Changes in the international environment are placing new pressures on Turkish policymakers and the Turkish public and are having important effects on Turkish policy. This is particularly true given the magnitude and rapidity of developments in adjacent regions, whether in the Balkans, the Caucasus, or the Middle East. These pressures alone would be stressful for Turkish foreign and security policymaking, which has a tradition of marked conservatism.

At the same time, Turkey confronts changes on the domestic scene that are arguably even more significant in their foreign and security policy implications. Turkey remains embroiled in a severe economic crisis that most Turks view as political at its base. The way Turkey responds to these economic and political challenges will shape Turkish society, perhaps for decades to come. It will also be a leading determinant of Turkey’s freedom of action and the direction of Turkish policy on the international scene in the coming years.

This chapter explores key issues at the nexus of internal change and Turkey’s foreign and security policy behavior, against a background of economic and political turmoil. These include the future of the state, the rise of new political and economic actors, the changing role of public opinion, the primacy of internal security considerations in Turkish policy, and the future role of Turkey’s Islamists and nationalists.

AN ECONOMIC—AND POLITICAL—CRISIS

The financial crisis of November 2000, and the much more severe crisis of February 2001, were precipitated by a liquidity crisis expos-
between Prime Minister Ecevit and President Sezer, but the underlying causes are deep-seated and structural. The rescue package, organized by the IMF and the World Bank in the winter of 2000–2001, amounted to some $16 billion and was tied to a stringent program of austerity, privatization, and banking sector reform. By the fall of 2001, it became clear that further “bailouts” by international financial institutions would be required. The ongoing economic crisis has been especially painful for the more modern sectors and regions, with Istanbul particularly hard hit. The Turkish lira lost almost 50 percent of its value, virtually overnight, and nearly 65 percent by October 2001. Unemployment mounted rapidly in the financial sector, affecting many younger, urban Turks. The collapse of the commercial credit system had a pronounced effect on small and medium-sized enterprises across the country. Turkish and foreign observers began to openly speculate about the prospects for social unrest and more violent protest. The economic reform package, above all, changes in the banking sector, will have enormous implications for Turkish politics because the old system of patronage using state-controlled banks has been the basis for funding and influence of Turkey’s leading political parties.

The foreign and security policy effects of Turkey’s economic crisis could be profound and may be assessed at three levels. First, Turkey’s near-term reform choices will shape the country’s domestic development and foreign orientation. Since the end of the Cold War, observers have often described Turkey as being at a crossroads. In previous crises, Turkey has simply “muddled through” without pronounced changes in course. By contrast, the events of 2000–2001 have clearly led Turkey to a crossroads, by any definition, and muddling through is unlikely to suffice.

Turkey faces two possible paths. On the one hand, successful implementation of the IMF-inspired economic reforms will require a degree of political change that could facilitate more rapid reforms, greater democratization, and the steps required for closer integration in Europe and the continued modernization of Turkish society. This very positive path would encourage an active but Western-oriented and multilateral foreign policy—in short, a more moderate and predictable Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey’s conservatism and
statism (common on the left as well as the right) may impede economic and political reform, and a deepening crisis could strengthen already potent nationalist forces within the country. The result would be a more inward-looking Turkey, more sovereignty conscious, and more inclined toward a unilateral and less predictable policy on the international scene. In the worst case, a more chaotic and uncontrolled Turkey would have little energy and resources for foreign policy initiatives. A more unstable and less secure Turkey, or a Turkish collapse, would pose substantial dilemmas for both U.S. and European policy and would leave a series of regional vacuums from the Balkans to the Caucasus and the Middle East.

Second, the economic crisis has had a “reshuffling” effect on Turkish politics and society. Old cleavages between, for example, religion and secularism, have been replaced by new divides, principally over the question of political reform—support for the old order and the established parties, or something new. The debate over reform appears to cut across sectors, including business, the bureaucracy, and even the military, that have often been seen as monolithic. Reformers and conservatives are to be found at all levels and in all sectors. Turkey’s secular establishment, long the leading interlocutor for the West, is being challenged by groups that have existed largely in the shadows and have traditionally had a less prominent role in the country’s international engagement. The result of this struggle over leadership and reform is likely to have considerable influence on Turkish foreign policymaking in the future.

Third, the crisis is already having an effect on Turkey’s key international relationships and the resources for national security policy. Notwithstanding its avowed distaste for international bailouts, the Bush administration has supported the IMF-led package of emergency assistance for Turkey. This support has not been linked to policy preferences in Washington, beyond insistence on adherence to the IMF reform plan. But requests for further support could well inspire a more explicit linkage to policy on Iraq, Iran, Cyprus, and other areas where American and Turkish views have differed. On the issue of counterterrorism, where American and Turkish policies are closely aligned, expanded cooperation is likely to strengthen the case for continued financial support to Ankara. Given Turkey’s status as a candidate for EU membership, Washington might also insist that Turkey’s EU partners bear a larger burden in any future assistance
for Turkey. Europe, for its part, may see the economic crisis as justification for a very slow and cautious approach to the entire question of Turkish membership.

Turkey’s regional position may also be affected. Economic stringency will undoubtedly complicate the military’s ambitious modernization plans and may indirectly facilitate a reduction in both Turkish and Greek defense budgets. It could also slow the pace of defense-industrial cooperation with Israel, as well as procurement from the United States and elsewhere. Energy requirements have been a leading factor in Turkey’s regional diplomacy. Access to energy is likely to remain an important objective in relations with Russia, Central Asia, Iran, and Iraq, but the rate of growth in Turkish energy demand may slow in a troubled economy. In Afghanistan, where Turkish forces have led international peacekeeping operations, financial stringency has made it even more imperative that Turkey’s allies, principally the United States, subsidize the cost of Turkish participation.

Overall, Turkey’s economic and political travails have interrupted an increasingly active Turkish debate about foreign and security policy and a more active set of external policies. Policymakers and the public are intensely focused on resolving the country’s internal problems and on the search for new leadership. The conservative, evolutionary nature of Turkish foreign policy could be disturbed by these developments, with the potential for a more nationalistic or simply less energetic and more inward-looking approach.

A QUESTION OF VISION

Since the beginning of the Republic, ideology—in the benign sense of a guiding philosophy—has had a powerful influence over public policy in virtually all spheres. Atatürkism as an ideology may have lost some of its coherence and influence over the last decade, but the legacy of almost 80 years can still be felt strongly in many areas. In politics, Atatürkism has stood, above all, for secularism and the unitary character of the Turkish state. In economics, Atatürkism has stood for statism—a legacy that is only now being eroded under pressure of an economic crisis and the imperatives of reform in a "globalized" economy. In foreign policy, the Atatürkist tradition has
emphasized nonintervention, a Western orientation, and vigilance with regard to national sovereignty.

In Atatürk’s own vision, domestic and foreign policymaking were also closely linked. He championed the use of “the world power balance” and Turkish foreign policy to defend “the full independence and territorial integrity of the Republic.” In negotiations surrounding the Lausanne conference in 1923, Atatürk asserted that the “foundation of foreign policy is a strong domestic policy, a strong domestic administration, and domestic organization. Domestic policy and foreign policy must always be linked.”

As Turkey enters the 21st century, these principles are being transformed by new actors and new issues in the Turkish policy debate. In the period since the Gulf War, in particular, Turkey has become a much more assertive actor in foreign and security policy. Ankara remains a relatively cautious player on the international scene and retains a strong preference for multilateral action in most areas, but nonintervention is no longer a meaningful description of Turkish policy. The country has at times flirted with more independent options. There is also a growing tension between Turkey’s very traditional and strong sense of national sovereignty and the demands of integration as Turkey aims at eventual membership in the EU. Pressures from the IMF and other international institutions have also increased as a result of the country’s economic troubles, and these too have spurred a nationalist reaction in some quarters. To the extent that Turkey progresses in its convergence with Europe, and as its society continues to modernize, this tension between sovereignty and integration is set to increase.

Viewed another way, change or the lack of change inside Turkey will be a critical determinant of Turkey’s foreign and security policy options for the future. Without reform and democratization, not to mention sustained economic growth, the EU option is likely to be stressful, if not altogether foreclosed. The economic crisis of 2000-2002 has underscored this reality. Electoral triumphs by Turkey’s Is-

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lamists, or nationalists, could recast Ankara’s approach to Europe, Russia, and the United States. The persistence of Kurdish separatism would sustain a worldview, especially in Turkey’s security establishment, that places internal security concerns at the top of the strategic agenda—a distortion of Turkish security planning that is at odds with the situation elsewhere within NATO. A focus on security problems inside Turkey is also likely to delay or impede movement toward Western patterns of civil-military relations—a potentially critical constraint on relations with Brussels and Washington. The emergence of a much sharper discussion within Turkey over the future of its society, and whether to take risks with security and stability in pursuit of a more liberal system, have pushed staunch Kemalists within the Turkish establishment into a harder-line stance. As Cengiz Candar, a prominent journalist, has noted, “Kemalism is now a kind of state religion in its own right.”

Images of the Turkish internal scene have always had a pronounced effect on Western attitudes toward Turkey. This can be seen clearly in the European debate over Turkish EU membership, as well as in discussions in Washington on arms transfers, human rights, and the bilateral relationship as a whole. This tradition of analyzing Turkey and Turkish policy “from the inside out” is a very old one. In the Ottoman period, the nature of Turkey as a society was a key element shaping European perceptions. The five-hundred-year competition between the Ottoman empire and the West was not just a geopolitical competition but a competition between societies and, above all, religions. In the waning years of the empire, Western perceptions focused on Ottoman “backwardness” and these, in turn, influenced opinion in support of national independence movements in the Balkans and assessments of Turkey’s ability to help contain Russian ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean. The potential for developments inside Turkey to affect surrounding regions and the interests of extraregional powers is a central tenet of much recent analysis of

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2 For a highly critical assessment of the role of the Turkish military as an impediment to Turkish liberalization and as an obstacle to Turkey’s European ambitions, see Eric Rouleau, “Turkey’s Dream of Democracy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 6, November/December 2000, pp. 100–114.

Turkey as a “pivotal state.” It is arguably an important factor in the Western calculus regarding assistance to Turkey in its economic difficulties and encourages many Turks to believe that what happens inside Turkey is simply too important for the West to ignore.

WHITHER THE STRONG STATE?

Turkey is an example of a “strong state,” that is, a society in which the state is at the center of public policymaking and the notion of state sovereignty is highly developed and unalloyed. The idea of the strong state does not necessarily imply a powerful or capable state in practical terms (although, overall, the Turkish state has played this role in some areas) but rather a pervasive, doctrinal attachment to the primacy of the state. Republican Turkey emerged in 1923 at a time of authoritarian statism in postrevolutionary societies across Europe and Asia. Indeed, parallels have often been drawn between the emergence, in roughly the same period, of strong, centrally directed states bent on modernization in both Turkey and the Soviet Union. For almost 80 years, the Turkish state has had a pervasive role in virtually all aspects of Turkish life. The model of Turkey as a secular, Western-oriented society was promoted—very successfully—from the top down, from the earliest years of the Republic. Economic policy was shaped from the center on a statist pattern, with high levels of government ownership and oversight.

The idea of national sovereignty that guided the formation of the Republic and that persisted essentially unchallenged until the 1990s was based largely on 19th century European ideas. In important respects, the orientation of the early Republic was itself a reaction to threats to Turkish sovereignty and territory at the close of the Ot-

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4See Alan Makovsky’s chapter on Turkey in Robert Chace et al., eds., The Pivotal States, New York: Norton, 1999, pp. 88–119.


oman period and shortly thereafter, including the restrictive provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), the loss of Ottoman territories in the Balkans and the Middle East, and the Greek military intervention in Anatolia. Out of these experiences came a consolidated and fiercely defended idea of a unitary Turkish state, with state-directed modernization and Westernization as key elements, and with a very cautious approach to international affairs. Atatürk’s famous dictum “peace at home, peace abroad” captured the spirit of this period in which Turkey sought to reduce its exposure to further Western intervention (again, there are notable parallels to the Soviet concept of building “socialism in one country”). The experience of this period has left an enduring legacy of suspicion, among the Turkish public and elites, regarding Western aims in Turkey and its region. European and American observers may find Turkish fears of a Western-inspired breakup of the Turkish state unreasonable, but the power of these images cannot be discounted in Turkey, even today. Turkish views on the Kurdish problem and the situation in Northern Iraq, as well as reactions to American Congressional debate on an Armenian genocide resolution, point to the enduring nature of these suspicions. Not a few Turks will even suggest that Western “conditionality” in support for economic assistance to Turkey is rooted in a desire to shape and perhaps limit Turkey’s regional role.

Today, the greatest challenges to the traditional role of the Turkish state are internal, but these challenges are reinforced by pressures from outside, from the requirements of integration with Europe, regardless of Turkey’s membership prospects, to the effects of globalization on Turkey’s society and economy. Arguably, the future of the strong state is the central question for Turkey’s evolution in the coming years.

The primacy of the Turkish state is being challenged from many directions. First, and most fundamentally, the rapid if sometimes erratic growth of the Turkish economy since the economic liberalization of the Özal years has made the task of economic management
far more complex, and the central government in Ankara no longer enjoys a monopoly in economic affairs. Business associations, individual entrepreneurs, unions, and Turkey’s increasingly active media all want a say on economic matters. Although successive Turkish governments have been committed to the idea of privatization, progress in this area has been slow and characterized by a lack of transparency. It is notable that the Islamist Refah Party, once in government, was among the most adept at using the privatization agenda to build a constituency of supporters in the private sector.

The rise of a very dynamic Turkish private sector has, however, created an important counterweight to the sluggish and inefficient state enterprises that still make up a large proportion of the Turkish economy. This process has brought to the fore a number of prominent, family-controlled business empires, but it has also led to the rise of a large number of small and medium-sized enterprises, many led by prosperous Anatolian families that had traditionally been involved in agriculture. The net result has been the emergence of a very diverse private sector, with a range of perceptions about politics and foreign affairs. These range from the secular, reformist, and internationally minded members of TUSIAD to MUSIAD (the Independent Turkish Businessmen’s Association), an active group with a traditional and religious orientation. These very diverse elements are nonetheless generally united on the desire to reduce the role of the state in Turkish society.

The coexistence of a dynamic private sector alongside a large public sector also means that many private enterprises, including those in the financial sector, rely heavily on their relationship to the state. This phenomenon is, in part, responsible for the rise of corruption in Turkey as a growing public policy problem and represents yet an-

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8Over the last fifteen years, Turkey has enjoyed some of the highest rates of growth in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Between 1995 and 1998, growth averaged 8.5 percent. Since that period, growth has been slower, partly because of the costs of recovery from the 1999 earthquake, estimated at $5.7 billion. Growth in 1999 was 6.4 percent. *Turkish Economy 1999–2000*, Istanbul: TUSIAD, July 2000.


other angle of criticism toward the role of the state. The links between the state, banks, and large-scale business in Turkey have also been at the center of allegations of “crony capitalism” as Turkey experiences its worst economic crisis since World War II. The most successful political movements in recent years, including the Islamists and National Action Party, have capitalized on public cynicism about Turkey’s aging political class and have taken a strong stance against cronyism, corruption, and the lack of transparency.\(^{11}\) Perhaps more serious, over the last decade Turkey has seen a general expansion of the illegal sector, above all drug trafficking and money laundering, along with more exotic problems such as the smuggling of people and even nuclear materials. These activities exist largely outside the bounds of the state, but some of the most prominent scandals of recent years have focused on alleged links between organized crime, terrorism, and the state. The unstable situation in Southeastern Anatolia, with its own war economy surrounding the battle with the PKK, has been a breeding ground for the Turkish illegal sector.

Second, Turkey’s demographic growth and, more significantly, the tremendous movement of population from the countryside to the major cities over the past decades have placed great strains on the state’s ability to provide essential services and to provide for social welfare. In 1945, 25 percent of the Turkish population lived in urban areas. By 1997, this figure was 65 percent, and the percentage continues to increase.\(^{12}\) (There is some anecdotal evidence that the economic crisis is causing a slight countermovement from Istanbul back to the countryside as employment prospects in the city have worsened.) Turkey’s population stands at roughly 67.8 million today, and even with recent reductions in the rate of population growth, Turkey’s population is likely to reach 100 million early in the 21st century.


At the same time, the modernization of Turkish society and exposure to Western patterns have raised public expectations about what the state should provide. Turkey’s Islamist movements, Refah (Welfare) and its successor, Fazilet (Virtue)—both legally banned—and newer Islamic groups, such as the Justice and Development Party, have capitalized on this growing gap between public expectations and the ineffectiveness of state institutions. This is one explanation for the consistent success of Turkey’s Islamists in municipal elections across the country. Dissatisfaction with the role of the state was dramatically demonstrated in the wake of the major earthquake that struck Turkey in August 1999. Under very stressful conditions, the state appeared incapable of effective civil emergency management. The earthquake may not have spelled the end of the strong state, as many predicted at the time, but it has certainly left an enduring legacy of dissatisfaction. To a degree, this dissatisfaction with the state, and the tendency at many levels of society to organize affairs, to the extent possible, without reference to the state, is a common phenomenon across the Mediterranean.13

A third challenge to the role of the Turkish state arises from external pressures. Simply put, the current role of the state as enshrined in the Turkish Constitution is incompatible with the objective of closer integration in Europe and an obstacle to meeting the criteria for the opening of accession negotiations with the EU. The incompatibility is clear at the level of economic policy, where convergence would require a substantial reduction in the role of the state even to meet European norms. More fundamentally, integration implies a substantial diminution in state sovereignty as policy and administration in key areas are subordinated to European procedures.14 Movement toward a more dilute and modern notion of sovereignty is at the heart of much Turkish ambivalence about the implications of membership, but the pressures for modernization in this sphere are very strong. If Turkey’s European aspirations are not frustrated, and the

13This has sometimes been described as the “Italian model,” in which an efficient private sector coexists alongside ineffective state institutions, and individuals seek private arrangements for the provision of essential services.
post-Helsinki path remains open, significant changes in the role of the state can be anticipated, affecting many aspects of Turkish life.

The question of the role of the state is also central to the outlook for political reform, civil-military relations, and human rights. Turkey is a functioning if very imperfect democracy, and the process of democratization in Turkey is well advanced by the standards of adjacent regions. There is an extremely active public debate in Turkey over questions of democratization and reform—a debate that has acquired even more vigor and urgency in the context of pressing economic problems. Nonetheless, there are persistent problems concerning human rights, the status of minorities, and the governance of regions within Turkey that also turn on the role of the state. The tradition of strong central authority and concern about threats to the unitary character of the state (read Kurdish separatism) have made the discussion of decentralization, and especially forms of regional autonomy, anathema for Ankara. The question of Kurdish rights, against the background of a violent insurgency and counterinsurgency campaign in Southeastern Anatolia, has made this a highly charged issue for Turks, and for Turkey’s partners in the West. By most accounts, the human rights situation in Turkey has improved in some respects but is not improving rapidly enough to satisfy Western opinion—or to satisfy many Turks.\textsuperscript{15} There is now greater transparency with regard to human rights abuses, and the waning of the PKK insurgency has created a better climate in the towns and cities of the Southeast. But abuses persist, and political rights (e.g., the treatment of “thought crimes”) are limited in ways that continue to surprise Western observers.

Many Turks are hopeful that the progressive modernization of Turkish society, efforts at constitutional reform, and ever-increasing transparency will eventually change those aspects of Turkish political culture that have fostered human rights abuses. The advent of a reform-minded president, Ahmed Necdet Sezer, was widely interpreted as a positive sign. Sezer has, for example, taken the position (opposed by Turkey’s military as well as by Prime Minister Ecevit) that state “decrees with the force of law” may not be used in lieu of

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parliamentary measures to remove alleged antisecularists and separatists from Turkey’s state bureaucracies. Under pressure from international financial institutions, Turkey is now struggling to implement a series of economic and political reforms that will also require constitutional changes. If successful—and the outlook is unclear—the ground may be paved for more far-reaching changes in democratization and human rights.

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY

The role played by the Turkish military has been changing in important ways. Historically the armed forces have occupied a privileged position both in the Ottoman period and in the Turkish Republic. In the late Ottoman period and in the early days of the Turkish Republic, the military spearheaded the modernization process. Six out of ten presidents of the Turkish Republic—including Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic—were high-ranking military officers. Today many Turks worry that the Turkish military’s doctrinaire interpretation of Atatürk’s policies is becoming an obstacle to the democratization and modernization of Turkish society. But understanding military attitudes in Turkey is not an easy task, and opinion within the military establishment may be more dynamic and less monolithic than is usually imagined.16 In any event, the military’s stance on reform, including the reform of civil-military relations, will be a key factor shaping the future of Turkish society and its international relations.

The Turkish military has acted as custodian of the Kemalist legacy, seeing its mission as not only to defend the territorial integrity of the Turkish state against external threats but also to protect it against internal challenges. The armed forces have intervened in Turkish politics four times in the postwar period when they felt that the Kemalist legacy was under threat. The most recent instance was in 1997 when the military forced the ouster of Prime Minister Necmet-

16 Turkish observers have pointed to the growing differences of view within the military. The respected Turkish journalist Mehmet Ali Birand, for example, has noted; “We can not speak anymore of a Turkish Armed Forces that has an uniform view, adopting as its own view the ideas expressed by its commander. There are different views within the ranks of the military as well.” See Mehmet Ali Birand, “Why does the military keep silent?” *Turkish Daily News*, July 17, 2002.
Tin Erbakan, head of the Refah Party, in what was widely interpreted by Turkish and foreign media as a “silent coup.”

The military’s power is institutionalized through a variety of organizations. The most important of these is the National Security Council (NSC). Although technically the NSC makes only “recommendations” to the Council of Ministers, its recommendations can be tantamount to orders—as Prime Minister Erbakan was reminded in 1997. When Erbakan attempted to circumvent the military’s 20 recommendations on curtailing Islamist activity by sending them to the parliament, rather than carrying them out, the military—backed by Turkey’s wider secular establishment—forced his eventual resignation.

The relationship between the military and Turkey’s political leadership has often been uncomfortable, even on foreign policy matters. Özal pressed for active Turkish participation in the Gulf War coalition, against the advice of a more cautious military establishment, eventually leading to the resignation of Chief of Staff General Torumtay. Özal also took a softer line toward Islamism and favored a more liberal policy on the Kurdish issue. Since Özal’s death in 1993, the military has gradually won back the power lost during his tenure, bolstered by success in the counterinsurgency campaign against the PKK and a continuing, central role in opposition to religion in political life.

Nonetheless, the post-Helsinki dynamics in Turkey’s international relations and the ambivalent position of the military on the reforms necessary for Turkish convergence with Europe, suggest that Turkey’s military may find it difficult or unappealing to maintain its traditional role in the coming years. The military has a clear stake in overcoming Turkey’s current financial crisis, for the sake of keeping defense modernization plans on track, and because the military is also a large investor and participant in the Turkish economy.

The extent of reforms in the area of governance and human rights will have a profound influence on the character of Turkey’s relations with the West and above all with the EU. Indeed, changes in these areas are an essential prerequisite for progress toward accession negotiations. Civil-military relations are an important part of this equation. Analyses of the Turkish scene have traditionally empha-
The role of the military has become a flashpoint for European criticism of Ankara and pessimism regarding the country’s EU prospects. See, for example, the analysis by Eric Rouleau, “Turkey’s Dream of Democracy,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 6, November/December 2000, pp. 102–114.
spending, and its pension, foundation, and commercial holdings. Retired senior officers are commonplace on the boards of Turkey’s large holding companies.

It is also worth noting that opinion within the military establishment is not monolithic, even on controversial questions such as strategy toward Turkey’s Islamists or policy toward the EU. Some Turkish observers are beginning to suggest that there is now a debate within the military itself about the future role of their institution in Turkish society and the likely need for changes in civil-military relations. The extent of these changes is sure to be a leading determinant of Turkey’s integration and reform prospects over the next decade.

NEW ACTORS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY

The military as an institution has been important, not only in direct policy terms but also as a vehicle for upward mobility, education, and training in Turkish society. Since the early years of the Republic, the military has been extraordinarily successful as a vehicle for socialization across the country. For decades, young Turks in the provinces aspired to military careers and the military as an institution enjoyed high prestige among average Turks. The military ran many of the best and most modern educational institutions in the country. Although the role of the military, especially the Turkish General Staff, in Turkey’s domestic politics (e.g., its influence on Turkey’s coalition arrangements, education policy, and the headscarf question) has been the most controversial issue from a Western perspective, and from the perspective of Turkish liberals, the dominant position of the military in foreign and security policy is, perhaps, even more complete.

With few exceptions, Turkey has not had a well-developed cadre of foreign and security policy experts outside government circles. Ex-

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19Turkey’s military culture, as it has evolved over recent decades, was described in considerable detail in Mehmet Ali Birand’s controversial book, *Shirts of Steel: An Anatomy of the Turkish Armed Forces*, London: I. B. Tauris, 1991.
ternal and defense policy has traditionally been almost the exclusive preserve of professional diplomats and, not least, high-level military officers. The military’s capacity for analysis of these issues has actually been bolstered in recent years by the expansion of the staff of the National Security Council. One consequence of the military’s extraordinary role has been a marked asymmetry in Turkey’s dialogue with allies on regional and defense matters. Whereas Western governments generally view their high civilian officials as the key interlocutors on foreign and security policy, the corresponding civilian officials in the Turkish Ministry of Defense are, in practical terms, subordinate to the leadership of the Turkish General Staff. Thus, Turkey’s model of civil-military relations not only affects internal politics, but has shaped the country’s dialogue with Europe and the U.S. on a range of issues. This is almost certainly one of the factors responsible for the continued predominance of security issues in Turkish-American relations.

Some of the elements pointing toward change in the role of the military and civil-military relations have already been suggested. Another element of equal or perhaps greater importance concerns the rise of other actors and “power centers” outside the military and outside the state. The transformation of the Turkish economy and the dynamism of the Turkish private sector have become a leading vehicle for change in Turkish society. Young Turks who might once have aspired to careers as military officers or as state employees are now more likely to seek careers in the business world—although this too could change if the country’s economic problems persist. Moreover, Turkey’s famous state universities and military schools are now challenged by a host of private colleges and universities, many with impressive funding from private entrepreneurs and foundations. At the primary and secondary level, the network of religious schools (the “Imam-Hatip” schools) expanded dramatically in the 1990s, a trend paralleling the rise of Islamic politics at the local and national levels. Recent legislation has placed limits on the scope of the religious schools. But they have played a role in educating a generation

20The Imam-Hatip schools are high-school-level lycées with a religious orientation. Their graduates may go on to private universities, but not, for example, military academies.
of students who are now to be found in Turkey’s bureaucracies and elsewhere.

One consequence of this expansion of alternative education and career paths has been the emergence of a generation with new views about Turkey and Turkey’s international role. The information revolution has clearly played a part, as well. Even provincial towns in Central Anatolia now sport Internet cafes, and the wide availability of satellite television and the proliferation of private stations have encouraged a far broader world view. The net effect of these changes on Turkish opinion is, however, an open question. These trends have certainly contributed to the erosion of the Atatürkist tradition in its various manifestations. But they have also sharpened the political debate, and strengthened support for more extreme views, especially among the young. In this context, it is noteworthy that in the 1999 general elections, younger voters formed the basis of National Action Party success.21

The vigor of the Turkish private sector over the past decade has had important consequences for public debate and policymaking, with meaning for the country’s international relationships. Turkey’s large holding companies (and a much larger group of small and medium-sized enterprises) have recognized and have begun to articulate their policy interests across a range of issues. The traditional reliance on personal relationships as a means of access and influence with state officials has been augmented by the emergence of private sector institutions devoted to discussion, analysis, and ultimately lobbying on questions of concern. Such institutions, including business associations and a small number of independent “think tanks,” are commonplace in the West but are a very recent phenomenon in Turkey.22 They are beginning to play a role in articulating the policy

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21 MHP’s youth wing has attracted attention for its extremism and occasional violence, harkening back to the behavior of MHP in the 1970s and 1980s when the party was linked to right-wing terrorism in Turkey.

22 TUSIAD, in particular, has emerged as a key source of analysis and policy commentary on the Turkish scene and Turkey’s foreign relations. It has taken controversial, reformist positions on a number of issues, including the situation in the Southeast. TESEV (the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation) in Istanbul was established in 1961 but is now becoming more active and influential, especially on Turkish-EU relations. The newly formed Istanbul Policy Center at Sabanci University is another policy-oriented institution to watch.
interests of particular circles, although the longer-term outlook for these institutions will be heavily dependent on the health of the Turkish economy and contributions from private sector sponsors. Notably, these institutions are among the most interested in building international ties and tend toward a liberal, reformist outlook. As a group, they represent an increasingly important set of interlocutors for Western officials and unofficial observers of the Turkish scene and encourage a more activist but multilateral approach to Turkey’s foreign policy interests.

PUBLIC OPINION AND THE MEDIA

In the period since the Gulf War, public opinion has emerged as an increasingly important factor in Turkish foreign policy, spurred by the expansion of the private media and its growing role as a shaper of opinion. Some aspects of this phenomenon, including the concentration of media assets in the hands of a few large conglomerates, are controversial and the subject of considerable debate in Turkey (as they are elsewhere). With the concentration of media ownership and the tendency for media holding companies to diversify their activities, including involvement in the financial sector, Turkey’s economic crisis has contributed to the turmoil in Turkish journalism. Organizations such as CNN-Turk and other major stations, as well as newspapers, have recently seen large-scale layoffs after years of rapid expansion. The Dogan group currently dominates Turkish media ownership, and some Turkish observers point to the possible emergence of a “Turkish Berlusconi” in the country’s tumultuous politics.

At the same time, the proliferation of media outlets, especially television, has brought a more diverse set of voices to the Turkish debate. In some cases, notably television stations with a religious orientation, the non-mainstream media have faced official and unofficial pressures over the nature of their programming, including temporary bans. But stations such as the religiously inclined “Channel 7” have nonetheless survived on a profitable basis. Papers such as Yeni Safak have attracted a sophisticated secular reader-

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23 See, for example, the discussion in Andrew Finkel, “Who Guards the Turkish Press? A Perspective on Press Corruption in Turkey,” *The Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 1, Fall 2000, pp. 147–166.
ship—and some respected secular journalists—despite their religious orientation, because they are seen by many readers as objective and independent.

A more active and diverse media have been a vehicle for the rise of public opinion as a factor in the traditionally closed world of Turkish external policymaking. Several elements are worth noting in this regard. First, the engagement of public opinion on foreign policy issues has been encouraged by developments in Turkey's region over the past decade. The Gulf War marked a turning point in this respect, as the events in Northern Iraq first reinforced and then complicated Özal's presentation of his strongly pro-Western stance. The promise of more-rapid Turkish progress toward EU candidacy and other prospective benefits allowed Özal to successfully present the case for Turkish action, including the use of Turkish bases for the strategic bombardment of Iraq, and the closure of Iraqi oil exports through Turkey by road and pipeline. Public opinion in this case was an important element in Özal's ability to pursue an activist policy against the inclinations of the Turkish military. In the wake of the war, however, public opinion became critical of the costs of participation in the coalition and of Turkey's failure to receive sufficient compensation from the West. Many Turks came to regard, and still regard, the Gulf War as a catalyst for Kurdish separatism and a continuing cost to Turkey in the form of lost revenue from trade with Iraq and pipeline fees. Public opinion remains a major constraint in Ankara's policymaking toward Northern Iraq, including renewal of Operation Northern Watch.

Events in Bosnia also galvanized Turkish opinion and encouraged a more active, albeit multilateral, stance from Ankara. Turks have sympathized with the plight of the Bosnian Muslims and feel considerable affinity for Muslim communities elsewhere in the Balkans. Turkish affinities have also been aroused by Azerbaijan's dispute with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, by successive conflicts in Chechnya, and by the crisis in Kosovo. It is interesting to note that the public reaction to the Kosovo crisis has been notably less animated than in the case of Bosnia. This may be explained by mixed attitudes toward the Muslim Kosovars, who have not always been on good terms with the Turkish minority in the region. Moreover, Turks, while sympathetic to the plight of the
on a strongly nationalistic and at times anti-Western (mainly anti-European) flavor in the face of perceived Western inaction. Periodic violence by Chechen sympathizers, including the April 2001 hostage-taking at the Swissotel in Istanbul, seems designed to play to media attention and, ultimately, public opinion.

Second, the last decade has seen the rise of distinct “lobbies” within Turkish society. This was particularly observable in relation to the Bosnian and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts and, of course, with regard to Cyprus. Crises in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Eastern Mediterranean have come at a time when many Turks are rediscovering their regional roots. Bosnian and Azeri Turks, in particular, are to be found in some numbers among Turkey’s elite, and their voices have been influential in shaping attitudes in Ankara. Similar ethnic identifications and attempts at policy influence—or at least symbolic gestures—have occurred on behalf of Bulgarian Turks, Tatars in Russia and Ukraine, the Gagauz in Romania, and the Uighur Turks in Western China. These associations are now very much a part of the Turkish scene. In a very real sense, developments around Turkey’s borders have stimulated more discussion inside Turkey about what it means to be a Turk and have encouraged tentative debate about Turkey as a multicultural society. This trend has also had an influence on the definition of Turkey’s international interests, which clearly extend to include the status and treatment of Turks abroad, particularly those in Germany. The growing role of public opinion as a factor in Turkish policymaking has also been associated with a rise in nationalist sentiment, especially in circumstances, as in Bosnia, where Turkey’s Western partners appeared inactive or indifferent.

Third, the public opinion factor complicates Turkish crisis management and has produced considerable unease among Ankara’s foreign and security policy functionaries who are unused to this reality. In the Imia/Kardak crisis of 1996 between Greece and Turkey, for example, events were driven (on both sides) by aggressive television journalists and responsive public opinion, to the extent that Turkish diplomats and officers worried about losing control of the situation.

Kosovars, are generally opposed to new separatist movements (echoes of the Kurdish problem) and the alteration of borders in the Balkans.

Similarly, in the hijacking of a Turkish Black Sea ferry by Chechen extremists in 1996, negotiations with the hijackers were preempted with the arrival, by helicopter, of Turkish journalists who assumed the role of negotiators, with the Turkish public held in rapt attention. Incidents of this type suggest a very different domestic environment for crisis management than has traditionally prevailed in Turkey.

SECURITY POLICY THROUGH A DOMESTIC LENS

In common with many other states around the Southern Mediterranean, Turkish debate and policy on security matters are strongly influenced by internal security concerns. This outlook is somewhat outside the NATO mainstream but is not completely alien to the Alliance, as attested to by Spain’s preoccupation with Basque terrorism, Britain’s struggle against terrorism in Northern Ireland, France’s concern about spillovers of North African extremism, and the growing interest in “homeland defense” spurred by the recent experience of disastrous terrorist attacks in the United States. Yet, in the Turkish setting, questions of internal security are central to the political landscape and the worldview of Turkey’s traditional foreign and security policymakers. Increasingly, problems of energy supply and non-traditional challenges in the areas of crime, refugees, and the environment are also being seen as part of the security agenda, with strong domestic linkages.

As noted above, Turkey’s military establishment continues to have a central role in defining and vetting the policy agenda, and this establishment has been extraordinarily consistent over the past decade in describing the fight against Kurdish separatism and the fight against Islamism as the leading security challenges for the Turkish state. The struggle against Islamism has, by and large, been carried out through political and legal means and has resulted in the termination of Turkey’s experiment with an Islamist-led government, the banning of Refah and its successor the Virtue Party, and the prosecution of leading figures in religious politics, including Recip Tayip Erdogan, the former mayor of Istanbul, and former Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan. The political ban on Erdogan was lifted in July 2001, and he emerged as a very popular leader of the religious/reformist wing of
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the now defunct Virtue Party in national politics.\textsuperscript{26} His political future as head of the new Justice and Development Party remains unresolved, however, in light of ongoing legal challenges.

For all the effort devoted to the suppression of Islamic politics, a substantial undercurrent of religion has survived and may be poised to emerge again in a more reform-minded vein. Turkey’s extensive network of religious orders (\textit{tarikat}) has operated underground since the time of Atatürk but reportedly retains substantial and influential memberships. Center-right parties such as True Path (DYP) and ANAP have always had their religious wings, and with the large number of deputies who entered parliament under the Virtue Party banner, the bloc of religious conservatives is very large. In this context, the controversy over the wearing of headscarves in government institutions, including schools, has been a political as well as a cultural dispute, pitting a more overtly religious public against the tradition of state involvement in all aspects of Turkish life.

The struggle against Islamic groups acquired a more direct security dimension with the crackdown on Turkey’s violent and shadowy Hizbullah network (unrelated to the Lebanese movement of the same name). This network is alleged to be responsible for numerous assassinations and disappearances over the past decade, including a number of high-profile terrorist incidents. Turkish and foreign observers also link Turkish Hizbullah to organizations tolerated and perhaps supported by Ankara in the past as part of the counterinsurgency campaign against the PKK. 1999 estimates suggested that Hizbullah may have as many as 25,000 adherents, including 4,000 armed militants.\textsuperscript{27} Revelations about these groups and the security operations against them have given a harder edge to the question of Islamism in Turkey at a time when more mainstream Islamic movements such as Erdoğan’s reformists within the Justice and Development Party, the Felicity Party and the Fethullah Gülen group are taking pains to appear centrist. Against this background, the attitude


\textsuperscript{27}“Turkey’s Divided Islamists,” \textit{IISS Strategic Comments}, Vol. 6, Issue 3, April 2000.
of the military and secular elites to the Islamist question shows few signs of weakening. Although Europe has little sympathy for Islamists, the EU factor could constrain Ankara’s ability to bar Turkey’s Islamic parties from political life—a fact reflected in support for Turkish accession among Turkey’s mainstream Islamists. In the meantime, there is growing concern that armed Islamic groups on the margins of Turkish society may take over the mantle of extremist opposition to the state, filling a vacuum left by the waning of the PKK challenge.28

The second overarching internal security challenge has been Kurdish separatism. Even before the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, Turkish security forces had essentially defeated, but not eliminated, the PKK insurgency. The struggle against the PKK has claimed perhaps 30,000–40,000 lives on all sides since the mid-1980s. This little-reported war inside a NATO country imposed immense costs on the Turkish economy and society and distorted the Turkish political scene in fundamental ways. The war with its terrible human rights abuses—inflicted by both sides—continues to damage Turkey’s international standing even as the struggle in the Southeast winds down.

The defeat of the PKK insurgency can be ascribed to a number of factors. The PKK campaign inside Turkey relied heavily on access to bases in Northern Iraq and Syria (and in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley) and practical support from Damascus. Since the mid-1990s, Ankara has pursued a cross-border strategy in the fight against the PKK, deploying its security forces over the Iraqi border to disrupt PKK operations and to fight the war, to the extent possible, on Iraqi rather than Turkish territory. The result has been the establishment of a de facto Turkish security zone in Northern Iraq, comparable in some respects, although by no means all, to the zone held until 2000 by Israel in Lebanon. The capture of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and the end of Syrian support as a result of a credible threat of Turkish intervention severely weakened the PKK’s capacity for operations inside Turkey. This, in turn, touched off a struggle over strategy and leadership within the PKK and Kurdish organizations based in Europe, further weakening the PKK position. Even before the capture of

28Ibid.
Öcalan, Turkish forces had considerable success in containing PKK operations, largely as a result of improvements in training, tactics, and equipment.

The security situation in the Southeast has improved markedly, especially in cities such as Diyarbakir, and it is unlikely that the PKK will be able to reconstitute itself to carry out operations on the scale of the early 1990s. But perhaps 5,000 to 10,000 PKK militants remain in Turkey and Northern Iraq and inside Iran’s border with Turkey, and Ankara is not inclined toward amnesty for these activists. With rare exceptions, the PKK has not been actively involved in urban terrorism inside Turkey, despite Turkey’s vulnerability to attacks threatening business and tourism. The potential for a hard core of residual PKK militants to move in this direction cannot be ruled out, although such a campaign would face constraints, including opposition from moderate Kurds living in Turkey’s larger cities.

With the containment of the PKK challenge, Turkey now faces the much harder problem of how to resolve its long-standing and troubled relationship with the Kurds by political means. As many as 15 million Kurds live in Turkey, but after years of conflict and the lure of better economic opportunities elsewhere, perhaps no more than 50 percent live in the traditionally Kurdish areas of Southeastern Anatolia. Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir now have large Kurdish populations, and these populations are highly assimilated—perhaps a quarter of the deputies in the Turkish parliament are of Kurdish origin. But these figures should not be taken to suggest that the pressure for Kurdish cultural and political rights has abated. Although most Kurds, and especially those living in Western Turkey, would not favor the establishment of a separate Kurdish state, the desire for greater cultural and linguistic rights, and perhaps greater autonomy in predominantly Kurdish areas, is strong. The conflict in the Southeast has, if anything, heightened the sense of Kurdish identity inside Turkey, and the Kurdish issue is unlikely to fade even with the decline of the PKK.

Many analysts believe that Öcalan’s capture offered an unprecedented opportunity for the development of a new political approach

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toward the Kurds. To date, Ankara has been unable to seize this opportunity, but the broad possibility of a political settlement remains open, whether through unilateral steps by Ankara or through the cultivation of new, nonviolent Kurdish interlocutors.\(^{30}\) In the end, any strategy for resolution will involve some concessions from Ankara, and a diminution, however modest, of the sovereignty of the "strong state." The prospects may well depend on the extent of other pressures for modernization and liberalization in Turkey which, if potent enough, could create a more encouraging climate for resolution of the Kurdish problem. In the absence of such a settlement, the issue is likely to remain a central feature of Turkish politics, as well as a domestic security problem and will continue to impose costs on Ankara’s international relationships.

**ISLAMISM, NATIONALISM, AND TURKISH IDENTITY**

Much Western debate about Turkey’s internal scene and its foreign policy meaning has focused on the question of Islamism. This was a natural product of the striking rise in the electoral fortunes of the Refah Party in the mid-1990s, first at the local and finally at the national level, leading to the formation of a Refah-led coalition in 1996. In that period, secularism in Turkey seemed to be at bay, and Turkish society was increasingly polarized along religious and secular lines.

If there was a prospect for a fundamental reorientation of Turkish external policy, it appeared to arise from the Islamist phenomenon. In retrospect, these concerns proved exaggerated. The Refah experiment in government was short-lived, and Prime Minister Erbakan’s forays into foreign policy, including a tour of Islamic capitals (no Arab states were included) and consultations in Libya, were not taken seriously in Turkey or the West. Turkey’s 1999 general elections resulted in a poor showing by the Islamists at the national level and a surprisingly strong performance by Turkey’s MHP. This result can be ascribed, in part, to the legal measures taken against key Islamist politicians and the closure of Refah. But it also seems that Turkey’s nationalists, who also champion the sort of cultural conser-

vatism favored by the Islamists, have inherited the mantle of opposition to Turkey’s traditional politics.

Indeed, Refah’s appeal in the mid-1990s also went beyond the issue of religion to include economic populism, anticorruption, and not least, Turkish nationalism. Refah was especially adept at articulating the nationalist message against a background of crises in Bosnia, Chechnya, and Azerbaijan that suggested Western indifference to Turkish and Muslim interests. In the government that emerged after the 1999 elections, with the right-wing MHP as a key partner in Prime Minister Ecevit’s coalition, and with MHP’s leader, Devlet Bahçeli as Deputy Prime Minister—a strange coalition of the left and the right—the nationalists exerted considerable influence over Turkish policy. MHP is the leading obstacle in most areas to the implementation of Turkey’s reform and recovery plans.

Despite MHP’s reputation for radicalism and even violence in previous decades, Bahçeli has adopted a relatively moderate line. But some Turkish observers fear that with its growing influence, MHP will sooner or later take a more assertive course. The foreign policy consequences of this could be significant, although the traditional foreign and security policy establishment remains wary of MHP. Under the right conditions, including a new economic shock and the frustration of Turkey’s European aspirations, MHP’s strongly nationalist line could reinforce tendencies evident elsewhere across the Turkish political spectrum (e.g., Ecevit himself is well known as a nationalist of the left, and many of Turkey’s Islamists are highly nationalist, as noted above).

The areas most sensitive to the policy influence of Turkish nationalism are Cyprus, the nationalist issue par excellence; the Balkans, where Turkey could opt for a more independent and assertive stance; and relations with Russia in the Caucasus and Central Asia. A more nationalist line would have implications for the overall outlook for relations with Greece, especially in the context of a deterioration in relations with the EU. The nationalist impulse would also complicate security cooperation with Washington. MHP has been among the most critical of American use of Incirlik for Operation Northern Watch over Iraq and would be sensitive to policies that cut against Turkey’s perceived interests in Iran and Iraq. The imposition of an economic reform package dictated, in large measure, by interna-
tional financial institutions and Turkey’s Western partners has also fanned nationalist opposition.

Turkey’s EU candidacy is a significant development, but it clearly does not end the debate over Turkish identity. In some respects, the post-Helsinki environment has actually sharpened the questions of what it means to be a Turk, how Turks view the future of their society, and whether closer integration in Western institutions is compatible with Ankara’s more activist approach to international policy. There is a deep reservoir of nationalist sentiment, evident even in mainstream political discourse.31 Turkey may well continue to evolve along modernist and liberal lines, with a reduced role for the state and a multilateral approach to foreign policy. Under less favorable conditions of economic stringency, regional tensions, or political instability, the departure is more than likely to be in a nationalist direction.

DOMESTIC STABILITY AND TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY POTENTIAL

The close connection in the Kemalist outlook between internal stability and foreign policy potential is very evident in the current environment. The connection is neither unusual nor new, but it takes on special meaning in the context of Turkey’s expanded external policy horizons and great economic uncertainty. The tour d’horizon of regional and functional challenges and opportunities facing Turkey, and discussed in detail in subsequent chapters of this book, raises fundamental questions about Turkey’s capacity to respond. Turkey’s potential as a “big emerging market,” as a positive regional actor, and as an effective partner for Europe and the United States, as well as the pursuit of Ankara’s own regional objectives, will depend to a great extent on the energy Turkey can devote to foreign policy and international perceptions of the country’s stability and direction. Three issues will be critical in this regard.

First, there are strong pressures for modernization and liberalization at work in Turkey, but ultimately their success will be measured in terms of their corrosive effect on the “strong state,” with its ideological and bureaucratic underpinnings. A modern foreign policy, including convergence with European practices, will require sovereignty compromises and a reduction in the pervasive role of the state. In the absence of change in this area, Turkey will be constrained in its foreign and security policy options, and opportunities for expanded economic cooperation may also be limited. Successful economic and political reform can encourage movement in this direction, but the outlook is far from certain.

Second, many Turkish and foreign observers view the current fragmentation of the Turkish political scene, and the rise of movements on the extremes, as inherently unstable and unhealthy for the country’s evolution toward a liberal order. A renewal of the center in Turkish political life will almost certainly require modernization and restructuring of the traditional centrist parties, ANAP and DYP, discredited by scandals and political infighting, or the emergence of credible alternatives. Above all, it is likely to require the emergence of a new generation of capable leaders to replace an aging political class, possibly drawn from other-than-traditional party circles. In this context, some observers see the emergence of Mehmet Ali Bayar as head of the Democratic Turkey Party—an amalgam of centrist, populist visions in the Demirel vein—as a promising new force in Turkey’s politics. In the absence of competent “new faces” at the center, Turkey’s political scene may remain uncertain, with the potential for radical departures in foreign and security policy, and very negative consequences for foreign investment and Ankara’s regional and transatlantic relationships.

Third, Turkey’s considerable economic success of the past decades, followed by a virtual collapse in 2000–2002, raises important questions of equity and social cohesion. Turkey is certainly not alone in facing this developmental dilemma. But as a “pivot” state, the stakes are relatively high for Turkey and its international partners. With other states around the Southern Mediterranean, Turkey suffers from a growing problem of income disparity. Persistent high rates of inflation, and the devaluation of 2001, have had a disproportionate effect on the country’s large but insecure middle class. The by-products of Turkey’s economic growth are all too visible to the vast
majority of Turks who do not participate in the country’s financial markets and have to live with minimal social services. It is precisely these conditions that have fueled religious politics, especially at the local level, and not just among Turkey’s poor but among many middle class voters. The problem of corruption is part of this equation to the extent that it plays a large role in public perceptions about the Turkish economy and the quality of Turkish governance.

In important respects, Turkey is at a turning point in its evolution as a state and society. The direction Turkey takes on key questions such as the role of the state, civil-military relations, economic reform, secular versus religious politics, and a nationalist versus internationalist orientation will have a strong effect on the country’s power and potential in the coming years. In an era in which the ability to hold down Soviet divisions in Thrace and the Caucasus is no longer a valid measure of international weight, or a basis for alliance relationships, Turkey’s internal evolution matters a great deal and will influence the character and extent of European and American engagement with Ankara. Turkey has already emerged as an important regional and “trans-regional” actor. Its capacity to sustain and expand this role will depend on Turkey’s internal development as much as changes in the external environment. But to return to Atatürk’s observation offered at the beginning of this chapter, the two spheres are interdependent—increasingly so as public opinion has become more aware of international issues and as the number and diversity of actors involved in Turkey’s foreign policy debate has grown.