The following are the current Marine Corps urban ground reconnaissance shortfalls as listed in Chapter Two. They appear below as stand-alone elements without the explanatory material that accompanies them in the body of the report.

**DOCTRINE**

**General**

Formal, written urban combat reconnaissance doctrine is essentially nonexistent.

Intelligence collection in densely populated areas is more reliant on human intelligence (HUMINT) than is normally the case in other contingencies. Yet there is little guidance regarding how Marine commands should integrate this greater reliance on HUMINT into their collection and analyses processes.

Savvy employment of urban target systems analysis and urban intelligence preparation of the battlefield can enhance the value drawn from such HUMINT.

A need exists to further investigate the possibility that the complexity of urban areas may impose greater responsibility on Marine teams to provide analysis versus only reporting what is seen using the Size, Activity, Location, Unit, Time, and Equipment (SALUTE) report.

It is possible that urban reconnaissance teams must be better armed.
Counterreconnaissance guidance is lacking.

**Specific Observations**

There is a need to delineate Surveillance and Target Acquisition (STA), division reconnaissance, and force reconnaissance responsibilities relative to each other and to provide guidance with regard to their positioning that accounts for LOS, supporting fire, and communications limitations in the urban environment.

There is a similar lack of guidance on how to coordinate organic and external, in particular clandestine or “black” intelligence collection assets.

Prebriefings and immediate debriefings of civil affairs and medical personnel working with noncombatants should be incorporated into collection efforts, whether during Block 1, 2, or 3 missions.

Urban reconnaissance doctrine and training need to better identify requirements of other Marine units they are likely to support.

There is a lack of guidance regarding mission-relevant relationships between critical components of the civilian infrastructure.

Doctrinal guidance lacks information regarding conduct of subterranean reconnaissance.

Viable guidance is absent with regard to the insertion and extraction of reconnaissance elements.

Helicopter support operations are another area seen as requiring much more investigation.

Ground insertion techniques have proven viable for allied forces, but the use of which has reportedly been denied by some Marine Corps leaders.

Time factors for urban insertions and extractions are unknown and may vary from those in open terrain.

A need exists for planning and coordinating fire support plans to cover reconnaissance teams during reconnaissance missions and to minimize the number of changes to those plans during missions.
Similarly, urban escape and evasion (E&E) plans should be uniform and coordinated.

Marine air support for ground reconnaissance suffers from the same absence of doctrine and training opportunities as do the ground elements.

Combat reconnaissance elements may find themselves reconnoitering in support of multinational and NGOs/PVOs. No USMC doctrine exists that provides guidance with regard to proper execution of or training for these tasks.

Marine doctrine needs to discuss how reconnaissance assets can best aid leaders in shaping actions involving villages, towns, or cities.

The close proximity of STA teams and other reconnaissance assets to other friendly units during urban operations means that traditional reporting procedures may be inappropriate.

**TRAINING**

**General**

There is an outstanding and immediate need to develop a comprehensive and tiered approach to urban reconnaissance training that incorporates classroom instruction, drills, military training facilities, and actual urban areas.

The curriculum and standards for urban training should be consistent in reconnaissance schools and across units. Urban training packages that prepare units for the specific built-up areas in which they will operate during pending deployments should be tailored to meet local unit mission requirements.

There is a misunderstanding of weapons effectiveness in cities.

**Specific Observations**

Controlling urban fires is difficult.

Reconnaissance teams are at times not properly educated with regard to rules of engagement (ROEs) during deployments.
Cultural awareness and cultural intelligence training for urban reconnaissance personnel is an area requiring significant attention. Other techniques thought to be of value but insufficiently covered in training are:

- Quiet and undetectable urban entry methods, such as picking locks and window latches or overcoming computer security systems.
- Gaining entry into and “hot wiring” vehicles for use when keys are unavailable.
- Better procedures for detecting, neutralizing, and installing boobytraps.

The lack of effective urban training involving units of greater than platoon size was considered a deficiency in USMC readiness. Though communications, use of lasers, photography, and vision enhancement hardware has been improved in recent months, the lack of training that would permit testing these assets in urban environments leaves team members unsure of how built-up areas will influence technological performance during missions.

Urban environments impose special medical concerns for reconnaissance elements.

Marine reconnaissance training is currently too reliant on host nation support.

**ORGANIZATIONAL, STRUCTURE, MANNING, AND PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT**

**General**

Members of the reconnaissance community are unsure of what the optimum size is for urban reconnaissance teams.

It is necessary to “break the wall between the G2 and G3.” Information of value to maneuver units at times never reached the elements most in need.
Specific Observations

There is a lack of specific information regarding urban infrastructure in mission areas and local national points of contact that can address specific related mission concerns.

A need exists to determine the echelon to which UAVs will be allocated and how they will be integrated into reconnaissance and intelligence dissemination systems.

Means to resupply Marines in hides, observation posts, or listening posts without compromising the position are currently lacking.

MATERIEL

General

There is a concern that too great a reliance on extant commercial off-the-shelf (COTS), military off-the-shelf, or brass board (in advanced concept, early development, or prototype form) products may fail to fully address identified needs in the interest of cost savings or immediacy of fielding.

Specific Observations

A need exists for acoustic or motion sensors that assist in detecting targets and potential threats in built-up areas.

Other wireless listening devices, including those that can amplify sounds over considerable distances or distinguish sounds through walls, would permit standoff collection of intelligence.

Design standards for equipment should consider the special demands urban environments put on end items.

A concern has arisen that new equipment purchases are too often not accompanied by the operator and maintenance training necessary to properly employ it.

Reliable communications and Global Positioning System (GPS) signals are areas of notable concern.
Communications compatibility even within the Marine Corps is terrible, much less with elements from other services.

There is a requirement for a stealthier means of monitoring radios.

The cumulative bulk of equipment was cited as a concern, one with special implications for urban operations.

There are several concerns regarding unmanned aerial vehicles.