicate attempts to pressure them through political or economic isolation.

Neither of the two primary cases examined here represents absolute successes or failures of coercion for either actor. Rather, specific aspects of the two cases studied, the conflict on the Korean peninsula from 1950 to the present and the conflict with Iraq from 1990 to 1991, provide a variety of outcomes of coercive strategy at the MTW

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level. Two other cases provide ambiguous, yet provocative, examples of deterrence at the MTW level. These are Operation Vigilant Warrior and the Chinese objections to a U.S. invasion of North Vietnam. While the first two cases rest primarily on a comparison of capability and will, the latter two are more complex, involving hidden intentions and ghosts from the past.

All conflict begins with an initial failure of deterrence. In the case of the Korean War, South Korea and the United States failed to deter an invasion from the North. Although several factors contributed to this event, certainly including the weakness of the South Korean Army compared with that of the North, U.S. statements prior to the invasion have drawn particular attention from historians. As part of a general military drawdown following World War II, the Truman administration declared its limited interests in Asia, explicitly excluding the Korean peninsula. The North Korean government, confident that its aggression would not provoke a response from America, welcomed this statement of noninterference and prepared for the invasion. At a later stage in the Korean War, as UN troops invaded the North and pushed toward the Yalu River, another failure of deterrence took place. Despite repeated warnings from China that it would not tolerate a UN invasion of North Korea, the UN Command (UNC) pressed on, eventually prompting the open involvement of China in the conflict and leading to a two-year stalemate. Had Chinese deterrent threats been less ambiguous, and had the Chinese military preparation for intervention been more visible, it is possible that the UNC would have yielded. Thus, both of these examples demonstrate the importance of clearly communicating demands and expectations in coercion, even if clarity comes at the expense of military operational secrecy.

Following the initial failure of deterrence in the Korean War, North Korean forces advanced rapidly down the peninsula. To confront the force and compel the North to halt the invasion and withdraw beyond the 38th parallel, a decision was made to deploy U.S. troops stationed in Japan. The centerpiece of this deployment was Task Force Smith, consisting of 500 ground troops with artillery support but no air or naval assets and largely ineffective antitank weapons. Paul Wolfowitz, now Deputy Secretary of Defense, once described
the deployment as “too late to deter, too weak, too small, too ill-equipped and too ill-trained to defend, but large enough to die.” North Korea was not deterred, and Task Force Smith suffered heavy casualties. By responding with a small ground force that was difficult to protect and unsupported by air or naval forces, the planners demonstrated a total misapprehension of their adversary’s will and capability. This aspect of the Korean War, and the deaths of American soldiers placed haplessly in harm’s way, demonstrates the gravity of coercive strategy at the MTW level and the continued importance of force protection considerations despite imminent threats to national interests.

The aftermath of the Korean War created conditions for classic conventional deterrence. The 38th parallel became a highly fortified Demilitarized Zone, lined on both sides by minefields, artillery emplacements, and large armies. The threat these defenses posed to both sides and the geopolitical and escalatory constraints of the Cold War have allowed the stalemate to prevail since 1953 with only minor incursions from the North. As the South Korean economy and armed forces subsequently grew stronger, the United States was comfortable reducing its presence and gradually drew down the size of its force deployment to South Korea. Some observers argue that the South Korean Army is now strong enough to deter, and probably defeat, an invasion by an adversary weakened by corruption, famine, and political isolation and therefore advocate that the United States withdraw its remaining 36,000 troops stationed on the peninsula. These analyses generally discount the argument that the U.S. troop presence is symbolically significant, signaling a clear commitment to South Korea, and that these troops project a stabilizing influence throughout East Asia.

A secondary case of coercion studied at the MTW level derived indirectly from the aftermath of hostilities on the Korean peninsula. During the Vietnam War, the Chinese government, as it had during

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the UN intervention in Korea, opposed the presence of U.S. troops in Vietnam and supported the North Vietnamese government during its conflict with the South. U.S. government documents indicate that fear of China entering the war on North Vietnam’s behalf contributed to the U.S. decision not to invade North Vietnam, and it also led to restrictions on the use of U.S. air power over the North.\footnote{William C. Gibbons, \textit{The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships. Part IV: July 1965–January 1968} (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 102–107.} This fear was driven in large part by the parallels between this conflict and the Korean War, particularly the role played by China.\footnote{See Yuen Foong Khong, \textit{Analogies at War} (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992).} Chinese leaders actively objected to the war in South Vietnam and made unambiguous statements regarding their interests in the North, and their deterrence strategy was greatly strengthened by a recent historical precedent that gave credibility to their threats.

The history of Iraq’s confrontation with its neighbors and the Western world since 1990 reveals a variety of coercive strategies succeeding and failing by degrees. Like the Korean conflict, the history discussed here begins with a fateful misunderstanding. At a meeting held on July 25, 1990, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie reportedly told Saddam Hussein:

\begin{quote}
We have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait. I was in the American Embassy in Kuwait during the late 60’s. The instruction we had during this period was that we should express no opinion on this issue and that the issue is not associated with America. James Baker has directed our official spokesmen to emphasize this instruction. . . . I received an instruction to ask you, in the spirit of friendship—not in the spirit of confrontation—regarding your intentions.\footnote{“Excerpts from Iraqi Document on Meeting with U.S. Envoy,” \textit{New York Times}, September 23, 1990.}
\end{quote}

It has been suggested that Ambassador Glaspie did not unambiguously express U.S. support for Kuwait and that this might have contributed to the failure of deterrence and the Iraqi decision to invade in early August. However, Richard Haass recognizes that Ambas-
sador Glaspie might have “jacked up her message 10 percent in terms of firmness” but attributes Iraq’s aggression to broader psychological and historical causes:

Saddam probably figured he could do it quickly, as he could militarily, and the Arab world and the world at large would bitch and moan for a couple of days, and then people would get used to it. And the world would essentially learn to live with it. And the United States, which had left Lebanon a decade before and so forth was not going to do anything.23

The initial U.S. deployment to the theater in August 1990 performed both a deterrent and a compellent mission. The ultimate strategic objective of the deployment, known as Operation Desert Shield, was to drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Even when coalition forces were vastly outnumbered in August, and before there was any approval to use force to achieve this objective, commanders still demanded that Iraq withdraw, although they understood this was not likely to succeed.24 The more immediate mission of operation Desert Shield was to deter Iraqi forces from invading Saudi Arabia, particularly the ports that would be necessary for unloading follow-on forces. For this mission, the ready brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division and several Air Force fighter squadrons were deployed in the days following the invasion of Kuwait. Fortunately for the soldiers, Iraq did not invade Saudi Arabia. Neither is there any indication that this was ever its intention. Although it was a light force with low mobility and little offensive capability, the 82nd performed a vital function by instantly reassuring America’s allies, adding weight to diplomatic initiatives in the UN, and creating a ground presence for future reinforcements to build on.

Following the initial deployment several steps were made to strengthen the coercive effort. First, Iraq was isolated by an economic embargo and the condemnation of Arab nations from whom Saddam Hussein might have expected assistance. Second, the force

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was strengthened, first to a level capable of defending Saudi Arabia, then to a level more than sufficient for attacking and defeating Iraqi forces. As then–Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney recalled later:

In August all we had over there initially was the ready brigade of the 82nd Airborne and wing of F-15s from Langley [AFB] in Virginia and relatively small forces at the outset, so it wasn’t really until the end of August that we began to feel fairly comfortable with the size forces we were getting there. That we could respond aggressively if he were to launch an attack. In September, as you move through the month of September and U.S. forces have arrived, the 24th from Fort Jackson the other kinds of heavy forces began to flow into the region, elements of the 101st, the Marines and so forth and then you begin to feel that you’ve achieved your first stage objective which is to be able to defend Saudi Arabia. Then you move into the second phase, which is, OK—now what are we going to do to get this guy out of Kuwait?25

The hope was that the combination of economic and diplomatic isolation, reinforced by a threat to destroy both his military and economic infrastructure, would prove sufficient to persuade Saddam Hussein to abandon Kuwait. However, a strong commitment to resist, perhaps fortified by doubting the coalition’s political will to proceed, led the Iraqi regime to refuse all demands regardless of the strength of the opposing force or the hardships endured or threatened, until the coalition air and ground offensive in early 1991 drove Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

In addition to the main coercive effort, the United States and its allies also faced the threat that Iraq would employ chemical, biological, or even nuclear weapons. It was known that Iraq possessed chemical and biological agents and had used the former in past conflicts against Iran and the Iraqi Kurdish population. While these weapons are of limited utility in desert environments and the coalition troops were well prepared to deal with them—probably far better prepared than their Iraqi counterparts—the danger was real and demanded a response. The United States communicated to Iraq that “in the event of a first use of a weapon of mass destruction by Iraq, the United States reserved the right to use any form of retaliation (presum-

25Ibid.
ably up to and including nuclear weapons).”26 and similar threats were issued by the United Kingdom and Israel. Again, whether Iraq actually intended to employ unconventional weapons is unknown. What can be said is that Iraq had the capability to use WMD but chose not to do so. Against a larger unsuccessful effort to compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait without using force, this success in deterring the use of unconventional weapons stands out.

The survival of Saddam Hussein’s regime at the conclusion of Operation Desert Storm necessitated subsequent missions to coerce the damaged but unvanquished Iraqi military. Chief among these efforts were Operations Northern and Southern Watch, discussed in the previous section, and Operation Vigilant Warrior. Operation Vigilant Warrior responded to events similar to those of 1961, when the British reinforced the Kuwaiti border in the face of what appeared to be an imminent Iraqi invasion. In 1994, the United States responded in strength to provocative mobilizations inside Iraq, rapidly fielding a brigade of armor that had been prepositioned in the theater and deploying large numbers of aircraft. Although Iraq’s true motives and intentions in this case remain obscure, the strength of the joint force would have been sufficient to engage and defeat any advancing forces. Provided Iraqi leaders understood this danger of proceeding, and the objective of the mobilization had not already been satisfied, it can reasonably be inferred that deterrence prevailed.

**Force Structure Implications of MTWs**

To identify force mixes appropriate for deterrence at the MTW level, it is instructive to look at the current U.S. deployments in Korea and Southwest Asia. MTW threats are few, and the two most threatening scenarios are currently being addressed effectively through military, diplomatic, and economic means. This triad of coercive strategies is essential to any long-term effort, and, because the issues involved in MTW scenarios are immense, it is generally difficult to determine when a crisis will end, suggesting that planners should hedge against the possibility of a long-term commitment. For that reason, deterrent strategies at the MTW level must incorporate sustainable mili-

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Conventional Coercion Across the Spectrum of Operations

Military forces with the ability to protect and retaliate against a well-armed adversary in a high-threat environment. This mission calls for both the permanence of ground troops and the range and striking power of air assets.

Ground troops are essential for several reasons. First, because the objective of most aggressors at this level is territorial, the deployment of ground forces, whether American or allied, directly addresses the need to take, hold, and control terrain. Second, these missions usually require lengthy deployments, and the Army has the ability both to sustain itself and to contribute to the support of other services. Finally, the presence of ground troops, though often seen as a burden on local communities, reflects and should reinforce the unity between governments and their shared commitment to a cause. This restricts an adversary’s ability to believe that he can aggressively pursue his goals without provoking a response from the United States.

The two MTWs studied in this section both began with an aggressor misunderstanding American intentions. Deployed ground troops clarify matters considerably.

In compellence operations, the importance of deploying robust joint forces is magnified. While ground troops should never operate alone at the MTW level, the study suggests that an even greater role should be played by air and naval forces when the mission objective centers on compelling rather than deterring an adversary. Except for operations against landlocked adversaries, the Navy provides unique compellent value as a blockading force, diplomatically and economically isolating the adversary in order to pressure him to concede to stated demands. When the application of force is necessary to compel an adversary, air assets prove particularly useful. Air power provides the ability to strike quickly and discriminately against major targets while remaining highly protected from opposing fire and the option of being safely based in Allied or CONUS facilities, further reducing the force-protection demands of an operation.  

Furthermore, in these delicate missions, air power benefits from being amenable to

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27 A recent report studies the evolving threats to expeditionary Air Force basing and the demands of defending vulnerable installations through such advancements as Theater Missile Defense. See John Stillion and David T. Orletsy, Airbase Vulnerability to Conventional Cruise-Missile and Ballistic-Missile Attacks: Technology, Scenarios, and U.S. Air Force Responses (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, MR-1028-AF, 1999).
centralized control and therefore responsive to real-time crisis management at the highest levels. That said, to sustain and protect deployed air forces, it is often necessary that they be accompanied by a robust ground presence.

One of the key factors used by an aggressor contemplating an attack is the balance of power in the immediate theater, disregarding the more abstract, and therefore contestable, elements of military power that could potentially be brought to bear by his opponent’s allies. The United States has identified two scenarios that threaten MTW and taken steps to address this tendency in these cases. This has emphasized two different methods, each of which offers significant deterrent value: prepositioning and forward deployment.

In Southwest Asia the United States has prepositioned military equipment and munitions to shorten the response time to deal with threatening behavior by Iraq. The ability to respond was demonstrated in Operations Vigilant Warrior (1994), Vigilant Sentinel (1995) and Desert Thunder (1997–1998). The Army maintains the AWR-5 Set (one armor brigade) ashore in Kuwait, the AWR-3 (one armor brigade, four maneuver battalions and a direct support artillery battalion) afloat in the Persian Gulf, and another armor brigade with a full division headquarters prepositioned in Qatar. The brigade in Kuwait is constantly exercised by approximately 5,000 soldiers, while the equipment afloat and in Qatar is exercised and available for troops from the United States to fall in on whenever the situation demands. The Army’s position is complemented by the presence of approximately 170 aircraft, in addition to the aircraft dedicated to Operations Northern and Southern Watch. The combined presence, JTF-SWA, has successfully responded to increased tension in the theater five times since the end of Desert Storm by dramatically altering the immediate balance of power. Furthermore, JTF-SWA demonstrated its worth not only in deterring attacks on Kuwait but also in pressuring Iraq’s regime during negotiations with the UN, thereby acting as a compellent force.

The second method to alter the immediate balance of power in extended deterrence is through forward deployment, the linchpin of

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conventional deterrence in Europe and Korea during the Cold War. This requires much greater political will than some other coercive strategies, not only on the part of the United States but also in the host country. The coercive value of strong forward deployment is unmatchable, however, and, when conflict at the MTW level is at stake, forward deployment is a prudent measure if it is possible.

STRIKES AND RAIDS

Case Analyses

Two other mission categories fall outside the spectrum of operations in that their desired effects are not directly related to the level of effort expended to achieve them. These operations, known as strikes and raids, are germane to the discussion of coercion because they represent alternatives to coercive strategies. Rather than applying pressure to valued assets or regime stability, strikes and raids address the primary objective of the mission directly through the application of pure force. Often this option follows a failed effort to compel an adversary. The two operation types relate differently to coercion and will be dealt with here in separate sections.

Strikes. A strike is an extreme, unconditional military response to a political problem, usually one caused by a failed diplomatic strategy. The decision to execute a strike suggests a total abandonment of coercion, for it deprives your adversary of any control over the situation, even the opportunity to accommodate to your demands peacefully. The occurrence of strikes is noteworthy because they pit determined adversaries with vastly disparate military capabilities against each other. Furthermore, strikes demonstrate the unique capability of the military to achieve strategic objectives against weak adversaries unconditionally and in a short amount of time.

The strikes addressed in this study are Operation Urgent Fury (the invasion of Grenada), Operation Just Cause (the invasion of Panama), Israel’s strike on the Osirak reactor site, and the Soviet Union’s interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Each represents a “pure force” military approach to address perceived threats to national interests. The choice to use military force to mount a strike is typically a product of the strategic requirement that the interest be secured quickly and without negotiations that could result in delay,
compromise solutions, or political obstruction. The ultimate success of a strike operation should never be in doubt due to the great disparity in capability between the adversaries. The case analysis identified three key elements of strike operations that maximized their effectiveness. These characteristics were the use of overwhelming force; the speed of the entire process, including both political decisionmaking and military responsiveness; and the element of surprise.

These characteristics were present in each of the strike cases except for Operation Just Cause. This operation, whose objective was the arrest and extradition of Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega, developed under unique circumstances that caused planners to deviate from the standard strike. Instead of attacking without warning and forgoing diplomatic efforts to achieve the aim, the planners of Just Cause issued demands and warnings suggestive of a compellence strategy. Perhaps because a major joint command, SOUTHCOM, was located in Panama, planners felt they could compel Noriega by issuing threats and slowly building up forces. If this is true, they significantly underestimated Noriega’s will to resist. Because of Noriega’s relative isolation and the unlikelihood of an international outcry following his apprehension, there was little risk to the United States in following a less aggressive path. In general, however, the faster a strike operation is executed the more successful it is likely to be. Just as every aggressor wishes to present the world with a fait accompli, so to should strike planners design operations that will achieve their mission before third parties can come to the aid of their adversary.

**Force Structure Implications of Strikes.** The forces appropriate for a strike operation depend on the nature of the target. To deny Iraq the ability to develop nuclear weapons, Israel executed a successful aerial strike while minimizing collateral damage by striking before the facility became operational. In the other four cases, where the mission objective was to effect a regime change, planners deployed rapid-reaction land forces followed by heavier troops. The value of rapid deployment was most clearly demonstrated during the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia to “help the Czechoslovak working people in their struggle against reactionary forces and to protect
Czechoslovakia’s security against the intrigues of imperialism.”

Airborne troops were used to seize the airport and television station during the opening stages of this operation while ground forces attacked across the borders. Because strike operations often provoke charges of illegality or hegemony, experience suggests that whichever forces can act most quickly and with a minimum of collateral damage should be chosen to initiate the attack. In this way the initiator can secure his threatened interests without interference at crucial stages of the operation and marginalize ensuing diplomatic and humanitarian complaints.

**Raids.** Raids involve the “swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or destroy installations.”

Generally, raids have been employed to punish adversaries when more-extensive military operations have not been desirable, but the other instruments of national power have not achieved the desired outcomes. Thus they may contribute to a larger coercive strategy but are not maintained until the enemy complies with a set of demands.

This study evaluated two raids: Operation El Dorado Canyon against Libya in 1986 and the 1998 U.S. cruise missile attacks on Sudan and Afghanistan. Both operations were provoked by terrorist acts. The dimensions of the offending acts demanded a response from the United States to support its antiterrorism platform and deter future acts, but it is unclear whether either of these goals were achieved. There is a risk after every raid that it will be perceived as an act of illegal and arbitrary retaliation. For that reason, it is vital that planners identify, and verify, legitimate strategic targets, the destruction of which will directly impair the ability of the adversary to pursue aggressive policies.

**Force Structure Implications of Raids.** Air assets, particularly cruise missiles and other standoff munitions, or in some cases long-range artillery, are typically used to execute raids. Because the objective is

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30 Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-07*, p. III-15. Furthermore, when forces are inserted in enemy territory during a raid, they are withdrawn upon completion of the mission.
generally limited to “sending a message” by inflicting pain, there is usually little reason to incur the risks involved in creating a presence on the ground. Nevertheless, situations may exist where the operational objectives require ground forces, which will typically be special operations forces. The amount and types of force employed on a raid depend on the degree of punishment desired and can be further constrained by force-protection concerns, such as using cruise missiles instead of manned aircraft to conduct the raid.

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31The first publicized U.S. ground operation in Afghanistan in October 2001, a raid by Rangers against a target near Kandahar, is an example of such a case.