

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has invested significant military, political, and economic resources into conducting operations in the aftermaths of conflicts or civil unrest. Numerous studies, articles, and reports have been published on various aspects of these operations, but most have focused exclusively on the post-Cold War period. This is the first effort of which we are aware to review the major U.S. experiences in nation-building exercises since 1945, compare and contrast the results of these operations, outline significant lessons and best practices, and then suggest how those lessons might be applied to the current challenges facing U.S. policymakers in Iraq.

Various terms have been used over the past 57 years to describe the activities we are seeking to analyze. The German and Japanese operations were referred to as *occupations*. The operations in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia were generally termed *peacekeeping* or *peace enforcement* missions. The current U.S. administration has preferred to use the terms *stabilization* and *reconstruction* to refer to its post-conflict operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq. In all these cases, the intent was to use military force to underpin a process of democratization. *Occupation*, *peacekeeping*, *peace enforcement*, *stabilization*, and *reconstruction* do not fully capture the scope of such operations. Neither does the term *nation-building*, but we believe it comes closest to suggesting the full range of activities and objectives involved.

We chose seven historical cases for this study: Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. These are the most important instances in the post-World War II period in which U.S. military power has been used to underpin democratization. Fur-

thermore, they include substantial variation in both the success of nation-building and such critical inputs as resources, manpower, and money. *Success* is defined as the ability to promote an enduring transfer of democratic institutions. We did not include the U.S. colonial experience in the Philippines because the societal transformation attempted there was intended to span several generations. We did not include the post-World War II occupation of Austria because we believed its lessons would largely parallel those of Germany and Japan. We did not include the Cold War interventions in Korea, Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, Lebanon, Grenada, and Panama because these were shorter lived and had more-limited political objectives.

The case studies themselves were designed to draw out “best practice” policies for democratizing states. To achieve this goal, we adopted a common approach for each case study. In each instance, we first described the nature of the settlement that ended the conflict. Second, we describe the scope of the problem. To develop a set of best practices, we needed to be able to compare the magnitude of the challenges facing the United States across the case studies. To do so, we outlined the security, humanitarian, administrative, political, and economic challenges that the United States faced at the end of the conflict. Third, we described the institutional arrangements and policies adopted during the operations. In particular, we described the roles the United States, other countries, and international organizations assumed during reconstruction. Fourth, we examined how each operation developed over time, how the security environment stabilized or grew more fragile, how the humanitarian situation evolved, how a civil administration was constructed, how the process of democratization developed, and how economic reconstruction progressed. Finally, we evaluated each operation. Then, using our evaluations of the various operations, we compiled the most important cross-cutting nation-building lessons.

In the final chapter, we applied these lessons learned to the case of Iraq. We first examined the challenges that the United States faces in assisting the reconstruction of Iraq. Then, based on best practices from the case-study operations, we provided recommendations concerning policies likely to be most effective for creating an economically healthy and democratic Iraq.