

This chapter compares the results of the operations in the seven cases—Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan—with the resources that the United States and the international community invested in them. We compare the cases in terms of five measures of inputs (military presence, police presence, total economic assistance, per capita economic assistance, and external assistance as a percentage of GDP) and four measures of outcomes (the numbers of postconflict combat deaths among U.S. forces, time until the first elections after the conflict, return of refugees and IDPs, and growth in per capita GDP). Because of the different sizes of the populations and economies of these countries, we have frequently used per capita, rather than aggregate figures. In many instances, we used time trends to help measure the speed at which and the extent to which nation-building efforts proceeded.


Most attempts to quantify inputs and outputs of complex processes suffer because available statistical measures are often poorly adapted to charting developments of consequence. This effort is no exception. The choice of metrics employed in this analysis was determined by the availability of data, as well as developments of interest.

MILITARY PRESENCE OVER TIME

Military force levels varied significantly across the cases. They ranged from 1.6 million U.S. forces in the European theater of operations at the end of World War II to the approximately 14,000 U.S. and international troops currently in Afghanistan. Gross numbers, however,


are not always useful for making comparisons across the cases because the sizes and populations of the countries are so disparate. For purposes of comparison, we calculated the numbers of U.S. and, when the U.S. led a multilateral coalition, international soldiers per thousand inhabitants for each country. We used these numbers to compare force levels at specified times after the end of the conflict or after the U.S. operation began.

As Figures 9.1 and 9.2 illustrate, force levels varied widely across the seven operations. Large numbers of U.S. military forces were initially deployed to Germany, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Initial force levels in Japan, Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan were more modest—in some cases, much more so. In most cases, forces have stayed for very long periods. Forces were still in Bosnia five years after the conflict ended; U.S. forces remain in Germany and Japan today, more than 50 years after the end of World War II. In the cases of Haiti and Somalia, U.S. soldiers stayed for two years or less, and international forces left not long thereafter.



NOTE: Year 0 represents the end of the conflict.

Figure 9.1—Military Presence over Time, Excluding Germany



NOTE: In order to capture Germany in the same chart, we used a logarithmic scale because Germany started with a much higher troops-to-population ratio than all the other cases. The figures for Germany represent the level of U.S. troops at the end of the war as a proportion of the population in the U.S. sector.

Figure 9.2—Military Presence over Time, Including Germany

INTERNATIONAL POLICE PRESENCE OVER TIME

A more recent innovation has been dispatching U.S. and international police to supplement the efforts of military forces to provide security for local inhabitants. These initiatives have differed greatly in scope and scale. Some have principally consisted of training programs for local law enforcement officers; others have been major operations that have included deploying hundreds or thousands of armed international police to monitor, train, mentor, and even substitute for indigenous forces until the creation of a proficient domestic police force. Figure 9.3 shows numbers of foreign police per thousand inhabitants over time for the four cases that featured significant deployments of international police.


As Figure 9.3 demonstrates, it can take a year or more to build up and deploy a CIVPOL force once combat has ended. In Kosovo, for example, it took until the end of the second year of the operation to

reach the target level for foreign police in the country. These delays can create a short-term vacuum of law and order and can increase the pressure on nation-building states to use their military forces, including military police, to maintain internal security.

POSTCONFLICT COMBAT-RELATED DEATHS

One of the most sensitive aspects of postconflict operations, especially after the 1993 U.S. retreat from Somalia, has been the issue of casualties. During the 1990s, the U.S. military, under guidance from its civilian leaders, placed tremendous emphasis on force protection to avoid U.S. casualties. As Figure 9.4 illustrates, casualty figures have not been high in postcombat environments. Somalia and Afghanistan top the chart with 43 and 30 deaths, respectively.

Afghanistan has the second-highest total for postconflict combat-related deaths, which reflects the nature of the operation. Although



NOTE: Year 1 represents the end of the first year of military presence.

Figure 9.3—International Police Presence over Time




Figure 9.4—Total Postconflict Combat-Related Deaths

the fighting against the Taliban government ended in December 2001, combat operations against al Qaeda and Taliban remnants continue in what amounts to a low-level counterinsurgency campaign.

The highest levels of casualties have occurred in the operations with the lowest levels of U.S. troops, suggesting an inverse ratio between force levels and the level of risk. Germany, Japan, Bosnia, and Kosovo had no postconflict combat deaths. The postconflict occupations in Germany and Japan proved relatively risk-free because both Japan and Germany were thoroughly defeated and because their governments had agreed to unconditional surrender. The low numbers of combat deaths also show that postconflict nation-building, when undertaken with adequate numbers of troops, has triggered little violent resistance. Only when the number of stabilization troops has been low in comparison to the population have U.S. forces suffered or inflicted significant casualties.

TIMING OF ELECTIONS

Democratization is the core objective of nation-building operations. Central to this process has been the planning and conduct of democratic elections. The timing of these elections varied by case, as Figure 9.5 illustrates.




Figure 9.5—Timing of Elections

In Somalia, the situation never stabilized long enough for elections to occur. In Germany and Kosovo, local elections preceded national polls by at least 18 months. National elections in Germany had to wait until a new country, the Federal Republic of Germany, was created from the Western occupation zones. As a consequence, national elections were not held until 52 months after the fall of Hitler, excluding the Soviet zone. In Japan, Haiti, and Bosnia, local elections were held at the same time or well after national elections.


The case studies suggest the desirability of holding local elections first. This provides an opportunity for new local leaders to emerge and gain experience and for political parties to build a support base. The extended preparatory periods in Kosovo and Germany appear to have facilitated the building of political parties and the establishment of other aspects of civil society, such as a free press. In contrast, the early national elections in Bosnia were probably counterproductive because they legitimated the nationalist governments responsible for the civil war in the first place. Early elections, driven by a

desire to fulfill departure deadlines and exit strategies, can entrench spoilers and impede the process of democratization.

REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

All these conflicts caused citizens to flee, either abroad as refugees or to other areas of the country as IDPs. The number of refugees and IDPs a conflict generates is an important indicator of the degree of domestic instability. In almost all the cases, large numbers of people fled their homes. The exodus of people also had important political effects, especially if the destinations were countries that had the ability to intervene to reduce these flows. In Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, refugee flows to the United States and EU, respectively, were a significant factor in the decisions to intervene to stop the fighting. The U.S. and European governments recognized that, until secure conditions were created in these areas, people would continue to flee, and refugees would not return.

Figure 9.6 shows the number of people who fled their homes during each conflict. For purposes of comparison, we calculated the number



NOTE: The total for Kosovo was actually 500.9.

Figure 9.6—Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons

of refugees and IDPs per thousand population, rather than the total numbers of refugees and IDPs.

The wide range in the number of IDPs and refugees is noteworthy. Although Haiti had the smallest number of refugees per thousand inhabitants (1.9), the flow of refugees from Haiti seeking asylum in the United States was a major factor in the U.S. government's decision to intervene. At the other extreme, the Bosnian civil war led to the displacement of over a million people, 229 people per thousand, roughly one-quarter of the population. Similarly, millions of ethnic Germans fled their homes in regions outside Germany or that had been annexed from Germany at the end of World War II, creating an enormous problem of refugees in the immediate postwar years. Despite the number of refugees and IDPs in Germany following World War II, the most striking displacement occurred in Kosovo, where virtually half of the province's population fled their homes during spring 1999. By late May, 863,000 Albanian Kosovars had fled Kosovo and approximately another 250,000 were internally displaced.¹

INITIAL EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE

In all the cases studied, substantial amounts of assistance in the form of grants of money, goods and services, or concessionaire loans were given to help revive the local economies. Assistance has been provided by private individuals, often emigrants from these countries, and from governments and international organizations, such as the IMF, UN, and EU. Figure 9.7 illustrates the total assistance in constant 2001 U.S. dollars provided to each of the countries in the two years immediately after the end of its conflict.

The amount of external aid varied widely between countries and postconflict situations. Germany, Japan, and Bosnia received the highest amounts of assistance in absolute terms during the first two postconflict years, at \$11.6 billion, \$4.1 billion, and \$4.5 billion, respectively. In contrast, Haiti, Kosovo, and Afghanistan all received less than \$2 billion.

¹OSCE (1999).




Figure 9.7—Total Assistance During First Two Postconflict Years

EXTERNAL PER CAPITA ASSISTANCE

Aggregate numbers are not always the most useful metric when comparing countries with very different populations. Consequently, Figure 9.8 provides data on assistance in constant 2001 dollars on a per capita basis.

On this basis, Germany, which was granted the most assistance in aggregate terms (\$12 billion) after the first two years of conflict, does not rank as highly: Per capita assistance ran a little over \$200. Kosovo, which ranked fourth in terms of total assistance, received over \$800 per resident. Levels of per capita assistance have had some bearing on the speed of economic recovery. Kosovo, with the second-highest level of assistance on a per capita basis, enjoyed the fastest recovery in levels of per capita GDP following the conflict. In contrast, Haiti, which received much less per capita than Kosovo, has experienced little growth in per capita GDP since the end of the conflict.

EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP

Another useful measure is assistance as a percentage of GDP (Figure 9.9). Although the numbers vary, external assistance in relation to




Figure 9.8—Per Capita Assistance in First Two Postconflict Years





Figure 9.9—External Assistance as a Percentage of GDP

GDP has been substantial in many of the post–Cold War cases, running between 20 and 45 percent of the country’s GDP in the first two years after the conflict. These levels of assistance were generally the outcome of donor conferences, during which international financial institutions presented assessments of need to potential donors. The levels illustrate both the depressed levels of economic activity after conflicts and the substantial sums that, according to experienced outside observers, could be profitably used to speed reconstruction and recovery.

CHANGES IN PER CAPITA GDP

One of the most important indicators of a country’s economic revival after a conflict is the recovery of incomes as reflected in per capita GDP. Figure 9.10 tracks changes in per capita GDP in each country in the years following the conflict. The figure shows postconflict per capita GDP as a percentage of per capita GDP in the year immediately prior to the conflict.



NOTE: Year 0 is the first year after the conflict.

Figure 9.10—Postconflict Per Capita GDP Growth

Although per capita GDP for all the countries increased during the immediate postconflict years, it did so to varying degrees. Haiti's per capita GDP recovered very slowly and then remained stable at about 75 percent of what it was prior to the conflict. On the other hand, Germany's per capita GDP jumped from 75 in 1946 to 175 in 1953. Although estimates of per capita GDP in the immediate aftermath of the conflict are prone to large margins of error, Bosnia appears to have experienced the sharpest drop in income over the course of the conflict. In 1995, per capita GDP was estimated at just one-third of preconflict levels. However, postconflict recovery was swift, primarily due to the large amounts of external assistance Bosnia received. By 2002, per capita GDP had reached close to 90 percent of prewar levels. In Japan, per capita GDP was half its 1939 level in 1945, but by 1952, incomes had risen to 80 percent of their levels in 1939. However, in contrast to Germany, Japan's initial economic recovery was slow.

CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS

The German and Japanese occupations set standards for postconflict transformation that have not been equaled. One of the most important questions this study addressed is why these two operations succeeded so well, while those that have come after have fallen short to one degree or another. The easiest answer is that Germany and Japan were already highly developed and economically advanced societies. It is easier to reconstruct economies that have been modern than to foster rapid economic growth in economies that have never been developed. This may explain why it was easier to reconstruct the German and Japanese economies than it was to fundamentally reform the underdeveloped economies in the other five case studies. Note also that past difficulties fade with the passage of time. George Marshall was seriously concerned about the potential economic collapse of Germany in winter 1947, a concern that led to the passage of the Marshall Plan in 1948, three years after the end of the war. Japan had one of the slowest rates of recovery among the case studies. Per capita incomes in Bosnia have recovered much more rapidly; those in Kosovo exceeded preconflict levels within 24 months of the end of the conflict. In Japan, this did not happen until 1956, over a decade after the end of the war.

However, the successes of Germany and Japan are not primarily a matter of economics. Nation-building, as we have defined it, and, more importantly, as those responsible for the operations defined their objectives at the time, was not primarily about rebuilding a country's economy but about transforming its political institutions. The spread of democracy in Latin America, Asia, and parts of Africa suggests that this form of government is not unique to Western culture or of advanced industrial economies. Democracy can, indeed, take root when neither is present. No postconflict program of "reconstruction" could turn Somalia, Haiti, or Afghanistan into thriving centers of prosperity. But the failure of U.S.-led interventions to encourage democratic transitions in these countries has other than purely economic explanations.

Homogeneity is another possible variable to explain the differences in nation-building outcomes. Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan were divided ethnically, socioeconomically, or tribally in ways that Germany and Japan were not. But again, homogeneity is not a necessary condition. The kind of communal hatreds that mark Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan were even more marked in Bosnia and Kosovo, where, nevertheless, the process of democratization has made some progress. What distinguishes Germany, Japan, Bosnia, and Kosovo, on the one hand, from Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan, on the other, are not their levels of economic development, Western culture, or national homogeneity. Rather, what distinguishes these two groups is the levels of effort the international community has put into their democratic transformations. Successful nation-building, as this study illustrates, needs time and resources. The United States and its allies have put 25 times more money and 50 times more troops per capita into postconflict Kosovo than into postconflict Afghanistan. This higher level of input accounts, at least in part, for the higher level of output in terms of democratic institutions and economic growth.

Japan, one of the two undoubted successes, fully meets these criteria, at least in terms of the amount of time spent on its transformation. On the other hand, Japan received considerably less external economic assistance per capita than did Germany, Bosnia, or Kosovo. Indeed, it received less than Haiti and about the same as Afghanistan. Japan's postconflict economic growth rate was correspondingly low. U.S. spending on the Korean War, however, spurred

Japan's economic growth during the 1950s, which subsequently helped consolidate public support for the democratic reforms that had been instituted soon after the war. As with the German economic miracle of the 1950s, this experience suggests that rising economic prosperity is not so much a necessary precursor for political reform as a highly desirable follow-up and legitimizer.

The stabilization (or, as it was then termed, occupation) force in Japan was also smaller, in proportion to population, than those in Germany, Bosnia, or Kosovo, although it was larger than those in Haiti and Afghanistan. The willing collaboration of the existing power structures and the homogeneity of the population undoubtedly enhanced the ability to secure Japan with a comparatively small force. But the very scale of Japan's defeat was also important: years of total war had wrought devastation, including the firebombing of Japanese cities and, finally, two nuclear attacks. The result was a population tired of war and effectively beaten into submission. When conflicts have ended less conclusively and destructively (or not terminated at all)—as in Somalia; Afghanistan; and, most recently, Iraq—the postconflict security challenges have proven more difficult. It seems that the more swift and bloodless the military victory, the more difficult postconflict stabilization can be.

The pace of economic growth and political transformation in the German and Japanese cases suggests that the basics of democratization were put in place during a period of economic deprivation. The Marshall Plan did not begin until 1948, and per capita incomes in Japan did not exceed pre-World War II levels until after the economic boost from U.S. purchases of material for the Korean War. But in both cases, the basic political reforms were in place by 1947. Economic growth and the recovery in per capita incomes helped legitimize and consolidate democracy but were not necessary precursors.

Burden-Sharing Versus Unity of Command

When it was shouldering the burden of Japan's transformation and most of that for West Germany, the United States generated some 50 percent of the world's GDP. By the 1990s, when the number of nation-building cases increased, the United States accounted for about 22 percent of world GDP, although in absolute terms U.S. output was far higher than in the immediate post-World War II era. The

decline in the U.S. share of global GDP and the concomitant rise in output and incomes elsewhere have made international burden-sharing both politically more important and more affordable for other countries.

Throughout the 1990s, the United States wrestled with the problem of how to achieve wider participation in its nation-building endeavors while also preserving adequate unity of command. In Somalia and Haiti, the United States experimented with sequential arrangements in which it organized, led, and largely manned and funded the initial phase of the operation but then quickly turned responsibility over to a more broadly representative UN force. These efforts were not successful, although Haiti was better organized than Somalia. In Bosnia, the United States succeeded in achieving unity of command and broad participation on the military side of the operation through NATO but made less progress toward that goal on the civil side.

In Kosovo, the United States achieved unity of command and broad participation on both the military and civil sides through NATO and the UN, respectively. While the military and civil aspects of that operation remained under different management, the United States ensured that the mandates and capabilities of the two entities—KFOR and UNMIK—would overlap and prevent a gap from opening between them.

None of these models was entirely satisfactory. Arrangements in Kosovo, however, seem to have provided the best amalgam of U.S. leadership, European participation, broad financial burden-sharing, and strong unity of command. Every international official in Kosovo works ultimately for one of two people, the NATO commander or the Special Representative of the Secretary General. Neither of these individuals is an American. But by virtue of its credibility in the region and its influence in NATO and the UN Security Council, the United States has been able to maintain a satisfactory leadership role while paying only 16 percent of the reconstruction costs and fielding only 16 percent of the peacekeeping troops.

The efficacy of the Kosovo and Bosnian models for managing a large-scale nation-building operation depends heavily on the ability of the United States and its principal allies to attain a common vision of nation-building objectives and to shape the response of the relevant

institutions, such as NATO, the EU, and the UN, to those common objectives. When the principal participants in a nation-building exercise have a common vision, the Balkans models offer a viable amalgam of burden-sharing and unity of command.

More recently, in Afghanistan the United States opted for two separate military command structures and even greater variety on the civil side. An international force with no U.S. participation operates in Kabul, while a coalition and, mostly U.S., force operates everywhere else. The UN is responsible for promoting political transformation, while individual donors coordinate economic reconstruction—or, more often, fail to do so. This arrangement is a marginal improvement on Somalia, since the separate U.S. and international forces are at least not operating in the same physical space. But Afghanistan represents a clear regression from what was achieved in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The overall Afghan nation-building operation is certainly more successful than that in Somalia, but not yet better than that in Haiti, and less advanced than the efforts in Bosnia or Kosovo at a similar stage. It is also considerably cheaper.

Duration

The seven cases also differed in duration. Haiti began with clear departure deadlines that were adhered to. Germany, Japan, Somalia, and Bosnia began with very short time lines but saw those amended. Kosovo and Afghanistan began without any expectation of an early exit. The record suggests that, while staying long does not guarantee success, leaving early ensures failure.

And if democratization takes hold, does that provide the ultimate exit strategy? Not necessarily. U.S. forces left clear failures behind in Somalia and Haiti, but remain present in every successful or still-pending case: Germany, Japan, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. These five interventions were motivated by regional or global geopolitical concerns. Democratization alone does not fully address such concerns. Germany and Japan were disarmed. They received American military support and financial assistance long after they became self-sufficient democracies because they were not capable of defending themselves unaided against the Soviet Union. This was because of their initially enforced and then voluntary disarmament, particularly their renunciation of nuclear weapons. Bosnia, Kosovo, and

Afghanistan may require assistance in maintaining their external security even after their internal peace is established. Whether this help will take the form of an external military presence, security guarantees, or leadership in forging new regional security arrangements remains to be seen. But international involvement in their external security is likely to continue long after the democratic transformation is completed.

Indeed, if Germany and Japan are any guide, the more thorough the democratic transformation the more deeply forged the residual links may be. The record suggests that building a nation creates ties of both affection and dependency that persist long after the end of the initial conflict.

Conclusions

With these considerations in mind, there are, in addition to the case-specific lessons noted at the end of each preceding chapter, some broader conclusions to bear in mind:

- Several factors influence the ease or difficulty of nation-building: prior democratic experience, level of economic development, and national homogeneity. However, among controllable factors, the most important determinant is the level of effort—measured in time, manpower, and money.
- Multilateral nation-building is more complex and time consuming than unilateral efforts but is also considerably less expensive for each participating country.
- Multilateral nation-building can produce more thoroughgoing transformations and greater regional reconciliation than can unilateral efforts.
- Unity of command and broad participation are compatible if the major participants share a common vision and can shape international institutions accordingly.
- There appears to be an inverse correlation between the size of the stabilization force and the level of risk. The higher the proportion of stabilizing troops, the lower the number of casualties

suffered and inflicted. Indeed, most adequately manned post-conflict operations suffered no casualties.

- Neighboring states can exert significant influence. It is exceptionally difficult to put together a fragmented nation if its neighbors are trying to tear it apart. Every effort should be made to secure their support.
- Accountability for past injustices can be a powerful component of democratization. It can also be among the most difficult and controversial aspects of any nation-building endeavor and should, therefore, be attempted only if there is a deep and long-term commitment to the overall operation.
- There is no quick route to nation-building. Five years seems the minimum required to enforce an enduring transition to democracy.