The strategic research, analysis, and intelligence (SRAI) subarena comprises the full range of specialist research, analysis, recommendations, and intelligence gathering (generally known in China as simply strategic assessment and analysis (zhanlue pingjia yu fenxi) used to support the activities of leaders and agencies in both the foreign and defense policy subarenas as well as the senior leadership charged with formulating and revising broader national strategic objectives. In this subarena, strategic research and analysis are undertaken, intelligence gathered, and policy recommendations provided on a wide range of subjects critical to the creation and development of external civilian and military doctrines and strategies. Such subjects include the general strategic and security dimensions of international affairs; major (and minor) power relations; global, regional, or subregional political, economic, social, and military developments; country-specific military issues (including analyses of foreign forces, doctrines, etc.); and other functional topics related to weapons procurement and arms control.¹ Military intelligence

¹For further details, see Shambaugh (1987), pp. 278-280; Cheung (1987a), pp. 240-241; and Alastair I. Johnston, “Learning Versus Adaptation: Explaining Change in Chinese Arms Control Policy in the 1980s and 1990s,” China Journal, No. 35, January 1996, pp. 36-46. Historically, the Chinese military did not conduct extensive research and analysis on arms control issues, given its limited exposure to Western ideas and contacts and its greater overall focus on weapons development. Most of this work in the past was undertaken by the civilian institutes mentioned in this report. However, this situation has changed markedly over the past decade or so, as a result of the greater attention given to arms control issues by most major powers and China's expanding involvement in various major arms control regimes. Approximately half of
gathering focuses on identifying and assessing potential military threats on China’s borders, including the order of battle of forces near China, military geography, the military doctrines and intentions of potentially hostile states, military economics, biographical information on key foreign figures, and nuclear targeting information.

The actors of the SRAI subarena constitute what David Shambaugh has referred to as China’s “national security research bureaucracy.” They include a wide range of institutes, departments, and related organizations, each attached to major civilian or military organs of the foreign or defense policy subarenas, as indicated in Figure 5.

As the above suggests, these bureaucratic actors perform one or more of the following three basic categories of functions for their parent organization, the leaders of their subarena, or major leaders of the national strategic objectives subarena:

- Analysis and recommendations on fundamental national security strategy issues, military security strategy or doctrine issues, or foreign/diplomatic policy issues
- Operational analysis in support of diplomatic relations with specific countries or key aspects of defense policy, such as military targeting or orders of battle
- Provision of raw intelligence relating to the previous two areas.

the Chinese delegation to the U.N. Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (CD) is now composed of arms control specialists from military institutions. In addition to attending the CD, experts from the military also participate in other international arms control conferences, such as those sponsored by the Rome-based International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts (ISODARCO), the Union of Concerned Scientists, and the Federation of American Scientists. Moreover, COSTIND now plays a major role in arms control and disarmament research, as discussed below.


3It must be stressed that the agencies of the SRAI subarena did not always play as important a role in the overall national security policy process as they do at present. Their significance has gradually increased since the late 1970s as the more ideological, personalistic, and top-down pattern of decisionmaking typical of the Maoist era gave way to the more pragmatic, bureaucratic, and consensus-oriented pattern of the reform period. As part of this process, Zhao Ziyang established a set of structures and procedures designed to increase leadership use of finished policy analysis by strategists, not just raw news data and foreign opinions provided by the Xinhua News Agency.’ See Hamrin (1995), pp. 90–91; Barnett (1985), pp. 84–86, 116; and Cheung (1987b), pp. 94–101.
Figure 5—Strategic Research, Analysis, and Intelligence Subarena

Key
- Primary consumers
- Secondary consumers
- Primary producers
- Secondary producers
- Evaluators and distributors
- (Note: The Ministry of National Defense is not a fully constituted organization and is depicted differently.)
- Important reporting channel
The internal structure and functions of the civilian components of the SRAI subarena have been discussed in various scholarly sources and will not be repeated in detail here. The most significant agencies are attached to the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), and the Xinhua News Agency. They include the China Institute for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR)—the largest civilian strategic research institute under the MSS; the Institute for International Studies (IIS), the International Policy Research Office, and the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS), all under the MoFA; and a foreign news and intelligence gathering and reporting office within Xinhua. Other less significant civilian agencies are attached to the State Council, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), and various major universities in Beijing and other large cities. These include the International Studies Research Center (ISRC), the Development Research Center (DRC), and the State Council Research Office, all under the State Council; the Institute of World Economics and Politics (IWE), the Institute of American Studies, and the Russia/East European Institute, all under CASS; and various international security affairs or regional studies departments or research institutes at Beijing University, People's University, Nanjing University, and Fudan University.

Among the top civilian agencies, CICIR produces the most long-range and comprehensive strategic studies of the first category of functions mentioned above. In contrast, analysis conducted by units of the MoFA falls primarily within the second category, i.e., focusing essentially on foreign policy issues and short-term strategic or diplomatic problems, often in response to immediate events and the urgent needs of the diplomatic community. Xinhua's news/intelligence operation obviously provides products most relevant to the third category. It deploys hundreds of journalists overseas to

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5In general, strategists and researchers attached to the MoFA, MSS, and Xinhua have access to critical internal policy documents and usually attend the most important internal leadership meetings. In contrast, researchers and strategists associated with CASS or various universities do not have such access and involvement. Hence, the latter's analysis is less influential. However, CASS agencies routinely submit analysis and reports to the MSS, as part of their reporting responsibility on contacts with foreigners. This link to the MSS might serve to increase CASS's importance in the policy process.
collect foreign news and produces several types of classified reports/journals for party officials.\(^6\) The MSS also conducts a very significant range of foreign intelligence activities. It is especially known for its intelligence work and strategic analysis regarding Taiwan. In the past, the State Council’s ISRC reportedly played a critical role within the foreign policy process as a producer, conduit, and central transmission point to the senior leadership of intelligence, research reports, and some policy documents.\(^7\) However, ISRC’s superior status and influence depended on the personal clout of its director at the time, Huan Xiang, a veteran diplomat and international affairs specialist with strong ties to the top leadership, especially to Deng Xiaoping. Since his death, ISRC has lost virtually all of its influence within the national security policy arena and now ranks as a mere bureau within the government hierarchy. In recent years, the State Council’s OFA has taken over many of those activities in the civilian strategic research, analysis, and intelligence subarena previously performed by the ISRC. The State Council’s DRC was established during the mid 1980s under Zhao Ziyang. Originally directed by the well-known economist Ma Hong (who now serves as its honorary head), the DRC conducts and coordinates research and analysis on economic, technological, and social-development-related policy issues. As a coordination unit, it reportedly can commission reports from both civilian and military research units on topics relating to any of the above areas. It also has its own research offices that produce analysis on a wide range of subjects.\(^8\) As mentioned above, the

\(^{6}\)Eftimiades (1994), p. 108. Xinhua’s activities in these areas are thus far more relevant to the strategic research, analysis, and intelligence subarena than those of the above mentioned Foreign Propaganda Leading Group. The latter serves mainly as a watchdog on media interactions with the outside, not as a provider of analysis and intelligence.

\(^{7}\)The ISRC functioned during its heyday as both a policy coordination point (kou) and a strategic research institute. See Cheung (1987b), p. 90.

\(^{8}\)Hence, as with the ISRC in the past, the DRC probably serves as both a policy coordination point and as a producer of economic research and analysis. The DRC was originally called the State Council Research Center for Economic, Technological, and Social Development (jingji jishu yu shehui fazhan yanjiu zhongxin). According to Carol Hamrin, it “evolved from the 1979 structural adjustment group, which in 1980 became the technical economic research center and then merged in 1985 with the economic reform and price reform research centers.” Under Zhao Ziyang, its leading officials and researchers, many of them recruited from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences by Ma Hong (the former president of CASS), helped shape the development strategy and reform policies of both the 7th Five Year Plan adopted in 1986 and the
State Council Research Office is involved in a broad range of government policy issues and often produces analysis for the FALSG and the PBSC. It is reportedly not a major player in the SRAI subarena, however, as mentioned in Chapter Three.

These civilian actors support the national strategic objectives and foreign policy subarenas in a wide variety of ways. On the formal level, the leading analytical and intelligence units under the MSS, MoFA, Xinhua, the State Council, and CASS are tasked to provide various reports or papers on behalf of their parent organization, for submission to the FALSG and PBSC. The most important such “official” reports or papers are produced for specific policy meetings (e.g., party plenums or congresses, and various work conferences or internal meetings organized by the MoFA, the State Council, or the FALSG), in preparation for major events (e.g., major trips abroad by senior leaders), or in response to a foreign policy “crisis” (e.g., Washington’s issuance of a visa to Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui). Other formal reports on a variety of topics are prepared from time to time by all of the above agencies at the initiative of either the leadership or the producing agency. One additional type of formal report is a year-end review of the key events of the previous twelve months. This document focuses primarily on the strategic environment and critical foreign policy problems facing China and assesses likely future developments over the coming year and beyond.

Most formal reports first pass through the CC GO, which evaluates, summarizes, and distributes them. However, an undetermined (but probably very small) number of formal reports are delivered directly

According to one well-placed interviewee, the majority of CICIR reports are reportedly generated from below and are often intended to tell the top leadership what they should be thinking or doing about a particular national security issue. Only a minority of reports are in response to higher-level requests.

Interviews. Also see Yang (1995), p. 97. Virtually all year-end reports are “homogenized” as a result of this screening process, however; in other words, the more extreme views are toned down and moderated to conform more closely with the official line. As a result, they often become very bland documents, similar in tone and content.
to senior leaders or heads of ministries and commissions, bypassing the CC GO entirely.\textsuperscript{11} A larger number of less formal reports are routed directly to the offices of PBSC members through an irregular reporting channel. These reports (known as yaobao) do not pass through the CCP CC GO, and are apparently regarded far more seriously by the leadership than the regular, formal reports discussed above.\textsuperscript{12} As a result, agencies compete with one another to establish such channels. At the end of the year, a list of all reports (both formal and informal) is issued, with an asterisk placed next to those actually used by the top leaders. Other relatively informal means of providing input into civilian leadership organs include briefings of top leaders, participation in ad hoc meetings of ministerial-level policymakers, and informal discussions with various bureaucratic leaders.\textsuperscript{13} In addition, since the mid 1980s, civilian strategists from different agencies often meet informally to discuss issues.

Most studies of the specialist or intelligence components of China's national security policy process have concentrated on the above activities of the leading civilian bureaucratic actors. Some scholars have even asserted that national security policy analysis is largely dominated by these actors and is thus “civilianized.”\textsuperscript{14} This may have been somewhat true during the Zhao Ziyang period of the middle and late 1980s, when civilian research and intelligence agencies became very critical to the national security policy process, as noted above. At that time, the major analytical agencies supporting Zhao included the ISRC under Huan Xiang, the Foreign Affairs section of the Party Secretariat's Policy Research Office, CICIR, and the SIS. However, such civilian agencies account for only part of the analytical and intelligence contributions to the national strategic objective subarena. Their military counterparts are obviously the

\textsuperscript{11}The criteria or factors that determine whether or not a formal report must pass through the CC GO (and the specific difference between such reports and the less formal yaobao reports discussed below) are unclear to the author.

\textsuperscript{12}For example, CICIR reportedly has a direct channel to the offices of the FALSG and those of several PBSC members, including Jiang Zemin. These senior leaders often incorporate sections of CICIR analyses directly into their formal policy speeches. Both yaobao and more formal reports are classified according to different levels of urgency, usually by the submitting agency.

\textsuperscript{13}For example, civilian strategists are often asked to brief the FALSG.

major (indeed the sole) providers of such resources to the defense policy subarena and also provide far more significant inputs into the national strategic objectives and foreign policy subarenas than is usually assumed. In fact, the amount and quality of military analysis, recommendations, and intelligence provided to the entire national security policy arena has reportedly increased considerably during the past decade.\textsuperscript{15}

The SRAI subarena includes a large and apparently growing (and increasingly capable) number of military and quasi-military actors.\textsuperscript{16} The most significant are directly attached or subordinate to the MND (on a purely formal level), the GSD, and COSTIND, as indicated in Figure 5. The GSD's Operations Department (zuozhanbu) exercises line authority over all producers of strategic research, analysis, and intelligence for the General Staff Department; these primarily include the GSD’s Second, Third, and Fourth Departments. The Operations Department also produces its own strategic analysis, albeit on a relatively small scale.\textsuperscript{17} The Second and Third Departments are the premier analytical and intelligence arms of the PLA, however. They perform a variety of support activities relevant to all three of the functional areas of this subarena listed on page 58.

In the view of many knowledgeable observers, the Second Department (military intelligence) is superior to all other organs, civilian and military, as a source of national security and defense intelligence and military-related strategic analysis for the senior leadership.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{15}This impression is based primarily upon admittedly subjective estimates provided to the author by both civilian and military analysts.

\textsuperscript{16}Before the reform period, most military research, analysis, and intelligence was highly ideological in approach, overly cautious, internally fragmented, and generally lacking in rigor. Only during the past decade or so has it become more dynamic, creative, pragmatic, and collaborative. See Cheung (1987a), pp. 246-247, for a discussion of the changes that had occurred by the mid 1980s. This trend toward greater professionalism and sophistication of analysis continues today, according to interviewees.

\textsuperscript{17}The GSD Operations Department is primarily concerned with military deployments and warfighting, and is thus considered the premier GSD department. It is usually supervised by the first-ranking Deputy Chief of Staff. The GSD Equipment Department is arguably the second most important GSD department, with primary responsibility for force structure and weapons procurement, as previously discussed.

\textsuperscript{18}Established in the 1950s with Soviet assistance, the Second Department has a total staff of at least 1500 analysts and support people, including intelligence gatherers. It uses all forms of intelligence gathering means, including satellites.
Indeed, the strategic analysis capabilities of both the MND’s China Institute of International Strategic Studies (CISS) and NDU’s Institute for Strategic Studies (zhanlue yanjiusuo, or ISS) (discussed below) were formed primarily by transferring to them, on a temporary or permanent basis, some of the best military analysts from the Second Department. Although formally presented as the MND’s major research unit on international security affairs, CISS is in reality staffed and directed entirely by the Second Department. Reports analyzing China’s external threat environment (including the capabilities of foreign militaries and especially the United States military in Asia) are usually produced by Second Department/CISS strategists. In addition, intelligence collection units at the military region level are also subordinate to the Second Department, which maintains a tactical reconnaissance bureau to foster communication among intelligence division commands in each MR.19

The Third Department (technical intelligence) conducts various forms of electronic intelligence using satellites and other long-distance wireless-gathering means. Hence, it performs similar functions to the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA). It also carries out a wide range of diplomatic, military, and international communications activities.20

The Fourth Department, established in 1990, is primarily responsible for communications, counter-electronic warfare, and early warning. This office mainly conducts intelligence and research activities and not strategic analysis.21

COSTIND’s units primarily undertake research and analysis on specific conventional and unconventional-weapons-related issues, using a wide range of primarily technical intelligence and information.22 The Beijing Institute of Systems Engineering (BISE) and the

20Eftimiades (1994), pp. 46, 94. The Third Department has a much longer history than the Second Department, predating the Sino-Soviet alliance of the 1950s.
21For further details on the Second, Third, and Fourth Departments, see Eftimiades (1994), and Desmond Ball, “Signals Intelligence in China,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 7, No. 8, August 1995, pp. 365-370.
22Hence, COSTIND agencies do not collect and analyze intelligence on foreign military forces in the manner of the Second Department. In fact, according to at least one
China Defense Science and Technology Information Center (CDSTIC) attached to COSTIND undertake a variety of strategic studies and generally provide analysis for the COSTIND “wise-men’s group” mentioned previously.23 These two offices often make recommendations concerning military technology and weapons acquisitions to the CMC G0, in coordination with related offices within the AMS, NDU, GPD, the GSD’s Equipment and Technology Office, and the MoFA.24 Moreover, COSTIND’s agencies usually take the lead in producing analytical studies affecting disarmament, arms control, and weapons development issues.

The strategic research arms of the AMS and NDU are next in importance within this subarena. Although formally under the MND, both are directed and generally tasked by the CMC and the GSD. Their activities are largely limited to both strategic and operational analysis, not intelligence gathering. NDU’s above-mentioned ISS performs two functions: It produces analysis for the CMC and GSD and conducts research and writing on strategic issues in support of the university’s officer instruction programs. In carrying out these duties, the ISS reportedly enjoys considerable flexibility in choosing subjects for study. In contrast, the activities of the AMS’s larger Department of Strategic Studies (zhanlue yanjiubu, or DSS)25 do not include an instructional component and are more closely directed by the CMC and the GSD.26 Hence, the resulting strategic analysis usually reflects the more operationally oriented concerns of those well-informed military analyst, COSTIND has few contacts with the Second and Third Departments.

23The former office primarily studies various military technologies as part of the nuclear weapons lab system; the latter focuses on disarmament and arms control issues. In addition, several other COSTIND agencies also provide various types of (primarily technical) input on arms control policy. These include the China Academy of Engineering Physics (the CAEP or Ninth Academy), and the Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics (IAPCM). The author is indebted to Alastair Johnston for this information.


25The NDU’s ISS includes approximately 50 researchers and support personnel, compared to about 90 within the AMS’s DSS.

26Other key AMS departments study operations and tactics, military systems, Chinese military history, and foreign military systems. The AMS also has a department for maintaining the AMS military encyclopedia, and departments for postgraduate work, military operations, and military simulations.
leading military organs. For example, the DSS performs much of the PLA's analysis relating to the development of its defense doctrine and warfighting capabilities.\textsuperscript{27} However, according to interviewees, despite their broad responsibilities, the strategic analysis produced by both NDU and AMS often reflects the traditional interests of the ground forces.

Secondary military or military-related agencies in this subarena serve two of the PLA's service arms, the GPD, the Second Artillery, and, loosely, the GSD. They include separate PLAN and PLAAF research institutes, the Center for Peace and Development (CPD) of the China Association for International Friendly Contact (CAIFC, attached to the GPD's Liaison Department), the Foundation for International Strategic Studies (FISS), and the Strategy Department of the Second Artillery.\textsuperscript{28} This group of secondary agencies also includes the Policy Research Office of the CMC.

The PLAN and PLAAF research institutes largely assess external threat potential relevant to their respective services. This activity primarily entails logistical and tactical analysis rather than broad strategic analysis.\textsuperscript{29} In other words, these research agencies play a significant role when operational or tactical issues are under examination. They also exert considerable influence over the analysis of military funding issues. Much of the research and intelligence these agencies generate are reportedly also conveyed to the Second and Third Departments.

The GPD's Center for Peace and Development (CPD) under the Liaison Department's CAIFC carries out both intelligence and analysis activities. Historically, the GPD Liaison Department has enjoyed a strong reputation for strategic analysis and intelligence regarding Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao. This reputation originated during the pre- and immediate post-liberation period, when Red Army political operatives and intelligence agents were very active in all three territories, and the GPD has since maintained strong capabilities, es-

\textsuperscript{27}Cheung (1987a), pp. 242-243.
\textsuperscript{28}The role of the Second Artillery's Strategy Department in producing analysis on nuclear doctrine is discussed above.
\textsuperscript{29}Shambaugh (1987), p. 296.
especially concerning Taiwan. In recent years, CAIFC has been tasked by the GPD to develop broader capabilities within the military analysis community, equal to those of CISS. However, the CPD under CAIFC is definitely still a second-rank player in this larger subarena. It contains few full-time researchers and thus must often employ specialists from other units, including CASS.

The FISS and CAIFC are recent additions to the military actors in the SRAI subarena. They were reportedly formed as part of an overall effort to expand the level of GSD and GPD contacts with foreigners, diversify the type of policy research produced, and generate supplemental income through various profitmaking activities. Regarding the latter, FISS participates in a wide variety of seminars and conducts various types of policy research for different PRC and some foreign “clients.” Although nominally “independent” and “non-governmental,” it is loosely connected to the GSD Second Department.

The above military actors provide analytical assessments, recommendations, and intelligence in a similar manner to their civilian counterparts, i.e., via formal and informal reports, briefings, and working-level organization meetings and leadership discussions. Of course, the vast majority of these activities are intended to support the major ministry-level organs of the defense policy subarena, as well as the leaders and offices of the CMC. The latter is primarily a coordinator and recipient of analysis and intelligence, not a producer. Its Policy Research Office generates some products but has few analysts. Hence, the CMC usually turns to subordinate PLA units for assessments and recommendations, depending on the subject.30

30However, the CMC GO (discussed in more detail below) has conducted significant research and has independently commissioned strategic analysis on a few occasions in the past. Such activities usually generated strong resistance from strategic analysis units within the GSD, however, which regarded the CMC GO’s actions as encroachment on its “turf.” The most notable example of such bureaucratic conflict occurred in the mid 1980s. At that time, the CMC GO under Li Jijun, with support from Yang Shangkun, developed several long-range plans for the modernization and deployment of China’s land forces that aroused the wrath of Xu Xin, then deputy GSD head in charge of strategic analysis. This incident again illustrates the extent to which the authority and influence of policy bodies depend on the personal and political clout of individual leaders.
On the formal level, the Second and Third Departments assist the GSD in preparing an annual year-end analytical report similar to those prepared by China’s civilian institutes. FISS also reportedly submits such a document. These reports are provided to the members of the CMC and, through the CMC, to the PBSC. As in the civilian sphere, other formal analytical reports to these leading organs are also provided on occasion by the Second Department, CISS, various AMS institutes, COSTIND institutes, and the NDU’s ISS, at the initiative of either the senior military leadership or the producing agency. The AMS often organizes and channels the submission of these reports.

Most such formal reports produced by PLA research units are routed through the CMC GO before they can be sent to top leaders in the defense policy, foreign policy, and national strategic objectives subarenas. As with the CC GO in the civilian sphere, the CMC GO evaluates, summarizes, and distributes these reports. Occasionally, individual PLA institutes will submit less formal analytical reports or yaobao directly to the offices of PBSC members, as in the civilian sphere. For example, FISS provides such out-of-channel reports directly to the offices of PBSC members. However, this practice may be less common in the military system as a whole.

Other formal products regularly generated by PLA institutes are intelligence reports to the senior military and party leaderships. The Second Department provides, on a regular basis and on request, both long-range and short-term intelligence reports to the GSD and CMC as well as the MND, the services and military region headquarters, key organs of the military-industrial complex, and unit commanders. Of equal significance, the Second Department also produces a daily report of major military events covering the previous day.

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31 FISS participates in this high-level reporting system because of its informal contacts: Chen Chu (now deceased), formerly the honorary head of FISS, was head of the State Council Foreign Affairs Office before his retirement and served as a foreign policy advisor to the Premier’s Office for many years.

32 A (presumably small) number of formal PLA reports bypass the CMC GO.

33 On the other hand, some interviewees have indicated to the author that military and civilian research units vie with one another to get their views expressed directly to leading organs.
twenty-four hours. This report is circulated to CMC and PB members and heads of the PLA general departments.

Finally, aside from the above support activities aimed at both the defense policy and national security leaderships, the military on occasion provides strategic analysis to civilian leaders within the foreign policy subarena via the State Council OFA and the PLA representative of the FALSG as well as through the activities of major military organizations involved in military-civilian issues such as arms control and disarmament. In addition, military strategists often attend, on an informal basis, various internal discussion meetings and report preparation conferences convened by civilian research institutes and departments under the major organs of the foreign policy subarena. Finally, research meetings and preliminary expert discussions on specific topics (known as wuxu hui) are organized by both military and civilian research units. Such meetings often provide a venue for direct contacts between military and civilian (e.g., MoFA) analysts and officials at the working level. In some instances, military experts are even seconded to civilian institutes, to facilitate policy deliberations and interactions. These activities indicate that a significant amount of interaction occurs between military and civilian strategists. Thus, it would be incorrect to state

35 General Xiong Guangkai is reportedly in charge of preparing this report. In addition, he almost certainly produces additional similar reports for Jiang Zemin on an “as-needed” basis. As noted above, General Xiong is very close to Jiang and doubtless serves the secretary general as a key source of both military intelligence and more general information on the state of the PLA.
36 For example, Liu Huaqiu’s OFA has the authority to request reports on defense-related topics from various military departments and research institutes or even from the CMC. However, some interviewees insist that such requests are rarely made and that OFA’s overall level of interaction with the defense policy community is not terribly great, as suggested above. In the arms control and disarmament area, COSTIND directs, within its China Defense Science and Technology Information Center (CDSTIC), an Arms Control and Disarmament Program which sponsors seminars on arms control and conveys technical information to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and various agencies of the defense policy subarena. See Johnston (1996).
37 For example, some military officers reportedly work in the Fourth Office of MoFA’s International Organizations Department, responsible for multilateral arms control. The author is indebted to Alastair Johnston for this information.
38 According to several interviewees, the greatest level of (and most significant) interaction in the strategic realm occurs between strategists of the GSD Second Depart-
that the military and civilian wings of the SRAI subarena operate entirely separately from one another. This should not be surprising, given the fact that there is a considerable overlap between the types of strategic analysis performed by civilian and military specialists.39

The above suggests that military research, analysis, and intelligence agencies play a critical role in China’s overall national security policy arena, above and beyond their obvious support function for the defense policy subarena. Indeed, military strategic analysis and intelligence are probably provided to a wider spectrum of influential consumers than similar civilian products. Hence, specialist military views on major national security issues probably exert a greater influence over the perceptions of senior leaders in both the foreign policy subarena and the national strategic objectives subarena than is generally assumed. The importance of military analysis and intelligence to China’s leadership could grow significantly in the future, as a function of the broader expansion of the military’s role in foreign and national security policy.

39It should be emphasized, however, that the military does not provide raw intelligence (as opposed to strategic research and analysis) to civilian agencies of the foreign policy subarena.