This book reflects the reshaping of defense analysis that went on at RAND and elsewhere after Desert Storm and the fall of communism—i.e., the movement away from a focus on the awesome predictability of the Soviet threat toward contemplation of a world that had become, if less dangerous, surely more uncertain. In place of the Cold War’s one overriding potential foe, there were now numerous possible threats, so the Department of Defense (DoD) moved, haltingly, from single planning scenarios to planning for two major wars and, ultimately, to planning based not on threats or scenarios but on the capabilities needed for a fast-changing world. It is no surprise that this book, and the body of work that lies behind it, is dominated by techniques for dealing with uncertainty and, uncertainty’s obverse, the explosion in information that also characterizes today’s world—and tomorrow’s.

In its efforts to understand and frame policy for this changing world, RAND developed new analytic techniques, such as exploratory modeling, and a wider range of its analyses became relevant, reflecting the changing nature of security. Peace and humanitarian operations, for instance, required the U.S. military to deal with not only a wide range of coalition partners, but also with private nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The same was the case as RAND thought through the problem of protecting critical national infrastructures (such as that for information), infrastructures that are no less a national asset for being mostly in private hands.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have now ushered in a new world, one still far from being fully apprehended by the Ameri-
can people or their leaders. Not only have the potential threats become still more diverse, but some of the fundamental distinctions of planning have been overturned. The United States planned—and still must plan—to project force over large distances. But it now must also deal with threats right at home. Comfortable distinctions between “foreign” and “domestic” were already being eroded by the rise of the global economy. Terrorism does not respect them at all.

The world before us will require RAND and its fellow organizations to further develop the approaches and techniques in this book. Planning will be increasingly stretched by the blizzard of uncertainty and the range of capabilities that might be needed. How much and how the U.S. military will be involved in homeland security remain to be seen, but surely the change from the world of the Cold War will be marked. Interactions defying other comfortable distinctions—those between “government” and “the private sector”—will also intensify, calling forth new ways of understanding new kinds of partnerships.

Terrorism surely is a grave threat, but it is not exclusively or even primarily a military threat—another manifestation of the changing nature of security. Now, as the world confounds comfortable distinctions, it also calls on a wider range of RAND analyses and impels collaborations that were infrequent before. Techniques from what used to be thought of as RAND’s “domestic work” are more and more relevant to the nation’s security, rather than just its well-being. RAND Health, for instance, has moved quickly to make its knowledge of medicine and health-care delivery available to those planning against biological or chemical terror. The kind of partnership between health care and national security professionals that was often discussed but seldom occurred is now happening. RAND’s next volume on challenges and techniques for defense and security decisionmaking will be enriched by work from not just health, but from survey research, criminal justice and public safety, insurance and infrastructure protection, and other realms of RAND research.